Disputationes metaphysicae

1. The solution of the arguments which were posited in the preceding section against our opinion depends on the resolution of the present question; for it is not to be denied by us that matter is pure potency, since all philosophers seem to agree in that assertion; but the true sense of that expression is to be explained.

Various opinions

2. The disciples of St. Thomas, then, commonly interpret that matter is called pure potency because neither of itself nor in itself does it have any existence except through form.¹ But Scotus, Henry and others cited above distinguish a twofold act, namely formal and entitative, and teach that matter of itself has entitative act, yet not formal, and consequently they say that matter is called pure potency in order to formal act, not in order to entitative act.

3. But some modern authors,² although they do not dissent from Scotus in the thing, nevertheless do not approve his mode of speaking; for they confess that matter has a proper existence distinct from the existence of the form, and consequently teach that matter is actually outside nothing; yet they deny that it is to be called entitative act, both on account of the reason made above, that it is neither informing nor subsisting act; and also because, although matter has an act of existence proper to itself, it is nevertheless not its own existence, because in every creature existence is distinguished at least from the nature of the thing from essence.

4. Nevertheless, if the thing which those authors teach does not displease, I do not see why the mode of speaking can displease, because neither is such a mode of speaking repugnant to Aristotle, as we shall show, nor does it disagree with the common and received use of terms. For in as many ways as potency is said, in so many can act also be said; but a thing is said to be in potency either passive, because it can receive act, or active, because it can effect, or objective or logical, because, although it is not, it is not repugnant to it to be; so, then, a thing can be said to be act or in act either with respect to receptive potency or to objective potency, active potency being omitted for now, which matters nothing at present. Prime matter, therefore, although it is pure receptive potency, and so in its essence includes no formal act, which is signified by that particle pure, nevertheless, after it has been created, cannot be said to be in pure objective potency; therefore by this reason it is rightly said to be, or to have, entitative act.

5. Nor does it matter anything to this whether it is or is not its own existence. First indeed, because when matter is called pure potency it is denied not only that it is act, but also that it consists of act and potency; but if matter has a proper existence, although we grant that it is not its own existence, we cannot nevertheless deny that it consists of its essence and existence; therefore it includes act; for actual existence is the act of essence according to all, and most of all in that opinion; therefore matter cannot be called pure potency in order to entitative act. Next, according to that opinion act is not sufficiently divided into formal and subsisting; for besides these there is the act of existence, which is not subsisting, since it is received in the essence, nor is it properly formal, since it is not a form, but it can be called the terminative act of the essence; therefore, since matter as it is distinguished in the thing from form includes this act, it cannot be called pure potency in order to entitative act. Moreover, according to that opinion about the real distinction, or from the nature of the thing, of existence from actual essence, it cannot be denied that actual essence as it is co-distinguished from existence has some actuality which essence conceived in objective potency alone does not have; therefore actual essence itself, granted that it is not its own existence, is some entitative act, that is, something else besides pure objective potency; indeed, unless actual essence is so conceived, that opinion which distinguishes it from existence as thing from thing or from real mode cannot be understood.

6. Whatever, then, we think of the distinction of essence and existence, certainly matter as it is in the thing distinct from form is some entitative act, yet in a diverse way; for those who do not distinguish existence from essence from the nature of the thing but only by reason will say that matter as it is actual entity is its own existence and actual essence, which in the thing are the same. And because according to this opinion the entitative act of the thing is nothing other than its existence or actual entity, therefore it is rightly concluded that matter is some entitative act. But according to the other opinion distinguishing existence from actual essence from the nature of the thing, and nevertheless admitting that prime matter has its proper existence which it retains under any form whatever, it must be said that matter, besides the act of form, both is its actual essence and has besides a proper act of existence. But those who so posit a real distinction between essence and existence as to deny that matter has a proper existence besides the existence which form brings, will consequently say that matter is pure potency in order to act both formal and entitative or of existence; yet they cannot deny that it is some actual entity in the being of essence. Although, because they think that the actuality of essence depends altogether on distinct existence, by that reason they can say that matter, even if in the thing it has an entity of essence, nevertheless has it so potential that it is not capable of existence except by means of form; and in this sense they can call it pure potency even in order to entitative act.

7. Matter existing in the thing is through itself entitative act.—Since, therefore, we think that matter has its partial existence and that existence is not distinguished on the side of the thing from actual essence but only by our mode of conceiving, we judge it also most true that matter as it is actual entity in the thing is also in the thing some entitative act, and according to reason, or in our mode of conceiving, is composed of being and essence as of terminating act and as it were objective potency. And each is sufficiently evident from what has just been said against the above opinion. But I always speak of matter as it is actual entity, because, if it is conceived according to that only which it has of itself, all efficiency being excluded, then it has no actuality in itself, but is only in the power of the cause, and of itself has only the non-repugnance of being; but this is not proper to matter; for form too, indeed every creature regarded according to itself, is in this way in pure potency; it is necessary, therefore, to speak of matter as it is actual entity, or, what is the same, in so far as according to itself it has a proper act of existing distinct from the act of the form.

8. But in order that the difficulties touched upon in the above section may be solved, and the mode of speaking of the philosophers explained, and all ambiguity of terms taken away, I notice that the name of act can be taken in many ways; for sometimes it is said absolutely, sometimes respectively; for sometimes something is called act because it actuates something, in which way form is the act of matter. And this I call respective act, because it is the act of another. But sometimes something is called act because in itself it is something actual and not potential, although it actuates nothing else, in which way God is called act; and this I call act absolutely said. Again, each of these acts can be subdistinguished; for actuating act is one physical and formal, as is the physical form; another metaphysical, which is manifold; for one is the act of essence, as the difference; another of existence, as existence; and there can be added also the act or mode of subsistence. But act absolutely said is one act simply, another in a certain respect. The former is that act which in the genus of being simply, or of substance, is so complete that it is neither constituted through a physical act distinct from itself, nor actuated by it, or needs it in order to exist. Or otherwise it can be explained that that being is called act simply which by virtue of its actuality alone includes the formal perfection which other composite beings are wont to have through informing substantial act. Whence, although an absolute act of this kind is not actuating or informing act, it can nevertheless be called formal act in an eminent way, that is, having through itself that complement of perfection which is wont to be conferred through informing act on those beings which are completed through composition. But that being will be called act in a certain respect which has some actuality in so far as it is actually outside nothing; but it has it incomplete and imperfect, because it is not so sufficient that it does not need another act, both in order to be completed in the notion of being simply, and also in order to exist.

Resolution of the question

9. Matter does not exclude every act.—It must be said, then, first, that matter is not called pure potency with respect to every metaphysical act, that is, because it includes no metaphysical act; for this cannot be true. First, because prime matter in its essential concept can be understood as composed of genus and difference; as, for example, if the matter of the heaven and of these inferior things are distinguished in species, this matter of generable things of which we are now treating consists of the common genus of matter and a proper difference, which can be taken from its order to the form of generable being; this matter, therefore, has its formal metaphysical act, by which it is constituted in its essence. And it is confirmed, for matter by its nature has some transcendental perfection and goodness, as St. Thomas also taught, Contra Gentiles III, c. 20. For it is certain that the composite of matter and form is something more perfect than the form alone; therefore matter has something of perfection which it adds to the composite. Likewise matter itself is desirable and fitting not only as a means but per se, because by reason of its perfection it is fitting to this form or composite; therefore matter by its nature has some proper perfection; but perfection cannot be understood without some actuality, at least transcendental. Moreover matter has a proper act of existence, as has been shown. Finally it has a partial and proportioned act of subsistence; for it altogether needs it in order to be able to be the first subject; for the first subject underlies all; but to subsist in itself is prior to underlying others. Of which matter we shall say more below in treating of subsistence. Prime matter, therefore, cannot so be pure potency that it excludes every actuating metaphysical act.

10. What act matter admits.—I say, secondly: matter is not so pure potency that it is not some entitative act in a certain respect. This assertion has been sufficiently declared and proved from what was said about the opinion of Scotus. And it is sufficiently gathered from the notion of first subject; for in the first subject there is necessary a real passive potency, or rather it itself is essentially passive potency; but a real passive potency cannot be understood without some entitative actuality. For how can it be understood that something is truly and really receptive of another unless in itself it is something? Whence the Commentator rightly says, De caelo III, comm. 29, that every passive potentiality is founded in some actuality. And St. Thomas, I, q. 45, a. 1, ad 1, says that matter is not called being in potency in the way in which a possible being is said to be in potency from the mere non-repugnance of the terms; he supposes, therefore, that it is some being in act founding real passive potency, or rather that it is real passive potency in the genus of substance.

11. How matter is pure potency.—I say, thirdly: matter is said to be pure potency with respect to informing or actuating act and with respect to act absolutely and simply said. It is declared, for first of all matter is not actuating act nor informing, as is self-evident from the notion of first subject. Next, in its intrinsic and essential concept it does not include informing physical act; for we have shown that it is a simple entity, which is also gathered from the notion of first subject. Moreover matter is such an entity that through itself alone it is not sufficient for existing without a substantial act perfecting and actuating it; whence by virtue of its precise entity it includes no formal act formally or eminently, and therefore it is not act absolutely simply. Finally, whatever of entity is in prime matter, all of it is for exercising the function of potency receptive of substantial form; for to this it was primarily and per se instituted, and therefore, as we were saying above, in its essential notion it includes a transcendental relationship to form. From these, then, it is evident that it is deservedly called pure potency in the genus of substance and is excellently explained in the aforesaid way; for, since matter is a simple entity and the whole of it is receptive potency, it is excellently called pure potency. But just as it is wont to be said that an exclusive expression does not exclude concomitance, so that expression pure does not exclude the entity and actuality in a certain respect necessary for the notion of real potency, but excludes first of all every other function besides that of passive potency, and next excludes the notion of complete act, or act simply and absolutely said, and (what comes to the same) excludes every formal act, both properly informing and simply constituting a perfect and complete act.

12. In what to be potency and to be in potency differ.—To be act and to be in act differ.—But on account of the use of words it is to be considered that in rigour one thing is signified when matter is called pure potency, another if it is said to be in pure potency. For the first is simply true and has the legitimate sense expounded; but the second is at the least ambiguous; for to be in pure potency in rigour signifies the privation of actual existence; whence it is only said of that which actually is nothing, yet can be, which cannot be said of matter after it has been created or concreated. For, although it is near nothing, it is nevertheless not nothing but a true thing, as we were saying above with Augustine. And in a similar way we can distinguish these expressions, to be in act or to be act; for that matter is in act is simply true, because this signifies nothing other than that matter is in the nature of things and exists, which is true; as it is true that matter was created, receives form and composes the composite, all which include existing; but that matter is act is at the least ambiguous; for absolutely it seems to signify to be actuating act or certainly to be act simply; and therefore it is not to be admitted absolutely, but with some diminishing addition, namely, to be imperfect entitative act and in a certain respect.

13. The premised explanation of the potency of matter is consonant with Aristotle.—But that this explanation of matter in the notion of pure potency is consonant with the sayings of Aristotle and the other philosophers is evident. For Physics I, text 69, comparing prime matter to the matter of artefacts, he says that it is so related to form and essence simply as wood to the statue or the form of the statue. Whence he concludes that matter is something formless; but through these and similar sayings only every formal and complete act is excluded from matter, not incomplete and as it were inchoate entitative act, without which there cannot be real receptive potency. Next it is evident from the definition of matter which he hands down, Physics I, c. 9, text 82, saying that matter is the first subject from which something per se comes about, being present in it. For matter is said to be present in the thing generated because through its entity it remains in the thing generated, per se composing it; and according to that entity Aristotle says in the same place that matter is prior to the thing generated and is ingenerable and incorruptible. And finally he says that matter per se is being, but per accidens non-being by reason of privation; he does not, therefore, exclude from matter every entitative actuality, but formal, to which it is in potency. Finally, Metaphysics VII and other places, when he says that matter is neither quantity nor quality nor a this something, he only excludes from the entity of matter composition from informing act and every formal act. Nor in truth is anything else necessary for the function and office of matter, as is evident from that reason which Plato too brings forward in the Timaeus, and from that of Aristotle, De caelo III, c. 8, namely, that because this is receptive of other things, it must not have in act those things of which it is susceptive, but in potency only; but matter is susceptive of formal act and of complete being; therefore with respect to these it is said to be pure potency, not with respect to its own entity. Moreover in the same sense Averroes said that matter is substantiated through being able, because it is such a substance that the whole of it is ordered to receiving, and therefore is essentially incomplete and potential. And in the same way St. Thomas declares the potentiality of matter, question De spiritualibus creaturis, a. 1, citing Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram I, cc. 14 and 15.

The arguments left from the preceding section are solved

14. Matter is metaphysically, not physically, composed of act and potency.—Through these, then, sufficient answer has been given to all the testimonies which in the preceding section were brought forward against our opinion. Indeed the reasons too have almost been solved; for they excellently prove that matter is pure potency, yet not in another sense than that which we have explained, which will be more clearly evident by answering in form to the reason made there. For when it is said that matter is not composed of act and potency, we concede this to be true of proper physical act and potency; but metaphysically it must be conceded that matter is composed of act and potency proportioned to itself, that is, of genus and difference, essence and existence, nature and incomplete subsistence. But when it is inferred that there would be a potency prior to matter, the answer is that of physical potency this is inconvenient and plainly repugnant, yet it does not follow from what has been said, since we do not say that matter is composed of potency and physical act. But if the discussion is of metaphysical potency, then it is true that matter in common is conceived as prior to this species of matter, and the essence of matter as prior to its existence, not in so far as it is being in act but absolutely, and similarly that the nature of matter in some genus is prior to its partial subsistence. Nor yet in rigour does it follow that there is in the thing itself some potency prior to matter, but that in matter itself there is one notion prior to another; yet always in that notion which is conceived as prior the very potency of matter is included, either confusedly, as in the concept of matter in common, or as possible, as in the precise concept of the essence of matter, or after the manner of partial nature only, the partial mode of subsisting being prescinded.

15. Whether every act is the principle of some operation.—But to the other part, by which it is proved that matter is in no way act, we concede that it is not actuating or informing act, nor yet act simply consummated and perfect in itself. Which at most the reasons show by which it is proved there that matter is not subsisting act; yet it is not proved that it is not incomplete and entitative act. Whence in this sense I deny that a partial entity or subsisting act is more perfect than any informing act whatever, because that very partial entity participates less of the notion of act than informing act. Next I deny that there cannot be an incomplete subsisting act; for the very essence of matter subsisting is its proper partial subsistence, and with that addition can be called act in a certain respect, that is, according to its entity, by which it is separated from nothing and from possible being. But all the other things which are adduced there proceed of act completely subsisting and including formal act through a simple and more excellent mode. And in the same sense is true what is subjoined in a certain confirmation in the same place, that every act is the principle of some operation; for this is true of formal act, whether informing or completely subsisting; yet it is not necessary that it be universally true of every partial and entitative act, because it is not necessary that every entity be the principle of some operation properly and in the genus of efficient cause; for it can be instituted for exercising another genus of cause, and so the entity of matter is for receiving, not for acting.

Objections against the above resolution

16. But there still remain to be solved some other objections which are wont to be made against the last assertion of this section. The first: nothing has actuality except in so far as it is, and therefore being itself is the actuality of all things, as St. Thomas says, I, q. 4, a. 1, ad 3; but matter has no being except through form, as Avicenna says, Metaphysics II, c. 2; and Boethius, book De unitate et uno, says that all being in created things is from form; therefore. The second, that otherwise from matter and form there would not come about one per se, because from two beings in act one per se does not come about; for on this account one per se does not come about from subject and accident, because the being of the subject is one thing, of the accident another. The third: matter is physically altogether simple; therefore either it is wholly act, or wholly potency, because a simple entity cannot consist of physical act and potency. But it cannot be said that it is wholly act, since it is essentially potency; therefore it is altogether potency including nothing of act. The fourth, that pure act is so act that it has nothing of potentiality or receptive potency admixed; therefore conversely pure potency is so potency that it has nothing of actuality admixed; for the reason of opposites is the same; and because pure potency must be supremely distant from pure act; but it would not be supremely distant if it included something of actuality. The fifth, that, if matter is something in act, then either substance or accident; not the second, as is self-evident; nor yet the first, because it is potency to substance; but what is potency to something is not actually that very thing, for these two are repugnant. The last, that otherwise matter could be known through itself and directly and by proper knowledge, which the philosophers seem commonly to deny with Aristotle and Plato in the places cited.

17. How all being is from form.—The first and second objection are to be professedly treated below, in the disputation on the essence and being of creatures; now briefly that principle, All being is from form, can be expounded in two ways. First, of specific and complete being. Secondly, that all being is from form either intrinsically giving and composing it, or at least in some way terminating its dependence; and in this way the very being of matter can be said to be from form in so far as it depends on it, as has been said. But the other axiom, From two beings in act one per se does not come about, cannot be understood of any actual entities whatever; for rather it is impossible that a being per se and complete in act be composed except of incomplete actual beings; for what is nothing, as we have often said,³ cannot really compose, and especially a being per se one. It must therefore be understood of beings in act complete in their genera; for these neither are per se ordered nor rightly cohere to compose one per se. But we do not say that matter is being in act in this way, but rather that it is as it were a certain inchoation of being, which naturally inclines and is per se conjoined to form as completing the integral being, as we shall explain more fully afterwards.

18. To the third the answer is that matter is wholly potency and wholly act such as we have explained, not through the composition of act with potency, but through identity and (so to speak) through intimate and transcendental inclusion; for not every potency is opposed to every act, but with proportion; receptive potency, therefore, is not opposed to incomplete entitative act, but rather essentially includes it.

19. How pure potency is equated with pure act.—To the fourth it is said, first, that, as pure act includes no potency receptive of another act, so pure potency includes no act actuating another, and as regards this the proportion holds, but not as regards entitative act. Whence, if the discussion is of this, the consequence is denied, because it involves a repugnance that there be a real receptive potency, however pure, which does not intimately include the actuality of being. But conversely it is not repugnant so to include the actuality of being as to involve no potentiality. For potentiality expresses imperfection; but it is not repugnant that there be given a perfection so pure that it excludes every imperfection; but it is repugnant that there be given a pure real imperfection without any perfection; for it would rather be nothing and the pure negation of all perfection. Whence, just as the theologians say that there is a supreme good which includes nothing of evil, yet that there is not a supreme evil which is such that it has no goodness or is founded in none, so, although there is a pure act which excludes every potency, nevertheless there cannot be a pure potency which excludes every actuality, even entitative and incomplete. But what was objected about the supreme distance between pure potency and pure act can first be dispatched by denying that it is of the notion of pure potency that it be supremely distant from pure act; for the matter of the heaven is pure potency, and yet it is not supremely distant from pure act; for the matter of these inferior things is more distant, since it is more imperfect; and it is still uncertain whether another matter less perfect than this inferior one could be made, and consequently more distant from the perfection of God. Accidents too are more distant from the divine perfection than prime matter. Likewise a twofold distance can be distinguished: one can be called negative, such as is between being and nothing; the other positive on the side of each extreme. It is not, therefore, of the notion of pure potency that it be distant from God in the former way, but in the latter; and therefore, although we admit that pure potency is supremely distant from pure act, it does not follow that pure potency must include no actuality, because that distance is not supreme compared to negative distance, but among positive ones; and therefore it requires some agreement between the extremes in entity, granted that that agreement is very small.

20. To the fifth the answer is that matter is substance, as Aristotle expressly teaches, Metaphysics VIII, from the beginning, and often elsewhere. Whence matter is not potency to the whole breadth of substance, but to form and to the being of the composite; but to the substantial entity of matter it is not in potency, but is actually such an entity. For it is repugnant that there be given a real and receptive potency with respect to the whole genus and breadth of substance as it comprehends complete and incomplete, because substance is prior to accident, and therefore such a potency, since it is the first subject, cannot be an accident but substance; nor can it be in potency to itself; therefore neither can it be in potency to the whole breadth of substance. In which there is a great difference between substantial and accidental form; for the accidental supposes a being of a nobler genus, namely substance, and therefore it can happen that the subject or potency to an accident is in no way an accident, that is, neither complete nor incomplete; but the substantial form does not suppose a being of a nobler genus, and therefore the potency to such a form cannot not be some substance, at least incomplete.