Disputationes metaphysicae

1. We can speak of accidents in two ways: in one way in the abstract, or of the accidental form alone; in another way in the concrete, or of the composite of such a form and the subject. And according to this twofold consideration the material cause of an accident can be sought in two ways, namely either as composing it, or as sustaining it or its union.

There is a material cause of accidents

2. First, then, it is certain in general that there is a material cause of accidents. This is evident first from Aristotle, Metaphysics XII, text 13, where, resolving the question which he had proposed in Book III, text 15, he says that the principles of all genera are the same according to proportion; for (as the Commentator expounds), although the potency to substantial being is one thing and the potency to accidental being another, they nevertheless agree proportionally in the notion of material cause. Whence this causality is demonstrated by the same way and proportion as the causality of prime matter; indeed, as better known to us, it was known first, and through proportion to it one came to the knowledge of prime matter, as we saw above. For we experience that in the same subject a change comes about from one accident into another, as from hot into cold; from which we understand that there is a subject which underlies each accident, and that we call the material cause of the accident. For truly it is a cause, since the accident depends on it; and in so far as it is a subject it does not participate another genus of causality, as is self-evident and will be more evident from what is to be said. Next, because this transmutation does not come about in all accidents, a universal reason is to be added, which is to be taken from the nature of accidental entity; for accidental entity cannot subsist in itself, but needs a subject in which it is sustained; and therefore it needs a material cause as necessary from the nature of the thing in order that it can be. Which reason proves not only that there can be a material cause of accidents, but also that all accidents by their nature necessarily postulate this cause; because the being of an accident is to be in, as we shall declare afterwards in its place; but in the very notion of inhering the subject is included, and consequently the material cause.

3. A difference to be noted between substance and accident.—From which is gathered a difference between substance and accident, that substance, even created, does not universally require a material cause, as was shown above, but every accident requires it. And the reason is that the notion of created substance or form, from this precise and common notion, does not require matter, since by virtue of those notions it is not repugnant that it be a subsisting and simple thing, but it is required from the peculiar notion of such substance, namely corporeal, or of such form, namely material. But an accident from the precise and common notion of accident postulates a material cause, because it expresses an entity so diminished that by its nature it is unfit to subsist, and so needing some sustaining subject. Whence it comes about that this material causality extends itself also to incorporeal things, for spiritual accidents too need a material cause, the name material being extended beyond that from which it was taken. For matter properly and rigorously so called is corporeal matter, and from it the denomination material was taken; yet thence it is extended to every cause which has the same or a proportional reason of causing, even if according to its entity it is spiritual and incorporeal; and in this way spiritual accidents, although in themselves they are indivisible and incapable of quantitative extension, nevertheless have a material cause. Indeed, according to the principles of divine theology, even supernatural accidents need a material cause, for, however much they are beings of the most perfect order, nevertheless, by the very fact that they are accidents, they need a subject by which they are supported. It is to be noticed finally, however, that in this conclusion the discussion is of proper accidental entity, for an accidental mode which of itself does not have a proper entity, but is intrinsically identified with some accidental entity of which it is the mode, does not always have a proper material cause, but the entity itself which it proximately modifies suffices, whether it is conjoined as to a subject or in another way, which cannot be declared in particular except by explaining the various genera of these accidental modes, which we shall do in the course of this matter. And therefore I omit the special difficulties which occurred here about relation as relation, and about transient action as such, and about place or other forms denominating extrinsically, for they will be treated more conveniently in their proper places.

The accident in the concrete is composed of matter, not in the abstract

4. I say, secondly: accidental entity taken in the abstract does not have a material cause of which it is intrinsically composed, but in this way there is given a material cause of the accident in the concrete, or of the accidental composite. Soncinas posits this conclusion, especially as regards the former part, Metaphysics XII, q. 26, and Javellus, q. 8, and they indicate that some thought the opposite on account of Aristotle there, text 26, saying that in every genus there is a proper potency and act. The conclusion, however, is most certain, speaking of proper and real matter, because the whole accidental entity is a certain form; therefore it does not need intrinsic and real composition from proper matter and form. The antecedent is declared, because the whole accidental entity is in the subject as a form; whence those who feign in the accident the said composition from matter must necessarily confess that that part which they call the matter of the other, formal, part is with respect to the subject act and form, at least partial. But hence the first consequence is proved, because form as form does not postulate composition from potency and act really distinct, as is evident in substantial forms and was proved above in special of the rational soul. Nor in an accidental form can a proper reason be thought out on account of which it requires that composition; for, although such a form consists of genus and difference, which are compared after the manner of metaphysical matter and form, nevertheless they are neither distinguished in the thing, nor per se require principles or foundations really distinct, as was proved above. Nor yet do these accidental forms on account of their imperfection postulate that composition from potency and act really distinct, because an imperfect thing, if it is partial and incomplete or the form of another, can be really simple, indeed even indivisible, as the point; for simplicity does not always import or require great perfection, but is then only a sign of greater perfection when other things are equal; therefore no probable reason can be thought out for attributing this composition to accidents.

5. Add moreover that it cannot be understood of what kind that matter is of which the accidental form is intrinsically composed; for either it is such that the same in number is successively under diverse accidental forms, or it is always transmuted or perishes with the form itself. The first cannot be said, otherwise not only would cold come about from hot, but also cold from heat, and hatred from love, and so of the others, which is openly false. Likewise, because heat is active according to its whole entity; therefore it introduces heat into the subject according to its whole entity, as regards that degree which it introduces; therefore it expels the opposite degree of cold similarly as regards its whole entity; it does not, therefore, expel only the formal part from the material in order to introduce into it another opposite formal part, but simply expels the whole form, or the whole contrary degree, in order to introduce its own. Just as in a purely privative change, as, for example, in the ceasing of light, the formal part of light does not perish and the potential remain, but absolutely the whole light. But if the transmutation of an accident always comes about in the whole entity of the form, then that matter of which accidents are feigned to consist serves nothing for the transmutations of accidents, nor yet serves in order that they inform substance; for the notion of matter of itself rather impedes information, because matter as such is not actuating act, as we said above. Likewise it does not serve for action; rather it can impede the form from being active according to its whole self, for matter according to itself is not active; since, therefore, many accidental forms are active according to their whole entity, they are not intrinsically composed of matter and form. Finally, if the accident so consists of matter and form, the form too of the accident itself will consist of matter and form. And so one will proceed to infinity; if, therefore, one must stop at some form, as truly one must, let us stop at the first, which is the accident itself, which is only a form whose matter is the subject which it informs. The first sequel is evident, because there is no greater reason of one form than of another, because each is an imperfect and incomplete entity and the form of another, and in each a generic and specific notion can be conceived; the reason is therefore the same.

6. And from these the other part of the conclusion is easily evident, because the accidental composite intrinsically consists of subject and accident, and in that composition the accident has the notion of form; therefore the subject has the notion of material cause. Whence it comes about that this causality with respect to the composite is to be explained in these accidental composites by the same proportion by which we declared it in substantial ones. For the composite itself is the effect of such a cause, since it consists of it and depends on it. But the reason or principle of causing is the first potency or entity through which the subject receives the accident, of which potency and entity we shall speak professedly in the following sections. But the causality in the thing is nothing other than the union of the accidental form to the subject, for by means of it it comes about that from subject and accident one composite coalesces. For we are speaking of the composite and its causality in completed being; for of causality in becoming it will be said immediately. Nor is it necessary in the subject of the accident to feign a distinct mode of union besides the accident itself as united to the subject, because, when the accident comes about in the subject, two changes do not come about in the subject itself, one through the information of the accident, another through a peculiar mode of union identified with the subject itself; and on account of the other reasons made above, which here have the same or greater force. And so this whole causality with respect to the accidental composite is evident.

7. An objection is met.—You will say: this accidental composite is one per accidens; therefore with respect to it true material causality cannot intervene; otherwise every composite per accidens would arise from causality of this kind; which is evidently false in a heap of stones, or also in a house, in so far as it consists of foundation, walls and roof. The answer is, from what was said above of unity, that in beings which are one per accidens there is a breadth, and some have greater unity than others. The composite, then, of subject and accident is one per accidens, because it consists of things of diverse predicaments and of act and potency not per se ordered, but accidentally. Nevertheless the unity which it has is not only metaphorical or apparent, but true and physical, because it is through a true and real union of one to the other, and therefore such a composite truly arises through the real causality of the components, both among themselves and with respect to the composite. But a heap of stones is so one per accidens that it does not have true and physical unity, but only metaphorical or apparent (so to speak); and therefore, just as it does not arise from a true union of the composing parts, so it is not necessary that true material causality intervene there, but only according to proportion, in so far as in site and order one part is conjoined to another. But in artificial composition there is wont to intervene a certain greater conjunction and subordination of parts, yet not true and physical union; and so neither true material causality; which is understood by comparing the integrating parts of the artefact among themselves, for, if the whole artefact is compared to its proper artificial form, which is figure, with respect to it there is a more proper material causality, in so far as figure is compared to its subject as a true accident really united.

The accident in the abstract is educed and sustained by matter

8. A difference among accidents as regards becoming.—I say, thirdly: the accident as regards its accidental entity precisely and abstractly taken has a material cause, not of which it is composed, but by which it is sustained in its being; whence that is the material cause of the accident not only as regards union but also as regards its entity, which it causes in its genus by means of the union; nor yet is it cause only in completed being, but also in becoming. This whole assertion follows from the preceding by a sufficient division, for from the first assertion it is evident that accidents need a material cause on account of the diminished entity which they have; and in the second it was proved that accidental entity does not need this cause in order that it be intrinsically composed of it; therefore in order that it be sustained by it. Indeed even those who feign a material cause intrinsically composing accidents do not exclude a material cause sustaining the whole accident itself composed of intrinsic matter and form; which is a new argument that that intrinsic composition of the accident from matter and form is falsely feigned. Again, from the same diminished and imperfect entity of the accident it is evident that it depends on its material cause not only in union but in its entity, because it can in no way naturally subsist in itself. Likewise, because the accident depends no less on its material cause than the material substantial form on matter; but this depends not only in union but also in entity; therefore. Finally hence it is also concluded that it depends not only in completed being but also in becoming, both because becoming is proportioned to being itself, and also because the action through which the accident naturally comes about is also a certain accident necessarily depending on the subject in which or from which it comes about. This, however, is to be understood with proportion, for some accidents come about through proper action, but others only through resultance or consequence upon the effecting of other things; each accident, therefore, in the way in which it comes about, depends on some subject in becoming, and so has a material cause of its effecting in the way in which it can naturally come about. But what this causality is it is not necessary to declare again; for it is altogether the same as in substantial causality, proportion being kept.

9. How material cause is said of the substantial and the accidental.—But someone can ask whether material cause is said univocally of that which is of substance and of the material cause of the accident. And the reason for doubt can be that the material cause of the accident in itself is either more perfect or equally perfect with the material cause of substance, for it is either an integral substance, or a form, or at least matter itself; therefore also in the notion of material cause it is either more perfect or at least equally perfect, because in this causality the cause offers itself and its being; therefore, if in itself it is equally perfect, it will also be so in the notion of cause. But on the contrary is the fact that the being which results from this causality is not being simply, but in a certain respect, namely accidental being. Likewise the production or generation of an accident is only production and generation in a certain respect. Likewise the union of the accidental form with the subject is only in a certain respect, as being accidental; but actual material causality consists in the actual union itself, or uniting, in so far as it depends on the subject; therefore this causality with respect to the accident is only in a certain respect. And so it must be said that material cause formally, in the notion of cause, is said analogically of these causes and more principally of the cause of substance; but materially the thing which causes accidents can be either equally or more perfect. But this is not enough for it to be more perfect in the notion of cause, even if through itself it enters the composition of the whole accidental composite, because the notion of cause is not to be taken thence, but from the actual causality which it exhibits and from the formal being which arises thence.