Disputationes metaphysicae

1. In this matter there was the opinion of Avicenna that the matter of all bodies, both heavenly and terrestrial, both corruptible and incorruptible, is the same according to species; which opinion many of the theologians have followed, especially Giles in the places cited, and Scotus and others incline to the same. But this opinion can be defended in two ways. First, by asserting that the heaven is a corruptible body and of elemental nature, and in this way Plato taught it, as St. Thomas, to be cited below, also mentions; and Nemesius, book De natura hominis, c. 5, reports that Plato posited the heaven to be of fire and earth. Secondly, that opinion can be defended together with the incorruptibility of the heaven, and in each way it will be treated by us, although at present we rather suppose the incorruptibility of some superior bodies, and, that incorruptibility being supposed, inquire into their material cause. But the aforesaid opinion can be founded partly on natural reason, partly on theological.

2. The first metaphysical reason is that a specific distinction between matters seems impossible, because, on the testimony of Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, text 49, it is act which distinguishes, especially specifically and essentially; but any matter is pure potency; therefore specific distinction cannot be found in it. And it is confirmed, because prime matter is the lowest substantial being that can be, and therefore is said by Augustine to be near nothing; therefore within the breadth of matter there cannot be specific distinction; otherwise, since two things diverse in species are necessarily of unequal perfection, one matter would be essentially more perfect than another, and so some matter would not be the lowest being nor supremely distant from God, which is repugnant to the imperfection of matter. For pure potency is extremely opposed to pure act, and they seem to be as it were the two extremes of the whole breadth of substances; whence, as in pure act there cannot be specific distinction, so neither does it seem possible in pure potency.

3. The second reason of the aforesaid opinion is that such a distinction is not necessary. For if anything compelled the introduction of it, it would be most of all the incorruption of the heavens; but not this. First indeed, because, although the heavens are never actually corrupted, it does not thence follow that they are incorruptible from within; for it can happen that, although by virtue of its substantial composition the heaven is corruptible, nevertheless in fact it is never corrupted, because, existing in its natural place and distant from all contrary agents, it is so disposed that it can resist all. Or secondly, because, although the heaven consists of this matter, it can be naturally incorruptible from within. Because prime matter alone is not a sufficient principle of corruptibility unless the form too is such that its union is separable from matter, which is wont to come from a twofold head, namely, either because it does not fill the whole capacity of matter, or because it is united to matter by means of dispositions having a contrary; which two reasons are found in the forms of generable things, but not in the forms of the heavens; for the form of the heaven, on account of its eminent perfection, virtually contains the inferior ones, and so through itself fills the whole capacity of matter, and moreover¹ is united to matter through dispositions not having a contrary; whence Aristotle proved the heaven incorruptible only from this, that it has no contrary. So, then, the reason is made up: for, in order that the heaven be incorruptible, it is enough that its union with matter be naturally indissoluble; but this can be without diversity of matter on account of the mode of information and of the dispositions; therefore on account of this cause it is not necessary to introduce that distinction of matters. Which can be declared by a theological example; for the union of the humanity of Christ to the Word is indissoluble, although that humanity of itself is capable of proper subsistence and lacks it, because the subsistence of the Word is such that it fills the capacity of the humanity and has no contrary; so, then, in the present case it can be understood of the information of the form of the heaven, even if it is in the matter of generable things. And it is confirmed, because otherwise, if on account of the incorruptibility of the heavens their matter had to be distinguished from inferior matter, by the same reason the matter of each heaven would have to be distinguished from the matter of the others, which seems very absurd; but the sequel is evident from parity of reason.

4. The preceding opinion is strengthened by a theological argument.—Thirdly, the theologians add a foundation taken from the first creation of things, which we cannot pass over here, in order that we may declare that metaphysics is not repugnant to theology. They say, then, that it is evident from the history of Genesis that God founded the heavens and the elements from the same matter, and therefore that there are no bodies which consist of distinct matters. The antecedent is proved from those words of Genesis 1: In the beginning God created heaven and earth, but the earth was void and empty, and darkness was upon the face of the abyss. Where Augustine, Confessions XII, c. 7, understands that by heaven the angelic nature is signified, but by the name of earth prime matter, from which all bodies were formed. But others, because that interpretation of the word heaven seems too metaphorical, say that by the name of heaven is signified the empyrean heaven, which is the seat of the blessed, of which many things are read in the ancient Fathers, as may be seen in Damascene, De fide II, c. 6; and Theodoret, Questions on Genesis, qq. 11 and 14; and Basil, Homilies 2 and 3 on Genesis; and Bede, in his Hexaemeron, at the beginning; and Chrysostom, expounding those words of Hebrews 8: A minister of the holy things and of the tabernacle of God, which God pitched and not man; and Hilary, on those words of Psalm 122: To thee have I lifted up my eyes, who dwellest in the heavens; and Diodorus, in Lippomanus, in the Catena on Genesis. But by the name of earth they say is signified prime matter, or the bodily mass from which God formed all bodies, in which they agree with Augustine. Which opinion Abulensis follows, on Genesis; and it is wont to be attributed to Bede, Strabo and Hugh of St Victor; and Theophilus of Antioch indicates the same, Ad Autolycum II, a little from the beginning; and Philastrius, in the book On Heresies, reports among the ignorances of certain heretics that they were ignorant of the twofold acceptation of earth: one, by which it signifies this element which we inhabit; the other, by which it signifies hyle, that is, invisible and uncomposed matter, which is as it were the womb of all things. Which opinion can be confirmed by a difficult place of Wisdom 11: Thy almighty hand created the world out of formless matter; this matter, therefore, was signified by the name of earth, and of it as of matter the whole world consists.

5. But others, since this interpretation of the name of earth too is very metaphorical and foreign to historical narration, understand properly that by that word is signified the element of earth which God created on the first day together with the empyrean heaven. They add, however, that together with them there was created water which filled that whole space which is interposed between the earth and the empyrean heaven, from which afterwards God created all the heavens and the element of fire and air; and so they conclude that all these bodies consist of the same matter. But they prove the assumption from those words immediately following: And darkness was upon the face of the abyss; for the abyss is copious water to whose bottom one cannot easily penetrate, as Basil declares on Genesis, and Augustine on Psalm 14. Whence it is immediately subjoined: And the Spirit of the Lord moved over the waters. The waters, therefore, were together with the earth and the heaven, and were procreated between the earth and the heaven; and since it is not likely that any space interposed between heaven and earth remained void, it is evident that the whole was filled with waters, because Scripture makes no mention of another body then procreated by which it could be filled. And so it is concluded that the heaven was produced from water. Which opinion those words of Peter favour, 2 Peter, last chapter: For this they are wilfully ignorant of, that the heavens were before, and the earth out of water and through water, consisting by the word of God. And the same Peter is reported to have said the same, disputing with Simon Magus, in the Recognitions of Clement, Book I, near the beginning. Finally the Hebrew word too by which the heavens are called Shamayim favours this opinion, for (as Jerome says, Epistle 83, to Oceanus) that name was taken from waters. But some add that that body by which the space between earth and heaven was filled was not the proper element of water, but watery matter, as it were a certain vapour or mist, according to that of Ecclesiasticus 24: As a mist I covered all the earth; and that of Job 38: Who shut up the sea with doors, when it broke forth as issuing out of the womb, when I made a cloud the garment thereof, and wrapped it in a mist as in swaddling bands? And from this misty matter they say all the heavens except the empyrean were created, and so it comes about that they consist of the same matter.

6. And this opinion is confirmed by another twofold opinion of Scripture. One is that there are true waters above the firmament, that is, above the eighth and starry sphere, as is evident from the same Genesis 1: Let there be a firmament in the midst of the waters, and let it divide the waters from the waters; and God made a firmament, and divided the waters that were under the firmament from those that were above the firmament; and in other places of Scripture mention is often made of waters existing above the heavens, as in Psalms 103 and 148, and in Daniel, in the canticle of the three children. From this opinion of Scripture, then, it is gathered that the heaven is not of another matter than the element of water, and was formed from water, and part of the waters was left above it. The other opinion of Scripture is that the heavens are sometime to be corrupted and burned by fire and transformed into a better substance, as Isaiah seems expressly to predict, cc. 51 and 65, and more clearly St. Peter, 2 Peter, last chapter, and it is indicated in many other places. Hence, then, it is rightly gathered that the heaven consists of matter capable of substantial change, and consequently has matter of the same notion with the matter of these inferior things.

The latter opinion, contrary to the former

7. The second opinion teaches that the matter of the heaven is of a diverse notion from the matter of these inferior things, or, to speak more universally and more metaphysically, that the matter of incorruptible bodies is necessarily of a diverse notion from the matter of corruptible bodies. So St. Thomas teaches, I, q. 66, a. 2, and I-II, q. 49, a. 4, and Contra Gentiles II, c. 16; and the authors cited in the preceding section follow it. Indeed even the Commentator, Metaphysics VIII, comm. 12, although he absolutely denies that the heaven has matter, nevertheless says conditionally that, if it has it, it is of a diverse notion. And this is without doubt the opinion of Aristotle in the places cited for the opinion of the Commentator in the preceding point; for in them he plainly denies that the heaven has such matter as these inferior things have; whence, since in other places he said that it has matter, it is necessary that he asserts it to be of a diverse notion. Which he affirms in almost express words, Metaphysics XII, text 12; and in this sense is commonly expounded what he says, Metaphysics X, c. 5, that the corruptible and the incorruptible differ in genus; for this is not true of the logical genus, since corruptible and incorruptible bodies agree in the genus of substance and of body; it must therefore be understood of the physical genus, which all understand to be matter, which is so called because it keeps that proportion to form which genus keeps to difference. Whence De generatione I, c. 6, he says more openly that things which cannot mutually act and undergo do not have the same matter. This opinion, therefore, is more consonant with philosophical doctrine; but in order that we may show it to be simply truer, we must proceed little by little according to the three foundations of the former opinion.

Specific diversity of matters is not repugnant

8. I say, first, that nothing is repugnant to the natures of things that there be given in substantial potencies and matters specific and essential diversity. It is proved, first, ostensively, from those things which were said above of the nature of prime matter. For we have shown that it has a true essence, real and substantial, and in the genus of being has its entitative actuality, although incomplete and with a relationship to form; therefore in that grade and mode of partial essence there can be diversity and greater and lesser essential perfection. The consequence is evident, because neither on the side of God is there impotence, nor on the side of the thing repugnance. For just as accidental passive potency can be diverse in species, because it is ordered to act diverse in species and genus, in the same way substantial potencies can be distinguished. Which is declared more fully; for some substantial forms are united to matter through the generation of the whole, which broadly can be called generable forms; but others are forms which cannot come about or be united through generation, but through creation or concreation only; therefore, if there is instituted a matter apt to receive only forms of the former kind and incapable of the others, it will be plainly of a diverse nature from matter capable of ingenerable forms; but it is not repugnant that matter of this kind be instituted with such a nature and capacity; therefore it is not repugnant that there come about matters of diverse natures and essences.

9. How act distinguishes is to be understood.—Secondly, this can be proved by solving the foundation of the first opinion and all the reasons by which its defenders try to prove that this is impossible. For when that principle is adduced from Aristotle, It is act which distinguishes, if we use the name of act in its whole breadth, we shall easily answer that one matter is distinguished in species from another through an intrinsic essential difference, which is compared to the genus of matter as metaphysical act; for we have already shown above that it is not repugnant to the pure potentiality of matter in the physical genus to be constituted of metaphysical potency and act. Nor is it necessary to have recourse to the analogy of matter in common with respect to matters of diverse notions, which Cajetan constitutes, I, q. 66, a. 2. For such an analogy is founded on no probable reason, since the essential notion of substantial potency belongs most properly to any matter whatever and without any relationship of one to another. And so, if we speak of metaphysical act, any matter whatever has in itself an intrinsic act by which it is distinguished from another, which is manifestly convinced from the essential distinction of matter from form; for, if it is act which distinguishes, it is necessary that matter have in itself an act by which it is distinguished from form. All the more because it is very probable that there is given a common, univocal and generic concept to matter and form, in that way, namely, in which genus can be found in parts, according to what was said above of universals; for of this kind seems to be the concept of nature, or of intrinsic and essential principle or cause; this genus, therefore, is divided through opposite differences as through acts; so, then, the common notion of matter can be distinguished through various differences. But if the discussion is of physical or real act, we can still distinguish entitative or formal act; and in the former way it is not necessary that any simple entity be distinguished from another of dissimilar nature through another act besides the very entity of the thing. Because a simple entity cannot be distinguished in the thing from another except by itself; for it is distinguished by the same by which it is. But speaking of the latter act, namely formal, then too every distinction can be attributed to it, in so far as it comes about either through it or through a relationship to it; for so the composite is distinguished through the form as through the constituting act; but one matter is distinguished from another through a relationship to a diverse generable or ingenerable form, as we have declared.

10. The matter of generable things is positively one.—And the conclusion is declared more fully, because specific unity with numerical distinction is not repugnant to prime matter; therefore neither will specific distinction with numerical unity be repugnant. The consequence is thence proved, because, just as it is act which distinguishes, so also it is act which gives unity and which constitutes the specific nature; for to constitute is prior according to reason to distinguishing. Likewise, because, just as the genus is compared as potency to the specific difference, so the species to the individual difference. And finally because numerical distinction too, since it is actual and real, must come about through act, as is evident from what was said above of the principle of individuation. But the first antecedent as regards each part is manifest. For as regards the former, all confess that all the matters of generable things are of the same species. First indeed, because they are altogether similar in essence, whence they also have the same definition. Secondly, because any portion of matter whatever is capable of all the forms of which another is, for any is the common subject of these transmutations; and therefore Aristotle rightly said that those things have one matter which are mutually transmutable, which must necessarily be understood of specific unity. Finally we proved at length above that the first material cause of generable things can only be one, namely according to species, which Aristotle teaches through the whole of Physics I, especially text 69, and the Commentator there and Metaphysics XII, comm. 14; and St. Thomas, I, q. 66, a. 2. Nor is the mode of speaking of some to be approved who say that the matter of generable things is one in species negatively, not positively; for they will have positive specific unity to be through form. But it is an inept distinction, for if they speak of unity as regards the formal, every unity is negative; but if as regards the foundation of unity, this is as positive in many matters as in many forms or composites, for it truly has a positive essence and a positive likeness or agreement in its whole essential nature. But as regards the other part too, about numerical distinction, the matter is most clear; for the bodies of two men differ in number, therefore also their matters, which distinction they retain even if they are deprived of their forms. Indeed even matters which are under forms diverse in species, although as regards the proximate dispositions they are said to differ in some way in species, as is taken from Aristotle, Metaphysics VIII, text 11, nevertheless as prime matters as regards their entities are only diverse in number, with which distinction they can be preserved without any form actually informing. Nor does it matter that this whole matter of generable things could be constituted under a form of the same notion and under the same continuous quantity, and so be one in number; for this unity or distinction in matter is such as is wont to be in homogeneous things, whose integral parts, if they are actually divided, are also several individuals simply and actually distinct in number; but if they are not disjoined but continuous, they are actually one in number and several in potency. So, then, it is evident that unity or distinction, both specific and generic or numerical, is not repugnant to the nature or essence of matter.

11. Matter is the most imperfect of all beings.—To the confirmation which was founded on the imperfection of matter the answer is, first, that it is probable that matter as such according to its common genus is so imperfect a being that nothing can be lower and more imperfect in the genus of substance, not only comparing genus to genus, which is most clear, but also comparing all and each of the things contained under the genus of matter to all the others which are contained under other genera or notions of substance. This is declared, for matter as such is distinguished within the breadth of substance both from form and from complete substance, either composite or simple; and in this way it is clear that the genus of matter as such is less perfect than the genus of form, and a fortiori than composite or complete substance. We can, however, further compare any form whatever with any matter whatever, and so it is not so evident that every matter is inferior to every form. For what if someone says that the matter of the empyrean heaven is a more perfect being than the form of earth? by what evident reason will this be demonstrated to be false? For that that form has more of the notion of actuating act does not seem sufficiently to convince, because accidents too have more of the notion of actuating act than matter, and nevertheless in their actual entity they are simply less perfect, because they absolutely confer less perfection in the genus of being. So, then, someone could say that that matter is better which as it were begins the most perfect body, such as is the empyrean heaven, than is the form which as it were consummates and completes the most imperfect body, which is earth. Nor does it stand in the way either that that matter is contained under a less perfect genus; for it often happens that a perfect species under a less perfect genus is simply nobler than some lowest species under a better genus, as the will is an absolutely more perfect power than sight, although this is contained under the genus of cognitive power, which is nobler. For the nobility of the genus is not to be taken from the comparison of all and each of the species, but either according to itself and comparing the precise notions, or certainly by comparing the supreme species of one genus to the supreme of another. But although this can be so disputed, nevertheless we admit as more probable that any matter whatever is inferior to any form whatever, because it is pure potency in the genus of substance, under which genus it can participate little perfection. Likewise, because otherwise someone could easily say that some matter is more perfect than some complete and integral substance, because, since it is posited to be more perfect than form and otherwise includes the whole perfection of matter, it can easily happen that at least intensively it exceeds in perfection some integral and composite substance, which is not likely. In this way, then, it is excellently explained that prime matter is the lowest being, not only by reason of this inferior matter of generable things, of which Augustine chiefly spoke when he said that matter is near nothing, but also by reason of the whole genus or the whole breadth of matter, for the whole pertains to the lowest grade of substantial being.

12. But it does not pertain to this lowest perfection of matter that in its breadth there cannot be grades or greater and lesser essential perfection, because it is not necessary that that perfection of matter be altogether essentially indivisible; for, as I have declared, it can be divided and contracted through various differences. Nor as regards this is pure potency to be compared with pure act, a manifest sign of which is that pure act is essentially one in number and singular, but not pure potency. But the reason is that pure act is constituted in itself through infinite perfection simply, including in itself every other perfection, to which infinity and containment multiplication both essential and generic is repugnant, as we shall see afterwards. But pure potency is not constituted through infinite perfection, as is self-evident, since it is of the lowest perfection; nor yet will it be constituted through the lack of all perfection, nor through the inclusion (so to speak) of all perfection, nor finally is it of the notion of matter as such that it have the lowest and indivisible physical perfection, for the notion of pure potency does not postulate this, and from elsewhere it does not have it. But here there immediately occurred to be asked which of these matters is less perfect; for they are not equal, as we have already conceded and as the notion of specific distinction seems to postulate. Again it can be asked whether there can be made another matter essentially less perfect than any created matter whatever, and consequently whether in these matters one can proceed to infinity. But these will be declared more conveniently in the following section.

The second assertion

13. All the heavenly orbs are incorruptible.—I say, secondly: if we regard reason alone, it is more probable that the matter of the heavens is of a diverse notion from the matter of generable things. To prove this conclusion we suppose that the heaven is ingenerable and incorruptible. Although, as I said, we are not treating in this place of the heaven as it were materially (so to speak), but formally of incorruptible body. But it is certain that it is not repugnant that there be given some incorruptible body, of which the proposed question proceeds, whether it is given in fact or not. Again, of some heavenly body, at least of the empyrean heaven, the theologians hold it as established that it is an incorruptible body, as is evident from the authors cited above. Finally, although of the inferior orbs many think that they are corruptible, and some of the ancient Fathers sometimes indicate this, and modern astrologers too think they demonstrate it from certain appearances of comets, nevertheless the opinion of Aristotle seems more likely to us, that all those bodies down to the heaven of the moon are by their nature incorruptible, both on account of experience—for we see corruptible bodies, either according to their whole selves or according to parts, either corrupted or altered, receiving foreign impressions or sometimes falling from their natural state; but by the most ancient experience it is established that the heavens, both according to their whole selves and according to all their parts, have remained integral from the creation of the world and are moved with invariable uniformity in the same way, and are not altered or cast down from their connatural state; from which experience arose the common consent of all nations thinking the heaven to be of itself perpetual, as Aristotle noted, book De mundo ad Alexandrum, and De caelo II, c. 1. And also because this is more consonant with the end for which those bodies were created, namely that they be certain universal causes which by their motion and uniformly variable influx may help all these inferior things to be preserved through continual succession and generation; but for this end it was necessary that the heavens be perpetual and be moved in the same invariable way. And finally because it is not repugnant that the heavens were created of an incorruptible nature, as is evident from what has been said and will be more evident from what is to be said; therefore it is more likely that they were created such; for, as I said, this is more consonant with their end and pertains more to the perfection and beauty of the universe, nor is there anything in divine Scripture which is repugnant to this philosophical reason, as I shall show in the following assertion. Indeed there are many expressions which favour it, as that the heavens are called most firm, 2 Paralipomenon 6, and most solid, Job 37, and eternal, namely for the future, Psalm 148, and 2 Corinthians 5.

14. Proof of the conclusion.—The answer of some is refuted.—This, then, being supposed, the conclusion posited is proved, because, if the heaven were composed of the matter of the elements, it would be as corruptible of itself as the elements themselves are. The sequel is proved, because the matter of the heaven would be capable of other forms, for example of the elements, and would lack them; therefore it would be subject to the proper privation of such forms, and consequently, as far as depends on itself, would desire them; but this is the whole root of the corruptibility of the elements; therefore. Some answer by denying the major, because matter, while it is under one form, is not capable of another, because it cannot have both at the same time, and therefore it does not properly have privation nor appetite of another, because it is content with the form which it has. But this is frivolous, for the capacity to several forms is not to be declared in the composite sense (as they say), but in the divided; for the same subject is capable of contrary forms, not because it can receive both at the same time, but because of itself it is indifferent to receive one or the other, and this is enough that, when it has one, it is truly deprived of the other, because it truly lacks a form of which it is capable. Otherwise neither would the matter of generable things be subject to privation, nor in any subject in which there is a form or positive quality would there ever be the privation of the opposite form, which is against the common sense and mode of speaking of all. Finally, the matter of generable things is not by any other reason the principle of corruption except because in this way it is capable of other forms which it lacks, and by that reason it is said to desire them, according to metaphor; for this appetite is not other than natural capacity, as was declared in the first prooemial disputation.

15. Others answer that the form of the heaven fills the capacity of matter on account of its eminence and virtual containment, and on account of this peculiar reason matter existing under such a form does not desire others, nor is properly capable of them. But this too is false, for the form of the heaven does not eminently and virtually contain all other forms; for it does not contain the rational soul, nor the other forms of more perfect living things, nor does the form of one heaven eminently or virtually contain the forms of the other heavens, supposing that they differ in species. Whence, when the form of the heaven is said to fill the capacity of matter, it can be understood intensively, and this is neither true nor enough, for the rational soul actuates matter more perfectly, and, since it is the most perfect, it alone can be said to fill intensively the capacity of matter, and nevertheless it leaves it so capable of others that it is a sufficient principle of corruption. It can be answered that the rational soul exceeds the form of the heaven in the grade of form, but is exceeded in the mode of informing. But we say that from this excess and mode of informing the diversity of matter is sufficiently gathered, and otherwise it cannot be explained of what kind that excess is, as will be more evident from what follows. Or, then, the form of the heaven is understood to fill the capacity of matter extensively, and this is impossible if that matter is of altogether the same notion and capacity with this our matter, because of itself it is plainly indifferent to all forms whose perfections the form of the heaven contains neither formally nor eminently. Wherefore it cannot happen that through itself alone and through its mode of informing it fills the capacity of such matter.

16. Another answer is that the capacity of matter can be considered in two ways: in one way, according to itself and as it were remotely; in another way, proximately and as it is reducible to act. In the former way they concede that the matter of the heaven is capable of other forms, as the argument made proves; and similarly that it has privation and as it were radical appetite; but proximately they deny that it has capacity, because that matter is already so effected, disposed and actuated that it is not reducible to another act, because it is not separable from that which it now has. But this comes partly from the dispositions which do not have a contrary, partly from the very information or mode of informing, which is such that it inseparably conjoins such form to this matter. But matter is the principle of corruptibility not as it is considered according to remote capacity, but as it is proximately disposed and affected. This answer indeed is probable, yet it does not so satisfy that the contrary opinion is not left more probable. First indeed, because, in order that the agent can alter the patient, it is not necessary that it suppose in it a positively contrary disposition, but it is enough that it suppose capacity with privation; for these, the form which the agent introduces being adjoined, are sufficient principles of natural change; therefore, although in the heaven there are not dispositions directly and positively contrary to the qualities of the elements, nevertheless, if there is in it matter capable of such qualities and lacking them, this is enough that the heaven can be altered by the elements and receive foreign impressions. You will say that the heaven has some noble qualities formally repugnant and resistant to all these inferior qualities. But this first of all is said voluntarily and without proof, and next from that answer it is at most had that the heavens cannot be corrupted because there is not in the inferior agent a power which can overcome the resistance of the patient; if, therefore, the active power were increased or rendered stronger, it could alter the heaven and dispose it to corruption.

17. And finally, although we granted that that mode of incorruption is possible, nevertheless it cannot be denied that it is an easier and nobler mode if the heaven is incapable of foreign impressions and forms not through the resistance of qualities, but through intrinsic and substantial composition. Since, therefore, the heaven was made so as to be abstracted from all these impressions and alterations and so that its matter never changes its form, it is more likely that it was made of itself incapable of all these forms and qualities, and so that the heaven is of another notion and order from all inferior bodies, not only as regards form but also as regards matter. But if someone says that this incapacity of foreign corrupting impressions is to be attributed neither to the incapacity of matter nor to resisting qualities, but to the mode of informing of the form, against this is the fact that, if the matter has the same capacity, it can scarcely be understood how through the mode of information alone the composite itself is rendered incapable of the inferior qualities, especially since the passive potency to receive these qualities belongs to bodies by reason of matter. And for this cause Aristotle, in the places cited above, deservedly thought that, as those things which are mutually transmuted have a common matter, so also conversely those which cannot be transmuted do not have a common matter, because diversity in form alone cannot suffice for this. To which is added that, although the form of the heaven has such a mode of informing that by its nature it postulates inseparability from the subject which it informs, nevertheless through this very thing it is sufficiently indicated that the matter subject to that form must be of a diverse notion, because potencies are distinguished through acts; but a form informing in that way is an act of a far diverse notion from a generable form, and postulates in the subject far diverse conditions, namely inseparability and full satiety, and (so to speak) perpetual rest under such act; therefore the potencies or matters ordered to acts of this kind are distinct.

18. All the heavenly orbs are ingenerable.—How many absurdities arise from the opposite.—Finally, reasons no less efficacious can be taken from this, that the heaven is ingenerable by natural generation; for hitherto we have weighed only its incorruptibility. If, then, the matter of the air and of the sun, for example, were of the same notion, the matter of the air would now be capable of the form of the sun and lacking it and desiring it, for there is no less reason of it than of the other forms of which it is the act. Therefore, as far as depends on the side of the material cause, the heaven is truly generable from air; therefore it is simply generable. The consequence is evident, both because this denomination is most of all taken from the side of matter, and also because to natural passive potency there corresponds natural active potency, otherwise such a potency would be superfluous and idle in the nature of things. Or certainly, although in fact such an active power were not given, it would nevertheless not be repugnant that it be given within the order of natural agents. And so, as far as depends on itself, the heaven would be naturally generable. Rather, no reason could be given why the heaven itself or the sun could not generate something similar to itself from matter applied to it, because there is given in nature a subject containing that form in potency and lacking it; therefore that form is makeable through eduction from the potency of such a subject; therefore it is finite both in its being and grade and in the mode in which it can come about; therefore it can be educed through the finite power of a natural agent; why, then, is there not in the heaven or in the sun such a power of generating something similar to itself? certainly no philosophical reason can be assigned. Since, therefore, the heaven is ingenerable, its form is such that it can neither be educed from the potency of matter nor be united through generation; therefore it is not contained in the potency of that matter which is the subject of generation, nor does it regard it or can actuate it; therefore conversely the matter which is subject to such a form is by its nature a subject incapable of generation, and consequently is of a diverse nature from the other matter which is the subject of generation. And these reasons, although they have been made by way of example about the matter of the heaven, nevertheless proceed universally and formally of a body incorruptible from within, which will be more confirmed by solving the second foundation of the former opinion.

19. The second foundation of the former opinion, then, has been solved from the confirmation of the preceding assertion; for we have already sufficiently shown how from the incorruptibility of a body, if it is altogether natural and intrinsic, the diversity of matter is inferred, and all the things which are touched upon in the discourse of that foundation have been treated and dispatched by us one by one. But the example which is adduced there of the indissoluble union of the humanity of Christ matters nothing to the present matter; for we do not deny that some union can be indissoluble by its nature, but we say that such a union of form with matter is an indication of diversity not only in the form but also in the matter, both because potency is proportioned to act, and also because such a union postulates matter incapable of foreign impressions.

The matters of the heavens are compared among themselves

20. But in the confirmation of that foundation a special difficulty is sought about the matters of the heavens, whether they too differ in species among themselves; in which we can speak either supposing that the heavenly bodies are of the same species, or on the hypothesis that they differ in species; and, as I have often said, it matters nothing to the present question what in fact is truer in this, for it is enough to speak of the possible, in which there is no doubt that there can be given incorruptible bodies both of the same and of diverse species. If, then, we speak of bodies having forms of the same notion, no question remains that the matters too must be of the same essential notion, because they have nothing whence they would be distinguished. Nor can such agreement in matter stand in the way of the incorruptibility of such bodies, because like does not undergo from like; whence between such bodies there cannot be natural action and transmutation, nor does the matter of one desire the form of another, since they are of the same species. And as regards this the reason is the same of diverse bodies as of diverse homogeneous parts of the same body; but the parts of the same homogeneous body have distinct portions of matter, yet of the same notion, as are the forms. But it is not improbable that this singular matter of such species is naturally co-adapted and proportioned to this singular form and has with it a peculiar bond and proper individual relationship, although this is uncertain and matters little to the present point.

21. The difficulty, then, touched upon in the aforesaid confirmation proceeds supposing a specific distinction between bodies of this kind, whether that intervenes between integral bodies, such as are, for example, the empyrean heaven and the heaven of the moon, which it is far more likely differ in species, or whether they are related as parts of the same body, as are the stars with respect to the other parts of the heavenly bodies. Of all these, then, there is the difficulty, because, if the reason made is efficacious, it proves equally that the matters of all incorruptible bodies differing in species are also different in species, which seems incredible.

22. The opinion of some on this.—In this matter the disciples of St. Thomas are divided, for Capreolus, whom Soncinas and others follow, does not think that that consequent is to be admitted, because, in order that matters be diverse in species, it is not enough that the forms be distinct in species, since it is evident that in these inferior things the same matter receives various forms; it is necessary, therefore, that there be diversity in the mode of informing; but all the forms of the heavens agree in the same mode of informing inseparably and of filling the appetite of matter; therefore, although those forms differ in the essential grade, nevertheless the matter of all is one, because it regards all as it were under one formal notion which is taken from the mode of informing, as the matter of inferior bodies is one because it regards several forms in so far as they agree in another mode of informing, namely separably. Whence Aristotle, although he said that the corruptible and the incorruptible differ in genus, never said that incorruptible things differ among themselves also in physical genus; therefore they do not differ in matter. Finally all those bodies, as they are incapable of corrupting alterations, so they are capable of those changes which do not bring corruption, as local motion and passive illumination; it is therefore a sign that they have matter of the same notion.

23. The matter of the heavenly orbs is diverse in species among themselves.—But Cajetan concedes the sequel of the argument and teaches that all incorruptible bodies diverse in species have not only forms but also matters diverse in species. And in that opinion he speaks more consistently, because the reasons made have the same efficacy in the present case. For if the matter of the crystalline heaven, for example, is of the same notion with the matter of the empyrean heaven, it is therefore naturally capable of its form and of all the dispositions which are required for it; therefore the form of the empyrean heaven, as far as depends on itself and on the side of such a subject, can be educed from its potency; therefore the empyrean heaven is naturally generable, and conversely the crystalline heaven will be naturally corruptible and transmutable into another. The consequence is evident, because matter is said to be of itself indifferent to all those forms and to be determined to them through the proper dispositions of each; therefore there will be as great a repugnance between the dispositions as between the forms; therefore through those dispositions that matter can be prepared to cast off one form and receive another. Nor for this transmutation does positive and perfect contrariety seem necessary, but proper privative opposition with natural repugnance and incompossibility of the forms and of the proper qualities or dispositions will suffice. But if on the side of natural passive potency this whole is true, no reason can be brought forward why the natural active potency corresponding to that passive potency is impossible; indeed neither can a reason be given why in fact it is not found in the heavens. Therefore, that such bodies are mutually impassible by such a passion as would dispose to corruption or generation comes from this, that each has a proper matter so accommodated and commensurated to its proper form and its dispositions that it is altogether incapable of others; whence it necessarily comes about that the matters of these bodies are as diverse in species as their forms.

24. Wherefore, although it is true that all the matters of the heavens agree in this, that they are ordered to a form informing inseparably, nevertheless this agreement cannot be specific in them, but generic, and from it specific diversity is inferred. For, in order that each matter be inseparably conjoined to its proper form, it is necessary that by virtue of its entity and essence it can contract a natural bond with that alone; for, if it were indifferent, by this very fact it could dismiss its form and cohere to another repugnant one. Therefore to regard a form informing inseparably is nothing other than to regard determinately a proper and unique form; and conversely, that the form informs inseparably is because it regards such a potency which is content with that act, nor desires another, because it is not capable of another. Nor can it be understood by any other reason that each form of the heaven satisfies the appetite of its proper matter. There is, therefore, in this a great dissimilitude between the matter of corruptible and incorruptible things, for the former regards a separable form for this reason, that of itself it indifferently regards several forms repugnant among themselves; whence the very separability of the forms requires unity in matter and such a capacity which is not altogether filled by one or another form. But the matter of each heaven regards an inseparable form for this reason, that it does not regard another but its own, and therefore it is satisfied by it, because it is not capable of others nor indifferent, but by virtue of its essence is determined to such a form. Nor can Aristotle be repugnant to this opinion, since he said generally that those things differ in matter which are not mutually transmutable. But that he said in Metaphysics X that the corruptible and the incorruptible differ in genus does not prevent incorruptible things themselves too from being able to be said to differ among themselves in physical genus, if this is nothing other than to differ in matter; but if by that expression something more is indicated, then by a special reason corruptible bodies will be said to differ in genus from incorruptible ones rather than incorruptible ones among themselves, because, namely, those are of diverse orders, but these constitute one grade. Likewise the matters of the heavens and of the elements differ in a certain way in physical genus, because one matter is the subject of generation, but the whole other matter is incapable of generation; and so there is also a greater specific and subaltern likeness between the matters of the heavens among themselves than with the matter of these inferior things. And that agreement is enough for them to be able to agree in some local or perfective changes, as is self-evident. And so satisfaction has been sufficiently made to the foundations of the others and our opinion confirmed.

The third assertion, by which the testimonies of divine Scripture are satisfied

25. The empyrean heaven far incorruptible.—I say, thirdly: it cannot be gathered from the divine Scriptures that the heavens were made from the matter of the elements, and consequently there is nothing in sacred Scripture which is repugnant to the proposed philosophical truth. This assertion indeed exceeds the limits of metaphysics; we cannot, however, pass it over, both in order that we may satisfy the foundations of the opposite opinion, and also in order that we may briefly touch upon the material cause of the whole corporeal universe and its condition, in which not only the theologians but also the philosophers have laboured from the beginning. First, then, as regards the empyrean heaven, the conclusion is beyond controversy; for the theologians who admit that heaven teach that in the first moment of the creation of things it was created together with the earth, and that it is either signified or at least comprehended in those words: In the beginning God created heaven. Whence, at least as regards this body, all the things said of the matter of the heaven proceed without any theological difficulty. On account of which the theologians also teach that that heaven at the end of the world will neither be burned by fire nor renewed, because it is always most pure and most clear, as becomes the seat of the blessed. But the philosophers could know nothing of the existence of that heaven, because it has neither motion nor illumination nor manifest influence by which it could be investigated by mortals through human discourse.

26. The inferior heavenly orbs created from nothing together with the empyrean.—But of the other heavens the conclusion is proved, because no reason compels that by the name of heaven in the cited words one heavenly body only be understood, and that the supreme and empyrean; for the frequent and usual mode of speaking has it that by the name of heaven simply said the whole order of heavenly bodies is comprehended. Which custom is also frequent in Scripture, all the more because that singular is plural in Hebrew, since the word Shamayim lacks a singular; and in another place it is translated in the plural, Psalm 101: In the beginning, O Lord, thou foundedst the earth, and the heavens are the works of thy hands; where it is signified that all the heavens were founded together with the earth. Nor does it stand in the way that a little after in the same c. 1 of Genesis the firmament is said to have been made on the second day and called heaven, and the sun, the moon and the stars to have been created on the fourth day; this (I say) does not stand in the way, both because it is more probable that these were not created on the second and fourth day as regards substance, but only as regards certain accidental functions, as we shall indicate a little later; and also because that firmament of which mention is made on the second day is not one of the incorruptible bodies of which we are speaking, as we shall immediately declare. It is more likely, therefore, that by the name of heaven Moses comprehended all the heavenly orbs, and spoke most of all of this visible heaven which is seen by human eyes; for this he chiefly did in that work, that he might show God the creator of all visible things, as Jerome noted, Epistle 139 to Cyprian. It is not, therefore, to be believed that Moses began his narration from the creation of the invisible heaven alone; he comprehended, therefore, under that word all the visible heavens, as Basil too interprets, Homily 2 on the Hexaemeron. Indeed it is sufficiently probable that by the name of heaven he comprehended all bodies down to the air inclusively; for it is frequent in Scripture that by the name of heaven the air is comprehended, Psalm 103: Stretching out the heaven like a skin, who coverest the higher rooms thereof with water. And frequently in Scripture mention is made of the birds or fowls of heaven, that is, of the air; and in the same place of Genesis it is said: And God called the firmament heaven; which firmament either is a certain part of the air or includes the air. Just as, therefore, a little below it is said: And he called the dry land earth, and nevertheless by the same name (as it were by anticipation) he called it in the beginning, so too of the name of heaven it can fittingly be understood.

27. And hence it is further gathered that it is no argument that the heaven was created from water, or that the whole space from the surface of the earth to the empyrean heaven was full of waters, because in that first narration Moses made mention only of heaven, earth and waters. This (I say) argument is not efficacious. First, because it has already been declared that by the name of heaven he comprehended all the superior bodies down to the air. Secondly also, because the exposition of many Fathers is probable who understand by the name of spirit the air to be signified, where it is said in the same place: And the spirit of the Lord moved over the waters, as may be seen in Theodoret, q. 8 on Genesis, and others whom Lippomanus reports in the Catena on Genesis. Thirdly, because the exposition of many is also very probable who think that by the name of earth Moses comprehended the four elements disposed in their natural sites and proper order. Which is the opinion of Basil and Bede in the Hexaemeron, and Damascene, De fide II, c. 5, and the more common opinion of the theologians; for, just as by the name of heaven he could comprehend the whole superior world, so by the name of earth the whole inferior world, understanding the intermediate things from the extremes. Especially because (as the philosophers say), one of contraries being posited in the nature of things, it is necessary that the other too exist; whence, mention being made of the creation of earth, fire too, extremely contrary to it in site and lightness, is understood as created, and in them the intermediate things are comprehended; or certainly under earth and water are comprehended air and fire, which in the first qualities are extremely opposed to them. I add finally that, if from this, that in those words: In the beginning God created heaven and earth, the element of earth alone was expressly named, it is rightly gathered that air and fire were not then created, by equal reason it could be gathered that neither was water then created, because neither is this narrated of it, but it is immediately subjoined: But the earth was void and empty, and darkness was upon the face of the abyss, etc. Whence some heretics took occasion to say that God did not create that abyss of which mention is made there, nor that invisible and uncomposed earth, because of these it is not said that they were created, but that they were, namely before the creation of things came about. And they said that by those words is signified that ancient chaos which the philosophers or poets thought out, or the prime matter which Plato thought uncreated, from which they said God created heaven and the elemental earth. Which exposition is heretical. It is necessary, therefore, that under heaven and earth we understand water too; whence, just as the immediately following words: But the earth was void and empty, are not understood of another earth than that which was created in the beginning, so the abyss of waters of which mention is made in the same words is understood as created in the same beginning together with the earth; therefore it is necessary that under those words: In the beginning God created heaven and earth, something else is comprehended besides that which the words expressly signify; therefore by the reason by which water is comprehended, the other elements too will be comprehended.

28. The received exposition of the Greeks and Latins.—And indeed, if we understand that by the name of heaven is signified the whole heavenly body down to the aerial heaven, by the name of earth earth and water are excellently signified, which are so conjoined that they in a certain way compose one body and the inferior world. Nor does it matter that in that beginning in which they were created they were not so disposed, nor had altogether that site which they now have; for it is enough that, when Moses wrote, they were already so constituted that he could speak of them after the manner of one. But if by the name of heaven only the proper heavenly orbs are understood, under the name of earth the remaining elements are comprehended by the reason already said. And so in each way it is concluded that by the name of heaven and earth there is comprehended the whole universe consisting of simple bodies as regards their substance, yet without the adornment and disposition which it now has. And this is the more received exposition of the Greeks and Latins on Genesis; nor does it displease Augustine, City of God XI, c. 33, and Contra Maximinum II, c. 3, although he sometimes adds something more, which does not pertain to the present disputation.

29. From these it is evident that no argument can be gathered from the history of the creation of the world by which it may be persuaded that the heavens and the elements were founded from the same matter; but if it is not had thence, it cannot be gathered from any other testimony of Scripture; but each will become more manifest by answering the third foundation of the former opinion. That exposition, therefore, which understands by the name of earth prime matter and says that from it all bodies except the empyrean heaven were formed is Augustine’s as regards the former part, but not as regards the latter. For, although he understands by the name of earth prime matter, it does not thence follow that he understood that the matter from which the heavenly and terrestrial bodies were formed is one and the same, but only that each was created from some formless matter. All the more because the same Augustine, book De Genesi contra Manichaeos, c. 7, judges that by the name of heaven and earth is signified the formless matter from which heaven and earth were formed, which he says is so called not because it already was this, but because it could be; therefore by the same reason it can be understood that Augustine thought that some diversity preceded in the formless matter itself, on account of which it was called by those distinct names. But (as regards the matter) that whole exposition of Augustine is very metaphorical and foreign to the historical sense, which must be proper and not turn aside to metaphors, especially obscure and unusual ones. Whence it is one thing to say that by the name of heaven the angels are comprehended, not excluding the proper sense of the word but adding that the contained is comprehended in the containing, or the located in the place; another to say that by the name of heaven the angelic nature alone is signified, which is incredible because that metaphor is very obscure and unusual, especially since in the same chapter it often signifies a visible body; but much more incredible is it that by the name of heaven formless matter is signified. And the same almost holds of the name of earth, which in that whole chapter signifies the element of earth, and this is its only proper signification, which must not be excluded, although under it water too or the other elements are comprehended, as we have explained. And this is, as I said, the common sense of the Fathers; indeed Tertullian, book Against Hermogenes, c. 21, vehemently inveighs against him because he interpreted formless matter by the name of earth. Likewise otherwise the name of abyss and the name of waters too would signify formless matter, which is very repugnant to the certitude and truth of the history.

30. The place of Wisdom 11 is expounded.—But to the place of Wisdom 11: Thy hand created the world out of formless matter, the answer can be given in two ways; first, so that those words out of formless matter do not signify a material cause pre-existing in the order of time to the creation of the world, but only in the order of nature, so that they do not properly signify the material cause of creation itself but of the things created, so that the sense is: Thy hand created the world consisting of formless matter, which the same hand of thine founded in order that from it it might form the whole world. Which exposition is consonant with the doctrine of Augustine, who in other places says that the formlessness of matter preceded the creation of bodies not in time but in nature, as we shall see below. But according to this interpretation it is not necessary that that word out of invisible matter, or formless (as the Greek has literally), signify some lowest species of matter, but matter absolutely, whether it is of one genus or species. Secondly and more literally, the answer is that the Wise Man is not speaking there of the first creation of things, which was made not from matter but from nothing, but of the adornment, disposition and distinction of things by which this world was founded and constituted in that state and beauty which it now has. For, although the Latin Vulgate translates created, it does not take that word in that rigour in which it signifies production from nothing, but as it is also wont to signify any effecting whatever; and so the Greek word κτίζω, which corresponds there, signifies generally to fabricate and to found. Whence by invisible matter is not understood there prime matter (of which divine Scripture never made express mention), but all the simple bodies are signified from which God constituted and adorned this world, in the way in which stones and timbers are wont to be called the matter of a house, and universally the thing which is supposed for action or fabrication is wont to be called the matter of the action. But that matter is called formless not by substantial formlessness absolutely and simply, but either by accidental formlessness on account of the lack of light, motion, etc., or also by some substantial formlessness, because the forms of mixed bodies had not yet been introduced into matter; and by a peculiar reason it could be called invisible matter on account of the darkness which was upon the face of the abyss. But this exposition can be declared from Paul, who seems to have alluded to the aforesaid words of the Wise Man when he wrote to the Hebrews 11: By faith we understand that the worlds were framed by the word of God, where, on the testimony of Cajetan, he notes that Paul is speaking of the work of distinction and adornment, and therefore does not say that all things were created, but that the worlds were framed, because in six days God framed and disposed this world that from invisible things, that is, from hidden and unadorned bodies, both on account of the darkness and because the earth lay hidden under the waters, visible things might be made, that is, might be constituted in that state in which they could be seen; and both simple and mixed bodies, and especially living things, could enjoy this visible world.

31. An inference to be noted.—Moreover from what has been said it is also evident that it is not gathered from the history of Genesis that that whole space which lies between the empyrean heaven and the earth was first full of waters, in order that from them the heavens might be procreated. For the abyss is sufficiently said of the whole element of water which then surrounded the earth and was enveloped in darkness; but above it were air and the other heavenly bodies. But those words of St. Peter: The heavens were before, and the earth out of water and through water consisting, do nothing to the matter, both because there the discussion is not of the ethereal heaven but of the aerial, and also because not the heaven but the earth is said to consist by the word of God out of water and through water, not indeed as regards its substance, but as regards the state which it now has, so that it is habitable and can be fruitful, as I expounded more fully in tom. II of the Third Part, disp. 57, sect. 2. But that the Hebrew name by which the heavens are named was taken from waters is not because the heaven was founded from water, but because the heaven was interposed between the waters, that it might divide the waters from the waters.

32. Watery vapour was not the matter of the bodies situated between the empyrean and the earth.—A place of Ecclesiasticus is expounded.—Nor is the other opinion more probable which says that all things except the empyrean heaven and the earth were made from watery vapour; for, if that watery vapour is something distinct from water, it is repugnant to Scripture, which says that water was created above the earth, not watery vapour. It is repugnant also to reason, because that vapour can only be some imperfect mixed body; but it is against reason to say that mixed bodies were made before simple bodies. Whence it is also repugnant to all the ancient expositors, because they made no mention of that watery vapour created in the first instant with heaven and earth. Nor do the testimonies of Scripture which are asserted to confirm it effect anything; for what Wisdom says of itself, Ecclesiasticus 24: As a mist I covered all the earth, is expounded literally in two ways. First, so that there is not signified some peculiar work of the divine wisdom, but its presence and majesty by which it fills all the earth, which is declared through the likeness and metaphor of a mist, as in the thing itself God sometimes showed his presence in the appearance of a cloud in the tabernacle; and according to this sense mist in the said testimony is not of the ablative case, but of the nominative. The other sense is that it is said not formally (so to speak), but effectively, that wisdom covered the earth with a mist; and so it can be referred to the first creation of the world, when darkness was upon the face of the abyss; or it can be referred to the continual succession of darkness and night after the illumination of the sun, which the immediately preceding words seem to indicate: I made that in the heavens there should rise light that never faileth, and as a mist I covered all the earth.

33. Where a place is elucidated.—But the other words of Job 38: Who shut up the sea with doors? etc., only commend the divine omnipotence by which on the third day of the creation of the world it gathered the water into one place, which on the first day as it were broke forth, so as to surround the universal earth. But when it is subjoined: When I made a cloud the garment thereof, and wrapped it in a mist, nothing else is signified but what is said in Genesis 1: And darkness was upon the face of the abyss. But someone can take occasion from that place to think that the water was then surrounded by some most dense cloud which was the cause of that darkness, and therefore that a cloud is said to have been as it were the garment of the water, etc. Which opinion, although it be admitted to be true, it is not necessary to feign that that cloud filled all the superior places up to the empyrean heaven, but only that it was next to the water in a density and magnitude which would suffice to wrap the water in mist. But if perhaps it was so done, the reason of the darkness which was then upon the face of the abyss is easily given; yet the reason is not easily given why God willed to create that cloud in the first instant and to cover the water with it. Nor do those words compel us to understand a cloud properly; for the misty and dark air which surrounded the water could through metaphor be called a cloud. But if this is so, the cause of the darkness could be either because God did not put light into the sun in the first instant, or because he did not concur with it to illuminate. However this may be (for this does not pertain to the present matter), no matter can be assigned, nor any body, from which the heavenly bodies and the elements were founded.

34. Whether there are true waters above the firmament.—To the other confirmation about the waters above the firmament, many things being omitted which can be disputed about that question and are learnedly treated by Benedict Pereira, On Genesis I, in the work of the second day, that opinion has always pleased me which denies that there are above the ethereal heavens true and elemental waters, because the opposite does not have a sufficient foundation in Scripture, which being taken away it is evident that that opinion is foreign to all philosophical reason. The major is now only shown by declaring the place of Genesis; for it is evident from the opinion of all interpreters and from the propriety of the word raqia that the firmament does not signify one body only, but this whole expanse of the heaven, both aerial and ethereal, of which whole it was said: Stretching out the heaven like a skin. But since in that expanse there are various parts, something is sometimes attributed to it according to the supreme part, as when God is said to have placed the stars in the firmament of heaven, but sometimes according to the lowest part, and so God is said to have placed the firmament, that is, this lowest region of the air, in the midst of the waters, namely the rain waters and the terrestrial. And in the same way it is added in the cited place: Who coverest the higher rooms thereof with water; for he calls them higher with respect to us, not with respect to the supreme bodies; and of these waters and the aerial heaven all the places of Scripture in which mention is made of waters existing above the heavens can be expounded with the greatest ease. And Jeremiah sufficiently indicates this interpretation, c. 10, saying: He that maketh the earth by his power, that prepareth the world by his wisdom, and stretcheth out the heavens by his knowledge. At his voice he giveth a multitude of waters in the heaven, and lifteth up the clouds from the ends of the earth; and c. 5 [recte 51]: When he uttereth his voice, the waters are multiplied in the heaven; he lifteth up the clouds from the ends of the earth. Some object that in Genesis 2, paradise having already been founded, it is said: The Lord had not yet rained upon the earth; whence they gather that the rain waters could not have been elevated and divided from the inferior ones on the second day. On account of which some concede that the vapours and clouds were not raised on the second day to the middle region of the air, but only that the air was designated to divide the waters from the waters. But this does not please, both because Scripture says that on that day the division of the waters was made, and also because, this division and elevation of the waters being excluded, that designation of the air is nothing but perhaps some extrinsic denomination. Nor do I see the force of the inference of that argument; for watery vapours are not so disposed as soon as they ascend to the middle region of the air that it rains at once; especially since it is written in Job 26: Who bindeth up the waters in his clouds, so that they break not out and fall down together.

35. Of what kind the change of all things on the day of judgement will be.—The last confirmation of that opinion was taken from the renewal of the world to come on the day of judgement, in which the heaven is to be burned according to Scripture, of which matter I disputed at length in tom. II of the Third Part, disp. LVIII, sect. 2, where I showed that on the day of judgement the heavenly bodies are not to be changed according to their substances, but only according to some accidents pertaining to the perfection of the state of glory, and that the fire of the conflagration will not ascend above the aerial heaven; where we also expounded at length the place of Peter and the other testimonies of Scripture, which it is not necessary to repeat here.