Disputationes metaphysicae

1. There is evil in things.—That evil is in some way in things and sometimes denominates them evil is evident from the common sense and speech of all, which is also frequent in the divine Scriptures, Ecclesiasticus 11: Good things and evil, life and death, poverty and honesty are from God; and c. 39: He has tried good and evil in all things. Isaiah 5: Woe to you who call evil good, and good evil. Matthew 6: Deliver us from evil. Which we should say to God in vain if there were no evils, as Augustine rightly says, Contra Julianum I, c. 3. But what this evil is, and how it is in things, is obscure and placed in controversy. The question, however, is about evil as regards the formal from which evil is denominated; for as regards the material, or the thing which is denominated evil, it is evident that it can be any thing whatever which lacks due perfection, as we shall see.

The old error about evil is refuted

2. There was, then, the ancient error that evil is the positive nature of certain things which were thought to be altogether evil and to have proceeded from a certain supremely evil principle. Which was the error of the Manichees and Priscillianists, as was touched upon in the preceding disputation, sect. 3. And St. Thomas attributes the same to the Pythagoreans, I, q. 49, a. 1, ad 1; and it is taken from Aristotle, Metaphysics I, c. 5, where he reports that the Pythagoreans posited good and evil among the first principles of things. But since sacred Scripture openly teaches both that there is only one first principle of things, supremely good, and that all things effected by it are good, as is evident from the testimonies cited in the preceding section, therefore among Christian philosophers it is certain that evil cannot be some positive thing which by its nature and according to its whole self is evil; both because it cannot be good and altogether evil simply and according to itself; but it has been shown that any thing whatever is good of itself; and also because a thing cannot be evil on account of the natural perfection due to it; but whatever of such perfection is lacking to it, or whatever adverse it has, cannot be connatural to it, since it is supposed to be opposed to due perfection; no thing, therefore, can be evil in itself by its nature.

What evil is, is defined

3. But from this principle the Fathers further inferred that evil as regards the formal, or malice, from which some thing is denominated evil, is not some thing or positive form, nor yet is it a mere negation, but is the privation of perfection due in being. The reason of the first part is that every positive thing is good, as has been said. But the reason of the second part is that a thing is not evil because it does not have a more excellent perfection, if it is not due to it; otherwise every creature would be evil because it does not have the perfection of the creator. And so the third part remains, sufficiently confirmed by a sufficient enumeration of the parts. And Dionysius confirms it at length, On the Divine Names, c. 4, where in this sense he says that evil is not existing, nor is it something, but is the privation of perfection and of the proper and accommodated good; and again he adds that evil is the weakness of the good, which comes to the same; and St. Basil, Constitutiones monasticae, c. 3: Vice (he says) is nothing but the desertion of virtue; and in the homily That God is not the author of evils: Depravity (he says) does not subsist, nor can we produce its subsisting essence (that is, real and positive); for the privation of good is evil. Similarly Gregory of Nyssa, Homily II on the Canticle: There is no other substance of evil (he says) than separation from the good. And he has similar things in the Great Catechetical Oration, cc. 5, 6 and 7; Damascene, De fide II, c. 4, Book IV, c. 2: Nothing (he says) is evil but the privation of good, as darkness of light. Athanasius has the same opinion, Oration against the Idols; Nazianzen, Oration 9, near the end, and Oration 38; Epiphanius, Heresies 24 and 66; Chrysostom, Homily II on Acts, near the end; and Justin, qq. 46 and 73 to the Gentiles, says that evil is nothing but the corruption and depravation and privation of good. And in the former question he professedly proves that it is not a positive thing; but in the latter he excellently confirms that it is not a mere negation. But among the Latin Fathers the chief author and confirmer of this opinion is Augustine, City of God XI, c. 9: Evil has no nature, but the loss of good has received the name of evil; the same, Book XII, from the beginning, and in the Enchiridion, c. 11: Things, in so far as they are certain natures, cannot be evil; and c. 24, treating of sin, he says that it is the first evil of the rational creature, that is, the first privation of good; and Eighty-three Questions, q. 7, he says that the name of evil was taken from the privation of species. The same, Confessions III, c. 7, and Book VII, from c. 5 to 16, and Contra adversarium legis et prophetarum I, c. 5, De vera religione I, c. 40, and the book De natura boni contra Manichaeos, and De moribus Manichaeorum II, and De libero arbitrio, last chapter, where he disputes in particular of the evil of fault and says that it is nothing and therefore is not from God, accommodating to this that of John 1: Without him was made nothing, that is, sin. Ambrose, De Isaac et anima, c. 7: What is malice (he says) but the want of good? Jerome has the same opinion, on Matthew 27, Isaiah 18, Amos 3; Gregory, Moralia 36, c. 24, elsewhere 32, and on 1 Kings, Book I, c. 14, near the beginning, where he speaks specially of the evil of fault. Likewise Fulgentius, De fide ad Petrum, c. 21; Anselm, De concordia praescientiae et liberi arbitrii, c. 1, at the end, and De conceptu virginali I, c. 27, and professedly De casu diaboli, from c. 7; Bernard, Homily VI for Advent. And finally Pope Leo favours it, Epistle 93, c. 6. And all the theologians embrace this doctrine, especially St. Thomas, in the said q. 48 of the First Part, and I-II, q. 54, a. 3, q. 71, a. 1, q. 72, a. 1, and De malo, q. 2, aa. 2 and 9, and others on II, dists. 34, 35 and 40.

Difficulties about the above resolution

4. Whether the evil of fault and of punishment consist in something positive.—But concerning this received doctrine some difficulties occur. The first is that every evil is either of fault or of punishment; but each of them is something positive, even formally as regards the malice itself; therefore. The minor as regards the former part is proved, both because in moral things evil is contrarily opposed to good, on the testimony of Aristotle in the chapter on Opposites and Ethics II, c. 8; and also because in the act, for example, of intemperance the very positive conversion of the will to the inordinate object is contrary to reason, and so evil; and finally because the act of vice is not evil only on account of the privation of the opposite virtue, otherwise avarice would have the same malice as prodigality, because they deprive of the same virtue of liberality; it is therefore evil by reason of its positive entity. But as regards the other part, about the evil of punishment, it is proved by similar arguments, for pain is an evil of punishment and yet is something positive. Nor can it be said that pain is evil because it deprives of the opposite pleasure; for, although the privation of pleasure is some evil, nevertheless the existence of pain is a far greater evil and of another notion; therefore not that privation alone, nor the positive only by reason of that privation, is evil, but also the positive itself. Whence, even if we feign that pain does not exclude the contrary delight, nevertheless pain itself would be some evil; just as, therefore, the delightful good is positive, so the saddening or painful evil is positive. Likewise, if a sweet thing, for example, is positively fitting to taste, so a bitter thing is positively unfitting. Likewise error in the intellect is a certain evil of punishment and without doubt is a far diverse evil from the ignorance of privation; it is therefore a positive evil by reason of the positive relationship to such an object.

5. The second difficulty is that it seems proved by no sufficient reason that evil as regards the formal consists in privation alone, because, as the good is manifold, so also is the evil opposed to the good; although, then, there is no positive being in which some notion of good is not found, which alone the reasons adduced above seem to prove, nevertheless some being can be positively evil by some kind of malice. For, as we were saying above that the same thing can be good according to various notions of good, namely honest and delightful, so it can happen that the same thing is good on one title and evil on another, although each notion is positive, as if it is honest and painful, or conversely if it is delightful and base.

6. The former solution of the difficulties is rejected.—Moral evil according to the mind of the Saints placed in privation.—On account of these things some distinguish evil in the genus of nature and in the genus of morals; and of the former they say that it consists in privation, but of the latter that it consists in a positive form or difference. This was the opinion of some theologians, and its chief author is thought to be Cajetan, I-II, q. 18, a. 5, q. 71, a. 5, and q. 27, a. 1, who nevertheless does not distinguish evil of nature and of morals, but evil simply and evil of morals. But because this matter of moral evil as such pertains rather to the theologian or moral philosopher than to the metaphysician, it is not to be specially treated in this place. It must only briefly be said that those distinctions are not rightly nor consistently applied. First indeed, because the holy Fathers, in the places cited, speak chiefly of the evil of fault, which is moral evil, especially St. Augustine, and St. Thomas, whom Cajetan falsely adduces for his opinion from I, q. 48, a. 1, ad 2 and 3, and Contra Gentiles III, c. 9, although in the former place he says that good and evil specify moral acts, yet good per se, but evil in so far as it is the removal of the due end; but in the latter place he expressly says that the evil which is a difference in moral things is not something which is evil in itself, but in so far as it deprives of the order of reason, which is the good of man. Secondly, because the reason of the Saints, which is taken from this, that God is the author of every good and nothing can be from him which is not good, proceeds most of all of moral evil; for, if it is positive, it is from God, and consequently would rather be simply good than evil. Thirdly, because, as regards the former distinction, the reason of natural evil is the same as of moral; for, just as in man there are positive forms or qualities unfitting to rational nature as such, and therefore contrary to right reason, which is the rule of the things which become man, so in water, for example, there is a positive quality unfitting to it and contrary to its nature; whence, if water were capable of knowledge, it would rightly judge that it is to be avoided by it; if, therefore, for that cause moral evil is said to be positive, some natural evil will also be positive; or, if this is not enough for natural evil to be positive, neither will it be enough in moral.

7. An inept division of evil into simply and moral.—But as regards the words of Cajetan, it is scarcely understood what he understood by evil simply, or how the members of that partition are opposed. For if that is called evil simply which absolutely and without any addition is evil, no evil is more simply evil than moral evil; indeed in a certain way that alone deserves the name of evil, for the others in comparison with it are evil in a certain respect. But if evil simply is called evil in common, as it abstracts from all the differences of evils, evil is not rightly nor sufficiently divided into evil simply and moral evil, as animal would not rightly be divided into animal simply and rational, because on one side the thing divided itself coincides with one member of the division, and on the other the other members which could be numbered are omitted. And moreover it is not rightly understood how, if evil in common consists in privation, positive evil is directly contained under it, since privation cannot be of the essence of the positive. But if by evil simply is understood that evil which is purely evil and has nothing of good admixed, this first of all cannot be said of the thing which is denominated evil, or of the subject of malice; for in this way there is no evil simply, but evil is always founded in good, as St. Thomas teaches from Dionysius and other Fathers, and we shall declare below. It is necessary, therefore, that by reason of the malice itself pure evil be said to consist in privation. Whence it comes about that moral evil can be called positive only for this cause, that besides malice it includes something of good; and so that too which in it pertains formally to the notion of evil will be only privation, since whatever is positive is rather an admixture of good than formally constituting evil. Nor in this will there be anything special in moral evil rather than in natural; for heat too with respect to water is not evil simply, that is, pure and having no admixture of good, because it is a positive form.

What evil in itself and evil to another are

8. Otherwise, then, we can distinguish concerning evil, as it is said of that which is evil in itself and that which is evil to another; for in these two ways we said above that something can be good; but in as many ways as one of opposites is said, the other too can be said. That, therefore, which is called evil in itself can be denominated evil from privation alone; and by this reason it is truly said that evil formally is placed in privation alone. And this the reason indicated above excellently convinces, that a thing cannot be called evil from positive perfection due to it, since the notion of good consists in this, that the thing has perfection due and fitting to it; therefore it is necessary that from the privation alone of such perfection the thing be denominated evil in itself. And it is confirmed, for each positive thing has in itself its essence and its positive being; but each is good and fitting to it; and therefore there is nothing which does not desire its being and its essence; therefore nothing positive as such can be evil in itself. But speaking of that which is evil to another, it can thus be conceded that evil consists in the positive and is opposed to good not privatively but contrarily, as pain is opposed to pleasure, vice to virtue, and so of others. And the reason is that not only privation but also a positive form can be unfitting to some subject; but this notion of evil is the same as the notion of what is unfitting to something; just as, therefore, the good under the notion of what is fitting to another expresses nothing other than the perfection of one thing, connoting in another some condition by reason of which such perfection is due or congruous to it, so the evil opposed to this good formally and precisely expresses nothing other than the perfection of one thing, connoting in another some condition by reason of which it has repugnance or unfittingness with such a form; therefore, just as that good consists in the positive, so also the evil opposed to it.

9. According to this distinction, then, it must be said that the Fathers cited above speak of evil taken in the former way, namely of what is evil in itself; for that is properly and simply evil. But what is only denominated evil because it is unfitting to another, although in itself it is good, is not simply evil, but only in a certain respect and as it were per accidens. But the reasons and difficulties objected to the contrary proceed of the latter evil or the unfitting; for so pain in itself is a certain good, but is unfitting to the animal; and similarly heat is in itself good simply, although it is unfitting to water; and in the other natural evils, or those unfitting to nature, the same is found; and the reason is the same of moral evil, for the will of lying, as it is in itself a certain being, is some good; but it is unfitting to man using reason, and therefore is morally evil.

10. No substance is to be called positively evil.—This distinction indeed is excellent, and the things which are said in its former member are simply to be approved, but not those in the latter. In order to declare which, I infer, first, that no substance can properly and formally be denominated positively evil, but only privatively; because a substance is not properly and formally evil to another; but in itself it can be denominated evil only by reason of some privation; therefore. The major is evident, because substance is per se, not the being of another. You will say this is true of integral and complete substance. The answer is that matter and form too, by the very fact that one is ordered to the other, are not its evil but its good; for both matter is fitting to the form which it serves, and any form is fitting to matter, although it is unfitting to the opposite form or its composite; integral parts too are of themselves fitting to the composite and to the other parts; but how on account of disproportion some part can sometimes be unfitting, we shall say below. But I said properly and formally, because by extrinsic denomination substance can be denominated evil because it effects a form unfitting to something; in which way God too, in so far as he is the author of the evil of punishment, can in that genus be denominated, or rather apprehended and thought, evil, that is, unfitting; under which notion he can also be hated by an inordinate will; yet this is not true malice, but a denomination taken from external malice or unfittingness existing in another thing.

11. Any accident whatever is good to some subject.—Secondly I infer from what was conceded in that former member that every accident, by reason of its positive perfection, is not only a certain good in itself but is also good and fitting to some subject. It is proved, because there is no accident to which it is not connatural to be in some subject, with which it has either a natural connection or at least is ordered to it as its perfection; it will therefore be some good with respect to such a subject; there is, therefore, no positive thing which by reason of itself is evil or unfitting to all.

12. No being is evil in itself by reason of something positive.—And hence it seems to be concluded, thirdly, that no thing can be evil even to any subject by reason of the positive precisely taken. Which can be proved from the doctrine given in the former member of the distinction posited. Because otherwise it is necessary that there be some being evil in itself by reason of some positive form; for if a positive form as such is evil to some subject, then the composite of such a subject and such a form will be a certain evil being, since it is compacted of beings unfitting or not rightly cohering among themselves; therefore either it must be confessed that some being is evil in itself by reason of a positive form, or it must be denied that a positive form as such, and by virtue of its precise perfection, is evil. Likewise the subject affected by such a form is evil or badly disposed; therefore malice too, absolutely speaking, is some positive form, and some thing is evil in itself not because it is deprived of some perfection, but rather because it is affected by some positive thing. The consequence is evident, because malice seems to be nothing other than that by which some subject is badly affected; whence, just as St. Thomas, I, q. 5, a. 5, ad 2, and I-II, q. 51, a. 4, ad 1, and III, q. 11, a. 5, ad 3, says that the habits of the virtues are not so much certain goods as certain goodnesses by which the will is well affected, which affected by them is called good in itself, so that form which by reason of its positive badly affects some subject could be called a certain malice, and the subject affected by it, or the composite resulting from it, would have to be called a certain being evil in itself by virtue of its positive affection or composition. Moreover there is an excellent reason, because a form which is good in itself and expresses perfection cannot be evil to anything by reason of its goodness precisely taken; therefore, in order that it be thought evil and unfitting to something, it is necessary that something else intervene, which can only be some privation; for, if it is something positive, that too will express goodness and perfection; whence the same argument will return concerning it; therefore it is necessary that every malice be completed by some privation.

13. Which finally is declared by reason and examples taken from Dionysius and other Fathers; for in that which is called evil to another we can consider either that being which is called evil to another, or that which results from both; as, for example, it is evil to a man to have six fingers on his hand; if, then, that whole composite is considered, that is, a hand consisting of six fingers, it can be called a certain evil as a monster or sin of nature. Yet Dionysius says, in the said c. 4 of On the Divine Names, that such evil is constituted by privation, which he himself calls the inept composition of dissimilar things and the defect of due and fitting proportion according to the institution of nature. So too Augustine, De natura boni, cc. 3 and 4, says that evil is nothing other than the corruption of mode, or species, or natural order. Which St. Thomas explaining, I, q. 5, a. 5, ad 4, says that mode, species and order, in so far as they are such, are good, but are called evil in so far as either they are less than they ought to have been, or because they are not accommodated to those things to which they are to be accommodated, or because they are foreign and incongruous. So, then, that monster is called evil in so far as it lacks due species and fitting proportion of parts, and so it is not evil by virtue of positive perfection. And the same is found in any being whatever composed of parts which do not agree well among themselves, which universally can be called monstrous.

14. A thing which is called evil to another is such by reason of something privative.—And hence it further comes about that, if we consider that part of such a composite which is called unfitting or evil to another, as is the sixth finger with respect to the human hand or heat with respect to water, it does not have the notion of evil except by reason of some adjoined privation. For first of all the unfittingness itself pertains to privation, as universally contrariety, repugnance, dissimilitude and distinction include negation in their intrinsic concept. For contrariety includes the incompossibility of opposite forms in the same subject; but incompossibility includes negation; so, then, unfittingness expresses disproportion or ineptitude to fitting union or composition. Next, in that subject to which another thing or form is called evil, there is connoted the lack of natural propensity or connection with such a thing. And finally in the very thing which is called evil to another there is denoted the lack of perfection fitting to such a subject, which, although with respect to the form itself absolutely considered it seems to be a certain negation, nevertheless with respect to the subject has the notion of privation, because it is the lack of perfection due to it. And with respect to the form it can be called a privation not simply but hypothetically, or in order to such an effect, because, although absolutely such perfection is not due to such a form, nevertheless in order that it could fittingly inform such a subject, it would need it.

15. And in this way in moral things the act of intemperance is called evil to man in so far as it lacks the rectitude of temperance, and in natural things heat is the evil of water in so far as it lacks the perfection of cold; and so universally St. Thomas said, I, q. 5, a. 3, ad 2, that no being is called evil in so far as it is being, but in so far as it lacks some being; and he thinks the same, De potentia, q. 3, a. 6, ad 12, and clearly and excellently explains it, De malo, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1, saying that something is called evil in two ways, namely simply and in a certain respect. Simply (he says) that is evil which is evil according to itself; but this is that which is deprived of some particular good which is from the debt of its perfection, as sickness is the evil of the animal; but that is called evil in a certain respect which is not evil according to itself, but of something, because it is not deprived of some good which is of the debt of its own perfection, but which is of the debt of the perfection of another thing, as in heat there is the privation of the perfection due to water, and therefore it is not evil in itself, but to water. So, then, every evil includes privation, but proportionately; for what is evil in itself includes the lack of perfection due to itself; but what is evil to another includes the lack of perfection due to that to which it is evil.

16. Although, then, the distinction given of the twofold evil, namely what is evil in itself or what is evil to another, is good, nevertheless of neither evil is it to be conceded that it consists in positive entity alone, but it includes privation. Only a difference can be constituted, that when a thing is called evil in itself, there intervene only the thing which is denominated evil and the privation from which it is so denominated, which alone has the notion of evil formally, or rather of malice; but when a thing is called evil to another, there intervenes a positive entity or form which, as it underlies some privation, is called evil to another thing or subject. Whence not the privation alone, but the form itself too, as it underlies it, has the notion of evil formally with respect to another subject, because in truth it is a form badly affecting it; nevertheless in the form itself, in so far as it is evil to another, that which is positive is as it were material, but the privation as it were formal, constituting the notion of evil with respect to another; for what with respect to one is a form can with respect to another be compared as a subject or matter; and so it comes about that universally the formal constitutive of evil consists in privation, as the holy Fathers taught.

The difficulties posited above are satisfied

17. To the first difficulty, then, and its first member, about the evil of fault, the answer is that the evil of fault is properly the evil of man as he is rational and uses free will; and therefore it is not always said of privation alone, but also of a positive act, yet not by reason of the positive alone, but in so far as it lacks due rectitude. This evil, then, by reason of the act which it includes, can be contrarily opposed to a good act or of virtue, and the same holds proportionally of habits. And in the same way the act itself is called contrary to reason because it lacks due rectitude; whence it is not only evil because it excludes from the subject a contrary good act or habit (which seems to be supposed in the arguments), but because it itself is unfitting to rational nature; but it is unfitting not on account of the precise positive entity, but as underlying the lack of due rectitude, as has been said. And so there can be specific diversity in an evil of this kind, even if perhaps it does not exclude from the subject a form or virtue diverse in species; because this malice, as I said, does not consist in the privation of the contrary form which is caused in the subject, but in the privation of due rectitude, which is understood in the act itself, which can be diverse according to the diversity of acts.

18. To the other member, about the evil of punishment, it must similarly be said that pain is not evil in itself, for it has its perfection and whatever is due to it in the breadth of such perfection; pain, therefore, is something evil as unfitting to man or animal. Whence it must be conceded that it is not only evil causally, that is, because it excludes the opposite delight, but also because it itself is unfitting and disproportioned to the animal, which the argument made there rightly proves. Yet it is not unfitting by reason of the positive entity alone precisely taken, but because according to it it includes the lack of some perfection necessary in order that it could be a form fitting and proportioned to man. And in the same way the answer is to be given to the other examples which are proposed in that difficulty.

19. The same thing as positive can be good, as including privation evil.—To the second difficulty the answer is by conceding that it is not repugnant that the same thing be good and evil by diverse notions; but we deny that each can be altogether positive, because a thing cannot be evil under that notion under which it is good; but under every positive notion precisely considered it is good, as we have shown; and therefore under the notion under which it is evil it is not merely positive. And so, if the discussion is of a thing good or evil in itself, the same thing can indeed be good in itself essentially, but evil integrally or accidentally; yet the former belongs to it in so far as it has the essential perfection due to such a nature; but the latter in so far as it lacks due integrity or accidental perfection. But if the discussion is of a thing good in itself and evil to another, it has the former by reason of its proper nature and positive perfection, but the latter only by reason of some disproportion or unfittingness which it has with another thing, and so by reason of some adjoined privation; and the same almost holds, proportion being kept, when the same thing is good to one and evil to another. But that it be altogether evil in itself and good to something cannot happen, both because no thing is altogether evil in itself, and because we showed above that nothing can be good to another, properly speaking, which is not good in itself.

How good is opposed to evil

20. And from these things it is easily evident how good and evil are opposed, for this too was asked in the difficulties posited. Good and evil, then, can be compared either formally, according to goodness and malice, or only materially, as regards the things themselves which are denominated good and evil. Next, in order that good and evil be opposites, they must be compared with respect to the same thing, as the notion of opposites requires; whence a little before we were saying that the same thing can be good and evil with respect to diverse things, in which there is neither material opposition, since the thing is the same, nor properly formal; for, although those notions of good and evil are diverse, they are nevertheless not opposed but disparate, as to be similar to one and dissimilar to another. And of good and evil so considered holds true what Augustine said in the Enchiridion, c. 14, that in good and evil the dialectical rule fails that contraries cannot be in the same thing, because the same thing can be good and evil, although good and evil are contraries or opposites. For he is speaking of good and evil according to common notions, according to which they do not have perfect and complete opposition unless they are taken in particular and with all the required conditions.

21. Properly, then, comparing good and evil with respect to the same thing, they are opposed privatively in their formal notions; for the good is the same as the perfect as regards that in which it is good; but evil is that which lacks due perfection; and that is good to something which is fitting to it, but that evil which is unfitting. Whence it comes about that they have opposite properties; for the good of itself is desirable, for it is that which all things desire; and therefore it has the causality of end, or at least of means; but evil of itself is not desirable, but rather turns the appetite away from itself. Whence per se and as such it can have the notion neither of end nor of means, but only as it puts on some notion of good, for example in so far as it can be thought useful for avoiding a greater evil. But if the things are compared which are denominated good and evil, then they are not properly opposed in so far as they are called good or evil in themselves, but in so far as with respect to another one is fitting, the other unfitting; for so they mutually exclude each other, but not as they are good or evil in themselves. And in this way they can have in themselves contrary opposition both in moral and in natural things, as was said above.

22. And so Aristotle spoke in the chapter on Opposites of good and evil, not by reason of malice precisely, but by reason of the act or quality which is denominated evil to another, as true and false can be said to be contrarily opposed by reason of assents or judgements. So too Dionysius, On the Divine Names, c. 4, says that evil does not fight against good except by reason of some good, for according to itself it is impotent. And St. Thomas, Contra Gentiles III, c. 9: Evil is not positively repugnant to good except by reason of some goodness. The same, De malo, q. 1, aa. 1, 2, 3 and 4, and De potentia, q. 3, a. 6, ad 11, and In II, dist. 40; whence such opposition is not always necessary, but sometimes privative suffices, if that which is denominated evil is not a positive being but a privative one, in which way blindness or sickness is a certain evil; but sometimes another repugnance between positive forms suffices, although it is not properly contrariety; for so error and science are opposed as good and evil to man, although they are not properly contraries.