Disputationes metaphysicae

1. Hitherto we have explained the material cause only in generable and corruptible substances, in which it is better known on account of continual transmutation; now it remains to be seen whether this genus of cause is also in incorruptible bodies. In which matter many questions are contained. The first, whether there is matter in the heavens (for by the name of incorruptible bodies we understand these). The second, of what kind it is, and in what it agrees with or differs from the matter of generable things. The third, how it exercises material causality with those bodies; and although the first two questions are physical and are wont to be treated in the books De caelo, nevertheless for explaining the third, which is proper to this place, the others must necessarily be premised.

The first opinion, of the Commentator

2. Concerning the proposed question, then, there was the opinion of the Commentator, denying that there is in the heaven the composition of matter and form. So he has it, Metaphysics VIII, comm. 12, and Book XII, comm. 20, and De caelo I, comm. 20, and in the book De substantia orbis, cc. 1 and 2. And all his followers follow him: Jandun, De substantia orbis, q. 1; Zimara, theorem 107; Cajetan of Thiene, Physics I, q. 21; and of the scholastics Durandus and Gabriel and others, In II, dist. 12, where St. Thomas too inclined to the same opinion, q. 1, a. 1, and in the disputed question De spiritualibus creaturis, a. 6, ad 2, and In Metaph. VIII, c. 14. This opinion is founded chiefly on various testimonies of Aristotle, on account of which Scotus, In II, dist. 14, q. 1, confesses that it is the opinion of Aristotle, although he does not approve it. The first is Metaphysics VIII, text 14, where he says: Nor is there matter of all things, but of those whose generation and transmutation are into one another; but of those which are or are not without being transmuted, there is not matter; and in text 4 of the same book he says: It is not necessary, if something has local matter, that it also have generable and corruptible matter, that is, which is the foundation of generation and corruption, which with him seems to be the same as matter composing substance, as I shall immediately show. And in the same sense he seems to subjoin, text 12, that perpetual substances either do not have matter, or not such, but only that which is movable according to place; and Book IX, text 17, he says that in perpetual things there is not potency to being simply, but only to where: Otherwise (he says) there would also be potency to not being; for every potency is a potency of contradiction. Finally Metaphysics XII, text 10, repeating the same opinion, he says: Whatever things are changed have matter, but diverse; for even of the everlasting things themselves, whichever are not generable but movable by local motion, have matter, yet not generable, but from whence to whither.

3. The reason of this opinion is that the philosophers did not arrive at the knowledge of matter except by way of transmutation, the proportion being taken from artificial or accidental transmutation to substantial; therefore in these substances in which there is no vestige of substantial transmutation matter is not necessary, nor can there be any foundation for asserting it. Secondly, this reason is declared more fully, because nature makes nothing in vain; but in the heavens this composition from matter is not necessary for any end; for in these inferior things, because there were to be continual generations and corruptions, on account of their contrariety matter was necessary, which would be their first subject and foundation; but since the heavens were instituted to be perpetual, as they were founded without contrariety, so also without that composition which is proper to those things which, as they are composed, so can be dissolved; for a simple entity is more apt for perpetuity than a composite one. Thirdly, because, if there were any sign of matter in the heaven, it would be most of all because it has quantity; but this is not a sufficient sign, because it is not repugnant that there be made an integral substance physically simple and capable of quantity; therefore quantity is not a sufficient sign of material composition. For, if that substance is possible, let God make it; therefore then the extension of quantity would not be a sufficient indication of material composition in such a substance; therefore neither is it now in the heaven. For why shall we not say that such is the substance of the heaven? For, if such a quantified substance is possible, it is better and more perfect if it is simple than if composite, other things being equal. Again, such a substance will pertain to the beauty and perfection of the universe; for there are in the universe certain simple substances not quantified, and other substances composite and corporeal; therefore, in order that there be in the universe the variety of all things or grades, it fits excellently that there be some substance simple as regards physical and essential composition, but quantified and composed of integral parts; therefore of this kind are those eternal bodies, which on this side seem to approach more nearly to the mode of existing of simple substances.

4. But that what is assumed in this reason is not repugnant, namely that there be given a substance not composed of physical and substantial act and potency and capable of quantity, is proved, because no repugnance is involved in these terms or conditions, nor can any reason be given on account of which such a being would not be comprehended under the breadth of creatable being. You will say that every substance is either form, or matter, or composite; therefore a substance which is neither composite nor capable of matter will be a subsisting form; therefore intellectual; therefore incorporeal; therefore it is repugnant that there be a substance simple and corporeal; whence it is the same to say an immaterial and corporeal substance as to say an immaterial and material substance. And it is confirmed (and it comes almost to the same), for every substance is either potency, or act, or composed of potency and act; but that substance would not be substantial and receptive potency, otherwise it would be matter; nor would it be composed of act and potency; therefore it would be subsisting act; but such act is not capable of quantity, otherwise the way is closed for proving that angelic substances are not capable of quantity. But these reasons do not seem sufficiently to show a repugnance; for the former division of substance into matter, form and composite is not adequate to substance in common; for Aristotle, when he hands down that division in De Anima II, at the beginning, and Metaphysics VII, text 7, plainly speaks of informing form; but in this way angelic substance is neither form, nor matter, nor composite; there, therefore, inferior substance, or substance in some way subject to generation and corruption, is divided. Otherwise, in order that the division be adequate to every substance, in place of that member, namely composite substance, complete substance would have to be posited; for every substance is either complete, or incomplete after the manner of potency, as matter, or after the manner of act, as form. But complete substance is again to be divided into composite of matter and form and simple according to the negation of such composition; but this can further be subdivided into incorporeal, which is so simple that it excludes even the composition of integral parts, and corporeal, which would have the composition of these parts without composition of the essential principles of matter and form; for no reason is brought forward on account of which it is repugnant that the same complete substance have one composition without the other.

5. Wherefore that repugnance, by which such a substance would be material and immaterial, seems to consist only in words. Whence that word material can be distinguished; for properly it signifies a thing composed of matter which is pure potency and of form, and in this sense that simple substance would not be material but rather immaterial, this privative word being taken in the contrary and proportioned signification; but in this way immaterial and incorporeal will not be convertible, according to the aforesaid opinion. But because integral parts are reduced by Aristotle to the material cause, therefore that word can be taken more broadly, and every substance which has integral parts can be called both material and in some way composed of matter. And in this sense that substance of which we are treating would not be called immaterial but material; for immaterial taken in the proportioned signification will be said reciprocally with incorporeal. Nor are these significations unusual, for the form of wood is called material although it does not consist of matter, because it is extended; but the form of man by the contrary reason is immaterial. But the other division of act and potency also suffers equivocation; for, if by the name of subsisting act is understood an integral substance which does not need another substantial and intrinsic act in order to be in act, in this way we concede that that simple substance of which we are treating would be subsisting act; yet we deny that such subsisting act cannot be capable of quantity; nor on that account is the way closed for proving that angelic substances are incapable of quantity; for this is not to be proved from the common notion of subsisting act in that signification, but from elsewhere, namely because they are more perfect and indivisible and intelligent acts. Whence, if by the name of subsisting act is understood a substance so perfect that it altogether recedes from the conditions of matter and from composition of integral parts, then we deny that that division is adequate, or that that simple and corporeal substance is subsisting act. And this is the whole probability of this opinion, according to which it is to be denied that the proper substantial material cause of which we are treating is found in heavenly or incorruptible bodies, but only reductively, in so far as integral parts, as I said, are reduced to the material cause. For it cannot be denied that corporeal substance necessarily has this composition; for the contrary involves a clear repugnance.

The second opinion, of St. Thomas

6. The second principal opinion is that all bodies, even incorruptible ones, are composed of true and proper matter which is substantial physical potency to form. This is the opinion of St. Thomas and his disciples, I, q. 66, a. 2, and In De caelo I, lect. 6, and In Phys. VIII, lect. 20; Capreolus, In II, dist. 12, q. 1; Soncinas, Metaphysics XII, q. 7; Javellus, Book VIII, q. 12; Soto, Physics II, q. 1. Scotus too holds it, in the place cited; and Giles, In II, dist. 2, and Hexaemeron I, c. 4 and following; Ockham, In II, q. 22; St. Bonaventure, In II, dist. 12, a. 2, q. 1. Avicenna too held it, Sufficientia I, c. 6; Paul of Venice, in the Summa de caelo, c. 2, where he reports Themistius, Theophrastus and others. And for this part too various testimonies of Aristotle are brought forward, so that what his opinion was on this point seems sufficiently obscure. For De caelo I, c. 9, texts 93, 94 and 95, he expressly says that the heaven consists of matter, and thence proves that there cannot be another heaven, because it consists of the universal matter. Moreover, Metaphysics XII, text 22, he says that of all sensible bodies there are the same principles, namely matter and form; and De generatione II, c. 9, text 51, he says that two principles, namely matter and form, are attributed also to eternal things and those holding the first place; but in these inferior ones a third is added, namely privation, for constituting generation. Finally Metaphysics VIII, text 10, he says that every sensible substance consists of matter. By reason this opinion is founded on two principles opposed to the preceding. One is that for the incorruptibility of the heavens or bodies the lack of matter is not necessary, which principle will be declared more fully in the following point. Now it is briefly proved, because, although the thing consists of matter and form, their union can be indissoluble, which is enough for incorruptibility. The other principle is that the quantity of bulk which all bodies, even incorruptible ones, have is necessarily conjoined with matter, so that it is a property so proper to matter, or to the thing composed of matter, that it is a certain indication of it. Which Plotinus wrote in these words, Enneads II, Book IV, c. 6: Whatever has bulk has matter.

Comparison of the above opinions

7. Of these opinions neither can be evidently proved, because there is no effect which evidently shows us that there is or is not matter in bodies of this kind, which has been sufficiently declared in reporting the opinions themselves. For the former infers the lack of matter from incorruptibility, which inference the latter opinion evidently shows is not good; for, although an immaterial thing is necessarily incorruptible, the converse does not hold; and so, although in an incorruptible thing as such composition from matter is not necessary, it can nevertheless be necessary for other causes, incorruptibility not impeding. Because, although this often arises from the simplicity of the thing, sometimes nevertheless it can arise from the indissoluble bond of form and matter, as the latter opinion rightly said. For neither can it reasonably be said to be repugnant to the union of matter and form that it be indissoluble; for what is this repugnance? For not every composition postulates that it can be dissolved, even in natural things, as is evident in composition from accident and subject. If, therefore, there is given an accidental form inseparable from the subject, why could there not also be given a substantial form inseparable from matter? Likewise composition from integral parts can be naturally indivisible, as it is in the heaven; therefore also the other composition from matter and form will be able to be naturally indissoluble; the inference, therefore, which is made from incorruptibility to the lack of matter is inefficacious.

8. The heaven is composed of matter and form.—But the latter opinion infers composition from matter from the quantity of bulk, which consequence too seems uncertain on account of the last argument of the former opinion. On account of which it is not evident to me that it implies a contradiction that there be made a simple and complete substance capable of quantity; but if this does not imply, that consequence is altogether weakened, since it is neither formal nor absolutely necessary. Nevertheless, as far as we can judge from signs and effects, it is more likely that the heaven is composed of matter and form. First indeed, because in it there are all the accidents which follow matter, corruptibility excepted, as are quantity, which is of the same notion in all bodies. Next there is in the heavens the rare and the dense, which are defined through matter; for that is dense which under a small quantity has much matter, as is evident from De generatione II. Further, in the heavens there are certain accidents which seem ordered only to receiving, as quantity, according to which they are physically movable; but others to acting, as light, and if there are any other faculties through which they influence; therefore, as these indicate form, so those indicate matter. Finally all physically movable bodies are natural beings; for on this account they are comprehended under the object of philosophy; whence Aristotle, De caelo I, c. 2, places the heavenly bodies among the natural beings which consist of nature; but according to the doctrine of the same, Physics II, cc. 1 and 2, nature is nothing but matter or form, nor do we know another physical nature; therefore all bodies, even incorruptible ones, consist of nature of this kind. Which reason at least proves that this opinion is more consonant with the doctrine of Aristotle. But what is to be answered to the former testimonies we shall see in the following section. And this resolution will be more persuaded from the following answers.

Solutions of the arguments

9. To the first reason of the former opinion, then, the answer is that, although the first knowledge of prime matter was found by way of motion and transmutation, nevertheless, this composition from matter being once known in inferior bodies, thence one reasoned to the superior ones, and from other likenesses and accidents of such bodies it was understood that this composition is common to all bodies. Whence to the second the answer is that it is not necessary that the composition from matter and form be for the sake of another extrinsic end, but for the sake of composing the substance itself which consists of them; and because the nature of such a substance postulates composition of this kind in order to have all things which are connatural to it, namely matter, in order that it can subsist, occupy place, be moved and similar things, but form, in order that it be in act and be able to act. Wherefore in that argument it seems falsely supposed that matter in these inferior things is only for the sake of generations and corruptions; for this is one of the properties of this matter, yet not the adequate notion of matter as such.

10. To the third the answer is, first, that it is probable that quantity and matter are of their nature so adequately connected that it is repugnant for quantity to be connatural to any being which does not have matter; for the things which we experience of bodies indicate this more, and there is altogether no sufficient foundation for feigning another genus of possible natural beings. Nor is this repugnant to the infinity of the divine power, as is sufficiently self-evident, because the infinity of the divine power does not change the natures of things; and although it can operate above them, it nevertheless does not make connatural that which is not congruous or consonant with the order of nature. Whence we shall show below that conversely it cannot happen that there be a substance composed of matter and form to which it is not natural to have quantity; what wonder, then, ought it to seem that conversely it is also repugnant that there be given an altogether complete and quantified substance which is not composed of matter and form as of its parts? Two orders of substances creatable by God, then, are to be conceived, namely of those composed of matter and form and of simple ones. To all the former this imperfection is common, that they are capable of quantity; but all the latter substances are so perfect (we are treating of complete substances) that quantity is repugnant to them; and therefore such substances are called by Aristotle separated and simple and intellectual acts. But it is repugnant to the natures of things that these two orders be confounded among themselves, and therefore one and the same thing cannot have the imperfection of one order conjoined with the perfection of the other.

11. I add next that, although we admitted this, namely that there can be given a simple and integral substance subject to the quantity of bulk, such a mode of substance cannot fittingly be attributed to the heaven, because it would be very imperfect, because it would not be a most perfect act, as is self-evident, because it would be more imperfect than intellectual substances, indeed even than many substances composed of matter and form, especially man, and from elsewhere it would also lack substantial act, which is the most perfect among informing acts. Just as, therefore, a created substance lacking all beauty of accidental form is very imperfect, so a corporeal substance lacking the beauty of substantial form would be very imperfect and as it were monstrous. And perhaps hence is taken a not light proportional argument, nor of small (so to speak) weight: just as there cannot be given a created substance incapable of accident, so there cannot be given a corporeal substance incapable of substantial form or not constituted through its actuality, if it is integral and complete; but if it is simple and subsisting under quantity, it is not integral but a potential part needing the actuality of form. And it is confirmed, for such a substance could not according to its whole self be active by any genus of action; not indeed by immanent action, since it would be an inanimate thing, nor yet by transient, because this exceeds the limits of natural agents such as are the heavenly bodies, and so it would rather be of no activity or efficacy. Just as, therefore, the heavenly bodies do not act except by inducing form into matter, so also they are not except through the existence of a proper form in proper matter. Wherefore, although simplicity, other things being equal, is an indication and argument of perfection, nevertheless that simplicity in a corporeal substance would not be an indication of perfection but rather of imperfection; for it is not always that beings are more perfect the simpler they are.