Disputationes metaphysicae

1. Evil in itself and evil to another.—This question is easily defined from what has been said, for it is about evil formally as it is evil; for material division on the side of things does not fall under science. So, then, evil is divided into that which is evil in itself and that which is evil to another, which St. Thomas called evil simply and in a certain respect; but others call them evil absolutely or respectively, whose notions have been sufficiently expounded from what has been said.

2. Evil to another as a natural being, and as a free agent.—Again, what is evil to another can be divided into that which is unfitting to another in so far as it is a natural thing, and that which is unfitting to another in so far as it is a free being or agent; and in this way evil is divided into natural and moral. Natural evil is every privation of the natural good due to nature, or everything which by its nature is unfitting to another nature. But moral evil is that which is unfitting to free nature in so far as it is free. Whence natural evil is found in all things lacking reason and extends itself also to intellectual things, in so far as they have a proper nature and require some natural perfection, of which they can be deprived without their consent or free cooperation; but moral evil is found only in free nature as free, because, as we said above, morals properly consist in free actions. Whence, although moral evil is unfitting to rational nature as it is rational, and in this can agree with some natural evil, it is nevertheless unfitting to such a nature as it has a peculiar mode of operating, namely with liberty, and in this it differs from natural evil.

What the evils of fault and of punishment are

3. In what the evil of fault and of punishment differ.—And hence further seems to have arisen another celebrated division of evil into the evil of fault and of punishment, which St. Thomas hands down, I, q. 48, aa. 5 and 6, where he constitutes the difference between those members, that the evil of fault expresses a defect in action or second act, but the evil of punishment expresses a defect in some form or integrity of the thing which pertains to first act. Which exposition has a difficulty, because neither does every defect of action pertain to the evil of fault, as is evident of error or of the action of writing or painting badly; nor conversely is every fault in second act, for original or habitual sin is an evil of fault and is not in action; and similarly not every defect in first act is punishment, for blindness, for example, is sometimes not punishment, but a merely natural evil; nor does every punishment consist in a defect of first act, for error too is an evil of punishment; indeed fault itself can be the punishment of a prior fault, as the same St. Thomas teaches, I-II, q. 87, a. 2, from that of Romans 1: Wherefore God gave them up to the desires of their heart.

4. But because this division pertains more to the theologians and moral philosophers, it must briefly be said that this division is properly given of the evil of the rational creature in so far as it is free or exercises its liberty; for in other things or actions there cannot properly be fault, since fault signifies a moral act, and consequently neither can there be punishment, because this expresses a respect to fault on account of which it is inflicted, as Augustine rightly said, Retractations I, c. 9. When, therefore, the evil of fault is said to consist in a defect of action, it is to be understood of free action in so far as it is free, whether this defect be the lack of free action due according to law or right reason, or the lack of honesty or rectitude due to such an action, that is, whether it be the omission of due action or action lacking due rectitude. For the actual use of liberty is only in action or voluntary lack of action, and therefore this evil of fault is per se primarily in such action, because it is the evil of the rational creature as free, that is, as using its liberty. Nor does what was objected about original or habitual fault stand in the way, because these do not have the notion of fault except through order to actual fault, through which they are voluntary. Whence they participate the notion of the evil of fault as it were only mediately, in so far as in them the defect of free action is morally thought to remain; and so it comes about that the evil of fault, which is such per se primarily and immediately, consists in a defect of human or free second act as such. But the evil of punishment is said to be in a defect of first act, not because it cannot also be found in actions, but because it can be sufficiently saved in any lack of due perfection, even after the manner of first act; or certainly because, just as the evil of fault is radically and primarily in action, so the evil of punishment is radically and primarily in first act. For, although it happens that a natural, that is, not free, action is defective, nevertheless that defect always proceeds from some prior imperfection and defect in first act or in the proximate cause. But if the defect of the action is not natural but voluntary, it will now either pertain to the evil of fault or will have no notion of evil, because it will not be a defect of due perfection. And although one sin is said to be the punishment of another, nevertheless it is not according to that which is formally fault in it, but according to some other notion; and so that punishment too is primarily in some thing which is related after the manner of first act with respect to the fault, such as is the denial of some help or the permission of an occasion of falling, which can be said to pertain to first act in so far as the removal of an impediment is supposed to the action and is a condition required in first act.

5. Where the evils of fault and of punishment are placed.—So, then, we can say briefly and perspicuously that the evil of fault is inordination in free action or omission, or the lack of perfection due according to free action; but the evil of punishment is any other lack of due good contracted or inflicted on account of fault. Whence it comes about that this division comprehends all the evils of rational nature, because it can easily be reduced to contradictory members, because every evil which is outside free action as such will pertain to the evil of punishment. And although, divine providence being set aside, there could be understood in the rational creature some natural evil which was not inflicted on account of fault, which accordingly would be neither fault nor punishment, nevertheless from divine providence we believe that there is no defect of due perfection in the rational creature which is not fault or has not drawn its origin from fault; and therefore Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram imperfectus liber, c. 1, says that every evil is either sin or the punishment of sin. Rather, not only the evil which is formally in man himself, but also that which is in irrational or inanimate things, if it turns to some harm of man himself, pertains to the evil of punishment, not with respect to the inferior things, but of man himself, on account of whose fault it is inflicted or permitted.

6. Fault the moral root of the evil of punishment.—Whether the evil of fault or of punishment is graver.—And hence it is also evident how these two evils are compared among themselves; for, formally speaking, the evil of fault is the origin of the evil of punishment and its cause, not physical but moral; for, just as merit is the cause of reward, so fault is the cause of punishment. But if these two are compared in the gravity or magnitude of evil, the evil of fault is far greater than that of punishment; for fault deprives man of due order to God; whence it turns to the offence and injury of God; but punishment as punishment does not have this from its notion, but stops at some detriment of the creature; but the offence of God is a greater evil of man than any other detriment whatever, and therefore any evil of punishment whatever is rather to be sustained than the evil of fault admitted. And for the same cause God can be the author of the evil of punishment, but not of the evil of fault. But let us leave these to the theologians.

7. The base evil opposed to the honest good.—The saddening opposed to the delightful.—Finally, according to the preceding division, it is easy to divide evil by a partition opposite to that by which the good is divided into honest, delightful and useful; for so one evil is the base, which is opposed to the honest, and taken in propriety and rigour is almost the same as the evil of fault. Although fault in rigour is said of the moral sinful action or omission which renders a man morally evil; but the base evil, as it is adequately opposed to the honest good, is said not only of actual or habitual fault itself, but also of the base object and of the vicious habit, which is the principle of the evil act and properly is not fault. Indeed, if the honest good is taken more broadly for that which is per se lovable and consonant to nature and per se fitting, then the evil opposed to it cannot properly be called base, unless whatever deforms (so to speak) nature is called base, but this evil will be called per se avoidable or worthy of hatred. But another evil is opposed to the delightful, which in common can be called unpleasant and saddening, which is to be declared in the same proportion as the good to which it is opposed. But to the useful good there seems to be no properly so-called evil opposed, because the uselessness which can be considered in some thing in order to another, which seems most of all opposed to the useful good, seems opposed not after the manner of privation but of pure negation, and therefore does not have the proper notion of evil. Which can be declared in this way, for a means or thing which is not useful to some end either by its nature lacks that condition or property which is necessary for such utility; and so for the thing to be useless to such an end is not a privation but only a negation, and so it is not an evil. Or by its nature it requires such a property and by accident lacks it; and then that lack has the notion of evil with respect to that thing which has been deprived of natural perfection; but that evil is not properly opposed to the useful good, but to the natural and per se fitting good of such a thing; but the uselessness which arises thence in order to the end is a certain negation. And perhaps for this cause this three-membered division is not wont to be assigned in evil, but only two-membered, namely of fault and punishment, base and unpleasant. But if anyone wishes to find in means some notion of evil opposed to the useful good as such, he can not improbably say that those are called by a peculiar reason useless evils which, although by their nature or institution they ought to be apt for acquiring some end, have from some accident been made disproportioned. And let these suffice about the divisions of evil.