Disputationes metaphysicae

1. The heavenly matter exercises its causality about the composite and the form.—It remains to speak of the material causality which the matter of an incorruptible body exercises. But above we distinguished two causalities of matter about substance: one, as regards its constitution; the other, as regards its effecting. Of the former it is certain that it is exercised by the heavenly matter about its composite and consequently also about its form. For that composite is such that it essentially consists of its matter and form; therefore it depends essentially on it as on an intrinsic and essential principle and composing material cause. Likewise the form of the heaven is such that it cannot be preserved outside its matter; it therefore depends on it in being as on a subject in which it is sustained; that matter, therefore, exercises its causality about such a form. From which it also comes about that that matter exercises this causality by means of the union of the form of the heaven with that matter, for that union too depends essentially on such matter, and by means of it the form and the whole composite depend on the same matter; nor besides it is another mode necessary which would be the causality of such matter, as can easily be proved from what has been said above; for as regards this the reason is the same of the incorruptible and the corruptible body.

2. Whether in the effecting of the heaven matter in some way concurred.—But of the other causality as regards effecting there can be a difficulty, whether in any true sense the matter of the heaven can be said to concur in its genus of material cause to the effecting of the heaven. And the reason of the difficulty is that the heaven, and universally an incorruptible body, comes about only through creation; therefore its effecting is from nothing; therefore no material cause of that effecting can be given; for those two are repugnant. And it is confirmed, for the effecting of the heaven is (so to speak) the total effecting of the substance of the heaven, even as regards matter; but matter cannot be the material cause of the effecting of itself; for this is repugnant in every genus of cause except the final, because in the others to cause supposes to be; therefore matter cannot be the cause of the effecting of the heaven. But on the contrary is the fact that, when the heaven comes about, its form comes about dependently on matter, for in being it depends on it; therefore also in becoming; therefore the effecting of the whole heaven depends on matter. This last consequence is proved; for the effecting of the whole composite depends on the same material cause on which the effecting of the form depends, especially when the form is such that it does not come about except united to matter; but the effecting of the form of the heaven depends in the genus of material cause on matter; therefore also the effecting of the whole composite. The minor is evident from what has been said, for, if the form depends in becoming on matter, then its effecting depends on matter. Likewise because that form is such that it cannot naturally come about except united to the subject. Whence it comes about by the same action by which it is united to the subject, and is united by the same action by which it comes about; but a uniting action depends essentially on the subject to which the union comes about; therefore. But the major too seems clear, because the composite does not come about except through the union of form with matter; therefore, if that action depends on the subject, the effecting of the composite too depends on the subject. Likewise, by no other reason does the corruptible composite come about through an action dependent on matter except because its form comes about or is united to matter through an action dependent on it; but it has been shown that the same happens in the incorruptible body; for I suppose that the form of such a body is not subsisting but material and dependent on matter, which form does not properly come about, but is co-produced with the composite; and therefore by the same action by which it comes about and is united, the composite too comes about.

3. This difficulty does not proceed of the creation of the heaven in so far as it is terminated at its matter; for so it is evident that matter is not its material cause, but its term. It proceeds of that production of the heaven in so far as it is formally terminated at its form and at the union of the form with matter, and at the composite in so far as it results from it, namely whether that action as regards that part (so to speak) has a proper material cause; for the arguments made in the latter place seem to convince the affirmative part. Whence someone could think out that, as an incorruptible body is composed of two parts, so its effecting is composed of two parts or partial dependences, of which one is terminated at matter absolutely, the other at form as informing matter, and so at the composite as such. For action is proportioned to the term, with which it is identified; therefore, as the term is composite, so also the action or dependence. That action, therefore, by reason of that part which is terminated at matter, does not have a material cause, as has been said; but as regards the other part it seems to have it, and this seems sufficiently proved by the arguments made. But in this opinion it is difficult to explain whether those are two actions or one; for, if they are two, one will be the creation of matter, the other generation or eduction of the form from the potency of matter; but if it is one, it will be as it were mixed and composed of creation and eduction, and it does not appear how those two partial actions are united to compose one.

4. Wherefore it can be said otherwise that that action is one and indivisible, by which the whole incorruptible body is produced primarily and per se and the parts are co-produced, which action cannot have a material cause because it is altogether from nothing. And so it comes about that the matter of these bodies in no way concurs materially to their production. But in this opinion too it is difficult to believe that an action terminated at a composite thing is in itself indivisible. For the reason made above seems to prove the opposite, because action is identified with the term produced; therefore, as the term coalesces from parts, so it is necessary that the integral productive action of the term itself arise from the partial actions productive or co-productive of the parts of the term itself.

5. In how many ways an action can be indivisible.—It is to be noticed, then, that some action can be called indivisible in two ways: in one way, because it is not composed of parts, as the creation of an angel is indivisible; and in this way the production of the heaven cannot be called indivisible, as the reason made rightly proves. In another way an action can be called indivisible by its nature, because, although it consists of parts, it nevertheless cannot come about except indivisibly or inseparably, nor can one part come about or remain without the other, nor by itself alone, but together with the whole action. And in this way I think that the action by which the heaven is created and its matter and form are concreated is one and indivisible. For, whatever may be the case with absolute power, which we shall see below, nevertheless from the nature of the thing the creation of the matter of the heaven so depends on the actual information or uniting of the form that that effecting of matter cannot naturally be without the company of the other partial action by which the form is introduced into it; nor conversely can that introduction of the form come about by itself after the manner of a total action, but only after the manner of a part composing one total action together with the production of matter. In which the effecting of an incorruptible body differs from the production of a corruptible body; for in a corruptible body the action by which matter is created can remain the same, the action by which the form is induced being varied either in number or also in species, although it is necessary that some remain or succeed; and conversely the action inductive of the form can come about by itself after the manner of a total action, as generation comes about, as we shall declare more fully below in treating of the eduction of form.

6. The proposed difficulty is solved.—This, then, being supposed, to the proposed difficulty it must be said that that integral and indivisible action absolutely and simply does not depend on matter in the genus of material cause, because to the action as such no subject is supposed; nevertheless it must be confessed that that action, as regards that part by which it is co-productive of the form, depends on matter as on a subject and material cause; for the discourse made above rightly proves this. Nor yet does it thence follow that that action as regards some part is generation or the proper eduction of the form from the potency of the subject, for this notion belongs only to an action which can come about by itself and separately and after the manner of a total action; but that partial action is to be called concreation, because by its nature it is part of one total action which is true creation. Nor is it repugnant to concreation as such to depend on a subject and material cause as regards that notion or part according to which it is called concreation; just as also, in so far as it is the partial concreation of matter, it depends in its own way on the form and its union. Which is nothing else than to say that there is given a certain total creation which consists of material and formal parts, proportioned to the parts of which its term consists; which is most true. And so satisfaction has been made to all the reasons for doubting, and all these will be better understood from what is to be said below of creation and of the eduction of substantial form, where I shall say more of this difficulty.