Disputationes metaphysicae

1. Under this title we can comprehend three things, namely the principle of causing, which is as it were first act, the conditions necessary for so causing, and that causality in second act.

2. As regards the first, it must be said that the principle of causing is nothing other than the entity and nature of the form itself, which causes through itself and its entity, exhibiting (so to speak) its whole self to matter or the composite. For which it does not need another faculty or potency distinct from itself, but through itself is essentially apt for exercising this causality. Whence, just as we were saying above that in matter the principal and the proximate principle of causing are not distinguished, because the receptive potency through which it causes is not its property but itself essentially, so in the form there can be considered as it were a certain potency or aptitude for causing formally, which remains, for example, in the separated soul, even if it does not actually inform, and that aptitude is the proximate principle of causing formally. Yet it is not distinct from the principal, because that aptitude is not a property superadded to the entity of the form, but is its essential notion and specification; for the form is essentially actuating act; but of the essence of such act is aptitude for actuating. Likewise, because from matter and form there comes about one per se because they are not united by the intervention of some property or accident, but immediately through themselves, on account of the proportion and mutual aptitude which they have to each other through their incomplete entities pertaining to the same genus, as is taken from Aristotle, Metaphysics VIII, c. 6, and De Anima II, c. 1, where the Commentator notes it, comm. 7, and other writers on Metaphysics VIII; St. Thomas, Contra Gentiles II, c. 70, and I, q. 76, a. 7; and other theologians, In II, dist. 12, especially Scotus, q. 1, and Durandus, q. 2; therefore, just as in matter no distinct potency is to be feigned which mediates between it and the form, so neither in the form is an aptitude to be thought which is something distinct from the form itself. You will say: how can the form, which in its nature is so distant from matter, be immediately united to it through itself? Which can seem most of all difficult in the rational soul, which is spiritual. I answer, first, that there is not so great a distance that they do not agree in the same genus. Next, that distance does not stand in the way, if there is due proportion; for, as Plato said in the Timaeus, mutual proportion is as it were a bond between things which are proximately and per se united; but this proportion consists in the notion of act and potency and in the natural and essential aptitude and mutual relationship which they have among themselves.

Conditions necessary in order that the form cause

3. Actual existence.—As regards the second, of the conditions necessary for exercising this causality, three conditions seem able to be assigned. The first is the actual existence of the form itself, of which one must judge diversely according to the diverse opinions on the existence of the creature and its distinction from essence. Although in no opinion does existence seem properly to be called a condition necessary for the causality of the form; for, if existence is a thing distinct from essence, it cannot be called a condition of the form for causing, but rather an effect, either in the genus of formal cause, in so far as the form is said to give being, or in the genus of efficient cause, in so far as some say that existence emanates from essence, or, as others will have it, in the genus of material cause, in so far as the form completes the essence, which is the proximate receptacle of existence. But if existence is not distinguished in the thing from actual essence, the existence of the form cannot properly be called a condition necessary for causing; for a required condition, if we speak properly, is distinguished from the very notion of causing; but existence cannot be so distinguished according to that opinion, because the form causes through its actual entity, because it cannot be understood actually to cause except as having its actual entity and outside its causes; therefore as having existence. And this opinion is more to be approved; because, just as the actuality of the form is not a condition distinct from the notion of causing or actuating, so neither is existence, which is intimately included in actuality itself. But whether it is necessary that the existence of the form be previous to its causality, it must be said that it is not necessary that it be previous in the order of duration, because such antecedence is irrelevant; indeed naturally it is not possible, because being is not due to the form until a proximately apt subject postulates it, which being posited, the form, as soon as it is, naturally informs it. Again, neither is it necessary that the existence of the form be so previous in the order of nature that some sign or moment be understood in which it exists and does not inform, because neither is this necessary for priority of nature, nor can it be understood in forms which depend on matter, as is evident from what was said in the preceding section. But antecedence of nature according to some genus of causality can intervene and is necessary; for the causality of the form depends on its entity and existence; whence it is necessary that between the existence and the causality of the form there be an order of nature from which is taken the priority (as they say) from which, not in which. Of which priorities more in what follows.

4. Intimate nearness of the form to matter.—Another necessary condition can be assigned: the presence or intimate nearness of the entity of the form with the entity of matter; which condition is most truly assigned and so necessary that without it, even by the absolute power of God, the form cannot provide its formal effect. For who would understand a substantial form distant in place from the body composing a substance per se one? This composition, then, comes about through intimate union, which is not indeed local presence, but something distinct from it, yet necessarily requires it. Which can be further declared and persuaded from what was said above in a similar case of matter; for as regards this the reason is the same of the form.

5. Dispositions connatural to the form.—A third condition can be assigned: a disposition accommodated on the side of matter, which the form necessarily requires in order that it can confer its formal effect. Which disposition some think is so necessary that even by absolute power the form cannot inform matter lacking every disposition, especially quantity. So Henry, Quodlibet VII, q. 17. Nevertheless, whatever may be the case whether on the side of matter or of quantity it is repugnant that the one be separated from the other, which we cannot treat until the disputation on quantity, nevertheless, if it is once supposed that matter can be preserved by God without quantity, which we judge truer, it will not be repugnant that such matter be preserved by God in that state also informed by substantial form, because there is no so essential connection between the form, as exercising its intrinsic formal effect, and these accidents that it cannot be preserved by God without them. So absolute a necessity, then, does not intervene; but that this condition is necessary in the natural and physical mode experience itself teaches. For hence arises the natural corruption of a thing, through which the form is separated from matter, which begins through the casting off or corruption of the dispositions; therefore it is a sign that dispositions of this kind are at least conditions necessary from the nature of the thing in order that the form inform matter. But whether they are conditions previous to or consequent upon the form in the order of nature is to be sought from what was said in the preceding disputation.

The causality of the form is explained

6. As regards the third, the actual causality of the form itself, what it is is not easy to explain; yet from those things which have been said of matter we can proceed proportionately to declare it. And first of all it seems certain that such causality is something in the nature of things distinct from the nature of the thing from the entity of the form. It is proved, because, just as to act is something in the nature of things, so also to inform, because it is truly really and physically to cause. Again that, whatever it is, is in the thing itself separable from the form; for in the rational soul it is in fact separated and in any substantial form whatever could be separated by the absolute power of God; for it can be preserved outside matter, as quantity has been preserved; for the reason is the same or greater; therefore it is distinguished from the nature of the thing from it.

7. The union of the form to matter is the causality of the form.—A difference to be noted between the causality of the efficient and of the form.—Next it must be said that this causality can be nothing other than the actual union of the form to matter. It is proved, first, from a sufficient enumeration, because it is neither matter, nor form, nor composite; therefore it is the said union; for besides these nothing else can be thought out; and the antecedent as regards all its parts is self-evident. For of the form it has already been proved; and the same reason proves it a fortiori of matter; but the composite is the ultimate effect of this causality, as will be said at once; it is not, therefore, the causation itself. Likewise, the composite includes the entity of matter and of form; but the causality of the form precisely taken cannot include all these. Moreover, the union being posited and any other thing whatever being prescinded, besides those which have been said, the form necessarily exercises its causality; but all the others being posited and the union being taken away, it is impossible that the form exercise its causality; therefore it is a sign that such causality consists in the union. The major is evident, because, if the form is united to matter, it necessarily communicates itself to it through itself, that is, not by effecting another similar thing, but by communicating to it its own perfection and entity and in this way actuating it. And thence too there necessarily arises a composite substantial nature per se one; but in this consists the whole causality of the form and its whole effect, which, the union being taken away, cannot remain, as is self-evident; therefore. Whence in this is to be noted a difference between the union, which we have said is the causality of the form, and action, which we shall say afterwards is the causality of the efficient, that action is so the causality of the agent that the agent, in so far as it is agent, altogether remains outside the effect; because, although through action it communicates itself, yet not by giving itself through itself to the effect, but by conferring on it some similar entity; but the union is so the causality of the form that by means of it it offers itself either to matter or to the composite; for it is an intrinsic cause causing through itself. In which sense it could also be said that the causality of the form embraces in itself the entity of the form, or that this causality is the form itself, not absolutely taken but united. But in this mode of speaking the cause is confused with the causality and the notion of causing as it were in first act with the causation, which is as it were second act; and therefore it is said more formally and more precisely that this causality consists in the union itself.

8. A small doubt.—But a difficulty occurs, for this union happens in a twofold way in diverse substantial forms. For in some it is pure union, that is, without inherence or dependence of the form, as in rational souls; but in others it is union which at the same time is dependence and as it were inherence of the form in matter. The former union, then, cannot be the formal causality of the rational soul, because it is from it effectively; but effective causality is far diverse from formal. The antecedent is evident, because by the very fact that the soul is created by God in a disposed body, at once it itself as it were by a natural impetus unites itself to matter, effecting the union; for, since the soul is naturally inclined to that union and has its proper subject perfectible by it applied, there is no reason why it could not itself as by a natural weight couple itself to the body, as Henry thought, Quodlibet XI, q. 14; and Aureolus, in Capreolus, In IV, dist. 43, q. 2; and Richard there judges it probable, a. 3, q. 2. The latter union likewise cannot be the formal causality with respect to the other forms, because those forms through the union itself are caused by matter and depend on it in their being; therefore the same forms cannot be causes of the same union; therefore the union cannot be the causality of such form; for causality is from that cause whose causality it is, as action is from the agent, and therefore supposes the being of such cause. Nor can it be understood that the same thing or mode is the reason or as it were the way both for the form to be caused and through which the form causes. And it is confirmed, for above, disp. XII, sect. 1, we were saying that the form cannot be the formal cause of generation, because through generation it comes about and is educed from non-being to being; therefore by the same reason it cannot be the cause of the union, and consequently neither can the union be its causality. The consequence is evident, both from parity of reason, and also because generation itself seems to be the same as union, since it has been said that these forms come about and are united by the same action.

9. Whether the rational soul intimately unites itself to the disposed body.—To the former part the answer is that the opinion of Henry which is mentioned there is sufficiently uncertain, as can be seen in Scotus, In IV, dist. 43, q. 3, a. 3; and Capreolus, there, q. 2, a. 3. For perhaps the union of the rational soul and the body comes about either by virtue of the seed and of the dispositions from the generator itself, or, if from this only dispositively, it will come about effectively from God alone, by whom the soul is created. But that it comes about from the soul itself is shown by no sufficient reason; for, although the form by its nature is apt to be united, and therefore is naturally inclined to union, it does not thence follow that it is powerful to unite itself; for these are diverse aptitudes or powers, of which one is not necessarily inferred from the other; as also matter is apt to be united and is in its genus inclined to union, and yet is not powerful to unite itself. For, just as receptive potency and the appetite founded in it are of a diverse notion from active potency and its propensity, so the formal potency (so to speak) or aptitude and the propensity founded in it are of a distinct notion from the active; nor is there any sufficient reason why the latter should be inferred from the former, especially since in all other forms it seems more probable that the union is not effectively from the form. Secondly, even if that opinion is admitted, the consequence is to be denied; for, even if the union to a sufficiently disposed body emanates effectively from the rational soul, it can nevertheless be the formal bond by which the soul is conjoined to matter as act to potency. And nothing is repugnant that the same union be from the soul in a twofold genus of cause, namely effective and formal, or that it be the effect of the soul as efficient and that it be the reason of causing formally the whole composite; for no repugnance is involved in these diverse relationships.

10. The union which is the causality of the form is caused by it and by matter.—Various acceptations of union.—To the latter part the answer is that the same union is caused both by the form and by matter and by the efficient, by each in its genus of cause, because it depends on all of them; and therefore it is not repugnant that the same union, in so far as it is from the form, be as it were the way or reason by means of which the form causes the whole composite; and, in so far as it is from matter, be the reason by means of which the material form depends in its being on matter. For that union is the bond of each, namely of matter and of form, and therefore, when the union is such that it is also inherence, it can at the same time be the way (so to speak) of matter to form and of form to matter. Nor does it matter that the causality of the form must be from the form and therefore must suppose it prior in the order of nature; for, as we touched upon above, this priority is not in which but from which; but it is not repugnant that the same union both be from the form as informing matter and be such a bond of the form with matter that by means of it the form is sustained by matter. And so the same union, in so far as it is from the form, is the medium or reason by means of which the form actuates matter and composes the composite, and in this way is said to be the causality of the form; but, in so far as through it the form adheres to matter and is sustained by it, it is the dependence of the same form on matter. For there is so intrinsic a connection between such a form and the union that they depend on each other mutually by diverse reasons. To the confirmation the answer is that union is sometimes taken for the action, which to take away equivocation is wont to be called uniting; but sometimes and more properly it is taken for the very mode of union or inherence permanent in completed being between matter and form; and sometimes it is taken also for the consequent relation, as is noted more fully on III, q. 2, a. 8. When, therefore, we say that union is the causality of the form, the discussion is not of the relation, as is self-evident; for this, if it is taken as something distinct from the others, is either nothing or something posterior. Nor yet is the discussion of the action, of which the said confirmation proceeds; for we confess that the form, especially that which is educed from the potency of matter, is not properly the formal cause of that action through which it is educed, as we showed in the cited place, because it is its term, whence that action is in some way actively compared to the form itself, and therefore cannot truly and properly be caused by the form itself. We are speaking, then, of the mode of union, of which the reason is far diverse, because it is not compared actively to the form, but is as it were the formal bond between it and matter, and therefore can have dependence on each, as has been declared.

11. Here a difficulty at once occurred, why this mode of union is attributed to the form rather than to matter. But this has been satisfied in Disp. XIII, sect. 6 [recte 9]. Nor does anything occur to be added here.