Disputationes metaphysicae

1. The causality of matter is not the very entity of matter.—There are various opinions on this matter. For some say that the causality of matter is nothing other than matter itself, which offers itself to the composite and through itself sustains the form, because its causality does not consist in the production of some thing distinct from itself, as the causality of the efficient does, but in this alone, that it offers itself to its effect. But this opinion cannot be true; for, although it is true that matter does not cause otherwise than by sustaining or composing that which it causes, nevertheless this which is to sustain or to compose is something distinct in the thing itself from matter itself; for matter can be in the nature of things and not cause this form or this composite, and successively vary its causality about various effects, its entity remaining unvaried; therefore causation itself is other than its entity. Indeed by absolute power matter can be preserved without any form, as we shall show below, and then it would actually cause nothing, but would only of itself be able to cause; therefore that by which it is constituted actually causing is other than that by which it is constituted able to cause; for by this reason alone we prove in the acting cause that action is other than the power of the agent. But if someone perhaps says that for matter to cause does not add something to matter itself, but connotes the existence of the form in it, he will not satisfy. For, whatever may be the case with that addition, which we shall see afterwards, for form to exist in matter, formally and precisely speaking, is not for matter to cause, but rather to be caused or informed; but it is necessary to designate something from which that denomination of causing is formally taken, and to declare whether that is intrinsic or extrinsic to matter.

2. The causality of matter cannot be a predicamental relation.—Secondly, others say that actual causality adds nothing to matter besides the relation of cause to effect. But if the discussion is of a proper predicamental relation, this opinion cannot be true, because this relation follows when the effect has already been caused and foundation and term posited; therefore it supposes causality as the proximate reason upon which it follows; therefore causality cannot consist in this relation. Which was also said above of cause in common, and is to be understood as said for all causes, lest it be necessary to repeat it further. But if the discussion is of some transcendental relation, this opinion coincides with the fourth, immediately to be reported.

3. The causality of matter is not the same as its every effect.—There can, then, be a third opinion, asserting that this causality of matter is its very effect, signified and conceived in a diverse way, because this suffices for explaining this causality, and scarcely can another be found or thought out. But, although of some effect this is perhaps true, as I shall immediately declare of generation and union (for these are so related as action to the acting cause, which can also be called its effect), it cannot nevertheless be universally true, both because causality in all causes is something intermediate between cause and effect, and also because the material form is an effect of matter and cannot be its causality. For the soul of a horse, for example, which is now caused materially by its matter, can in the thing be preserved without such causality; therefore that causality is other in the thing from that soul and from its entity. As the quantity of the Eucharist, which before was preserved by means of the material causality of the substance of bread, afterwards is preserved, that causality ceasing, which is a sign that that causality is something diverse from the reality of the quantity. But if the form according to its absolute entity is not the causality of matter, neither can the whole composite be; most of all because in the composite matter itself is included, which is not caused by itself; and in some composite, namely man, the form too is included, which is not caused by matter; how, then, could the whole composite be the causality of matter?

4. The opinion of some.—A fourth opinion can be that the causality of matter is a certain real mode of matter itself, distinct from the nature of the thing. For, the absolute entity of matter being considered, this mode is only contained in potency by it; but, the occasion of an agent inducing a form being offered, matter actually exhibits this mode, by which it receives and cherishes the form in itself and consequently composes the composite. But if such a form recedes, another form coming, matter also loses the prior mode and exhibits another about the coming form. So think the Coimbrans, Physics II, qq. 6 and 8. The foundation is taken both from a sufficient enumeration of the parts, and also because such a mode is necessary, since it has been shown that this causality is something, and it is not necessary that it be a distinct entity, since matter through itself is immediately united to form; therefore it is necessary that it be some mode really identified indeed with matter, but modally and from the nature of the thing distinct, since it is separable from it.

Resolution of the question

5. The causality of matter with respect to generation is generation itself.—Nevertheless this opinion seems partly false, partly doubtful. In order to declare which and open my opinion, I distinguish those four things which I said above are caused by matter: generation, the union of the form, the entity of the form and the composite itself. As regards generation, then, I think that it is caused by matter through itself, no other thing or mode being added to matter besides generation itself inhering in it; and so that the causality of generation itself by matter is nothing other than generation itself, as it is eduction from matter. For just as action is from the agent not through another action but through itself, and has the notion of action as it is the very emanation from the acting cause, and as such is the very causality of the agent, as I shall say below, so eduction or passive generation, in so far as it depends essentially on the subject and through itself is necessarily conjoined to it, is caused by it materially not through another causality but through itself. This is proved first of all from the very declaration of the thing; for in this way the causality of matter about generation is excellently understood, and nothing else is necessary; therefore it is superfluous to feign something else. Secondly, this is declared from accidental changes and unions; for when wood is heated, the heating comes about in such a subject and from the subject; but two changes do not then come about in that subject, one which is the passive heating itself, another which is some mode by which such a subject causes the heating materially or is united to it; for it is superfluous to multiply these changes, for, by the very fact that the heating is such that it intrinsically expresses a relationship of actual union and of dependence on such a subject in the genus of material cause, both it itself is caused by the subject and the subject causes it, and it itself is united to the subject and the subject remains united to it; it is superfluous, therefore, to add another change in the subject; the same, therefore, holds in the material causality of substantial generation. Whence it is confirmed, thirdly, because through the same or through the same mode by which the effect is caused the cause causes, because causation itself as such essentially includes that twofold relationship, to the cause as to the principle and to the effect as to the term, and therefore it denominates each, the one cause, the other caused; but generation, by the very fact that it is intrinsically and essentially dependent on matter, through itself is caused by it; therefore by the same, as it is from matter, matter is denominated causing it; therefore no other thing or mode is necessary in order that matter be denominated actually causing generation. Indeed neither can it be understood how matter causes generation through another mode. Which is declared, fourthly, for for matter to cause generation is nothing other than to sustain it as a subject; but it sustains it immediately in its entity and through its entity, by the very fact that generation comes about in it; therefore every other mode is irrelevant to this causality, nor can it confer anything to this sustentation.

6. An objection is answered.—Finally I argue, because, if besides generation itself the causality of matter were a distinct real mode, it would have to be made by some agent; for every new real mode must be made by a new cause; but there is no agent by which such a mode is made; therefore. The minor is proved, because the agent, as it acts only through its substantial or accidental form, so it does not concur effectively except to the eduction of the form, which is heating, for example, or generation; therefore besides that it does not make any other mode. You will say: although that other mode does not come about per se primarily, it nevertheless results; for, by the very fact that this thing is united to that, the union of that to this results. But against this, first, because it has been shown that there is no necessity of such resultance for causality, nor does it seem necessary for union either, because another thing can be denominated united through the union of another to it without a new mode of union in it, as the theologians say in the mystery of the Incarnation, and in natural things when a man sits, for example, the sitting is united to the man and the man to the sitting; but who would feign that the man is denominated united to the sitting through a new mode distinct from the sitting, and not rather through the sitting itself, which through itself is united to the subject? Otherwise one would have to proceed to infinity. So, then, matter is denominated united to generation because generation comes about in it, nor is another mode necessary which results in matter. Next I shall inquire of what kind that resultance is and by what; for it can be understood in two ways: first, that, the action of the agent educing the form being posited in matter, that mode results from matter; and so matter would effectively make its material causality, which cannot be said, even if that efficiency is said to be through natural resultance. Secondly, that resultance can be thought out as coming about from the extrinsic agent by means of the form which it induces into matter, and so the induced form would effect the material causality through which it itself is caused, and would be prior in nature in matter to that mode resulting; from which it is easily convinced that such a mode is irrelevant to the causality of matter.

7. Generation cannot even supernaturally be preserved outside the subject.—From these, then (as I think), it is sufficiently evident that in the material causality of generation causality of this kind is not distinguished from generation itself as it is in matter, from which matter is denominated actually causing in so far as it is from it, as by the same the generator is denominated actually acting in so far as it is from it. Whence, just as the denomination of agent is not from some mode which is in the agent itself but extrinsically from the action, so the denomination of actually causing in matter itself is not from some mode which is so intrinsic that it is in the thing the same with it, but from generation itself in so far as it is from it; and by this reason such a denomination can be called extrinsic, although, because generation is in matter itself, by that reason it can be called intrinsic, in which it differs from the denomination of agent. You will say that God can preserve the same generation in number separated from matter; but then it would not be caused by matter and consequently would not denominate it actually causing; therefore it is not denominated actually causing precisely from generation as such; it is necessary, therefore, to adjoin some other mode. The answer is, first of all, that the assumption is false; for it implies that the action of generation be or be preserved outside the subject and without the causality of matter, both because generation is essentially a change; but change cannot be understood without a subject. And also because generation in all others besides man is essentially eduction from the potency of matter; but in man it is the uniting of the form with matter; but in each way it is repugnant to be understood without the concurrence of matter. And finally because action without the concurrence of a subject is creation, either productive, if it is new, or conservative, if it is about a pre-existing thing; therefore, by the very fact that a form which was in a subject and depended on the subject is preserved outside the subject, the action is necessarily varied. Whence it is concluded that that change which is generation essentially includes union to matter and the causality of matter, and therefore from it, precisely taken, matter is denominated causing. Add that, although we gratuitously granted what is assumed, it would not be inferred thence that for that denomination a special mode is necessary in matter itself, but that in generation itself the entity and formality of generation is distinguished from its union with matter, as we shall say below of form itself; but because in the change which is generation this is not true, we shall not now linger on this.

8. Matter flows into form and composite by generation as causality.—From these it is further concluded that the causality of matter, in so far as it is the cause in becoming either of the form or of the composite, is nothing other than generation itself as essentially dependent on matter; for by means of it matter concurs to the eduction of the form or the composition of the composite; but the causality of a cause is nothing other than its concurrence. Likewise, because to cause some thing in becoming is nothing other than that the becoming of such a thing is from such a cause; therefore through the same causality the thing is caused in becoming through which the very becoming of the thing is caused. Which is evident by a similar case from the acting cause; for the very action which through itself is from the agent is its active causality with respect to the term or the thing in becoming; the same proportion, therefore, is to be kept in material causality. Finally many of the arguments made can be applied to this, especially that this reason of causing suffices for that denomination by which matter is said to cause the thing which is generated, and, that reason of causing being posited and every other mode whatever being prescinded by the intellect, that denomination necessarily follows; therefore whatever else is feigned is superfluous and without foundation. Only a difference seems to be noted in this causality with respect to the form and with respect to the composite, that with respect to the form matter in a certain way remains extrinsically, in so far as it sustains the form in itself or as informing, but does not intrinsically compose it; and therefore it seems most manifest that the causality of matter with respect to the form in becoming is nothing other than its eduction or uniting as it is from matter, which we have shown is in the thing nothing other than generation itself. But with respect to the composite, matter is compared more intrinsically, because through itself it composes it; and therefore with respect to the composite it seems necessary that matter itself be intrinsically included. But this is indeed true as regards inclusion in the effect caused, yet not as regards the way or becoming by which one tends to such an effect in this genus of material cause; for matter is not so the cause in becoming of the thing generated that it itself too comes about; for it is always presupposed made and only communicates itself to the composite which is generated in its genus of cause; and in so far as this communication is in becoming and matter is its cause, it is said to be the cause of the thing generated in becoming; but this communication is not in becoming except by means of eduction or generation; and therefore this whole causality, in so far as it is understood to be something intermediate between matter and the effect or composite in the thing, is not other than generation itself as it is from matter.

What causality of matter perseveres after the change

9. The union of the form to matter is caused by matter through itself and depends on it.—It remains to speak of the causality of matter in completed being, for explaining which one must begin from the causality of the union of the form with matter; for we said that this too is caused by matter; but now we add that it is not caused through some causality distinct from such union, but through itself. Which can easily be demonstrated from what has been said of generation itself; for there is the same proportional reason. Which I show thus: for this union of the form with matter too is through itself conjoined to matter in the way in which it can be; therefore through itself it is dependent on matter in the way in which it can depend; therefore through itself it is caused; for so far is it caused as it depends; therefore conversely matter causes that union through itself; for, as I said, the causality is the same from which both the effect is denominated caused and the cause causing. All the consequences have been proved above; but the antecedent is evident, first, a posteriori, because it is impossible that that union be preserved without the concurrence of matter, or without its being in matter in the way in which it can be; it is therefore a sign that through itself it depends immediately and essentially on matter; for, if it depended by means of some mode distinct from the nature of the thing, God by taking away that mode could preserve that union without matter; for by this reason he can preserve the form, as I shall say below. The antecedent is evident, because the union cannot remain without actually uniting; but it cannot actually unite without conjoining the extremes and attaining each in the way in which it can and ought. And this is the a priori reason on account of which that union through itself depends essentially both on the form and on matter, on each in its genus, because it is as it were the actual bond of them and does not need another interposed bond or mode by which it attains them or is conjoined to them, lest one proceed to infinity. Finally it is confirmed by the reason made above, because this suffices for this causality, and without it it cannot be posited, and, it being posited and every other mode prescinded, such causality of matter is sufficiently understood; therefore everything else is feigned and without foundation; nor is there in this any difficulty, besides that immediately to be touched upon.

10. The permanent causality of matter into the material form is union.—Of what kind is the bond of the rational soul with matter.—Hence I further add that the causality of matter into the form itself (when the form is such that it is caused by and depends on matter) is not other than the proper union of such form with matter, in so far as that very union is materially caused by matter, and by means of it the form itself also depends on matter. I said not other than the proper union of such form, because not any union whatever suffices for this causality; for the rational soul has a proper union with matter, which union is also caused materially by matter, and yet the soul itself is not caused; not any union whatever, therefore, is the causality of the form itself, but that which is through the eduction of the form. From which in passing we understand that the union of the rational soul with matter is singular and of a diverse essential notion from every union of a material form, which we can call substantial inherence, and this we say is the causality through which matter causes such a form.

11. An objection is met.—You will say: why can we not distinguish in a material form two modes, of which one would be the mere union of the form with matter, such as is in the rational soul, and through it that form would not depend on matter but only be united to compose the composite, but the other mode would be the dependence of such form on matter? I answer that it is either plainly impossible or altogether superfluous to distinguish and multiply such modes. First, because in an accident we do not distinguish two modes, of which one would be union, the other inherence or dependence of the accident on the subject, but by the same inherence it is united and depends; therefore similarly, etc. Secondly, because proper dependence on a material cause intrinsically and essentially includes union, so that it can neither come about nor be understood without intimately including it; therefore inherence, which is the same as material dependence, is not a mode distinct from the nature of the thing from the union of the inhering form, but is as it were a species of union in common; for one is inhesive, another not; just as, therefore, genus and species are not modes diverse from the nature of the thing in the same individual, so union and inherence or material dependence are not distinct modes in the same form. From these, then, the assertion posited remains easily proved, because this form through its union depends on matter; therefore by means of it it is caused by matter in its genus; therefore also matter causes the form by means of it, according to the principle posited above, that to be caused and to cause express the same causation under a diverse respect; therefore this union itself is the causality of matter about such a form. Secondly, because the causality of a cause in a certain way mediates between it and the effect; but between matter and form nothing mediates but this union and as it were inherence; therefore that is the causality of matter into the form. Thirdly, because this suffices for this genus of causality, every other thing whatever being prescinded even by the intellect.

12. You will say that neither does this seem necessary, because form and matter are immediately united, as was said above. The answer is that immediate union does not exclude a mode of union really or from the nature of the thing distinct from the extremes, but excludes an intermediate form which would intervene as a common term in which the extremes would be conjoined; but a mode of union cannot be excluded when the extremes are such that they can be separated, because unless either both or one of them is otherwise related than when they are disjoined, they will not be able to be really united; and therefore also in the mystery of the Incarnation the theologians posit this mode of union on the side of the humanity.

How manifold the union is in the material composite

13. But hence arises another difficulty, which alone seems to be of some moment in this opinion, and on account of which we said that the fourth opinion is in part doubtful, namely, because, if the form is united to matter through a proper mode of union, then matter too is united to the form through a proper mode of union; therefore matter causes not only through the union or inherence of the form, but much more through its proper union by which it itself is conjoined to the form; and so the causality of matter will rather be a proper mode of matter itself than of form. To this difficulty I confess that it is doubtful whether in the composition of matter and form matter has a proper mode of union distinct from the union of the form. I say, however, two things. One is that the negative part is very probable, because for the union of two extremes which are immediately united among themselves one simple mode of union suffices, and a special reason can be assigned on account of which such a mode pertains more to the form and is really the same with it than with matter; therefore it is not necessary to multiply several modes of this kind. The major is proved, because every mode of union is the bond of two extremes, whence it expresses a relationship to each, without which it cannot be; therefore any mode of union unites the two extremes of which it is the union; therefore one suffices for conjoining extremes of this kind. And therefore we were saying above that the union of the form to matter cannot be or be understood in the nature of things without conjunction and dependence not only on the form but also on matter; and therefore, if we prescind by the intellect every other mode identified with matter, through the union of the form to matter alone we shall understand matter and form to be perfectly united among themselves and matter to exercise into the form the whole causality which it has; therefore a twofold mode of union is not necessary, but one suffices. But the minor, namely that this mode pertains rather to the form than to matter, is proved, because the whole efficiency of the natural agent is terminated formally and proximately at the form, by educing it or uniting it to matter; therefore whatever it makes anew is in the form as in the formal term of the action, but in matter only as in the subject; and therefore it does not unite matter to the form by directly effecting in matter a special mode, but only by uniting the form to matter itself and effecting in it information and union or inherence. And this is consonant with the mode of being related and concurring of matter and form; for matter underlies the action of the agent and the coming and receding of forms. Whence as regards its entity and every intrinsic mode of its own it remains unvaried, and is only varied or changed by reason of privation or of the form receding or newly coming. Which Damascene seems to have said in these words, in his Physics, c. 3, where he says of matter: As that which obtains the notion of subject, and as regards that which is potency is endowed with substance and is with privation and remains with the form actually present, and preserves that which is its own, that is, potency, free from all change; and hence it comes about that it does not pass from that which is potency into act, but remaining in its state receives the form, and, the form receding, again retains its prior state. But form is that which comes to matter and recedes from it, and therefore every change which comes about in matter is by reason of form, and similarly every union is through the conjunction of the form to it. Which moreover can be declared by a material example: for the base which is placed under a column is not varied in itself nor changes place or any other mode from this, that the column is placed upon it or is taken away or varied, but the whole change comes about in the column which is placed upon it, from which comes every denomination into the base, which is said to sustain the column. And similarly in accidental changes, when wood, for example, is heated, there does not come about a twofold change in the wood, one in the adhesion of the heat, another in the union of the wood to the heat, but one only, which consists in the introduction of the heat.

14. I add, secondly, that, although we gratuitously admitted that there is in matter a proper mode of union distinct from the union of the form, nevertheless it cannot be attributed that it is the causality through which matter causes the form, because neither does matter through such a mode sustain the form, nor does the form through that mode depend on matter. The former part is evident, because matter does not through a mode, but through its entity, sustain the form. The latter is proved, because the form through its inherence depends on matter, whence, if there is such a mode of union in matter, it will rather be as an effect consequent upon the information, and as far as depends on itself it will be of the same notion whether the form depends on matter or not. Of which union of matter discussion will occur again in treating of the formal cause.

15. By what causality matter constitutes the composite.—From these it is further concluded that the causality of matter about the composite adds nothing at all to matter itself besides the union of the form, and so that there is no other causality of the composite except the very causality of the form or of the union, and that it only adds with respect to the composite that matter by means of the union offers itself to compose the composite intrinsically; whence the very entity of matter enters more intimately into the causality of the composite than of the form or of the union; yet in the thing nothing else intervenes but the entity of matter and the union or causality of the form.

16. Matter performs a twofold distinct causality.—An objection is satisfied.—Finally it is understood from what has been said, what was also indicated above, that there are only two causalities of matter distinct from the nature of the thing, although by reason more can be distinguished. For the material causality with respect to the thing in becoming and in completed being are distinct from the nature of the thing, as generation is distinguished from the nature of the thing from the form or from the thing generated, and the uniting in becoming from the union as made; but we have shown that the causality of the thing in becoming is not distinguished in the thing from generation itself or the uniting; but the causality of the thing in completed being similarly is not distinguished from the union as made and formally terminating the uniting; it is necessary, therefore, that causalities of this kind be distinct among themselves from the nature of the thing. You will say that these two causalities can be reduced to one, because the thing in completed being is not caused except by means of action; therefore the whole causality consists in action and in generation itself as it is from matter; for all the others are rather something caused than causalities, as with respect to the agent the whole causality consists in action or uniting, and the union in completed being is not the causality of the agent but something caused. The answer is that the reason is not equal, because the material cause per se is the cause of the thing in completed being even if all action ceases, so that if, per impossibile, the material composite did not depend on any agent in becoming or in being preserved, matter would nevertheless have its causality about such a composite or about its form; there is, therefore, in matter a certain proper causality, which is not concerned with action or change nor comes about through it, but is immediately about the very being of the whole composite, in so far as it includes the union of matter with form; and from the following section it will be evident that matter is sometimes the cause of the thing and not of the production of the thing; these causalities, therefore, are distinct from the nature of the thing. But each of them can be compared and precisely conceived in order to diverse things, and explained according to various relationships in order to the form or the composite; yet that whole distinction is through reason or through our inadequate concepts, as is evident from what has been said above.