Disputationes metaphysicae

1. In this section and the following, the opinions of the ancient philosophers are briefly to be touched upon, which Aristotle in various places treated and attacked at length, especially Metaphysics I, c. 3 and following, and Physics I, from c. 2, and De generatione I, c. 1 and following, and De caelo III, c. 7; and in Diogenes Laertius, in the lives of these philosophers, the same things are read, and in Plato in the Theaetetus and Sophist, and Plotinus, Enneads II, Book 9, and Theophrastus, in his Metaphysics, c. 3; and Plutarch, De placitis I, c. 3; and of the Fathers Augustine touched upon them, City of God VIII, from the beginning; and Epiphanius, Against Heresies III, in 80; and Irenaeus, Against Heresies II, c. 19; and Clement of Rome, the book of the Recognitions, and Clement of Alexandria, Stromata I; and Eusebius, Praeparatio evangelica XIV, from the beginning; and Ambrose, Hexaemeron I, c. 2. The opinions of these philosophers, then, we reduce to two heads: one, of those who posited several first material principles, of whom we shall treat here; the other, of those who posited only one, but erred in assigning it, of whom we shall speak in the following section.

The opinion of those constituting infinite material principles

2. The first opinion, then, was that the material cause of all things is put together from indivisible little bodies or atoms, which Leucippus, Democritus, Epicurus, Metrodorus and Anaxagoras posited to be infinite. Who almost all thought that these little bodies are similar among themselves and of the same notion, and only according to the variety of position, figure and order compose various beings; and that the corruption of things is nothing other than the dispersion or disordering of atoms, but generation is their new composition. But Anaxagoras posited atoms partly similar, partly dissimilar, so that from similar ones homogeneous things would come about, but from dissimilar ones dissimilar things, as in the organic body the heterogeneous parts, for example flesh from fleshy atoms, but bone from bony ones, and so of the others. Again, some of them seem to have posited these atoms altogether indivisible; and therefore, in order that they could compose a body, they said that a body coalesces not only from them but also from some void or empty; for, if all of them were immediately and solidly conjoined, the bulk would never increase, as is taken from Aristotle, Metaphysics I, 4. But others seem not to have posited them mathematically indivisible, but only physically; according to which interpretation it is not necessary to interpose some void between the atoms themselves in order that the magnitude of a body might increase from them. Again, of these philosophers some posited no efficient cause of things besides these atoms, nor any final cause either, but that from their various concourse and perpetual agitation some things are dissolved and others arise by chance; and therefore, as Aristotle reports,¹ Epicurus said that these little bodies have a natural weight by which they are always borne. But others, as Anaxagoras, posited an efficient cause operating by intellect and will and composing various things from these little bodies.

3. The proposed opinion is refuted.—Absurdities following from the opinion asserting atoms as the material cause.—But this part pertains to the disputations on the efficient and final causes. Now, as regards the present matter, these philosophers first of all did not know the true material cause which is a potency physically receptive of some act; for those atoms are not in potency to receiving some physical form, nor can they be called the matter of the whole composite except in the way in which integral parts are called the matter of the whole and stones and timbers the matter of the house. Whence it further comes about that, according to that mode of philosophizing, the forms of natural beings are only as it were artificial, namely certain figures arising from the various position and order of the atoms. And so there will be no true substantial generation and corruption, but only various coordination or disordering of atoms. And although Anaxagoras posits atoms of diverse notions, nevertheless it is necessary that he posit all of them confused and intermixed in each thing, so that through their eduction one thing can be generated from another. And so all things differ only in this, that some have certain atoms more evident or in the exterior parts, but others more hidden and in the more secret parts, which whole diversity is only in the position and coordination of the atoms. Add that it cannot be understood how such various little bodies, having repugnant conditions, are intimately conjoined in each thing. Nor is it less inexplicable how from any thing whatever these hidden little bodies are brought forth to light, so that other things seem to be generated, or rather composed.

4. This too is absurd in all these philosophers, that they posit an infinite multitude of these little bodies; for either they understand that in individual natural beings there is an infinite multitude of these atoms, or only in the whole universe, but in individual bodies or its parts a finite multitude. In the former sense it is altogether absurd; for infinite atoms could not compose any body without it growing into infinite magnitude; for, if the atoms are feigned to be not mathematically but physically indivisible, each will have some magnitude, in which either all will be equal, because there is no reason of inequality, or at least a least atom could be assigned to which the others are either equal or greater; therefore from such infinite atoms a magnitude actually infinite will necessarily be composed. But if the atoms are mathematically indivisible, they cannot compose magnitude unless a void space is interposed, which space will be divisible and of some magnitude; from which it is similarly concluded that infinite atoms so distant among themselves necessarily effect an infinite body, occupying or including an infinite space, partly void, partly filled with atoms. Nor can an instance be brought forward of the infinite points existing in a line, for there there are no immediate points, because the whole line is continuous; but in atoms it would be necessary, any atom being marked, that there be some one proximately distant from it by some certain and definite distance, and so of the rest; it would therefore be necessary that those infinite little bodies occupy an infinite space in that way.

5. But in the latter sense too that opinion is improbable; and first of all against it proceed all the things which Aristotle wrote against the infinite magnitude of the world, Physics III and De caelo I. Next it is evident that the whole sphere of generable and corruptible things is finite, since it is terminated at the sphere of the moon; but to attribute also to the heavens a composition from atoms and to extend them to infinity cannot be philosophical, because neither experience nor reason leads us to so think. Finally, if any body of finite magnitude consists only of finite atoms, this fiction of atoms cannot suffice for the generations and corruptions of things, both because from the same thing various things can be generated almost to infinity; and also because it would be necessary that the magnitude of the body always be much diminished in every generation and corruption through the dispersion of atoms, although it is evident by experience that this does not always happen. Unless perhaps it be said that there always comes about as it were a certain circulation of atoms, while the interior ones are brought out to the external parts, but the exterior ones are driven into the inmost parts, and therefore the magnitude of the thing is not diminished. But nothing can be more absurd than this; for thence it comes about that in truth nothing is changed except according to place or appearance. And that inducing and educing of atoms is against experience; for when fire is generated from tow, the generation comes about not only in the exterior parts but intimately and in the whole magnitude; and when a man dies, corruption comes about in all parts, both internal and external. This opinion, then, is altogether absurd, nor does it have a foundation which it is necessary to satisfy. For that principle on which both the cited philosophers and others were founded, From nothing nothing comes, what true sense it has we shall declare below.

The opinion of those positing several finite material principles

6. The preceding opinion is refuted.—The second opinion also posits several principles, or several first material causes of generable things, yet in finite number. So Empedocles thought, who said that the four elements, fire, air, water and earth, are four first material causes from which mixed bodies are generated, but that they themselves have no prior cause or material principle. But this opinion is false and can be evidently refuted; for first of all, although he touched upon the composition or generation of the mixed from the elements, he did not consider the transmutation of the elements among themselves, although it is evident that both air is converted into fire and water into earth, and conversely. But of transmutation of this kind the elements cannot be the material principles, but some subject common to all of them. But if perhaps Empedocles thought that the elements are not substantially transmuted, and therefore do not consist of matter and substantial form, but are certain altogether simple beings subject to accidents, against this first of all we shall show below that it is no less certain that there are substantial forms of the elements than of other natural beings, and consequently that they are truly and substantially transmuted among themselves. Next, although we admitted it, there would be no foundation for multiplying matters or first substantial subjects; but it would rather have to be said that in all the elements there is the same substantial subject, which, affected by diverse accidents, is called a distinct element. And since that subject is also the material principle of mixed bodies, it comes about that in truth and substantially there is only one first material cause of all things.

7. But if perhaps Empedocles said that that diversity of natural accidents which is seen in the elements indicates the essential distinction of substantial subjects, from this very thing an efficacious argument ad hominem is taken; when air is so transmuted by fire that it remains affected by the proper accidents of fire, the change comes about not only in the accidents but also in the substance itself; but it cannot come about in the whole substantial entity, on account of the reasons made in the preceding section about annihilation and creation; it is necessary, therefore, to confess that also in the elements themselves there is some subject prior to them and common to them, by reason of which they can be mutually transmuted; therefore those are not the first material causes, but there is another prior one of which they consist. And hence it is also concluded that these elements are not the first material causes of mixed bodies, because in them there is matter prior to them, and this is also the material cause of mixed bodies, which remains in them and is informed by their forms; that, therefore, is the first cause in that order also of mixed bodies, all the more because according to the true opinion the elements do not remain formally in the mixed body, that is, according to their proper substantial forms, because the substantial form of the mixed body cannot fall (so to speak) upon the form of the element, or inform matter as already informed by the form of the element; therefore the elements according to their proper substances are not the remaining and proper material cause of mixed bodies, but the same matter which is the first material cause of the elements themselves is also of mixed bodies.

Resolution of the question

8. It must be said, then, that the prime matter, or material cause, of all sublunary things is only one. Which is the common opinion of all the philosophers whom we shall report in what follows. And it is sufficiently proved by the reason now made against Empedocles and by the latter discourse made in the preceding section. Where from the common and mutual transmutation of sublunary things we showed that there is a common matter; for that reason equally proves that the first subject which remains under all these transmutations is only one. Both because the contrary principles from which generations and corruptions come about must be concerned with the same thing. And also because that subject is of itself indifferent to any forms whatever of corruptible things and their dispositions; therefore it does not require in itself distinction or multiplication, indeed it has nothing whence it would have it. And conversely every form of a generable thing of whatever species can be introduced into any part whatever of this matter if it is fittingly disposed; it is therefore a sign that this matter according to itself is one and of the same notion and sufficient in its genus for causing all the effects which can be materially caused in these things, if the other causes necessary in other genera are applied or concur.

9. An objection is satisfied.—It can only be objected that the material cause is intrinsic and essential; but these generable and corruptible things are essentially diverse; therefore one and the same matter cannot be in all of them. But this objection touches that question whether matter is part of the quiddity of material substances, which we shall treat below in a more convenient place;² now it is briefly answered that the essences of these material things are diverse and dissimilar as regards their forms, but similar as regards prime matter. Nor does this stand in the way of essential diversity at all; for this does not exclude agreement and likeness in some part.