Disputationes metaphysicae

1. The twofold mode of ultimate end.—In two ways, as we said in the foregoing, some end can be understood to be ultimate, namely, either only in a qualified sense, or in some series of means, or with respect to some intention and the elections which proceed from it, or simply and with respect to all things which can be ordered to an end; here we treat chiefly of the ultimate end in this latter way, because in it the chief difficulty of this matter is placed; yet, in order that we may proceed from clearer things, we shall premise some things about the former mode of ultimate end.

Resolution about the end ultimate only in a qualified sense

2. I say, then, first: in every series or intention and action for the sake of an end, some ultimate end must necessarily be given, either negatively, that is, one which is not ordered to another end in that series or by virtue of that intention, or also positively in a qualified sense, or in that series, because, namely, all things which pertain to it are referred to such end and stop there. And in this sense it is impossible that there be a process to infinity in these ends. Aristotle chiefly intends this conclusion, bk. II Metaph., and from the last part the rest are necessarily inferred. For if, proceeding from the election of the first means towards the end, there is no process to infinity, one must necessarily stop in something beyond which intention does not tend; that, therefore, will be the ultimate end in that series, both negatively, because such end is not ordered to another, otherwise one would not stop in it; and positively, because to it are referred all things which pertain to that series, since all are desired for its sake; for if something were not desired for its sake, it would not pertain to that series, but would be joined as it were per accidens. As, for example, with respect to the physician and in the series of curing, the health of the man is the ultimate end negatively, because it is per se intended and the intention of the physician does not proceed beyond it, and therefore, it being attained, action ceases; it is also the ultimate end positively, because to it are referred all things which are of that art, as instruments for preparing medicines, medicines for tempering or evacuating the humour, and this finally to health itself. But if someone perhaps takes a medicine also either for the sake of delight or for the sake of nourishment, that end no longer pertains to the series of curing, but to another intention joined per accidens with the other.

3. It remains that we prove the last part of the conclusion, which Aristotle demonstrates at length in the cited place; but the demonstration can easily be formed in this way. For in the first place, descending from the intention of the end to the election or execution of means, it is necessary that election stop at last in some means which is first in execution and last in the order of intention, because otherwise action could never be begun and so every election would be frustrated, because one would always proceed from one election to another, and never come to use, and so all action would be taken away. Hence, as much as it is evident by experience that inquiries of ends through means are begun by us, so much is it evident that in the progress from end to means one stops in the last, or first, means. Again, that from this first means tending towards the end one cannot proceed to infinity is proved, first, because it is impossible that all things which are desired in that series be desired for the sake of another; therefore one must stop in something which is desired for its own sake; that, therefore, will be the ultimate end in that series, for in that particle, for its own sake, is included the negation of for the sake of another, which negation is also supposed in the antecedent, while we assume that not all objects, or all ends contained in one series, can be desired for the sake of another or ordered to another.

4. But this antecedent is proved, for I take the whole collection of ends and means (for whether it is finite or infinite, it can be conceived as a whole at once); of it, then, I ask whether it is desired for its own sake, or for the sake of another; this latter cannot be said, otherwise outside the whole collection there would be something, which involves contradiction; therefore the first must be given; therefore necessarily within that collection one must stop in something which is desired for its own sake. For since, beginning from the first means, it is chosen for the sake of the second, and the second for the sake of the third, and so on, unless one stops in some end intended for its own sake, the whole collection cannot be desired for its own sake, because neither by reason of all or of the single things which are in it, since many and almost all are desired for the sake of another; nor by reason of some one, unless something intended for its own sake is admitted; this, therefore, must necessarily be admitted.

5. An objection is satisfied.—It will perhaps be said that that collection is neither desired for its own sake nor for the sake of another, because it is not intended as a whole by way of one, but by parts (so to speak), that is, by loving the single things contained in that collection; and so it is said to be desired only by loving one thing for the sake of another. Hence it will also be granted that, although the collection of the things which are loved one for the sake of another is always finite, because proceeding from one to another one cannot pass through to infinity, nevertheless the desirable ends in that series are not finite, but proceed to infinity, and so it does not stop in some ultimate and desirable for its own sake.

6. But against this the reasons of Aristotle evidently proceed. The first, because in this way intention could never be begun, for it must be begun from something which is first in intention; but this can be none, if one proceeds to infinity in that way. For either that which is first in intention is loved for its own sake, and so the process ceases; or it is loved for the sake of another, and so it cannot be that first in intention, but that other for the sake of which it is loved; therefore, if one always proceeds from one thing loved for the sake of another to that other for the sake of which it is loved, there can never be a first in intention; therefore neither will there be a first intention; therefore intention can never be begun, because it is not begun except from some first.

7. The second reason (and it comes back almost to the same), because in this way final causality is taken away. The sequel is evident, for the intermediate end does not cause except in the power of the prior and dependently on it, as was declared and proved in the preceding disputation; therefore, if one proceeds to infinity from one to another prior, and never comes to the end first in intention, all the intermediates will not be able to cause anything, since all depend on that first and it never causes, or is not; necessarily, therefore, one must come to some one which is first in causing in this order, which we now call last in execution, because in the progress of means inquiry stops there. And this reason is declared, lest anyone think that in it the question is begged by supposing that there is a first end; for it is not supposed, but proved to be necessary, if there is to be final causality. But it is declared almost by the argument made at the beginning; for I take the whole series of ends collectively: either it is dependent in causing finally on another end, and this is impossible, otherwise the whole collection would not be taken; and moreover because then that whole could not cause except relying on another on which it is said to depend; about which the same question returns, for if that end is said to be independent, that is the ultimate which we are seeking; but it cannot be posited dependent, otherwise it would have been comprehended in the prior collection. But if the whole collection is independent in causing finally, it is necessary that within it there be some end independent of another prior in causing finally; for it is impossible that all things contained in the collection be dependent and the whole collection be independent, and by the same reason it is impossible that causality be begun unless in the collection of subordinated causes some one is independent. Which discourse we shall pursue more at length below in efficient causes, demonstrating that God exists.

8. The third reason of Aristotle, and the best, is that, while it is said that every means is desired for the sake of another and one never comes to something lovable for its own sake, the notion of good is destroyed, which per se is established to be most absurd. The sequel is evident, because the good useful for another is only good in a qualified sense and becomes desirable only by reason of another to which it is useful; but that which is such simply being taken away, it is necessary that that be taken away which is such only in a qualified sense, especially since it is such only through relation to others. The end desirable for its own sake being taken away, then, the good simply, which is per se good, is taken away, and consequently the good in a qualified sense is also taken away, because it no longer has whence it is good, nor whence it is rendered desirable. Hence it is an open repugnance to say that one thing is desirable for the sake of another, and this in turn for the sake of another, nothing existing desirable for its own sake. Aristotle has other reasons, both in the cited place and in I Ethic., c. 2; but these suffice, for the matter too is sufficiently clear.

Resolution about the ultimate end simply

9. I say secondly: there is also some end ultimate simply with respect to all things and particular ends and their co-ordinations, which is God Himself. This assertion is certain in the doctrine of faith, which St. Thomas hands down, I, q. 44, a. 4, and q. 103, a. 2; and with him the other theologians from that of Prov. 16: The Lord hath made all things for Himself; and Apoc. 21 and 22: I am Alpha and Omega. And the holy Fathers handed down the same, especially Dionysius, c. 10 De Divin. nom.; and St. Augustine, bk. I De Doctr. Christ., c. 23, and bk. XIX De Civit., from the beginning; and among the philosophers Aristotle touched upon it, XII Metaph., c. 10, and in the book On the World to Alexander, and Plato in the Timaeus, and bk. IV of the Laws, and Trismegistus in the Pimander.

10. But the difficulty is whether it can be demonstrated by evident reason that this ultimate end is one with respect to all things. For from those demonstrations by which it is proved that there is no process to infinity in ends, it cannot be sufficiently concluded that there is in this way some universal or common ultimate end to which all things are referred, and it to no other; for each thing can tend ultimately to its own proper end, and so in no series will there be a process to infinity in ends, even if there is no ultimate end common to all.

11. It is answered that it is one thing to ask whether there is some common ultimate end to which all things are ordered, another whether all and each thing intend and seek that end. Of this latter point we shall speak in the following section; now we treat only of the former sense. And in it we say that it is evident by natural reason that there is one ultimate end of all things, and that this is gathered from that principle that there is no progress to infinity in ends, two others being added which were also demonstrated above, namely, that there is one first effective principle of all things and that it operates for the sake of an end. From which the reason is concluded thus. The first efficient principle of all things produced, conserves and rules them for the sake of some end, and in its intention there is no process to infinity; therefore it operates all these things for the sake of some ultimate end; that ultimate end, therefore, which the first agent intends, is one, and consequently is the ultimate end simply of all things. This last consequence is proved, for the rest are clear. Because God cannot intend several ultimate ends, adequate to His intention, in His works; for even man cannot intend several ultimate ends in this way, as is demonstrated in I-II, q. 1, a. 5; much less, then, God, because to intend several ends pertains not to perfection, but rather to imperfection.

12. You will say that the reason is far diverse of man and of God; for man intends the ultimate end as his own end, in which he places his happiness and the sufficiency of all goods, and therefore it cannot happen that man at the same time intend two complete ultimate ends; for if he thinks that neither suffices for him without the other, neither is a complete ultimate end; but if he loves one of them as sufficient, the other cannot have the notion of ultimate end. But God, while He operates for the sake of the ultimate end, does not operate for the sake of His own ultimate end, but of those things which He creates; for in the foregoing it was shown that there is a difference between the created and the divine will, in that in the created will the act itself of the will is ordered, as to an end, to the object which it loves; but in the divine will by no means, but one thing willed is ordered to another as to an end. Thus, then, it will not be repugnant that God intend several ultimate ends of those things which He wills and operates outside Himself, because with respect to diverse things nothing is repugnant in there being diverse goods in which their ultimate perfection and as it were happiness consists. Just as several men can intend several ultimate ends, although one cannot. For so God behaves in intending for several things their ends. Hence it is confirmed; for the things of which God intends the ends are of diverse notions and natures; therefore they can also have various ultimate ends proportioned to themselves; therefore God too can intend those ends, as they are several, for various things.

13. Someone will say that God does not intend the variety and distinction of things except in order to something one, for example, the completion of the universe or something similar, and therefore it is necessary that in the procreation of things however distinct He intend one ultimate end. But this does not satisfy. First, because it is not so evident that God intends all created things for the composition or completion of one thing; for, although in corporeal things it so appears, of spiritual things it cannot be so proved by reason, most of all if spiritual things are compared with corporeal ones, and especially if God had produced several worlds, as He could have. Secondly, that is not enough for all things to be said to have one end ultimate simply, both because the very unity and constitution of the universe is something very imperfect for all things to be said to be ordered to it as to an ultimate end, and also because the very order of the things of the universe is ordered to the conservation of single things or species, and all corporeal things are ordered in some way to man, as Aristotle too acknowledged, I Polit., c. 5.

14. Wherefore this whole demonstration cannot be concluded otherwise than by demonstrating the last part of the conclusion, namely, that this ultimate end which the first efficient intends in its actions cannot be something other than itself; for hence it evidently follows that all things procreated, however diverse among themselves, just as they are united in one first principle, so are also united in one ultimate end, even if we feign some of them to be so constituted that among themselves one is ordered to another, or several to some one outside God. But the first proposition assumed is proved, because that which is to each agent the chief end of its actions is to it the best and greatest good, especially if the intention is ordered and right, as Aristotle taught, I Ethic., c. 7; but to the first agent nothing is the best and greatest good except its intrinsic goodness; therefore with respect to it nothing can be the ultimate end of its actions and effects except itself by reason of its goodness; for the ultimate end is chief in every intention and action. Moreover, because the notion of final cause is perfect and of itself pertains to perfection simply; therefore it belongs to God in the highest grade of perfection, both because every perfection simply is in God in the highest grade, and also because, since goodness is the notion of causing finally and God is the supreme good, it is necessary that He have the notion and perfection of final cause in the highest degree. But just as the highest perfection in the order of efficients is that it be first and most universal, so in the order of ends, that it be ultimate and most universal; therefore such perfection must necessarily be attributed to God. Moreover, every agent, inasmuch as it is agent, operates in some way for its own sake, and so is the end of its actions; therefore the first agent too operates all things for its own sake; therefore it is the end of all, since all things are from its action and effecting; but it is not a non-ultimate end, for such is always imperfect in its order; therefore it is the ultimate end. Finally, that axiom tends to this, that the order of ends is according to the order of agents; for the more perfect or universal an agent is, the more perfect or universal the end it intends; but God is the most perfect and most universal agent; therefore He intends the most perfect and most universal end. Read St. Thomas, III Cont. Gent., cc. 17 and 18.

15. To the objection made above, then, it is answered that, although God does not act for His own sake as for the sake of His own end, but of His effects or actions, nevertheless He cannot have but one ultimate end of all of them, not because He seeks that end in order to be satiated and to have in it the sufficiency of all goods, but rather because He is supposed to have in Himself the sufficiency of all goods and supreme goodness and perfection, by which alone He could first be moved or invited to do good to others for His own sake. Hence, although it is true that of the very things which He creates He orders some to others as to ends, or rather connects all so among themselves that some serve others in turn, and in this way under God Himself other common or universal ends can be assigned to which single creatures, besides their private ends, are ordered by the Creator Himself, and especially to the order or beauty of the universe, yet simply nothing outside God can be said to be the ultimate end to which the divine intention or action tends. So much so that St. Thomas said, q. 3 De Potent., a. 15, ad 14, that even the very communication of the divine goodness is not the ultimate end, but the divine goodness itself, because the communication of the divine goodness is something created, whence it too is referred to the uncreated goodness, from love of which God willed to communicate Himself, not because it is advantageous or useful to Him, but because it befits Him and is consonant with His goodness. But St. Thomas adds there that God does not act from appetite of the ultimate end, but from love of Himself, because He does not act in order to obtain the ultimate end, but in order to communicate its goodness. Which indeed is true with respect to God Himself, because, as we have often said, He does not act for His own sake as for the sake of His own end; yet with respect to creatures it can also be said that God operates from appetite of the end, that is, desiring that creatures attain Himself as end.

16. God the ultimate objective end of creatures, not the formal.—From which it is also understood, since in the preceding disputation we distinguished a twofold end, objective and formal, that God is not called the ultimate formal end, but the objective end of creatures, either properly or broadly speaking of object, according to what we shall say in the following section. And the reason is that the formal end is not ultimate simply, since it is ordered to the objective, as was shown above. Likewise, because, although God is the supreme good, yet creatures do not attain it except inasmuch as they in some way participate it; hence the attainment of that supreme good, which is called the formal end, is always something created. Hence by the way a certain objection made above is solved, namely, how so great a variety of things and natures can be ordered to the same ultimate end; for the reason is that that is not the end as attainment, but as the good attained; but diverse things have diversity in the mode of attaining that end although they agree in the same ultimate end, just as they agree in the same first principle, yet differ in the mode or grade of emanation from it.

17. The end to which of the actions of God is God Himself.—Finally it is understood from what has been said that, although with respect to creatures God is the ultimate objective end, for the sake of which they either were created or themselves operate, yet with respect to the action of God Himself He is the ultimate end to which; for to Him all things are created or done, or rather He creates and effects all things for Himself. For every agent has the notion of end to which with respect to its action, whether through it it seeks its own advantage, as created agents commonly act, or only the communication and manifestation of its goodness, as God.

1. The title of the question is explained.—This question is to be understood of the end ultimate simply or universal; for of that which is only ultimate in some series we have already shown above that it is that which immediately inflows finally into all the effects or actions per se pertaining to that series. Indeed we said that an end of this kind is the whole notion of causing, so that the means or intermediate ends have no proper final causality except inasmuch as they underlie, or are as it were informed by, this end. But of the end ultimate simply there is a special question, whether it inflows with all particular ends into their causalities per se and immediately, after the manner of a universal cause in that genus, in the way in which the first efficient cause in the genus of efficient cause concurs per se and immediately with all particular efficient causes.

Arguments for the affirmative part

2. And it seems indeed that it must wholly be so said: first, because the notion of final cause belongs to God in its genus as perfectly and universally as the notion of efficient in its own; therefore, just as the notion of first efficient so belongs to God that all things depend on Him per se and immediately in causing efficiently, so the notion of first or ultimate end belongs to God with this perfection and universality, that all particular ends depend on Him per se and immediately in causing. Nor is it enough if someone says that the causalities of particular ends depend indeed immediately on God, yet not in the genus of end, but in the genus of efficient, as we said above of the material and formal cause; it is not (I say) enough, because material and formal causality include imperfection, on account of which they cannot be exercised by God in their genus, and therefore the concurrence of God to those causalities is through efficiency; but final causality as such formally involves no imperfection, and therefore can belong to God as immediately and per se about every action and causality as effective causality; therefore it belongs to Him equally, for whatever of perfection simply can be understood in God is in Him. Hence it is confirmed, for just as there is a per se order between the proximate and the first efficient cause, so between the proximate and the ultimate end; for, just as the proximate efficient cause has entity and power of effecting participated from the first, and therefore dependent on it, so the proximate end has goodness, through which it causes finally, participated from the supreme goodness of the ultimate end; therefore it depends on it equally as to causality in its genus.

Arguments for the negative part

3. On the contrary, however, is that neither in proper agents for the sake of an end, such as intellectual ones are, nor yet in lower ones, does such an influx of the ultimate end per se and immediately seem to intervene in every final causality. The prior part is proved, because in agents through intellect the end has no causality unless it is known by him who operates for the sake of the end; but these agents operate for the sake of a particular end when they think nothing at all of the universal ultimate end; therefore then the particular end causes finally without the actual influx per se and immediate of the ultimate end itself in that genus of cause. And it is confirmed and declared further: for causality in the genus of end is through metaphorical motion; therefore, in order that God concur immediately after the manner of ultimate end and in the genus of final cause, it is necessary that He metaphorically move at the same time, or that the metaphorical motion which is from the particular end be also immediately from Him, as such; but this cannot be unless He Himself is known, as is established from what was said above about metaphorical motion; therefore. And certainly experience itself seems sufficiently to persuade this; for when a man is moved by health to seek it, he is in no way moved immediately by the divine goodness, of which he thinks nothing, but by the fittingness of health.

4. Nor does it matter if someone says that health does not move except inasmuch as it has goodness participated from the divine goodness; for this is the same as if it were said that that motion comes remotely from the goodness by essence, inasmuch as from it some goodness has been derived into health, not however that the goodness by essence itself concurs immediately and per se also. Just as heat too does not heat except through power of acting participated from the effective power by essence which is in God; yet by virtue of this participation or of the emanation of that effect from such participated power, it is not immediately from God, but remotely, and therefore it is necessary that through the uncreated power itself God inflow immediately, so that He have the proper influx of the first efficient cause; but this mode of influx He does not have in the genus of end, as the reason made seems to prove.

5. And hence a fortiori the other part about lower agents is proved; for brutes, in the way in which they are metaphorically moved through cognition, can in no way be said to be moved immediately by the goodness itself of the ultimate end, which much less can they know. But lower natural agents are only said to operate for the sake of an end inasmuch as they tend or are directed to their ends; but they do not tend immediately to the goodness of the ultimate end, but only to such form or terminus of their action. But what is commonly said, that these agents intend to be assimilated to the ultimate end in communicating their perfection, seems said metaphorically rather than properly; and so it serves nothing for explaining the immediate causality of the ultimate end about these actions. The assumption is evident, both because these agents per se do not intend likeness as referred to the goodness of God, but only intend the foundation of that likeness, which is not something besides that created good which is in their actions; and also because in their communication, regularly speaking, they do not intend to communicate themselves for the sake of communication alone (so to speak), but for the sake of some advantage or their own perfection, namely, to conserve their species, or to perfect themselves; it is a sign, therefore, that in their communication they do not properly and formally intend assimilation to the communication of God.

Various opinions

6. In this matter I find it frequently said by the theologians that God is the ultimate end of all creatures, so that all in their actions intend to attain Him, each according to its capacity. So St. Thomas teaches at length, III Cont. Gent., cc. 18, 19, 20 and 21, and I-II, q. 1, aa. 6, 7 and 8; and in that doctrine all the rest agree. None, however, so far as I have seen, sufficiently declares the proper dependence of proximate ends on the ultimate in causing within the proper genus, nor the mode of influx which the ultimate end has together with the proximate or particular ones. Indeed rather, they finally so declare that notion of ultimate end that they seem to attribute to it only a remote concurrence to the motions of the proximate ends. For of the agent from purpose, man for example, they say only that he operates for the sake of the ultimate end in all his actions because he operates for the sake of some good, which does not have the power of moving finally except inasmuch as it is a certain participation of the supreme good; but of the lower agents they say only that they intend the ultimate end inasmuch as they intend some representation or participation of its goodness; by all which nothing is declared except the remote causality of the ultimate end, as seems proved in objecting. But Fonseca, bk. V Metaph., c. 2, q. 12, since he thinks that God concurs per se and immediately with all causes to their causalities, and with each by a proper concurrence pertaining to its genus, tries specially to prove this opinion of his there only of the material and formal; for of the final he supposes it is as certain and received a dogma as of the efficient, about which he had already disputed. But, the material and formal cause being omitted, of which it was spoken above and which do not pertain to the present matter, of the final he expressly teaches there, sect. 5, that it concurs immediately with proximate ends to their causalities, from that general reason that they are causes essentially subordinated in the same genus; but the mode of that immediate concurrence he does not declare but only affirms.

Resolution of the question

7. But to me this matter seems to be so explained that we declare the causalities of ends by proportion to agents; for, as has often been said, the causality of the end is best understood through relation to the agent as it is agent, or to the action of the agent. It is to be considered, then, what we handed down above, that all the actions of secondary agents are also actions of God; for chiefly on this ground God is said to concur to all of them per se and immediately as the first efficient cause. From which it is inferred that those actions are for the sake of an end, and therefore are caused by some end, not only as they are from the proximate agents, but also, and much more, as they are from the first agent. Because the first agent, just as in every action of His operates through intellect and will, so in every action of His operates for the sake of an end in a far more excellent way than any other agent; and so every action, inasmuch as outside God it is transient and flows immediately from God, is caused by some end, intended by God Himself too.

8. God as ultimate end concurs finally to all the actions of creatures for the sake of an end.—I say now, first: God as ultimate end inflows immediately and per se into every action of the creature inasmuch as it is from God Himself, and in this way at least concurs immediately and per se in causing finally with every proximate end. The first part is proved, for every action of a created agent is immediately from God operating for the sake of an end; therefore it is from God as from the ultimate end; therefore God as ultimate end causes in His genus immediately that action. The antecedent has been proved. But the first consequence is proved, because God does not act for the sake of an end except by acting for His own sake as for the sake of the ultimate end, because, as was proved above, He cannot per se primo be moved or inclined to act by some extrinsic goodness, but by His own.

9. You will say: can God not be moved by some created goodness to confer or effect another? For so on account of the goodness of merit He is moved to give reward, and because He promised, He is moved to fulfil the promise, and in this way God exercises an act of fidelity, or of justice, or of mercy, etc., on account of the honesty of each; therefore God also operates for the sake of some proximate created end; therefore the said inference is not certain and formal.

10. Some do not dare to grant that antecedent, because it seems to be beside the divine perfection to will something for the sake of a created end. Yet, since for God to act for the sake of an end is not to act for the sake of His own end, but for the sake of the end to which He orders that thing which He effects, it is not unfitting that He proximately effect something for the sake of some created end, because this is nothing else than to order one creature to another as to a proximate end, which is most ordered and without any imperfection. And in this way God ordered single things to the beauty of the universe, and founded herbs and animals for the sake of man, etc. And by the same reason, because creatures are not good formally by the divine goodness, but by their own, as was said above, so God wills creatures for the sake of His own goodness that yet He wills to each the goodness or perfection proper to it, and in this way God wills grace to man, as it is the perfection of man himself; hence proximately He wills it for the advantage or utility of man himself. And in this way, although in comparison with His goodness He wills all creatures as means to the manifestation and communication of Himself, yet comparing one creature to another He wills one as the proximate end of the other.

11. Nevertheless it is necessary that in every action and operation for the sake of an end God operate for His own sake, as for the sake of the ultimate end. Both because He always operates for the sake of an end in the most perfect way, and therefore by a most simple and most eminent act leads all things up to the supreme cause and refers them into Himself as into the ultimate end, and also because the divine goodness is so to God the universal reason of willing every other goodness or created end, that without relation or habitude to it nothing outside God Himself is lovable to God. For if through created goodnesses the divine goodness were not communicated, represented or shown, there would be no reason why they should be loved by God Himself. Yet, because that by which the creature represents and participates the divine goodness is something lovable according to itself and for its own sake with respect to created appetite, therefore it is not repugnant that God at the same time will one creature as the end of another and as something ordered to Himself as to the ultimate end. This respect, then, is not separable from the volition of God as it is terminated to the creature, and therefore it is excellently inferred that, if God operates something for the sake of an end, He also operates it for His own sake, as for the sake of the ultimate end actually and most perfectly intended.

12. Now the other consecution is easy to prove, namely, that the ultimate end inflows immediately and per se with any proximate end into every action of the creature, because the end inflows immediately in its way into that action which is done for its sake from the formal and direct intention of the agent; for final causality, especially about transient actions, consists only in this dependence which the action has on the agent so ordering it to the end; but it has been shown that every action of the creature, at least inasmuch as it is from the first agent, is done necessarily with this actual relation or ordination to the ultimate end; therefore every such action is caused immediately and per se by the ultimate end in its genus.

13. Whether God with dishonest ends concurs to finally causing depraved actions.—You will say that this cannot be universally true; for, although in merely natural actions and in honest free ones it seems possible and without drawback, yet in free and sinful actions this seems both unbecoming and impossible; the first is evident because it is unbecoming that God will these actions; much more, then, that He will them for His own sake. The second is evident, because those actions are intrinsically repugnant to the supreme goodness of God; how, then, can they be referred to the supreme good as to the ultimate end? It is answered, in the first place, that the whole argument can and must be granted of sinful actions as they are sinful; for strictly the objection proceeds of them only as such; for as such they are repugnant to the divine goodness, and of them as such we confess that they are not from God as from the ultimate end, nor is that a drawback, because as such too they are not from God as from the first agent, because as such they are not actions, but defects of action. Hence it is further added that these actions, however sinful with respect to the secondary cause, as they are actions are also actions of God Himself, and as such are per se and immediately from the ultimate end, and for the sake of the ultimate end; for as such they include no defect or malice by reason of which they would be repugnant to the supreme goodness of the ultimate end. And although God does not efficaciously and absolutely will them on account of the relation which, absolutely taken, they have to the secondary cause, with which and from which they have concomitant malice, yet He wills to concur to them and so wills them inasmuch as they are His actions, and in this way orders them to Himself as to the ultimate end, because in them, considered under this notion, the goodness of God shines forth most, which diffuses itself to all things inasmuch as they have something of good, and is able so to inflow into goodness that, although malice is conjoined to it, it does not attain it, nor is it to be imputed to it by any reason. In which He also manifests His omnipotence and wisdom, indeed in a certain way His justice too, either because He uses His right in offering His concurrence even to those who will abuse it, or because to each principle He gives the concurrence naturally due to it, and lets each act according to its mode. Thus, then, there is no action of a creature caused by a proximate end which is not at the same time caused per se and immediately by the ultimate end, at least with respect to the first agent. Read St. Thomas, III Cont. Gent., especially reason 6, for there he virtually contains the whole doctrine of this assertion.

14. Creatures in their ends do not always intend the ultimate end formally.—I say secondly: the action of the creature, as it is from the creature itself for the sake of an end, is not always caused immediately and per se by the ultimate end formally and according to its proper goodness, but at most virtually or implicitly; and in this sense it can with due proportion be said that the ultimate end does not always concur to these actions as such immediately by immediacy of supposit, but only of power. The reasons posited above in the latter place, I think, sufficiently prove this conclusion, together with those which we adduced in reporting the common doctrine of St. Thomas and others. And indeed of natural or irrational agents there can be no reason for doubting, because these do not operate for the sake of an end to which they themselves direct their actions; much less, then, can they operate for the sake of the ultimate end. Next, in the way in which they are said metaphorically to intend an end, inasmuch as through natural inclination or appetite they tend to something certain and determinate, in truth they do not tend properly and formally to God, but to something created fitting or proportioned to themselves, and so they tend to God only virtually and as it were interpretatively. Finally, if they are considered inasmuch as by extrinsic denomination they are said to be directed to the end by their author and cooperator God, so indeed they can be said to tend to the ultimate end itself formally intended; yet that direction and ordination to the end is now from the first agent itself, by whom alone that end is intended.

15. But of agents from purpose, it is not necessary that their actions never be per se and immediately from the ultimate end, even inasmuch as they are for the sake of an end from the direction and intention of such agents. For they can often be so, namely, when these agents consider the ultimate end itself in itself and refer to it all their actions and private intentions, which they can do because through intellect and will they can objectively attain the ultimate end in itself, which the lower agents cannot. But we said that the actions of these agents, inasmuch as they are from them for the sake of an end, are not always caused finally per se and immediately by the ultimate end by immediacy of supposit, that is, by itself and by its goodness finally inflowing into such action, and in this sense the assertion is sufficiently proved by that reason posited above, because the ultimate end thought of in itself does not always move these agents when they operate for the sake of some particular end. But virtually the ultimate end can be said always to move agents of this kind, because they are always moved by some good or under the notion of some good, which, inasmuch as it is a certain participation of the supreme good, is reckoned to move in its power; and conversely, he who tends to that good is reckoned virtually to tend to the ultimate end, because by desiring (so to speak) a part of the good, he is reckoned virtually to love more the complement of the whole good, which sense St. Thomas declared, In IV, dist. 49, q. 1, a. 3, quaestiunc. 4, and in the same way he speaks in I, q. 60, a. 2, and I-II, q. 1, a. 6, where in the solution ad 3 he says that the power of the first intention with respect to the ultimate end moves in any appetite of any thing whatever, even if the ultimate end is not actually thought of. Read Aristotle, I Ethic., cc. 4 and 7, and I Rhetoric., c. 5; Augustine, X Confess., cc. 20 and 21, and bk. XI De Trinit., c. 6.

Brief resolution of an incidental question

16. But here at once the question insinuated itself whether in these agents it is always necessary that a proper and elicited intention of the ultimate end, terminated at the ultimate end itself proposed in itself under the notion of supreme or complete or common good, must necessarily precede the intentions of particular ends. For some theologians seem to think it necessary that such an as it were universal intention precede at least sometimes, or once in life, in order that the other intentions of particular ends can be had in its power. But this question is proper to the theologians, and is commonly treated in the cited places of St. Thomas. And to me that opinion seems certain which denies that such intention is necessary, because neither on the part of the intellect is there anything which necessitates to think first of that object, nor on the part of the will is that intention necessary in order that it can will the particular goods proposed to it as per se lovable, since in those objects there is sufficient reason for tending to them for the sake of their goodness. Indeed even if that universal intention precedes, yet if afterwards it does not remain either in memory or in some affection or habit, it can serve nothing for the subsequent acts. See Scotus, In I, dist. 1, q. 4, and In IV, dist. 49, q. 3; and there Paludanus, Major, Capreolus and others.

The reasons for doubting posited at the beginning are satisfied

17. The arguments posited in the prior place at the beginning confirm our prior conclusion; they do not, however, stand against the latter, because it is not of the notion of the first cause that it inflow into the action of the secondary cause except with due proportion; nor yet is it necessary that the causality of the first and of the second cause, formally and precisely taken, say the same relation, although in reality, as they are in the effect, they are not distinguished. Thus, then, for the subordination of the proximate and ultimate end it is enough that the former depend on the latter in causing in its genus, and that the former cannot cause except the latter causing; yet it is not necessary that each end cause with respect to the same agent, but only with respect to the same effect or action. Indeed rather the proximate end causes with respect to the proximate agent and the action which is in it or from it; but the ultimate end does not cause with respect to the first agent itself, but with respect to the effect or action as it flows from it. But the arguments posited in the latter place to the contrary stand nothing against the prior conclusion, as is sufficiently established per se; but they confirm the latter, as has been declared.