Disputationes metaphysicae

1. The reason of the difficulty.—The reason for doubting was touched upon in the preceding section; for the substantial form is a thing distinct from matter; either, then, that thing is something before generation, or nothing; if it is something, then it is a substantial form before it comes about; for that thing is indivisible and essentially is a substantial form; that thing, therefore, cannot be something before generation without being a substantial form; but this is impossible, both because otherwise there would be no substantial generation, and also because otherwise repugnant forms would be in matter at the same time. But if the other part is chosen, namely that the form before generation is nothing, it follows that the form comes about from nothing, which is repugnant to the axiom of the philosophers: From nothing nothing comes. Nor does he satisfy who answers that the form does not come about, but the composite; and the composite comes about from matter, and therefore there is nothing which comes about from nothing; this (I say) does not satisfy, because it consists more in words and in the mode of speaking than in the thing, for the form truly before was not and afterwards is; therefore it has been made. Likewise, because the composite does not come about except in so far as it is composed of matter and form; but it is not composed except of beings made. Likewise, because, when the whole is corrupted, the form truly ceases to be and passes into nothing; for what before was something afterwards is nothing; therefore, when the whole begins to be, the form too comes about.

2. The view of the ancient philosophers is rejected.—On account of this difficulty the ancient philosophers denied substantial forms and thought that all things come about through the change of accidents alone. Whose opinion has already been disproved from the demonstration of substantial form and of generation and corruption; but now we add that they did not solve the difficulty by denying substantial forms unless they also deny accidental ones which truly and really come about anew, and consequently say that there is no change in things except perhaps local, but that things seem to be transmuted because those which appeared are hidden and those which were hidden appear, which, how absurd it is, is clear. The assumption is evident, because the same difficulty can be objected of the accidental form; for that form too, when it is, has its reality and entity. Either, then, before it comes about it was something, or nothing. If something, then it does not come about; if nothing, then it comes about from nothing. Whence Anaxagoras, as we saw above, conceded that all the forms of things are actually in the atoms, from whose various concourse he composed all things; but that view has been sufficiently refuted above.

The first opinion is proposed and explained in various ways

3. Albert the Great is extricated from this opinion.—The ancient philosophers, then, being omitted, among the later ones there are various opinions on this matter. The first is that all forms are actually in matter, not indeed integral and perfect, because they see that this takes away true generation and corruption of things and involves a manifest repugnance, since the forms themselves fight among themselves, and since the reason is the same of accidental ones, which are sometimes properly contrary. But they say that the forms are actually in matter according to certain inchoations of them. This opinion Soto, Physics I, q. 7, attributes to Albert, in the same place, tract. III, c. 3; but Soncinas, Metaphysics VII, q. 28, denies that Albert is of this opinion. And in truth Albert only says that in matter, which is the subject of forms, there is a confused habit of the same forms; but this habit he declares to be nothing else than the habitual potency by which matter encloses forms in itself; but he indicates that that confused habit is something distinct from the nature of matter, by reason of which the form is said to pre-exist in matter: Nor do I intend (he says) to say that part of the form is from within and part from without, but the whole is from within and the whole is from without. Which declaring, he indicates that the form is from within, that is, pre-exists in matter according to the being of essence, and therefore he says that the agent does not act to produce the essence of the form, but its being; and in this sense he had said that the whole form is from without, that is, comes about from the efficient as regards the being of existence. All which, although they are said most obscurely, can be drawn to a right sense if by the being of essence we understand only being in potency, which does not come about from the natural agent, but is supposed in matter. Whence the same Albert, Metaphysics V, tract. II, c. 12, says that the whole form is from within according to potential being and from without according to actual being; in Physics VIII too, c. 4, he calls the potency to form the inchoation of the form. Rightly, therefore, by that confused habit we understand the very potentiality of matter, which Albert himself calls habitual power. He only seems to distinguish the potency of matter from matter, which pertains to another question treated above, and could sufficiently probably be expounded of a distinction of reason and not of thing; for in the same place he distinguishes in the same way in the genus the nature of the genus from the power by which it contains the differences.

4. Another opinion is reported by Durandus, In II, dist. 18, q. 2, which posited in matter certain possibilities of forms, which do not remain when the forms are produced, but are converted into them; and so it saved that forms do not come about from nothing, but from those possibilities. But Durandus does not report any author of this opinion, and therefore we cannot certainly affirm its sense; yet it can scarcely be believed that those authors understood by that possibility some true thing distinct from matter and form, but only the possible essence of the form, which others call in objective potency; although, if this opinion wished only this, it brought forward nothing peculiar by which it would explain that the form is not created; for even things which are created come about from such possibility. Finally Soto reports another opinion of Aureolus, In II, dist. 18, that the form pre-exists in matter according to a part, from which it is perfected through the action of the agent, and therefore does not come about from nothing; but neither does Capreolus report that opinion from Aureolus, nor could I find it in any other author.

5. In whatever sense, then, it is asserted that there precedes in matter some thing distinct from matter itself in order that from it the form may be produced, it is improbable and serves nothing for unravelling the difficulty in which we are occupied. The first is evident, because it cannot be understood what or of what kind that entity is, because either it is substance or accident; this latter is not said by those authors, nor can it be said, both because an accident is not an intrinsic inchoation of the substantial form, but at most can be a disposition; and also because on account of a pre-existing accident it is not avoided that the whole reality of the form come about from nothing of itself, because the accident is not anything of the form itself. But if the second is said, it will be asked again whether that substance is matter, or form, or composite; it cannot be the composite, as is self-evident; not matter, because it is supposed to be a thing distinct from it; nor form, because this begins to be through generation. It will perhaps be said that it is the form in imperfect being. But against this one urges further, supposing that the discussion is of actual being, by which a thing is a true actual entity outside its causes; for it would be very frivolous to speak only of possible being, because according to that being there is not posited in matter some true thing distinct from it which is outside nothing and is form in imperfect being.

6. Speaking, then, of such a thing having true actual being, although imperfect, I ask how from that thing the form in perfect being comes about, whether through intension or through the transmutation of one into another. Nor besides these modes can another be thought out; for in the former mode the prior entity, which was imperfect, remains, the imperfection being removed by something which is superadded to it; but in the latter mode that imperfect entity is taken away and the perfect succeeds to it, whether through the conversion of one into the other or by whatever other reason; the two modes, therefore, include an immediate contradiction; whence another cannot be thought out which is not reduced to one of them. But the first mode has no likelihood. First, because the substantial form is not intensible and remissible, as I shall show below. Secondly, because otherwise all the substantial forms which can be educed from matter would pre-exist actually in it, in a remiss degree indeed, yet according to some true and actual entity, and so there would be at the same time in matter infinite actual entities, for forms can be multiplied to infinity. But this is plainly absurd, both on account of the infinity of entities, and also because matter of itself does not have such forms congenital as it were emanating from its proper entity; nor is there any agent by which they were made; nor are they due to matter itself, so that we might feign that God infused or concreated them. Thirdly, because, even those imperfect entities being posited, the same difficulty remains, how that degree or part of entity comes about which is added to the preceding, because it altogether begins to be, since before it was nothing; for in forms which are intensified the second degree does not properly come about from the first, except perhaps as from the term from which; in which way the posterior degree rather comes about from the remission or limitation of the prior, which is the privation of the further degree, than from the positive entity itself of the prior degree; therefore that one degree is supposed does not take away that the second before is nothing until through the action of the agent it receives being; therefore of that degree the same difficulty remains, how it does not come about from nothing. Finally, according to that opinion true substantial generation and corruption is taken away, because there will only be a certain intension or remission of forms.

7. Nor are reasons equally efficacious lacking against the latter mode; for first it follows from it that infinite entities are supposed in matter; for it cannot be feigned that one and the same is the inchoation of all forms; for, if, when one form comes about, its inchoation is taken away and destroyed, the others remaining, and so in all it can happen in turn and mutually, it is necessary that all those entities be distinct among themselves. Secondly, because, if the perfect form comes about from the inchoate through transmutation or conversion, then the one only comes about from the other as from the term from which; therefore the whole entity of the form comes about, which before was nothing in act; for on account of the pre-existing inchoation it cannot be said to have pre-existed in act, since they are distinct things, of which one perishes when the other begins; therefore that imperfect entity is irrelevant to the form's not coming about from nothing; for that inchoation too is not something, that is, some part or some degree of that form which comes about. But if a relationship to a positive term from which is necessary or suffices in order that a thing not come about from nothing, for this too that inchoation is not necessary, because the contrary or repugnant form suffices, which is always expelled when another is introduced, because the generation of one is the corruption of another. Thirdly, it can be asked whether that imperfect entity which is cast off and the perfect form which is introduced are of the same essential species or distinct. For, if they are distinct, then each is perfect in its species; and if one casts off the other, they will be repugnant among themselves; therefore to posit those inchoations is nothing other than to multiply forms in matter without utility; for in order that one form come about from a repugnant term, one contrary or incompossible form suffices, which is always supposed. But if those entities are of the same species, no reason can be given why one casts off the other or why one comes about in a subject in which another actually pre-existed.

8. What difference Aristotle posited between the matters of diverse artefacts.—But you will object Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, text 21, saying that in matter there is some part of the thing to be made, and constituting in this the difference between artificial and natural things, that in artificial things only matter apt to obey the artificer is supposed, but in natural things there is in matter something of the form to be introduced. And it is confirmed, because otherwise the generation of a complete substance would not be more natural than the effecting of an artificial thing in its matter. The answer is that Aristotle calls the very aptitude of matter to form a part of the thing to be effected. So St. Thomas and Alexander of Hales expound, and it could be understood of a part not of the form itself but of the whole composite. But the proper sense is that Aristotle does not call matter itself the part, but some active power which is sometimes conjoined to matter and cooperates in the generation or effecting of the thing. For Aristotle there doubts why the things which come about by art sometimes come about also by chance and without art, as health, but sometimes it does not happen that they come about without art, as a house; and he answers that the reason is that sometimes in the matter from which or about which art operates there precedes some part which can be a principle of moving or operating about that matter, as in health animal heat precedes, which it happens can be excited or helped from elsewhere besides art, and so without it and by a certain chance effect health. But sometimes in the matter of art there is no active part, as in stones and timbers, and therefore a house cannot be effected from them without art. Aristotle, then, does not speak of the inchoation of forms, as St. Thomas and Scotus rightly noted, but of the power which is sometimes in matter for beginning action. And this exposition too the Commentator and Alexander of Aphrodisias handed down. Whence it is false and altogether beside the letter of Aristotle that there a difference is constituted between artificial and natural things; for it is only constituted among artificial things themselves, and rather, text 31, Aristotle indicates that the same happens in natural things, as St. Thomas noted; for sometimes the patient from which a natural thing is generated is in passive potency alone, and then nothing can be generated from it except by an extrinsic natural agent; but sometimes it has adjoined an active seminal power, which is as it were a part of it, as is evident in seed or in a grain of wheat, and then it happens that the effect comes about without another extrinsic agent. To the confirmation the answer is that generation is natural on the side of natural passive potency, and consequently also on the side of the natural active potency which corresponds to the passive; but to artificial things as such there is not so much natural passive potency as obediential, to which there corresponds not natural active potency, but rational or ideal, which we shall declare a little below.

Not all substantial forms are created

9. Plato and Avicenna are vindicated from error.—The second opinion was of others who, overcome by the difficulty touched upon, said that all substantial forms come about through creation. Which opinion Albert reports, In II, dist. 18, a. 12, and some attribute it to Plato in the Phaedo, because he said that forms are induced into matter by separated ideas, and to Avicenna, Sufficientia I, c. 10, and Metaphysics IX, c. 4, who said that the same forms are induced by a separated intelligence, which he said was the tenth after the nine which preside over the nine heavenly bodies, and presides over the sublunary world. But these two philosophers, although perhaps they erred about the effective principle of substantial forms (of which we are going to speak afterwards about the efficient cause), nevertheless it is not established that they erred about the mode of effecting these forms; nor does Aristotle attack Plato on this title, but because he introduced separated ideas without cause, since things of this kind can be generated by things similar to themselves. Which reason urges more against Avicenna; for Plato perhaps did not posit ideas outside the divine mind, and said that forms are induced by them as by a universal principle, which does not exclude proximate agents; but Avicenna indeed erred in attributing to the superior intelligences the creation of the inferior ones, and to the lowest the introduction of substantial forms; yet it is not established that he said that all inferior forms come about through creation. Whence Soncinas, Metaphysics VII, q. 29, judges that his opinion can probably be defended; of which we shall speak in the cited place on the efficient cause, and again below in treating of created intelligences. But whosever that opinion was, understood universally it is improbable; for of the rational soul it is true and Catholic, but of the others it is false, because otherwise all substantial forms would be subsisting and independent of matter in becoming, and consequently also in being, which is most absurd; otherwise all the souls of brutes would be immortal. The sequel is evident, because creation both is of subsisting things and does not depend on a material cause, as we shall say below. Secondly, the reason indicated above urges against this opinion, because, if substantial forms are created on account of the said cause, it is necessary that accidental ones too be created, because the accidental form too comes about from nothing of itself and does not actually pre-exist in the subject, neither according to its whole self nor according to a part. But if this is conceded, it further follows that, just as the introduction of substantial forms on that account is not from natural agents, so neither is the effecting of accidental ones. And so it finally follows that natural agents act nothing at all, which we shall show below is most absurd.

Resolution of the question

10. The first assertion, about the rational soul.—The true and Peripatetic opinion, then, is that among substantial forms some are spiritual and substantial and independent of matter, although they truly inform it; but others are material and so inhering in matter that they depend on it in being and becoming. Of the former order are human souls alone (for we are treating only of informing forms), and of them the consequent inferred in the difficulty touched upon is to be conceded, namely that they come about from nothing through true creation, which is to be shown more fully in its proper place; now let it suffice to say that this necessarily follows from the principle posited, supposing that these souls do not pre-exist before they are united to bodies, which is certain from faith and from that principle that they are true forms of the body. Indeed, even if they pre-existed, they could not exist except through creation, because they are not beings necessary of themselves and having being from their quiddity, as we shall demonstrate universally below, partly in the disputation on the efficient cause, partly in demonstrating that there is only one uncreated being. But if the rational soul does not have being except through the efficiency of another, and is feigned to be before the body, in a certain way it is clearer and more evident that it has being through creation, because it has been made from nothing and without the concurrence of a subject or material cause. But I say in a certain way clearer, because now, while the disposition of the body is awaited in order that the soul come about, it can seem not to be so proper a creation, because it comes about with some concurrence of matter. Nevertheless it is true creation, because on the side of the body there is no concurrence per se and in the genus of material cause into the very being or becoming of the rational soul, but it is as it were a certain occasion requiring the creation of that soul, without which occasion neither would it be due to the soul itself to come about, nor would its cause be determined to its effecting. But that the body or matter does not flow per se into the becoming or being of the soul is evident from this, that the rational soul, separated from the body, retains its being; therefore it does not depend on a sustaining subject in its being; therefore neither in becoming, because such is the becoming of a thing as is its being; therefore conversely the subject itself or matter does not have per se influx into the being or becoming of such a soul; for these two are correlatives, or rather the same, the dependence of the effect and the influx of the cause.

11. From nothing nothing comes, an axiom to be limited.—Wherefore that principle, from nothing nothing comes, understood universally of every cause and of every effect, is false and against natural reason, as is shown by this very example of the rational soul, and also by the example of prime matter, as was touched upon above, and we shall bring forward more in what follows. But understood of the power of a finite and natural agent, it is true. Whence, as regards this form, it is to be conceded that there is not in proximate natural agents a power to effect it, but that the proximate agent disposes matter, but a separated intelligence effects the form, not indeed a created intelligence, as Avicenna thought, nor an idea separated and existing outside God, but God himself, who alone, as we shall show below, is the effector of all things which come about through creation.

12. Prime matter is natural potency to the rational soul.—You will say: hence it comes about that prime matter is not in natural potency to the rational soul, which seems inconvenient. The sequel is evident, because to every natural passive potency there corresponds a natural active potency; but there is no natural active potency which can effect this form in matter; therefore neither is there in matter a natural passive potency to it. Some concede the sequel, both on account of the reason made, and also because, if matter were in potency to the rational soul, when this soul comes about it would be said to be educed from the potency of matter. But this opinion does not please; for, if matter were not in natural potency to the rational soul, the generation of man would not be natural, because it would be natural neither from the active principle nor from the passive. Likewise, because matter is naturally disposed ultimately to receiving the rational form, and to matter so disposed according to the order of nature such a form is due; it is therefore in natural potency to it. To the difficulty, then, the answer is by denying the sequel. To the first reason the answer is that natural potency is first and per se to be attended to in order to connatural and proportioned act; but the rational soul is a natural act proportioned to matter, and therefore matter too is natural potency to that act; whence from both there comes about a certain natural being per se one, and matter itself is connaturally preserved under such act. But as regards active potency, first of all there can be given a natural active potency for uniting such an act to such a potency, and in this way a natural active potency now corresponds to the natural passive potency. Next, although this form can be made by God alone, nevertheless God in that action operates according to the mode and order due to the natures of things, and this is enough that he be said to operate after the manner of a natural cause and that a sufficient active power correspond to the passive potency. To the other reason the answer is that it is one thing for matter to contain the form in potency, another to be in potency to the form; for the first indicates power of causing the form, for the cause contains the effect in its genus; but the second indicates only capacity for receiving the form. Matter, then, is in natural potency to receiving the rational soul, yet does not contain it in its potency, since it cannot cause it; and therefore the rational soul is not educed from the potency of matter, because nothing is educed except whence it is contained, and because eduction indicates the causality of matter into the form, as we shall say at once.

13. All substantial forms, the rational excepted, come about from an underlying subject.—Secondly, of all other substantial forms it must be said that they do not properly come about from nothing, but are educed from the potency of the underlying matter; and therefore that in the effecting of these forms nothing comes about against that axiom, from nothing nothing comes, if it is rightly understood. This assertion is taken from Aristotle, Physics I throughout, and Metaphysics VII, and from other authors whom I shall report at once. And it is briefly declared; for to come about from nothing expresses two things: one is to come about absolutely and simply; the other is that such effecting be from nothing. The first is properly said of a subsisting thing, because becoming belongs to that to which being belongs; but that properly is which subsists and has being; for what lies alongside another is rather that by which another is. On this side, then, material substantial forms do not come about from nothing, because properly they do not come about. And this reason St. Thomas gives, I, q. 45, a. 8, and q. 90, a. 2, and it will be more explained from what is to be said. Taking, then, becoming in this propriety and rigour, to come about from nothing is to come about according to its whole self, that is, no part of itself being presupposed from which it comes about. And by this reason natural things, while they come about anew, do not come about from nothing, because they come about from presupposed matter of which they are composed, and so they do not come about according to their whole selves, but according to something of themselves. But the forms of these things, although in truth they receive anew their whole entity, which before they did not have, yet, because they themselves do not come about, as has been said, therefore neither do they come about from nothing. Nevertheless, because, taking the word to come about in a broader way, it cannot be denied that the form has been made in the way in which it now is and before was not, as the reason for doubting posited at the beginning of the section also proves, therefore it must be added that, to come about being taken in this amplitude, to come about from nothing denies not only the relationship of material cause intrinsically composing that which comes about, but also the relationship of material cause per se causing and sustaining the form which comes about, or co-comes-about. For we said above that matter is the cause both of the composite and of the form dependent on it; in order, then, that a thing be said to come about from nothing, each mode of causality must be denied, and in the same sense that axiom is to be taken in order that it be true: from nothing nothing comes, namely that by the power of a natural and finite agent nothing comes about except from a presupposed subject concurring per se both to the composite and to the form, if each in its way comes about from the same agent. From these, then, it is rightly concluded that material substantial forms do not come about from nothing, because they come about from matter, which in its genus concurs per se and flows into the being and becoming of such forms, because, just as they cannot be except affixed to matter by which they are sustained in being, so neither can they come about unless their effecting and penetration is sustained in the same matter. And this is the proper and per se difference between effecting from nothing and from something, on account of which, as we shall show below, the former mode of effecting exceeds the finite power of natural agents, but not the latter.

14. What it is to be educed from the potency of matter is explained in various ways.—First.—From these it is also evident that it is properly said of these forms that they are not created but educed from the potency of matter, and what it is to be educed from the potency of matter; in explaining which many labour, both on Physics I and on Metaphysics VII. But St. Thomas briefly declared each, I, q. 90, a. 2, ad 2. For, since those forms do not come about from nothing, they are not created, because to be created is to come about from nothing. But since those forms are contained in the potency of matter, and through the action of the agent come about as it were outside that potency—not that they exist outside matter and do not actuate and adhere to its potency, but that, whereas before they were only contained in potency and in the cause, afterwards they are in act and outside the cause—and so from potential being matter, in which they were contained, they are educed into act by the power of the agent, the same matter concurring. You will say: then by the same reason things will be said to be educed from the potency of the agent, because in it too they were contained by power and potency, and from this being in potency they are educed into act through the action of the agent itself. The answer is by absolutely denying the sequel, because those words in all propriety signify the relationship of material cause and not of efficient. And so both the efficient and matter can be said to contain the effect, yet in a diverse way; for the agent contains eminently or virtually, but matter only in receptive or passive potency; when, therefore, the form is said to be educed from the potency of matter, this relationship of material cause is peculiarly denoted; but the agent is properly said by its power to educe the effect from potency into act.

15. Secondly.—Otherwise too it is wont to be explained what it is for the form to be educed from the potency of matter, namely, that it is to come about in matter with dependence on it in being and becoming, which belongs to all substantial forms except the rational. Which explanation differs from the preceding in words only; for (as I was saying above) for matter to contain in its potency imports on the side of matter causality or power of causing in its genus; for the form, then, to be drawn or to come about outside the potency of matter in which it is contained is nothing other than to come about in act in matter, matter itself concurring in its genus through its potency to the becoming and being of such form; but this very thing is for the form to come about with dependence on matter in becoming and in being; and it is only a diverse mode of explaining through the relationship of effect to cause, or conversely through the relationship of cause to effect. Another explanation too occurs, which, although it does not contain a thing diverse from the preceding, nevertheless declares it more and is apt for explaining some difficulties arising. For the form, then, to be educed from the potency of matter is to come about by the same action by which the composite comes about from preceding matter, which through that action does not come about; which exposition St. Thomas seems to have intended when he said that the form is not created but educed, because it is not that which is per se produced, but the composite, while the form is co-produced from the underlying matter. And by induction it is evident that it so comes about in all forms which are educed from the potency of matter. But the reason can be given, because eduction consists in this, that it is an action or change per se and essentially depending on matter; but through this action the form at the same time comes about and is united to matter; and therefore through the same the composite comes about per se primarily and such form is co-produced, and comes about in act outside the potency of matter; therefore the eduction of the form from the potency of matter is excellently declared through that action.

Corollaries from the preceding resolution

16. The rational soul is not educed from the potency of matter.—And hence it is understood, first, more fully what we were saying above, that the rational form is not educed from the potency of matter, because neither is it contained in its potency so as to be educed outside it, nor does it come about or exist dependently on matter, nor does it come about by the same action by which the composite comes about, or by which it itself is united to matter; for first, at least in nature, it comes about in itself and receives its being independent of matter, and afterwards by another action it is united, by which the whole composite is generated.

17. Whether the heavenly forms are educed from the potency of matter.—Secondly, another difficulty which occurred here is dispatched from what has been said, about the heavenly forms, namely whether they can be said to be educed from the potency of matter; for according to the prior interpretations it seemed that it must be so affirmed; for those forms depend in becoming and being on their matter; therefore they are educed from its potency; for, if they depend in becoming and in being, then they are caused by matter; therefore they are contained in its potency; therefore, when they actually come about, they are educed from its potency. Nor is it enough to answer that those forms do not come about, but co-come-about with the composites, because the forms of generable things too do not come about, but co-come-about, and nevertheless are said to be educed on account of the said dependence and containment. But it must be said with the common opinion that those forms are truly not educed, because where there is not the generation of the whole composite neither can there be the eduction of the form. But the reason a priori is that, as was touched upon above, there is a single action by which the heaven according to its whole self is produced, and not only the form but also the matter comes about, which action is the integral and perfect creation of the whole and the concreation of matter and form, and therefore there is there no eduction from the potency of matter. When, therefore, a form is said to be educed which depends in becoming and being on matter, it is understood when to the form itself, or to the formal being which is communicated through it, there tends a proper becoming and a proper action, which so presupposes matter that through it matter does not come about. And similarly, when a form is said to be educed from the potency of matter because it was contained in its potency, matter is supposed existing in potency to the form before it actually has it; but the matter of the heaven, although it is potency to its form, postulates from its nature that it not be in potency to it, because this being in potency includes privation.