Disputationes metaphysicae

1. This question supposes that among created substances there are some incorporeal ones, that is, lacking this quantity of bulk which bodies have, which is to be proved by us below in treating of separated substances. This, then, being supposed, this question has seemed necessary for explaining universally material causality about substance, or for assigning the limits by which it is enclosed, or for designating a certain property by which it can be discerned.

Various opinions

2. In which some have erred, saying that material causality is not limited to corporeal things, but is found also in incorporeal ones. Which opinion can be understood in two ways. The former is that it be understood of matter of the same notion with the matter of corruptible things. In which sense Avicebron held that opinion, in the book Fons vitae, as St. Thomas reports and declares, I, q. 50, a. 2. But this sense is easily rejected from what has been said, besides some things which we shall immediately subjoin. Because we have shown that the heavenly bodies on account of their incorruptibility cannot consist of this matter; but incorporeal substances are incorruptible and more abstracted from such foreign alterations than the heavenly bodies; therefore.

3. In another sense, then, that opinion can be understood of matter of another specific notion from this our matter, yet of the same generic notion with the matter of corporeal things; so that that matter which in fact is said to be in incorporeal things is of itself capable of corporeal bulk and quantity, if the form admits it. And in this sense that matter is said to be of the same common notion with the matter of corporeal things, although it differs in state and actually lacks corporeal bulk by reason of the form. Which too Avicebron asserted, in the cited place. But this sense too is improbable, because it is connatural to corporeal matter to be under quantity and under it or through it to be divided into parts; therefore it is impossible that any substance by its nature consist of matter of this kind lacking corporeal bulk. The consequence is evident, both because such matter cannot be without quantity, at least in a connatural way; but no substance can naturally consist of matter and not have it in a connatural state, but in a prodigious and miraculous one; and also because such an incorporeal substance would consist of a portion or part of matter distinct either from the whole matter of corporeal substances, as St. Thomas argues in the cited place, or also from the matters of other incorporeal substances, as Cajetan adds in the same place. But it is repugnant to this matter according to its common notion to be divided into parts except by means of quantity.

4. But someone can say that it is not of the notion of this matter taken in common to have quantity, nor positively (so to speak) to postulate it as a property necessary to itself, but only to be indifferent to having or not having it, according to the exigency of the form. But this first of all is foreign to all philosophical reason, because we have never experienced matter of this kind except under quantity; therefore this matter is not only capable of quantity by its nature, or can admit it if the form is not repugnant, but also by its nature postulates to be under quantity, indeed can scarcely be understood without it. And this is confirmed, for, if in matter there is capacity for quantity, it cannot naturally lack it on account of the form; for this would most of all happen when the form was spiritual; but we see in man that the form is spiritual and the matter is not on that account deprived of its quantity. But moreover I argue a priori in this way, for either that matter of incorporeal substances would be in its entity indivisible and lacking entitative parts integrating it, or it would have entitative parts yet penetrating one another on account of the lack of quantity. If the first is said, it plainly follows that such matter not only does not actually have quantity but is also altogether incapable of it, because to an indivisible thing to be extended through quantity is repugnant, as is self-evident from the terms themselves; such matter, therefore, will not agree with the matter of corporeal substances even in this common genus of corporeal matter or matter capable of quantity. But if the second is said, it is repugnant (at least naturally) that that matter be separated from quantity, both because the matter of corporeal things does not postulate quantity for any other reason except because it is divisible into parts; and also because neither is there in nature any indication or vestige of such matter, nor can it easily be conceived, as I was saying, as existing in that way, especially by its nature.

5. Otherwise, then, there could be thought out (and let it be the third mode of speaking) in an incorporeal thing a composition from altogether spiritual and indivisible matter, so that, as there is given a substance composed of corporeal matter and form, and a substance composed of corporeal matter and incorporeal form, so also there can be given a substance composed of incorporeal matter and form. For what is repugnant to there being given such a composition in a spiritual substance? And Alexander of Hales reputes this opinion probable, II, q. 20, memb. 2, at the end, and q. 44, memb. 2, where he distinguishes a twofold matter, namely elemental, heavenly and spiritual; and Bonaventure, In II, dist. 3, a. 1, q. 1 and following; and he truly speaks of proper matter as it is an essential part really distinct from form; and Richard holds the same, in the same distinction, a. 1, q. 2; and Aureolus there is reported for the same opinion; and Plotinus taught the same, Enneads IV, 2, c. 5, where he says that the depth of each thing is matter, even in the intelligible world. Proclus held the same, in the Elements, proposition 210. Of the philosophers Aristotle is cited for this opinion, Metaphysics II, text 12, where he says that everything which is moved has matter; and the Commentator, Metaphysics XII, text 20, saying that matter is the cause of potency in things in which there is potency, namely passive, signifying that all things which are in some way in potency have matter; which he has also in Physics VIII, text 15. And Avicenna has the same, Metaphysics II, c. 2. Whence, Book IV, c. 2, he says that everything which has being after non-being has matter. But of the Fathers Augustine, De mirabilibus sacrae Scripturae I, c. 1, says that God from formless matter, which he first founded from nothing, divided the multiform species of all visible and invisible things, that is, sensible and insensible, intellectual and lacking intellect; and Confessions XII, cc. 20 and 21, among other expositions of those words: In the beginning God created heaven and earth, he posits this one, namely: God made the formless matter of the spiritual and corporeal creature. Damascene too, De fide II, c. 3, says: although some creatures are said with respect to us to lack matter, nevertheless whatever is other than God is gross and consists of matter. And Boethius, book De unitate et uno, says that the angel is one by the conjunction of matter and form; and De Trinitate I, c. 3, he says that a form which is without matter cannot be the subject of accidents.

6. From all which this opinion gathers that there cannot be given a created substance which is a pure subsisting form, because there is no created substance which, although it is in act by reason of form, is not in potency so that it can be and not be, which belongs by reason of matter. Likewise, there is no created substance which cannot act and undergo or be moved; but the first belongs by reason of form; therefore the second belongs by reason of matter, because the same potency according to the same simple notion cannot be active and passive, because it cannot according to the same be in act and in potency. Finally no created substance can be pure act; therefore neither pure form; therefore it must consist of matter and form. Nor yet is this composition repugnant to a spiritual thing, because it is not repugnant to understand an indivisible and incorporeal substantial entity which in its genus is pure potency and depends on some informing substantial act. For, just as an integral spiritual substance is in potency to proportioned accidental forms, so there can be given a partial spiritual substance which is in potency to a proportioned substantial form. Finally, as in forms there are grades, why can there not also be in matters up to the spiritual grade?

7. This opinion is without doubt false; yet it has two parts. One is that the causality of matter is necessary in every created substance, however incorporeal. The other is that this causality at least is not repugnant to it. Since, then, the former part is more easily attacked than the latter, one must speak of it separately.

Resolution of the question

8. I say, then, first: it is not of the notion of created and complete substance that it have an intrinsic material cause of which it is composed. All the authors suppose this conclusion who teach that in fact there are given created substances not composed of matter, namely angels. So think almost all the scholastics, In II, dist. 3; and St. Thomas, I, q. 50, a. 2, and Contra Gentiles II, cc. 50 and 51, and the question De spiritualibus creaturis, a. 2; Marsilius, In II, q. 2; Henry, Quodlibet V, q. 16; Hervaeus, Quodlibet XI, q. 3; and it is the express opinion of Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, c. 4, and On the Divine Names; and without doubt Damascene thinks the same, Book II, c. 3; Aristotle too, Metaphysics XII, c. 6, clearly teaches that the intelligences are abstracted from matter, although in this he seems to exceed, making them pure acts, of which matter we shall speak below in its place. Now the assertion posited is proved by reason, because neither from the notion of created substance as such, nor from the properties or effectings of such substance, can the necessity of this composition or material causality be gathered; therefore there is no such necessity. The antecedent as regards the former part is evident, because of the notion of substance as such it is only that it be being per se subsisting or by its nature apt to subsist. But that such a substance is created adds only dependence on another, and consequently that such a substance is finite and is not of itself necessary being nor altogether simple; but this whole notion of created substance is excellently saved and understood without composition from matter and form, or from substantial act and potency really distinct; therefore. The assumption is proved, because, in order that a substance be not altogether simple, metaphysical composition suffices, either of nature and supposit, or of being and essence, of which we shall speak below, besides which there is also composition from genus and difference; which also suffices for such a substance to be understood to be finite; nor does such composition indicate true composition from matter and form, because it is not necessary that genus and difference be taken from parts of the substance really distinct, as was said above. Finally, in order that such a substance depend, it is enough that of itself and from its intrinsic essence it is not being in act, but through the efficiency of another; but this can belong to a substance by the very fact that it has some composition from being and essence, or from the mode of dependence and the thing which depends; therefore for the notion of created substance proper composition from matter and form is not necessary.

9. But the other part of the antecedent is proved, because it is not repugnant that the same thing be in act in the genus of substance and be in potency to accidents, as we shall say more fully in the following disputation. And it is briefly evident, because with respect to diverse things act and potency are not repugnant. Indeed, by the very fact that a created substance does not have through itself every perfection, it follows that after substantial perfection it is perfectible through accidents; and this is to be in potency to them. Next, if such a substance is living and most of all intellectual, through the same real faculty it can have the power of acting and of receiving, as through the same will it can elicit and receive the act of willing; and in the same way it can move itself, not by reason of matter but by reason of its proper substance; therefore these are not sufficient indications of proper composition from matter and form, because they do not necessarily require it; but besides these there are no other indications of such composition which are necessarily found in every created substance; therefore there is no necessity of attributing this composition to every created substance.

10. The rational soul includes no matter.—And this discourse is confirmed and declared from the rational soul separated from matter; for that is a created substance, dependent and not altogether simple, and able to understand, to will and to move itself; and it is capable of all these without composition from matter and form. Whence the authors of the contrary opinion, compelled by this example, indicate that this composition is found also in the soul; but this is very foreign not only to natural principles, but also to those of faith. For either they understand that the soul, even while it is in the body, is composed of spiritual matter and form; but thence it follows that the soul is not the true form of the body, both because the soul will per se be a complete and integral substance, as composed of proper substantial matter and proper form; and also because it will not be able to inform the body through its matter, because matter is not actuating act but the first subject of form; nor yet through its form, because the same form cannot at the same time inform two matters, nor have a connatural and intrinsic transcendental relationship to them. Or they understand that the rational soul, as soon as it is separated from the body, receives some spiritual matter to which it is united and in which it is preserved; and this is equally false and erroneous. For thence it follows, first, that the rational soul is not truly preserved separated. Secondly, it follows that the creation of new matter is necessary in order that the soul can remain outside the body, because that matter could not pre-exist before; otherwise it would have had either to be without form, or something else to be corrupted in order that the rational soul could remain outside the body. All which are absurd. Indeed moreover it follows that it is not necessary that such a soul sometime return to the body; for, if it already has a proper and more perfect matter which it informs, why must it be deprived of it in order to return to the body? Especially because that composite of such matter and soul would by its nature be incorruptible. In no way, therefore, can it be said that the rational soul consists of matter and form.

11. An objection is met.—But someone will say that the reason is not the same of the rational soul and of the complete substances of which we are now treating; for that, since it is incomplete and by its nature instituted to inform matter, it is not wonderful that it is wholly form and does not consist of matter; but it can be otherwise in complete substances, which so subsist per se that they cannot inform matter. But this difference stands in no way; rather, from this, that the rational soul, although it is an incomplete substance, because it is incorporeal can be per se subsisting without matter and operate in itself and move itself—from this (I say) we infer that it is not repugnant that there be given complete incorporeal substances which do not consist of matter and can operate in themselves and move themselves. And the reason of this consequence is that, just as in the soul the same thing can be the principle of effecting and of receiving motion and accidental act, so in those complete substances. And just as the separated soul does not need matter for its acts and motions, so neither will a complete and incorporeal substance need it. And from elsewhere matter is not necessary for the notion of complete substance as such, for God is a complete substance without matter; nor from the precise fact that a substance is created does it postulate that its completion be from the composition of matter, as has been demonstrated; therefore.

12. And hence arise two other reasons excellently confirming the conclusion. One reason is St. Thomas’s, in the cited place, because it is not repugnant that there be given a complete created substance having a simple operation independent of matter; therefore it is not repugnant that there be given a substance having complete being without matter. The consequence is proved, because being is for the sake of operating, whence it is proportioned to operation and operation to being: if, therefore, a substance in no way needs matter for operation, neither will it need it for its complete being; all the more because such matter could confer nothing to the being or subsisting of the form; because the form, as is supposed, would be incorporeal, therefore independent in being of any subject whatever and per se subsisting, as is our soul; therefore such a form will need matter neither as regards being nor as regards operating; therefore it cannot by its nature be the act of matter, but act per se subsisting, as a complete substance. But the antecedent is proved, because it is not repugnant that there be given a purely intellectual created substance; but intellectual operation per se and by its nature is independent of all matter, as is proved at length in De Anima III; and it is briefly evident, both from its object, for it embraces under itself every being however abstracted from matter; and from its mode, because of itself it abstracts from time and place and from all composition; and finally from the primary intellectual substance, which is God, in whom there is no genus of matter, and from the lowest, which is man or the rational soul. For, although this soul is the act of the body, of whose ministry it can in some way use for its mental operations, nevertheless per se and formally the rational soul does not need any matter for intellectual operations; whence separated it exercises them without any matter; if, therefore, it is not repugnant that there be given a totally intellectual created substance, it will not be repugnant that there be given a created substance lacking composition from matter.

13. The other reason is taken from the likeness of the effect to the cause, at least according to the common and analogous notion; since, then, God is a simple complete substance, it will not be repugnant that there be given a substance similar to God in this perfection, at least as regards the lack of composition from parts really distinct; for every likeness to God which does not conflict with the notion of an equivocal and dependent effect, or which from elsewhere does not conflict with the notion of being as such, can be communicated by God to some creature; of which discourse we shall say more below in treating of created intelligences.

14. A material cause is repugnant to incorporeal substance.—I say, secondly: it is altogether repugnant that there come about an incorporeal creature having a true substantial material cause. I do not find this conclusion so expressed in the authors; for they only say that the angels lack all matter; yet, in so far as they gather this from this, that they are incorporeal, they plainly suppose that composition from matter, of whatever kind it is feigned to be, is repugnant to incorporeal substance as such. But the assertion can be proved, first, from the effect, or rather from the end, because composition from matter cannot belong to any substance except in so far as it is connatural to it; but nature does not postulate composition from matter except on account of some use or end consonant both with the composite and with the form, for matter is for the sake of form; but incorporeal matter can be of no use to an incorporeal form; therefore. The minor has been sufficiently proved in the preceding assertion; for an incorporeal form does not need matter absolutely in order to be, nor yet in order to operate intellectually, as was proved there; nor in order to be moved locally, as the example of our separated soul also proves. And the reason is that local motion can be received in any subsisting thing whatever having a finite and limited place, whether that thing is composite or simple. Nor can another genus of operation be feigned for which such matter would serve, because in incorporeal matter there cannot be senses, nor any mode of knowledge which is not better exercised through the form alone; nor yet could there be an act of vegetative life, since an incorporeal substance is incorruptible; such a mode of matter, therefore, is most inept for every use of nature; therefore it cannot be connatural to any substance; therefore it is simply impossible; for matter either is part of a nature, or is not matter. Likewise, if some matter is possible, a form too is possible which would be its natural act; therefore to the composite of both such a material cause will be connatural; if, therefore, to no form or composite can matter of this kind be connatural, neither can it be absolutely. But the a priori reason seems to be taken from the nobility of the grade and order of incorporeal substance, for that order of things is more actual than all corporeal and extended substance; and therefore it is repugnant that there be given in that order a substantial entity after the manner of pure potency needing a substantial form really distinct in order to be able to be.

Matter and quantity mutually infer each other

15. From these I infer that matter and quantity are related inseparably and reciprocally, so that every composite of matter is necessarily quantified, and also every quantified body is necessarily composed of matter; for this latter part was proved in the preceding section, but the former is evident from what has just been said. Whence it consequently comes about that quantity is compared to matter as its property, for, since they inseparably accompany each other, it is necessary that they have among themselves some natural connection; but since matter is substance and quantity accident, they cannot be connected otherwise than as property and essence, root or foundation. Indeed, if we speak of a real and physical property, we shall find no other in matter; for, if anything else is wont to be assigned, either it is not a property but the essence, as to be potency to form; or it is not a positive property, but one which declares the same essence through negation, as to be ingenerable and incorruptible, to be of itself formless and in some way unknowable, to lack active power, and similar ones. Or finally it explains through metaphor only the same essential capacity of matter, as to have appetite for form. But quantity is a true and real property having a proper entity (of which we shall speak below in its place), naturally and necessarily conjoined with the entity of matter. And it is very proportioned, for it is most apt for receiving and undergoing, and of itself is not ordered to acting anything. But here immediately grave questions offer themselves, namely, whether quantity is so a property of matter that it is coeval with it, and whether it emanates from it or by means of the form, and whether it is subjected immediately in it or in the whole composite; but these questions are not necessary for the present disputation, and will have a more convenient place in the following one.

16. A small doubt.—Answer.—It can only be doubted in this assertion, if quantity and matter follow each other, how, the notion of matter being varied, the notion of quantity is not varied; for we have said that the matter of incorruptible bodies is distinct from the matter of corruptible ones; but no one will say that the quantities are of diverse notions. But if it is said that quantity follows matter as such according to its generic notion, it will remain to be inquired what property follows this and what that matter in so far as it is such, or how upon the generic notion of matter a specific property follows, and yet upon the specific notions of matter no property follows. To this it must briefly be said that it is no inconvenience that two natures or matters distinct in species, in so far as they are in some way similar among themselves, have a common property; for this is frequent also in forms and complete substances. For just as two causes distinct in species can have an effect of the same notion, because they can have a common power, either formal or eminent, so two matters can have a common property on account of agreement in some condition of nature, although they do not agree simply in the whole essence. For all matters have extension and composition of integral parts, and in this they are altogether similar, and according to that notion the property belongs to them; but they have further that they are potencies to form, and according to this notion they differ through a diverse relationship to form. And according to this specific notion and distinction it is true that one matter does not have some peculiar accidental property distinct from quantity or from the properties of another matter. Nor is this inconvenient, because matter, since it is pure potency, does not need other properties or faculties.

Solutions of the arguments

17. A place of Augustine is expounded.—Damascene is explained.—Boethius is expounded.—To the arguments of the other opinion the answer is that Aristotle, when he says that all things which are moved have matter, speaks of physical motion, in which one part of the mobile traverses space before another. But the Commentator and Avicenna proceed in that error that all the intelligences are necessary and eternal beings. To Augustine: first of all that work De mirabilibus sacrae Scripturae is of an uncertain author; next St. Thomas, sole question De spiritualibus creaturis, a. 1, ad 4, explains that Augustine is not speaking of matter properly as it is part of the essence, nor of substantial formlessness, but of matter as it expresses any substance or subject accidentally formless. Whence by formless matter in intellectual nature he understands nothing other than intellectual nature itself not yet illuminated by the Word. Or perhaps the author of that book thought the angels to be corporeal. And in this way Capreolus answers, In II, dist. 3, q. 1, to the other place of Augustine from the books of the Confessions, that that exposition is according to the opinion of Plato, who thought the angels to be corporeal; especially because Augustine does not approve, but only reports, that exposition. But Damascene openly thinks that the angels are immaterial, although in comparison with God he calls them gross and material, not because they consist of matter, but because they are in some way composite and potential. So almost St. Thomas, q. 50, a. 1, ad 1. But Boethius, in the former place, either thought the angels to be material, or speaks broadly of matter and form as they are sometimes said of any potency and act whatever, whether they be genus and difference or essence and being. But in the latter place he either speaks of pure form which is pure act, as Capreolus expounds, or speaks according to formal prescission, that form as form does not receive accidents, but in so far as it participates something of the conditions of matter, or of potentiality.

18. And from these last words the answer has almost been given to the reason of that opinion; for it is denied that a created substance not composed of true matter is impossible. To the first proof the answer is that it is false that every created substance can not be through an intrinsic passive potency, which belongs to things by reason of matter subject to privation; but if the discussion is of potency to not being through mere extrinsic denomination from the efficient cause, that does not require matter. To the other proof the answer is that the same living thing can move itself accidentally, or reduce itself to act, because for this it can be through its substance in eminent or virtual act and in formal potency, as was declared above in confirming the truth, and we shall say more fully in treating of the efficient cause.

19. To the last proof it has already been declared whence it is repugnant that there be given an incorporeal substance and pure potency in the genus of substance, namely from the eminence of that grade and order; and therefore it is not similar of potency to accidental forms, because a substance which is simply in act can be in potency to accidents; which is not potency to being simply but in a certain respect. Finally there is a diverse reason of form and matter, for form, since it is act, can deservedly be found in the incorporeal grade, and likewise the corporeal grade can participate the actuality of substantial form, because that order is not so imperfect that within it there is not found being simply in act constituted through form; but conversely matter on account of its imperfection cannot be elevated to the incorporeal grade.