Disputationes metaphysicae

1. Matter of itself can terminate direct knowledge.—God has an idea of matter.—The last objection requires that we say a few things of the knowledge or knowability of matter. Of which many things are said by authors; briefly, however, it must be said that it is one thing to speak absolutely of the knowledge of matter according to itself, another of the mode in which it can be known by us. In the former consideration I concede that matter can be known by direct and proper knowledge; for so it is known both by God and by the angels through a proper species or concept. For, although the theologians dispute whether God has a proper idea of matter, and some seem to deny it with Plato in the Timaeus, nevertheless in truth they cannot deny it, except perhaps as regards the mode of speaking. For Plato denied that matter was created by God, and therefore it is not wonderful that he denied to God an idea of matter, although it is not likely that he denied to God proper knowledge, at least speculative, of matter. But since according to true doctrine God is the creator of matter, he cannot altogether lack an idea of matter, since he operates all things through intellect and will. But that idea is wont to be said not to be proper, that is, adequate to matter itself, because God does not have another idea of the whole and of the parts, but through the idea of the composite represents matter, as St. Thomas says, I, q. 15, a. 3, ad 3. This, however, does not prevent it from representing matter exactly, directly and as it is in itself; whence Cajetan there admits a speculative notion of matter, although not an idea. But Albert, In I, dist. 35, a. 10, did not hesitate to concede also an idea of matter. In a similar way the angel can be said to know matter directly and through a proper species, not because that species represents nothing else—for perhaps the same species which represents the whole composite is the principle of knowing matter—but because such a species represents matter according to its proper notion and leads directly and without any metaphor or analogy into its knowledge.

2. Matter cannot be comprehended without the form being known.—You will say: matter cannot be known without form even by God or an angel; therefore it can never be known by proper knowledge. Some answer by denying the antecedent; for, since matter has its absolute entity distinct from form, according to it it can be precisely conceived, either by a concept really distinct from others, as in the angel, who can voluntarily contemplate matter alone, or at least distinct by reason, as in God; which Scotus thinks, in the Prologue, q. 1, and In II, dist. 12, q. 1; and Themistius inclines to it, Physics I, text 61; who speak absolutely of the knowledge of matter. But it seems more probable that matter cannot be conceived essentially and comprehensively as it is in itself without form, at least as the term of the essential aptitude which matter has to form, as authors more frequently teach and is taken from Aristotle, Physics II, c. 2, where he says that matter is of those things which are toward something, namely by transcendental relationship, as we declared above; but things which are of this kind cannot be known without their terms. Whence, the antecedent being admitted, the consequence is denied, because a proper concept is accommodated to each thing, and therefore, if the thing is respective, it is then understood by a proper concept when it is conceived through the respect to another. Nor does it follow thence that matter does not have in itself and of itself a proper actuality of its entity, but only that it does not have it without a transcendental relationship to form; for conversely form too, as informing or as informative, cannot be conceived without respect to the matter of which it is the act.

3. But if we speak of the knowledge of matter as regards us, in that knowledge we can consider either the mode of inquiring and finding the knowledge of matter, or the term of this inquiry, or the ultimate concept which we can form of matter. As regards the first, what Aristotle says is true, Physics I, c. 7, text 69, and from him Damascene, in his Physics, c. 3, that matter is known by us through proportion or analogy to the matter of artificial things or to the subject of accidental changes; for we do not arrive at the knowledge of matter except by way of change, as was declared above. But this does not come from this, that matter has no entity and actuality, but from this, that substantial change is more hidden and cannot be perceived per se; and therefore it is not perceived by us except through order to accidental and sensible changes. Indeed thence it also comes about that substantial form is not known by us directly, but through sensible indications, as we shall immediately see. And by this reason Plato too said, in the Timaeus, that matter is known by a bastard reasoning, as Simplicius noted, Physics I, text 96.

4. What concept we can form of matter.—But as regards the second it must be said that we arrive indeed at some proper concept of prime matter, yet not altogether distinct and as it is in itself, but partly negative, partly confused. This whole assertion is evident from the definition of matter handed down by Aristotle, namely, that it is the first subject, etc.; for through that description we explain some objective concept; but that is proper to matter, as is the definition itself. But in that definition subject is something confused and common; but it is added that it is first in order that it be limited to matter; but first imports the negation of a prior subject. It is the same that we commonly declare the nature of matter through the notion of pure potency; for the notion of potency is confused and common; but the expression pure expresses the negation of every form composing or constituting matter itself. But the reason is that we scarcely know simple things by proper concepts except by adjoining some negation; wherefore this is the more frequent mode of declaring the nature of matter, through the lack of form and of complete actuality, etc. And so Aristotle describes it, Metaphysics VII, text 8, saying that matter is neither quantity nor quality, etc.; and therefore perhaps he said in the same book, text 35, that matter is of itself unknown. But sometimes, as St. Bonaventure noted, In II, dist. 3, a. 1, q. 2, we seem to declare the nature of matter through purely positive concepts, as if we say that it is incomplete substance receptive of substantial form; but what is said, incomplete, imports negation. And finally we never declare the nature of matter unless we adjoin the negation of every formal act constituting it. And therefore Augustine said, book De natura boni, c. 18, that matter can scarcely be thought through any species, but through the privation of every species. And Confessions XII, c. 5, he says that we try to know matter by not knowing, or to not know by knowing. For as darkness is seen by us while light is not seen, so while we understand something formless, which is to be ignorant of form, we know matter in some way.¹ And conversely, when we know something formed or composed with form, we are ignorant of matter, or rather we know that it is not matter, and remove something, so that we may conceive matter alone. But this does not come from this, that matter has no entity, but from this, that it has it so simple and potential and hidden under substantial and accidental forms that it cannot be investigated or conceived by us in another way.