Disputationes metaphysicae

1. Since it is evident from what has been said that nothing is found in the Scriptures which is repugnant to the incorruptibility of the heavens and to their creation from nothing, it follows that that opinion which affirms that the heaven has matter of a diverse notion from the matter of generable things is more consonant with philosophical doctrine and in nothing repugnant to Catholic doctrine. But it can next be asked which of these matters is more perfect; for they are not equally perfect, since they differ in species, as was said above.

2. And indeed, comparing the matters of the heavens among themselves, it is certain that that matter is more perfect which by its nature is destined to receive a nobler form. It is proved, because that potency is nobler which by its nature is ordered to a nobler act; but any matter of the heaven is ordered to its form as to the act adequate to it; therefore that is nobler which is to the nobler form. Nor does any probable reason for doubting occur in this.

3. But the difficulty is in comparing the matter of generable things to the matter of incorruptible things as such, which of them is less perfect. And the reason for doubting is that they are related as exceeding and exceeded; for the matter of the heaven is determined to a certain most perfect form, but the matter of inferior bodies is indifferent to even most imperfect forms. Again, the matter of the heaven is always and necessarily conjoined to its act; whence it comes about that, both according to its entity and according to its union to its act, it is altogether incorruptible; but the other matter, although according to its entity it is incorruptible, is nevertheless changed according to union. Thirdly, the former matter is not subject to privation; whence neither according to that notion can it be corrupted; but the latter is always subject to some privation, indeed to infinite privations according to which it can be corrupted, as Aristotle said, Physics I. Fourthly, the former matter is always fully satisfied, because it is always fully actuated; whence it does not desire another form besides that which it has; wherefore it does not have appetite after the manner of desire, but only after the manner of love and rest; but the other desires and as it were longs for other forms which it does not have, and therefore it is called both base and maleficent by Aristotle, Physics I, text 81, and is said to be the principle of corruption, Metaphysics VII, text 22.

4. But the matter of corruptible things surpasses the heavenly in this, that it is simply capable of a nobler form than the latter; indeed it seems to be capable of the noblest form of all which can be, namely the rational soul; but this excellence alone seems of greater moment and to pertain more to the absolute perfection of matter than all the others enumerated. For the perfection of a potency is to be weighed not from any act whatever, but from the noblest; therefore, although the matter of generable things is capable of several forms, among which some are more ignoble than the heavenly forms, nevertheless, because in that whole order of forms there are others, or at least one, nobler than all the heavenly forms, this is enough for this matter to be judged absolutely nobler. And it is confirmed, because the matter of generable things also exceeds in the amplitude and capacity of its potency, which too per se confers to the perfection of passive potency; as the intellect, because in the genus of cognitive potency it is the most perfect potency, can receive more forms; therefore, if from elsewhere it is adjoined that that amplitude of matter embraces under itself the noblest form, such matter will be absolutely nobler.

5. The heavenly matter far more excellent than the inferior.—Nevertheless all the authors who distinguish these matters think that the heavenly is nobler; indeed commonly this matter of generable things is reputed the lowest of all things which can be, even by the absolute power of God, within the genus of substance. Which Richard thinks, Quodlibet II, q. 5; and Giles, Quodlibet III, q. 5; Durandus, In II, dist. 12, q. 1, and in the same place Richard, q. 2; and Scotus inclines to it, q. 2, on the arguments, although he is doubtful; Thomas of Strasbourg holds the same, In I, dist. 44, q. 1, a. 2; Abulensis, on Matthew 22, q. 222. And the reason is that, speaking in genus, the greatest imperfection is that of passive potency, if it is compared with the perfection of act of the same genus; therefore among substantial passive potencies that is the most imperfect which of itself is most passive, and so most indifferent to receiving any act whatever, whether perfect or imperfect. And it is confirmed and declared in this way; for the matter of generable things can be preserved under the least form; it is therefore a sign that it is of the least perfection and entity. Finally, the matter of the heavenly bodies is incapable of all alteration and foreign impression; it is therefore a sign that it is constituted in a higher order. Whence, although in active potencies perfection is attended to according to the most perfect act, not so in passive ones unless other things are equal; but the proper and adequate act of them, and chiefly the mode of actuating, is to be considered. In which too the heavenly matter exceeds, because it regards an act informing inseparably, but the matter of corruptible things regards a form informing separably; and therefore any heavenly matter whatever is more perfect than elemental matter.

6. Whether another matter can be lower than this lowest matter.—But that by absolute power no matter lower than this can be created is not so constant and certain; for, if we conceive a matter capable of the form of stone, for example, and so determined to it that it is incapable of all more perfect ones, that without doubt would be less perfect than the matter of generable things which now is. Nevertheless the common opinion seems more probable, because, as I said, this matter seems to be of the highest potentiality and near nothing, as Augustine said. Nor does a matter seem possible capable of one corruptible form which is not also of itself capable of others, both because all corruptible forms agree in this notion of informing separably, which is sufficient to constitute a certain ultimate species of matter, under which essential division cannot be understood; and also because, by the very fact that matter is conjoined to a corruptible form, it is subject to privation and consequently capable of diverse forms and contrary dispositions; and therefore such matter cannot be determined to a form, nor be capable of one without being also capable of all the repugnant ones which can of themselves drive it from the same subject. And therefore the matter of corruptible things is not only less perfect than that of the heavens, but also the lowest of all which can be.