Disputationes metaphysicae

1. The effect can be compared in perfection either to its single causes or to all taken together, and this either to all¹ simply, or to all of the same genus or notion.

2. First, then, it is certain that the effect cannot exceed in perfection all its causes taken together. It is proved, because there is nothing of perfection in the effect which it does not have from its causes; therefore the effect can have nothing of perfection which does not pre-exist in some one of its causes, either formally or eminently, because causes cannot give what they in no way contain in themselves.

Comparison of the effect to its intrinsic causes

3. Secondly it must be said that, if the effect is compared only to those causes of which it intrinsically consists, it cannot exceed in perfection all of them taken together as actually causing. Which is to say that a composite substance, for example, which is the intrinsic effect of matter and form, cannot exceed in perfection the matter and form themselves taken together and united; for I added actually causing in order to comprehend their union. And so the assertion is easily proved, first, because that effect is not distinguished in reality from such causes taken together and actually causing, as I shall show below in treating of material substance; therefore there cannot be inequality of perfection between them.² Secondly, because the effect does not have perfection formally or entitatively from elsewhere than from those causes of which it intrinsically consists; therefore it cannot exceed in perfection all of them with their causalities, because there is no source from which it has that excess of perfection. You will say that many things belong to the composite which pertain to perfection and cannot be attributed to its intrinsic causes, such as to be per se, to operate per se, as in living things to live belongs to the composite, which belongs neither to the matter nor to the form. It is answered that these perfections do not belong to the single intrinsic causes taken by themselves, but belong to them as together and actually causing; hence it is only concluded that from the union or causality of these causes there arises something more perfect than is the aggregate (so to speak) of these causes without their union and causality among themselves.

4. But hence it is inferred and said thirdly that, comparing the effect wholly and simply to the single intrinsic causes, the effect is more perfect than any one of them. It is openly proved, because it includes the whole perfection of any one of them, and moreover includes the perfection of the other, and moreover the perfection of their union among themselves. Likewise, if such effect is a composite substance, it is established that it is more perfect than matter; above too it was shown to be more perfect than the form. Nor can this seem wonderful, because such effect does not have its whole perfection intrinsically from either of such causes taken by itself, and therefore it can exceed either of them taken by itself by reason of the other. But I said, if the whole effect is compared simply according to the whole perfection which it has; for if the comparison is made only in a qualified sense, in that precisely which the effect has from such cause, it cannot exceed in that notion the perfection of the cause, since from it it can have nothing more than it contains in itself. Indeed, under that consideration the cause in a certain way exceeds, inasmuch as it is that which communicates its perfection to the other, and inasmuch as the effect depends on it under that notion. You will say: when this effect is some accidental composite, it is not always more perfect than the other cause taken by itself, namely the material, which is the substance itself. It is answered that even this composite surpasses the substance itself at least in the perfection of the accidental form and its information;³ for this is some perfection. But if it happens that this whole perfection is contained eminently in the substance alone, that will not be by reason of material causality, but by another superior reason. Hence that is per accidens to the comparison of the material cause as such to its effect, which we are now making. But here a further comparison could be made between the material and formal causes themselves, inasmuch as one can be the effect of the other; but we shall touch on this comparison better in the following section.

Comparison of the effect to the efficient causes

5. Fourthly it must be said that the effect can never exceed in perfection all the efficient causes which concur to it, taken together; indeed not even any one of them which concurs to it as principal and total cause in some genus; but conversely the principal efficient cause often exceeds its effect in perfection. This assertion is easy as to all its parts from what we disputed most broadly about the efficient cause. And the first part is proved, because the whole perfection of the effect flows from the efficient causes; therefore it cannot happen that there be some perfection in the effect which is not in an equal or nobler way in some one of the efficient causes; therefore the effect cannot exceed in perfection all its efficient causes taken together. You will say: besides the efficient causes the effect has other causes intrinsic to it; therefore by reason of them it can exceed the efficient causes in perfection. It is answered that the intrinsic causes themselves composing the effect necessarily flow from some extrinsic efficient cause; and therefore it cannot happen that the effect, compared to the efficient cause adequate to it, have some perfection from its intrinsic causes which is not in an equal or nobler way in the extrinsic or efficient cause.

6. But the other part, in which the effect is compared to the single efficient causes, is easily declared from the distinction of principal and instrumental cause. For the instrumental can be less noble than the effect, as was said above and as St. Thomas noted, In IV, dist. 1, q. 1, a. 4, quaestiunc. 1, ad 3, because the effect does not proceed principally from its power. But the principal cause can never be less noble, especially if it is integral and total in its genus; for of the partial the matter is more doubtful. Although, speaking properly of intensive perfection, it is more probable that even the partial principal cause is never intensively less perfect than its effect, because in this it most differs from the instrumental cause, and because such cause, although on the part of the action it is partial, yet on the part of the effect acts upon the whole of it; and therefore it cannot exceed the grade of its perfection, as was touched upon in the foregoing. And hence a fortiori it is established that, when the cause is total principal, it cannot be inferior in perfection to its effect, because it could not give it perfection which it did not have in itself. But among principal causes some are univocal, others equivocal, as we said above; of which the latter are necessarily nobler than their effects, because, since they are of a diverse species from the effects, they necessarily do not contain their perfection formally and according to the same notion; therefore they must have it in a more eminent way, as St. Thomas noted, I, q. 4, a. 2, ad 3; and it is frequent among all philosophers. But the univocal cause, although it cannot be inferior to its effect, yet need not exceed it; for it communicates its whole perfection, which it produces in the same species; and therefore between them equality is found. But if you object Augustine, bk. LXXXIII Questions, q. 2, saying: Everything which is made cannot be equal to that by which it is made, I answer, first, that it can be understood that the effect is never equal to the cause in all things; for at least in the relation of dependence it is inferior; yet not in absolute and intrinsic perfection. Or secondly, and perhaps more to the mind of Augustine, I answer that it is to be understood of that which is made by another as by a necessary principle on which it essentially depends; but the effect never has such dependence on a univocal cause, but on some superior one; and therefore of such effect it is true that it can never come to equality with the cause.

7. From another side someone can object that, when several principal causes per se subordinated concur to the same effect, even if each in its genus and grade is total, nothing prevents the effect from exceeding the inferior or proximate cause, provided it does not exceed all the superior ones, because it is enough that the whole perfection of the effect be in the whole series of causes, although it is not in each. And so it happens that a less perfect brute generates another of a more perfect species; and more frequently it happens that one man generates another of better wit, and therefore more perfect in the individual. To the argument it is answered from what was said above that no causes are per se and essentially subordinated in acting except the second and the first; for secondary causes among themselves do not have that so intrinsic subordination, although among secondary causes there are some universal and superior ones which in their way help the inferior ones to their effects. The first cause, then, when it acts with the second operating principally in its order, accommodates its action to the perfection and nature of such cause, and therefore the effect can never exceed the perfection of the secondary cause, nor can some perfection flow from the first cause into the effect except through the second; otherwise in communicating that perfection the first cause would no longer act as concurring with the second, but by itself, as supposing some defect of the secondary cause. And in a similar way, if sometimes the effect from the influence of the heavens has some greater perfection than the particular univocal cause, as to that perfection it does not proceed from the particular cause, at least as from the principal, but from the heaven or another universal cause which in that effect holds the place of proximate principal cause.

8. Hence to the examples about animals, which seem to be generated in a more perfect species by others less perfect, either the assumption is to be denied, because always at least one of the generators is equally perfect or more perfect in species; or certainly it must be said that such generators do not concur to that effect as principal causes, but as instrumental, disposing the matter; but that the generation is perfected by the power of some superior cause, as happens also in the effecting of a mixed body which is generated from the mutual action and mixture of the elements. But of individual inequality, if we hold that individuals of the same species are not unequal except in accidental dispositions, as is the opinion of many, the answer is easy; for the perfection of such disposition or complexion does not always come from the proximate and univocal causes, but from other surrounding ones and especially from heavenly influence, as is the concordant opinion of all philosophers. But if perhaps in the individuals themselves there is inequality of perfection, and a more perfect individual is generated by a more imperfect one, it must necessarily be said that that excess of perfection too comes from the concomitance and concurrence of other causes, which, just as they help to dispose the matter more perfectly, so also to introduce an individually more perfect form. Which matter is properly wont to be disputed in the books On the Soul, and well by Fonseca, V Metaph., c. 28, q. 16.

Comparison of the effect to the final cause

9. Finally it must be said that the final cause is not always more perfect than its effect; although, if the end is ultimate and the order to the end is right and according to the institution of nature, it is always more perfect than its effect or the thing ordered to the end. The former part is established, first, by induction; for often someone exercises most noble actions for the sake of money, or the esteem of men, which are more imperfect ends. And the reason is that the end only moves the agent metaphorically to operate, and therefore it is not necessary that it contain the effect either formally or eminently, but it is enough that it have some notion of good under which it can move the will. The latter part too is established by induction, for inasmuch as God operates for the sake of an end, it is clear that the ultimate end which He intends is nobler than the other things procreated for the sake of such end. Again natural agents, since they do not operate except for the sake of the ultimate end intended by God, also act for the sake of a nobler end. But if they are considered precisely inasmuch as they act from the natural impetus of nature, they operate in one of three ways. The first is for the sake of the perfection or fitting state of the individual, as when a stone is moved to rest at the centre, or a brute to conserve its life; and in this mode of operating the agent itself is the end of that action, and in some way ultimate, namely in that series; and so it is established that an end of this kind is more perfect than such action or its formal terminus. The second mode is when these agents act for the sake of the conservation of their species, as when fire generates fire, etc.; and then the end is in a certain way equally perfect, inasmuch as the form itself of the thing generated is called by Aristotle the end of generation; or, inasmuch as the generator⁴ itself is the end of its action, it is in a certain way a more perfect end, inasmuch as the common good of the whole species and its perpetuity is a more excellent good than one or another individual. The third mode is when these causes operate for the sake of communicating in some way the being which they have, as when the sun illuminates, and the same holds of all the influences of the heavens; for they do not act in order to conserve themselves, since they are incorruptible; they act, then, only in order to communicate themselves, or (what is the same) in order to conserve or perfect others. In which action, if the proximate end of the action itself is considered, it is indeed less perfect than is the agent itself, yet that is not the end of the agent itself, but of the action alone; but if the ultimate end is considered, for the sake of which agents of this kind can be said to act, that according to a certain notion or series is the good of the whole universe; but simply it is God Himself, whom these agents imitate while they communicate themselves; and in both ways the end is something more excellent than that which is ordered to the end.

10. Finally, created intellectual agents, if they operate rightly and in an orderly way for the sake of an end, tend through their operations to the true ultimate end, which is God, either expressly, or at least implicitly, inasmuch as they operate for the sake of virtue and honesty. In which too they in some way operate for their own sake, inasmuch as they operate for the sake of their own perfection, not indeed resting in themselves as in the ultimate end for the sake of which they operate, but as in the end to which they procure that perfection. And so the end which they ultimately intend is absolutely more perfect than all that which they order to the end; for of God it is established; but of the agents themselves, inasmuch as they order something to themselves and are compared to it as ultimate end in some series, it is also necessary that under that notion they be more perfect, for these agents are more perfect than their operations. But if they are said to be for the sake of their operations, they do not so rest in them as not to order them to themselves, so that they completely intend themselves in the perfect state; which can be called the intrinsic ultimate end of such action, yet not simply ultimate, since that whole action either is referred or of itself tends to a further extrinsic ultimate end, which is God.

11. But sometimes these agents can order other things more perfect than themselves, even God Himself, to themselves as to the ultimate end simply; yet that is a perverse order and foreign both to right reason and to that which the natures of things demand; and therefore I said in the conclusion if the order to the end is right from the very institution of nature. And in this way is to be understood what Aristotle said, that the end is the best of each thing; for he speaks of the ultimate end respectively, so to speak, that is, either simply or in a qualified sense, in order to that of which it is the ultimate end. And the reason is that the ultimate end is desired for its own sake, and other things for its sake; and therefore it is also loved more than the rest, according to that: That on account of which each thing is such is itself more such; and therefore, if it is loved rightly and consonantly with the natures of things, it must itself be more lovable, and consequently a greater and more excellent good.

12. But it is otherwise of the end not ultimate; for rightly and in a most fitting order a more perfect thing can be ordered to a less perfect as to a proximate end, provided that the whole series is referred to another ultimate and more perfect end, because then the proximate end is not so much attended to as it is per se lovable from its own goodness and perfection as it is lovable from relation to the more perfect end.

1. The reason for doubting.—The reason for doubting is that Aristotle, V Metaph., c. 2, asserted without any distinction that the cause in act is together with the effect in act; therefore it is not prior to it. But if you say that the cause in potency is prior to the effect in act, this is surely nothing, both because this does not come from the notion of cause, but from the notion of potency and corresponding act; for so being in potency can also be called prior to being in act. And also because the comparison is not rightly made; otherwise it could also be said that the effect in potency is prior to the cause in act; it must therefore be made proportionately; and in this way, just as the cause in act is not prior to its effect in act, but together with it, so neither is the cause in potency prior to the effect in potency. But if you say further that Aristotle spoke only of simultaneity of time or duration, against this is, first, that he himself distinguished nothing. Secondly, because in c. 11 of the same bk. V Metaph., enumerating various modes of prior and posterior according to nature, he makes no mention of that which is between cause and effect. Thirdly, because cause and effect are said relatively; but relatives are not only together in time, but also together in nature. On the contrary is that every cause is a principle; but every principle, especially in created things, is in some way prior to that of which it is the principle, as was seen above. Hence Aristotle too, in the Postpredicaments, ch. on the Modes of Prior, said that every cause is prior in nature to its effect.

2. This question, as has been touched upon, can be understood of a twofold priority, namely of time and of nature; and because the reason of them is diverse, one must speak of them singly, running briefly through the single causes, since one general answer about all cannot be handed down. But it must be considered that it is one thing to inquire what belongs per se to the cause, namely, whether per se and necessarily it is together with or prior to the effect, another what can belong to it, even if it is not necessary. Finally, we can speak of the thing which is the cause, either as it can be, or inasmuch as it is actually a cause.

The question is dispatched as to the final cause

3. The final cause does not necessarily exist before the effect.—Beginning, then, from the final cause, it is established from the foregoing that it does not always require real existence in order to cause, but that sometimes it can have it, namely, when the end moves not in order that it be made, but in order that it be acquired, or be accidentally perfected. Hence, then, it comes about that some end, as to the thing itself which is the end, can be prior in real existence to its effect, yet that this is not necessary, indeed not even that the end actually causing exist together in time with its first effect, but only with its last; because that which is first in intention is last in execution. But if you object Aristotle saying generally that the cause in act is together with the effect in act, it must be answered that that is to be understood with proportion, of the cause in act according to that being which is necessary for causing, and that in the final cause it suffices that the end actually causing be together with its effect in apprehended being, because it cannot actually move the agent unless it is apprehended.

4. Yet it has priority of nature to the effect, as depending on it.—But of priority of nature the final cause has nothing peculiar besides that which is common to every cause, namely, that, inasmuch as the effect depends on it and it does not depend on the effect, it is prior in nature to it; of which priority of nature, what it is and how it is to be understood, we shall speak more at length below. And this priority of nature alone belongs per se to the final cause. But the other modes of priority of nature, which are either priority of perfection, or in the consequence of subsisting, are not required per se in the final cause; but how they can belong to it is sufficiently established from what has been said, both in the preceding section about the perfection of the end, and in this assertion too about its real existence.

The question is resolved as to the material cause

5. Secondly, the matter can also easily be dispatched in the material cause; for as to priority of existence, it belongs per se to this cause that it not be posterior in time to that effect which it causes. And as to this that pronouncement holds true in it: The cause in act is together with the effect in act. And the reason is that it cannot actually cause unless it actually and really exists, as was proved above, and therefore it cannot happen that it be posterior in time to its effect. But it is not of the notion of this cause that the thing itself which causes be so together in time with its effect that it did not also exist before; for it can have existed before such effect in time, not indeed actually causing it, but as to the absolute entity itself of such cause. And in this sense another pronouncement of Aristotle can hold true in this cause: The cause in potency is not necessarily together with the effect, but can be prior; for the comparison is made between the things themselves of cause and effect in order to actual existence; for that is not called a cause which can be, but which can cause. And in this way it is said of it that it is not always together in real existence with the effect, but can be prior, which is manifest in this cause; for the matter of wood, from which fire can be generated, is the cause in potency of the fire not yet generated, and is prior in time to it.

6. Matter cannot precede all its effects in duration.—But it must be added that it is peculiar to this cause that, although it can be prior in time to any designated effect of its own, yet it cannot be prior in time to all its effects, understanding this collectively, which is most of all true in the material cause of substance; yet, proportion being kept, it will also be found true in the material cause of accidents. And the reason is that this cause is of such a nature that it cannot actually exist at any moment without also actually causing, because neither can matter naturally be without form, nor can a substance capable of accidents be without every accident; and so there is always some effect of this cause equal to it in duration; therefore with respect to such effect it is not prior in time. But that this is with respect to this determinate effect is accidental; for such matter could have been made under another prior form, and so have preceded in time. I omit the matter of the heaven, to which it is connatural to be always under such determinate form; for that comes from a peculiar reason and connection; but now we are speaking from the general reason.

7. In how many ways matter is prior in nature to its effect.—And hence it is easily understood by what reason prime matter is prior in nature to its effect. For it can be called prior in nature in two ways: either from the intrinsic notion of causing, by reason of which the effect depends on it, but it itself depends on the effect. Which will be easier to understand if matter does not depend on the form as on a prior and as on a proper cause, as was touched upon above and will again have to be touched upon in the following disputation. Secondly, it can be called prior in nature on account of the consequence of subsisting, which is to be expounded according to what was just said about priority in existing. But if prior in nature is taken by reason of perfection, in this way this cause is not simply prior in nature, but rather posterior, because it is less perfect than its effect. And this is the common opinion, which is most clear if the comparison is made with respect to the whole composite, which is also the effect of the material cause. But if the comparison is made with respect to the form, I so interpret it that in substances matter is understood to be simply posterior in perfection; but excellent in a qualified sense, namely in the notion of subsisting or mode of being per se; for in this matter exceeds the material form, which is its effect, because it sustains it. Hence such form in a certain way inheres in the matter itself; but matter, because it is the first subject, can inhere in nothing, but must be per se, and in this we say this cause exceeds this effect of its own, which will be more established from what is to be said below about created subsistence. But in accidents the converse happens; for the material cause is simply more perfect than the effect, which is the accidental form, since the cause itself is a substance; yet in a qualified sense it is less perfect, inasmuch as it is compared as passive potency to its act.

What is to be said of the form in the present question

8. The form is always together in time with its effect.—Thirdly it must be said of the form that per se and from its nature it is never prior in time to its effect, nor yet posterior, but together. Hence in this cause there is no place for the cause in potency being prior to the effect, because this cause is not prior in time actually a being and a cause in potency than it is also actually a cause, because it does not exist or have real power of causing prior in time to its actually causing, as Aristotle rightly taught, XII Metaph., c. 3. And the reason is manifest, most of all in those formal causes which depend in their being on matter, as are all except the rational soul; for forms of this kind cannot naturally exist outside their subjects; therefore neither outside their composites; therefore neither can they exist without their effect. But in the rational soul, although there is not this necessity of dependence, there is yet a connatural property of such thing; for since its being is for composing the composite, by its nature it demands not to be made except when there is actually the composite to be composed of it, and so it is never naturally prior in duration to its effect, although it can afterwards endure when the effect ceases; in which it has a certain genus of priority as to the consequence of subsisting, as I shall now say.

9. What notions of priority of nature the form obtains with respect to its effect.—But of priority of nature, if it is taken as to perfection, the comparison between the form and the composite has already been made above, and we said that the form is simply less perfect, in which sense it can be called posterior in nature to its effect; but with respect to matter it will be prior in nature, if indeed matter is to be called the effect of the form. But if priority of nature is taken in the consequence of subsisting, in this way it is not necessary that the form be prior or posterior in nature to its effect, but they are together, because neither can the composite be without the form, nor the form, at least naturally, without the composite. I except only the rational soul, which, although by some reason it is together, inasmuch as it cannot be unless at some time there is also a man, yet simply does not convert, because sometimes the soul can exist even if the man is not; and according to that notion it can be called prior as to the consequence of subsisting.

10. Whether the form is prior to its effect in causality.—But of the priority of nature which per se follows the notion of cause, it is difficult to explain how it belongs to this cause from its proper notion, the peculiar condition of the rational soul being omitted. And the reason of the difficulty is that it seems impossible that the form be prior in nature to its informing; therefore it cannot be prior in nature to its effect. The antecedent is evident, because it is not prior in nature in itself than in a subject; for this is proper to a subsisting form; therefore it is not prior in nature to its informing, and consequently neither is it prior in nature to the composite, because as soon as the form informs the matter the composite arises. Some answer that the form informs prior in nature, yet is not prior in nature to the composite, for being belongs first to the composite, and through it to the form, who a fortiori will say the same of matter. But this answer neither removes the difficulty nor contains true doctrine. First, because Aristotle said not only that the cause causes prior in nature, but also that it is prior in nature to its effect. Next, if the form informs prior in nature, in this very thing it is included that it be prior in nature, both because being is a transcendental predicate included in any real predicate; but to inform is a real predicate; and also because to inform is nothing else than by actuating to give proper being; therefore to inform intrinsically includes being. Finally, if the form informs prior in nature to the composite's being, this is because the being of the composite arises from the information of the form; but the entity of the composite too arises from the entity of the form; therefore the entity of the form is prior in nature to the entity of the composite; therefore the form, as it informs prior in nature, so is prior in nature.

11. It can be answered otherwise that three things intervene here, namely, the form's being, the form's informing, and the composite's being or (what is the same) being formed or constituted, which three are distinguished not only in reason, but also in some way from the nature of the thing, as can be established from what was treated in the foregoing. The form's being and informing, then, are prior in nature to the composite, because they are compared in a certain way as way and terminus, and as becoming and having been made. And so in this genus of cause too the general pronouncement of Aristotle holds true: The cause is prior in nature to its effect. Which is true not only of the thing which is the cause in potency or in first act, but also of the cause causing in second act; because as such it exercises the action of the cause and the effect depends on it, as we shall also explain in the acting cause. But the form is actually causing inasmuch as it actually informs; therefore as such it is prior in nature to the composite, which is its effect. Nor does the difficulty touched upon proceed against this, because rather from the fact that the composite results from the information of the form it follows that the information itself and the form as informing are prior in nature to the composite. But comparing the other two among themselves, namely being and informing, it can be granted that neither is prior in nature to the other in those forms which are made dependently on a subject; for the difficulty touched upon seems to intend and sufficiently prove this, which being granted it is satisfied. Nor does that principle stand in the way, that the cause is prior in nature; for Aristotle did not say that every cause is prior in nature to its causing, but said that the cause is prior in nature to its effect; but this latter can be true even if the former is not, for the causing itself is prior in nature to the effect, as I said. But it does not seem necessary that the causing be posterior in nature to the being of the cause where the causing itself is not properly the effect of the being itself of the cause, but is the very being communicated or united to the subject, which union is the effect of the agent, as is the very being of the form, and is made together with the existence of the form.

12. This answer, as to the former part about priority of nature with respect to the composite, is true and satisfies excellently. But as to the other part, although it is probable, yet it does not wholly satisfy me, because it seems it cannot be denied that the very causality of the form is in some way from it, as the causality of the agent is from the agent; hence, just as the agent is not only prior in nature to its effect, but also to its action, yet in a diverse way—for inasmuch as it is actually acting, it is prior in nature to the effect, not however to the action, because through it it is formally constituted actually acting, yet inasmuch as it is actually a being, it is at least prior in nature to its action—so it seems the form is prior in nature to its actual causality, since this too is caused by it; therefore it is prior in nature to its informing. Hence this causal proposition is true: Because the form is, therefore it informs or causes the composite, and this very thing was said by us in the foregoing. Let us grant, then, that the form is prior in nature to its informing.

13. But to the difficulty posited above it must be said that, although the form, which by its nature depends on matter, is prior in nature to its informing, yet it is not prior in nature in itself or per se than in matter, but only precisively (so to speak) it is prior in nature to its being in such a way, namely, by informing the matter. But if it is asked in that prior of nature in what way it is in itself or in another, it is answered, first, that the question is not rightly asked about that prior of nature as if it were some instant in which the form is and does not inform; for this priority of causality is not to be explained by a prior in which, but from which. For the form is not said by any other reason to be prior in nature to its informing except because informing in some way flows from being, although in reality, in no sign even of reason, is the form understood simply to be before it informs the matter. But the priority being so understood, to the question asked it must be said that in that prior the form is neither in itself nor in another, but only is through such being as intrinsically demands to be in another, which matter we shall explain more at length in the following disputation, treating how causes are causes to each other.

The question is treated in the efficient cause

14. Fourthly it must be said that the efficient cause of itself can be prior in time to its effect as to its absolute entity or power of acting, which Aristotle called the cause in potency or in first act, yet that this is not always necessary; for the effect of this cause can sometimes be equal in duration; but if such cause is taken in second act, it is necessarily together in time with its effect, although it is simply and most properly prior in nature. The first part is proved, first, by induction, for God, who is the first efficient cause of things, by eternity existed before He effected anything, and in the heavens and other secondary causes the matter is manifest. But the reason is that this cause, per se speaking, does not need its effect in order to be, nor from elsewhere has necessary connection with its action. Hence, if sometimes there is some efficient cause which does not precede its effect in time, this is not from the precise notion of such cause, but from some peculiar condition.

15. But this can happen in three ways (by which we prove the second part of the conclusion): first, if the efficiency is less proper, through natural resultance alone, in which way the essence does not precede in time the passions flowing from it. Secondly, if the cause is naturally acting and from the first instant of its being has all the requisites for acting without any impediment, in which way light produced by the sun can be coeval; thirdly, if the cause is free, and as soon as it is wills to act, in which way the angels in the first instant in which they were created could do something; and God could have created something from eternity, if He had willed. But in all these modes it must be supposed that the effect must be such that it can be made through indivisible action; for if it is to be effected successively, it cannot be wholly together with its cause, unless otherwise the cause itself too is supposed to begin and be successively or after the manner of successive things. Otherwise the successive effect necessarily begins after some instant in which the cause is already supposed existing, either of itself, as God, or through creation or generation, at least from the nature of the thing and miracles being excluded. For which reason the motion of the heaven could not be together in time with its mover, but this had to precede by at least an instant. But I say miracles being excluded, because, if it is true that God could have created an angel through a last non-being, it will also be true that such an angel could at the same time be and move the heaven; but of this elsewhere.

16. The third part of the conclusion, besides the authority of Aristotle, is per se evident, because the cause is in act through action; but action is not without a terminus; but the terminus of the action is the effect of the acting cause; therefore from first to last the acting cause in act is not without its effect in act. But in this two things are included: one is that the effect cannot actually flow from the cause unless the cause itself exists at the same time, which was proved above against some who said that the effect can actually flow from a thing no longer existing, either in itself or in some power of its own, which is plainly impossible and against this dogma of Aristotle, that the cause in act and the effect in act must be together. But that is called the effect in act, not that which is actually a being through its actual existence, but that which is actually an effect, that is, which actually flows from the cause; for that thing can actually be and not actually emanate, but have emanated, and then it is established that it can be without the cause existing then, although it supposes that it was and caused. Secondly, it is included in that pronouncement that the cause cannot be actually a cause prior in time to the effect's actually being, because it is actually a cause inasmuch as it actually inflows; but it cannot actually inflow unless there already is something into which it inflows. But it must be observed that the effect is so together with the cause in act as it flows from it; for if it flows whole at once through momentary action, it will be simply and according to its whole being together in time with its cause in act, because in an effect of this kind (as they say) becoming and having been made are together, and consequently the cause's acting and the effect's being are also together. But if the effect is made successively, the cause too will be in act successively, and then the effect will be together with the cause in act only in becoming or according to something of itself.

17. Someone can only object that God from eternity was a cause in act, not only in the first but also in the second way, and yet no effect was from eternity. But this objection has place only in the opinion of those who posit that the whole action by which God acts ad extra is immanent in God and eternal. According to which it will have to be answered that this is peculiar in the action of the divine will, which is powerful not only to inflow being into the effect, but also to inflow for that time which it itself prescribes and not before, although it itself is before. But those who think so will speak better if they say that that immanent act or volition of God does not constitute Him actually acting ad extra except as it actually inflows, and as such connotes the coexistence of the effect. But to us the answer is easier; for we deny that God is a cause actually acting ad extra through an act remaining in Himself alone, but through action passing outside, which is not prior in time to the effect.

18. Finally, the last part about priority of nature is established, first, from the general opinion of Aristotle that the cause is prior in nature to its effect, which priority is nothing else than the dependence of the effect on the cause and the independence of the cause from the effect; but this dependence on the part of the effect and independence on the part of the cause is most of all discerned in the efficient cause, as we shall declare more at length in the following disputation. And therefore I said that the efficient cause is not only prior in nature, but also that this belongs to it most properly; because the efficient cause most of all requires existence for causing and according to it is wholly independent of its effect. But about this priority of nature it must be considered that the discourse can be of the efficient cause either as it is actually efficient, or according to itself, or as it is in first act proximately disposed for acting. Again, it can be compared either to its proper effect, or to its action or causality. In comparison with the effect, then, the cause in act is simply prior in nature, even as actually acting, because the action itself is prior in nature to its terminus. But in comparison with the action itself the cause in second act cannot be prior in nature, as Soncinas well noted, V Metaph., q. 7, because by the action itself it is formally constituted acting in second act; therefore it cannot be prior in nature to the same action. With respect to the action, then, the cause can be said to be prior in nature only inasmuch as it is considered in first act.

19. You will say: in this way it is not only prior in nature, but also in time. It is answered that, if we speak of the cause in first act sufficient and not impeded and with all the requisites for acting, it is not so, except perhaps in a free power, in which this is special. Next it is said that, even if priority of time has preceded, priority of nature can also intervene for that very instant in which the action and the acting cause are already together in duration; and so the free cause too is not only prior to its action in that time in which it does not operate, but also for that instant in which it operates it is also prior, at least in nature; and therefore it can be free for that very instant, as we said above. And the reason is that the action itself flows from first act, yet does not flow by means of an action, but by itself; and therefore it is posterior in nature to the cause in first act, not however to the cause in second act.

The arguments posited at the beginning are satisfied

20. The Aristotelian axiom is explained.—From what has been said the reason for doubting posited at the beginning has been solved, and the proposition of Aristotle has been explained, the cause in act and the effect in act are together. For he speaks openly of the cause actually causing, and of the effect in act in the notion of effect, as we have explained, and of simultaneity of time, not of nature, as is openly established from the context. Hence it matters nothing that he does not distinguish there in express words, both because the thing itself is sufficiently perspicuous, and also because in the context itself, as I said, it is sufficiently declared; most of all since the Philosopher himself, in the Postpredicaments, says that those things are said simply to be together which are together in time. And in the same way is to be taken what Aristotle says there, that the cause in potency is not together, namely in time, with its effect; for he calls the cause in potency, as I said, not the thing itself which is the cause, as existing in potency, but the thing actually existing and in potency to causing; and of this he denies that it is together in time with the effect, not because it cannot be, but because this is not necessary.

21. To the other arguments against priority of nature it is answered. To the first it is said, in the first place, that it is enough that Aristotle in the Predicaments posited this mode of priority of nature; for in V Metaph. he does not seem to have repeated all the modes of prior posited elsewhere. Or it can be said that this priority of nature was comprehended under that which is in the consequence of subsisting; for the cause is said to be prior in nature to its effect by reason of causality inasmuch as that which depends, as such, cannot be without that on which it depends, in which it has the notion of posterior; but conversely that on which another depends, as such, is independent of it, and by virtue of this independence can be without it; but if perhaps it depends from elsewhere, it is per accidens on account of another causality. And so causality is said to be priority of nature inasmuch as it virtually includes priority in the consequence of subsisting, either absolutely, or at least so far as concerns that head.

22. To the last, about relation, I have often already said in this treatise on causes that we are not concerned with the predicamental relations consequent upon causality; for, whether they are of the thing or of reason, they are posterior to causality and have their proper consideration and place in the predicament relation. Cause and effect, then, are not taken here as they can formally say predicamental relations, in which sense it is true that they are together not only in time but also in nature, if they are taken as relation and its actual terminus; but the discourse is of cause and effect as to the act of the causing and of the caused; and so they are not together in nature, even if they include a transcendental relation, because this does not require simultaneity of nature between the extremes, as in many other things is per se known.

1. The title of the question is expounded.—Under this title many things are comprehended which it is necessary to distinguish and briefly dispatch. For the discourse can be either of causes of diverse genera, or of causes of diverse order or species in the same genus, or of causes of the same notion and species in the same genus. Again, the question can be of causes total in their order, or of partial ones; but that cause is total which supplies the whole concurrence necessary for the effect in that order; but that is called partial, on the contrary, which by itself alone does not confer the sufficient and whole necessary concurrence. Moreover, it is one thing to ask whether several causes are necessary for the effect, in which is inquired at the same time both the connection of the effect with the causes and the connection of the causes themselves among themselves in order to causing the effect; another to ask whether several causes can come together for causing the same effect, granted that it is not necessary. Finally this is to be considered, that when the influx of several causes into one and the same effect is inquired, the unity of the effect is not inquired as to the relation of the effect, that is, whether such effect is referred by one and the same respect to several causes; for this question is of small moment and has its proper place in the predicament of relation. Nor yet is the unity or identity of the causality of several causes into the same effect inquired, but it is inquired of the being itself or absolute entity of the effect, whether several causes can or must inflow into it, whether each inflows by a distinct influx or not; for that will have to be judged from the mode of the causes and from the principles posited above about the causalities of the single causes, as will also easily be established from what is to be said.

The question is dispatched in causes diverse in genus

2. In the first place, then, of causes of diverse genera, it is certain that there are some effects to which causes of all genera must necessarily concur, if they are properly and per se effects. Of this kind are first of all all natural substances, of whose notion it is that they be composed of form and matter, and so already two causes concur there; but matter cannot be per se unless it is made by something; nor yet does it have form unless some agent induces it; but the agent does not induce it unless it intends some end, and so it is necessary that the other two causes too concur. From which it comes about that the same concurrence of causes is necessary both for the matter and for the material form or form informing matter, yet not in the same way, both because neither does matter cause itself, nor yet the form; and also because matter concurs otherwise to the form than to the composite, and conversely, and so of the others, as is sufficiently established from the foregoing. The same concurrence of causes is proportionally necessary in order that any accident be per se caused in a connatural way, because it is not made except from a subject, by some efficient, for the sake of an end. But I said if it is properly and per se an effect, because in a contingent and per accidens effect, as such, there is neither a final cause nor properly and per se an efficient; yet that, as such, is neither a per se effect nor properly one effect, but an aggregation of several, in each of which the said causes are found. But in simple or immaterial substances alone only two causes concur, namely the efficient and the final, because they do not have a material cause, nor can they have a formal one, unless perhaps someone calls the metaphysical form a cause; but that this is not properly and physically a cause we showed above.

3. No effect depends on a single cause.—From these it is understood, first, that there is no effect in the nature of things which has only a single cause, formally speaking. For in the first place it is necessary that whatever is caused have an efficient cause, as is evident both from the induction made and also because what is caused does not have being from itself; it must, therefore, have it given by another extrinsic cause; but the cause which really inflows being, as extrinsic cause, is the efficient. Next, because everything caused has a final cause; for this is the first of the causes; but whatever has a final cause also has an efficient, as Averroes taught, book On the Substance of the Orb, c. 2, because the final cause is that for the sake of which the agent operates. Hence above we showed that the causality of the end is first and per se exercised about some action of the agent. And conversely the efficient cause too per se operates nothing except with the end concurring for the sake of which it operates; these two causes, then, are at least necessary and have necessary connection between themselves, in the way in which we declared above how every agent operates for the sake of an end. But I said formally speaking, because where it happens that the efficient and the end coincide in wholly the same thing, the effect will indeed be able to be really from one cause only, yet as exercising a twofold notion of causing, according to which they are formally named two causes. And in the same proportion those who number the exemplar as a distinct cause will say that it has connection with the efficient and the end, at least by reason of the first agent, according to what was declared above.

4. You will say that some thing can be understood to be of itself for the sake of another end, even if it is not from another efficient, so that the adequate notion of end is not to be that for the sake of which something is made, but for the sake of which it is either made or is. And Gregory and others think that Aristotle so thought of some things, that they have a final cause and not an efficient, of which matter we have partly spoken above and shall partly speak below. Now, as regards the present matter, it is impossible in the first place that a thing which is of itself be for the sake of something other than itself; for what is from itself is also for its own sake, because such a being is wholly perfect, nor is there reason why it should have being ordered to another, if it has it from itself. Next, even if such an order were feigned, it would not be through the proper causality of the end with respect to the very being of such a being, because such being would be of itself simply necessary, since it is supposed not to need an efficient cause; therefore it does not depend on another even as on a final cause, because otherwise, that being taken away, it would lose its being, which is repugnant to a simply necessary being. Hence neither could it depend on another as on an end in operating, because such as being is, such is operating. These two causes, then, are at least required for any effect.

5. It follows secondly from what has been said that no effect has an intrinsic material cause which does not have all the others, nor yet has an intrinsic formal cause which does not have the rest, and finally that the intrinsic material and formal cause have necessary connection, not only between themselves, but also with the efficient and the end. All these are clear and certain from what has been said, because matter and form under the said notion have between them a mutual relation or transcendental habitude, because neither does matter cause intrinsically except through the complex of the form, nor the form except through the information of matter, and so one cannot cause intrinsically without the other. But I say intrinsically, because inasmuch as matter causes the form itself, it does not cause so intrinsically, and therefore as such it does not require the form as concausing itself, but only as caused, and consequently as concausing the composite. But each of these causes, and both together too, have connection with the efficient, and consequently also with the final, because both matter and form and also the composite of them is a being so imperfect that it cannot have being from itself, and therefore, just as neither of these causes is without an efficient, so neither does it cause without an efficient; but the efficient, as has often been said, per se does not effect without the concurrence of the end.

6. Why the material and the single other causes are called total.—Finally it is understood from what has been said how these causes are called total, while yet none of them by itself alone suffices for the effect. For they are total in their genera, because each in its genus suffices and applies the whole causality necessary in that order, and because each has its causality of a diverse notion from the other and they do not compose one integral cause, therefore each absolutely exists a total cause. You will say: at least it follows that any of these causes is imperfect in the absolute and common notion of cause, granted that each is called perfect in its genus. The sequel is evident, because any of them is absolutely insufficient for constituting the effect in the nature of things without the partnership of the others. But the consequent is false, otherwise God too in the notion of cause would be something imperfect. It is answered, first, by absolutely denying the sequel on account of the instance of the divine causality. Secondly it is added: the consequent is true in every other cause besides God; and I declare the reason of each saying thus. For in the first place the material and formal causes are simply imperfect, both because they do not cause except by composing, which mode is of its genus imperfect; and also because, since each causes as it were by giving its own entity to constituting the entity of the effect, neither by itself alone is sufficient for this, because each has an imperfect and incomplete entity, so that from the conjunction of both the complete entity of the whole effect arises. Finally each gives something proper which the other can in no way confer. By these reasons, then, each is simply imperfect.

7. The final and efficient cause of their genus purely perfect.—But the final and efficient cause, as such, say no imperfection either in the mode of causing or from the fact that other causes sometimes concur with them. But in creatures they always have some imperfections mixed in, as to the mode indeed, because either they operate with change or mutability, or for their own advantage, or something of this kind. But as to the need of other causes (which pertains to the present matter), because every created efficient cause needs a material cause in order to be able to effect, which is of imperfection, both on account of the limited mode of acting and also because the matter itself which they suppose is in no way from them. Again, they need some final cause outside themselves; for, although they operate for their own sake, yet it is necessary that they also operate for the sake of another, at least as ultimate end. And moreover they need the concurrence of a superior cause in the notion of efficient of a superior notion. And in similar proportion every created end has imperfection in causing, on account of which and on account of its limitation it needs the concurrence both of some distinct efficient and of some matter or subject in order that it can have some effect.

8. But in God alone is there causality without imperfection; for in the first place He absolutely does not need the concurrence of matter or form for effecting. Next, when these causes are necessary in some effect, even if it is made by God, none of them concurs as simply supposed to the causality of God, but as made and conserved by Him Himself. And moreover the necessity of such causes is not from the defect of the power of God, otherwise God would not give being even to the causes themselves, but is from the intrinsic need of the effect, whose nature it is to consist of such causes. From which it also comes about that such causes, inasmuch as they concur to the effect of God, concur rather as His effects than as concauses with Him, so much so that the very causalities of such causes cannot be exercised unless God effects them. Again, God, in order to cause effectively, so needs the concomitance of the final cause that He does not need an end distinct from Himself, because He Himself is the ultimate end of all His actions. But if sometimes He wills to order His action to another proximate end, that too is not from need, but from His perfection and will, and moreover such proximate end could not be an end unless it received from God the perfection and goodness by which it could undertake that office. And similarly, conversely, in order that God cause after the manner of end, He does not need the partnership of another agent but of His own power, to omit that in those very genera of end and efficient God has the highest independence. So, then, it comes about that the concurrence of several causes to one effect does not diminish the perfection of God in the absolute notion of causing, even though in inferior causes it is an indication of imperfect power.

The question is treated in causes of the same genus diverse in species

9. There cannot be several matters of the same effect.—In the second place one must speak of several causes of the same genus, yet of diverse notion or order in such genus. And this can be dispatched briefly, because the matter is very easy. For it must be said that in the material and formal cause several causes cannot concur in this way to the same effect; but in the efficient and final they can. The first part, about matter, is proved because matter does not concur except by receiving the form; but two matters of diverse notion, either in being or in causing, cannot concur to receiving the same form, because neither can the same form be received in several matters; but if several matters receive several forms, they no longer concur to one effect, but to several.

10. You will say that, although the reason made concludes with respect to substantial forms which depend on matter, yet not with respect to the rational soul, because several matters concur with the same soul to compose the same man, either together by reason of diverse parts, or successively on account of the continual change of matter. It is answered that on account of the diversity of parts there are not properly several matters, but one adequate one, consisting of several parts, especially since neither can those parts be informed by the same soul unless they are in some way united and conjoined among themselves to compose one adequate receptive subject. I add moreover that, inasmuch as those several partial matters concur to one effect, to that extent the effect itself is manifold and various according to parts. Hence to the other part, about the successive change of matter, it is answered that that effect is indeed one by reason of the soul, yet on that side on which the matter is varied, the effect too is in some way varied, as was treated above, disp. V.

11. You will say again that, although this is true in a substantial effect, yet not in an accidental one. And the reason of the difference is that the proximate material cause of the substantial form does not have another in which it is founded, because it is itself the first subject, and therefore there can be only a single material cause of one form and one composite; but the accidental form can immediately have some material cause which needs another matter in which it is sustained, because, as we said above, an accident can immediately inhere in an accident. Thus, then, the same accident will be able to have two material causes, one proximate and another remote, as the same intellection, for example, is caused materially by the subject in which it is received and by the substance of the soul. It is answered, first, that that remote subject does not properly concur per se to the last act, but only by sustaining that accident in which another inheres, and so the assertion posited above is to be declared or limited of the immediate and per se material cause. But if someone wishes to defend that the same accident, for example the same vital act, immediately affects each subject, both the proximate and the radical, he must say that those two then concur by way of one adequate receptive subject, and each concurs only partially, but that the conclusion is to be understood of total causes.

12. Several forms of the same effect cannot be even supernaturally.—Now of the formal cause the assertion posited is more evident, because several forms cannot come together to constitute the same effect. For as regards substantial forms, it was shown above that several cannot be at once in the same matter; but although they are successively, they do not compose with it the same effect, but diverse ones, because they formally give diverse being. Hence, although by absolute power several forms were at once in the same matter, they would not concur to one effect, but each would constitute its own species and its own effect. But as regards accidental forms, although several can be at once in the same subject, they do not concur to the same effect, but each has its own proper and distinct effect. Nor does it matter that sometimes the composite of such forms is denominated in some way one, as one artificer, even if he has several arts distinct in species, for that singular denomination is taken from the unity of the subject subsisting in those forms; hence formally it does not fall upon the effect of such forms, for that in truth is not one, but falls upon the supposit itself, inasmuch as one and the same underlies all those forms or accidents. Finally, if sometimes perhaps several forms, either accidental or even substantial, are said to concur to constitute one thing, they do this not as total forms, but as partial, as the form of blood, flesh and bone to constitute the animal, and colour, figure, etc., to constitute a beautiful thing, or if there is anything else similar. Always, therefore, such forms concur as composing one, nor is there greater unity in the effect than there is proportionally in the form; never, then, do several formal causes concur to the same effect.

13. But in efficients and ends, if they are of diverse notions and subordinated among themselves, the matter is manifest from what we discussed about these causes. For several causes of this kind can concur to the same effect; and when the effect is from a created cause, this is always necessary on account of the dependence of the particular cause.

1. It remains, then, to speak of the third point, which is chiefly intended in this section, namely, of several causes of the same genus and species or order in that genus. And, in order that we may come at once to the point of difficulty, the intrinsic causes, material and formal, are to be excluded, for in them this question has no place, as is evident a fortiori from what was said in the second point of the preceding section. The question has place, then, in efficients, and the reason is almost the same of ends, as we shall add at the end; and we shall show that the same must be said of any cause inasmuch as it is extrinsic. Again, the difficulty is about causes total in their order; for of partial ones there is no difficulty, because it is established that many natural effects are from several partial proximate efficients, as the same son from father and mother, supposing that the mother concurs effectively, and the same light or heat from many lamps or fires, and so of others. And the reason is that, when the causes are only partial, from all there arises only one total and sufficient cause; therefore nothing prevents several causes from concurring in that way, because those are not so much several causes as several parts of one cause. For neither is it necessary that the total cause be so one that it be either simple or per se and properly composed through real union of the partial causes, but it suffices that it coalesce from several helping one another to act, and sufficiently conjoined or brought near, so that they can inflow in their partial way. In this part, then, there is no difficulty.

2. But about total causes a twofold question still turns. One is whether the same effect can proceed at once and conjointly from several causes. The other is whether at least successively or dividedly the same effect can be made by various causes, that is, whether that which is made by one would be made the same in number by another, if it were applied to the same matter at the same time. We shall speak first of the former question, and then of the latter.

The first opinion, denying wholly that this is possible

3. There is, then, a first opinion teaching that it is so impossible that several causes concur at once in that way to the same effect that it implies a contradiction, and therefore cannot be done even by absolute power. So thinks Scotus, In III, dist. 1, q. 2, and In II, dist. 20, q. 2. And many Thomists think the same, who, while they say this is impossible, add a proof inferring implication of contradiction; so Cajetan, III, q. 67, a. 6, near the end; Soncinas, V Metaph., q. 6; and Capreolus, In II, dist. 20, q. unica, a. 3, to the arguments of Scotus against the 3rd conclusion, and In III, dist. 1, q. 1, a. 3, to the arguments of Scotus against the 2nd conclusion; and Ferrariensis, III Cont. Gent., c. 68; and Javellus, V Metaph., q. 7. And this opinion in this sense is commonly attributed to St. Thomas, because sometimes he absolutely says that this is impossible, as in I, q. 52, a. 3, and III, q. 82, a. 2, ad 2, and In I, dist. 37, q. 3, a. 3, and V Metaph., c. 2; and Marsilius thinks the same, I De Generat., q. 8. And I do not doubt that this was the opinion of those philosophers who thought that to be simply impossible which cannot be done through natural causes, of which we shall speak at once.

4. The foundation of the proposed opinion.—But this opinion is founded, first, on this, that it is against the notion of a total cause that it have the partnership of another in the same order, for the total cause is that which acts with the whole power necessary in that order for such effect; therefore it is repugnant to the total cause as such to have the partnership of another like cause in the effecting of the same effect. The consequence is evident, because by the very fact that it has another cause concurring, it no longer applies the whole necessary power. Or certainly, if it applies the whole power, and nevertheless the other too exhibits its own, more power is actually applied to that effect; therefore a greater effect too will proceed, and consequently it will be made by them as by partial causes and by neither as total. For it seems to involve manifest repugnance that a more powerful cause should actually operate according to its whole power, and yet operate no more than if a less powerful cause alone effected. And it is confirmed, secondly, in this way, for if one cause effects the effect as total cause, then either the other does nothing, and so it is falsely called a cause; or it does what has been done, and this is impossible, because to act is to educe from non-being to being, for, on the testimony of Aristotle, every action takes place between these termini; but that which has been done by one cause is already outside non-being; therefore it cannot be made by another. Thirdly, it confirms this very thing, because otherwise one total cause could not only at the same time and in the same instant, but also at a later time, produce a thing already produced by another, which is against the notion of production, as we have said. Hence further it would come about that the same thing could produce itself, because if it could not, most of all because for acting it is supposed to be; but even if the thing already is, it can be produced again by another cause; therefore also by itself.

5. Fourthly, it is impossible that the same action be from two total causes; therefore also the same effect. The consequence is evident, both by parity of reasoning, and also because one effect cannot be made except by one action. But the antecedent is proved, because action depends wholly essentially on the agent; one and the same action, then, cannot depend at once on several agents and on each as total. Hence there is the fifth and common reason, because otherwise it follows that such effect depends and does not depend essentially on those causes, which is a contradiction. The sequel is evident, for that it depends is asserted in this very thing, that each of them is said to be a per se and total cause, for a per se cause is that on which the effect per se depends, and a total one that on which it totally depends. But that it does not depend is proved, for if this one is taken away, nevertheless the effect will remain in reality from the influx of the other, since it is said to be a total cause; therefore it does not depend on this one. Again, if this one remains, although the other is destroyed, the effect will remain; therefore it also does not depend on the other; therefore it depends on neither. But if it is said to depend on either confusedly or disjunctively, then in fact neither of them determinately and per se taken is a total cause, because on neither of them determinately taken does the effect depend. Sixthly and finally I argue that, if the concurrence of such causes is not absolutely repugnant, neither will it be naturally repugnant, which this opinion supposes to be wholly false.

The second opinion, affirming it even naturally

6. The second opinion, extremely contrary, can be that it neither implies contradiction nor, per se speaking, is repugnant from the nature of the thing that two total causes of the same order effect the same effect at once. I say per se speaking, because perhaps on the part of the antecedent conditions necessary for acting two causes cannot according to the order of nature be so applied that they effect the same effect at once and totally; yet per se and by virtue of causality, even natural, it is not repugnant. For if two agents are so applied to some patient as is necessary in order that each can totally effect some effect, both too will effect it at once and in the same way. And this opinion, as it seems, Cajetan holds, I, q. 52, a. 3, where, although he interprets St. Thomas, saying that one effect cannot be from two total causes, as to be understood not of logical but of natural power, yet in the discourse he so explains it that he places that natural repugnance only in the application of the causes; but from the hypothesis that the causes are applied, he openly teaches that the effect will naturally emanate from them at once as from total causes.

7. The foundation of the proposed opinion.—But this opinion can be founded on the last argument made for the prior opinion, taking the contrary principle in this way. It does not imply contradiction that there be two total causes of one effect; therefore, if two fires, for example, were equally applied to the same matter disposed in the same way, they would naturally act as much as they could; therefore they would act one and the same effect, because we suppose the same matter is not at once capable of several; but then each would act as total cause, because we suppose each has a sufficient principle for effecting that whole effect, and each would naturally act as much as it could; therefore each would produce the whole effect as its total cause, since from elsewhere no repugnance is adjoined. And it is confirmed, for then either each fire would act or neither, because there is no greater reason of one than of the other; but it cannot be said that neither would act, because there is nothing which impedes them; for since they are alike in power, one does not impede the other; but we suppose that no other impediment intervenes; therefore each acts, and with its whole power, and therefore as total cause.

8. And hence it can further be concluded, not only in the said sense, but absolutely, that it can naturally happen that the same effect proceeds from two total causes, because that supposition, namely that two sufficient agents are applied at once and equally to the same effect, there is no reason why it should naturally be repugnant. For Cajetan adduces no other reason except that nature abhors superfluity. But this is not enough, first, because, although nature abhors superfluity, yet not abundance, nor is that always to be called superfluous which is not simply necessary. It would indeed be superfluous to demand two causes where one suffices; yet that nature was so provident as to confer on several causes sufficient power for the same effect is to be called not superfluous but rather liberal. But that those two causes concur at once, although it was not per se primo intended by nature, can yet be permitted and contingent, since it has nothing repugnant to the natures of things. Secondly, nature abhors a monstrous effect more than superfluity, and yet sometimes it does not refuse it, if the order and concurrence of natural causes produces it; why, then, cannot the same be said of the multitude of total causes? Thirdly, although nature so abhors superfluity, yet a free cause does not always abhor it; therefore two angels can at their will apply their whole power to moving a stone, and then each will move as total cause. The same can be said of two men, if each has the whole power sufficient for carrying a stone, and both at once at their choice apply it wholly. And this opinion is commonly attributed to Ockham and Adam, whom Capreolus, In III, dist. 1, reports from In I, dist. 1, dub. 4; but there I find nothing and the allegation is ambiguous, because there is no dub. 4 there, but various questions, and neither in the 4th nor in the others do they say anything.

Approval of the third opinion and resolution of the question

9. Between these opinions I think a middle way is to be held: it must be said, first, that it does not imply contradiction that the same effect proceed from two total causes. As to this part the opinion of Cajetan pleases, which he also insinuates in III, c. 3, a. 6. Nor can it be better proved than by answering the prior arguments; for if there is nothing which proves contradiction, there will be no reason why it should be believed or asserted. But conversely, since God can do everything in which repugnance is not shown, He will also be able to make two total causes effect the same effect. And it is declared briefly in this way, for God can, this sun existing in this hemisphere, create another equally perfect and equally applied to illuminating. Again, He could through another sun effect in the air the same light in number which this present sun now makes, dividedly, or without this sun concurring or assisting; for what repugnance is there that God make through one cause what He can make through another? Indeed in the following point I shall show that this can even be done naturally. These two luminous bodies, then, existing at once and applied, God can supply to each the whole concurrence necessary for producing the same light and bring it about that each of them produces it by its own proper action, total and independent of the other, which is to be properly a total cause; for no repugnance intervenes in this, as will easily be evident from the solutions of the arguments.

10. What is of the notion of total cause.—To the first, the assumption is denied, namely, that it is against the notion of total cause that it have another like and equally inflowing into the same effect. For, although, in order that a cause be total, it is necessary that it actually operate with the whole power necessary in that order for the effect, yet this is not taken away or impeded from the fact that another cause acts with like power and action, but each will exercise its whole force and action about that effect. But when it is inferred that then greater power is actually applied and consequently the effect increases, a distinction must be used about greater power, either intensive or extensive. And of the intensive the assumption is to be denied, because several agents equal in intensive power, per se speaking, do not compose one of more intense power or efficacy, but that multitude can only contribute to a more intense effect when neither agent could act according to its whole intensity on account of some impediment, as was treated at length in the foregoing. But in the present case we suppose that the single agents act according to the whole intensity possible to them, or certainly that God does not supply concurrence for a more intense effect, but up to a certain grade which can be made by each, and gives to each the whole necessary concurrence. The acting power as such, then, does not increase intensively, and therefore it is not necessary that the effect increase intensively. Yet that power can be called greater extensively, which is not so much to be greater as to be several powers; yet it does not necessarily follow from this that the effects too be several, because at least from the direction of the first agent the influx of each secondary cause can be determined to the same effect, since there is no repugnance in this by virtue of the multitude or plurality of acting powers; for as several ways tend to the same terminus, so several acting powers too can tend.

11. The mode which several causes of the same order concurring to the same effect would observe.—To the second and third it is answered that, when two total causes so acted the same effect, one indeed would act the whole and by a total action, and the other would not act nothing, but would act that same whole effect by another total action. But those causes can be understood to effect in two ways: first, so that they begin to effect wholly at once and in the same instant, and so neither, properly speaking, acts what has been done, because neither acts before the other, either in time or in nature. For we suppose that they are equal and not subordinated among themselves, but behaving merely concomitantly; neither, then, supposes the effect of the other as already made prior either in time or in nature; neither, then, acts what has been done, but each acts the same which the other acts, educing it from non-being to being, and this was enough for our conclusion. But in another way it can be understood that one of these causes has produced that effect prior in time, and afterwards the other begins to effect the same by a total action. And indeed, if the prior has already ceased from its action, there is no difficulty nor is it the case of which we dispute, because those two causes do not concur at once to the same effect, but successively, the prior as effecting and the posterior as conserving; which too I shall say below can happen naturally. It is necessary, then, to posit that, the prior agent continuing in its total action by way of conservation, another begins to effect the same effect, and this too we say is not repugnant. For to effect extends more widely than to produce anew, because to conserve too is to effect. That agent, then, could anew effect the same effect by conserving it; which action, although it could have been production, yet then in that case cannot receive that denomination, because production as such connotes on the part of the effect a certain negation of prior existence. Although, then, it is repugnant to do what has been done, that is, to produce anew that which pre-exists, yet it is not repugnant to conserve what has been made. Nor yet does it stand in the way that it is conserved by another cause, because, just as in the beginning it could be made by two, so afterwards it can be conserved by two, although before it was produced by one only.

12. The same thing can supernaturally participate efficiency upon its own substance.—But what is further inferred in the third argument, that the same thing could have efficiency upon itself, is in my opinion no drawback, speaking of absolute power and of conservative efficiency, provided the thing is supposed already produced and conserved through another action; of which matter I have written more at length in tome III of the III Part, disp. XLIX, sect. 1, and disp. L, sect. 4, at the end, because that miracle is proper to that mystery, and therefore pertains to the theological disputation. But lest the present resolution seem necessarily connected with that opinion, it can be answered otherwise by denying the sequel, because in efficiency of itself there is a peculiar difficulty which is not in efficiency of another, even if the thing is at once made and conserved by another cause. Because the efficient cause seems necessarily to demand distinction in reality from the effect, and therefore no thing, inasmuch as it is active, includes itself under the object of its activity; and therefore perhaps it cannot happen that it have action upon itself according to its proper being; but two active powers can enclose under the object of their activity one and the same thing distinct from them, as we shall declare a little below. And from this side there can be greater repugnance in conservative efficiency of itself than of another thing, although it is not convincing; for, although that assumption is true of the object contained under natural power, yet not of every thing to the effecting of which a thing can be elevated through obediential potency; but of this elsewhere.

13. In the fourth reason it is asked whether the effect made by two total causes can or must be made by one or by two actions. And it must be said that it is necessary that it be made by two actions, as the argument made there rightly proves. Indeed I add that in this chiefly consists the difference between two causes of the same order, when they act as total causes or as partial; for if they act by one action, they cannot be total causes but only partial. Which I prove because a cause is not called total on account of power in first act, although that is an integral and total power, because by virtue of it it is not constituted a cause in act, but in potency; but here we are not treating of the total cause in potency, but in act. But a cause in act is constituted through actual influx, which is nothing else than the action itself; therefore, in order that a cause be total, it must inflow into the effect by a total action proper to itself in its genus; therefore, whenever the action is as it were divided between two causes of the same order, it is from neither of them totally or as from a total cause, and so each will be only a partial cause, with partiality on the part of the cause, as they say.

14. That a single action emanate from several total agents not subordinated implies contradiction.—You will say: by this reason it would also be proved that the first and the second cause are partial while they inflow into the same effect. It is answered that many so speak, as we said above, considering not the genus of causality but causality simply; but the sequel is better denied; for the reason is far diverse, for between the first and the second cause there is subordination and essential dependence, and consequently a diverse order of causes; and therefore each can be total in its order, even if it inflows with the other through the same action. But when two causes are of the same order, if they concur only concomitantly and inflow through the same action, they can be called total neither simply nor in that genus; they will be, then, partial. If, therefore, causes of this kind are to be total, they must inflow into the same effect by diverse actions; and it is repugnant that one and the same action be from two causes of the same order as from total causes, which also the fifth argument made above convinces, as will be established from its solution. Yet I deny that the reason is equal of the effect or terminus of the action, for the effect flows from the cause by means of action, and the same effect in number can be made through various actions, as we declared above in treating of the causality of the efficient cause; since, therefore, various actions can proceed from diverse agents, the same effect in number too can proceed through several distinct and total actions from diverse causes of the same order, and this very thing is to proceed from them as from total causes. But action does not proceed from the cause through another action, but by itself, and therefore one action cannot proceed except from one agent or from several by way of one; and therefore it cannot be at once from many causes as total in the same order, which will be declared more in the following solution.

15. To the fifth argument, then, it is answered by denying the sequel and that contradiction, whose affirmative part we admit, namely, that that effect depends on those causes and on each of them. But when it is proved that it does not depend, because, any of those causes being taken away, the same whole effect remains, it is answered by denying the consequence. For there is an equivocation in that word to depend, for, in order that one thing depend on another, it is not necessary that, that being taken away, this too be removed from the midst, but it is enough that it receive being from it, even if, that not giving being, it can retain being as given by another. For so the light of this air truly depends now on this lamp, and nevertheless, this being extinguished, the same light could be conserved if at the same moment another luminous body were applied sufficient to conserve such light. When, therefore, a thing is said to depend on a cause because, it being taken away, it is taken away, it is understood of the cause which is unique, and because regularly and naturally the total cause is wont to be so, therefore dependence on it is wont to be declared in that way. Or certainly there is to be understood there a condition, namely, that, the cause on which the effect depends being taken away, the effect too is taken away, unless from elsewhere another cause comes to aid which can conserve the effect in being, as happens in the present case.

16. The agent being taken away, the dependence of the effect on it must be taken away.—But it rightly and necessarily follows that, the cause being taken away, some dependence of the effect on it is taken away, by reason of which the effect too would be taken away unless it were conserved by another cause. It is proved, for every effect, inasmuch as it is from a cause, depends on it; but it can depend only as long as the cause is, because nothing depends on that which is not, especially efficiently, as was shown in the foregoing; therefore, the cause being taken away from which the effect proceeded efficiently, it is necessary that some dependence of such effect on such cause be taken away. But this dependence is not other than the action, as was also proved above; therefore it is also necessary that, the cause being taken away, some action of it about such effect be taken away; yet it is not necessary that the effect itself be taken away, because another sufficient cause holds it in being through another proper and total action. And hence is confirmed what we said before, that, although the effect is one, if the causes are several and total of the same order, it is necessary that the actions be several, because, the influx of one cause ceasing, its action is of necessity taken away, because the dependence on it is taken away, and nevertheless the action of the other cause can remain, because, since it is total and not subordinated to the other, it can conserve its action even if the other ceases from acting; therefore it is necessary that the actions be distinct.

The second assertion

17. Naturally the same effect cannot emanate totally from several non-subordinated agents.—The sixth argument demands that we pass judgement on the second opinion. I say, then, secondly, that it cannot happen naturally that the same effect be effected at once by several total causes. In this conclusion the philosophers almost agree, and Aristotle signified it, V Metaph., c. 2; for, saying that there can be several causes of the same effect, he adds but not in the same way, as St. Thomas and the other interpreters noted. Who all understand not only that this cannot be done naturally because the application of several agents per se sufficient cannot naturally be made; for this is both uncertain, as the arguments touch upon, and very remote and accidental; but they understand that, even the application of several agents of themselves sufficient being made (whether that application happens naturally or is posited to be made supernaturally), provided those agents are left to their nature, they will not effect the effect as total causes, but only as partial.

18. Various reasons of the second assertion.—But the reason of this conclusion so understood is not very easy. Some bring back the reason to another principle, namely, that no natural cause can naturally effect some effect the same in number which another can. From which principle one must philosophize thus. For in the first place it must be said that those two causes equally applied cannot produce one and the same effect at once, so that each makes it as total cause, because, by the very fact that it is contained in the power of one, it is not contained in the power of the other. And so it comes about that, if one of them by its sole power effects the effect which it contains, the other effects nothing; yet this will only happen when one is applied prior in time to the other; for then the posterior will effect nothing, because it already finds the capacity of the patient filled. But when both are applied at once, it cannot rationally be said that one effects the proper effect adequate to itself, and the other causes nothing, since there is no greater reason of one than of the other. Unless perhaps someone has recourse to the concurrence and will of the first cause and says that it is necessary that only one operate, and therefore God by His will gives concurrence to whom He wills, and therefore that one operates and not the other. But this, although it can be done by the first cause, yet does not seem philosophical nor consonant with the natures of things; for since each agent is equally powerful and equally prepared or brought near for acting, as we suppose, concurrence is not more due to one than to the other.

19. It must be said, then, that both together, as partial causes, produce one effect. For, although they cannot operate at once either several effects distinct in number alone, because we suppose the subject is not capable of them, or one and the same by way of total causes, because there is no effect which the same in number is contained in the power of each agent, yet it is not therefore necessary that only one of those agents effect its own proper effect; for both can concur by way of one to some effect contained in them taken together, which will necessarily be distinct from those effects which those agents singly and by themselves could totally produce. It is therefore more consonant with the natures of things that God supply to those agents concurrence for acting in this way, than that He give the whole to one and wholly deny it to the other. Those agents, then, will effect together in the said way; and so they will always act as partial causes and not as total, because that effect so proceeds from each of those causes that it could proceed from neither alone, and so it will also proceed by one single action, because it so depends on both those causes conjointly that it cannot be without either.

20. But this discourse, although it proceeds rightly from the principle posited, yet the principle itself is to me very uncertain, nor do I think it can be proved by any sufficient reason, as we shall declare in the following point. And therefore a more certain conclusion does not seem to be founded on a less certain thing; but it is more constant in philosophy that several total causes cannot conjointly effect the same effect than that they cannot dividedly. The conclusion, then, is better founded in this, that one effect in number cannot naturally be made at once except by a single action; but a single action cannot be from two total causes of the same order, as was proved above; therefore neither can one effect naturally be made by several total causes. The major is proved, first, because the unity of the action is in some way taken from the terminus; I say in some way, because relation to the agent is also necessary; yet, since unity of terminus is also necessary, at least from that head, for one terminus a single action is naturally demanded. Secondly, although the agents are several and otherwise could effect singly, yet they can also be conjoined for acting by way of one, and this mode of acting is more consonant with the unity of the terminus; therefore, naturally speaking, they always so act. Thirdly and finally, since each mode of acting is absolutely possible, although natural agents themselves cannot determine themselves to either of them, but would have to be determined through the concurrence of the first cause, a twofold concurrence for acting by two total actions would not be due to them, because it is not necessary to them and nature abhors superfluity; therefore also from the definition of the concurrence of the first cause those secondary agents cannot naturally act at once as total causes. Which reason will be declared more in the following point, and after its resolution the arguments adduced above in the second opinion will be better answered.

1. It remains to say whether at least dividedly the same effect can be made by several total causes, which is to ask whether the light which here and now is produced in this air by this lamp applied in this place would be produced the same in number by another lamp distinct in number, yet wholly like in power of acting, if it had been applied to the same air at the same time and place; and so of the other effects. In which matter there is no controversy about the absolute power of God; for so no one that I have seen denies that God can make through one natural cause the same effect in number which He makes through another; although this too needs declaration in the opinion of those who deny that this can be done naturally, if they are to speak consistently, as I shall declare below.

The former, negative opinion

2. The disputation, then, is of the natural power of causes, and in this way many deny that one natural cause can effect the same effect in number which another makes, even if it were applied to the same patient with the same conditions. Which opinion St. Thomas signifies, Quodl. V, a. 8; and Capreolus, In II, dist. 20, q. 1; and Marsilius holds it, I De Generat., q. 8; and Soto, In IV, dist. 34, q. 1, a. 3. And it is the opinion of the Commentator, in VII Metaph., comm. 31.

3. The first reason for the reported opinion.—Various reasons are adduced. The first is that, when this effect is produced such in the individual, some proximate natural cause must be given why such individual is produced rather than another; but this can be none except because such effect is produced by this singular cause, not that it alone is the adequate reason of the production of such effect in the individual, but that without it the adequate reason cannot consist; for this is enough for this effect in number not to be able to be produced except by this cause in number. The inference is clear; but the antecedent can be proved by running through all things which can contribute to the production of this individual effect. Because neither does this subject suffice, because it is indifferent to several forms, nor time, place, etc., both on account of the same cause and because they are very extrinsic, as was treated at length above, disp. V.

4. It is refuted.—But this reason in our opinion has no force, for if the discourse is of the intrinsic notion of the individuation of the effect, we already said above that it is placed in the intrinsic principles themselves of the thing or in its proper entity. But if the discourse is of the reason on account of which the agent is determined to this effect in number, the reason is not rightly given because it is this agent, for this agent too is powerful and of itself indifferent to producing several effects distinct in number. But if it is said that this particular agent is not indifferent to producing several effects distinct in number here and now about this subject, but is determined to one, the cause of this determination still remains to be inquired, which is not sufficiently given from the individuation of the cause, because that per se is powerful for several; nor yet from the other adjoined circumstances, as I proved in the said place, because either they too are indifferent, and from many indifferent things one determined principle is not made; or they are very extrinsic, as extrinsic time or place. On account of which we thought it more probable that the secondary cause is determined as to this from the concurrence of the first; but this determination on the part of the first cause can be made as well with this individual cause as with another like one distinct in number in order to the same effect in number, as I shall show a little below; therefore from this head it is not proved that for this singular effect this singular secondary cause is necessary. But Soto objects (who chiefly magnifies this first reason) that it is not philosophical to bring back this determination to the first cause, because the first cause of itself does not concur except by general and indifferent influx. But this is proved by him by no reason, nor is it true, as is established from what was said above about the concurrence of God; and it is more consonant with the perfection of divine providence that God by His will decree which individuals are to come from all causes.

5. A second reason is wont to be given, because, if this effect in number could have been produced by another cause distinct in number, it would not depend per se and essentially on this singular cause by which it is now produced, and consequently such cause would not be the per se cause of this effect, but only per accidens, because the effect depends per se and essentially on the per se cause. But the discourse was supposed to be of the per se cause; therefore, in order that the per se order between cause and effect be saved, it is necessary to say that the singular effect which is made by this cause in number cannot naturally be made by another distinct in number. The first sequel is proved, because, if in place of this cause another distinct in number had been applied, the same effect in number would have been produced by it; therefore it is per accidens that this effect is produced by this cause. And it is confirmed, first, for every determinate and singular effect by its nature demands a determinate per se cause by which it is made, because it depends per se on some one; therefore it cannot naturally be made except by it. And it is confirmed, secondly, because this action in number which is made by this total cause cannot be made by another distinct in number; but this action in number tends to this effect in number, and actions distinct in number to effects distinct in number; therefore this effect too which is made by this cause cannot be made by another like one and of the same order and distinct in number.

6. It is disproved.—But neither are all these things efficacious for persuading the opinion. And indeed in the principal reason two terms are to be distinguished, to depend per se or essentially; for they are not equivalent, but to depend essentially is more than per se; for in order that the effect depend per se on the cause, it is enough that it truly and properly receive its being from it, because to receive being and to depend are almost the same. But to depend essentially adds that the effect from its intrinsic nature and essence demands the influx of such cause, so that without it it cannot be; which is sufficiently proved from the signification of that word, essential dependence. When, then, it is inferred that, if this effect in number could be produced by another total cause of the same order, it follows that it does not depend per se and essentially on this cause by which it is now produced, since the consequent is twofold, a twofold answer too must be applied, and the former part of the sequel denied and the latter granted.

7. I deny, then, that it follows that the effect does not depend per se, because it depends on a cause properly and per se inflowing being into it. Nor does it matter that it could be made by another, because in fact it is not made by another, but by this alone in the order of causes; therefore that is enough for it to depend on it as on a total cause. But when it is pressed that another could be applied, and so it is per accidens that it is made by this one, it is answered that there is an equivocation in that term per accidens, because it is no longer taken as it is opposed to the per se cause, but as it is opposed to the simply necessary or unique cause. I grant, then, that with respect to the effect it is per accidens, that is, contingent and outside its essence and beside its notion, that it is made by this cause in number rather than by another. Likewise on the part of the cause it can be called per accidens that this cause rather than another is applied, because either it is not applied by itself but by another, or because this is accidental and contingent with respect to it. But all these are remote and extrinsic to per se causality, because already in that instant in which this cause is applied it truly and properly inflows being into this effect, and this is enough both for it to be a per se cause and for the effect to depend per se on it. Just as also this cause, here and now applied to this patient, could induce not this form but another in number, and for this reason it can be called per accidens with respect to it that it makes this in number rather than another, because it is extrinsic and accidental that God defined concurrence to this effect rather than to another. Nevertheless, already so applied, it per se makes this effect; so, then, the effect too here and now depends per se on this cause by which it is properly made, even if it could be made by another. But the other part of the sequel rightly follows and is to be granted, namely, that such effect does not depend essentially on such cause; and that consequent is most true. Indeed, as is established from what was said above about the concurrence of the first cause, no effect depends essentially on a univocal cause; indeed no created effect, inasmuch as it is from the efficient cause, depends essentially on a created cause, but on God alone, because it can be made by Him alone without any other, but by the others it cannot be made without Him.

8. But if it is said that this is true taking that word essentially in its rigorous signification, but that here it is not so taken, but as it is the same as connaturally, and in this way a created effect can depend on a created cause and a univocal on a univocal, and so one effect has only one cause on which it connaturally depends, I answer that it is indeed true that actually one effect depends only on one total cause of one order by connatural dependence; but I deny that one effect in number can depend only on one cause in number, because if it were made by another like one, it would depend on it as connaturally as on the other.

9. Hence to the first confirmation I absolutely deny the antecedent, because this effect in number, if its individual nature and entity is considered absolutely, does not determine nor necessarily demand (namely by connatural and intrinsic necessity) to be made by this cause in number and not by another; or at least this is proved there by no reason, because this thing by its nature only demands to be made by something having sufficient power to make it. But if several agents have had that power, it matters nothing to the nature of such effect, nor does anything prevent it from being made per se by whichever happens to be applied, as has been declared.

10. To the second confirmation, I grant that this action in number can only be from this agent and to this terminus. But I deny that actions distinct in number necessarily terminate at effects distinct in number; for that this is not necessary has often been proved in the foregoing; otherwise not even by absolute power could the effect which is made by one agent be made by another distinct in number, even dividedly, because the action of one cannot be made by another. But if it is said that actions distinct in number tend by natural necessity indeed to effects distinct in number, yet not by absolute necessity and in order to the divine power, against this is that that natural necessity has been proved by no reason. For when several agents concur at once, there is some necessity or at least natural congruity that they act on the same effect by one rather than by two actions. But that diverse agents, total as to power of acting, cannot have their own proper distinct actions about some effect, so that each can by itself effect it, at least when it is applied alone and without the other, has so far been shown by no reason. There is no reason, then, why it should be necessary by natural necessity that one effect can naturally be made only by one individual and particular action, even dividedly.

The second opinion, contrary to the preceding

11. The foundation.—Because, then, more efficacious reasons have not so far been found for confirming that opinion, it has not been approved by other authors, but they say that the same effect in number can be made dividedly by diverse total causes, and that now indeed this light is made in this air by this lamp, because this one has been applied; yet that the same would nevertheless have been going to be if another lamp had been applied. Scotus holds this opinion, In II, dist. 20, q. 2, which is proved by him by a philosophical and a theological argument. The theological argument is that God, before original sin was foreseen, elected to glory these singular men whom He predestined, of whom many are now generated by reprobate men; but if Adam had not sinned, they would be generated by other men distinct in number, because then there would be no reprobate by whom they would be generated. But this argument inculcates many things which are to be passed over by us, lest we transgress the metaphysical bounds. Yet in truth the reason is not efficacious, and, besides many uncertain things which it supposes, this is certain with me, that God elected the predestined with at least conditional foreknowledge of the fall of the human race, which is enough for Him to have been able to will at the same time that these predestined be generated by these parents in number. But if God had foreseen, even in conditional knowledge, that Adam was not going to sin, either He would not have had the decree of electing these men whom He now elected, or He would have elected together with them the parents of those whom He now elected, or certainly He would also then have permitted some to be reprobate. For it is not true, or at least not certain, that if Adam had not sinned no other men would have sinned or been damned. Thus (that we may omit these things) it is certain that on account of the certitude of predestination it is not necessary to say that one man can naturally be generated by other parents than by those by whom he is in fact generated.

12. The physical reason is that two agents of the same species are of equal power; therefore whatever one can effect from such matter here and now applied to it, the other can effect; otherwise they would not be of equal power; therefore the effect which is made by one could be made the same in number by the other. But neither is this reason convincing; for from equality of power only equality of the effect can be gathered, not identity; for, just as in the power itself it is one thing to be equal, another to be the same, so also in the effect. It is easily answered, then, that equal power can from the same matter effect an equal effect, yet not the same. Other reasons too are wont to be made in favour of this opinion, which seem to me lighter and therefore I omit them.

The point of difficulty is opened

13. In order, then, that the point of controversy be attained, one must insist on seeing whether an effect contained under the object of one active power can be contained under the object of another, and whether this can be defined with certain reason on either side. In which is to be noted the difference between the particular and univocal cause and the equivocal and universal, that the universal, because it contains the effect not formally but eminently, can per se regard the whole species and all the individuals contained under it. And hence I think it certain that the same effect in number which is made by a particular and univocal cause can be made in a connatural way by an equivocal cause as total and proximate cause, if, without the intervention of the univocal cause, the equivocal cause alone, and of itself universal, is applied to generating such effect immediately and by itself alone. This is most certain in the most universal and most eminent cause, which is God, for by this reason He can make by His power any effect which secondary causes can. I think the same of the heavenly powers as to those effects which they truly contain eminently and as per se sufficient causes. As, for example, if the sun is a sufficient cause for generating gold or fire, so far as concerns itself it is sufficient for any individual of gold or fire, because its power, being more eminent, adequately regards that whole species, and therefore, so far as concerns itself, it can effect it in any individual.

14. An equivocal cause can effect the same effect in number which an inferior would effect.—As to these causes, then, no reason appears why it should be denied that the effect produced by fire, for example, in this wood could be produced the same in number by the sun, if it were sufficiently applied to the same patient and with the other circumstances. In which we do not properly compare the particular cause to the universal, inasmuch as that is called a universal cause which operates with another particular one, but we compare two particular and proximate causes operating through diverse powers, namely formal or eminent. From which it is also understood by the way that the reason is far diverse of total causes operating conjointly or dividedly, for two total causes of this kind which operate as particular and proximate causes cannot conjointly and at once effect the same effect in number by their own proper and distinct total actions, even if one is equivocal, the other univocal; for the reason and resolution made in the preceding point proceed equally in these; but dividedly the same effect can very well proceed from either of these causes, as has been said and declared.

15. The univocal cause does not have its whole species as adequate object.—But the univocal cause cannot have as the adequate object of its active power the whole species of such effect, as St. Thomas noted, I, q. 45, a. 5, ad 1, because otherwise such cause would enclose itself under the object of its natural power, which is impossible; otherwise it could produce itself. Nor yet is it enough if someone answers that, so far as concerns the power, it can produce itself, yet from another side it is repugnant that that power be reduced to act with respect to itself, because for acting the cause itself is necessarily supposed already produced. This (I say) does not satisfy, because efficiency from its intrinsic nature regards a distinct thing; therefore also the power of effecting by its nature has as object only a thing distinct from itself; therefore it in no way contains itself under its adequate object, and therefore the univocal cause cannot regard its species as the adequate object of its power. Which reason does not proceed in the equivocal cause, for, although this adequately regards some whole species, it is not reflected upon itself, because it itself is not an individual of that species, but of a higher order. Hence, then, a doubt arises, how widely the object of the univocal active power extends; for since it is not the whole species, nor only one individual of that species, as is per se established, it must be several individuals of that species; how many, then, will those be, or what rule is to be kept in assigning the adequate object of such power? In which all agree that a finite number of individuals cannot be designated, because the active power, so far as concerns itself, if it is not corrupted or impaired, can always produce another and another individual. Hence it can be said to be of itself indifferent to infinite individuals syncategorematically, successively or disjunctively. Yet this very infinite multitude can be understood in various ways; but there are chiefly two which pertain to the present matter.

Various modes of assigning the adequate object to the active power of the univocal agent

16. The first.—One is if we say that such cause can effect any individual of its species outside itself. And no improbable reason can be given, for about itself it cannot have efficiency on account of identity; but if this impediment were removed, there would be no drawback in such power having as adequate object that whole species; therefore, since this reason ceases about all the other individuals of the same species, because all others are distinct from this agent in number, it is likely that any individual of such species encloses under the adequate object of its active power all the individuals of the same species other than itself. But if this mode is true, it evidently follows that two total causes of the same species can dividedly effect the same effect in number. Indeed, rather it follows that no effect can be made by one which cannot be made by the other, themselves reciprocally excepted, for any one can effect the other, but not itself. Hence further it also follows that any univocal cause, so far as concerns its power, has force for effecting that individual by which it itself was begotten, as that Peter, for example, has power for generating his parent or also his grandfather and any progenitor of his, so far as concerns the force of the active power; which can seem the greatest drawback of all which can be thought of in this mode of speaking. Nor can it be denied that it follows, for all those individuals are comprehended under the adequate object of such power, as is supposed; therefore, so far as concerns the force of the active power, and per se speaking, it could produce any of them. But it can easily be denied that this is a drawback. For in fact this thing in number cannot effect those individuals from which it itself proceeded and was made, because those individuals preceded in being and were produced by other causes; yet, if they were considered according to themselves and no repugnant condition were presupposed, nothing would prevent those individuals which are now causes of others from being their effects, and conversely.

17. The second mode.—Another mode of explaining the adequate object of this power is if we say that the single active powers of the single agents determine for themselves certain individuals of their species which alone they can effect, and conversely that that whole series of individuals determines for itself from its nature such univocal cause by which they can be made, and not by another within that species. Which series of individuals proceeds indeed to infinity, yet nevertheless contains only a peculiar order or flock (so to speak) of individuals saying of themselves relation to such cause; which orders of individuals can be multiplied to infinity within the same species, for within one species there can be not only infinite individuals, but also infinitely infinite and infinite series of individuals, which all contain distinct individuals and in each one proceeds to infinity. And according to this mode it openly follows that the singular effect which is made by one univocal cause cannot be made by another, because the individuals contained under the object of one power are not contained under the object of the other.

18. What difficulties weaken this mode of resolving the question.—But I do not see a sufficient reason which can be given on the part of such causes why they so determine their objects and each tends to its proper collection of distinct individuals, but it can only be affirmed that by reason of its individuation each is so determined in acting. As the intellect of Peter, for example, is by its nature determined to effecting such acts of understanding in number as no other intellect distinct in number can effect; and the same holds of the single intellects; for in this way that opinion explained in the said mode philosophizes. Yet in truth the reason is not the same of the powers which elicit immanent acts and of those which effect in exterior matter, for in the former powers each is determined to effecting only in itself and from itself, for this is of the intrinsic notion of the immanent act; and because in diverse subjects diverse acts distinct in number are found, therefore each of these powers is determined by its nature to acts distinct from the acts of the other. But the power which acts in external matter does not determine for itself a certain subject in which it acts; and therefore agents distinct in number can act in the same patient in number, either at diverse times, or at the same, either conjoined as partial causes, or dividedly as total; and therefore there is not in them the same reason on account of which they are determined to effecting forms distinct in number, even with respect to the same patient.

19. Wherefore on the part of the cause no probable cause of this determination occurs; for certainly the individuation alone of the cause itself is not a sufficient reason for it to be determined to effecting these individuals rather than others; nor yet for causes distinct in number to be determined to individuals distinct in number. Otherwise with the same facility someone could say that the individual cause by virtue of its individuation is determined to effecting only one individual, especially from the same subject, as the univocal cause of one species is determined to making an effect of one species only. But on the part of the effect the reason touched upon above can be given, because one effect by its nature demands one determinate cause by which it is made, because, since the effect has natural dependence on the cause, the singular effect too has natural dependence on a singular cause; and therefore the power itself too encloses under its object only those effects which can naturally depend on it.

20. The first reason of difficulty.—But this principle too, which is taken from the effect, I do not see by what sufficient reason it can be proved; and from elsewhere vehement conjectures occur on account of which it does not seem to be admitted. First, because the dependence of the effect on the univocal cause is accidental, since it is only in becoming and is separable from the thing itself; but there is no reason on account of which this individual thing should by its nature determine such accident; as, then, the same subject is indifferent to several heats distinct in number and naturally receives that which the agent first occurring can effect, so the same effect is indifferent to dependences accidental to it, although, while it is made, it is made naturally and per se through the dependence which can be from that agent which is then applied.

21. The second.—Secondly this is declared further, because, if the entity of the effect itself is considered, it is absolute, that is, not including in itself a respect, even transcendental, to some univocal agent, because, since it does not depend on it essentially and in its being, there is no source from which it should include in itself such respect; therefore such effect by virtue of its entity does not demand dependence on this cause in number as more connatural to itself than on another.

22. The third.—Thirdly, the same effect in number which is made by a univocal cause can be made per se and connaturally by an equivocal cause, not only the first, but also a secondary and created one, if it eminently contains such inferior species, as we said and proved a little before; therefore, the comparison being made between those two causes, univocal and equivocal, that singular effect does not more determine for itself by its nature emanation from one than from the other; for it can be made equally indifferently by whichever of them has first been sufficiently applied; therefore, the comparison being made between univocal causes, there is no reason why that effect should determine for itself by its nature emanation from one of them only, but it can be produced indifferently by many, or by any like one. The consequence is evident, both because, if it were connatural to every effect to determine for itself only one cause, it would have to determine simply one, either univocal or equivocal, at least among created ones. And also because the reason which seems to have moved other authors to say that one singular effect has natural dependence on one singular cause, namely, that it may seem to be produced by it per se and not per accidens, this (I say) reason can equally be applied to the univocal and the equivocal cause, because it too could be said to be produced per accidens by either of them, since it could equally well be made by the other, if it had been applied; but if this does not impede the per se causality of that cause which in fact is applied, whether it be univocal or equivocal, it does not impede it in univocal causes either, whether this one in number is applied or another. But if someone says that the reason is unequal in the equivocal cause, since it eminently contains the whole species and consequently all its individuals, it is answered that this does not matter to the present reason, in which we consider the determination or indifference on the part of the effect, not on the part of the cause. But if the effect by its nature were determined to depending only on one singular cause, it could not be contained virtually in several causes; but if on the part of the effect there is not this determination, then neither on its part is it repugnant to be contained in many causes and to be able to depend on each; therefore there is no reason why this should be more true with respect to the univocal and equivocal cause than with respect to univocal causes. Most of all if both the first and the second comparison are made to created causes; for, although the univocal cause does not contain the whole species as the equivocal does, yet it can virtually contain any individuals like itself and distinct from itself.

23. Fourthly, we can at the same time take a similar reason from the fact that one effect in number can dividedly depend on two total equivocal causes, even created, distinct either in species or in number, for each of them contains eminently the whole species of the inferior effect; hence, so far as concerns itself, it is powerful for effecting any individual of that species; and consequently every individual which can be made by one of those causes can be made by the other; therefore the same can be in univocal causes. The consequence is evident from what was said above, because that is a sufficient indication on the part of the effect that it is not repugnant that it can naturally depend on this or that cause; nor can a reason be assigned why on its part it should be more repugnant in order to univocal causes than to equivocal ones. But if on the part of the effect there is no repugnance, in truth on the part of the causes none can be assigned.

24. And in this way another reason which can be made here has force, that the same effect in number is made by one cause and conserved by another; for this has no place in the univocal cause, for its effect does not depend on it in being conserved, per se speaking; for when it is said to conserve in the wood the heat which it produced, it is not understood of conservation directly and per se, but per accidens, by defending from contraries; and therefore it is no wonder that such conservation, or rather defence, can be made by any agent of like power. But in equivocal causes it seems certain that the effect produced by one can be conserved by another, as the light of this air made by this lamp is conserved by another sufficiently applied, even if this one is at once extinguished. For it is not likely that a sudden and insensible change of light takes place; therefore by the same reason one lamp could have effected from the beginning the same light which the other made, if it had been applied, both because conservation of this kind is true efficiency and of itself and by its nature could be production; and also because, unless this light were contained under the object of the other lamp, it could not naturally be conserved by it; but if it is contained, it can also be made.

25. But from univocal causes some sort of argument can be taken from the fact that one can intensify the same quality in number which another began; therefore it can also begin or effect it; for it is wonderful to say that one and the same quality according to diverse grades determines for itself diverse natural agents otherwise wholly like among themselves. Finally it does not seem likely that one angel cannot effect in the same body the same local motion in number, or the same intrinsic Ubi, which another would effect, if it had moved it at the same time. And therefore in this example the authors of the contrary opinion too admit that the same effect in number can be made by diverse total causes disjunctively; but they deny that a sufficient argument is taken thence to other effects, because through local motion no new absolute entity is made in the mobile. But this answer does not satisfy, both because, although through local motion no new absolute thing distinct from the mobile is made, yet a real absolute mode, distinct from the mobile from the nature of the thing, is made, from which no light argument is taken to the effect which is a distinct form. And most of all because, even with respect to local motion and Ubi, true efficient causality and per se dependence of this effect on this cause intervene; therefore, if this does not prevent such effect from being able to be made by another cause distinct in number, neither will it prevent it in effects which are distinct things or forms. It is true that this example too proceeds of equivocal causes, because in local motion the mover is always an equivocal cause; yet we have already shown that a sufficient argument is taken from equivocal causes to univocal ones.

Affirmative resolution of the whole question

26. The reasons of each side, then, being weighed, although neither wholly compels or demonstrates, yet these latter bear greater likelihood. Wherefore, speaking in general, I think it must be said that it is not repugnant that the same effect in number depend on several proximate and total causes disjunctively, or conversely (and it comes back to the same), that several causes can have power such that each can per se effect the same effect in number, which is more certain if both or one is an equivocal cause; yet it is also more probable in univocal causes. Some things, however, must be observed. First, it must be supposed that the effect is either equal or inferior to the cause; which I note for this reason, because, if the opinion were true which affirms that individuals of the same species can be unequal in perfection, it would not be necessary that any individual cause in some species could effect all other individuals of the same species by its own power, but only those which were proportioned or equal to it. Next, one must speak of effects wholly alike in the individual, as are two heats of the same subject; for if effects, although they are of the same species, are not wholly alike, but (so to speak) in some way heterogeneous individually, it can happen that on account of the peculiar condition which the single individuals have, they determine for themselves only one natural cause of one order, which can happen not only in univocal causes, but also in equivocal ones. As, for example, the visible species of Peter and of Paul are of the same species (for I suppose each is white), and nevertheless neither can Peter effect the species of Paul nor Paul that of Peter, because those species, although they are alike in specific nature, yet from their individuation have proper relations to distinct objects, and therefore I call those species unlike and as it were heterogeneous individually, and those objects, although they are in their way equivocal causes of such species, yet do not have eminent power for the whole species, but each for those species only which represent it. Something similar can be observed in immanent acts, as we said above; and the same holds of habits. Thus, where a peculiar reason or determination intervenes, it can happen that a cause is determined to some individuals of one species and cannot be to all; and thence too it can come about that the effect which is made by one cause cannot be made by another distinct in number; absolutely, however, it is not repugnant to the natures of things.

27. Finally it must be observed that so far we have explained only what can be done by virtue of particular causes, not what is done; for that is much more uncertain to us, so that it cannot be defined by any reason. For, although two particular causes have power for effecting the same effect in number, yet the actual determination of such cause to making this individual rather than another depends on the first cause as on the primary origin of such determination; and therefore, although this cause now applied effects this singular effect, to which it is determined by the first cause, whether, if another like one had been applied in its stead at the same time and place and about the same subject, it would have made the same effect in number, is not established to us. Not because it is not in that power, which we have so far treated, but because that power too is indifferent to several individuals and we do not know whether in that case it would be determined by the first cause to making the same individual in number; we affirm only, then, that it can be so determined, but that the actual determination depends on the concurrence and will of the first cause.

The arguments of the second opinion left over from the preceding section are satisfied

28. From these too must be answered that question which was made in the foundations of the second principal opinion adduced at the beginning of the preceding section, namely, what two causes total in power or in first act would do, if they were applied at once and equally to the same patient and were left to act according to their nature. For one must distinguish, for either those two causes would be applied at once and in the same instant, or one prior in time to the other. Again, either the patient is capable of several effects distinct in number, or of one only. Next, if the effect is one, it can be indivisible, as is the substantial form, or having latitude of dimensions; likewise it can depend on the cause only in becoming, or also in being conserved. First, then, if the causes are applied at once and the patient is capable of several effects, they will effect them, and each its own, and so all controversy ceases; for in this way two white objects equally applied will effect two intentional species. For in this example those two causes neither are nor can be total causes of the same effect in number, because neither object can make the species of the other. Hence I do not think an example can be found in which each cause can be total with respect to each effect, and yet the patient can receive both at once, because two forms or accidents distinct in number alone and wholly alike cannot be at once in the same subject. But if this is admitted according to the opinion positing several lights in the same air, it could also be said that then those causes would operate as total causes, yet not both the same effect, but each its own. Although this too would be uncertain; for it depends on the determination of the first cause, which could give concurrence either to diverse effects in number or only to one and the same; yet, since those causes from that hypothesis are then apt to operate as total causes, it is likely that they would receive the natural concurrence to operate so, and consequently would effect diverse effects in number.

29. But supposing that the subject is capable of only one form, then those causes applied at once would effect the same effect at once, yet not as total causes, but as partial; not because that effect the same in number could not be made by each of those causes, nor by either of them alone, but by both together partially; for it is incredible that some natural effect should by its nature determinately demand for itself this mode of dependence on many causes at once, to which it is per accidens to be so conjoined for operating. The reason, then, is only that that mode of acting is then more consonant with the natures of things, as was declared above. But if the effect is indivisible, it cannot be more perfect on account of the conjunction of two causes; but if it is capable of greater or less intensity, sometimes it will be more intense, namely, when neither of those causes by itself alone could have operated according to the whole latitude of its intensity or activity, either on account of distance, or on account of the resistance of the patient,¹ or on account of a peculiar property of its nature; in which way we experience that two lamps equal among themselves effect together a more intense light in the air than each could effect by itself.

30. But if one of such causes is applied prior in time to the other, it will at once effect the whole effect which it can effect at that time or instant; and then it is more uncertain what the other cause supervening effects. And indeed, if the effect does not depend in being conserved, but only in becoming, and is indivisible or already wholly produced, it is clear that the posterior cause can effect nothing, because it already finds it made, and because the other cause already does nothing, but has done. But if the effect depends in being conserved, some say that the effect which had been made by the prior cause will perish, and that a new one will be produced by those two at once and conserved for the future. But that is incredible, because there is no cause there why the prior effect should be corrupted, nor yet is it consonant with nature that God should suspend the concurrence by which He conserves it, no corrupting cause supervening.

31. Others say more probably that from that instant in which the posterior cause is applied that effect begins to be conserved by two causes at once, which before was conserved by one only, because it ought not to be idle, since it can operate for this. But this too has difficulty, because either that effect begins to be conserved by the posterior cause through a new action which flows from it alone, the prior cause also persevering in its action; and so it follows that that effect is conserved by those two causes at once as total causes; which we do not admit; or the prior cause desists from its proper action, and both causes begin to have a new common action by which they conserve the same effect; and this too is difficult, because there is nothing which compels the prior cause to remit its influx or to desist from the prior action. Nor can this be reduced to the determination of the first cause varying its concurrence and the determination of the action of the secondary cause, because it is not due to the supervening cause that the action or concurrence be changed in order that it can do something. Wherefore it is probable that in that case the posterior cause will effect nothing, because it finds made whatever it could make.

32. But if that effect were intensifiable and had not been produced according to the whole latitude of such causes, then the posterior cause would effect its intensification. But this could be understood in two ways: first, that the first cause would precisely persevere in the prior action, but the posterior would add so many grades of quality; and then each would be the total cause of some part (so to speak) or of some grades of that effect; but each would be a partial cause with respect to the whole effect, by partiality, as they say, not only on the part of the cause, but also on the part of the effect. In which mode of speaking it is only difficult, since those agents are like and equal, as we suppose, why that greater intensity should be made by the posterior agent alone, since that action of greater intensity seems in some way more perfect. For neither can it be said that the prior cause both conserves the whole action which it was effecting before and helps the supervening cause to the intensification of such effect, because by the prior action it was acting as much as it could, therefore it cannot act anything further unless it remits something of the prior action. And therefore it is probable that in that case the prior cause ceases from the action which it was totally exercising and is conjoined to the posterior, so that both together both conserve the effect and render it more intense. And so far about efficient causes.

Brief resolution about the concurrence of several final causes

33. Finally it is easily established from what has been said what is to be said of final causes; for in them the resolution is much easier. For if the discourse is of the intrinsic end, that can only be one with respect to one action, because both one action can have only one total terminus, and nature intrinsically and of itself always tends to one. But if the discourse is of the extrinsic end, which the free operator intends at his choice, either it is only proximate or particular, or it is the end simply ultimate and universal. When it is of the former mode, nothing is repugnant in there being several final and total causes of the same action, as is established by experience; for someone can give alms both in order to satisfy for sins and in order to honour God and to help his neighbour, so intending all these that for the sake of each he has an absolute will of doing that work. And the reason is that, when the end is so extrinsic with respect to the action or effect, it does not add intrinsic entity or real mode, but only subordination to the extrinsic intention or will of the agent, and therefore there is no drawback that in this way the same action proceed from many total ends. It is true that, if they are compared not to the external action but to the internal act of the created will, then two ends of the same notion, that is, equally proximate, cannot be total causes of wholly the same act, because with respect to the interior act they have the notion of object, if they are proximate ends; but one and the same internal act cannot tend to several total objects. And the reason is that with respect to interior acts such ends are not extrinsic, but intrinsic, since they are their proper and formal objects, but we have spoken of extrinsic ends; of which matter can be seen what we wrote in tome I of the III Part, disp. V, sect. 3. But if the ends are simply ultimate with respect to the operator, there cannot be several total with respect to the same, even from the intention of the operator himself, because it is of the notion of the end so ultimate that all things be referred to it, and therefore it is repugnant that it be multiplied, of which matter many things are disputed by the theologians, in I-II, q. 1, a. 5.

1. The order of sequence between this and the preceding disputation.—We have compared several causes to one effect; now conversely we compare one cause to several effects. And because in contrary effects there is a peculiar difficulty, we shall speak chiefly of them, and most of all because Aristotle, treating of causes, made peculiar mention of this matter, saying that the same thing can be the cause of contraries. But the question can be treated of several effects either at once or successively. And because in the material, formal and final cause the matter is easy, we shall speak of them first, afterwards of the efficient. Although, as regards contrary effects, we can take of all without disputation that one cause cannot cause contrary effects at once, because they include repugnance, if they are taken with respect to the same, as they ought to be taken; for if they are taken with respect to diverse things, they are no longer taken as contraries. For although the sun at the same time dries mud and melts wax, it will not properly make contrary effects.

The question is dispatched in the formal cause

2. These things being supposed, of the formal cause it must be said that one cause cannot cause except one effect; hence a fortiori it comes about that it can never confer contrary effects. It is proved, because in the first place this cause does not cause except by offering itself to the effect; but it itself is only one entity; therefore from this side that which it causes and which it offers to the effect is always one and the same. Again, the formal cause causes the effect by giving complement in its being; therefore from this side too one formal cause always causes only one effect. And it can be confirmed by induction, both in any individual cause one in number, and in that which is one in genus or species; for the former always constitutes the same effect in number, the latter the same in species or genus.

3. But an instance can be made of the rational soul; for in the others, which depend on a subject and therefore are not changed from subject to subject, there is no difficulty; but the rational soul, the same in number, is united gradually to diverse matter; therefore it already has various effects, either inasmuch as it conserves various matters or inasmuch as with them it composes diverse composites. Another instance can be that one form according to species gives to the effect specific and generic unity, while it does not participate that genus, as is evident in the same rational soul, which gives to man to be animal, while it itself is not sensitive. Thirdly an instance can be made, for Aristotle said of the efficient cause that the same thing can be the cause of contraries, because, just as presence is the cause of conservation, so the absence of the same cause is the cause of corruption; therefore by parity of reasoning it must be said that light is the formal cause of contraries or opposites, because, just as the presence of light formally causes the luminous, so absence causes the dark.

4. To the first it must be answered, from what was said about the principle of individuation, that man, physically speaking, is always the same, nor can it happen consonantly with the natures of things that the same soul inform, even successively, wholly diverse matters. But if it informed them supernaturally, the effect would still be the same, although not wholly, yet it would be more the same than diverse in number. But we speak physically; nor are we treating of matter itself, which is improperly called the effect of the form, but of the composite itself, inasmuch as it is constituted through the form; of which matter many things are wont to be said by the theologians treating of the resurrection. Of the second argument too the philosophers say many things in the books On the Soul. Briefly, however, I say that the physical effect of one real form is one really and essentially. But if in the effect specific or generic grades are metaphysically distinguished, the same can be proportionally distinguished in the form, so that the form never constitutes an effect one in genus with the effects of other forms unless it too has proportional generic unity with those forms. Which is true also in the rational soul; for it does not constitute animal except inasmuch as it is the principle of sensing, in which genus it agrees with the souls of brutes, and under that notion it is truly a sensing soul. For it is not of the notion of the sensitive soul that it be material; or if that word is taken in this sense, that is not the form adequately constituting animal as such. To the third it is answered that the privation of the form is not the form itself, but rather the opposite, and therefore that it is no instance. But of that example of the efficient cause it will be said below.

Resolution of the question in the material cause

5. Of the material cause it must be said that one and the same can be in some way the cause of several and contrary effects, not at once, but successively. It is proved, for the same prime matter is the cause of the several forms which in succession of time succeed in it and of the composites which result from them. In which matter partly agrees with form, partly differs; it agrees indeed, because it too causes by giving itself to the composite. Hence from this side it always confers the same being on the effect, namely its own proper potential being, which is always the same, under whatever forms it exists; and therefore the effect is not diverse in the matter itself, but in the form. But matter differs from form, because it only begins and as it were offers the foundation of the effect to be consummated through the form, on account of which, even if prime matter in various effects is of the same species, nevertheless the effects are simply different by reason of the forms; and the forms themselves too, either according to their being, if they are material, or at least according to information, are properly effects of matter. And moreover matter, because it is a common subject, can underlie various forms successively, while yet the form cannot change matter, or successively inform several as such. And therefore the same matter in number can simply be the cause of several effects, successively indeed, but not at once, because it cannot receive several forms at once, at least total and adequate ones. But we are speaking of substantial matter and form, for if the discourse is extended to the material cause of accidents, the same thing can indeed at once be the material cause of several effects, because, as was said above, the same matter sustains quantity and the substantial form, and the same subject can at once sustain several accidents, as is per se known. But of which accidents this is to be understood, namely whether distinct in species, or genus, or number, was said above, disp. V.

6. And hence it is easily established how the same matter can successively be the cause of contrary effects; for we do not take contraries in all propriety, but as opposed termini in motion or generation are called contraries. So, then, matter successively is the cause both of the form and also of the opposed privation, in the way in which privation can have a cause; for the same matter is the cause of the generation and corruption of the thing. Hence it is also the cause of the forms succeeding one another in the same matter, which, inasmuch as they are formally repugnant among themselves, can in some way be called contrary. But the same subject of accidents will with greater propriety be called the material cause of contrary effects, because proper contraries are concerned with the same thing. Indeed a material cause of this kind can in a certain way be at once the cause of contrary effects, at least in remiss grades, although those as such are not truly contraries.

Reply to the question as to the final cause

7. Of the end it must be said that the same end can truly and properly be the cause in its genus both of several and of contrary effects; of several indeed both at once and successively; but of contrary ones only successively. All these are easily established from what was said above about the final cause, where we showed that there are several acts or actions of the agent which can be caused by the same end, namely the election of means, execution, and also the intention and love of the end itself. Which actions, either all or some of them, it is not repugnant to be made at once for the sake of the same end, since they are in some way subordinated among themselves. It is true that, compared to the end, they have in a certain way the notion of one adequate effect. Hence not only in voluntary but also in natural things it happens that several actions are made for the sake of the same end; for since the end of generation is the substantial form, for its sake is made not only the generation itself, but also the preceding alteration. Yet this is always true of an end in some way extrinsic, or which is not made through the action itself, for an end so intrinsic is naturally made only through one action.

8. And in a proportional way it is easily evident how the same end, namely an extrinsic one, can be the cause of contrary actions, not indeed at once, for that is repugnant, unless they are made in diverse subjects, by which reason they are not contrary. But in this it must be considered that it is one thing to speak of internal acts which are caused by the end in the will itself, another of external actions, which are means to attaining the end; for in the former the same end, if it is properly and formally the same, cannot be the cause of contrary effects which are truly contrary; for effects of this kind are contrary, love or hatred, joy and sadness, and similar; but the same end cannot move to love and hatred of itself, either at once or at the same time, and consequently neither to other contrary acts which follow upon these. But I said if the end is properly and formally the same, because, if it is taken only materially, the same thing which under one notion of good moves to love of itself can under some notion of evil move to hatred. I said also which are truly contrary, for the same end which moves to joy at its attainment moves to sadness at its loss, and so of others; yet that joy and sadness are not properly contrary, as sadness for sin and joy in a good work are not formally contrary; indeed rather one effect follows from the other, if the object is supposed. But about external actions themselves the same end formally and according to the same notion of good can move to contrary actions at diverse times, as from the affection for health we are aroused now to motion, now to rest; yet always those contraries fall under the causality of the end as they are in some way one, that is, inasmuch as they agree in the notion of useful good for attaining the end.

The question is treated in the efficient cause

9. Of the efficient cause the same general answer cannot be given, but a distinction is needed. First between free and natural cause, next between per se and per accidens cause, universal and particular; and judgement must be passed otherwise of the plurality of effects, otherwise of contrariety.

10. First, then, it must be said that every efficient cause, if it effects through proper causality, can successively effect several effects, yet not in the same way, for the particular and univocal cause can only effect several effects distinct in number, but the equivocal cause also effects diverse in species. The whole assertion can easily be shown by induction. But I said if it effects through proper causality, because, when there is efficiency through natural resultance alone, sometimes the cause is determined to only one effect in number, as this rational soul to this intellect or will in number; for no other powers distinct in number can naturally emanate from this soul. But it can be said that this comes from the fact that these powers can never naturally be separated from the soul; yet if in fact they were separated by divine power and no other impediment were posited, at once other powers would flow from the same soul; and so that active power is not of itself wholly defined to one effect in number. Which is probable, although it could be called into controversy, which does not matter to the present; for it is enough that a principle properly effecting is not of itself limited to one effect in number. And the reason is that in the first place it is not an intrinsic principle, nor does it confer its own proper real being, but another like itself, which it effects by its power; but after it has conferred such being on one effect, its power remains as whole as before, per se, as we speak; therefore, if matter capable of another form distinct in number is applied, it will equally be able to effect another effect. But if it is a cause which does not need matter for acting, much more will it be able to do this by its sole power and will.

11. And this reason is common to all causes, both univocal and equivocal. But univocal causes, inasmuch as they are such, are determined to one effect in species, because the notion of univocal cause consists in this, that it effect an effect like itself in the same species; for if it could also effect in another species, it would already be an equivocal cause. But the equivocal cause, since it is of a superior notion to the effect, can of itself be universal in causing several species of effects, and the more eminent and superior it is in power, the more it will be able to extend to several. But I say that the equivocal cause can have this universality, and does not necessarily have it, because I do not see why it is repugnant that there be given also an equivocal cause determined to one effect in species, so that on account of some eminence of its own, as, for example, because by its nature it is ingenerable and incorruptible, or on account of another similar cause, it cannot produce a univocal effect and wholly like itself in the lowest species, yet can effect some effect of an inferior order, yet only of one species, because in that order its power is too limited and among the lowest. For I find no repugnance in some equivocal cause being of this kind; but whether in fact one is given, or all extend to effects distinct in species, is uncertain to me.

12. Nor in this assertion does a difficulty of any moment occur, except that which was touched upon in the foregoing about the determination of the natural cause to one effect, if it is itself indifferent to several. For, since in natural causes that philosophical principle holds most true, The same, remaining the same, always does the same, which is taken from Aristotle, II De Generat., c. 10, it does not appear how the same natural agent, remaining the same, can be determined to various effects, even at diverse times, or certainly to one out of many at the same time. But to this it has already been answered in the foregoing that an agent of this kind is determined from the concurrence of other causes or circumstances, and cannot otherwise be determined by itself. But when it is said that the same remaining the same does the same, remaining the same is to be understood not only in itself, but also in concurrence and in the concauses and circumstances required for acting; which happens otherwise in the free agent, as was declared at length in the foregoing.

13. I say secondly: no efficient cause can at once effect several effects adequate to its power; yet it can effect several inadequate ones. The prior part is proved, because it is repugnant that an adequate effect be multiplied, for if it is adequate, it is equal (so to speak) to the power of the agent; therefore it is a clear repugnance that effects be adequate and be several; otherwise the thing would act beyond its power, and the power beyond its adequate object. Hence not even God Himself can at once effect several effects adequate to His power; yet He can effect several in any number whatever, even if one proceeds to infinity, because no effect or multitude of effects is adequate to His power. And by the same proportional reason a finite power can be so superior with respect to one effect only that it is not equalled as to the efficacy which it can exercise at once and at the same time; then, therefore, it will be able at once to effect several effects inadequate to its power up to that multitude which is adequate to the efficacy of the power; for a finite power will always have in this some terminus, because it is finite. And from this principle philosophers and theologians teach that a man, or even an angel, cannot understand at once several things as several, but can as one; which briefly has this sense, namely, by way of one adequate effect, of which elsewhere. But a difference can be noted as to this plurality of effects between free and natural agents; for the free agent per se and from its intention and freedom can be determined to several effects, if they can fall under its power; but the natural agent within the sphere of its activity acts naturally and in the same way; but because it happens that within that sphere there are distinct subjects, therefore from them it also effects several effects; in which way one fire can effect several heats in diverse subjects, if they are contained within the sphere of its activity.

14. Thirdly it must be said that only the free agent can per se and properly effect contrary effects, either successively in the same, or at once and disjunctively even in the same, or at once and conjunctively in diverse. This is taken from the Philosopher, IX Metaph., text 3, where in this sense he says that it is proper to rational powers to be able for opposites. And it is also established from what we said above about causes acting freely or naturally. And it is declared briefly, for these opposites can be taken either privatively or contrarily; which correspond to the two modes or parts of freedom, namely as to exercise or as to specification. In the former way, then, it is clear that only the free agent as such can be for opposites, per se speaking, that is, all the requisites for acting being posited; for it can both love and not love and in general operate and not operate. But the natural agent can only operate, if the requisites are present; but if they are not present, it can only not operate; and therefore it is only per accidens said to be able for opposites of this kind, namely from the defect of some thing necessary for operating. Which difference Aristotle taught, IX Metaph., c. 9, in these very brief words: All the powers which are according to reason are powers of contradiction, namely per se and by their own power; hence he adds: But the irrational ones, by the very fact that they are present and absent, will be of contradiction the same, that is, because either they themselves can be applied and not applied, or the matter necessary or other things required for acting. Which place of Aristotle is worthy of note, for from it is plainly gathered the definition of the free faculty expounded above by us. Hence the free agent is said to be the cause not only of its operation, but also of the lack of operation, when it has it freely, because namely not from defect, but from its power, which it has for suspending its action, it is the cause of such lack of action. Nor is it necessary that this causality be through positive and real influx, but through the suspension of influx from the power of the cause itself, for causality must be proportioned to the effect; since, therefore, the effect is privative, it ought not to be caused through positive influx, but through suspension of influx, which is in the power of the cause itself; but the natural cause cannot so properly be said to cause the privation of its operation, because in truth that privation does not come from its power, but rather from impotence or from another defect.

15. And in this way I think is to be understood what Aristotle says of the pilot of a ship, that the same is the cause of contraries; because, just as his presence is the cause of conservation, so his absence is the cause of the sinking of the ship itself. For it is not to be understood of the sole absence and presence of the pilot of the ship, for in this way the same would not be assigned as cause of contraries, but contrary causes of contrary effects; because absence and presence are contrary among themselves, as are the conservation and sinking of the ship; it is to be understood, then, of the pilot himself, who both through presence is the cause of conservation and through absence is said to be the cause of the sinking of the ship. Which can be true in so far as the pilot himself is the cause of his absence, as also of his presence, for if he were not the cause of his absence, he would not be reckoned the cause of the loss or sinking which followed thence. But it is to be noted that that causality which is said to be through absence, if it is considered with respect to the privation or lack of action, such as is not to defend or not to govern the ship, can be per se causality, even physical, in the way in which it can intervene between privations, because there is a per se order of one to the other. But with respect to the positive effect which followed thence, such as is the sinking of the ship, that is only a cause per accidens, physically speaking, for the per se causes are the winds, etc. But morally the pilot will be called a per se cause, if he could and was bound to be present and govern the ship, as is treated more at length in moral science. Wherefore that mode of attributing contrary effects to the same cause present or absent, properly and per se speaking, has place only in moral causes; for the sun will not so properly be said to cause darkness by its absence, because it is not the cause of its own absence; hence, although darkness follows from absence, yet not from the causality of the sun, but of him who was the cause of that absence.

16. In the latter way contrariety is properly between positive effects or repugnant forms; and in this way too the free agent per se and by its own power and all the requisites for acting being posited can effect contrary effects, either by eliciting them through the free power, in which way it can either love or hate, or by commanding them, in which way a man can either assent or dissent to the same thing proposed, and the physician (which is the example of Aristotle) can by the same art of medicine heal the sick man or kill him. And so it can effect contraries in those three ways posited above, namely, either successively about the same, for it can now love, afterwards hate the same thing; or for the same instant and about the same, yet not conjointly, but dividedly, because it can in the same instant exercise either love or hatred; but both at once is repugnant; hence conjointly and for the same instant it can do this only about diverse things, as the physician can at once apply to one a salutary remedy, to another a harmful one. So, then, the free cause per se and by its own power can operate contrary acts or effects. But it is otherwise in the cause acting naturally, because it is by its nature determined to one, and therefore per se cannot effect contraries. And although sometimes contrary effects seem to proceed from the same natural cause on account of its eminent power, yet either they are not made about the same and disposed in the same way, but about diverse things diversely affected, and so they are not made properly as they are contrary, in which way the sun dries mud and melts wax; or one is made per se and the other per accidens, as we said in the foregoing of the effect through antiperistasis; or certainly such cause does not by itself alone effect each of the contraries, but with other causes and dispositions concurring; for so the sun concurs to various and repugnant forms in these lower things; of almost all which we spoke in the foregoing, and of the special difficulty which seems to be in the motion of the heart it was said in disputation XVIII.

17. Only against the prior part it can be objected that Aristotle, IX Metaph., text 3, signifies that even rational powers cannot per se be for each of contraries, but for one per se, and for the other per accidens. But, as we noted there, that per se and per accidens are not there taken in that signification in which they distinguish the cause beside intention and beside the proper influx and operating power from the per se cause, but as they distinguish the primary and secondary inclination of the operating power; and the will will be said in this way to love per se, but to hate per accidens, not because it does not per se and by proper influx elicit the act of hatred, but because pursuit belongs per se primo to the appetitive power, but flight consequently and as it were per accidens, that is, by reason of another.