Disputationes metaphysicae

1. Of this causality formally taken nothing else remains for us to say; but of the foundation of such causality and of the potency through which it causes it is necessary to say some things. For, since material causality consists in reception, two things are required on the side of the cause, namely the thing which receives and the potency through which it receives, which can be distinguished either in reality or by reason. But we suppose, as self-evident from what has been said, that substance is as it were the first foundation, or the first thing which materially causes accidents, because the whole order of accidents is imperfect and insufficient to subsist in itself; and therefore the first foundation on which accidents rest cannot be some accident, but must be substance. We inquire, then, through what potency substance materially causes accidents: whether through an accidental potency really or from the nature of the thing distinct from it, or through itself, or through a potency distinct by reason only.

The former opinion is treated

2. For some authors think that no accident is received in substance except by means of an accidental potency pertaining to the same predicament. So think Soncinas, Metaphysics XII, q. 26, and Javellus, q. 8, who say that there is in substance a potency receptive of quantity, which is reduced to the predicament of quantity, and another receptive of quality, pertaining to the predicament of quality; or rather Soncinas says that in the surface itself there is something potential of the genus of colour for receiving colour, whatever that may be (he says), say transparency or something of this kind. Their foundation is a certain saying of Aristotle, Metaphysics XII, text 26, that the principles of all genera are the same. Which the Commentator expounds of identity according to analogy, for any thing whatever of some predicament has those three principles, matter, form and privation; yet in all predicaments they are not the same, but proportional. Hence, then, they gather that, as in each predicament there is a proper form and a proper privation, so also there is a proper potency constituting the proximate material principle of that genus. Whence it is rightly concluded that substance as such cannot be the proximate material principle of any accident.

3. And hence was taken that axiom: Potency and act are in the same genus, which is received by many as a first principle in metaphysics on account of the said testimony of Aristotle, to which they add another of the Commentator, Physics V, comm. 9, that the potency to each predicament is in that genus of predicament in which the act is; and De Anima I, comm. 6, that potency and act are differences which happen to all predicaments, and he speaks of receptive potency, for he treats of the soul in so far as it is act and of the potency which corresponds. St. Thomas often uses the same principle, signally I, q. 77, a. 1, where he says: Since potency and act divide being and any genus of being, it is necessary that potency and act be referred to the same genus; and therefore, if the act is not in the genus of substance, the potency which is said to that act cannot be in the genus of substance. In which words both that principle and the intended conclusion and the reason of the conclusion seem to be contained. But the reason is that potencies are specified through acts; therefore the potency to receive an accidental form takes its species from the act to which it is ordered; therefore that potency cannot be substance. For by a similar reason we proved above that the potency of matter is not an accident but substance; and by a proportional discourse it can be concluded that the potency to receive quality is in the genus of quality. From which reason some extend that principle to active and receptive potency; whence generally they infer that the potency to accidental act is an accident and is referred to the same genus.

Substance through itself is the immediate material cause of accidents

4. But this opinion, as regards the present matter, cannot be defended, unless perhaps there is equivocation in the sense of the words. I say, then, that substance through itself, without the addition of some thing really distinct or of some mode diverse from the nature of the thing, can be a material cause immediately receiving in itself some accident. The former part is proved, because, if substance receives quantity, for example, by means of some distinct thing which is the potency to receive quantity, I ask whether that thing is substance or accident. It cannot be substance, both because otherwise it would not be a thing beyond the whole substance of the thing; and also because then substance would already be posited as through itself receptive of an accident. If it is an accident, then it is in some proximate subject; I ask, then, whether that is an accidental potency really distinct, or the substance itself; if this latter is said, we have the intent. But if the former is said, of that accident the question will again return, and so we shall proceed to infinity, unless we finally stop at the substance itself. And so it is truly necessary, for, although substance can be united to some accident by means of another, as we shall say afterwards, nevertheless, comparing substance to the whole collection of accidents, it cannot be united to it by means of some thing which is not either substance or accident; therefore it is necessary that some substance and some accident be immediately united, that is, by means of no thing distinct from the extremes.¹ Finally the reason a priori can be taken from this, that the accident is added to created substance to perfect it and to supply that which such a substance cannot have through itself; therefore it is necessary that in the entity of such a substance there be intimately included the capacity to receive accidents; therefore this capacity of substance which is receptive of accidents, as such, cannot be a thing distinct from the substance itself; whence as regards this part the conclusion posited seems evident.

5. But in the other part, about a mode distinct from the nature of the thing, first of all we are not treating of the actual mode of union, of which it was said above, but of a mode (so to speak) potential, or of some potency distinct from the nature of the thing from substance as a mode and not as a thing altogether diverse. And so the discourse made can almost be applied; for that potency too modally distinct will be a true accident, for if it were substance, it would falsely be said to be distinct from the nature of the thing from the whole substance of the thing; therefore through itself it is in its own way in the substance and depends on it in the genus of material cause; therefore it is received by it immediately through its proper substantial entity. Next, this distinction from the nature of the thing, real distinction being excluded, is feigned in the present case, for this capacity of receiving the first accident (so to speak) is so intimate to created substance that it is inseparable from it, even through the absolute power of God; for, by the very fact that the substance of an angel, for example, is essentially such, through itself it is capable of the intellective power; and although we grant that God can separate the intellect of the angel from its substance, we necessarily understand that that substance always remains capable of intellect, and however bare God preserves that substance, it is impossible that it not remain capable of its natural intellective faculty; and in the same way we understand substance composed of matter and form to be compared to quantity, for through itself it is capable of it nor can it be deprived of this capacity, even if every thing or mode which is separable from such a substance is separated from it; therefore a distinction from the nature of the thing between such capacity and substance is falsely feigned.

6. Cajetan restricts the opinion opposed to ours.—Cajetan’s limitation is disproved.—Whence Cajetan, I, q. 54, a. 3, while in part he adheres to the former opinion cited, limits it to those accidents which are acquired by means of some action and passion; for those which are congenital to substance do not need a mediating potency, but substance itself through itself is capable of them; and in this way he avoids the process to infinity. But the reason of this distinction and limitation, which is gathered from it in the same I, q. 77, a. 1, is that the potency congenital to substance is essentially a potency principally ordered to this, that it receive act; but that it is the act of substance it has only from the common notion of accident; and therefore it does not require another potency by means of which it inheres in substance; but other accidents are primarily and per se acts and therefore require proper potencies by means of which they inhere in substance. But from this doctrine I first of all gather that by virtue of the material causality of the accident as such a mediating potency is not per se required, but substance through itself is sufficient for this causality. This is evident, because for receiving those accidents which are essentially receptive potencies another potency is not required; because these potencies do not actuate substance according to some special notion of act but on account of the common notion of accident; therefore by virtue of the causality of the accident as such such a potency is not required, but, if in some it is required, it will be on account of some special reasons. Next, this is falsely limited to those accidents which are primarily and per se instituted to be receptive potencies; for quantity does not require in substance a mediating potency through which it is received, as was proved, because substance through itself is capable of quantity, and it is superfluous and plainly absurd to feign another mediating potency distinct from the nature of the thing; and yet quantity is not primarily and per se instituted to be a receptive potency, as they themselves too confess, otherwise quantity would essentially be quality. Whence quantity is primarily and per se instituted to extend the parts of substance, so that they cannot naturally penetrate one another in place. But thence it consequently has that it is a medium for receiving certain other accidents; therefore not only those accidents which are primarily and per se instituted to be receptive potencies, but also others which for whatever reason have an immediate relationship to substance, do not require a mediating potency in order to be received or materially caused by it.

7. Indeed I add that perhaps no purely receptive accidental potency is found really distinct from substance, as can briefly be shown by induction. For in corporeal inanimate substances there is no potency receptive of accidents besides quantity, as has partly been shown and will partly be more evident from what follows; but quantity, as I said, is not primarily and per se a receptive potency, but is a form giving to material substance this corporeal bulk and extension, by reason of which it is apt to occupy place. But in living things as such we do not recognize any purely passive potencies, for all which belong to living things as they are living are in some way active; which can also be considered in angelic substances; therefore precisely for receiving accidents it is not necessary to feign distinct potencies in substance, unless the necessity arises from elsewhere.

8. From which it is further concluded that that limitation or distinction of congenital or transmutable accidents is neither formal nor universally true. The first is evident, because, if substance through itself can be capable of an accident as such, it will also be able to be capable of change to such an accident, if perhaps it is separable. But if it is inseparable, that is per accidens and something material with respect to the causality of substance. The second is evident, because quantity, according to the common opinion, is an accident which is transmuted and acquired through proper motion; and nevertheless it does not require in substance a potency distinct from it. Likewise, local presence, or where, is an accidental mode which sometimes affects immediately the substance itself, as is more clearly evident in spiritual substance, and is in its own way true in material, as we shall say below in its place; and yet that accident can be acquired and lost through proper change. Likewise, if it is true that the relation of likeness or of specific identity is something distinct from the nature of the thing from the subject and foundation, such an accident does not require in substance a special potency, and yet it is not congenital, but can be lost or newly result. It remains, therefore, that we say absolutely that for the material causality of substance about an accident, whether it is in it after the manner of passive or active potency, or after the manner of simple form or disposition or quantity or another mode of accident, whether congenital or adventitious, per se and by virtue of these general notions precisely taken a special potency distinct from the nature of the thing from it is not necessary on the side of the substance.

The former opinion is disproved

9. An induction proving that a potency of the same category does not correspond to every act.—And hence I infer that an accident does not always require in substance a receptive potency properly pertaining to its predicament; indeed that this rarely happens, except in some accidents on account of peculiar reasons. This plainly is inferred from the preceding assertion. And it is declared more fully by induction, for in spiritual substance there are only accidents pertaining to the intellect and will and those which regard place. I speak naturally, so as to omit those things which can come about through divine grace or power. Although, if some gift of grace can be placed in spiritual substance which is not in the intellect nor in the will, as truly it can, that does not suppose in the substance a potency of the same genus, for that gift is a quality, but the obediential capacity is not a quality but the very substance of the soul, as is evident from theology. The accidents, then, which pertain to local motion or presence do not suppose in the substance a potency pertaining to the predicament of where or of action or passion; for how can such a potency be conceived or on what foundation be feigned? since the notion of potency, if it is proper, pertains to quality; but if it is taken broadly, it is as it were transcendent and a certain notion intimately included in various things of diverse predicaments, and so it comes about in the case proposed, for spiritual substance through itself is capable of such presence. But the intellect and will without any doubt do not suppose in the substance another potency of the genus of quality, as was proved. But the acts of these potencies are in the substance by means of the potencies themselves, although of the mode there is a controversy to be treated below, sect. 4; yet this comes from the proper notion found in such acts, as we shall say in the same place. And still the case is under judgement whether such acts are of the same predicament with the potencies themselves; for some place them only in the genus of action. And although it is true that they are qualities and suppose a potency which is a quality, nevertheless this does not come from that general reason, but from a peculiar cause and nature.

10. But of the accidents of corporeal substance all confess that among accidents having a proper entity really distinct from substance, the first accident of such substance is quantity, which does not suppose in the substance any potency which pertains to the predicament of quantity, as all the things which we have hitherto said prove a fortiori. But quantity itself is the medium or potency through which this potency receives corporeal qualities and similar accidents; but quantity is not a potency pertaining to the predicament of quality, as is self-evident. Nor yet between the surface, for example, and whiteness can some potency of the genus of quality be feigned to mediate or intervene, through which the surface receives whiteness; which the arguments hitherto made also prove, because such a potency, if in the thing it is not distinct from the surface, cannot be a true quality; but to feign it distinct, either as a thing or as a mode diverse from the nature of the thing, is both superfluous and without foundation; and either one will have to proceed to infinity, or, if one must stop at the intrinsic capacity of the surface by which through itself it is receptive of that potency, it will more truly be said that one must stop at the same intrinsic capacity of the surface by which through itself it is immediately receptive of whiteness, and that unintelligible and in no way necessary potency will be taken out of the middle. So, then, it is evident that the potency through which substance receives an accident does not always pertain to the same predicament with the accident received. And the reason a priori is that from accident and subject it is not necessary that one per se come about, but per accidens, and therefore it is not required that such potency and act pertain to the same genus; whence neither is it necessary that such potency be per se instituted and ordered to such act.

11. How some escape the force of the preceding reasons.—You will say that by these arguments it is rightly proved that the potency receptive of an accident is not always properly and directly in that predicament in which the accident received is, but not proved that it is not placed in it at least reductively, which alone the authors of the former opinion assert; for, since the accident expresses an intrinsic order to the subject in so far as it is capable of the accident itself, it is necessary that the subject according to that capacity be reduced to the predicament of the accident. On account of this evasion I indicated above that in this question there can be equivocation in words, for, if the sense is only that substance or quantity, conceived by us under the formality of the capacity of such an accident, is reduced in a certain way to the predicament of that accident as a certain addition through which such an accident is defined, then the controversy is about our mode of speaking or conceiving; for according to the thing no true potency is added intermediate between substance and quantity, or between quantity and quality, but only a certain denomination or respective conception. But we are speaking of real and true potency, of which St. Thomas speaks when he says that potency and act are reduced to the same genus; otherwise he would not rightly conclude thence that the potencies of the soul are things distinct from the soul, which he intends in those places; and in the same sense speaks Cajetan, who on that account applied the limitations and distinctions cited above. The Commentator likewise seems to speak in the same sense when he says that potency and act are opposite differences dividing the individual predicaments.

The axiom “Act and potency are in the same genus” is declared

12. How, then, is that axiom to be understood: Act and potency are in the same genus? Is it to be rejected altogether, lest it seem to stand in the way of the opinion posited by us and the resolution given? The answer is, first of all, that that axiom is not rightly founded in Aristotle, Metaphysics XII; for there he only asserts that the things of all predicaments have the same principles according to proportion or analogy, but never says that all those principles are placed in the same predicament; indeed, positing examples, he says that in colours white is the principle as form, black as privation, the surface as matter; and in illumination light is the form, darkness the privation, the air the subject; and in healing health is the form, disease the privation, the body the matter; in which examples he never assigns a potency which must be of the same predicament with the form; Aristotle, therefore, did not say that matter and form always pertain to the same genus, although he said that the things of all genera can have in some way a formal and material principle. Whence in the same place he says that the things of all genera have an efficient or moving cause, yet does not say or think that that cause pertains to the same genus with the thing effected. Nor does the rejoinder of Soncinas stand in the way, that the efficient cause is extrinsic and therefore it is not necessary that it be of the same genus; but the material principle is intrinsic, which must be of the same genus. For I answer that the material principle of the accident, if it is compared to the whole composite, is intrinsic to it, yet that composite as such is not properly in one genus, since it is one per accidens and consists of things of diverse genera; but if it is compared to the accidental form, it is not its intrinsic principle, that is, intrinsically composing it, but only after the manner of something added or of the subject to which the accidental form is united. But this principle is not necessarily of the same genus with the form in accidental composition.

13. How Scotus explains the said pronouncement.—What objective potency is in Scotus.—Hence Scotus, In II, dist. 16, q. 1, answers that that axiom, understood of receptive potency and its act, is false, and brings against it the instances indicated by us of substance and accident, of surface and colour, etc. And similarly he teaches that it is false understood of active potency and its act, for there too there are clear instances, especially in potencies which act by transient action, whether they are compared to the action as it is action, because they manifestly pertain to diverse predicaments; or to the thing or form made, for the locally motive potency is a quality, but effects where or local presence, and the augmentative potency is a quality, but acts quantity or substance. He says, then, that that axiom is to be understood of objective potency. Which interpretation many reject, keenly attacking this objective potency. But as regards this I think that these dispute with Scotus about a name and equivocally; for he does not understand by objective potency some true thing which is actually in the nature of things, in which sense only active or passive potency is real potency, as I shall say more fully below in treating of the essence of the creature and declaring the species of quality which is potency; but by objective potency Scotus understands the thing in the possible state before it actually is, in which way we say that a thing is in potency before it is; and because the thing, as it is possible, is the object of active potency, therefore it is said by Scotus to be in objective potency. And so he says that this potency and act are of the same genus, because the possible thing and the thing in act are of the same genus; indeed he could even say that it is the same thing negatively (as they say), because they are not two things, but the same conceived in diverse states. Wherefore the thing which Scotus intends in that interpretation is true, yet that interpretation is not rightly accommodated to the authors who before Scotus taught that axiom; for Aristotle, as is evident from what has been said, never spoke in that sense, nor Averroes, who in the cited place says that potency and act are opposite differences; and, although at the beginning of Metaphysics IX he enumerates various acceptations of potency, he never made mention of that objective potency.

14. It must be said, then, that that axiom is commonly understood of proper receptive or active potency. But in order that it be true, it is to be understood first of all of potency per se primarily instituted and ordered to such act, not of potency or capacity intrinsically included in and as it were concomitant with some absolute entity. This is declared, for it can be understood in two ways that some power, both active and receptive, is compared to act. In one way, because from its primary notion and essence it is ordered to such act; so matter is potency to form, as was declared above; so gravity is an active power for effecting downward motion or permanence in the downward place itself; so finally the intellect is an active and receptive power of intellection. A potency of this kind, then, is said to be per se primarily instituted for the sake of act, and therefore it takes its species from it; and of it at most that axiom can be verified in the way to be declared immediately. But in another way some entity can have a power or capacity for some action or act, not because it is primarily instituted for its sake, but because either on account of the eminence of its nature, or on account of a natural condition or mode of being which it has as it were concomitantly, or rather connaturally, it has through itself such a power or aptitude. So God has the omnipotence of acting; so also the intellectual creature has both the capacity and the obediential active power for supernatural acts or gifts; so finally material substance is capable of quantity and quantity itself is capable of qualities. And in this latter genus of potency or capacity it is not necessary that the potency or capacity and the act be in the same genus; because, since such a potency is not ordered per se primarily to the act, nor takes its species from it, nor composes with the act itself one per se, there is no reason why such potency and act should be placed in the same genus. Nor did St. Thomas ever speak of this latter genus of potency, but of the former; and of the same is Averroes to be expounded, if it is necessary to defend his sayings. Nor does the reason made to the contrary prove more; whence through these sufficient answer has been given to the foundations of the contrary opinion.

15. How St. Thomas and the Commentator understand the axiom.—But in order that that principle may remain exactly declared, it is necessary to add that it can be understood in two ways that a potency of the former order and its act are of the same genus. First, so that genus is taken broadly for the general notions of substance and accident, so that a potency per se ordered to substantial act is substantial, to accidental accidental; not that rigorously it is necessary that the potency and act be of the same predicament of accident, although in substance this is true, because of substance there is only one predicament. And this exposition pleases many, because it avoids difficulties. But others will have it that also in accidents a potency of this kind and its act pertain rigorously to the same predicament, because otherwise it is not rigorously true that potency and act are of the same genus. But it is difficult to defend this universally, especially in active potencies. Wherefore it can probably be said that accidental passive potency (for of substantial enough has already been said), when from its primary institution by virtue of its essence it is ordered to act, is contained under the same genus and predicament with its act. And of this potency St. Thomas and the Commentator seem to speak in the places cited. But under passive potencies we comprehend the potencies of the soul, which, although they are also active, are nevertheless at the same time passive and in passion and reception or information have their consummated perfection. But explained in this way this assertion can be proved by induction in all these potencies; for their habits and acts are placed rigorously in the same genus; for, although action as action pertains to the predicament of action, nevertheless as a vital act having consummated and perfect being in its genus it is placed in the predicament of quality; but when the potency is compared to the act and is said to pertain to the same genus, it is not to be compared to the act in becoming, but to the perfect and consummated act; for to that it is per se primarily ordered and from it receives its species. And so I find no example in which this rule fails. But the reason can be given, because, when a receptive potency is per se ordered to act and is compared to it as imperfect to perfect in its genus, and in a certain way seems to constitute one per se in that order with its act—as the intellective potency is per se conjoined with the act of understanding, and so of the others—therefore it is necessary that such potency and act be placed under the same genus, so that they may thus also keep a greater proportion among themselves.

16. But in active potencies, even if they are per se primarily ordered to acting, it does not seem necessary that potency and act be contained rigorously under the same genus. For, if by the act of this potency we understand action as it is action, it is evident that potency and action pertain to diverse predicaments. Nor is it of any moment what some say, that potency and action indeed directly and per se pertain to diverse predicaments, yet through reduction both the potency is placed in the genus of action and the action in the genus of the potency, because they have among themselves a mutual transcendental relationship; but the term of a relationship is reduced to the predicament of the related. This (I say) matters nothing, because this reduction is only according to the extrinsic denomination which the term as term includes; but we are speaking of placing under one genus according to its proper nature and essence. For in this sense it is necessary that the authors speak when they say that potency and act are under the same genus; otherwise they would not rightly conclude thence that matter, for example, is intrinsically substance because it is potency to substance, and that the intellect is a quality because it is potency to accidental and vital act, etc. Active potency, then, compared to its action as it is action, is not constituted under the same genus; but, if by the act of this potency we understand the formal term of its action, it is not necessary that it be placed in the same predicament, as the example adduced above of gravity proves, which can be adduced universally of the locally motive potency, whether it is progressive, or attractive, or expulsive, or impulsive, or impetus itself, which many think is a quality and yet is not ordered to making quality, but motion or where. And the reason can be given, because active potency as such is not ordered to act as imperfect to perfect, nor so as to compose with it something one per se, but as an extrinsic cause to an effect; but it can happen that an active cause is not of the same notion or genus with the effect, but more eminent, and therefore it is not necessary that it be placed in the same predicament with its act. Although it seems necessary, if the most proper act of such a potency is accidental, that the potency itself too be accidental, because substance as such is not per se primarily ordered to accidental act; such potency, therefore, will be an accident, although it is placed under a nobler genus of accident.

17. An objection is dissolved.—Notable.—You will say that sometimes an accidental potency is per se primarily ordered to producing substance, as the nutritive and generative potency. I answer, first, that it has not yet been explored nor treated by us how accidents attain the production of substance; for, if they only attain it by disposing matter, the difficulty ceases; but if they also immediately effect and introduce substantial form, it must be said that they do not attain substance except instrumentally. But they do not attain instrumental action except by a previous other action connatural and most proper, which is always accidental; and with respect to that it is to be verified that such potency and act are of the same genus, for the other instrumental action, although perhaps it is more principally intended by nature, is nevertheless with respect to such a potency not so proper and accommodated that the nature of such potency or quality is commensurated to it. Indeed hence it may be gathered in passing that, outside the locomotive potencies, every other potency per se primarily ordered to acting is placed in the same predicament with its proper act or the term of its action; for such potency is always a quality and effects nothing except by some previous proper action tending to quality, for, as I said, although it effects instrumentally substance or also quantity, it always effects this by some previous proper action tending to quality; but to the other predicaments besides where there is no per se action, but they always result from the term of another action. And so it comes about that every accidental active potency besides the motive is ordered to effecting some quality through a most proper action, although perhaps by means of it it can be ordered to things of other predicaments, at least as an instrument. And let these be said in explanation of that axiom: Potency and act are under the same genus.