Disputationes metaphysicae

1. That there is a cause is by far the best known.—We do not inquire whether there is a cause, because nothing is more self-evident; but for investigating what it is, we fittingly take our beginning from the notion of principle, since every cause is a principle and can and must be defined through it as through a genus, or in place of a genus. The reason for doubting, then, in the proposed question is taken from various sayings of Aristotle; for sometimes he signifies that cause and principle are altogether the same and are said reciprocally. For in Metaphysics IV, c. 2, he says that cause and principle are so compared among themselves as being and one; but being and one are convertible among themselves, as was said above. Likewise Metaphysics V, c. 1, where he enumerates the various modes of principle, at the end he so concludes: In as many ways too are causes said, for all causes are principles. Again, when in Physics I he had numbered privation among the principles of the natural thing, in Metaphysics XII, c. 2, he calls it a cause; he thinks, therefore, that cause and principle are the same; and the manner of speaking of some Greek Fathers favours this opinion, who also in the divine persons call the Father the cause of the Son because he is his principle; and similarly the Father and the Son the cause of the Holy Spirit, which is an indication that among the Greeks cause is the same as principle.¹ Which the Council of Florence signified in expounding those Fathers, last session. But the reason can be that a principle expresses a relation to what is from the principle as a cause to its effect; but what is from the principle seems to be the same as the effect.

2. But sometimes Aristotle seems to signify that cause extends more widely than principle; for he says, De generatione animalium V, c. 7, that it is of the notion of principle that it itself indeed be the cause of many, but that there be no superior cause of it; but it is not of the notion of cause that it not have a superior cause; therefore, according to Aristotle’s opinion, principle is something more contracted than cause. Whence also Physics I, c. 5, he says of the notion of principles that they be neither from themselves nor from others, but others from them; but it is not of the notion of cause that it not be from principles and causes; cause, therefore, extends more widely than principle. Finally, from elsewhere it appears manifest that principle is something more general than cause; for every cause is a principle, as we reported from Aristotle; yet not every principle can be called a cause; for privation, on the testimony of Aristotle, is a principle of generation, yet not a cause; and the dawn is the principle of the day and not a cause. And among the theologians it is sound and received doctrine that in the divine persons one is the principle of another, yet not the cause, as is evident from St. Thomas, I, q. 33, a. 1, ad 1.

The various modes of principles and their order

3. What the complex principle, or principle of knowledge, is.—In order to explain this question, one must begin from the name and notion of principle; but since, as Damascene says, Dialogue against the Manichees, at the beginning, the word principle is equivocal, that is, analogous, it will be better to enumerate its various significations, which Damascene recounts there, and before him Aristotle, Metaphysics V, c. 1. But in order that they may be handed down by us with some certain method, we can first distinguish a twofold principle, one of the thing, the other of knowledge or of science; which in another way is wont to be distinguished into incomplex and complex principles; for the principle of the thing is incomplex, but that of knowledge complex. For, although the principles of knowing are frequently taken from the principles of the thing, they are nevertheless not proximately principles of science except as complex principles flow from them. And in this way Aristotle says above: The suppositions of demonstrations are called principles; and Sophistici Elenchi II, last chapter, he says that one must chiefly insist on the principles of knowing, because, these being known, it is easy to know the things which follow. But of these complex principles nothing more need be said by us, for what is necessary for this doctrine was handed down in Disputations I and III; but the rest pertains to the books of the Posterior Analytics. But the denomination of principle which is attributed to these pertains to some genus of causality or to some relationship from among those which we shall immediately enumerate; for, because knowledge is a certain thing, a principle of knowledge is so called according to some relationship in which it agrees with other principles of things.

4. A principle of the thing, then, can be so called either only by reason of order and any connection whatever, or by reason of an intrinsic relationship. In the former way Aristotle seems to have spoken in the Poetics, a little after the beginning: We say that is a principle which is not necessarily after another, and after which something is apt by nature to be or to come about. But this appellation under this notion is manifold. For, first, in every action or business that from which it is begun is called the principle, which sometimes is arbitrary or casual, sometimes is due to the thing itself, or at least more consonant in order that it come about fittingly, either the nature of the thing which comes about being regarded, or sometimes the knowledge of the operator being considered. And in this way, in the order of science handed down, Aristotle says above that that which is better known to us can be called the principle of doctrine, because thence science is fittingly begun. Secondly, in succession or the order of time the dawn is called the principle of the day, because thence the day begins. Thirdly, in the order of place, he who sits first is called the principle of the others, and that place too from which a fountain arises is wont to be called its principle. Fourthly, Damascene adds that it is also wont to be said on account of the order of dignity, as: The king (he says) is the principle of those over whom he presides; although this can pertain to causality, as Aristotle indicates. Finally, whatever is presupposed to another can be called its principle, as the foundation is called the principle of the house and unity the principle of number. And in every thing which has extension or breadth, the first part or first extreme which is supposed to the others can be called the principle of the whole or of the other parts. Whence this acceptation or denomination of principle is most broad and can be multiplied in various ways, so that it cannot be reduced to a certain and scientific notion, because it is an almost equivocal denomination.

5. What principle more strictly taken signifies.—In another and more philosophical way, then, a principle is so called by reason of some per se relationship between it and that of which it is the principle, so that from it the other in some way per se arises. Which can happen in two ways. First, through positive influx and the communication of its own being; which mode with respect to created things is always with dependence and causality, as we shall explain; wherefore a principle of this kind, speaking philosophically, always puts on the notion of cause. Only in the divine persons is found a principle with true influx and communication of its own being without causality; but why this is so we shall try to explain in the following section. Whence this genus of principle, in so far as it includes the notion of cause, can be divided into as many members as cause. For some principles are intrinsically constituting the thing; but others are extrinsic, which flow being into the thing and remain outside it, as the end and the efficient, of which we must speak afterwards.

6. How privation is called a principle of the natural thing.—Secondly, something can per se arise from another as from a principle not through positive influx, but only on account of a necessary and per se relationship to the other. In which way privation is numbered by Aristotle among the principles of the natural thing, which seems to have a certain intermediate notion between the two modes of principles declared. For the former is most broad and is founded only in any order of priority whatever, nor does it require a per se relationship, but can be found in any genus of composition or succession whatever; but privation in a more perfect and more intrinsic way is called a principle of natural generation. But the other mode of principle through influx is more perfect than that it could belong to privation, because privation, since it is not a true thing, cannot have proper influx into the thing which comes about or into its generation; and much less can it intrinsically compose the thing generated. It is called a principle, then, on account of the intrinsic relationship of generation to it; for, because generation is essentially a transition from non-being to being, therefore it per se supposes privation and comes about per se from it as from a necessary term; by this reason, then, privation is said to be a principle of the natural thing, not indeed of its constitution in completed being, but of generation.

7. Form is the principle of generation in one way, of the thing generated in another.—How matter is the principle of generation.—Indeed (to say this in passing) form too, as it is the principle of generation, is a principle in a far other way than as it is the principle of the thing generated and its constitution; for of the thing itself it is the principle through influx and formal causality, as we shall declare below; but of generation it cannot be the principle in this way, because it cannot be the proper cause of the generation through which it comes about, so as truly to flow into it, unless perhaps it is reduced to the final cause, for the end of generation is the introduction of form; or also to the extrinsic formal cause, in so far as generation takes its species from the form to which it tends; which physical causalities are very improper with respect to such a form, as will be evident afterwards. And therefore this notion of principle by which form is called the principle of generation properly pertains to this last mode; for generation per se and intrinsically intends form as the formal term to which it tends, which is enough for it to be called the principle of generation. But it is otherwise of matter, because this has some influx and causality also with respect to generation, although diverse from that which it has about the constitution of the natural thing; for into this natural thing matter flows by intrinsically constituting it through itself; but into generation not so, but only by sustaining and receiving it. And let these be said on occasion about these principles, because the name of principle of the natural thing is wont by antonomasia to be accommodated to them. Finally, to this last denomination of principle can be reduced some examples posited in the first and general denomination, in so far as in them a per se order, necessary from within, can be found; for so the point can be called per se the principle of the line, and the first degree of the whole quality, and the foundation of the house; although in these such a per se mode of principle is always reduced to some genus of influx or causality.

How to be prior is common to every principle

8. From this enumeration of principles it can be gathered, first, that it is common to every principle that it be in some way prior to what is from the principle; for the very name of principle shows this. Indeed Aristotle, in the cited place of Metaphysics V, gathers that it is common to every principle that it be first, which is something greater than to be prior; for the latter expresses only antecedence to what is from the principle, but the former expresses the negation of a prior. But it is to be considered that that is called a principle simply in some genus or under some notion which is so a principle that it is not from a principle under that notion; for if it is from another principle in that series, it will not be a principle simply in that order, but only in a certain respect with respect to something; for example, a point is then properly the principle of a line when before it no point, and consequently no part of the line, has preceded; but a point continuing the parts of the line can only respectively be called the principle of the subsequent parts, since it is the term of the preceding ones. Which it is permitted to consider more clearly in time; for absolutely that instant alone is the principle of time before which instant no time has preceded, but which time immediately follows; but an intermediate instant will not be called simply the principle of time, but only respectively or under some determinate notion, namely the principle of the day or of the year. And the Saints seem to allude to this propriety of words² when they say that the eternal Father is the principle, fountain and origin of the whole deity. For they do not so speak because the Father is the principle of the divine nature itself, because according to the Catholic faith the divine nature has no principle, because it proceeds from none, otherwise it would be distinguished from it; whence, as this expression is condemned, the essence generates, so also this, the essence is generated or proceeds. They call the Father, then, the principle of the divinity, because in that grade or order (so to speak) of the divine persons he alone is so the principle of the other persons subsisting in the divinity that he has no principle; and therefore he is called the principle of the divinity, that is, of all communication of the divinity. But the Son, because he has a principle, cannot absolutely be called the principle of the divinity; but he is truly called the principle of the Holy Spirit, or of the communication of the divinity after the manner of spiration, because under that notion he has no principle. So, then, it is of the notion of every principle that it be prior to that of which it is the principle; but if it is absolutely and simply a principle in some order, it will also be first in that order.

9. Whether form is prior to generation.—You will say: form is the principle of the generation of the natural thing, and yet it is in no way prior to generation, since it is its formal term. Likewise the theologian will object that in the divine persons no proper priority is found, although in them there is the most proper notion of principle. To the former part the answer is that form is prior to generation in the notion of the per se term to which generation is ordered, which is reduced to priority in the order of intention. There will not be lacking, however, one who says that form is also prior in nature in execution and in the genus of formal cause; but this is not rightly said with respect to generation, because, as I said, it is not its proper cause; it is enough, then, the prior relationship of generation to form for this to be its principle, whatever may be the case with proper causality with respect to it. You will say: then act could be called the principle of potency, because, although it is posterior in generation or time to potency, it is nevertheless the term which potency per se regards and from which it takes its species; whence it is prior in nature in the order of intention. The answer is, first, by conceding the sequel in that genus of specifying principle; for what is inconvenient? Next, there is much greater reason concerning form with respect to generation, because form is so extrinsic to generation that it has it inseparably and intimately and essentially conjoined, so that actual generation cannot be understood without form actually informing intervening there; but act is more extrinsic to potency.

10. The other part of the objection pertains more to the theologians. Among whom there is a certain diversity, perhaps rather in the mode of speaking than in the thing. St. Thomas, then, I, q. 42, a. 3, in the body, although he concedes that among the divine persons there is an order of origin, nevertheless denies that one is simply prior to another, because in the Trinity (he says) there is order of nature without priority. And in the solution ad 2 he declares that there is there neither priority of nature nor of intellect, because those persons are both relative and subsist in the one same nature; whence neither on the side of the nature can they have priority, since that is the same, nor on the side of the relations, since correlatives are simultaneous in nature and intellect. Wherefore the same holy Doctor, in the said q. 33, a. 1, ad 3, so answers the difficulty which we are now treating that he seems to deny our assertion. For he says that, although the name of principle is taken from priority, it nevertheless does not signify priority. For it is frequent that in a name one thing is that which it signifies, another that from which it is imposed to signify. Nor is St. Thomas contrary to himself when, I, q. 40, a. 4, he says that the producing person is, in our mode of understanding, prior to the person produced. For there he speaks of our imperfect and confused mode of understanding. But in the other place he treats of the perfect understanding which is due to things as they are in themselves. And so Cajetan and the Thomists understand, and with them Durandus agrees in the thing, In I, dist. 9, q. 2, and dist. 20, q. 2. And this opinion is sufficiently probable, and that mode of speaking is cautious and secure; according to which opinion our assertion can be limited so that it be understood metaphysically, not theologically, that is, of the principle which the light of nature knows, not that which faith alone reveals. Nevertheless Scotus, In I, dist. 12, q. 2, and dist. 28, last question, whom Gabriel follows, In I, dist. 9, q. 3, concedes that, as in the divine persons one is the principle of another, so it is prior, not in duration, perfection or nature, but in origin only. For this priority does not include imperfection, and is necessarily included in the very notion of the producing principle. Each is evident, because it only imports in the producing person that it has being without such origin, according to which the other person proceeds from it; as the Father has being without generation, but the Son not except through generation; and both have being without spiration, but the Holy Spirit not except through it. Which kind of priority between correlatives cannot be found in created things, because one relative as such does not proceed from another; but in the divine there is found the procession of one correlative from another, in so far as they are such. And according to this opinion our assertion holds universally true; for, if it is found true in the divine persons, much more in created ones. Nor is it wonderful that, as the notion of principle is singular in those persons, so also the mode of priority is peculiar and of a far other notion than all those which are found in creatures. And this mode of speaking too is probable, and in the thing (as I think) St. Thomas does not contradict it, because he never expressly denied this genus of priority in the divine persons, but the others which are found in creatures. He was silent, however, and never used that expression, but called it the order of origin, not priority. And certainly not without cause, both because in divine things the manner of speaking of the Fathers is to be imitated, among whom that expression is not found; and also because the priority of origin is not of absolute priority as it is found in the divine persons, because priority asserted simply and without addition seems to indicate some imperfection in the thing which is called posterior. Likewise because that is called absolutely prior which can either be or at least be exactly understood without the other; but one divine person is compared to another in neither way. But what some add, that one divine person is prior to another in the order of natural enumeration, in which way we number the first, second and third person, this (I say) is not diverse from the preceding, for this mode of enumerating is founded only in the priority of origin; whence in the thing itself it does not indicate another genus of priority; but that mode of enumerating excellently declares that this mode of priority of origin, if it is declared in congruous words and in a sound sense, is not altogether foreign to the manner of speaking of the Church and of the Doctors. Whence with that addition it can be accepted, and is sufficient for it to be universally true that every principle is in some way prior to that of which it is the principle; although this always remains singular in the Trinity, that, while the notion of principle belongs absolutely and simply to one person with respect to another, the notion of prior is attributed only with an addition and limitation; for the former, absolutely said, seems to indicate no imperfection in the other extreme, but the latter some. The priority of origin, then, explained in the said way, is enough for the true notion of principle to be found in the divine; whence what St. Thomas says, that the name of principle was taken from priority, but does not signify it, is true if by priority he understands absolute and positive priority which connotes imperfection in what is from the principle; but if the discussion is of pure antecedence, as it were negative, under that notion under which it is called principle, then not only was the name of principle taken from priority, but it also signifies and requires it with due proportion, as has been declared and is evident from the definition of Aristotle and from all the things adduced.

The description of principle in common is completed

11. The connection required between principle and what is from the principle.—Secondly it is inferred from what has been said that for the notion of principle it is not enough that it be prior to another, but it is necessary that there be between them some connection or consequence of one from the other which is denominated principle. This is evident from the common mode of conceiving of men, and is easily declared by induction. For a man born yesterday is not the principle of one who is born today, although he is prior to him; and in the divine, if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, the Son could not be called his principle, even if he could in some way be thought prior in reason, namely in the way in which the act of the intellect is said to be prior to the act of the will. Some connection or consequence, therefore, is necessary; and therefore according to the various modes of such consequence the denomination of principle too is various; for sometimes it arises from position, sometimes from intrinsic succession, sometimes from emanation, and so of the others enumerated above. And Aristotle signified all this, in the said place of Metaphysics V, when he said that a principle is the first whence something is, etc.; for that word whence indicates the aforesaid connection or consequence. But this is to be understood with proportion; for a principle can be in act and in potency, and in each way it requires a relationship to the other, which follows upon it either in act or in potency.

12. A certain general division of principle.—What an intrinsic principle is, what an extrinsic.—And so is concluded the description of principle in common and most confusedly taken, which St. Thomas hands down under these terms, I, q. 33, a. 1: A principle is that from which something proceeds in any way whatever; where that word proceeds is not to be taken strictly for true origin, but for any consequence or connection whatever, as we have hitherto spoken; and to signify this St. Thomas perhaps added that particle in any way whatever. And in this sense that definition was taken from the aforesaid place of Aristotle, saying that a principle is that whence something is. For he seems deliberately to have abstained from a peculiar word signifying origin or another mode of emanation, so that by that particle whence he might embrace every mode of conjunction or consequence. But for greater explanation he adds that a principle is that whence something is, or comes to be, or is known, so that together with the description he might explain a certain general division of principles; for to those three members just mentioned all principles can be reduced, especially those which are per se; for those which are per accidens can scarcely be reduced to a certain method, except in so far as they are reduced to those which are per se. So, then, all principles are either principles of the thing in becoming or principles of the thing in being, and to these two members all principles of things are reduced, because another state in things cannot be understood except in becoming or in being; and the principle of effecting is not always the principle of the constitution of the thing, as is evident in privation. But under the principle of that which comes to be is comprehended every principle of motion or operation as such, or of any successive thing whatever, for all these have their being in becoming; but under the principle of that which is are included all the principles of things which in some way have being (as they say) in completed being. But because successive things too and actions themselves in some way are, therefore, taking the word is more generally, it is wont to be said by the theologians that a principle is that whence something is. And in the same way the principle of knowledge could be comprehended under these words, and in truth it is comprehended, if knowledge is considered in so far as it is a certain thing which comes to be or is; deservedly, however, Aristotle adjoined the third member, about the principles of knowledge, to signify that the principle of knowledge is not always the principle of the thing known, but that often the principles of the thing in known being are other than the principles of the same thing in being or becoming. But he did not add in special the principle of loving, because this is nothing but either the principle of being or of knowing. And from these things both the description and the division handed down by Aristotle are sufficiently evident—the division (I say) mentioned, which is three-membered. But after it Aristotle subjoins another two-membered one, saying that one principle is intrinsic, another extrinsic, which is a subdivision of the former members, as he himself sufficiently clearly indicates. And to that three-membered division he reduces all the acceptations of principle which he had enumerated above, and all others which can be thought out. For he was not solicitous in enumerating all the significations of the word itself, which would be prolix and not at all necessary, but those which were either more usual or from which others could easily be known. And therefore I judge it superfluous scrupulously to inquire into the further sufficiency of that enumeration. But if anyone requires a copious disputation on that matter, let him read Fonseca, Metaphysics V, c. 1, through seven questions, especially in the fourth.

The analogy of principle is declared

13. Thirdly it is inferred from what has been said that principle is not said merely equivocally of all the members which are contained under it and were enumerated above, since not only the name but also some notion of the name is common to them. But it is wont to be doubted whether it is univocal or analogous. To which it must briefly be said that it cannot be univocal. For three things can be considered in a principle: one is the thing itself which is denominated principle; another the proper relation according to being which is conceived of the principle to what is from the principle; the third is that which is understood as the proximate reason of founding that relation, which is that consequence or emanation of what is from the principle from the principle. But in none of these do all those things which are called principles agree univocally. The first is evident, because not only uncreated but also created being is denominated principle, and not only real being but also being of reason; but these do not agree univocally in some proper and intrinsic notion; therefore. And the same reason can be made of the second; for the relation of principle too is common to the created and the uncreated, although philosophy does not recognize the latter. Likewise to real relations and those of reason. And from these the same can be concluded of the third: first indeed, because so great is the variety in those notions or connections of what is from principles with the principles, that they scarcely agree among themselves except in name and some proportionality. Secondly, because when that which is denominated principle is only a being of reason, the reason of founding the relation of principle cannot be real; but in other things there is often true emanation and real procession. Again, this is sometimes created, sometimes uncreated; there is, therefore, in these the same reason of analogy. Finally, because principles which are so denominated only on account of the succession of time or the order of position, or another similar accidental connection, are far distant from per se principles, and most of all from those which are such through true influx and causality. Nor does the unity of the description given stand in the way of this analogy; for the terms of which it consists are so transcendental that they involve analogy in themselves. Nor does it stand in the way either that principle is almost always said absolutely and without addition of any of the significates posited above; for this can happen either on account of a clear and known proportionality, or because it is evident from the subject matter in which signification the word is taken, or certainly on account of some proper and intrinsic notion of principle, according to what we shall say below of the analogy of being.

14. The same is analogous with respect to diverse things both by attribution and by proportionality.—The order of the imposition of the word principle to its significates.—But someone will perhaps ask of what kind this analogy is, and of which significates principle is said primarily. On which matter the interpreters say many things, on the said Metaphysics V, c. 1. I, however, briefly judge that this analogy is not one but manifold with respect to diverse significates; for it is not repugnant that the same name, primarily signifying some thing, be transferred to some others by attribution, but to others by proportionality. As healthy, primarily signifying the animal, by attribution signifies medicine, but by proportionality an integral and incorrupt apple. So, then, I judge it must be said of the name of principle with respect to its significates. But it is to be considered that it is one thing to speak of the first imposition of this word as it was made by men, another of the thing signified by it, as St. Thomas distinguishes in a similar case, I, q. 13, a. 6. In the former way I think that this word was imposed to signify the principle of motion or of time; for, because the earlier philosophers knew only corporeal things, they first distinguished in them beginning, middle and end; but these seem to be first known from motion or some action; and therefore it is likely that the name of principle was first imposed to signify the principle of motion or of action, or that part of magnitude from which motion begins. And perhaps Aristotle signified this by enumerating this acceptation in the first place. But hence this word has been derived through proportion or proportionality to other significates.

15. What principle signifies primarily, what secondarily.—But as regards the thing signified, this word more principally signifies per se principles than per accidens ones; and especially those which are principles through true and real influx, because in these there is a much truer and more proper emanation of one from another and origin, which the name of principle shows. But this notion of principle is conjoined with causality with respect to creatures, and belongs both to God and to creatures. And by this reason it can be said of God and creatures according to the analogy of attribution; for example, to be an efficient principle is said analogically of God and creatures, not according to proportionality only, but on account of true and real agreement, analogous however and including attribution, as we shall explain generally below in the analogy of being to God and creatures. And the same can be said of the final or exemplar principle. But how the notion of principle is common to the efficient, final and exemplar principle pertains to the division of cause into these and other members, of which we shall speak below. But in God alone, ad intra (which philosophy did not recognize), is found the true notion of a positive and per se principle with true influx or production without causality, which is a higher and more wonderful notion of principle.

16. Of God, as he is principle of God and of creatures, how principle is said.—Whence the theologians are deservedly wont to inquire whether principle in common, said also of God himself as he is the principle of creatures, or as one divine person is the principle of another, is univocal or analogous. Some think that it is analogous and said first of God according to emanations ad extra rather than ad intra, because the creature proceeds from God not only according to person but also according to nature and essence; and therefore there seems to be a greater notion of principle in God with respect to creatures than there is in the eternal Father with respect to the Son, whose person he produces, not his nature. And it is confirmed, because the notion of principle with respect to creatures is absolute and essential, but the other relative and notional; but those things which are essential seem from their proper concepts to be more powerful and prior to notional ones. It is confirmed, secondly, because potency simply in God is said first of the potency of producing ad extra rather than ad intra; whence God is simply omnipotent through the potency of operating ad extra, not ad intra; otherwise the Holy Spirit would not be omnipotent, because he cannot produce ad intra. But the reason is the same of principle as of potency, since a principle is such by reason of potency. And so Durandus thinks, In I, dist. 29, q. 1.

17. But to others it pleases that it is analogous, said first of the principle ad intra rather than ad extra, both because the relation of principle to creatures is of reason, but among the divine persons it is real; and also because a principle is that whence something is; but the creature is analogically with respect to the divine person proceeding, because the latter proceeds in uncreated being, the former in created; therefore that procession is far nobler, even according to analogy; therefore also the notion of principle which corresponds to it is said first according to emanation ad intra rather than ad extra. And St. Thomas seems to be of this opinion, I, q. 33, a. 1, ad 4, and a. 3. But in those places he does not treat of the name of principle, but of the name of father, of which the reason is far diverse. But under the name of principle he expressly affirms it In I, dist. 29, q. 1, a. 2, where Capreolus, Albert, Richard and others think the same.

18. But a third opinion can be that this name principle is univocal to those two notions; for it is not repugnant that the same name which is analogous with respect to several be univocal with respect to some, as is self-evident and as we shall say more fully below in treating of the community of being and of accident. But that it is so in the present case as regards this part of which we are treating is proved, because here there intervenes neither analogy of proportionality nor of attribution. The former part is proved, both because otherwise God would be called the principle of creatures only through transference, not through propriety; and also because St. Thomas above expressly confesses that there is one common notion of origin of the procession of creatures from God, or of one divine person from another, which is for something to be from something, and so also there is one common notion of principle; but in the analogy of proportionality there is not one common notion. But the second part is proved, because God, as he is called the first principle of creatures, is not referred to himself as he is the principle of the persons; therefore there can be there no analogy of attribution. Likewise because otherwise the Holy Spirit would be called the principle of creatures through attribution to the Father or to the Son, which seems sufficiently absurd. Likewise because here the reason of the analogy of attribution which is wont to be between God and creatures ceases, namely that all the being or all the perfection of the creature is primarily in God and depends on him; but here one notion of principle is not caused by another, nor depends on it; indeed neither does the emanation of creatures per se depend on the emanations of the divine persons; because the multitude of persons was not per se necessary for production ad extra; therefore in the present case every reason of the analogy of attribution ceases.

19. In this matter those three things seem to be distinguished which we distinguished above in every principle, namely the relation of principle, the proximate reason of such relation, and that which is named principle. As regards the first, there is no doubt that here there is analogy, because the relation of principle of God to creatures is of reason, but of the producing divine person to the produced one is real. And Scotus expressly declares this sense, dist. 29, q. 1. Indeed this analogy either is not of attribution but of proportion only, or at least, if it is of attribution, it is not according to a common concept, because here there is none to being of reason and real being.

20. As regards the second, too, I think it more probable that the notion of actual principle is said analogically and more principally of God according to the processions ad intra than ad extra, on account of the reasons adduced. But this analogy is of attribution, and not only of proportion, as is the analogy of being and of the other attributes which are said properly of God and creatures. For this analogy of principle is founded in the analogy which is between creation and the processions of the divine persons in the notion of origin or emanation. Because, if the productions do not agree univocally in the common notion of production, neither can the notion of principle be univocal, especially since to be in this way the actual principle of creatures does not belong to God except through extrinsic denomination from the emanation of the creature from him. But that the notion of procession is analogous with respect to the created and the uncreated, and that it is said first of the uncreated procession, is proved, first, from the general rule of the divine attributes, which are said properly and always first of God, as we shall prove below. But it holds true not only in essential ones, but also in personal ones; for person is said analogically of the created and the uncreated; and Father or Son are said analogically of the divine persons and human ones.

21. Secondly, because also in this notion there is in some way a necessary dependence and natural antecedence between the origins ad extra and ad intra. For, although creation on its own side per se does not require the Trinity of persons and consequently not the processions ad intra, nevertheless on the side of God it per se and necessarily requires them and in its own way depends on them. Both because every effecting per se depends on the acting person; but in God there cannot be a person without production or procession ad intra. And also because the production of creatures of itself depends on intelligence and love; but there cannot be in God intelligence without the Word nor love without the Holy Spirit. And according to this consideration St. Thomas said, I, q. 45, a. 6, that the processions of the persons are the reasons of the production of creatures; and in the answer to the first he adds that the processions of the divine persons are the cause of creation. And so the foundation which we brought in reporting the third opinion against this part remains solved. But the foundation of Durandus stands in no way in the way; indeed it declares that the processions of the divine persons, since they are without any dependence or imperfection, are of so eminent a notion that they cannot agree univocally with created productions. That, therefore, in the person produced the essence is not produced but only communicated does not diminish the truth of the production, but rather pertains to its infinite perfection. As that the eternal Father produces the Son not only similar in specific nature, but also of the same nature in number, does not diminish the truth of generation, but pertains to its infinite perfection, as St. Thomas excellently noted, I, q. 41, a. 5, ad 1.

22. But as regards the third, that is, that which is denominated principle, if it is taken altogether materially (so to speak), it is clear that analogy cannot intervene, nor can there be anything prior to that which is denominated the first principle of creatures. Nor can there be anything more perfect than that which on the side of such a principle is the root and origin of such a denomination; for its perfection is infinite. Indeed even if we speak of that principle not so materially but formally, in so far as it is (so to speak) a principle in potency, then too I think that the notion of principle cannot be said less properly or secondarily of God as he is the principle of creatures; and some arguments made in the first and third opinions persuade this. And most of all because this denomination is absolute, eternal and essential; for it is taken from the attribute of omnipotence; but the potency of God in the notion of active or productive potency is not analogically potency, but primarily and principally. The notion of principle, therefore, as it is precisely taken from it, cannot be analogous.

23. An objection is satisfied.—You will say: then potency is not said analogically of the potency of creating and of generating or spirating; but the consequent seems false, for such is the potency as is the action or production; but production is analogous; therefore also potency. I answer, first, by conceding that there is no such analogy which is said secondarily of the potency of creating; because, as I said, the effective potency of God cannot be analogically potency, because it is so named through no proportion or attribution; and because it is the first and most perfect potency. Whence I add that either as regards this there is univocation, or, if there is some analogy, as perhaps there is, productive potency is said first of the potency of creating, etc., rather than of generating, etc. The reason is that the formal notion of potency, which signifies first act for producing, is found with every propriety and perfection in God with respect to creatures; but with respect to the internal origins, or the divine persons proceeding, it is rather according to our mode of conceiving than according to the thing. Because in the thing it is not so much first act as last with respect to the internal processions, as will be more fully evident below in treating of the knowledge, will and power of God. But the reason is that the potency of God with respect to creatures is to a transient emanation really distinct and not necessarily flowing from such potency; and therefore that is most properly potency and first act with respect to such emanation; but the potency of generating or spirating is according to an immanent procession, which in the thing cannot be only in potency but always in act, nor can it be in the thing distinct from that which is conceived by us after the manner of potency, as regards its absolute perfection, as is evident from St. Thomas, I, q. 41, a. 5; and therefore according to the thing and truth potency is said more properly of the creative than of the generative, etc.

24. Whether the generative and spirative principle are said univocally.—How principle is said of God creating and operating from a subject.—Nor does it stand in the way that origin or production is analogous, both because the potency of God does not take its notion from a relationship to the extrinsic but from its essential and most absolute perfection; and also because it pertains to the excellence of the divine potency absolutely taken that it be neither of necessity conjoined to its action nor be able to have an action adequate to itself or of the same order; and so it comes about that the imperfection which the production or dependence of the creature essentially includes not only does not diminish the perfection and propriety of the potency of God for acting outside himself, but is even a manifest indication of its infinite perfection. But conversely the excellence of the internal origins indicates the supreme and infinite perfection and propriety of the immanent acts of God, and consequently in some way diminishes the propriety of potency in first act, as has been declared. And let these be said in passing for declaring exactly the analogy of principle. But that is more theological which is wont to be asked, whether principle said within God of the generating and the spirating is univocal or analogous; in which I judge with Scotus, in the place cited above, that it is univocal, as is relation or person; nor in those things which are said with every propriety of the divine persons do I understand analogy or attribution, since there there is no dependence, or imperfection, or priority of nature. Again it is wont to be asked whether principle said ad extra of God as creating, or as operating from presupposed matter, is analogous; which some seem to think; but I judge that it is univocal, because effecting is said univocally of creation and eduction, especially that which is done by God as the first agent; but of these these things are enough.

Resolution of the principal question

25. Principle extends more widely than cause.—Finally from what has been said the answer to the proposed question is gathered, on account of which we have said so many things of principle, namely that principle and cause are not altogether the same nor said reciprocally, but that principle is more common than cause. So St. Thomas expressly teaches, I, q. 33, a. 1, ad 1, taking thence the reason why in God one person is called the principle of another and not the cause. He has the same In I, dist. 29, a. 1, in the body and ad 2, and De potentia, q. 10, a. 1, ad 9, and it is the common opinion. Which the reasons for doubting posited at the beginning in the third place rightly prove, and it is manifestly evident from all that has been said of principle. For principle is said also of that which does not properly flow into another, but cause not at all. Likewise hence it comes about that principle belongs not only to real beings, but also to beings of reason or to privation; but cause not likewise. This conclusion, therefore, is manifest comparing cause to principle in its whole generality; but if it is compared to the principle truly and per se flowing some being into that of which it is the principle, the conclusion is also true, yet so difficult that it cannot be known by the light of nature, because in the mystery of the Trinity alone is such a mode of principle found, and therefore it is difficult to assign the difference and reason, of which we shall speak in the following section.

The arguments are solved

26. Whether Aristotle reputed principle and cause the same.—Various places of Aristotle are weighed to this.—To the first testimony of Aristotle posited at the beginning many answer through that dialectical rule, that the truth of examples is not required; for in that place Aristotle posited principle and cause in passing and for the sake of example. But this is a harsh interpretation, or rather a modest concession of an Aristotelian lapse. Others expound that the name cause is not taken there properly, but in the vulgar way as it is said of any occasion or necessary condition whatever. But this exposition too has a difficulty to be touched upon below, for the name of cause, even vulgarly taken, never extends so widely as principle. It can be said, then, that Aristotle says two things there of being and one. The first is that they are the same. The second, that they are convertible among themselves; when, therefore, Aristotle says as principle and cause, he does not compare them in the second, but in the first; for he intends to teach that being and one are the same in the thing, yet not in reason; and to this he brings an example, saying that they are related as principle and cause, not as tunic and garment; whence, immediately after those words principle and cause, he subjoins but not as things which are said with one notion. Or, if in each the comparison is made, it is not necessary to understand it universally of principle and cause, but indefinitely, that sometimes principle and cause, although they follow each other mutually, differ in reason, for example principle and efficient cause.

27. To the second testimony from Metaphysics V some answer that there too the name of cause is taken in the broad and vulgar way. But this is openly against the mind of Aristotle, since he treats distinctly of principle and cause and expounds the significates of each philosophically and properly. Another exposition is that when Aristotle says that cause is said in as many ways as principle, it is not to be understood positively but negatively, that is, that cause is not said in other ways than those in which principle is said, although it is not necessary that it be said in all those ways. And indeed, although the propriety of that word in as many ways seems to resist this exposition, nevertheless the reason which Aristotle subjoins seems to compel its admission; for he subjoins: Since all causes are principles. From which reason it would most ineptly be inferred that cause is said in all the ways in which principle is said; for it would be to argue from the superior to the inferior affirmatively; as if someone gathered: Every substance is being; therefore in as many ways as being is said, so many is substance said.

28. But Alexander of Hales indicates another exposition, namely that principle is said in as many ways as cause is said, because every cause is a principle. So that, after the significations of principle were enumerated, Aristotle subjoined as it were a general rule, that principle is also said in all the ways in which cause is said, although not in those alone. And according to this sense Aristotle’s reason fits excellently; yet it can scarcely be accommodated to the former words. Another exposition is indicated by St. Thomas, namely that so many acceptations of principle as are enumerated there belong to cause, although not under the same notion; for from a cause motion begins, and so of the others. According to which exposition Aristotle’s proof is to be brought in otherwise, namely so that thence he confirms that those acceptations have place in principle, because they also have place in cause, because every cause is a principle; but it does not follow thence that cause and principle are said reciprocally, because, although the acceptations enumerated there can according to other notions be accommodated to cause, nevertheless principle extends more widely, because it is said in all those ways in which cause is said and according to the proper notion of cause; and moreover it is said in other ways according to the general notion of principle.

29. To the third testimony from Metaphysics XII, where Aristotle calls privation a cause, the common and necessary exposition of all is that he used there the name of cause in the vulgar way, as whatever is in any way required for another is called a cause.

30. But someone will say: then, if we speak truly and with proportion, it must be confessed that principle and cause are said reciprocally; for if each is taken in its whole amplitude and analogy and vulgar use, they are convertible; but if cause is taken strictly and with every propriety, it is also convertible with principle taken in the same way. But if cause is taken properly and principle broadly, and principle is therefore said to be more general than cause, an improper comparison is made; and by the same reason it could be said that cause extends more widely than principle, because, if cause is taken broadly and principle properly, it will extend more widely. I answer by denying each part of the assumption; for, comparing the proper and per se principle to the proper and per se cause, the principle is more common, as is evident theologically in the principles of the divine processions and physically in privation. And taking each in its broadest signification, I also think that principle is something more common. For, although cause so taken comprehends many things which are not properly, truly and per se causes, nevertheless it comprehends nothing which is not contained under the general signification of principle; but principle embraces some things which are in no way called causes, even in vulgar speech; for the first-born is called the principle of the sons, yet not in any way the cause.

31. The Greek Fathers used the name of cause for principle.—To the manner of speaking of the Greek Fathers the answer is that they used the name of cause more broadly than it can or ought to be used in Latin propriety; yet in the thing itself they did not attribute the name of cause to the divine persons ad intra in so far as it properly expresses a relation to an effect and in that indicates some imperfection; but only as it expresses the origin of one from others.

32. Whether there is something from a principle in the divine, and what the correlative of principle is.—To the reason, the theologians deny that principiatum [what is from a principle] is the correlative of principle in the divine. Although, then, they say that the Father is the principle of the Son, they nevertheless deny that the Son is principiatum by the Father. So St. Thomas, I, q. 33, a. 1, ad 2, and others commonly. According to which mode of speaking the correlative of principle will be that which is from another. Which opinion has deservedly been approved by the Latin theologians out of reverence for the mystery of the Trinity and to take away the occasion of error; for principiatum seems to signify something made, as we argued above, or also indicates the same as initiated, and consequently indicates a beginning of being. But, that mystery being omitted and the odium of the word taken away, if by the name of principiatum there is signified only that which is the correlative of principle, then it is denied that principiatum is the same as caused or effect; but it signifies only that which is from another or which has a principle, not of duration (for this equivocation too is to be taken away), but either of origin or of any other mode. And in this sense are to be explained the Greeks, who, as St. Thomas reports above, admit that the Son is principiated by the Father.

33. The things which prove cause wider than principle are solved.—To the arguments made in the second place, by which it is proved that cause extends more widely than principle, the answer is that Aristotle in the first testimony does not speak generally of principle, but of the first principle in some order, which has influence and causality. Of which principle he had said in the same place that, although it is small in magnitude, it is great in power. And of this first principle he denies that it has a superior cause, namely in that order. For only the first principle absolutely and in the whole breadth of being has no cause. And in the same sense in Physics I he posits in the definition of the principles of natural being that they are not from others, namely in the way in which natural being is from them, because those are the first principles in that order. Of which principles as they are principles and their proper definition one must dispute in Philosophy; but as some of them are causes, it will be said of them below.