Disputationes metaphysicae

1. Hitherto we have explained rather what matter is not than what it is; now this second is to be inquired into, because we cannot declare the causality of matter and its notion of causing unless we first know what of entity matter itself has.

Some certain things are established

2. In order, then, to begin from those things which seem certain, first it seems indubitable that the matter which is actually under a form and composes with it a corporeal substance has something of real and substantial entity, really distinct from the entity of the form. This whole assertion is taken from Aristotle, Metaphysics VIII, text 3, and Metaphysics XII, text 14, and De Anima II, text 2, and other places, in which he divides substance into matter, form and composite. But because matter is not a complete substance, therefore, Physics I, texts 66 and 69, he says that matter is being not as a this something but as a subject, and explains its entity through analogy to the matter of artificial things; and in text 79 and following he says that it approaches more nearly to the notion of substance; and Physics II, text 10, he calls matter a certain nature. Similarly Plato in the Timaeus placed matter under being, and declares its nature fully and excellently; sometimes, however, he calls matter non-being; in which he is reproved by Aristotle, because to be non-being belongs rather to privation than to matter. But the dissension is in word only; for it is called non-being, being being taken by antonomasia for complete being, which is being simply; all the interpreters of Aristotle also agree in this assertion: Averroes, Physics I, text 66, and De substantia orbis, c. 1; Simplicius, Physics I, text 69; Philoponus, text 60; Themistius, text 61; and St. Thomas, question De spiritualibus creaturis, a. 1, says that prime matter is in the genus of substance; and the same is gathered from other places which I shall immediately report.

3. And the individual parts are briefly proved. The first indeed, because matter is not altogether nothing; otherwise it would exercise no true and real function in nature; and while the things which are corrupted are said to be resolved into matter, they would be reduced to nothing, and while they are produced from matter they would come about from nothing; and so matter would serve nothing for generations and corruptions, nor for avoiding the perpetual creation and annihilation of things; matter, therefore, is something of thing; therefore it has this most of all when it is conjoined to form and composes the composite. Whence Augustine, Confessions XII, cc. 7 and 8, says that matter was created by God, not as something which is nothing, but near nothing, nor no thing, but almost no thing. And it is certain by faith, and will also be proved below by reason, that matter was created by God, as is evident from I, q. 44, a. 2, and q. 46, a. 1, ad 3; but what is created receives something of real entity; otherwise it would remain as unmade as before.

4. The entity of prime matter is substantial.—The second part is evidently proved from this, that prime matter essentially composes substance, Metaphysics VIII, texts 15, 16 and 36, and Book IX, at the end, and it will be treated more fully below. But substance is not composed except of substances, at least incomplete ones. Likewise composite substance adds something of thing besides the form, and that is not an accident; it is therefore something substantial. Finally prime matter, in the way in which it is being, is not in a subject; for this is most of all repugnant to it, since it is the first subject.

5. The last part too is clear, because matter is an entity really separable from any particular determinate form, which is enough for it to be distinct in the thing itself from the form; but they are not distinguished only modally; for the substantial form is not a mode but a true thing having a proper entity; whence sometimes it can also naturally be preserved separated from matter, as the rational soul, and by absolute power any form whatever can be preserved separated. Matter, therefore, is distinguished from form as thing from thing. And it is confirmed; for the composition of substance from matter and form is real and physical, and not of thing and mode; therefore of two things. Finally, since matter is perpetual and before the form, it is evident that it is really distinguished from the form, supposing that the form is not only some mode but true act and proper entity, which is also certain, since it is a more perfect thing than matter, of which more fully below. Soncinas, however, Metaphysics VII, q. 19, although he concedes that this part is true, adds nevertheless that someone could defend that matter is not actually distinct from form, because it does not have distinct being. But, whatever may be the case with the being of existence, of which it will be said immediately, no one can deny that according to the entity of essence the entity of matter is other than the entity of the form, as the reasons made demonstrate.

The point of the difficulty and the view of some

6. These things, then, being posited beyond controversy, the difficulty of this question is whether matter of itself has some actual entity. But that particle of itself can express the negation either of a formal or of an efficient cause, and in each sense the question is to be treated, but especially in the former. For about the latter there is no controversy among Catholic philosophers, although some pagans erred in it. But in the former sense many think that matter of itself has no actual entity, but altogether from the form. Which opinion seems to be St. Thomas’s, I, q. 44, a. 2, ad 3, where he says that matter of itself is only in potency and therefore cannot be created except under a form; and he signifies the same in q. 45, a. 4, and q. 66, a. 1, where from that principle he concludes that matter cannot be without form; the same De potentia, q. 4, a. 1, and Quodlibet III, q. 1, and often elsewhere; and so the Thomists think: Cajetan, on De ente et essentia, c. 5, q. 8, and I, q. 76, a. 1; Ferrariensis, Contra Gentiles II, c. 66; Soncinas, Metaphysics VII, q. 17; Javellus, q. 5; and Durandus holds the same, In II, dist. 12, q. 2, and In IV, dist. 44, q. 1. The foundation of this opinion is that matter is pure potency; therefore it cannot have of itself any act; therefore neither actual entity. The first consequence is proved, because act is opposed to potency, and when it is called pure potency, that addition includes the negation of every act. The second consequence too is proved, because actual entity is some act; for it is being in act. But the antecedent is as it were a common axiom of all philosophers, and is taken from Aristotle, Physics I, text 69, where he says that matter of itself is so related to natural things as natural things of themselves to artificial ones, to which they are only in potency; and Metaphysics VII, c. 3, he says that matter per se is neither a what nor anything else of this kind. And De generatione I, c. 3, he says that the essence of matter consists in being able itself; and Metaphysics VIII, text 3, and Book XI, c. 2, and Physics V, text 8, he thinks that matter is not being in act but only in potency. The Commentator too teaches the same in the same places, and therefore in the book De substantia orbis, at the beginning, and Physics II, comm. 12, he says that matter is substantiated through being able. Plato seems to have been of the same opinion in the Timaeus, and he proves it from this, that the receptive must be devoid of all those things which it can receive.

7. Next the same antecedent is proved by reason, because, if matter is not pure potency, then either it is composed of potency and act, or it is some act. The first cannot be said, as is evident from the preceding section, and because otherwise there would be another potency prior to matter itself. Again, if it is act, it is either informing act or subsisting act. Not the first, as is self-evident; otherwise it would be the act of another subject, and consequently there would be another subject prior to matter, which is repugnant to the notion of matter. Nor can the second be said either, first, because subsisting act is more perfect than informing act: whence, if it is so subsisting that it cannot inform, it is always a complete substance; for by this reason angelic substances are perfect and complete, because they are subsisting acts; and those who posit the substance of the heaven to be simple say that it is complete because it is act subsisting per se. Finally God himself, who is the most perfect act, is subsisting and not informing act; it is therefore a sign that subsisting act from its notion is more perfect than informing. But prime matter is most imperfect, and so less perfect than any substantial form whatever, which is informing and not subsisting act. And it is confirmed, for every act, whether informing or subsisting per se, has some operation, as is evident by running through all acts of this kind; but prime matter has no proper action; it is not, therefore, act, but pure potency.

Resolution of the question

8. In order to answer the question, all ambiguity of terms being excluded, let us distinguish the question about the entity of essence and about the entity of existence; for it is much controverted how these two are distinguished in creatures, and therefore the resolution about the one is more certain than about the other. Again, when it is inquired whether matter has entity of itself and not from the form, that negation can be understood in two ways: in one way, that it does not have it from the form intrinsically, or as from an act informing and giving being to matter through its intrinsic information; in another way, that in no way does it have its being through the form, or through a relationship to the form, or through dependence on it.

9. Matter has an actual essence distinct from form, but dependent on it.—I say, then, first: prime matter has its actual entity of essence of itself and not intrinsically from the form, although it does not have it except with an intrinsic relationship to the form. I speak in this assertion of the actual being of essence, so that in names and in the mode of speaking I may agree with the authors of the contrary opinion; although in this sense and as regards this part I do not see how there can be a diversity of opinions. It is proved, first: matter has some real essence, otherwise it would not be real being; but the essence of matter is not constituted intrinsically in its being of essence through the form; therefore through itself it has its entity of essence, whatever it may be. The minor is proved, because a form does not intrinsically constitute any nature in its being of essence except by composing it after the manner of act; but the form does not compose the essence of matter, as is self-evident, because matter is essentially a simple entity, as is the form too, and from both arises the composite. Whence the second reason is taken; for every simple entity necessarily has its essence through itself intrinsically, and not through another entity, because in this the very notion of simple entity or essence consists; but matter is a simple essence; therefore. Thirdly, matter is essentially an incomplete entity; therefore it is not intrinsically constituted through the form. The consequence is evident, because, if it included the form, nothing would be lacking to it for the notion of complete essence. Finally this very thing is gathered from the very notion of pure potency; for, if matter created by God and existing in the composite had its being of essence intrinsically through the form, it would include in its essential concept the act of the form, not as an extrinsic term or something added, but as an intrinsic formal act constituting it, and so it would not be pure potency.

10. You will say that these arguments rightly prove of potential being of essence, not of actual. The answer is that, if the discussion is of being in objective potency, or in the power of the cause, and of being in act opposed to this potency, then the reasons made proceed not only of potential being but most of all of actual, because, whether matter exists through an entity distinct from itself or not, it is nevertheless certain that, when it is actually conjoined to form, it has its actual essence, of which (whatever may be the case with existence) all that has been said proceeds: that it is essentially a simple entity, actuable indeed through form, yet not including the form intrinsically in its essence. And therefore, the same entity of essence in number being preserved, it can cast off one form and acquire another; therefore through that simple entity of its own it has a proper essential perfection, distinct from that which the form confers; and similarly according to it it has actual being of essence; for every essence includes some being, at least essential. But if the discussion is of potential being, as it is said from receptive potency and is distinguished from actuating act, then it is true that matter only expresses a potential entity; yet this does not exclude that in that essence, whatever it may be, it is intrinsically constituted through itself and not through the form.

11. But that matter does not have its very entity of essence without a transcendental relationship to form is proved because it is essentially potency, as will be shown below, and is evident from the definition of Aristotle, saying that matter is the first subject, etc.; but every potency expresses an intrinsic relationship to its act; but the proper act of matter is form; matter, therefore, has its proper essence through itself with a relationship to form. But this relationship is not per se primarily to this or that form, but to form absolutely, and consequently to any generable form whatever, or which can be united through generation; and therefore, although forms are varied in matter, the essential notion or relationship of matter is not varied. Which is also a clear argument that matter does not have its entity of essence from the information of form.

12. An objection is dissolved.—But some object: for every being of essence must be constituted in some certain species; but every species is through form; therefore no being of essence can be fully constituted except through form. Whence St. Thomas, I, q. 44, a. 2, says that matter is contracted through form to a determinate species. To this it has almost been answered above that the matter of generable things is constituted in a lowest species of matter, in which species it is not constituted through the form by which it is informed; for it always has the same under any form whatever. But when it is said that the form is that which gives the species, it is understood of complete and perfect species. And in the same sense St. Thomas understands that matter is contracted through form to a determinate species, as he openly declares by the following words, saying: As the substance of some species is contracted by an accident coming to it to a determinate mode of being, as man is contracted through white. Which example is adduced only to declare that this determination of matter through form is not as regards the intrinsic essence of matter itself, but as regards the essence of the composite, which in a certain way happens to matter according to itself, in so far as the mode of existing of matter under this or that form is not of the essence of matter but variable in it. Whence St. Thomas in that same article openly supposes that matter of itself has some being besides that which the form gives; for thence he concludes that God is the cause of matter, because he is the cause of things not only according as they are such through accidental or substantial forms, but also according to all that which pertains to their being in any way whatever. And the same, I, q. 14, a. 11, ad 3, says that, although matter recedes from the likeness of God according to its potentiality, nevertheless, in so far as even so it has being, it has a certain likeness of the divine being; and De veritate, q. 3, a. 5, ad 1, he says: although prime matter is formless, nevertheless there is in it an imitation of the first form; for however weak a being it has, that nevertheless is an imitation of the first being.

13. I say, secondly: prime matter also has in itself and through itself an entity or actuality of existence distinct from the existence of the form, although it has it dependently on the form. Henry holds the former part, Quodlibet I, q. 10, and Quodlibet IV, q. 16; Scotus, In II, dist. 12, qq. 1 and 2; and in the same place Gregory, q. 1; Gabriel and others, in the same place. The foundation of this conclusion, the preceding being supposed, is that the being of existence adds no thing or real mode over the entity of essence as actual and placed outside its causes, because, by the very fact that an entity is conceived as actual outside its causes, it is conceived as existing. Which principle is to be professedly proved below, Disp. XXXIV. But from it it evidently follows that matter, as it has an actual entity of essence distinct from form, so it has its proper being of existence, which it retains under any form whatever. Whence it is confirmed: for matter has the same actual entity in number under the form of the generated as it has under the form of the corrupted; therefore it also has the same being in number by which it is constituted in such actual entity. But that being is of existence, as is proved in the said place. It is confirmed, secondly, for matter as it is presupposed to form and is the subject of generation is not altogether nothing, otherwise generation would come about from nothing; it is, therefore, some created entity; therefore an actual and existing entity, because creation is not terminated except at actual and existing entity. Nor can there be a real subject unless it is existing in the nature of things. Finally, such is the existence of the thing as is its actual essence; as, therefore, the essence of corporeal substance is composed of the partial essences of matter and form, so also the integral existence of the same substance is composed of the partial existences of matter and form. Which is to be proved more fully in the cited place; for it follows manifestly from the said principle, that existence and actual essence are distinguished not in the thing but by reason; therefore matter, as it is an actual entity really distinct from form, includes in its entity a proper partial existence, also distinct in the thing from the partial existence of the form.

14. But that this existence of matter depends in some way on the form and on its information Scotus, Henry and Gregory seem to deny in the places cited above; but the contrary opinion, which we posited in the second part of the assertion, is commonly received, because matter, although it has its proper existence, nevertheless that is so imperfect that it cannot naturally be without the support of form; and this is called in the present case the dependence of matter on form. But of what kind this mode of dependence is cannot fittingly be declared unless we first explain the causality of form; and in the same place we shall also treat whether there is so great a dependence of matter on form that without it it can in no way be.

15. I say, thirdly: matter does not have actual entity or existence of itself without an efficient cause, but it is necessary that it receive this being from another, namely from God. This assertion according to faith is most certain; but according to philosophy not all admit that it is demonstrable. Whence according to the opinion of Plato¹ matter is supposed to every action, even of God, and therefore is thought to be unmade, as of the Fathers Justin reports, in the Hortatory Oration to the Gentiles; and Ambrose, Hexaemeron I, c. 1; and Athanasius, book On the Incarnation of the Word, at the beginning; and of the philosophers Plutarch, De placitis I; Philoponus, Physics I, text 6; and Themistius, text 32. But of the opinion of Aristotle the matter is doubtful, which we shall treat below in treating of the efficient cause. But the assertion posited is sufficiently demonstrated from this, that there can be only one being by essence and necessary from within, as we shall show below in demonstrating that God exists; but that being cannot be prime matter, unless we fall into the error of those who said that prime matter is God, which St. Thomas deservedly calls most stupid, I, q. 3, a. 8, and Contra Gentiles I, c. 17; for there is no substantial being more distant from God than prime matter, nor is anything more repugnant to God than that function on account of which matter is posited, which is to receive and to be passive potency, to be actuated and perfected; therefore matter is not being necessary per se and by essence; therefore it is not actual entity of itself, until it is made by another and receives existence. And it is confirmed, for to be being in act of oneself and by virtue of one’s own essence alone is a great perfection, which the most perfect finite beings, as are the heavens and the angels, do not have; indeed it alone is an indication of infinite perfection; since, therefore, matter is imperfect, this perfection cannot belong to it; but all these are to be treated more fully below in the places cited.

Corollaries from the above doctrine

16. The first.—From this conclusion it follows, first, that matter was made through creation and could not have been made otherwise; and in this sense must be taken what Aristotle calls it, ingenerable, Physics I, c. 9; for, if he understands that matter is altogether unmakeable, he altogether errs, as we have shown; it must therefore be understood that in such a way, namely through generation, it is not producible. Which is evident, because matter, since it is the first subject, cannot be produced from a subject, otherwise it would suppose another prior subject, which is repugnant; therefore it cannot come about through generation; for that comes about through generation which comes about from a presupposed subject; it remains, therefore, that it can only be effected through creation, because it can only come about from nothing. You will say: this is repugnant to the axiom received by all philosophers: From nothing nothing comes. I answer that this is true only with respect to natural agents, which are finite and have power of acting only through form; but not with respect to God, who is of infinite power and supreme actuality and the first and per se being, which is the first cause of all participated being in so far as it is such. But thence it is rightly concluded that God alone can be the effector of prime matter, because it is proper to him to create, as will be shown below.

17. The second.—Secondly it is inferred from what has been said that the entity of matter is incorruptible, which can be proportionally demonstrated by the reason made above; for what can be corrupted can be resolved into pre-existing matter; but matter cannot be resolved into a prior matter. Whence to be corrupted, if it is taken properly, belongs only to the composite of matter and form, whose union is dissoluble. But if it is extended to those things which are co-corrupted (so to speak), it can thus also belong to the form which depends on matter in its being, because it is so destroyed that at least its subject remains; but if the first subject too were destroyed, it would not be corruption, but annihilation. You will say that by this reason it is rightly proved that matter is not corruptible in the said propriety, but not that at the corruption of the composite it cannot be altogether destroyed or lose being; but it seems that in this way it can be corrupted or destroyed; for a natural agent is often able to expel one form and not to introduce another; therefore in this way it is able to destroy matter, since it cannot be preserved without form. I answer that a form can never naturally be expelled from matter except through the introduction of another, whether this introduction comes about from the proximate agent principally or only instrumentally or dispositively; and the natural order of things itself postulates this mode of generation and corruption. All of which are to be professedly declared in what follows. But thence it comes about that matter cannot naturally be corrupted or destroyed according to its proper being, but only according to its union to this or that form, or according to the privation of some form, as Aristotle said in the cited place; but God by his power could destroy matter, not by corrupting but by annihilating, by suspending the influx by which he preserves it, and the concurrence by which he introduces form into it; but this is only through the extrinsic power of God; whence it does not prevent matter from being of itself perpetual and incorruptible.