Disputationes metaphysicae

1. This difficulty arises from the foregoing and conduces to explaining them more fully. For, since it has been said that eduction is an action by which the form so comes about in matter dependently on it that through that action matter itself does not come about, thence it seems to follow that through such an action the form alone comes about per se primarily, which is repugnant to Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, texts 26 and 27, and Book VIII, text 4. The sequel is evident, because through that action the form alone according to its whole self is educed from non-being to being, but the whole does not come about except in so far as it coalesces from parts already made; therefore the form is that which comes about, and both prior and more properly. Prior indeed, because, in order that the whole be composed of parts, it is necessary that the parts be supposed having being. But more properly, because that which according to its entity is educed from non-being to being comes about more properly than that which is only composed of things already existing.

2. In this matter the former opinion admits, what the reason made seems to prove, that the form properly and per se comes about; so it is taken from Albert, De Anima II, tract. I, cc. 1 and 3, where he says that among these three, matter, form and composite, the form is properly and primarily being, which Zimara also defends at length, theorem 20. Others distinguish two actions, even in the effecting of material forms: one by which the form comes about, another by which it is united; and of the former they concede that it is terminated per se primarily at the form, although the latter is terminated primarily at the composite. This opinion is taken from Durandus, In II, dist. 1, q. 4, ad ultimum.

Resolution of the question

3. Each opinion, however, is false. And of this latter indeed we shall speak at length below, explaining the various modes of causing of the efficient cause. Now let the reason suffice against it which can easily be gathered from what has been said hitherto; for material forms (for of these alone is the discussion) are not even as regards their entity without the material concurrence of the subject; but the subject does not flow into the form except in so far as it is united to it, as is evident from what was said above of the material cause; therefore such a form cannot come about through any action which is not unitive of the form to the subject; therefore two actions cannot be distinguished there according to the thing, but only according to reason or inadequate concepts, or at most according to parts which are essentially conjoined among themselves, as we shall declare in the said place.

4. The twofold term of action.—But the former opinion is truly repugnant to Aristotle in the places cited, whom the Commentator follows in the same places and Metaphysics XII, comms. 12 and 18, and St. Thomas, in the same places, and I, q. 45, aa. 4 and 8, where in the solution ad 1 he adds that forms do not come about per se but only per accidens, which is to be understood in a sound way, using the word per accidens broadly as it is the same as with another; but more properly this form is said to be co-generated, as the same St. Thomas signifies in that a. 4, and q. 65, a. 4. The same is expressly held by Scotus, Metaphysics VII, q. 10; Antonius Andreae, q. 9; Zimara, theorem 100; Soncinas, Metaphysics VII, q. 23. But the reason is that becoming per se primarily belongs to that to which being belongs, since becoming tends to being; but that properly is which subsists, therefore that properly comes about; but these forms do not subsist, but the composites of them; therefore the action is terminated properly and principally at the composites. It is confirmed, for the action is one, as we suppose; therefore the adequate term too is one; but this cannot be the form, because the composite truly comes about and is not the form; therefore. But for the sake of greater clarity a twofold term is wont to be distinguished, namely as which and as by which, or that which absolutely comes about or by which another comes about. The composite, then, is the term which or as which, because that per se primarily comes about; for that is most of all intended through generation and at it generation is ultimately terminated, and by a like case it is evident in artificial things; for the house is that which per se primarily is built, etc. But the term by which is the form, because it comes about in order that through it the composite be constituted. Whence, because the verb to be educed properly indicates only a relationship to this term by which, therefore the form is properly and simply said to be educed from the potency of matter, but not the composite; but the verb to be generated or to come about expresses a principal relationship to that which is or which comes about, and therefore is said simply of the form and not of the matter.

5. To the argument to the contrary the answer is by denying the sequel, because, speaking of the order of time, the form does not come about before the composite, nor conversely. But speaking of the order of nature, the composite not only comes about first but also absolutely it alone comes about through this action; but the form only co-comes-about. And although we grant that in some genus of cause the form is educed prior in nature as it were in the order of execution, nevertheless absolutely the action is not understood terminated nor that made which is per se primarily intended until it is the whole composite. Nor does it matter that some part of the composite is supposed and not of the form; for it is necessary to distinguish four genera of actions; for one is an action only productive and not unitive, and this is always terminated at a simple thing, and therefore of itself it can be terminated at a partial entity, if it is apt by nature to be produced in this way; and such is the creation of the rational soul, and the same holds of the creation of prime matter, as I think. Another is an action only unitive and not productive of the components, as is the generation of man, and this without controversy is terminated only at the composite as which and at the union as by which. Again, there is another action so productive of some composite that it is at the same time unitive and co-productive of all the components; and of this kind is the creation of the heaven, which it is evident is terminated per se primarily at the composite, but concomitantly at matter and form. Another finally is an action at the same time unitive and co-productive of one component part on the presupposition of the other; and of this kind is the eductive action of which we are now treating, and therefore it is not of its notion that its adequate term so come about anew that no part of it is presupposed to be.

6. And hence it is gathered in passing that this opinion is true not only in substantial but also in accidental forms, even if Scotus above, Antonius Andreae and others indicate the opposite, because from accident and subject there comes about one per accidens, which does not seem able to come about through per se action and causality. But the proposed opinion is true, for Aristotle speaks universally and most of all adduces examples in accidents. And finally in text 32 he teaches this expressly and in particular of accidental forms. For (as he says in the same place) the reason is the same, because much more do accidents not come about per se, but as united to subjects and from them. Nor does it matter that they are beings per accidens, for they have real and true and physical composition, which that action per se includes; and therefore through it the accidental composite comes about per se primarily, for the action itself too is accidental.