Disputationes metaphysicae

1. The reason of the difficulty.—The reason for doubting can be that evil, as is evident from what has been said hitherto, is distinguished by reason from being, and is attributed to it and denominates it; why, then, is it not numbered among the properties of being? For that the good too is its property does not stand in the way, since being can be good and evil by diverse notions. Nor does it stand in the way that it expresses privation; for one too formally expresses negation, and nevertheless is one of the chief properties of being. Finally it does not stand in the way that not every being seems to be evil, because, although no being is absolutely evil in itself, that is, defective, nevertheless every being, even God himself, is evil to something, that is, unfitting; therefore this is enough that evil in common ought to have been numbered among the properties of being.

2. The conclusion by which the doubt is dispatched.—It must nevertheless be said that evil is deservedly not numbered among the attributes of being. Of which matter several reasons can be given, but those which were touched upon in arguing can suffice. For first, evil as evil does not formally express something pertaining to the notion of being, but rather a tendency (so to speak) to non-being, or the defect and weakness of being; therefore such a notion cannot constitute a peculiar attribute of being as being, but could rather be attributed to some being as it is defectible. Whence the reason is not similar of unity, both because unity does not express negation alone, but entity under negation, but malice is sufficiently saved in privation alone; and also because through that negation which one includes we circumscribe the integrity which being has in itself, and consequently its entity; but through the privation which evil expresses we do not declare entity, nor circumscribe something pertaining to the constitution of being itself, but rather explain the defect of entity, which can sometimes be in some being.

3. Being on one side exceeds evil, by which on the other it is exceeded.—Secondly, hence it comes about that evil is not reciprocal with being, so that also for that cause it cannot be its attribute. But it is not reciprocal, both on the side of evil itself, which extends more widely than being, and on the side of being itself, which from elsewhere extends more widely than evil. The first is evident, because, since malice does not include entity in its concept, but is sufficiently saved in the privation of entity, it does not require real being for the proper denomination of evil; for the very privation of due perfection is not only malice, but is truly and properly called a certain evil; for, in the way in which it is conceived after the manner of being (although it is not true being), it is also conceived and denominated a certain evil, although it is not conceived as being evil in itself but as the evil of that whose privation it is. In which way too in moral things pure omission, if it were truly and properly sin, would also be an evil of man. The second is evident, because not every being is truly and properly evil, which indeed is most certain of God, for neither does he have in himself any defect whence he could be called evil, nor is he truly and absolutely unfitting to any being, but supremely fitting, indeed simply necessary for the good and perfection of any other being. But if sometimes he is apprehended as unfitting, that either is falsely apprehended, or can be attributed to God only in a certain respect and through a certain extrinsic denomination by reason of some effect unfitting to man which he causes in him; but this extrinsic denomination neither properly constitutes evil nor can pertain to the properties of being. And not only in God, but also in many created beings, integral goodness without any malice can be found. For, although outside God there is no created being which cannot be subject to some evil—evil (I say) either moral, if it is a created and intellectual supposit, or at least natural, or penal—nevertheless it can be communicated to many created beings that they have properly no malice, but all the perfection due to them, as happens in the blessed angels, to whom this is peculiar, that they have never been subject to any evil nor will ever be. For men, even blessed, although they now lack every evil forever, were nevertheless once subject to some evil, if not of fault, which is rare, at least of punishment, which none has escaped. But among the other beings only the heavenly bodies seem free from every natural evil, in so far as they are incorruptible and altogether free from foreign impressions. But it is to be considered that all these are to be understood of evil properly taken, in so far as it formally expresses the proper privation of due goodness; for, if we speak more generally of evil, as it expresses only the negation of some goodness and perfection simply, then indeed every being outside God can be called in some way evil, in which sense that could be understood: No one is good but God alone. Nevertheless that acceptation of evil is most improper, as is evident from what was said above; for on account of the mere negation of perfection not due, a being can be called either negatively imperfect or less perfect, yet not evil; nor is God alone called good because all other things are evil, but because he alone is good by essence, or by antonomasia or analogy. I add moreover that in the way in which created being is called evil in that impropriety, or rather imperfect, it does not have this from the notion of being but because it is from nothing.

4. The heavens endowed integrally with natural good.—Evil is in being only accidentally.—A third reason can be taken from what has been said, because the properties of being must follow being itself per se and from within; but evil is not so compared to being, but belongs to it altogether per accidens and from without. By which reason we proved above that evil is not without some cause, because it expresses a defect against the debt of nature, which does not happen without an extrinsic cause. Evil, therefore, comes to that being in which it is, not of itself but from without and by accident; it cannot, therefore, pertain to the properties of being. And although sometimes it happens from the intrinsic nature of two beings that one is unfitting to the other, and consequently its evil, in which way in moral things some acts are said to be intrinsically evil, nevertheless this very thing is very per accidens to the notion of being and peculiar to certain beings having among themselves some repugnance or disproportion. For these causes, then, evil ought not to have been counted among the notions of being.