Disputationes metaphysicae

Name: Disputationes metaphysicae
Author: Francisco Suárez

Disputationes metaphysicae, in quibus universa naturalis theologia ordinate traditur, et quaestiones omnes ad duodecim Aristotelis libros pertinentes accurate disputantur

First published 1597

Francisco Suárez's fifty-four metaphysical disputations, the systematic metaphysics of the late scholastic tradition, first published at Salamanca in 1597. This edition gives the Latin of the prooemium and all fifty-four disputations — the first part on being and its passions (I–XI), the second on its causes (XII–XXVII), and the third on the division of being into infinite and finite, substance and the nine kinds of accident, and beings of reason (XXVIII–LIV) — with the transcription's apparatus of variant readings from the 1597, 1600, 1605, 1614, 1751 and 1861 editions, and the facsimile of the 1597 print.

Prooemium

Disputatio I: ON THE NATURE OF FIRST PHILOSOPHY OR METAPHYSICS

Sectio I: WHAT THE OBJECT OF METAPHYSICS IS

Sectio II: WHETHER METAPHYSICS IS CONCERNED WITH ALL THINGS ACCORDING TO THEIR PROPER NOTIONS

Sectio III: WHETHER METAPHYSICS IS ONLY ONE SCIENCE

Sectio IV: HOW MANY ARE THE FUNCTIONS OF THIS SCIENCE, WHAT ITS END, AND WHAT ITS USEFULNESS

Sectio V: WHETHER METAPHYSICS IS THE MOST PERFECT SPECULATIVE SCIENCE, AND TRUE WISDOM

Sectio VI: WHETHER AMONG ALL THE SCIENCES METAPHYSICS IS MOST OF ALL DESIRED BY MAN WITH NATURAL APPETITE

Disputatio II: ON THE ESSENTIAL NOTION OR CONCEPT OF BEING

Sectio I: WHETHER BEING IN SO FAR AS IT IS BEING HAS IN OUR MIND ONE FORMAL CONCEPT COMMON TO ALL BEINGS

Sectio II: WHETHER BEING HAS ONE CONCEPT OR OBJECTIVE FORMAL NOTION

Sectio III: WHETHER THE NOTION OR CONCEPT OF BEING IS IN REALITY AND BEFORE THE INTELLECT IN SOME WAY PRESCINDED FROM ITS INFERIORS

Sectio IV: IN WHAT THE NOTION OF BEING IN SO FAR AS IT IS BEING CONSISTS, AND HOW IT BELONGS TO THE INFERIOR BEINGS

Sectio V: WHETHER THE NOTION OF BEING TRANSCENDS ALL THE NOTIONS AND DIFFERENCES OF THE INFERIOR BEINGS, SO THAT IT IS INTIMATELY AND ESSENTIALLY INCLUDED IN THEM

Sectio VI: HOW BEING IN SO FAR AS IT IS BEING IS CONTRACTED OR DETERMINED TO ITS INFERIORS

Disputatio III: ON THE ATTRIBUTES OF BEING IN COMMON AND ITS PRINCIPLES

Sectio I: WHETHER BEING IN SO FAR AS IT IS BEING HAS SOME ATTRIBUTES, AND OF WHAT KIND THEY ARE

Sectio II: HOW MANY ARE THE ATTRIBUTES OF BEING, AND WHAT ORDER THEY KEEP AMONG THEMSELVES

Sectio III: BY WHAT PRINCIPLES THE ATTRIBUTES CAN BE DEMONSTRATED OF BEING, AND WHETHER AMONG THEM THIS IS THE FIRST: IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE SAME THING AT THE SAME TIME TO BE AND NOT TO BE

Disputatio IV: ON TRANSCENDENTAL UNITY IN COMMON

Sectio I: WHETHER TRANSCENDENTAL UNITY ADDS TO BEING SOME POSITIVE NOTION, OR ONLY A PRIVATIVE ONE

Sectio II: WHETHER ONE FORMALLY EXPRESSES ONLY THE NEGATION WHICH IT ADDS OVER BEING, OR SOMETHING ELSE

Sectio III: HOW MANIFOLD UNITY IS IN THINGS

Sectio IV: WHETHER UNITY IS AN ADEQUATE ATTRIBUTE OF BEING, AND ON THE DIVISION OF BEING INTO ONE AND MANY

Sectio V: WHETHER THE DIVISION OF BEING INTO ONE AND MANY IS ANALOGOUS

Sectio VI: HOW ONE AND MANY ARE OPPOSED

Sectio VII: WHETHER ONE IS PRIOR TO MANY, AND INDIVISION TO DIVISION

Sectio VIII: WHETHER THE DIVISION OF BEING INTO ONE AND MANY IS THE FIRST OF ALL

Sectio IX: WHETHER TRANSCENDENTAL UNITY IS NUMERICAL UNITY, OR WHAT IT IS

Disputatio V: ON INDIVIDUAL UNITY AND ITS PRINCIPLE

Sectio I: WHETHER ALL THINGS WHICH EXIST OR CAN EXIST ARE SINGULAR AND INDIVIDUAL

Sectio II: WHETHER IN ALL NATURES THE INDIVIDUAL AND SINGULAR THING, AS SUCH, ADDS SOMETHING OVER THE COMMON OR SPECIFIC NATURE

Sectio III: WHETHER SIGNATE MATTER IS THE PRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUATION IN MATERIAL SUBSTANCES

Sectio IV: WHETHER THE SUBSTANTIAL FORM IS THE PRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUATION OF MATERIAL SUBSTANCES

Sectio V: WHETHER THE PRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUATION IS THE EXISTENCE OF THE SINGULAR THING

Sectio VI: WHAT, FINALLY, THE PRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUATION IS IN ALL CREATED SUBSTANCES

Sectio VII: WHETHER THE PRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUATION OF ACCIDENTS IS TO BE TAKEN FROM THE SUBJECT

Sectio VIII: WHETHER IT IS REPUGNANT THAT TWO ACCIDENTS DIVERSE ONLY IN NUMBER BE AT THE SAME TIME IN THE SAME SUBJECT ON ACCOUNT OF THEIR INDIVIDUATION

Sectio IX: WHETHER IT IS REPUGNANT TO THE INDIVIDUATION OF ACCIDENTS THAT SEVERAL DIFFERING ONLY IN NUMBER BE SUCCESSIVELY IN THE SAME SUBJECT

Disputatio VI: ON FORMAL AND UNIVERSAL UNITY

Sectio I: WHETHER THERE IS IN THINGS SOME FORMAL UNITY DISTINCT FROM NUMERICAL UNITY AND LESS THAN IT

Sectio II: WHETHER THE UNIVERSAL UNITY OF THE NATURE, DISTINCT FROM FORMAL UNITY, IS IN THINGS BEFORE THE OPERATION OF THE MIND

Sectio III: WHETHER THE COMMON NATURE OF ITSELF HAS SOME UNITY OF PRESCISSION OUTSIDE THE INDIVIDUALS, AND BEFORE THE OPERATION OF THE MIND

Sectio IV: WHAT THE APTITUDE TO BE IN MANY IS IN THE UNIVERSAL NATURE

Sectio V: WHETHER UNIVERSAL UNITY ARISES FROM THE OPERATION OF THE INTELLECT, AND HOW THE DIFFICULTIES POSITED TO THE CONTRARY ARE TO BE SATISFIED

Sectio VI: BY WHAT OPERATION OF THE INTELLECT THINGS BECOME UNIVERSAL

Sectio VII: WHETHER UNIVERSALS ARE REAL BEINGS, CORPOREAL, SUBSTANTIAL OR ACCIDENTAL, AND WHAT CAUSES THEY HAVE

Sectio VIII: HOW MANIFOLD THE UNIVERSAL, OR ITS UNITY, IS

Sectio IX: HOW THE UNITY OF GENUS AND DIFFERENCE ARE DISTINGUISHED IN THE THING, BOTH AMONG THEMSELVES AND FROM SPECIFIC UNITY

Sectio X: WHETHER THE METAPHYSICAL ABSTRACTS OF GENERA, SPECIES AND DIFFERENCES CAN TRULY BE PREDICATED OF ONE ANOTHER

Sectio XI: WHAT THE PRINCIPLE OF FORMAL AND UNIVERSAL UNITY IS IN THINGS

Disputatio VII: ON THE VARIOUS KINDS OF DISTINCTIONS

Sectio I: WHETHER BESIDES THE REAL DISTINCTION AND THE DISTINCTION OF REASON THERE IS SOME OTHER DISTINCTION IN THINGS

Sectio II: BY WHAT SIGNS OR MODES THE VARIOUS GRADES OF THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS CAN BE DISCERNED

Sectio III: HOW SAME AND DIVERSE ARE COMPARED BOTH AMONG THEMSELVES AND TO BEING

Disputatio VIII: ON TRUTH, OR THE TRUE, WHICH IS AN ATTRIBUTE OF BEING

Sectio I: WHETHER FORMAL TRUTH IS IN THE COMPOSITION AND DIVISION OF THE INTELLECT

Sectio II: WHAT THE TRUTH OF KNOWLEDGE IS

Sectio III: WHETHER THE TRUTH OF KNOWLEDGE IS ONLY IN COMPOSITION AND DIVISION, OR ALSO IN SIMPLE CONCEPTS

Sectio IV: WHETHER THE TRUTH OF KNOWLEDGE OR OF THE INTELLECT IS NOT IN IT UNTIL IT JUDGES

Sectio V: WHETHER THE TRUTH OF KNOWLEDGE IS ONLY IN THE SPECULATIVE INTELLECT OR ALSO IN THE PRACTICAL

Sectio VI: WHETHER TRUTH IS IN DIVISION EQUALLY AS IN COMPOSITION

Sectio VII: WHETHER THERE IS SOME TRUTH IN THINGS WHICH IS AN ATTRIBUTE OF BEING

Sectio VIII: WHETHER TRUTH IS SAID FIRST OF THE TRUTH OF KNOWLEDGE RATHER THAN OF THE TRUTH OF THE THING, AND IN WHAT WAY

Disputatio IX: ON FALSITY OR THE FALSE

Sectio I: WHAT AND WHERE FALSITY IS, AND WHETHER IT IS A PROPERTY OF BEING

Sectio II: WHAT THE ORIGIN OF FALSITY IS

Sectio III: WHENCE THE DIFFICULTY OF ATTAINING TRUTH ARISES

Disputatio X: ON THE GOOD, OR TRANSCENDENTAL GOODNESS

Sectio I: WHAT THE GOOD OR GOODNESS IS

Sectio II: HOW MANIFOLD THE GOOD IS

Sectio III: WHICH GOOD IT IS THAT IS CONVERTIBLE WITH BEING AS ITS ATTRIBUTE

Disputatio XI: ON EVIL

Sectio I: WHETHER EVIL IS SOMETHING IN THINGS, AND HOW MANIFOLD IT IS

Sectio II: HOW MANIFOLD EVIL IS

Sectio III: WHERE AND WHENCE EVIL IS, OR WHAT CAUSES IT HAS

Sectio IV: WHY EVIL IS NOT NUMBERED AMONG THE ATTRIBUTES OF BEING

Disputatio XII: ON THE CAUSES OF BEING IN GENERAL

Sectio I: WHETHER CAUSE AND PRINCIPLE ARE ALTOGETHER THE SAME

Sectio II: WHETHER THERE IS SOME COMMON NOTION OF CAUSE, AND WHAT AND OF WHAT KIND

Sectio III: HOW MANIFOLD CAUSE IS

Disputatio XIII: ON THE MATERIAL CAUSE OF SUBSTANCE

Sectio I: WHETHER IT IS EVIDENT BY NATURAL REASON THAT THERE IS IN BEINGS A MATERIAL CAUSE OF SUBSTANCES, WHICH WE NAME PRIME MATTER

Sectio II: WHETHER THE MATERIAL CAUSE OF GENERABLE AND CORRUPTIBLE SUBSTANCES IS ONE OR MANIFOLD

Sectio III: WHETHER THE FIRST AND ONLY MATERIAL CAUSE OF GENERABLE SUBSTANCES IS SOME SIMPLE BODY OR INTEGRAL SUBSTANCE

Sectio IV: WHETHER PRIME MATTER HAS SOME ACTUAL ENTITY, INGENERABLE AND INCORRUPTIBLE

Sectio V: WHETHER MATTER IS PURE POTENCY, AND IN WHAT SENSE THIS IS TO BE TAKEN

Sectio VI: HOW MATTER CAN BE KNOWN

Sectio VII: WHAT MATTER CAUSES

Sectio VIII: THROUGH WHAT MATTER CAUSES

Sectio IX: WHAT THE CAUSALITY OF MATTER IS

Sectio X: WHETHER A SUBSTANTIAL MATERIAL CAUSE IS FOUND IN INCORRUPTIBLE BODIES

Sectio XI: WHETHER THE MATTER OF INCORRUPTIBLE BODIES IS OF THE SAME NOTION AS THAT OF THE ELEMENTS

Sectio XII: WHICH MATTER IS MORE PERFECT, THE HEAVENLY OR THE ELEMENTAL

Sectio XIII: OF WHAT KIND IS THE CAUSALITY OF THE MATTER OF INCORRUPTIBLE BODIES

Sectio XIV: WHETHER IN INCORPOREAL THINGS THERE CAN BE A SUBSTANTIAL MATERIAL CAUSE, AND HOW QUANTITY IS COMPARED TO THIS MATERIAL CAUSE

Disputatio XIV: ON THE MATERIAL CAUSE OF ACCIDENTS

Sectio I: WHETHER THERE IS A TRUE MATERIAL CAUSE OF ACCIDENTS

Sectio II: WHETHER SUBSTANCE AS SUCH CAN BE THE IMMEDIATE MATERIAL CAUSE OF ACCIDENTS

Sectio III: WHICH SUBSTANCE CAN BE THE MATERIAL CAUSE OF ACCIDENTS

Sectio IV: WHETHER ONE ACCIDENT CAN BE THE PROXIMATE MATERIAL CAUSE OF ANOTHER

Disputatio XV: ON THE SUBSTANTIAL FORMAL CAUSE

Sectio I: WHETHER THERE ARE SUBSTANTIAL FORMS IN MATERIAL THINGS

Sectio II: HOW THE SUBSTANTIAL FORM CAN COME ABOUT IN MATTER AND FROM MATTER

Sectio III: WHETHER IN THE EDUCTION OF THE SUBSTANTIAL FORM MATTER MUST PRECEDE IN TIME

Sectio IV: WHETHER THE FORM, WHILE IT IS EDUCED FROM MATTER, COMES ABOUT PER SE

Sectio V: WHAT IS THE PROPER NOTION OF THE SUBSTANTIAL FORM AND ITS PROPER CAUSALITY IN ITS GENUS

Sectio VI: WHAT IS THE NOTION OF CAUSING OF THE FORM

Sectio VII: WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF THE FORMAL CAUSE

Sectio VIII: WHETHER THE SUBSTANTIAL FORM IS A TRUE CAUSE OF MATTER, AND MATTER ITS EFFECT

Sectio IX: WHETHER THE DEPENDENCE OF MATTER ON FORM IS SO GREAT THAT IT CANNOT BE PRESERVED WITHOUT IT EVEN BY DIVINE POWER, AND CONVERSELY

Sectio X: WHETHER THERE IS ONLY ONE FORMAL CAUSE OF ONE SUBSTANCE

Sectio XI: WHAT METAPHYSICAL FORM IS, AND WHAT MATTER CORRESPONDS TO IT, AND WHAT CAUSALITY IT HAS

Disputatio XVI: ON THE ACCIDENTAL FORMAL CAUSE

Sectio I: WHETHER ALL ACCIDENTS EXERCISE TRUE FORMAL CAUSALITY, AND ABOUT WHAT EFFECT

Sectio II: WHETHER EVERY ACCIDENTAL FORM IS EDUCED FROM THE POTENCY OF THE SUBJECT

Disputatio XVII: ON THE EFFICIENT CAUSE IN GENERAL

Sectio I: WHAT THE EFFICIENT CAUSE IS

Sectio II: IN HOW MANY WAYS THE EFFICIENT CAUSE IS SPOKEN OF

Disputatio XVIII: ON THE PROXIMATE EFFICIENT CAUSE AND ITS CAUSALITY, AND ALL THAT IT REQUIRES IN ORDER TO CAUSE

Sectio I: WHETHER CREATED THINGS TRULY EFFECT ANYTHING

Sectio II: WHAT IS THE PRINCIPLE BY WHICH A CREATED SUBSTANCE EFFECTS ANOTHER

Sectio III: WHAT IS THE PRINCIPLE BY WHICH CREATED SUBSTANCES EFFECT ACCIDENTS

Sectio IV: WHAT ACCIDENTS CAN BE PRINCIPLES OF ACTING

Sectio V: WHETHER ACCIDENTS ALONE, WITHOUT THE CONCURRENCE OF SUBSTANTIAL FORMS, EFFECT OTHER ACCIDENTS

Sectio VI: WHETHER AN ACCIDENT IS ONLY AN INSTRUMENT IN THE PRODUCTION OF ANOTHER ACCIDENT

Sectio VII: WHETHER THE EFFICIENT CAUSE MUST BE REALLY DISTINCT FROM THE RECIPIENT IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO ACT

Sectio VIII: WHETHER THE EFFICIENT CAUSE MUST BE CONJOINED WITH, OR NEAR TO, THE PATIENT IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO ACT

Sectio IX: WHETHER THE EFFICIENT CAUSE, IN ORDER TO ACT, REQUIRES A PATIENT UNLIKE ITSELF, AND IN WHAT PROPORTION

Sectio X: WHETHER ACTION IS THE PROPER NOTION OF CAUSING OF THE EFFICIENT CAUSE, OR ITS CAUSALITY

Sectio XI: WHETHER THE EFFICIENT CAUSE, BY EFFECTING SOMETHING, CORRUPTS OR DESTROYS, AND HOW

Disputatio XIX: ON CAUSES ACTING NECESSARILY AND FREELY OR CONTINGENTLY; WHERE ALSO ON FATE, FORTUNE AND CHANCE

Sectio I: WHETHER AMONG CREATED EFFICIENT CAUSES THERE ARE SOME ACTING NECESSARILY, AND WHAT THAT NECESSITY IS

Sectio II: WHETHER AMONG EFFICIENT CAUSES THERE ARE SOME OPERATING WITHOUT NECESSITY AND WITH FREEDOM

Sectio III: WHETHER AMONG EFFICIENT CAUSES THERE CAN BE ANY ACTING FREELY IF THE FIRST CAUSE OPERATES FROM NECESSITY; AND IN GENERAL WHETHER FREEDOM OF ACTION REQUIRES FREEDOM IN ALL THE CAUSES INFLOWING INTO IT, OR WHETHER IT SUFFICES IN ONE

Sectio IV: HOW FREEDOM OR CONTINGENCY STANDS IN THE ACTION OF THE SECONDARY CAUSE NOTWITHSTANDING THE CONCURRENCE OF THE FIRST, AND CONSEQUENTLY IN WHAT SENSE IT IS TRUE THAT A FREE CAUSE IS ONE WHICH, ALL THE REQUISITES FOR ACTING BEING POSITED, CAN ACT AND NOT ACT

Sectio V: WHAT IS THE FACULTY IN WHICH THE FREEDOM OF THE CREATED CAUSE FORMALLY RESIDES

Sectio VI: HOW THE FREE CAUSE IS DETERMINED BY THE JUDGEMENT OF REASON

Sectio VII: WHAT IS THE ROOT AND ORIGIN OF THE DEFECT OF THE FREE CAUSE

Sectio VIII: TO WHAT ACTS THERE IS INDIFFERENCE IN THE FREE CAUSE

Sectio IX: WHETHER THE FREEDOM OF THE CAUSE IS PRESENT WHILE IT ACTUALLY OPERATES

Sectio X: WHETHER CONTINGENCY IN THE EFFECTS OF THE UNIVERSE ARISES FROM THE FREEDOM OF EFFICIENT CAUSES, OR CAN EXIST WITHOUT IT

Sectio XI: WHETHER FATE CAN WITH ANY TRUE REASON BE NUMBERED AMONG THE EFFICIENT CAUSES OF THE UNIVERSE

Sectio XII: WHETHER CHANCE AND FORTUNE SHOULD BE NUMBERED AMONG EFFICIENT CAUSES

Disputatio XX: ON THE FIRST EFFICIENT CAUSE AND ITS FIRST ACTION, WHICH IS CREATION

Sectio I: WHETHER IT CAN BE KNOWN BY NATURAL REASON THAT THE CREATION OF SOME BEINGS IS POSSIBLE, OR EVEN NECESSARY; OR, WHAT IS THE SAME, WHETHER ONE BEING INASMUCH AS IT IS BEING CAN DEPEND ESSENTIALLY AND EFFECTIVELY ON ANOTHER BEING

Sectio II: WHETHER INFINITE POWER OF ACTING IS REQUIRED FOR CREATING, AND THEREFORE WHETHER IT IS SO PROPER TO GOD THAT IT CANNOT BE COMMUNICATED TO A CREATURE

Sectio III: WHETHER THERE CAN BE AN INSTRUMENT OF CREATION

Sectio IV: WHETHER CREATION IS SOMETHING IN THE CREATURE DISTINCT FROM IT BY THE NATURE OF THE THING

Sectio V: WHETHER NEWNESS OF BEING IS OF THE NOTION OF CREATION

Disputatio XXI: ON THE FIRST EFFICIENT CAUSE AND ITS SECOND ACTION, WHICH IS CONSERVATION

Sectio I: WHETHER IT CAN BE DEMONSTRATED BY NATURAL REASON THAT CREATED BEINGS ALWAYS DEPEND IN THEIR BEING ON THE ACTUAL INFLUX OF THE FIRST CAUSE

Sectio II: WHAT ACTION CONSERVATION IS, AND IN WHAT WAY IT DIFFERS FROM CREATION

Sectio III: WHETHER ALL THINGS DEPEND ON GOD ALONE IN BEING CONSERVED

Disputatio XXII: ON THE FIRST CAUSE AND ITS OTHER ACTION, WHICH IS COOPERATION, OR CONCURRENCE WITH SECONDARY CAUSES

Sectio I: WHETHER IT CAN BE SUFFICIENTLY PROVED BY NATURAL REASON THAT GOD OPERATES PER SE AND IMMEDIATELY IN THE ACTIONS OF ALL CREATURES

Sectio II: WHETHER THE CONCURRENCE OF THE FIRST CAUSE WITH THE SECOND IS SOMETHING BY WAY OF PRINCIPLE OR OF ACTION

Sectio III: HOW THE CONCURRENCE OF GOD IS COMPARED TO THE ACTION OF THE SECONDARY CAUSE AND TO ITS SUBJECT

Sectio IV: HOW GOD GIVES HIS CONCURRENCE TO SECONDARY CAUSES

Sectio V: WHETHER SECONDARY CAUSES DEPEND ESSENTIALLY IN OPERATING ON THE FIRST CAUSE ALONE, OR ALSO ON OTHERS

Disputatio XXIII: ON THE FINAL CAUSE IN GENERAL

Sectio I: WHETHER THE END IS A TRUE REAL CAUSE

Sectio II: HOW MANIFOLD THE END IS

Sectio III: WHAT EFFECTS THE FINAL CAUSE HAS

Sectio IV: WHAT THE NOTION OF CAUSING OR THE CAUSALITY OF THE FINAL CAUSE IS, OR IN WHAT IT CONSISTS

Sectio V: WHAT IS THE PROXIMATE NOTION OF CAUSING FINALLY IN THE END

Sectio VI: WHAT THINGS CAN EXERCISE FINAL CAUSALITY

Sectio VII: WHETHER TO BE KNOWN IS A NECESSARY CONDITION FOR THE END IN ORDER THAT IT CAN CAUSE FINALLY

Sectio VIII: WHETHER THE END MOVES ACCORDING TO ITS REAL BEING, OR ACCORDING TO ITS KNOWN BEING

Sectio IX: WHETHER THE CAUSALITY OF THE END HAS PLACE IN THE DIVINE ACTIONS AND EFFECTS

Sectio X: WHETHER IN THE ACTIONS OF NATURAL AND IRRATIONAL AGENTS TRUE FINAL CAUSALITY INTERVENES

Disputatio XXIV: ON THE ULTIMATE FINAL CAUSE, OR ULTIMATE END

Sectio I: WHETHER IT CAN BE SUFFICIENTLY PROVED BY NATURAL REASON THAT THERE IS SOME ULTIMATE END, AND THAT THERE IS NO PROCESS TO INFINITY IN FINAL CAUSES

Sectio II: WHETHER THE ULTIMATE END PER SE AND PROPERLY CONCURS WITH ALL PROXIMATE ENDS FOR CAUSING FINALLY, AND CONSEQUENTLY WHETHER ALL AGENTS IN ALL THEIR ACTIONS INTEND THE ULTIMATE END

Disputatio XXV: ON THE EXEMPLARY CAUSE

Sectio I: WHETHER THE EXEMPLAR EXISTS, WHAT IT IS, AND WHERE IT IS

Sectio II: WHETHER THE EXEMPLAR CONSTITUTES A PROPER NOTION OF CAUSE, OR IS BROUGHT BACK TO ONE OF THE OTHERS

Disputatio XXVI: ON THE COMPARISON OF CAUSES TO THEIR EFFECTS

Sectio I: WHETHER EVERY CAUSE IS NOBLER THAN ITS EFFECT

Sectio II: WHETHER EVERY CAUSE IS PRIOR TO ITS EFFECT

Sectio III: WHETHER THERE CAN OR MUST BE SEVERAL CAUSES OF THE SAME EFFECT

Sectio IV: WHETHER THE SAME EFFECT CAN BE AT ONCE FROM SEVERAL TOTAL CAUSES OF THE SAME GENUS AND SPECIES

Sectio V: WHETHER THE SAME EFFECT CAN DIVIDEDLY BE NATURALLY FROM SEVERAL TOTAL CAUSES

Sectio VI: WHETHER THE SAME THING CAN BE THE CAUSE OF SEVERAL EFFECTS, ESPECIALLY OF CONTRARY ONES

Disputatio XXVII: ON THE COMPARISON OF CAUSES AMONG THEMSELVES

Sectio I: WHICH OF THE FOUR CAUSES IS MORE PERFECT

Sectio II: WHETHER CAUSES CAN BE CAUSES OF EACH OTHER

Disputatio XXVIII: De Prima Divisione Entis in Infinitum Simpliciter et Finitum et Aliis Divisionibus Quae Huic Aequivalent

Sectio I: Utrum Recte Dividatur Ens in Infinitum et Finitum, et Quaenam Divisiones Huic Aequivaleant

Sectio II: Utrum Sufficienter et Adaequate Dividatur Ens per Finitum et Infinitum et Alia Aequipollentia Membra

Sectio III: Utrum Praedicta Divisio Univoca Sit vel Analoga

Disputatio XXIX: De Deo Primo Ente et Substantia Increata, Quatenus Ipsum Esse Ratione Naturali Cognosci Potest