Disputationes metaphysicae

1. Various partitions of matter.—Since prime matter includes two things, it is necessary before all else to expound the signification of the word as regards each part. Matter, then, is wont to be divided into matter from which, in which, and about which. Which division can be explained in various ways; first, so that it is not a division of things or matters, but of the respects and functions of the same matter. For the same matter is called matter from which either with respect to the composite which consists of it, or with respect to the form which is educed from it. Whence in the former respect the body of man is matter from which, yet not in the latter consideration, because the form of man is not educed from the potency of matter. Whence with respect to such form it will be called the matter in which the form is introduced; so that in which expresses a respect of union, not of eduction. In which can also be taken abstractly so as to include the relationship to form as inhering in matter. But with respect to the agent the same matter will be called matter about which the agent operates. According to this interpretation of the terms, then, no member of those mentioned is excluded from the present consideration; for we are treating of matter according to itself, or as it includes in its adequate concept all those relationships; but whether these pertain to various causalities distinct from the nature of the thing we shall see afterwards. Otherwise matter about which is wont to be taken as it is distinguished from matter from which and in which according to real union and inherence, and so it properly expresses a respect to an agent by immanent action, and is nothing other than the object about which such an agent is occupied. Which signification of matter is metaphorical and matters nothing at present, because as such it does not exercise material causality, but either efficient or final, as we touched upon above; the discussion here, then, is not of objective but of subjective matter.

2. Again, matter from which is wont to be divided into transient and remaining. In the former way wood, for example, will be called the matter from which fire comes about; and in that signification from which designates not only the relationship of material cause, but includes also the relationship of the term from which; and on this side that signification does not pertain to the present disputation. But remaining matter is the proper and internal material cause which remains in the composite or in the term of generation, conferring in its own way to its constitution. Finally matter is wont to be divided into metaphysical and physical: the metaphysical is the genus with respect to the difference; but that appellation is only through analogy and proportion to physical matter, which is properly and simply the matter of which we are here treating; but of the metaphysical, besides the things which we said above in treating of universal unity, we shall add some things in Disp. XV, last section, in treating of metaphysical form.

3. But matter can be called prime both through the negation of a prior and through the respect to a second; since, then, matter expresses the notion of subject, that will be called prime which supposes no prior subject; and so Aristotle, Physics I, c. 9, defined matter as the first subject from which something comes about. But that will be called second matter which supposes a prior subject. And so many call the substantial composite second matter with respect to accidents, because it is so the subject of accidents that it consists of a prior subject; and by a similar reason those who admit several substantial forms in the same supposit call the composite, for example, of matter and the form of corporeity second matter with respect to the soul. Often too disposed matter, or matter affected by accidental dispositions, is called second matter, not because the composite itself of matter and accidents is the subject in which the form is received, but only because the reception of such dispositions precedes in the order of nature and constitutes matter proximately capable of such form; whence such matter is properly called proximate. But Aristotle, Metaphysics VIII, text 11, called proper or proximate matter the transient matter accommodated to the generation of the thing, as wine is the matter of vinegar, of which matter the Commentator says, Physics II, comm. 31, that it is the matter of alteration, not of composition. Every second matter, therefore, supposes prime and adds some form or disposition.

Resolution of the question

4. Prime matter is gathered from the necessity of a first subject in any change whatever.—And hence it is evident that, if we speak in common and as it were formally of prime matter, that is, of the first subject of changes or forms, abstracting from the question which such a subject is and of what kind the form which is received in it, then it is as evident that there is prime matter as it is evident that there are in things changes to various forms; because to every change some subject is supposed, as was proved above and is evident by experience. Therefore either that subject supposes another or not; if it does not suppose, it is first, and the intent is had. But if it supposes another, I shall ask of that; but it is evident that one cannot proceed to infinity; therefore one must necessarily stop at some first subject or prime matter. The minor proposition last assumed is demonstrated by Aristotle of all causes in Book II; yet it is in a certain way more evident in the material cause, which is the intrinsic foundation of the whole composite; but a composite standing per se cannot be perceived by the intellect, one part of which rests on another and another again on another, without finally stopping at some one which underlies the others. Since, therefore, every natural composite is so per se that according to its whole self it does not depend in the genus of material cause on some subject which is outside itself, it is necessary that it have below itself some subject which is first with respect to all the other entities of which it consists and which are in a subject. So, then, it is evident that there is prime matter, or a first subject, in natural things.

5. Matter is gathered from the continuous vicissitude of things.—Secondly, it is principally proved, for it is evident that generable and corruptible things are so transmuted that some are generated from others reciprocally and mutually, at least mediately; therefore it is necessary that they agree in some common subject which remains in all of them, by reason of which they are capable of that mutual transmutation; therefore that subject is first, and so the first material cause of things of this kind. The antecedent is evident by experience; for the elements act mutually among themselves, and one is converted into another, whether mediately or immediately, and mixed bodies too are generated from them, and consequently are also resolved into them; and so it comes about that all sublunary things, as far as depends on the force of their nature and composition, are mutually transmutable. I say as far as depends on the force of their nature, because it can happen that some parts of the elements are never transmuted because they are in hidden and most remote places to which the actions of contrary agents do not reach.

6. The first consequence is proved, first, because no natural transmutation can come about unless a common subject remains under each term; both because otherwise the thing which is corrupted would perish altogether according to its whole self, and another which begins to be would come about according to its whole self, and so the one would pass into nothing, the other would come about from nothing, no common thing remaining under each; one, therefore, would be annihilated and another created, which is naturally impossible. And also because otherwise the whole action of the natural agent would be either impossible or irrelevant to the generation of things. The sequel is declared, because we can speak either of the accidental alteration which we experience, which it is evident does not come about except in a subject and from a common subject which remains under each term, because it is evident by experience that this action does not come about unless a subject is supposed; for the accident which comes about through it cannot naturally be except in a subject which sustains both the action and its formal term, from which subject the opposite form or privation is expelled; there is, therefore, a common subject in an action of this kind. Or we speak of that substantial action or transmutation which comes about in the term of alteration, in which the thing which perishes loses the being simply which it had before and another thing simply begins, as when fire comes about from tow. And there too it is necessary that a common subject remain; otherwise the whole preceding alteration or heating of the tow would be irrelevant to the procreation of the fire, because it would in no way contribute to it if it itself and its whole subject altogether perished; but at most it could serve to empty the place or space into which the thing to be procreated could be introduced; but to this the destruction of the thing would be irrelevant; for local expulsion would suffice, which could come about through the introduction of another thing into that space, as happens in local motion.

7. Such a destruction of the thing through alteration would also be impossible, because an accident cannot, speaking per se, destroy its subject, since it is sustained by it and receives being from it. Either, then, that subject is simple or composite; if it is simple, it can in no way be destroyed through the action or accident which comes about in it, because it is necessary in order that such action or such accident can be. But if that subject is composed of a prior subject and another form, it will indeed be able to be destroyed by reason of the alteration and accident introduced into it, yet not per se but per accidens, by reason of another action and form following upon the prior alteration; but this consequence cannot be understood unless the subsequent form is introduced into the same subject in which the prior was, because otherwise there would be no cause why the union between the prior subject and its form would be dissolved; therefore this whole natural transmutation must necessarily be founded in some common subject which remains under each term.

8. From some special changes.—And this very thing can be declared by induction made in some transmutations; when an animal, for example, is nourished from food, either something of the food remains at the end of nutrition and is conjoined to the living substance, or the food and everything which is in it is altogether destroyed through the action of the living thing. If nothing of the food remains, the whole action of the living thing is superfluous, and nothing can be helped from the food so as thence either to grow or be strengthened, because from that which perishes in the food nothing is strengthened or grows. But if something of the food remains, that can be nothing but common matter or subject. The same argument can be taken from the visible and improper nutrition of fire; for it does not grow unless wood or something similar is supposed, nor is it preserved unless it is nourished by oil or similar matter; this matter, therefore, cannot be transient according to its whole self, otherwise it would be useless, and no reason could be given why it is necessary for such effects, nor could it be declared what it contributes to them; that matter, therefore, is in some way remaining under the form of the thing generated or nourished; it remains, therefore, according to some common subject.

9. Which finally is confirmed, because otherwise the transmutation of things would not be corruption and generation but a certain transubstantiation, because the whole substance of one thing would perish and the whole of another would begin. Indeed it would be more than transubstantiation, because not only in total substances but also in all their accidents there would be that succession; because, if no common subject remained, much less could the same accident naturally remain, which depends on its subject in being and being preserved. But this genus of transmutation is foreign to all philosophy and to every natural action; and besides the notion of annihilation and creation which it includes, as I was saying above, no reason can be thought why those two are so connected in the nature of things that for the production of one the destruction of the other is necessary, and conversely; natural transmutation, therefore, is not through total destruction and inception, but through transformation from some common subject. And to this the demonstration of Aristotle almost tends, that this transmutation always comes about from contrary to contrary (including under contraries privative opposites), which have a common subject. It is evident, therefore, that there is a common subject or material cause.

10. Matter is gathered from the resolution to one first subject.—It remains to prove the second consequence of the principal reason, by which we inferred that this matter is the first cause in its order, and in that sense is most truly called prime matter; but this can be shown in no more evident way (whatever some may wish) than that touched upon above, namely, because one cannot proceed to infinity in proximate and remote subjects, or in subjects and subjected things (so to speak), but one must necessarily stop at some subject which is not subjected, nor yet composed of a part which is in a subject, because every such composite can finally be resolved into simple things, in which there must be something which is altogether not in a subject. Nor does this discourse suppose that in the substantial forms of the same composite there is not a process to infinity; for, although this too is evident, nevertheless, if per impossibile infinite forms were feigned in the same composite, on the side of the potency receiving them one would necessarily have to stop at some simple subject which is not in a subject; because the whole collection of such forms is in some subject; therefore that is simple, as we shall demonstrate more immediately; this, then, we call prime matter. But besides this, that consequence can also be proved from the community of this subject; for, since all these inferior things are mutually transmuted immediately or at least mediately, as has been said, it is necessary that that subject which is supposed to these transmutations be first in the notion of subject or matter; for, if it consisted of another prior subject or matter, either that too would be transmutable, and so it would not be the common subject of all transmutations, but that which would remain after its resolution; or it would not be transmutable, and so not every corporeal being would be transmutable into any other whatever, the opposite of which we were supposing; but of this more fully in the third section.

11. What is inferred in all the premises.—From all that has been said, then, it remains generally proved that in every order of transmutations some first material cause is to be given; but it cannot be concluded from what has been said that there is a true prime matter which is the material cause of some substance, unless something is adjoined. Whence the discourses made, formally taken, prove equally that in each heavenly body there is some first subject of those changes which come about in it; indeed with the same proportion they prove the same of any spiritual substance whatever in so far as it is capable of real change, either local or intellectual or affective; for, although that change is not corruptive but perfective, it nevertheless necessarily supposes some subject, and therefore it is necessary that it be reduced to some first subject in its order, which can also be called the first material cause of that change, although it is not called prime matter according to the common use of this word; for it properly signifies the material principle of substantial transmutation or constitution. From which it also comes about that, although things which are in some way transmuted have a material cause of their transmutation proportioned to themselves, nevertheless, if the transmutation is not of one thing into another, by virtue of transmutation it cannot be concluded that there is some first material cause common to things of this kind; as, although the angels have a first subject of their changes and corporeal things similarly, nevertheless, because neither can these be transmuted into angels nor conversely, it cannot be concluded from transmutation that there is some first subject common to all of them. And the reason is the same of the heavenly and sublunary bodies, because neither can these pass into those, nor conversely; indeed the same holds of the heavens themselves among themselves, because they are not mutually transmutable, but each can only be accidentally changed in itself. Which very thing is true a fortiori in spiritual created substances. In all these, therefore, it is only concluded that there is one common subject of the accidents among which change comes about. But in these inferior substances and bodies, since they are mutually transmutable, some common and first subject is rightly concluded. But in order that it be concluded that this subject is the material cause of the very substance of such things, it is necessary to add that their mutual transmutation among themselves is according to substance and not only according to accidents; because, if they were transmuted in accidents alone, it would be enough that there be given in them a first subject of such accidents, whether that were a simple or a composite substance, and whether it were of one notion in all or diverse.

12. There is in things not only accidental but also substantial transmutation.—In order to conclude, then, that there is prime matter such as Aristotle posited, it remained to be proved that the transmutation of these inferior bodies which we experience is not only accidental but also substantial. But this, besides experience, which by itself seems sufficiently evident, not only in the elements and in inanimate mixed bodies, but much more in living things, animals, and in ourselves when we are generated and die—besides this experience (I say), it is to be proved by reason from the necessity of substantial forms distinct from accidents; for, if these forms are given, it is necessary that there be given prime matter which is their subject and composes with them one integral substance, which is to be the material cause of substance. But that there are substantial forms is to be proved below, Disp. XV; and therefore let it now be supposed, and only from that hypothesis let it be held demonstrated that there is a true and proper prime matter in these things which are generated and corrupted; for the consequence is evident and lacking all difficulty; but the antecedent is to be proved in the said place.