Disputationes metaphysicae

1. This difficulty arises from the preceding resolution, and its knowledge is necessary for comprehending more fully the origin or eduction of a form of this kind. And the difficulty is best explained in the forms of the elements, under which this matter of generable things was created when it was first produced, of which it is asked whether they were educed from the potency of matter. For to some it seems that the judgement is the same of these forms and of the heavenly forms, because the elements too were not then generated but created; therefore their forms were not educed but concreated. Likewise, because matter was never in potency to those forms, because it was always actually under them; therefore they were not educed, because, as we were saying, eduction from the propriety of the word expresses a relationship to a subject which was before in potency. Likewise, in that beginning by the same action by which the earth was created its matter and form were concreated together; therefore there there is not eduction. Thirdly, when an angel or a soul is created, its powers are not educed from the capacity of the subject, because they are concreated; therefore much less will substantial forms be said to be educed, which are concreated with any matter whatever. Fourthly, when an angel is created, subsistence or personality is not educed from the potency of the nature, although it is concreated; therefore similarly, etc. And so by these reasons it seems to be concluded that for eduction it is necessary that matter precede the form in time.

2. But from elsewhere the reason seems to be very unlike of the forms of the elements and of the heavenly bodies; for the latter are such that by their nature they postulate to come about by the same action by which the matter comes about, but the former not at all, but rather suppose matter created by a proper and distinct action, and by another are induced into it, even in their first condition; therefore that action by which the form is induced can only be true eduction. The antecedent is proved, for that action by which the elemental matter was created is such that until now the same perseveres in preserving matter itself; but the action terminated at the form or composite ceased when that composite was corrupted; therefore it is a sign that those actions are diverse from the nature of the thing. Nor can it be said that those were partial actions composing one; otherwise it would have to be said that even now one action is composed of the conservation of matter and the eduction of form or generation. For, if it was one composite action by which this part of earth was created, and afterwards this earth is corrupted and converted into grass, the action ceases as regards that part through which the form of earth is preserved in that matter, and in its place another succeeds, by which¹ the form of grass is induced into the same matter; but the action terminated at the entity of matter always remains the same; therefore, if that of itself is partial and composes one complete action with the action inductive or conservative of the first form, by the same reason it composes one action with that through which the second form is induced which succeeds to the prior. The consequence is proved, because the reason, proportion, conjunction and aptitude between these actions is altogether the same as between those; and also because otherwise that conservative action of matter would be of itself partial and apt to compose one total action, and yet now it would perpetually remain incomplete and without due composition. The consequent too seems plainly false, because the action by which matter comes about is true creation, and the same persevering is that by which it is preserved; but from creation and generation one action is not composed; they are, therefore, two actions and not two parts of the same action; therefore also in the first condition of things these actions distinct among themselves intervened, although conjoined in time. According to this discourse, then, it is plainly concluded that for true eduction it is not necessary that matter precede in time; for of those two actions that which is posterior in nature has the true notion of eduction; for it depends essentially on matter, which through it does not come about, but is supposed created. And it is confirmed, for, if we feign that God produced that matter first formless and after some time induced the form into it, no one would deny that it was true eduction; but, although this posterior action is conjoined in the same instant with the prior, it is of the same notion; therefore it is true eduction.

3. You will say: by a similar argument it would be proved that the form of the heaven is educed from the potency of matter, because, if God had first in time created that matter without form and afterwards induced the form into it, then he would educe it from the potency of matter. The answer is by denying the sequel, and to the proof the assumption is denied, because even then the heaven could not be said to have been made through generation, and consequently neither its form made through eduction, because that action from its nature does not suppose matter made; but that in that miraculous case it supposes it is per accidens and does not change the nature of the action. And perhaps that action by which matter would come about or be preserved without form or under another distinct form would not be of the same notion with that by which it comes about under its proper form. And therefore in the said case, when the form of the heaven were induced into pre-existing matter, the prior action by which it was preserved bare would cease, and there would begin a new action by which thenceforth the whole heaven would receive being, which in the thing would be true and total creation, although perhaps it would not be so named on account of the pre-existing matter. But if anyone contends (which is probable) that God preserves that matter by the same action by which before he preserved it, and induces the form of the heaven by another total action altogether distinct, in that case (if it is possible) we shall confess that that posterior action is the eduction of the form of the heaven, and consequently that the heaven is generable in a miraculous and extraordinary way; we deny, however, that the form of the heaven from its nature comes about through such an action, as the form of an element comes about; but the heaven now has been made in a mode proportioned to its nature, and therefore there is not a similar consequence. But that difference between the heaven and the element we gather from the incorruptibility of the one and the corruptibility of the other; for when matter and form are inseparable by their nature, they postulate to come about through one action of itself indivisible, either altogether or at least from the nature of the thing. But when matter of itself is separable from any form whatever divisively, under the same matter the actions inductive of forms can be varied, and therefore the action through which such matter comes about and is preserved is distinct and by its nature presupposed to any action inductive of form whatever.

4. An instance is satisfied.—But someone will say again: granted that these are true, nevertheless the first form concreated with this inferior matter cannot be said to be educed from the potency of matter, because that matter did not precede in time as existing in potency to such form; for it is not enough that it precede in the order of nature; for the matter of the heaven too precedes its form in the order of nature in the genus of material cause. Indeed some add that for the eduction of form it is necessary that dispositions too precede in matter, which cannot be said in the creation of the elements. But this about dispositions seems irrelevant; for remote dispositions are wont to precede in time as it were per accidens on account of the inefficacy of the agent; but if God in one instant transmutes water into wine, those dispositions do not precede in time, and nevertheless that is true generation and true eduction. But the ultimate disposition never precedes in time the introduction of the form; but in the way in which in natural generation it precedes in the order of nature, it preceded also in the first creation of the elements. For in truth that union of form with matter which was then made was made with the same dependence on the ultimate disposition which it now has in any element whatever; therefore with the same causality on the side of the disposition; therefore with the same order of nature, for this is taken from causality. But of prime matter itself this is what we contend, namely that, in order that the form be educed from its potency, it does not seem necessary that matter precede in the order of time under privation, but that it is enough that it precede in the order of nature; in which way it is evident that the creation of the matter of the elements was prior to the induction of the form; for those were two actions, as we have declared, so subordinated that the induction of the form essentially supposes the creation of matter, on which it depends as on an altogether necessary cause.

5. The difference between the matter of the heaven and elemental matter as regards concurrence to the effecting of their forms.—But that this antecedence suffices can be confirmed in many ways. First a priori from what has been said; for that suffices that that induction of the form is an action of the same notion with that which would be posterior in duration, if God first created matter without form and afterwards informed it. For interruption of time alone does not suffice to vary actions essentially; therefore the same antecedence of nature suffices for the eduction of the form. Secondly, from a similar case, because, if in the same instant in which air is created it is illuminated by the sun, that light is educed from the potency of the air; for I suppose that other illuminations come about through eduction, which I shall show below; but the air then would only precede in the order of nature the introduction of the light, as is evident; therefore. The major is evident, because that illumination is a proper and per se action distinct from creation. Thirdly, from the difference between the matter of the heaven and the matter of the element as regards antecedence to form; for there is a twofold difference to be noted, and which pertains most of all to the matter. The former is that the matter of the heaven even in the order of nature does not simply precede the introduction of its proper form, because it has a necessary connection with it, so that without it it cannot be created in a connatural mode; but the matter of fire simply precedes in the order of nature, because it does not have an intrinsic connection with the form of fire, but could be created under others. The latter difference, which declares the preceding, is that the matter of fire is so prior that by virtue of the action through which it is created it could be under the privation of the form of fire. And in this way not only matter, but matter as in potency, is said to be prior in nature, not because in the thing it first has privation annexed, but because by virtue of the action through which it is created it does not lack privation, but another action is necessary by which it is informed, which can have the true notion of eduction; but the matter of the heaven is informed by the same action by which it is created, and, although according to its proper notion of causing it is said to be prior in nature, nevertheless, as existing in potency and in some way under privation, it is in no way said to be prior in nature, and therefore it does not have that priority of nature which is necessary for the eduction of the form. Wherefore I judge it most probable that the reason is far unlike of the first information of the matter of generable things and of heavenly things.

Resolution of the question

6. In this matter I judge it true first of all that in the creation of a corruptible thing, whether an element or any other, those two actions declared above intervene. Which Henry indicated, Quodlibet I, q. 10, citing Augustine, Confessions XIII, c. 33, saying that matter was made from altogether nothing, but the species of the world from formless matter, although there Augustine speaks indifferently of the heavens and the elements. Nor is there reason why this should seem wonderful, since in the conservation of fire or of another similar thing two actions intervene, as that reason sufficiently declares, that, one ceasing, the other perseveres. But according to the doctrine of St. Thomas conservation, speaking per se, is the same action with production; therefore. Indeed in the conservation of man three actions intervene, namely the conservation of matter, and the conservation of the soul, and the conservation of the union or of the whole, which it is rightly gathered are distinct from this, that, this ceasing, the other two remain; and thence too the argument is rightly made that the same three actions intervene in the production of man; therefore the same proportionally holds in others.

7. Next I judge it also true that that action through which the matter of generable things is informed in the first instant of its creation is of the same notion with the action by which it would be informed by the same agent God even if the creation of matter had preceded in time. That reason persuades this, that the interval or concomitance of time matters nothing to varying actions essentially. Likewise, because those actions agree in the formal or total term and in the principles or causes on which they depend; therefore there is no reason for distinguishing them essentially. From which it is further concluded that that action by which this matter is informed, even in the first instant in which it is created, is not creation, speaking in rigour and considering that action precisely. It is proved, because, if that action came about at a posterior time, it would not be creation according to the opinion of all; therefore neither when made then, because it is of the same notion. And the reason a priori is that that action is from matter presupposed in the order of nature. Nor does it stand in the way that the earth is absolutely said to have been created in the beginning, both because shrubs and animals too are said to have been created, although it is certain that the forms of these things were not introduced through rigorous creation; and also because the earth is said to have been created not on account of that union precisely taken, but as conjoined with the action by which the matter of the earth was created; for, because those two actions were made at the same time and after the manner of one, from them the earth is said to have been created. Whence, although by the same word it is said, God created heaven and earth, it is not necessary that the mode of creation or of action which intervenes in the production of each be the same, except as regards that which is common to each, namely to come about from nothing; but as regards the rest each is created according to the mode and capacity of its nature.

8. And hence finally I draw that the question remains only about the name whether the eduction of form from matter has place even if matter does not precede in duration but in nature only, or (what is the same) whether that first effecting of the form of earth is to be called eduction from the potency of matter; for, if by the name of eduction there is signified only the positive notion of that action through which the form comes about dependently in becoming and being on matter which through that action is not created but is supposed created, in truth that is eduction, as the discourse made shows. But if by the name of eduction, besides the said positive and real notion, a negation or extrinsic denomination is connoted, namely that with that action the subject itself is not produced at the same time, even if it is created through another action, in this way that cannot be called eduction, as is self-evident, but is called concreation in a sense to be declared at once. And the name of eduction seems indeed to be taken more frequently in this latter signification, and therefore one must speak so with many, although one must understand and explain the thing itself with few. And according to this form of speaking the reasons made for the former opinion are easily reconciled and conceded; yet, lest they seem to proceed against the thing declared by us, it will be necessary to touch upon their solutions.

Solutions of the arguments

9. And the first indeed, which is taken from the heavenly forms, has already been dispatched, and the difference constituted between incorruptible and corruptible bodies. But the second, which is taken from the propriety of the word to educe, is also admitted by us if it looks only to the mode of speaking and to extrinsic connotation; but if to the thing and positive action, then we deny that it is of the notion of eduction that the subject precede first in time; for priority of nature suffices, as it has been declared by us. The third reason relied on the name of concreation, in which it is to be observed that something is said to be concreated with another in two ways: in one way, because by the same action by which something is created it itself comes about, in which way the matter and form of the heaven are concreated with the heaven, and when the form is so concreated it is not educed, as was declared in the form of the heaven. In another way that is said to be concreated which comes about at the same time with the thing which is created, although it does not come about by the same action, as grace is said to be concreated with the angels, and in this way too the form of earth is said to be concreated with matter, and what is so concreated can come about through an action which in the thing is of the same notion with eduction, although on account of the concomitance of the creation of the subject it is not called by that name. And hence too the solution is evident to the fourth reason, which was taken from the concreation of the powers in the substance of the soul or of the angel. But in that last reason a special difficulty is sought, which could have been treated here in the fourth place, of the eduction of the accidental form from the potency of the subject; yet, because we are going to institute the following disputation on the accidental form, we shall explain this difficulty more conveniently there.

10. Whether substantial modes are educed from the potency of matter.—But the fifth reason seeks another difficulty about substantial modes, namely whether they are to be said to be educed from the potency of the subject, as, for example, subsistence from the potency or capacity of the nature which it terminates; and the same holds of the mode of union of the form with respect to the potency of the form itself or of the subject; indeed even of substantial generation itself it can be asked whether it is educed from the potency of matter. Of all which it must briefly be said that in them there is a certain mode or participation of eduction, yet it does not belong to them so properly as to the substantial form; for subsistence does not come about through a proper action, and moreover does not properly inform, and consequently is not compared to the nature as to a subject and proper material cause, wherefore on this side it is not properly said to be educed; but in this it imitates eduction, that in its being and becoming, whatever that is, it altogether depends on the nature which it per se terminates and in its way actuates, as we shall declare more fully below in treating of subsistence. Substantial generation likewise does not so much come about as it is the way through which substance comes about; whence it is not so much educed as it is eduction itself; yet in the way in which generation itself comes about while through it the term comes about, it too is educed from the potency of matter, by which it is materially caused, as was said above, and on which it essentially depends in becoming and in being, which two in generation are the same. Finally the judgement is the same of the union of form with matter, which nevertheless is not per se educed, but the form is educed as united to matter, and so also (so to speak) the union itself is co-educed. Which indeed seems rightly said in material forms.

11. Whether the union of the rational soul is educed from the potency of matter or of the soul itself.—But in the rational soul it has a peculiar difficulty, because on the one side that union seems to be educed, because it comes about per se through a proper action distinct from that by which the form comes about; but I say that the union comes about per se as the formal term, for the adequate one is man; but that is enough for proper eduction, because, as we shall say at once, a form is never per se the term of action except formal and as that by which; that union, therefore, of the soul to the body is properly and per se educed. Likewise, it depends essentially in becoming and in being on the body as on a material cause; therefore it is properly educed. But on the contrary is the fact that that union is a certain spiritual mode; therefore it cannot be educed from the potency of matter more than the soul itself. The consequence is evident, because it is repugnant that a spiritual thing be contained in the potency of matter. But the antecedent is evident, because that mode proximately affects the soul itself, which it unites to matter; it is therefore proportioned and consequently spiritual, as the soul itself is. And it is confirmed, because, if the form is not contained in the potency of matter, neither can the union be contained, because the union is nothing but a mode of the form; therefore, if the form is not educed, neither can the union be educed. To this it must be said that this mode of union is as it were a certain medium or bond between form and matter, and therefore attains and in some way affects each, and therefore depends on each in becoming and in being. Whence it comes about that this mode of the rational soul, although in its entity it is spiritual, nevertheless participates the conditions of a material thing, because it both altogether depends on matter and in its way is co-extended, although on the side of the soul it does not have extension. For this cause, then, that mode can be educed from the potency of matter, although not adequately nor primarily from that alone; for it is educed also from the potency of the soul itself, which it per se primarily affects and unites to matter.