Disputationes metaphysicae

1. Supernaturally one accident inheres in another as in a subject which.—Otherwise naturally.—We are speaking according to the natures of things; for, some miracle being supposed, there is no doubt that some accident can concur after the manner of subject and material cause to the being of some accident and to its effecting, as the more approved theologians teach of quantity in the consecrated Eucharist. But according to the natures of things two things are certain: the first is that no accident can be the first and (so to speak) fundamental subject of another accident, which is called by some the subject which. This is evident, because no accident can sustain another without each being sustained in another, and in this progress one cannot proceed to infinity; otherwise there would be nothing in which that whole causality would be materially founded. And by the same reason one cannot stop at some accident; otherwise the whole collection of accidents would not be in another but in itself, which is repugnant to the nature of accident; one must necessarily stop, therefore, at the substantial subject or matter. And in this sense it is wont to be said that an accident cannot be the first material cause of an accident, but at most the proximate. And this Aristotle professedly teaches, Metaphysics IV, in the place to be treated immediately.

2. One accident is received in substance by reason of another.—Secondly, it is certain that some accidents are in substance by means of other accidents; this is evident by induction, for the acts of the intellect are in spiritual substance by means of the intellect, and the acts of the will by means of the will, and so proportionally of the other acts or habits of the sensitive powers; and corporeal qualities, by the opinion of all, are in by means of quantity. And a more general reason can be given, because, although all accidents are ordered to substance, they are nevertheless not without order among themselves, and therefore one can regard substance by means of another.

The point of the question

3. The difficulty, then, is how one accident is in substance by means of another, whether only as that by which or also as that which; for the philosophers use these terms. In which an equivocation is to be avoided, so that the point of the controversy may be attained; for in one sense it can be denied that an accident is a subject which, only because it is not the first foundation and as it were base of the whole causality by which another accident is sustained; but according to this sense some accident will be called a subject by which, because it is that by means of which substance receives another accident, whether the posterior truly and properly inheres in the prior accident or not. And this sense cannot fall into doubt, nor is there controversy about it. In another sense an accident can be said to be only a subject by which and not which of another accident, because one accident cannot be even a proximate subject in which another accident truly inheres, although it can be the reason of inhering, that is, a necessary condition or disposition prerequired in the substance in order that another accident can inhere in it, in which way many think that diaphaneity is compared to light. And according to this sense one accident is not truly and properly the material cause of another, except perhaps in that sense in which a dispositive cause is reduced to the material; in which way an accident too can be a material cause of substance; but we are treating of proper material cause, in which an accidental form is proximately in and received. Whence conversely an accident will be called a subject which of another accident if it truly receives it in itself and in itself proximately terminates its union and inherence, even if it is not the first (so to speak) support of both; and in this sense the present question is treated.

Various opinions

4. The first opinion is that no accident is a true subject and material cause of another accident. So holds Gregory, In II, dist. 12, q. 2, a. 2; and he attributes it to Aristotle, Metaphysics IV, texts 13 and 14, where he proves that an accident does not happen to an accident except because both happen to the same thing, and subjoins the cause, because there is no greater reason why one accident should happen to another than conversely. The nominalists seem to suppose the same, who deny that the qualities of the bread inhere in quantity even after the consecration of the bread, whom I cited in tom. III of the Third Part, disp. LVI, sect. 3. To the same opinion can be referred Capreolus, In I, dist. 3, q. 3, a. 2, ad 2 Scoti against concl. 1, where he does not sufficiently explain in what sense he speaks of subject by which and which; nor can this be sufficiently established from the places of St. Thomas which he adduces, as we shall see; but Gregory spoke more clearly, who brings forward reasons of no great weight; for the sum of all is that a form cannot be a principle of undergoing or receiving, otherwise the function of form is confounded with the office of matter; but every accident is a true accidental form; therefore it cannot be a receptive principle of an accident.

5. The second opinion is that one accident can be the proximate subject in which another is received, and consequently can exercise proper material causality about it. Durandus holds and excellently declares this, In I, dist. 8, 2 part., q. 4, n. 15, and St. Thomas and other authors suppose it, who (as I alleged in the said place) say that in the Eucharist after the consecration of the bread the qualities inhere in the separated quantity, not by a new inherence which is conferred on them through consecration, but by the old which they had in the quantity, which before inhered in matter as in a subject, which being taken away, the other accidents remain founded upon the quantity itself, as St. Thomas expressly teaches, III, q. 77, a. 2, second reason. And in the solution ad 2 he declares that one accident per se cannot be the subject of another, because per se it is not; but in so far as it is in another, it can be a subject, because one accident can be received in a subject by means of another; and so he says that the surface is the subject of colour; which would not be absolutely true if the accident were only a medium by which in the former sense declared above. And I-II, q. 7, a. 1, ad 3, and q. 56, a. 1, ad 3, where he repeats the same doctrine, he says that one accident inheres in another, which cannot truly be said of a pure disposition. He has almost similar things In III, dist. 33, q. 2, a. 4, quaestiuncula 1, and excellently in the question De spiritualibus creaturis, a. 11, ad 13, and often elsewhere. And this opinion I judge to be true.

Resolution of the question

6. But in order that we may prove and declare it more fully, I say, first: although not every accident can inhere proximately in another accident, nevertheless this can belong to some accidents. The former part is known, because, since the whole collection of accidents must necessarily inhere in substance, it is necessary that some accident inhere immediately in substance; for between substance and accident a medium cannot be found, although between substance and some accident another accident can intervene, because, just as the general division of being into substance and accident is adequate, so that between the dividing members no medium can fall, so between the first subject of accident, which is substance, and the whole collection of accidents, or between substance and its first accident, no medium can be found. Which St. Thomas rightly noted, I, q. 77, a. 1, ad 5.

7. Spiritual accidents truly inhere in other accidents.—The latter part is proved, first, by induction in corporeal accidents; for all are in substance by means of quantity, as all the philosophers teach; and it seems to be proved by experience, for whiteness is extended in the surface, and heat similarly, when it is diffused through the body, is extended in its quantity. It can be answered that hence it is only gathered that quantity is a disposition necessary in the subject in order that other corporeal accidents can be in it in a connatural way, yet not that quantity itself is the proximate subject in which such accidents truly inhere. As of the substantial form we were saying probably above that it does not enter into matter except as extended through quantity; but, that disposition being supposed, it is conjoined immediately to the entity of matter itself and is co-extended to it; why, then, could the same not be said of whiteness and of heat, etc.? The answer is that the reason is very diverse, for the substantial form, since it is of a superior order, is improportioned to inhere proximately in an accident. Likewise, it is not united after the accidental manner but the substantial, and therefore it must be united immediately to substance; but corporeal quality is an accident and is united after the accidental manner, and therefore of itself it is proportioned so that it can inhere proximately in an accident; therefore, when the quality is such that per se and necessarily it supposes quantity in the substance in order to be received by means of it, it is more likely that it is received immediately in it. And it is confirmed from the mystery of the Eucharist, for in the separated quantity the accidents inhere, as I suppose from theology; therefore by their nature they are apt to inform quantity, because a form cannot exercise its formal effect outside a subject proportioned to itself; therefore before the consecration those qualities inhered in the quantity, because a quality naturally informs a subject proportioned to it, if it is conjoined. Likewise, because a new inherence, made anew and miraculously in those qualities, is superfluously feigned, if according to the nature of the thing it can be understood both to have preceded and always to have remained. And this induction is more evident in certain accidents which are not things altogether distinct from the accidents in which they are founded, but their modes, as is figure with respect to quantity, and motion, and where or local presence with respect to the same, and relation (if it is a distinct mode) with respect to its foundation. Moreover, in spiritual accidents (and the reason is the same of material ones which are proportioned to them) this seems most certain, for first of all it is necessary that operative habits inhere immediately in the powers which they are ordered to help; because these habits give inclination and facility to these powers; but they do not give this facility except formally through themselves; therefore they inform these powers; therefore they are received proximately in them. And by this reason science is received in the intellect, and impressed species in the cognitive power proportioned to them, and so too the theologians say that faith is in the intellect and charity in the will. And the same or greater reason holds of vital acts, which essentially are immanent acts; whence it is necessary that they be received immediately in the proximate principle from which they proceed. But the reason a priori of this part is to be taken from the natural subordination of such accidents, which we investigate from the effects themselves and natural indications, and there is nothing whence it is repugnant to the nature of accident as such.

8. The second conclusion.—I say, secondly: one accident can truly exercise material causality with respect to another proportioned to it. This assertion follows from the former, for a subject receiving a form in itself exercises proper material causality toward it; but one accident is the proximate subject receiving another accident in itself; therefore. Secondly, because the accident which is received in another depends on it in being and becoming; and not as on an efficient, speaking formally and precisely by virtue of reception, which sometimes can in the thing be separated from effecting, as is evident in quantity, which does not make the whiteness which it receives in itself; whence whiteness does not depend on it by means of action, but by means of union and inherence; that dependence, therefore, pertains to material causality. Thirdly, the accident which inheres in another is its form; whence vital acts are called the second acts of the powers, because they ultimately actuate and inform them, and whiteness denominates the surface white as informing it; therefore, conversely, the accident receiving another exercises material causality about it.

9. A small question is treated and resolved.—But someone will ask, when one accident causes another materially, whether it alone proximately concurs in that genus, or also the subject itself or some other accident. Some answer that some accidents are simple, that is, neither formally nor identically composed of various entities, as is whiteness, vision, etc.; but others are composed of various entities, which composition will never be found in accidents which have a proper entity; for, although there can be in them composition of intension or extension, nevertheless this, in order to the subject, is compared after the manner of a simple entity; but in accidents which are modes of things that composition is sometimes found; for example, the local presence of the bread is not only in the quantity but also in the substance of the bread; whence that integral presence is composed of the presence of the substance and the presence of the quantity. Of the former accidents, then, when one is in substance by means of another, they say that material causality is exercised proximately by the accident alone, and conversely that the union or inherence of the accident is terminated per se and immediately at the accident alone, but at the subject of the other accident only remotely and as it were per accidens; for, since such an accident is a simple mode or simple entity, it cannot be united immediately to several things; so Ockham, In IV, q. 4, says that a simple accident cannot be except in an equally simple subject.

10. But when the accident is composite in the way explained, it is adequately in a composite subject; and therefore, although according to one part it is in another accident, according to another it can be immediately in substance; and in this way it is wont to be said that discrete quantity is partially in many subjects, of which in its place. And in this latter part there is no difficulty in the thing, although there can be a question about the name, whether that is to be called one accident or rather two, since in the thing they are so distinct that one can remain without the other; as in fact the presence of the substance of the bread was destroyed and the presence of the quantity remained, and it could have been done in the contrary way too. Whence there is no doubt that those presences are in the thing distinct and of diverse notions. But whether on account of some union they are to be called to compose one matters nothing to the present point, and seems a question of the mode of speaking.

11. But of the former part there is greater doubt, for that principle that an accident simple in its entity cannot be received immediately and adequately in a composite subject is neither certain nor seems necessary. For first of all many think so of all corporeal accidents, that they are primarily and per se in the substantial composite, at least when on each side it is material (which opinion, from this precisely, that the subject is composite and the accidental form simple, does not involve a repugnance); therefore by the same reason it could be in an accidental composite. Likewise, sometimes one and the same accident or accidental mode regards two distinct things, as the mode of union both regards or affects the thing which it unites and the thing to which it unites; therefore similarly one accidental entity can primarily and per se regard two things as composing one adequate subject, for example matter and quantity as they compose this quantified subject. Finally in this no intrinsic repugnance appears. I think, therefore, that from this principle it cannot be generally defined, when one accident is in substance by means of another, whether substance concurs there only remotely or also proximately, nor do I find another general principle from which this could be universally dispatched.

12. Wherefore I judge that one must look to the nature of each accident and to its formal effect; for, if the formal effect of the accident on account of its special nature does not postulate the immediate material concurrence of substance, it is more likely that substance concurs only remotely, and that one accident inheres immediately only in another, and so Durandus absolutely affirms, in the place cited above. And the reason is that, if that proximate cause is sufficient, it will be superfluous to add another. And in this way I think that whiteness and similar qualities inhere in quantity so that their mode of inherence is proximately terminated at the quantity alone. Of which the best sign is that, the matter being taken away and the quantity remaining, the same inherence is preserved. Nor is there any other sign or indication which shows that more is required for the formal effect of these accidents.

13. But if there is some accident which from its special mode of informing requires immediate inherence not only to some faculty but also to the very substance of the thing, it will not be repugnant that it so come about. This I notice specially on account of vital acts, for example of the intellect or will, which some think are so in the faculties that they also attain immediately the very substance of the soul or of the angel, on account of the intrinsic mode of affecting of vital act, and because it is so essentially an immanent act that it immediately affects the whole intrinsic principle immediately flowing into it; but this principle, as these authors consequently think, is not the power alone, but also the very substance of the angel or of the soul. Which opinion by virtue of material causality is not repugnant, yet its truth is to be examined elsewhere. And in the same way what some in theology think is probable, that per se infused habits, as they concur actively together with the powers to eliciting supernatural acts, so also concur materially to receiving them; for this (if from elsewhere it is proved necessary or more connatural to such acts) is not repugnant from this, that the power and the habit are distinct things, because it is enough that they are united and concur after the manner of one integral faculty.

Answer to the arguments

14. Whether accident happens to accident.—The foundation of Gregory has no difficulty; for the proposition of Aristotle, that accident does not happen to accident, is to be understood as of a subject which in the former sense declared above. Which sense St. Thomas indicates there. It could also be said that Aristotle there is not only treating of accidental inherence, but also of accidental predication by which one accident is said altogether per accidens of another, as when the musical is said to be white; for such predication does not arise from this, that one happens to the other, but that both are conjoined in one third. But sometimes an accident can be predicated of an accident not altogether per accidens, as in this proposition: the quantified is in place, or the intellectual understands, the appetitive loves; and in these it is not repugnant that accident be in accident in the way expounded above; and in the same sense it will not be repugnant that accident happen to accident, not merely per accidens, but on account of some per se order which they have among themselves, in which way too the surface is called white, and so of the others. To the reason the answer is that it is not repugnant that a thing which is form with respect to one be receptive potency with respect to another, which is evident in the rational soul and in any accidental passive potency whatever, and is sufficiently clear from what was said in sect. 1; nor does a new difficulty occur here.