Disputationes metaphysicae

1. From Aristotle we have no definition of cause in common; later philosophers laboured in assigning it, so that one might proceed better from the common to explaining the proper notions of the individual causes, and at the same time it might be declared what the agreement of causes among themselves is. But it is to be supposed that the discussion is of cause in act, formally as it is cause; for, as we were saying above of principle, so also in cause three things can be considered, namely the thing which causes, the causation itself (so to speak), and the relation which either follows or is thought. Of this third member nothing is to be treated in this whole matter; for it has its proper place below in the matter on relation. But of the other two we are going to speak; first, however, of causation itself, through which cause in act is formally constituted and from which the cause itself, or the power of causing, becomes known to us.

2. The first description of cause is rejected.—The first definition, then, is wont to be handed down thus: A cause is that through which the question is satisfied by which it is asked on account of what something is or comes about. Which can be taken from Aristotle, Physics II, c. 7, where he proves the sufficiency of the causes from this, that through them all the ways in which it is wont to be asked on account of what a thing is are satisfied; he signifies, therefore, that a cause is that through which the question on account of what is satisfied. Whence it is evident that the expression on account of what is not taken in that special way in which it is wont to be said of the final cause, but more generally so as to comprehend all. But this definition declares almost nothing of the thing; for it is equally obscure what that word on account of what signifies; for, if it is rightly taken, it signifies only the relationship of the final cause, and does not sufficiently declare even that, as we shall see afterwards. But if it is taken more widely, it comprehends the various modes which are signified by those words, from which, through which, by which something is; whence only a common name is imposed, yet the common notion is not explained. I add that that word in that generality can also comprehend principles which are not causes, as Christ said, John 6: I live on account of the Father, where not the relationship of cause but only of principle is signified.

3. The second definition of cause is refuted.—The second definition, and a very common one, is: A cause is that upon which another follows, which is wont to be reported from the book De causis, where it is not found; and it seems rather to have been taken from the definition of principle declared above from Aristotle, Metaphysics V. For what Aristotle posited, first, in place of a genus is posited in that definition of cause through a more transcendental term, namely that; but the remaining particles, namely upon which another, manifestly are equivalent to those words of Aristotle, whence something. Finally what Aristotle said under a disjunction, is, or comes to be, or is known, is comprehended sufficiently confusedly under the single word follows; for in this word consequence through inference alone cannot be signified, otherwise the definition would belong also to effects from which causes are inferred; it is necessary, therefore, that it signify generally any connection or consequence whatever. And from this very exposition the chief argument is taken against the definition itself; because that definition is not so much of cause as of principle; whence it also belongs to privation, for upon it change follows; unless perhaps it be said that the word follows is to be understood through influx and dependence; in which sense the definition will indeed stand, yet it will be very obscure.

Resolution of the question

4. The genuine and adequate description of cause.—The third definition is that which some moderns chiefly bring forward: A cause is that on which something per se depends. Which indeed, as regards the thing, meets with my approval; yet I would more willingly describe it thus: A cause is a principle per se flowing being into another; for in place of the genus I think it more fitting to posit that common name which belongs more nearly and more immediately to the thing defined; but principle is compared in this way to cause; for being and that relative that, which, posited absolutely, is equivalent to it, are most remote. But through that particle, per se flowing, privation is excluded, and every per accidens cause, which per se do not confer or flow being into another. But that word flows is to be taken not strictly, as it is wont to be attributed specially to the efficient cause, but more generally, as it is equivalent to the word of giving or communicating being to another. But some object against this part that the material cause does not give being, but the formal; and among extrinsic ones the final does not give being, but the efficient. But, although in a special way it is attributed to those two causes to give being—to the form as completing the proper and specific being, but to the efficient as really flowing—nevertheless absolutely and under the common notion matter too gives being in its genus, because the being of the effect depends on it, and it itself gives its entity by which the being of the effect is constituted; the final cause too, in the way in which it moves, flows also into being, as will be declared afterwards.

5. But for declaring further this part of the definition it is to be noticed that, if we treated philosophically only of natural causes and principles, or those which can be known by natural light, cause would seem sufficiently defined by those words and distinguished from all principles which are not true causes; but because our physics and metaphysics must serve theology, it is necessary to hand down such a definition of cause as does not belong to the eternal Father as he is the principle of the Son, or to the Father and the Son as they are one principle of the Holy Spirit; and this is what creates difficulty for us; for the producing person seems to be a principle per se flowing being into another person, and so the whole definition of cause seems to belong to it, although it is not a cause, as is evident from the received opinion of the theologians.

The difficulty taken from the mystery of the Trinity

6. In order, then, to exclude a principle of this kind giving being per se without causality, modern authors have used the word depending, because one divine person so receives being from another that it does not depend on it, because that which depends on another must have an essence at least diverse in number from that on which it depends. But first of all it is necessary to explain what it is properly for one thing to depend on another, or why for depending a diversity of essence is required and the distinction of things which necessarily intervenes between the producing and the produced thing does not suffice; because no reason appears why the word depending requires a greater distinction than producing.¹ Likewise one relative is properly said to depend on another, because, it being posited, it is posited, and, it being taken away, it is taken away; and yet it is not of the necessity of relatives as such to have an essence distinct in number; for the divine persons are correlative, although they are of the same essence. But if they are said to be of the same absolute essence, yet distinguished in respective notions, and this to be enough for correlative dependence, why will the same not suffice for the dependence of the produced on the producing? For it is not produced in so far as it is the same as the producing, but in so far as it is distinguished from it; but as such it has a distinct respective entity received from another; therefore according to it it truly depends on another. Add that according to its proper respective notion the produced person has a personal and respective being distinct from the producing person; and it cannot have that unless given by another; therefore in that it truly depends on another. For what is it to depend on another in some being, except not to have it from oneself, but given and communicated by another, by whom it must always be given in order that it can always be had?

7. What it is properly to depend on another.—Why the produced divine persons do not depend on the producing one.—In order to explain this, then, I said that a cause is that which flows being into another; for by these words the same thing is declared which is imported in the word depending; but it is signified by them that for causality it is necessary that that being which the cause per se primarily flows into the effect be caused by the cause itself, and consequently that it be a being distinct from the proper being which the cause has in itself. Whence this is properly to depend in its being on another, namely to have being distinct from it and participated, or in some way flowing from its being. But that this mode of dependence is found in all the causes which we experience can briefly be shown in every genus of causes. For matter and form flow being into the composite, communicating indeed themselves and their entities; but the being of the composite which thence arises is distinct from the being both of matter and of form, and therefore properly depends on them, because to constitute it each confers its being, and thence arises a being distinct from either of them, which cannot be without them. This is evident in the efficient cause (the final being omitted for now, which has a more obscure influx, of which we shall see below); for every thing which flows being into another after the manner of a per se and extrinsic principle, outside the mystery of the Trinity, gives it by effecting the very being which it communicates; and therefore it always gives a being distinct from the proper being which it has in itself; and this is properly to cause and to effect. And conversely the produced thing then properly depends in that genus of efficient cause when the very being which it has from another, per se primarily received, flows from the being of another and cannot be without such influx. But in the processions of the divine persons it does not so happen, because that being which per se primarily is communicated through those productions is not other than the very being of the producing person, but is itself the same in number which is in the producing person; and this is singular and wonderful in those divine processions; and therefore one person so proceeds from another that it nevertheless receives from it a being altogether independent, because it receives the very being in number which is in the producing person.

8. An objection is met.—Nor does it stand in the way that the relations themselves are distinct and have a proper distinct relative being, because not relative being as such, but absolute and essential being, is per se primarily communicated through those processions. For God proceeds from God, and the Father, by generating the Son, primarily communicates to him his nature; but the relation is required as a necessary property for constituting a distinct person; which is as it were material (so to speak) in every production. As in human generation what is per se primarily and formally intended is the communication of human nature and human being; but consequently personality is required. The notion of production, then, is principally to be weighed from the formal being per se primarily communicated. Whence the generation of Christ as man was truly human on account of the true being of human nature, even if the personality was of another notion. So, then, because the divine generation is such that the being which per se primarily is communicated through it is not flowing from another being, and therefore neither depending nor caused, but only communicated by the producing person, therefore that generation is not effecting nor causation (so to speak), but a production of a far superior notion. To this is added that the very relative being of those persons is such that it essentially includes the whole divine being, which is essentially independent; and therefore neither can the relative being itself be called dependent.

9. One relative, even created, does not properly depend on another.—But in created relations one relation is sometimes said to depend on another, in so far as it cannot be without it. But this is an improper and broad expression, because where there is dependence as we are now properly speaking there is priority of nature; but mutual relations are altogether similar, and it will be said less improperly that a created relation depends on its term, if it is supposed to be something absolute, because, foundation and term being posited, the relation results. From which it comes about that in created things much less can one relation be said to flow into another, since one is not the cause, indeed not even the principle, of the other, but they only have necessary simultaneity or concomitance. But in the divine, although one relative proceeds from another, it is nevertheless not through dependence nor through the influx of a diverse essential being which per se primarily is communicated through such production.

10. In order to declare this property of cause, then, we said that it is a principle which flows being, because it is necessary that the very being be caused and consequently essentially distinct from the being of the cause itself. To indicate which too, I deliberately added the particle into another [in aliud] and not into someone or into another person, for another thing [aliud] absolutely and properly is not said except of that which is diverse in essence. But that cause includes this property and requires such a mode of influx cannot be proved otherwise than from the common notion and use of this word, especially among the Latins. Likewise from the correlative, which is commonly thought to be the effect, which word openly indicates imperfection and dependence in that rigour which we have declared; wherefore it is certain that the produced divine person cannot be called an effect, otherwise it would also be called made, which is against faith, as is evident from the Creed. Finally, because from the thing itself, as it has been declared, it is evident that that mode of influx or emanation which belongs to created effects with respect to all their causes is of a far diverse notion from the emanation of one divine person from another, and has that mode of dependence which we have declared; it can, therefore, be signified by one common word which comprehends the causes of created things and not the principles of the divine persons; but of this kind is this word cause and the concept which corresponds to it, which we explain through the said definition of cause. So, then, it is true that it is of the notion of cause that it be essentially diverse from its effect, and that the effect properly depend on the cause; but each is indicated in that particle, as it has been declared by us, and through it the principle in the divine is excluded from the notion of cause.

The difficulty from the mystery of the Incarnation

11. But another difficulty arises for us from another mystery of faith, namely the Incarnation; for to the divine Word as personally terminating the humanity the whole definition of cause belongs; and yet as such it is not a cause according to sound doctrine, since it can be neither a formal cause, because that is imperfect, nor efficient, because otherwise the Word would have an efficiency ad extra not common to the Father and the Holy Spirit. The major proposition is proved, because according to the common manner of speaking of the theologians the divine Word terminates the dependence of the humanity; therefore the Word is that on which that humanity depends. But if you say that it depends indeed on it as on a term, not as on a cause, first the difficulty is not solved; indeed rather thence it is concluded that not everything on which another depends is a cause; and next it is very obscure what it is to depend as on a term. But this latter is not wonderful, because the matter is very supernatural, which the theologians explain as they can.² But that former point plainly convinces that the definition of cause is better explained through principle per se flowing being into another than through dependence, unless this particle is declared through the former. Therefore the Word, as terminating the humanity, is not a principle per se flowing being into it, nor does the humanity in this way depend on the Word as on a principle flowing being into it, but only in the notion of term, which is a certain necessary property, without which that humanity cannot exist.

12. How the divine Word concurs with the humanity to the constitution of Christ.—What causality terminating modes exercise with respect to the things terminated.—Which answer rightly satisfies as regards the dependence of the humanity on the Word;³ yet there still remains a difficulty about the dependence of Christ as he is a composite person. For I suppose from the true doctrine of the theologians, indeed also of the Councils and the Fathers, that from the Word as terminating the humanity and from the humanity itself there arises the person of Christ as God-man, one per se and wonderfully composite. That composite, therefore, truly depends on the Word as on a certain intrinsic principle of which it consists; whence it is necessary that it flow being into it, by communicating to it its personal being; from which together with the humanity this composite person results, which as such is in some way distinguished from the Word barely taken. But to this the same answer is to be applied, for the Word does not concur otherwise to constituting that composite than by terminating the humanity; whence, if in this it does not exercise some genus of causality, neither in constituting that composite person does it have some notion of cause with respect to it. But the argument made proceeds not only in the said mystery, but can be accommodated to all the extremes composing some composite, as is the point with respect to the line, and created subsistence with respect to the supposit, etc. Of all which it must be said that it rightly proves that they are indeed reduced to some genus of intrinsic cause, that is, formal or material; but how and in what they sometimes fall short of the propriety of such causes, and especially in the said mystery, depends on what is to be said of these causes in particular.

What causality is

13. From the things which we have said of the notion of cause in common it is gathered, first, what that is by which cause in act is formally and proximately constituted in the being of cause, which is wont to be called causation or causality in common; but this is nothing other than that influx or concurrence by which each cause in its genus actually flows being into the effect; but this concurrence must necessarily be something distinct in the thing, or from the nature of the thing, from the relation of the cause itself, since the thing which is denominated cause can remain in the thing without this actual influx; which is a certain sign of distinction from the nature of the thing, as was seen above. But this influx cannot be only the predicamental relation of the cause to the effect; for this, whatever it is, results from the influx itself of the cause as terminated at the effect, namely in the way in which it is wont to be said that, foundation and term being posited, the relation arises; that influx, therefore, is something prior to the relation; and according to it too the cause is prior in nature to its effect, although according to the relation they are simultaneous in nature. That influx, therefore, is something intermediate between the entity and the relation of the cause; but what it is, and whether it is something in the cause itself or in the effect, and whether it is some mode distinct from them or only a denomination taken from both, cannot be explained here more distinctly until we come to declaring the individual genera of causes. And the same holds of certain properties or conditions which seem to accompany the common notion of cause and are found diversely in diverse causes, as to be prior in nature, to be distinguished really or essentially from the effect, etc.

The single objective concept of cause

14. Secondly it can be gathered from what has been said that the name of cause is not merely equivocal, since not only the name but also some notion of the name is common. But whether to this name, according to that definition, there corresponds one concept, both formal and objective, of cause in common is in controversy; for some think that such one concept does not correspond, because the modes by which effects depend on causes in the diverse genera of causes are so primarily diverse that one common notion of dependence cannot be abstracted from them. But this is neither proved by them, nor does it seem to me very likely; for from every real agreement a common concept can be abstracted; but among causes there is not only some metaphorical proportionality, otherwise cause would not be said of all of them with propriety, but there is true and real agreement, as can also be confirmed from the definition given and its exposition; and from what we have said of the concept of being, many things can be applied here. There is no reason, then, why one common concept of cause should be denied. But whether according to it there is univocation or some analogy will be better evident after the division of cause has been handed down and the individual members and modes of causing explained; and therefore we shall omit that until we compare the causes themselves among themselves.