Disputationes metaphysicae

1. The opinion of some.—Just as in the created efficient cause there are wont to be distinguished the principal principle of acting, the proximate principle, and the conditions necessary for acting, so some think that all these can and must be distinguished in the causality of matter. For the principal reason of causing materially (they say) is the very essence of matter; for that is the first foundation and base of the whole material causality and sustentation, and of it as such the composite essentially consists. But the proximate principle of this causality they say is the potency of matter; for through it it proximately receives form; for every act is proximately received in a potency proportioned to itself; but that potency is a property of matter itself given to it by nature for causing its effect, as the Commentator thinks, De substantia orbis, c. 1, and Physics I, text 70; and there Themistius, text 69. Whose reason is that every potency is founded in some entity and essence. But some add that this potency through which matter proximately causes is its quantity, because prime matter precisely considered without quantity is not apt to be the subject of generation, because it is not extended, nor does it have parts; but through quantity it becomes apt, because it becomes extended.

2. What conditions some require in matter in order that it cause.—But among the conditions required for this causality some posit the existence of matter, because for causality and real composition real existence seems necessary. Others do not think existence is to be required, because its being of essence suffices for matter to cause; but existence it has not as prerequired, but only as following upon form. Again, others require quantity as a necessary condition on account of the reason made above, because the agent cannot act except on an extended subject; therefore it presupposes in the subject quantity at least as a necessary condition. But others do not think this condition necessary either, because they think that quantity follows upon form and depends altogether on it. Wherefore they require no condition for the causality of matter besides its entity and potency. There could also be reported here the opinion of those who require in matter a sealing by which matter, which of itself is indifferent to every form, is determined to this individual rather than to others, because an indifferent cause, remaining indifferent, cannot cause a definite effect; of which opinion enough has been said above in treating of the principle of individuation.

The potency of matter, undistinguished from it, is its reason of causing

3. It must be said, first of all, that prime matter does not have two reasons of causing, one principal, the other proximate, but through itself and its entity it causes its effect in its genus both principally and proximately. This opinion is taken from St. Thomas, In Phys. I, text 79, where he says that the potency of matter is not something added to matter besides its substance and essence; and he has the same in I, q. 5, a. 3, ad 3, and q. 77, a. 1, ad 2, and Contra Gentiles I, c. 43, and In I, dist. 3, q. 4, a. 1; and the Thomists commonly think the same: Hervaeus, De unitate formarum, q. 16; Capreolus, In I, dist. 42, q. 1, on the arguments of Aureolus against the fourth conclusion; Soncinas, Metaphysics VIII, q. 6; Henry, in the Summa, a. 5, q. 8; and Averroes signified this very thing, De substantia orbis, when he said that matter is substantiated through being able. From this principle, then, the conclusion is proved in this way. Matter primarily and principally causes through its essence, but proximately and immediately through its potency; but the potency of matter is not other than its essence, neither really nor from the nature of the thing; therefore in matter the proximate reason of causing is not other than the principal reason, but they are altogether the same. The consequence is evident, and the major too is beyond controversy; for, as regards its former part, nothing prior or more principal can be thought out in matter which would be the first root and as it were origin of its causality than its essence itself. But as regards the second part, since the causality of matter is the causality of a subject and recipient, it is also evident that the receptive potency or capacity of matter is the proximate reason of causing. Likewise, because matter causes by receiving act; but act is proximately received in potency; therefore matter through its potency proximately regards act and causes its effect.

4. But the minor is asserted by the said authors. And it is proved by reason, first, because matter is essentially ordered to form, as was said above with Aristotle, Physics II, text 26; but it is not ordered except as receptive potency; therefore matter is essentially a potency of this kind. Secondly, form through its essence is the act of matter, whence the soul is defined as the act of a physical body, etc.; therefore conversely matter is essentially potency to form; for they have among themselves a proportional correlation, and so are essentially instituted that through their essential entities they are immediately conjoined; and thence it is that they compose one essence per se and essentially; but they compose as act and potency united among themselves; matter, therefore, is essentially potency as form is essentially act. Thirdly, to confirm this can be adduced all the things by which we proved that matter is pure potency; for the philosophers do not only say that matter has potency, but that the whole of it is nothing other than potency, and this very thing is what Aristotle said, that matter is the first subject. Augustine too, book De natura boni contra Manichaeos, c. 18, says that matter is called in Greek hyle (ὕλη), because it is apt for those operating, not that it itself makes something, but whence something is made. Damascene too, in his Physics, c. 3, says that matter, as regards that which is potency, is endowed with substance.

5. Finally it is declared in this way: for either the potency of matter is the very substance and essence of matter, or it is some accident really distinct from it, or some mode at least diverse from the nature of the thing; for besides these nothing else can be thought out; but neither the second nor the third can be said; therefore the first is true. The minor as regards the former part is proved, first, because potency is proportioned to act; therefore to substantial act the potency must be substantial. Secondly, because otherwise form would be united to matter by means of some accident and so would not compose with it one per se, because their union would not be substantial but accidental. Whence Aristotle, Metaphysics VIII, text 15, teaches that substantial matter and form are per se immediately united in order that they compose one per se. Thirdly, because, if it were some accident, it would be most of all quantity; but not this; therefore. The major is evident, because no accident is nearer to matter than quantity. But the minor is proved, because quantity is not per se ordered to receiving substantial form, but is rather either a property following upon it, or at most a disposition preparing the subject for its reception. And it is confirmed, for otherwise, just as whiteness, for example, is received in quantity, so also substantial form would be received in it and would communicate its substantial being to it; and consequently, just as, the substance being taken away and the quantity preserved by itself, that quantity remains white without a new miracle, so, the matter being taken away and the quantity preserved, it would remain informed by the substantial form without a new miracle; all which are absurd. Finally, whatever that accident is which is interposed after the manner of potency between the substance of matter and form, it is necessary that it be received in matter, because it must be received in some subject, and there there is nothing else, since such a potency is supposed to form and consequently also to the composite; therefore there is in matter a potency to receive in itself such an accident, since it is subjected in matter; I inquire, then, whether that potency of matter is the very substance of matter or another accident; this latter cannot be said, otherwise one would proceed to infinity; but if the former is said, then some receptive potency of matter is its very substance; therefore this is rather to substantial act than to accidental, or at least is primarily ordered to that act; it is, therefore, per se and immediately receptive of it.

6. And hence the other part of the minor is easily proved, namely that this potency is not a mode distinct from the nature of the thing from the substance of matter. First indeed, because there is no necessity nor vestige of such a distinction. For such a potency is connatural to matter and altogether inseparable from it, even by the absolute power of God; indeed matter complete in the essence of matter cannot even be conceived by the intellect without its being conceived capable of form; therefore that capacity is not a mode distinct in the thing from matter, but is as it were its essential difference; for matter is essentially a substantial entity, not complete but partial, not after the manner of act but after the manner of potency; matter itself, therefore, through its essence is both the principal and the proximate reason of receiving form and causing materially.

7. Matter essentially requires existence in order to cause.—I say, secondly: the existence of matter is also necessary for the causality of matter, yet not properly as a condition only which is outside the notion of the per se principle in the genus of material cause, but as intimately and formally included in it. The former part is proved, because matter cannot be a real subject or actually exercise its function as it is in objective potency alone or in the power of the first cause, because according to the former consideration it is nothing, but is only conceived as not repugnant to being; but according to the latter it is not other than the creating essence itself; therefore, in order that it actually exercise the function of a real subject, it is necessary that it be in itself actually outside its cause and outside objective potency; but this very thing is to exist; therefore, in order that matter cause materially, it is necessary that it actually exist. And it is confirmed, for natural things are not created for this reason, that they come about from matter; but not for this reason are they not created, that they come about from possible matter; therefore because they come about from actually existing matter; and consequently matter itself does not cause materially except as actually existing. The minor is proved, for matter itself, while it is made by God, comes about from possible matter, and nevertheless is created, because to come about from possible matter is to come about from nothing, since possible matter as such is nothing. Whence the expression from in that locution does not express the relationship of material cause, but of the term from which. When, therefore, it expresses the relationship of material cause, it is necessary that it designate a thing which is not only possible, but also actual and outside its causes. Finally matter cannot cause materially unless it is created by God; but creation is terminated at an existing thing; therefore matter cannot cause materially except as existing. Which reasons formally and immediately prove that matter does not cause materially except as it is outside its causes as an actual entity in its being of essence; but consequently they prove it of the being of existence, because every actual entity outside its causes is formally constituted through existence, as we shall prove below in its place.

8. How matter depends on form.—And hence the latter part of the assertion is also easily proved; for that matter is an actual entity is not as it were an extrinsic condition necessary for causing, but is an intrinsic and proper reason of causing; for matter through its actual entity receives form; but through existence it is constituted in the being of actual entity; therefore the existence of matter is not in any way whatever a necessary condition, but as per se and formally pertaining to the principle of causing. Which matter will be more fully evident from what is to be said below of existence. It can only be objected that matter depends in its existence on form; therefore it cannot exist even prior in the order of nature to receiving form; therefore existence cannot be necessary for causing. The consequence is evident, because a condition necessary for causing is supposed to the effect. Nor can it be understood that a cause in its being necessary for causing depends on its effect. The answer is that an exact answer to this objection cannot be given until we explain the causality of form toward matter, and that proposition of Aristotle: Causes are causes of one another; therefore it is briefly said that it is probable that matter does not depend properly on form as on its cause, which can be called antecedent dependence, but only as on a connatural act and as it were a disposition and necessary condition, which can be called consequent dependence, according to which it is not inconvenient that the material cause depend on its effect. But whether matter can be said to depend also a priori on form we shall see below.

9. Matter requires nearness to form for its causality.—I say, thirdly: the necessary condition for causing in matter is intimate nearness or indistance from form. So that, just as in the efficient cause application to the patient is called a necessary condition for acting, so in the material cause application to the form; for with respect to it or with it it exercises its causality. But this application is through intimate nearness and indistance, because matter and form cannot be united unless they are indistant and as it were intimately penetrated through their entities. You will say that this is not a necessary condition, but the very conjunction of matter and form. The answer is that it is not so, because intimate presence is something distinct from the nature of the thing from union; for when the soul is created in the body, it is not united to the body by virtue of creation in such a place, but through another action, and yet it is created intimately indistant from the body. Whence in the thing itself too that intimate presence is separable from union. For just as an angel can be intimately present to matter and not inform it, so also can the rational soul, indeed any other form whatever, at least by the absolute power of God; that intimate presence, therefore, is something distinct from union and a necessary condition for it and for the causality of matter. But this condition in the generation of man is manifestly prior in nature, because there the form is supposed created without the causality of matter about it; but in other forms it does not seem so much a condition prior in nature as concomitant, because other forms absolutely and simply and according to the order of causality are not or do not come about prior in nature to their being united, as we shall see afterwards. But there intervenes there another priority of nature, which is called in the consequence of subsisting; for intimate presence is such that it can at least by the divine power be preserved without union and consequently without material causality; but conversely material causality can in no way be actually preserved without intimate nearness, as is self-evident.

10. Matter does not require quantity as a necessary condition for causing.—I say, fourthly, that besides this condition no other is simply necessary for the causality of matter, as far as depends on its side. It is briefly explained, for as regards quantity, it is a sufficiently controverted matter whether it is in matter or in the composite and how. And although it is probable that it is in matter and is not naturally separated from it, nevertheless this is not because quantity is a condition necessary for material causality, formally speaking, but because matter is such an entity which by its nature postulates such a property, so that quantity is rather a property following upon such a material cause than a condition antecedently necessary for its causality. Whence it comes about that either the form, if it too is material, or at least in its own way the information of the form, participates the effect or mode of quantity, not because that mode is per se necessary for union with matter, but because the form accommodates itself to matter, in so far as whatever is received is received according to the mode of the recipient. And in a similar way a material agent needs the extension of quantity in the patient in order to be able to act on it; yet this comes from this, that the agent itself, by reason of such a property following upon matter, has a mode of existing and acting accommodated to it according to all the faculties which depend on matter. And so (whatever may be the case with that question, about which we now define nothing) we now say only that quantity is not per se and formally necessary on account of material causality. Whence, if matter is preserved by the power of God without quantity, as far as depends on its side it will be able to exercise its function of sustaining the form or its information.

11. Again, a sealing of matter which would be something distinct from quantity and from the qualities disposing matter is altogether something feigned and fictitious, as was shown in the place cited above. But the qualities, if perhaps the same do not remain in the generated and the corrupted, do not seal matter otherwise than because these qualities which precede the instant of generation strip matter and leave it free and unencumbered so that the agent may introduce its form into it; but the qualities which are introduced in that instant only follow upon the form and as it were cherish and retain it in matter. But if the same dispositions in number which were begun in the corrupted remain consummated in the generated, then they can more easily be said to determine matter to such a form; yet this is not because matter of itself needs them for its causality, but either because by the natural mode and order of acting by means of accidents they are necessarily so premised, or because the form itself postulates such dispositions. But matter, although of itself it is indifferent to several effects or forms, is not of itself insufficient or incomplete for its individual effects, but rather in its genus is as it were a universal cause, sufficient for its individual effects; but a cause so indifferent can well cause a determinate effect if from elsewhere other causes necessary for that determination concur, as are in the case proposed the agent or the dispositions. Therefore per se and intrinsically, by virtue of material causality, no sealing is required for it as a necessary condition. But besides these conditions no others have hitherto been thought out, nor can they easily be feigned, since no reason or foundation of such necessity appears. For I omit the general and as it were transcendental condition with respect to every created cause, namely that it be preserved by God; for this is both common and is comprehended under existence. I omit also the necessary relationship or relation to form, and (so to speak) the concausality of form; for this is rather something necessarily following than a condition required for causing. Nothing else, therefore, is necessary for the causality of matter on its side. And let these suffice on this point; for the foundations of the other opinions, which were indicated in reporting them, have been sufficiently solved and dispatched from what has been said.