Disputationes metaphysicae

1. That the exemplar is something in things is the common consent both of philosophers and of theologians, as is evident from Plato, in the Timaeus; and from Socrates, who (as Eusebius witnesses, bk. XI De Praepar., c. 11) disputed about ideas before Plato; and from Cicero and Seneca in the places cited; and from Dionysius, Justin and Nazianzen, in places to be cited below. And Augustine, in the cited place, especially the said q. 46, says that the ancients placed so great force in ideas that, unless they were understood, no one could be wise. With which agrees what Clement of Alexandria says, bk. IV Strom., towards the end: Rightly Plato too said that he who contemplates the ideas will live as a god among men. Augustine likewise adds, bk. I Retract., c. 3, that the intelligible world which Plato posited is the eternal and unchangeable reason by which God made the sensible world. Which whoever denies to exist, it follows that he says that God made irrationally what He made. Augustine thinks it, then, as certain that there are ideas, which are the same as the intelligible reasons of things to be made, as it is certain that God did not create the world without knowledge and reason. And this very thing is what Boethius said, book De Consol., metre 9: Thou drawest all things from the exemplar above, / Thyself most fair, bearing the fair world in Thy mind.

Finally, this very thing can easily be demonstrated from human artificers; for they conceive in the mind the form of the thing to be effected through art, which is called the exemplar. And so Aristotle said, VII Metaph., c. 7, that the health of the body is made from the health which is in the mind.

2. The twofold acceptation of exemplar.—But it is necessary to observe that a twofold exemplar is commonly distinguished: one external, as is an image, or writing set before the eyes, which is proposed to be imitated, of which can be understood that of Exod. 25: Look and make it according to the pattern that was shewn thee in the mount; the other is the internal exemplar, which is formed in the soul or mind. Which division Seneca indicated above, saying that it matters nothing whether he has the exemplar outside, to which he may turn his eyes, or within, which he himself conceived and placed there. But I think that, although perhaps as to the use of the word the external exemplar is properly and from its first imposition so called, yet as to the office of the cause which we are now explaining, the notion or causality of exemplar is found per se and properly in the internal; but that the external is applied only per accidens and remotely, as I shall declare more at length in the following section, and therefore we must chiefly speak of the internal exemplar.

Where the exemplar is

3. Description of the exemplar.—From these, however, it can easily be understood, following the common view, where the exemplar is and what it is. For it is in the mind or intellect, and for this reason it is sometimes called an exemplar. Plato too for the same cause called the exemplar of the world the intelligible world, as Augustine noted above. For this reason finally Clement of Alexandria above said that the mind is the place of ideas, and in bk. V Strom., not far from the beginning, he said that Plato in the Phaedo for this cause declared that truth is the idea. But the idea (he says) is the understanding of God, or that which is understood by the divine mind. The idea or exemplar, therefore, is in the mind. But it is commonly described in general thus: The exemplar is the form which the effect imitates from the intention of the agent who determines the end for himself. So St. Thomas, q. 2 De Verit., a. 1;¹ and almost Seneca above. But because this description is common to the external exemplar, we can add that it is a form conceived in the mind, or something similar. But by form is to be understood not the intrinsic form informing and constituting the thing, but the form conceived and extrinsic to the effect, in imitation of which the effect is made from the proper intention of the agent. Which last particle is added because, if by chance it happens that one thing is made like another, it is not an exemplar, nor yet if from mere natural action the agent makes the effect like itself, as I shall now explain.

4. The exemplars of all things are in the divine mind.—Hence further it can be gathered that the exemplars of natural things and forms are only in the divine intellect, which Augustine intends in the places cited above. For among causes acting through intellect God alone can properly and per se be the cause of natural effects, especially substances and natural forms, and therefore He alone can have exemplars of such things. For intellectual or rational creatures, although they can conceive intellectual forms truly and properly representing natural effects, yet, because they do not have power effective of these effects, therefore they cannot either apply those forms to the work, or (what comes back to the same) be directed by them in the effecting of the things which they represent, and therefore those intellectual forms in the created intellect do not have the notion of exemplars. And this is what is commonly said, that the exemplar is a practical form, which directs the work, or is applied to the work. Which the theologians almost think of the name of idea; although to others it seems enough that it can be applied, of which elsewhere, for it pertains only to the question of the name. But lower agents lacking intellect, although they have power of effecting effects and forms like their natural forms, yet cannot by their intention direct their actions so as to effect their effects in imitation of such forms, and in these agents too there is no place for exemplar properly so called, but only by metaphor, which St. Thomas noted, the said q. 3 De Verit., a. 1. It remains, then, that with respect to natural effects or forms the exemplar is found in the divine intellect alone. But in the created intellect it is found according to a certain participation with respect to artificial things, under which we can comprehend local motion, inasmuch as it can be made by a voluntary agent according to the measure of reason.

Whether the exemplar is in the mind only objectively

5. But hence a grave question arises, how the exemplar is understood to be in the intellect, whether subjectively or formally, or only objectively. That is said to be subjectively which is in the intellect and informs it, either in reality through true inherence, as in creatures, or in our way of understanding, while yet in reality it is through identity,² as in God. But that is said to be objectively which is known, or actually objected to the mind. Which distinction is sufficiently established from what was said above, disp. II, sect. 1, about the formal and objective concept. Hence what in sum is here inquired is whether the exemplar is only an objective concept, or rather a formal concept. Which question the theologians treat about ideas; but it is common to any exemplar as such.

The common opinion

6. It is a quite common opinion that the exemplar is an objective concept. Which can be understood in two ways: first, that it is the objective concept of the same thing to be made through art, or (and it comes back to the same) that it is the same thing which is to be made through art, as objectively existing in the mind of the artificer. Secondly, that it is the objective concept not of the same thing, but of another, in imitation of which another thing is to be made. In the former way St. Thomas seems to have followed that opinion, q. 3 De Verit., a. 2. Scotus holds it, In I, dist. 35, q. 1; there Ockham, q. 5; Gabriel, q. 5, a. 2; Ailly, In I, q. 6, a. 3; Durandus, dist. 36, q. 3; Bassolis, q. 2, a. 2. And Richard treats this opinion as a problem there, a. 2, q. 2, and Major thinks it probable, In I, dist. 35, q. 1, at the end. According to which it is consequently said that the ideas of creatures in God are not something uncreated in Him, but are the creatures themselves in known being, or objected to the divine intellect according to the being of essence, or their possible being; for, so beholding them, He produces such in reality as He has objectively present. And He says the same proportionally of the exemplar of the human artificer.

7. The latter mode, namely, that the idea is a thing conceived, yet not the same which is to be made through art, but another in imitation of which the other is effected, many theologians hold, who explain this otherwise in divine ideas, otherwise in human. For of the divine they say that it is the divine essence, as known by God, as imitable by creatures. For since God does not receive knowledge from things outside Himself, but beholds all things in His essence, in it He also knows how it can be imitated or participated by each creature, and they say that the divine essence itself under this notion is the exemplar of creatures. So think Cajetan and many Thomists, I p., q. 16, a. 2;³ and Ferrariensis, I Cont. Gent., c. 54; and Giles, In I, d. 36, q. 5, ad 2; and there Richard, a. 2, q. 2. But of the human exemplar the cited authors do not speak so expressly; but some more recent ones say that it is always a known thing distinct from the exemplified, which is either some particular thing, objected to the senses or conceived in the mind, or is something confusedly conceived, from which too the particular artefact is distinguished, which is made in the individual in imitation of that which had been confusedly conceived.

The foundations of the said opinion

8. I omit the foundations of this latter opinion, because, inasmuch as they prove that the exemplar cannot be the same thing which is made through the exemplar, nor known creatures, with respect to the divine intellect, we shall use them; but inasmuch as they prove in general that the idea is an objective concept, they are the same as the foundations of the prior opinion. That opinion, then, can be persuaded, first, from a certain proportion between exemplar and end; for each requires to be known in order that it can exercise its office; for, just as the end does not move unless known, so the exemplar does not direct unless perceived by the mind. Next, just as in the end the formal being of cognition does not move, but the good itself objectively known, so in the exemplar the formal being of cognition does not direct the action of the agent, but the form itself objected to cognition; for that is what through cognition is proposed to be imitated in the action itself; therefore, just as the end is not subjectively in the intellect, but objectively, so the exemplar too is objectively in the intellect and not formally. Secondly, from the common mode of speaking about the exemplar; for that is called exemplar which the artificer imitates, or in imitation of which he produces the effect; it is also called the form, not from which, or through which, or out of which,⁴ but towards which the artificer looks while he operates; but these belong to the thing as objected to the mind; for to it the artificer looks, not to his formal concept, for this reflection is not necessary. Thirdly, because all theologians say that there are several ideas in God, according to the opinion of Augustine, bk. LXXXIII Quaest., q. 46; but they cannot be called several except because in known being several creatures are present to God,⁵ for in the formal concept of God there is no distinction or plurality; therefore ideas are the creatures themselves in objective being; therefore universally the exemplar is an objective concept and not a formal one. Fourthly, if the Blessed, seeing creatures in God, received power of effecting such creatures in reality, they would properly have exemplars or ideas of creatures, and not through a formal concept or word which they form, because in truth they do not form such a word, as is the opinion of many; therefore the creatures themselves which they behold in the uncreated Word would then have the notion of idea; therefore it pertains per se and formally to the notion of exemplar that it be objectively in the mind. Durandus and Gabriel propose other arguments, which I omit, because all suppose that the exemplar has the notion of known object, and from this supposition infer that it cannot be another thing besides that very thing which is made through the action, inasmuch as in known being it is supposed in the mind of the artificer; which consecution I shall easily grant, as I shall say in what follows; but now we are inquiring about what they suppose, whether it is true, namely, that the exemplar has the notion of known object.

The second opinion: the exemplar is subjectively in the mind

9. The second opinion is that the idea is in the intellect subjectively and formally, and therefore is the formal concept which the artificer forms of the thing which he has determined to make. Alexander of Hales holds this opinion, I p., q. 23, memb. 4, a. 1, where he openly says that the idea is the wisdom and exemplar of God, and that according to the exemplar God is said to be wise. Although there he establishes I know not what difference between exemplar and idea, which I do not approve. Bonaventure holds the same opinion, In I, dist. 35, a. 1, q. 1, where for this reason he says that God knows through ideas and has in Himself the reasons and likenesses of the things which He knows. Capreolus thinks the same, In I, d. 36, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1 of Durandus against the 3rd conclusion, inasmuch as he says that for an idea it suffices that it be such according to representation as is the thing of which it is the idea; and below, that if the creature were contained in the divine essence only objectively, and in no way formally or virtually, this would not suffice for it to have the notion of idea. And the same seems to be the opinion of St. Thomas, I p., q. 15, for in a. 1 he says that the idea is a form, that is, a likeness of the thing to be made, which the artificer has in himself according to intelligible being. And in the solution ad 2 he says that God has ideas through His essence, because through His essence He knows things operable by Him; but God does not know creatures through them in known being, but through their formal concept. And in the solution ad 3 he says that the divine essence is an idea inasmuch as it is the likeness of all things; which cannot be understood of natural likeness, but of intentional likeness or representation, which is had through the formal concept. And of the same is to be understood what he says in a. 2, that in the divine essence there is an idea inasmuch as it is participable according to some mode of likeness by creatures; and in the solution ad 1 he says that the idea is the essence inasmuch as it is likeness or reason; where the latter word, namely reason, declares the former, namely likeness; for reason is not properly said except of the formal concept expressly representing to the intellect the thing ideated in it. And in the solution ad 2 he says that God understands several reasons of things inasmuch as He understands Himself to understand several things outside Himself, and in this way there are several ideas in God; and he says the same proportionally there of the exemplar of any artificer whatever. And this opinion is more approved by me. But in order that it be proposed and proved more distinctly, some assertions are to be proposed.

The first assertion, against the first opinion

10. I say first: the exemplar is not a thing objectively known, or existing only objectively in the mind of the artificer. It is proved, because either it is the same thing which the artificer makes, or is going to make, or can make, or it is another objectively known and distinct from the formal concept, in imitation of which he makes the other; neither of these can be said; therefore. The antecedent as to each part is shown first in the divine exemplars, then in created ones.

The assertion is proved in the divine exemplars

11. The former part is proved, because the divine idea, according to the opinion more consonant with the holy Fathers and more approved by the theologians, is not something created or creatable, but the uncreated divine essence itself. Which is taken from Dionysius, c. 5 De Div. nom., saying that exemplars are the substance-making reasons of existing things, and singularly pre-existing, which theology calls predestinations and good wills. In which words he signifies that ideas are not some things outside God, nor creatures objectively existing in the mind of God, but their substance-making reasons, that is, substantial, or making of substances singularly, that is, uniquely and most simply existing in God, as he manifestly expounds in what follows.

12. Similarly Augustine, book De Civit., c. 29, says that in the Word of God there are the causes and reasons of things according to which they were made, remaining incommunicably, which could not have been said except on account of uncreated ideas; and tract. I on John he so expounds those words: That which was made, in Him was life, because that which was made has in God a reason, which is life. And he declares it by the example of the artificer, who has the chest in his art: Which in the art (he says) is life, because the soul of the artificer lives; he calls it life in the artificer because it is a work of life; but in God because it is the very concept of God, who is life by essence. In the same way he expounds this in bk. LXV Questions, q. 26; and bk. V Genes. ad lit., c. 13, similarly he calls ideas divine, unchangeable and eternal reasons, and at once in c. 14, by reason of them he understands it to be written that all things which have been made live in God, namely in the knowledge of God. He signifies the same in XII De Civit., cc. 25 and 26; and in bk. LXXXIII Quaest., q. 46, as I reported above, he says that ideas are principal forms, or stable and unchangeable reasons of things, which themselves have not been formed, and through this are eternal, and always behaving in the same way, which are contained in the divine intelligence. And below he says that these ideas cannot be seen except by the blessed vision; and lower he says that they truly are, and that by participation in them it comes about that whatever is, is. It is therefore the open opinion of Augustine that ideas are not creatures, but uncreated reasons truly and really existing in the mind of God itself.

13. Which Ambrose too not obscurely thought, II Hexam., cc. 1 and 2, where he reproves the opinion of Plato and the philosophers positing exemplars distinct from God, looking to which God created things; he thinks, then, that the creature, as it is something distinct from God, cannot be the exemplar by which God operates; therefore, whether the creature is taken as existing in act, or in potency or according to the being of essence, it cannot be the divine exemplar; for in each way it is outside God. And in the same way the other Fathers, Justin Martyr, Hortatory Oration to the Gentiles, towards the end, and Eusebius of Caesarea, bk. XI De Praeparat. Evangel., c. 11, and Gregory Nazianzen, oration 33, which is the first On Theology, at the end, and on the same place Elias of Crete, condemn the opinion of Plato as to that part in which he is said to have asserted that God, looking to exemplars outside Himself, founded things; for the same must be said by those who teach that creatures, as objected to the divine intellect, are His ideas, for in truth creatures, even so taken, are something outside God, and it matters little whether they are posited to have the notion of idea according to actual existence or according to essence. This part is also proved by reason, because the exemplar is a true cause of the effecting of the thing; but the possible creature as objected to the mind of God is not a true cause of itself as made; therefore. The major will be proved below; the minor is established, because otherwise God could not cause the creature except with the creature itself truly and properly concausing with Him, which is most absurd. Other general proofs we shall bring at once.

14. Further the other part is proved, namely, that neither can another thing objectively known, and distinct from the formal concept, be found in the intellect of God which has the notion of exemplar. And first indeed the testimonies of the Fathers, especially of Augustine, confirm this; for he places the ideas in the art itself, inasmuch as through it the reason or concept of the thing to be effected is formed; in which concept the effect is said to be contained, because it represents it, and so according to his opinion the idea in God is nothing but the essence intellectually representing the thing to be made. Secondly I argue by reason, because in God there is no known object distinct in reason from cognition except either the primary, which is the divine essence, or the secondary, which are creatures; of this latter it has already been shown that it does not have the notion of idea; of the former, then, it is proved, because in the divine essence, as so co-distinguished from cognition, the creature is not contained as in an exemplary cause, but as in an efficient cause, which contains creatures only by eminent power, not formally in any way; therefore according to that notion it cannot have the notion of exemplar. The minor together with the consequence is proved, because it is of the notion of exemplar that it be an extrinsic form, and therefore that it formally contain the exemplified thing, either through formal agreement and likeness, or through intentional or intellectual representation.

15. And it is confirmed and declared in this way, for the divine essence, if it is considered prior in reason to being knowing or known by itself, cannot be understood as the exemplar of creatures according to their proper notions, because, although it contains them by eminent power, yet it does not formally in any way contain or express them; just as the light of the sun, although it eminently contains heat, cannot be called the idea of heat, because according to itself it neither formally nor representatively expresses heat. Again, then, the divine essence, as known, cannot have the notion of exemplar. The consequence is proved, both because being known (so to speak) does not constitute the exemplar in the being of exemplar, but supposes it, and at most can be a condition necessary in order that it cause; if, then, the divine essence according to itself does not have the notion of exemplar, from the precise fact that it is known it will not have it. And most of all, because either the essence is considered precisely and as known according to itself; and as such it cannot be an exemplar, because as such it is wholly unlike creatures; or it is considered as in it known creatures are known as in a cause, and in this way the object of such cognition is no longer only primary, but also secondary; if, then, the object so known is the idea, the creatures themselves are ideas, or at least complete the notion of idea; which is equally disproved by the reasons made in the prior member.

16. An objection is satisfied.—It will perhaps be said that neither the essence absolutely known nor the known creatures, but the essence known as participable by creatures, is the idea. But against this, because to know the essence as participable by the creature is nothing else than to know that by virtue of such essence a creature can participate such a grade of being. But this is nothing else than to know the creature itself inasmuch as by virtue of the eminent power of God it can proceed from it; therefore such cognition is in truth the cognition of the creature in God; therefore, if the object of that cognition is the idea, the creature will be the idea. And I confirm it, because in God only those things are known which are eminently in Him, or which are formally; therefore, if the essence as objectively known is the idea, either it is according to those things which are formally contained in it, and this not, otherwise known absolutely and precisely without creatures it would be the idea, which is established to be impossible, because as such it is wholly unlike creatures and does not represent them according to their proper notions; or it is the idea according to those things which it has eminently, and according as such are known in it, and so rather the creatures themselves known as eminently contained would be the idea. Or the essence itself will be called the idea according to a certain middle notion, namely, according to that which it is formally, not absolutely, but as it says a certain relation to the things which it contains eminently, by reason of which it can be the primary object in which creatures are secondarily known; and this too is not rightly said, both because that relation is rather on the part of creatures, inasmuch as they can depend on God and are certain participations of Him; and most of all because the essence of God is not the primary object in which creatures are known as in some representing image, but as in an effective cause eminently containing them, and therefore as such it cannot have the notion of exemplar; therefore the exemplar in the divine mind is not a thing objectively known as such, and as prescinded according to reason from the cognition itself. But if someone finally says with Durandus that the divine essence has the notion of an exemplar at least imperfect, inasmuch as it is at least analogically imitable by creatures, that indeed is said most improperly, both because exemplar says some proper notion of the effect; but that is a most common notion; and also because the essence under that notion does not have the proper concurrence of the exemplary cause. For this does not belong to the thing inasmuch as it is, but inasmuch as it is knowing, as I shall show in the following section. Finally because that would be a most imperfect notion of exemplar.

The assertion is proved in created exemplars

17. From these, each member can easily be proved in the exemplars of artefacts which are in created intellects. First indeed, because, although these created exemplars are better known to us, yet in themselves they are certain imitations of the divine exemplars; hence they keep the same proportion. Wherefore the opinion of those has always displeased me who think that in this business one must think otherwise of the divine than of the created exemplars, so that they say the former are placed in the formal concept, the latter in the objective, or conversely; for that is supported by no reason, for, although in perfection these exemplars are far distant from each other, yet in the mode of existence, representation and causality they keep proportion, as the reason made proves, because one is a participation and imitation of the other, as also in the genus of efficient or end the secondary cause imitates the first as much as it can. And therefore St. Thomas far better thought the reason as to this to be equal of divine and created exemplars, as is evident from the places cited, especially I p., q. 15, a. 2, ad 2, and Scotus and others suppose the same, and deservedly.

18. Secondly, the same is proved by almost the same discourse, for if the artificial exemplar is something known by the artificer, either this is that very artefact which is to be effected, as objectively pre-existing in cognition, or it is something else to be imitated in the effecting of the other. This latter cannot be said, because very often no other object intervenes to which the artificer looks. For in the human artificer that reason ceases which is in God, who can know nothing outside Himself except as a secondary object known in His essence as in the primary; and therefore in the divine cognition there always intervene as it were two objects, of which it was necessary to speak singly. But the created artificer directly and immediately conceives the artefact, and by means of that cognition operates it; therefore there is not there another third thing which can have the notion of exemplar. It can be answered that the created artificer does not conceive that very artefact in particular and in the individual which he is going to make, but only confusedly an artefact of such notion or figure; and therefore he always has an idol objectively conceived distinct from the artefact, which afterwards he makes in imitation of that idol. But in the first place, as I shall say at once, that mode of preconceiving is not per se in the artificer as such, but in the imperfect artificer, or the one imperfectly knowing. Next, that confused concept is not distinct in reality from the effect, but only in reason, as common from particular, and if the effect is considered as it per se falls under the intention of such artificer, it includes only that confused notion; but the exemplar regards only that which per se falls under the intention of the agent; therefore, inasmuch as exemplary causality can intervene there, the preconceived object is not distinguished from the effect per se made from the intention of the agent.

19. Someone can say that at least sometimes an external exemplar intervenes, looking at which the artificer operates in its likeness; and that then at least it can be said that the exemplar is a thing objectively known, and existing in the intellect only objectively. I answer that we speak only of the internal exemplar, as we said at the beginning; because that alone we think is the proper and per se exemplary cause with respect to the action of the operator. For that other external exemplar either is only remote, inasmuch as it is the cause of the cognition of the operator, or sometimes also is not a cause, but only an extrinsic terminus of the action of the operator; in which way it can sometimes be found also with respect to God, as we shall see and declare in the following section.

20. Nor yet can it be said that the artefact itself, as foreknown by the created artificer, is the exemplar of itself as to be made. Because, if creatures foreknown by God are not ideas, why will the artificial thing, as foreknown by the artificer, be so? Some answer that there is a difference, because God does not receive knowledge from things, as the human artificer does. But I do not see what this matters to the present thing, for if in cognition which is taken from things themselves the known thing could be the exemplar of itself, much more in cognition which is not taken from things, but which God has from Himself, could known things be exemplars, because before such cognition they are in no way supposed to be according to their formal being; but through cognition they are expressed and as it were formed (which perhaps Scotus called being made in known being). Therefore, conversely, if in God, who preconceives things not taking knowledge from things, nevertheless the known things do not have exemplary notion, neither will they be able to have it in the human artificer. And most of all because we can constitute an artificer not taking knowledge from things, but having it per se infused. Others try to give the reason from the fact that the knowledge of God is most distinct, but the conception of the human artificer confused. But this neither is per se nor satisfies, as has been said and will be declared more in the following reason.

21. Secondly, then, I argue that the human artificer never preconceives the thing to be made by him wholly and in the individual the same as that which he afterwards makes, because he can never know with certainty which and what kind the thing will be in the individual which is to be elaborated by him through art, for the termination of the effect in the individual depends on various circumstances, or on a superior agent, as was touched upon in the foregoing. Which reason well proves, regularly and speaking in human manner, that the same artefact in the individual which is afterwards made does not fall under the human exemplar; nor is this wonderful, because neither does the determination of the action to such effect in the individual fall per se under human intention; but the exemplar is only with respect to that thing to which human intention can be directed. Yet that reason does not prove that at least according to the common notion of such artefact, according to which it falls under the intention of the agent, the same as foreknown is not the exemplar of itself as made through art. Likewise that reason does not prove that absolutely too the same in number could not be the exemplar of itself, either in the mind of an angel, or also of a man, if he were divinely strengthened to preconceive the effect as it is to be perfected in the individual.

22. It is proved, then, otherwise, because the exemplar is a true and real cause of the thing which is made through it; therefore it cannot be that very thing which is afterwards made, as it was before preconceived. The antecedent will be proved below; the consequence is evident, because the same thing cannot be the true and proper cause of itself. Nor yet is it enough that the preconceived thing and the produced thing be distinguished as a thing existing in potency or in act; for a thing of this kind in act and in potency is the same, and includes the same existence as actually exercised or as possible; and therefore the thing as in potency cannot be the cause of itself as in act. And this reason proceeds generally also of the divine ideas.

23. But it can still be answered that in those causes which inflow only according to being objected to the mind it is not unfitting that the same thing be the cause of itself, as is evident in the final cause, of which Aristotle said that it coincides in the same thing in number with the form made. And in this a certain agreement is found between exemplar and end, for each causes as existing in cognition. Just as, therefore, the same thing in the notion of end moves to the effecting of itself, so in the notion of exemplar it will direct or concur in its way to the effecting of itself. For the reason is common to both, because in the other genera the same thing cannot be the cause of itself for this reason, that it is supposed to be in order that it cause; therefore, what is not supposed to be except as known in order that it cause, it will not be repugnant that it cause itself in real existence. Most of all since each causality, of the end and of the exemplar, does not tend to the effect except in some way by means of the agent, by moving or directing its action.

24. But this can be disproved, first, from the very notion of explaining exemplary causality, and the difference which is found in this between it and the final. For the exemplar is said to be the form in the likeness or imitation of which something is made; in which mode of causing there seems necessarily to be included a distinction between the form which is the exemplar and the exemplified form or the effected thing, because the same is not said to be made in imitation of itself, nor to be assimilated to itself; therefore the same cannot be called the exemplar or idea of itself. But this reason seems to have its force and efficacy in the mode of speaking alone. For someone could answer that it is not of the notion of exemplar that the effect be made in its likeness or imitation; but, as Seneca says, that the exemplar is that looking to which the artificer effects what he intended; for in these words a relation is not involved which demands distinction between exemplar and exemplified, and yet they sufficiently declare the notion of exemplar. The assumption is evident, for the artificer, looking with the mind to some possible artefact, can intend to effect that very thing; therefore the whole and sufficient definition of exemplar is saved without the distinction which the likeness or imitation of the effect with respect to the exemplar demands. And this is confirmed and declared further, for if, when the artificer conceives one thing and proposes to make another distinct thing in its likeness or imitation, this suffices for the prior thing to have the notion of exemplar, why will not the same thing objectively conceived, if it is proposed to be effected in reality itself as it was conceived, have the notion of exemplar with respect to itself? For in truth it seems to direct the action of the agent in the same way; indeed so much the more perfectly, the greater the adequation of the thing made to the thing conceived, which will be the greater the greater the identity.

25. The proper reason of this part, then, seems to be sought from this last which we were now saying, namely, that the office of the proper and internal exemplar, of which we treat, is to direct the action of the agent as to specification (as they say); but this office is not of the known object, but of its cognition, inasmuch as in it it is contained in representative being. Which reason will be explained more from the following assertion.

The second assertion and approval of the second opinion

26. I say secondly: the exemplar is formally in the intellect as its formal concept. We use the word of inhering here, since we are now speaking abstractly and in general of the exemplar, either created or uncreated; it is to be understood broadly, either through union and proper inherence, or through identity and simplicity. Thus, then, the conclusion posited is very consonant with the expressions of St. Thomas and the Saints adduced above. For while they say that the mind is the seat of ideas, and that divine ideas are unchangeable and eternal reasons of things, and intelligible forms, they sufficiently signify both that they are true things existing from eternity, and that they are in God intrinsically, and that they are in Him formally, inasmuch as He is understanding and intellectually representing all things, which belongs to Him by reason of His concept or act of understanding. Many have taught that Plato thought in the same way of ideas, and Augustine especially indicates it in the places cited. And Caelius Rhodiginus explained it excellently, bk. XVI of the Ancient Readings, c. 17, in these words: God, who is and is called omnipotent, in the mind inherent in Himself fashions and in a certain way paints the natures of the things to be created, all which we perceive in these bodies; there the globes of the heavens and the masses of the elements, all things finally, even the forms of animals, are begotten, which, crowded together in the divine mind, the Platonists do not doubt to be and to be called by the warmth of God ideas. Similarly Eugubinus, bk. I De Peren. philosoph., c. 12, reports from Plutarch that Socrates and Plato placed ideas in the thoughts and senses of God, that is, subsisting in the mind; and below, from the same Plutarch, he observes that the divine mind and these ideas are the same; and from Philo and Plotinus, that the whole series of ideas and the immense wisdom of God itself are the same; and from Trismegistus and the Chaldeans, that ideas are the thoughts of the Father, and the universal reasons of nature. And that the same is the opinion of Aristotle about the created exemplar I shall show a little below.

27. This opinion can be proved by reason from a sufficient enumeration of parts; for the exemplar is in the intellect, and not only objectively; therefore it is in it formally or inherently; but it is not the intellect itself, inasmuch as it is or is understood by us as bare power, because as such it is not a representing form, which is of the notion of exemplar; and by the same reason it is not some habit of those which are called judicative and hold themselves on the side of the power, as can be, for example, art in the human intellect, because a habit of this kind too is not formally a representing form, but only inclining to judgement. Nor yet in the human intellect is it the intelligible species, both because, according to the truer opinion, this species does not represent formally, but is only the seed of the object effectively cooperating to the formal representation, which takes place through the act or word; and also because the species by itself is not an operative cause ad extra, or directive of operation, which belongs to the exemplar. It remains, then, that the practical formal concept itself of the thing to be effected is properly the exemplar.

28. The various offices of the exemplar. The first. The second.—Secondly it is proved from the office or function of the exemplar itself; for it belongs to it to determine the external action of the intellectual agent; and therefore as to this it performs the office of a form, for natural things are determined to their actions through natural forms or qualities; but the intellectual agent through an intellectual form proportioned to it, as St. Thomas rightly noted, in the said qq. 15 of I p. and 3 De Veritate. The exemplar, then, is a form actuating and informing the intellectual agent itself; but it is not another form than its conception, as has been declared. Again, it pertains to the office of the exemplar to direct the action of the intellectual agent so that it tend to a certain terminus and goal, so that it be not done by chance nor in an irrational way; and therefore Augustine said that it is as certain that God has exemplars as it is certain that He operates from reason; but this direction does not take place except through the actual representation of the mind, which is as it were a certain light which goes before showing the way and mode and terminus of the operation; but this whole takes place formally through the formal concept of the mind itself. And for this cause the thing itself directly conceived cannot properly be called the exemplar; for if that thing is the very one which is to be made, and wholly the same in the individual, it is not that which directs, but that to which the action is directed by means of the exemplar; nor yet is it properly proposed to be imitated, but to be made; which, in order that it be made rightly, the action is directed through the exemplar conceived in the mind. But if that conceived thing is another, as is an external image in the created artificer, or something similar, such a thing is not per se necessary for the operation of art, which takes place through the exemplar, for it would be done better through proper and immediate cognition of the very thing to be effected by art; that external aid (so to speak) objected to the mind, then, is not the proper and per se exemplar, but is as it were remote matter, or an object helping to form some sort of or imperfect exemplar. Finally, if that other conceived thing is only a cause virtually containing the thing to be made through the exemplar, as is the divine essence in the uncreated artificer, that as such cannot be the exemplar, because it is in no way a form formally containing or representing the thing to be made, as we argued above. Nor does that as such direct the action of the artificer, but is only as it were a reason (remote according to reason) for conceiving the exemplar, or the idea, which directs the operation of the artificer.

29. The third.—Thirdly, it is commonly attributed to the exemplar to be the measure and rule of the truth and propriety of the thing made. In which sense (as we treated above, disp. VIII) many authors, and sometimes St. Thomas, say that the truth of created beings is taken from conformity to the exemplars which are in the divine intellect, as from their measure; but that the truth of artificial things is taken from conformity to the human intellect; for the exemplar of the artificer is the measure of the artefact. But this properly belongs to the formal concept; for the objective concept, if it is wholly proper and adequate to the thing to be made, is not distinguished from the thing itself; but the same is not the measure of itself; but if it is the concept of another thing, either it behaves per accidens and only remotely, as has been said, or it does not have in itself the form of the effect, either formally or representatively, and therefore as such cannot have the notion of measure.

30. The fourth.—Fourthly, it is attributed to the idea to be the principle of cognition, as St. Thomas notes, the said q. 15, a. 1; but this is not to be understood of an effective principle, because, as we said, the intelligible species is not properly the exemplar; therefore it must be understood of the formal principle; for the object precisely as known, or as terminative, is not properly called the principle of cognition, since it is rather its end and terminus; but the formal principle of cognition is the formal concept itself; therefore that is most properly the exemplar, if it is the concept of the thing to be effected.

The third assertion

31. I say, then, thirdly: it is not of the notion of the exemplar as such, or⁶ as to its being, that it be actually and directly known as the object which; yet in order that it cause, it must in some way be known, and the more perfectly it has been known, the more perfectly, other things being equal, it will cause. This conclusion is proposed in order to dissolve the foundation of the contrary opinion, and in it we suppose that the exemplar causes, although it has not yet been proved, because, so taken in general, it is per se manifest; and then it is necessary for us in order to distinguish in what the proper being of the exemplar consists, and what is the condition required in order that it cause. For it is commonly said that it is of the notion of exemplar that it be actually known, because it seems not to have been sufficiently noticed that, just as in the end those two are distinguished, namely, the being of the end itself through which it causes, and being known, which is a condition necessary for causing, so in the exemplar these two are to be distinguished; for being known as such, inasmuch as it is said of the object directly known, since it is only an extrinsic denomination, cannot be the proper notion constituting the exemplar itself, nor can it be in it the formal principle of causing.

32. Moreover, as we said of the end, that it does not move to desiring according to known being as to the denomination (so to speak), but as to the thing denominated, or as to the very being which is known, so the exemplar does not direct to effecting in the effect the very known being as to the denomination, nor such being as is being in cognition; therefore the exemplar in the being of exemplar is not constituted through known being as such. Hence also in the external and remote exemplar, when an image proposed to sight is called an exemplar in imitation of which another is made, although that image must be seen or known, yet it is not constituted in that mode of exemplar through being seen, but this is a necessary condition; but to be so painted or figured is the proper being of such exemplar. And according to the opinion asserting that the artefact itself, or the creature objected to the mind, is the exemplar, it cannot be said that being known, as to the denomination of known, constitutes it in the being of exemplar, since in the effect likeness or conformity is not intended as to that denomination, but as to the natural or artificial being which is known in such thing; therefore the same must be said in every opinion, namely, that the exemplar is not constituted in the being of exemplar formally and precisely from the fact that it is known, but from its proper and as it were intrinsic being, whatever that may be, which either is known or can be known.

33. Hence, then, the prior part of the conclusion seems sufficiently proved; for if the exemplar is not constituted formally through known being, then to be known as such, especially directly and as the object which, is not of the notion of the exemplar inasmuch as it is exemplar. And this can also be confirmed from the first conclusion; for it was said that the exemplar is not, formally speaking, the objective concept, which formally in the being of such concept is constituted through known being; therefore this being is not formally of the notion of exemplar as such.

34. But the arguments of the prior opinion in part confirm the other part of the conclusion, and I take it from St. Thomas, I p., q. 15, a. 2, ad 2. And it is declared first in divine exemplars; for God, knowing creatures in His essence, forms (to speak in our manner) reasons or concepts of them, through which He knows them directly, although as secondary objects of His knowledge. But because His knowledge is most perfect, knowing and forming the exemplars of creatures, He knows in Himself that concept which intellectually represents creatures; which is to know in Himself the exemplars of creatures. Where, distinguishing those two in reason, we understand that the formal exemplars themselves are first, and then are known, which, although it seems to be a certain reflection, in God yet, on account of the supreme simplicity and infinity of that act, both are known by the same most simple act. In this way, then, there is in God the idea (so to speak) not only formed but also known, and as such it has all that which on the part of the intellect is necessary in order that it cause in its genus, because it is both a form existing in the mind of the artificer and is so proposed and applied that, looking to it, He can effect the thing represented through it in its imitation. And so, distinguishing in God according to reason the idea from the cognition of the idea, as we can also distinguish in reason direct from reflex cognition, we understand both that the idea as to its being consists in the formal concept which God directly has of the operable thing or thing to be made, as it is to be made; but the cognition of the idea we understand to be as it were a certain perfect application and conjunction to the artificer himself, so that he may produce the effect in its imitation.

35. St. Thomas reasons almost in this way above about the exemplar existing in the mind of the artificer: For while the artificer (he says) understands the form of the house in matter, he is said to understand the house; but while he understands the form of the house as speculated by himself, from the fact that he understands himself to understand it, he understands the idea or reason of the house. Where he plainly distinguishes that it is one thing to form the idea, another to understand the idea. For if the artificer, while he understands the form and reason of the house speculated by himself, understands the idea, then while he speculates the reason and form of the house itself he forms the idea; but in order that he operate through it and effect the house in its imitation, he reflects upon the reason of the house as speculated by himself, and so recognizes the idea, and through that cognition as it were applies the exemplar so that he cause through it. Thus, then, it is established how the cognition of the idea serves causality.

36. But at once a doubt arises, whether a reflection of this kind is simply necessary in the artificer in order that through the exemplar conceived by himself he can operate outwardly; for in God that as it were reflection is always necessary, not so much on account of causality as on account of the infinite perfection of that knowledge, which cannot be so terminated to some object that it does not intrinsically behold itself under every notion and representation. But in the created artificer, since that reflection must take place through a distinct act, it is difficult to believe either that it is necessary or that it always intervenes whenever the artificer operates through his art, or through the exemplar formed by it. Indeed experience seems to show the contrary; for he who writes or builds is not always in that actual reflection while he operates.

37. What cognition of the exemplar is required in order that the artificer can use it.—Hence some say that that reflection is not necessary, and that the created artificer uses his exemplar by knowing it, not as it is a certain quality inhering in the mind, but as it is a form and image representing the artefact objectively. As many think that the word of the mind is a quality distinct from the act of knowing, serving cognition as the proximate object in which the represented thing is known; for what in speculable things is the word is believed to be the exemplar in operable things. And this latter indeed I think true in created things; yet, as that opinion about the word of the mind is false, so also in the present case that way of explaining the cognition of the exemplar or idea through direct cognition of the exemplified thing is not true, namely, that it is the proximate object in which another is known, because neither can that mode of objective representation through formal likeness be understood in that quality, which has neither formal nor real agreement with the external object, nor yet can it be understood how in it the external object is directly known, it being in no way known. But these things are common to the word of the mind explained in that way; and therefore I omit them, and suppose that the formal concept is immediately terminated at the thing itself which it represents, and that it does not represent otherwise than by referring to the intellect the object itself, as an intellectual form constituting the intellect itself in last act; and that the same formal concept is called the word of the mind inasmuch as it is the internal terminus of the intellectual action or conception of it; but is called exemplar when it is of an artificial or operable thing.

38. To the difficulty posited, then, others grant that reflex cognition is necessary, through which the artificer, looking to the exemplar, that is, to the direct concept which he formed of the thing, can make such a thing as he conceived in thought. And to the experience they answer that internal acts of this kind do not always fall under experience; for often the intellect compares one thing to another and does not advert that it compares; and so too it can compare its own cognition and the exemplar, so as to measure through it the thing which it is making, although it does not advert that it uses that comparison; but if it adverts, it will understand that it does not do this without reflection upon its cognition. And to me indeed this does not displease, if we only understand that this reflection intervenes when the artificer uses his exemplar in a perfect way to commensurate and define the form which he must give to his effect; and this St. Thomas plainly seems to have willed above.

39. But I think it must be added that this formal reflection is not necessary during the whole time during which the exterior operation proceeding from the art lasts; which experience and reason seem to me sufficiently to prove, because the direct representation itself, and as it were the intuition of the mind about the thing or operation to be made, suffices to direct the operation. Then, therefore, it is not necessary that the exemplar be known as the object which, but it suffices that it be in some way known implicitly and by way of tendency to the object, by that implicit and virtual reflection only which any act of the mind includes in itself, by reason of which it is said to be known by itself as by which, although it is not known as which. And therefore I said in the conclusion that the exemplar is known in some way, yet is applied more perfectly to its work the more perfectly it is known.

The arguments of the prior opinion are satisfied

40. In what the end and the exemplar agree and differ as to the necessity of cognition.—To the first argument of the prior opinion, then, it has already been answered that the reason of the end and of the exemplar is far diverse; for, although they agree in this, that each causes as existing in cognition, yet in the mode of causing they have diversity, by reason of which the end can be the very thing which terminates the action of the agent, because it draws its affection to itself; but the exemplar cannot be that same thing, but another, which is its measure and rule. From which it comes about that the end is in cognition in such a way that it is not necessarily cognition; but the exemplar per se and proximately required is in cognition in such a way that it is intrinsically also a certain cognition, or concept of the intellect; for it is an intellectual rule and measure.

41. To the second it is answered that that expression, that the exemplar is that in the likeness of which the effect is made, and which the artificer imitates in operating, is easily verified of the formal concept itself, because those expressions are not to be understood of formal likeness, which is natural or entitative, but of likeness according to intellectual representation, which the formal concept has about the thing which it expresses, and this imitation or conformity the artificer intends in his operation; but that expression, that the artificer, looking to the exemplar, operates in its imitation, need not be taken with all propriety. For that mode of speaking seems to have arisen from sensible exemplars, which men because of their imperfection are wont to use, and to look to them as to proximate objects to be imitated. Nevertheless I have already said that exemplars of this kind are as it were per accidens; for per se the internal exemplar suffices and is required for the action, and its imitation is immediately intended; and therefore the notion of exemplar could sufficiently be explained by saying that it is that by which the artificer represents to himself the thing which he is going to effect, in order that he may imitate it, or rather that he may fulfil its representation. But because, as we said, the exemplar itself too can be reflexly known, and that reflection contributes to its exercising perfectly and completely the office of exemplar, therefore it can also properly be verified that the artificer, looking to his exemplar, operates.

42. The third argument has no difficulty; for the multitude of ideas in God is not according to the thing, but only according to reason, through respects of reason to diverse creatable things, and therefore it is not repugnant that that plurality or distinction of reason be understood in the formal concept itself or knowledge of God. But what kind and how great that plurality of ideas is, and through what intellect that distinction is made, and with respect to which things ideas are to be distinguished, has more of a question of the name than of the thing; but that disputation, whatever it is, belongs to the theologians, not to us.

43. To the fourth it is answered, in the first place, that it supposes something false, that the Blessed do not form a word; for they truly conceive God as He is in Himself, and so form in themselves a formal concept by which they represent to themselves God as He is in Himself; and that concept is the word, and nothing else. Hence, if they know creatures in God, they also form in themselves a reason or word of them, and that could have the force of an exemplar, if with it were given power of operating which could be directed by such exemplar. I add moreover that the Blessed, by seeing God and the creature in God, also see the idea which God has of creatures, and therefore the very formal concept of God can in some way undergo the notion of idea, even with respect to another intellect, to which it is per se and immediately objected; but that too would be remotely and mediately; for the proximate exemplar is always that which the operator himself forms in his own intellect.

1. This question supposes that the exemplar is truly and properly a cause; for this we take as certain from the common opinion of philosophers and theologians; for in those things which operate through intellect the exemplar is per se necessary, in order that they can in a rational way direct their action to a definite effect; for since they are not of their nature limited to determinate forms to be given to effects, as natural agents are, it is necessary that they be determined in their own proper and intellectual way. And although as to the exercise of their action they are determined through the will, yet as to specification and direction they are led through the intellect; but for this they need proper exemplars of such effects, so that they can effect them in an artful and intellectual way. And although Seneca, epist. 66, thinks that by this reason it is only proved that the exemplar is something required, but not therefore to be numbered per se among causes, otherwise many other things could similarly be counted per se among causes, nevertheless it is truer that it pertains per se to some genus of causality, or some mode of causing, although perhaps it does not increase the number of causes, nor constitute per se a new genus of causing. But both will be declared more conveniently by explaining to what genus of cause the exemplar pertains.

The exemplar is neither a material nor a final cause

2. And to begin from the clearer things, it is certain that the exemplar neither pertains per se nor is reduced to the genus of material cause, because it has no proportion or likeness with that cause, because the exemplar neither indicates something potential, but rather something actual and formal; nor does it concur in any way by receiving, but rather in its own way by actuating and determining. But about the final cause someone could doubt; for the office of the exemplar is said to be that the effect be made in its likeness or imitation; but this is the relation of the end; therefore the concurrence of the exemplar is nothing but a certain final concurrence. The minor and the whole discourse I prove from St. Thomas, III Cont. Gent., c. 19, where he proves chiefly by this reason that all things tend to God as to the ultimate end, because all intend to be assimilated to Him; therefore, the reason being converted, we rightly gather that, when God produces things in order that they be assimilated to Him, He concurs as their end; and then He concurs as exemplar; therefore. Indeed in reason 2 St. Thomas so gathers: The agent is said to be the end of the effect inasmuch as the effect tends to the likeness of the agent; but God is so the end of things that He is also their first agent; therefore all things intend as ultimate end to be assimilated to God. God, therefore, as He is that to which the creature is assimilated, has the notion of end; therefore also as imitable by creatures; for these words, to be imitable by creatures, and to be that to which creatures are assimilated, seem to signify the same relation; but to be imitable says the relation of exemplary cause; therefore it coincides with the relation of final cause. Hence more clearly in reason 4 St. Thomas says that all created things are as it were certain images of the first agent; but that the perfection of an image consists in this, that it represent its exemplar, and therefore all creatures intend this representation as their end. In which discourse he plainly seems to confuse the exemplar with the end.

3. But nevertheless all authors think that exemplary causality is far diverse from final, because the causality of the end consists in the metaphorical motion of the will. But the notion of exemplar consists precisely in this, that it be a form determining the action of the agent, as is taken from St. Thomas, I p., q. 44, a. 3. But the proposed difficulty proceeds as if the exemplar were some known thing which is proposed to be imitated, and not rather the intellectual concept itself of the thing. But in order that we may answer in every way, that mode of speaking being admitted, it must be said that, although it happens that the same thing is the end and the exemplar of the same effect, as the arguments made prove, yet under a diverse notion of causality. For as end it moves to effecting the representation of itself; but as exemplar it determines the action of the agent, and in a certain way gives species to the effect; hence it exercises the notion of end as it is a certain good; but the notion of exemplar as it is a certain form. But we can add, in order to declare this more, that the exemplar can be considered either as a certain terminus in imitation of which the action tends, or as a principle directing and regulating the action of the agent. Under this latter notion it exercises exemplary causality; for the former pertains more to the notion of end, because under that notion it is that for the sake of which the action is done. For when the image of Christ is painted in order that it may represent Him to us, Christ in truth under that notion has the notion of end, and the difficulty touched upon proves this too. And therefore that does not please me which some say, that the causality of the exemplar consists in the passive imitation of the thing made in its likeness; for this passive imitation properly belongs to the end, when in it nothing else is intended but its representation. Therefore in the passive action itself it must be distinguished whether it is taken as alluring the affection, or as determining and as it were specifying the action, or the form induced through it; for under the former notion it will pertain to the causality of the end, under the latter to the notion of exemplar.

4. And for this cause I think it most probable that proper exemplary causality, distinct from the final, is found per se in the internal concept formally expressing and representing the thing to be effected by art; for, although through the action conformity with that concept so representing is intended, yet it is not intended as the end of the action, formally speaking of conformity, but the form itself in which there is conformity is intended; but the conformity itself is only attended to as a certain commensuration, and as it were rule of the form to be induced. But in the external exemplar a distinction is needed, for it more puts on the notion of end, most of all when its representation is per se intended, for its honour or something similar; but sometimes it also has only the notion of measure and not of end, as when the artificer outwardly makes a small model of the whole building; for then he intends conformity to it not as end, but as regulation, so to speak.

5. And in a similar way it seems it can be said quite probably (distinguishing in God according to reason the intellectual ideas, as they were explained by us in the preceding section, and the divine essence as participable in being and in the perfections of being by creatures) that under the former notion it has proper exemplary causality, and as such the conformity of creatures to the ideas is intended, not according to their relation to the end, but to the measure and rule; but under the latter notion the divine essence has the notion of end, and so too the likeness of creatures to God is intended as to their end. For under the former notion it is intended that the creature be such as it is represented in the idea; but under this latter it is intended that it represent the divine being and divine perfection as much as it can; and therefore the latter relation is not to God as to exemplar, but as to end.

6. Finally, hence I think it is most fittingly said that in the actions and effects of God, as they are from Him, nothing outside Him can exercise exemplary causality properly taken, but that He Himself is the singular exemplar of all His actions and effects, because nothing outside Him can be the rule and measure of His actions as they are from Him. Hence if sometimes something created is said to be the exemplar of another, as Christ, as man, is called the exemplar of just men, either it is to be understood broadly of the exemplar as it were materially, as it puts on the notion of proximate end; for so Christ can be called exemplar, because in His honour others are made just like Him. Or it is to be expounded with respect to secondary causes; in which way too Christ can be called the exemplar of men, because He has been proposed to them so that they may look to Him as to an exemplar which they may imitate.

The opinion reducing the exemplar to the formal cause is proposed

7. The material and final cause being omitted, then, about the other two there is controversy among authors. For many bring back the exemplar to the genus of formal cause, and it is believed to be the opinion of Aristotle, who in numbering the causes named the exemplary together with the formal. And Albert holds this opinion, In I, dist. 20, a. 1; Cajetan, I p., q. 6, a. 3, at the end, and q. 44, a. 3; Thomas of Strasbourg, In I, dist. 45, a. 2. It is taken from Durandus there, q. 2, inasmuch as he denies that the exemplar pertains to the genus of efficient cause. Giles holds the same, proposition 37 On the Eucharist. These authors suppose that the exemplar concurs only as a known object, in imitation of which the agent operates something; and therefore they do not think it can have efficiency, and hence they conclude that it has extrinsic formal causality, which consists only in this, that through passive imitation it concurs to giving a like form and species to the effect. Indeed there are those who think that the exemplar is not reduced to the genus of intrinsic formal cause, but constitutes per se and directly a new genus of extrinsic formal cause; which Henry thinks, Quodl. IX, q. 2, whom some moderns follow. And indeed, the former part being supposed, they speak quite consistently; for, although the exemplar agrees in name with the form, as the very name of idea shows, and as we noted above from Augustine, yet in causing it has a far diverse notion. For the informing form is intrinsic and an essential part of the composite; but the exemplar is an extrinsic form; hence from this side they differ more among themselves than matter and form, and not less than the efficient form and the form made, for the efficient form too is a form and is an extrinsic cause, whose participation is the informing form proceeding from it; therefore, if the exemplar is an extrinsic formal cause, it constitutes a new genus of cause as much as the efficient form.

The opinion bringing back the exemplar to the efficient cause is preferred

8. But to me the opinion of those is more approved who deny that the exemplary cause constitutes a proper genus of cause, but say that it pertains to the efficient cause. Which Alexander of Hales holds, I p., q. 23, memb. 4, a. 1; Bonaventure, In III, dist. 11, a. 1, q. 3; Scotus, In I, dist. 2, q. 2, and dist. 36, a. 1; and there Hervaeus, q. 1. And first this opinion is proved from the mind of Aristotle, to which the opposite opinion seems to contradict, though modestly, because it constitutes a fifth genus of cause distinct from those which Aristotle numbered. For, although they call the exemplar by the name of form, yet in truth it is a cause not less diverse from the informing form than is the efficient form, as we declared in explaining that very opinion, and that agreement with form is scarcely more than in name, for the notion is far diverse, since the one is essentially and intrinsically a form constituting the thing; but in another way it is only called a form because extrinsically it represents or moves to making something like itself. Hence Aristotle did not number the exemplar with the form in this sense, but either because the name of idea which he uses signifies generically the same as form, or because (as he himself reports) Plato so posited ideas as exemplary forms that in them he constituted the essences and species of things. Add that Aristotle always numbers among efficient causes art itself, under which he comprehends the exemplar; hence in VII Metaph. he said that health outside is made efficiently from the health which is in the mind, that is, from the exemplar of health.

9. Secondly, that opinion seems founded on a false principle, namely, that the exemplar is some thing objectively and directly known, so that in it per se primo the notion of exemplary cause consists; for that this is false can be established from what was said in the preceding section. And it is declared moreover in this way, for in the created artificer such an exemplar is not per se necessary; for that which human artificers are wont to fashion for themselves outwardly is only a certain aid, which helps to conceive the thing inwardly and to preserve memory; hence, if without such a sensible object they could exactly conceive the house to be made and have it present inwardly, they would not need that extrinsic exemplar. Again, neither inwardly is some object distinct from the effect to be made by art per se necessary, for, although in men it regularly so happens, yet (as we argued above) that distinction too is as it were per accidens, because the artificer does not intend the effect except inasmuch as it is wholly the same, and in that in which it is diverse it does not proceed from exemplary causality. And moreover this is not universal in the created artificer as such; for angels too can make artificial things, and it is not necessary that they conceive them confusedly, but distinctly, and the same in number as they fashion. And Christ the Lord, as man, if He had willed to operate some artefact, would look to no other object except to that very thing in the individual distinctly known which He was going to make. This causality, then, is not per se from a distinct object, nor yet can it be from the same in number, as was shown in the preceding section, and a fortiori the same can be proved of the divine ideas from what was said above; therefore this causality does not consist in that as it were extrinsic information, which is as it were through the comparison and imitation of one form to another.

10. I add moreover that, even when a distinct extrinsic exemplar intervenes, it effects nothing per se about the effect of art which can have the proper notion of real causality and can truly and per se be called formal causality. For if we speak of the sensible exemplar, it first and per se moves to the knowledge of itself, and in that genus concurs efficiently as a motive object. Next it can mediately move to conceiving or effecting another like or proportional thing, and as to this too it is compared after the manner of end, or of remote efficient, and almost per accidens. For if the thing is attentively considered, per se it moves only to the conception of itself, from which the intellect fabricates or conceives another like thing, and through the will intends to effect it; but if such an object moves the will itself, as when an image which pleases moves to making another like it, this motion pertains to the end, not to the exemplar. No causality, then, intervenes there which deserves the name of formal causality. Moreover, either that causality is about the conception of the intellect, and this not, because with respect to that it is rather objective efficiency, as has been said; or it is about the artificial thing, and this too not, both because with respect to that such an exemplar behaves very remotely, for proximately the artefact is not regulated except according to the conception of the mind; and also because (final causality being set aside) that the artificer intends to assimilate the effect to an extrinsic object is only a relation or extrinsic denomination coming from the act of his will, and does not add to the effect essential dependence on another object, which would pertain to the genus of formal cause; indeed not even to any genus of cause per se, unless perhaps, as I said, such representation or likeness is intended under the notion of end. For the artificer per se only intends to induce such a form into his effect, for which per se he needs only the proper conception of that form; but that this form be assimilated to another extrinsic one is per accidens to the causality of art as such; therefore also to the causality of the exemplar. And this reason proves of the cognition of any other created object, whether particular, or universal or confused.

11. But in God a special reason can seem to intervene, because God does not know the creatures to be made by Him except in His essence and through His essence; and this belongs to Him per se. But nevertheless, although in our way of understanding the essence is as it were the medium for knowing creatures, yet in order to operation ad extra God does not per se operate as knowing precisely His essence, but as knowing the creatures themselves which He is going to produce; and therefore that order according to reason which is per se between the essence as known and creatures as known, namely, that the essence is the reason of knowing creatures, is with respect to the exemplary causality of creatures remote and per accidens; therefore by reason of it the essence as known cannot be called the extrinsic formal cause of creatures. Hence, if what many opine were true, that the divine essence is not the reason of knowing creatures as a medium or as a known object, but only as a mirror, or as a most eminent intelligible species, as regards exemplary causality it would matter nothing, for God could equally well by His uncreated art produce creatures such as He conceived; therefore that that cognition of creatures is understood by us according to reason to arise from the cognition of the essence, as of a cause eminently containing creatures, is something remote, and as it were per accidens to exemplary causality. Most of all since it was shown above that the essence as known precisely without creatures formally known cannot have the true notion of exemplar, nor yet can another as it were middle cognition be understood between the cognition of the essence precisely and the cognition of creatures in the essence, which may be called the cognition of the essence as participable by creatures, because, as I also said above, this is nothing else than to know creatures as participative of the essence (so to speak). It remains, then, that the proper causality of the exemplar is not in some known object distinct from the effect which is made in its imitation; therefore its causality will not be formal, since it was said to pertain to that genus only on account of that objective or passive imitation.

12. Lastly it is proved directly that the causality of the exemplar pertains to efficiency. First indeed, because art is a principle of effecting; hence Aristotle, treating of causes, says that Polyclitus is the cause per accidens of the statue, but the sculptor the cause per se, because namely it formally says art, which is the per se principle of that effect; but art does not cause except by means of the idea; for art teaches to fabricate in the mind both the thing to be effected and also the way and mode of executing it; and in this way it is the principle of the artificial effect; hence St. Thomas, III p., q. 78, a. 2, says thus: The artificial form is the likeness of the ultimate effect to which the intention of the artificer is borne, as the form of the art in the mind of the builder is principally the form of the house built, but of the building consequently; therefore the exemplar itself too is compared to the artificer as the proximate form through which in its way it operates; as, therefore, the form of the agent pertains to the efficient cause inasmuch as it is to it the principle of acting, so too the exemplar, inasmuch as it is the form of the artificer by which he operates, pertains to the efficient cause. Which the common mode of speaking of philosophers and theologians also confirms; for so they say that the exterior house proceeds from the house which is in the mind of the artificer, as we reported above of health from Aristotle; and St. Thomas, Quodl. VII, a. 3, says thus: The likeness of the thing known is in the knower in two ways: in one way as caused by the thing, in another way as the cause of the thing, as is evident in the artificer, who knows the artefact through that form through which he makes it. From which he infers below that the ideal reasons existing in the mind of God are efficacious for knowing the singulars of which they are the cause. He repeats the same, Quodl. VIII, a. 2; and in a similar way speak of the divine ideas Dionysius, c. 5 De Divin. nominibus; and Augustine, bk. XII De Civit. Dei, c. 25. For they call them effective of things. And for the same cause the theologians say that God is the efficient cause of things through intellect and will; for intellect and knowledge do not cause ad extra except through the idea; therefore, if knowledge is a principle of effecting ad extra, so also is the exemplar.

13. Hence it is confirmed; for to the action of the artificer three things concur, art, will and executing power; but the will, as moving the executing power, pertains to the genus of efficient cause; therefore also art as directing and determining it; but it directs and determines by means of the exemplar; therefore the exemplar pertains to the same genus of cause. It is confirmed moreover, because, just as the natural agent is completed in the notion of principle of acting through the form, so the intellectual agent is completed in its order through the exemplar, for just as the natural agent through the form contains the likeness of the effect and is determined to it, so the intellectual agent through the exemplar has in itself the likeness of the effect and receives a certain determination to it, at least as to specification, for as to exercise it is not determined through the exemplar alone; and therefore it needs the will; therefore the exemplar pertains to the genus of efficient cause as a form in its way completing a certain genus of efficient cause, namely the intellectual or artful.

14. You will say: by the same reason it could be said that the end does not constitute a proper genus of cause, but completes a certain genus of efficient, so that it be sufficiently constituted for acting, namely the intellectual agent, which, unless it is moved or determined by the end, cannot act. It is answered by denying the consequence, because the end is not compared to the agent as constituting it proximately apt for acting, but rather supposes it so constituted and moves it to act; but the exemplar does not suppose it completely constituted as to its peculiar mode of acting, namely artificial or intellectual. Next, the end as such is compared to effects according to a certain peculiar mode of dependence which they have on it, inasmuch as they are for its sake; but the exemplar has no peculiar relation per se to the effect except only inasmuch as it directs or determines the action of the agent. Wherefore, just as the will of the agent does not constitute per se a new genus of cause, but determines such a mode of acting, namely voluntarily, so knowledge, or art, or (what is the same) the exemplar does not constitute a new genus of cause, but completes a peculiar mode of effecting, namely artfully.

Corollaries of the preceding doctrine

15. And hence another reason can by the way be gathered why Aristotle named the exemplar together with the form; for the exemplar is a certain form not so much with respect to the thing to be effected through it as with respect to the artificer himself, whom in its way it informs and constitutes in act in his genus, so that he be sufficient for acting. But if with respect to the exemplified thing the exemplar is called a form, this is not on account of formal causality which it has about it, but because it contains it in itself in some way after the manner of an image, or in representative being; but all images are wont to be called forms; hence also the fourth species of quality is called form and figure.

16. Secondly it is also understood by the way that common distinction of a threefold form, from which, out of which, and towards which; for by these words are signified neither three distinct forms nor yet three distinct formal causalities; but only three relations, which can belong to the same form with respect to diverse things. For the same form of fire, inasmuch as it is the principle from which another fire proceeds, is called the form from which; but inasmuch as it constitutes the generating fire itself in its being, it is called the form out of which; but inasmuch as in its likeness the form in the generated thing is made, it can be called the form towards which. Hence that particle, from which, denotes the relation of efficient cause; out of which, the relation of intrinsic formal cause; towards which, although it is thought to denote the exemplary cause, yet in truth is equivocal; for fire properly generates fire in its likeness, and yet its form is not an exemplar. Hence through that particle there can be denoted in that form the relation of final cause, as we reported above from St. Thomas, that any natural agent acts for its own sake as for the sake of the end, inasmuch as it acts in order to produce an effect like itself, in which it may be conserved at least according to species, or in which its perfection may be in some way represented, if we speak more generally of the agent. And according to this universal consideration every form from which is also towards which, under a diverse notion of extrinsic cause, and without formal causality. In order, then, that the form towards which be said peculiarly of exemplary causality, it must be understood that it is a form proximately regulating the effect to which the proper intention of the agent is directed, and therefore it can be said to be that according to whose norm the effect is made. Hence, just as the form from which is not so called because it exercises formal causality about the effect which is from it, but because it is the form of the cause itself, so, although the exemplar is called the form towards which, it need not be understood to be so called because it exercises formal causality with respect to that which is made in its imitation, but with respect to the artificer whom it informs, unless it is called form more broadly, not on account of causality, but on account of representation. But when we say that the exemplar is the form of the artificer, it is to be taken as of the form of the agent, for in the created artificer or agent it is truly a form; but in the uncreated it is only a form in our way of understanding, or has whatever of perfection is in a form, imperfection being set aside, that is, intrinsic causality or information.

17. Thirdly, it can be understood from what has been said why the exemplary cause is commonly distinguished from the efficient, if it too is efficient; for this too can be objected against our opinion; as St. Thomas, I part, q. 44, when in the first and second articles he had shown that God is the efficient cause of all things, in a. 3 inquires whether God is the exemplary cause. But I say that the exemplary cause is not so much to be distinguished from the efficient cause as under the efficient cause, or under those forms or conditions which constitute a peculiar genus of efficient. As in the said example, after it is established that God is an acting cause, it is the same to ask whether He is exemplary as to ask whether He is an agent through intellect, and whether He has of Himself whatever is necessary for that mode of causing. It is true, however, that, if we attend to the force of the names, the exemplary cause is not said of every agent which operates through an exemplar, but only of the form which has the force and notion of exemplar; for the artificer is not called the exemplary cause of the artefact, but to have an exemplar, or to operate through an exemplar, because exemplar signifies as it were in the abstract the form itself. But God, because through Himself He knows and represents all things, is therefore simply called the exemplary cause of all things.

18. Finally, it is established from all that has been said that this genus of causality is properly and intrinsically found only in intellectual agents, inasmuch as they operate something ad extra through their art or knowledge. Hence it is found most perfectly in God, indeed in Him alone is this causality with respect to all substances and all natural accidents, as was also touched upon above, because no intellectual creature can per se make anything of this kind through art, but at most per accidens, by applying active things to passive ones. Hence proper exemplary causality can be found in created agents only of artificial things. And with respect to these too God has the power and property of first exemplary cause, not only because the first exemplars even of artefacts themselves are in the divine mind, but also because through them He actually inflows, and immediately in His genus, with all lower artificers. Indeed under this notion too all the actions and effects of natural causes are immediately from the divine exemplary cause, and under that notion or in that genus they have no other nearer cause; for, just as God concurs immediately through His power to all those actions, so through His ideas He directs them, and in this way, just as God is the first and immediate cause of all actions in the genus of efficient and of end, so also in the notion of exemplar.