Disputationes metaphysicae

1. I said in the title per se and immediately, because, from what was said in the preceding disputation, it is constant and certain that, at least remotely and per accidens, the divine influx is necessary for the action of any created cause, because it is at least necessary that God conserve in being the creature which operates something; but he who gives being gives also operation, at least remotely and per accidens.

The first, negative opinion is proposed and persuaded

2. Reasons for the aforesaid opinion.—The first.—There were not lacking, then, theologians who denied that God concurs per se and immediately to the actions of secondary causes. The chief defender of which error is thought to be Durandus, In II, dist. 1, q. 5, and dist. 37, q. 1, although that opinion was older; for Albert, Henry and others report it. Indeed St. Augustine, V Genes. ad litter., c. 20, in these words: There are those who think that only the world itself was made by God, but that the other things are now made by the world itself as He ordained and commanded, while God Himself works nothing. The foundation is that the necessity of this cooperation cannot be founded on any sufficient reason, and therefore it is not to be asserted, because God does not apply a superfluous and in no way necessary concurrence. The antecedent is proved, first, because secondary causes are not instruments, but principal causes; for they operate by their own power, and not through some extrinsic motion, whence sometimes they are univocal and make effects like themselves; but when they are equivocal, they are more perfect and nobler causes; therefore they operate by sufficient power; therefore they do not need the help of a superior cause. The consequence is evident, because for producing an effect a power equal to it, or certainly nobler, suffices.

3. The second.—Secondly, God could make a creature operating an effect proportioned to itself without the help of another; for why is this repugnant? No repugnance or contradiction certainly appears; nor is it against the divine perfection or power, but rather indicates the power of God more. For, just as it belonged to the divine power not only to make creatures but also to communicate to them a similar power of effecting, so the same power of God will be shown more if He can communicate to His creatures this power of acting complete and wholly integral; but such will it be if it does not need the help of another for acting. But if God can do this, whence is it established that He has not already done it? Or, if He did it, in what other way would He do it than by giving the creature a power equal to or greater than is necessary for the effect? But this He has already done.

4. The third.—Thirdly, it cannot happen that two agents concur immediately to the same action unless each of them is imperfect and only partial, which is not to be said of God; therefore He does not concur with the creature immediately to its action. The major is evident, because either one of those causes acts through the other, or neither. If the first, it follows that that which acts through the other does not act immediately, but only by means of the other; and since the creature cannot be said to act through God, God will act through the creature; and so we often are wont to speak, namely, that God operates through secondary causes or by means of secondary causes. The best sense of which expression is that God gave secondary causes the power of operating, and conserves them, and as it were constituted them to operate in His stead. But if the second is said, namely, that neither of these causes, that is, neither the first nor the second, operates through the other, it plainly follows that each is imperfect, both because each would act only as a partial cause, and also because they would come together for acting without subordination and as it were fortuitously.

5. The fourth.—Fourthly, because of some created things it must be confessed that they are not immediately from God; therefore by parity of reasoning the same would have to be said of all which proceed from secondary causes operating by principal power. The consequence holds by parity of reasoning, and the antecedent is proved, first, in every action of a creature, inasmuch as it is action, as is, for example, the heating of fire; for although we grant that heat, as heat, is immediately from God, yet of the heating of fire as such this cannot be said, because it involves open repugnance. For action, or such action as such, namely the heating of fire, says an essential relation to this agent, namely fire; therefore it is impossible that that action, inasmuch as it is such, be from God immediately; and yet that action is something in the nature of things distinct from heat; therefore. Secondly, this seems to be said by special reason of free actions, because, if they were immediately from the first cause, they could not be free to the secondary cause itself, because both the first cause, since it is more powerful, would carry the second with itself wherever it willed, and the second would not have in its hand and power the influx of the first cause so that it could operate when it willed. Thirdly, there is a most special reason of free sinful actions; for it is unbecoming to attribute them to the first cause as operating per se and immediately. A fourth example we can bring of the effects or causalities of the other causes; for these are not immediately from God as from a first cause, as is established, because the modes of causing, especially the formal and material, cannot be exercised by the first cause; if, then, matter and form are sufficient in their genus for their own proper causality, why will not any efficient cause be so in its genus?

The true opinion

6. The second opinion is that God acts per se and immediately in every action of a creature, and that this influx of His is simply necessary in order that a creature effect anything. And this is the true opinion, which is to be explained and confirmed by us more fully. First, then, we say that it is so certain that God inflows immediately and per se into every action of a creature that to deny it is erroneous in faith. It is proved, first, from the common consent of the scholastics, who so think of this truth as of a Catholic dogma, as is evident from St. Thomas, I, q. 105, a. 5, and I-II, q. 109, and III Cont. Gent., c. 70; Cajetan and Ferrariensis there; Capreolus, In II, dist. 1, q. 2, a. 3, to the arguments against the second conclusion; Alexander, I p., q. 9, memb. 2, ad 2; Albert, In II, dist. 35, a. 7, where he speaks thus: The other opinion has almost departed from the hall, and is reputed heretical by many of the moderns. Likewise Gregory, in the same place, q. 1, a. 3; Scotus, In II, dist. 1 and 37, q. unica; Bonaventure, dist. 37, a. 1, q. 1, where he says that this opinion is to be held without any ambiguity; the same, In I, dist. 45, a. 2, q. 2; Hervaeus, treatise On the Eternity of the World, q. 1. Secondly, the same can be proved from the common consent of the saints, who teach this truth as contained in the divine Scriptures, whom, because this is not our task, I shall indicate briefly. Augustine, then, when he had reported those holding the contrary in the place cited above, adds: Against whom that saying of the Lord is brought forward: My Father worketh until now.¹ And below: Next, because He works not only the great and chief things, but also these earthly and lowest ones, so says the Apostle: Thou sowest bare grain, but God giveth it a body as He will, and to every seed its proper body. The same Augustine proves the same at length in Ep. 146 to Consentius, where he adduces other testimonies of Scripture, as that: Before I formed thee in the womb, I knew thee, Jerem. 1; and that: If God so clothe the grass of the field, which is today, and tomorrow is cast into the oven, Luke 13. The same Augustine, bk. IV Genes. ad litter., c. 12, where he adduces that of Acts 17: In Him we live, and move; and bk. IX, c. 15, he adduces that of I Cor.: Neither he that planteth is any thing, neither he that watereth, but God that giveth the increase. Prosper, Sentence 281. Likewise Gregory, XVI Moral., c. 18: All things (he says) which have been created are able neither to subsist nor to be moved of themselves; but they subsist in so far as they have received that they should be, they are moved in so far as they are disposed by a hidden impulse. And the remaining Fathers, wherever they treat of divine providence, suppose this truth as most certain.

7. Secondly, it must be said that this truth can be sufficiently proved by natural reason. And first it seems to be evidently inferred from what has been said about conservation, so that for this reason too it is held almost as certain in faith that God immediately makes all things as that He conserves them. The first inference is proved, first, because, if not all things are made immediately by God, then neither are they conserved immediately, because a thing is related to being as to becoming. For neither can the being of a thing depend more on an adequate cause after it has been made than when it was being made. Likewise, because, if the cause depends on God in being, then also the effect, because each is being by participation; therefore, just as the cause depends in the instant in which it acts, so the effect in the instant in which it is made, because also in that instant each is being by participation; therefore every effect of a secondary cause depends on God in becoming, and consequently the secondary cause can do nothing without the concurrence of God. Finally, because otherwise it follows that sometimes a thing does not depend on God in being conserved even mediately; for if heat produced by fire depends on God only by means of the producing fire, when the action of the fire ceases it will no longer depend in any way. Durandus will perhaps answer that the effects of secondary causes, as long as they are made or conserved by them, are made or conserved only mediately by God, but when the action of the secondary cause ceases, then God alone immediately conserves the effect, even if it was immediately produced by the secondary cause alone, because no created thing can either have or retain being without some efficient cause; and therefore, as long as the secondary cause immediately effects, it suffices; but when it ceases, in order that the thing remain in being it is necessary that God effect it by conserving, as we too say that, when the secondary cause ceases, the first applies greater force and efficacy.

8. But in the first place, according to this reply, the truth demonstrated above about the conservation of God is limited to immediate or to mediate conservation, which is foreign to all sound doctrine. Otherwise, when God is called creator of all things, it could be limited as to whether He is so mediately or immediately. Next, that opinion being supposed, it is not consistently said that, when the action of fire ceases, God begins to conserve the heat, both because, if heat does not depend on God in operating, why should it depend in being?, and also because the produced heat does not depend in its being on the producing heat by reason of the being itself, but by reason of such becoming, as was declared and proved above; therefore, although the action of the heating fire ceases, there is no reason why the action of a superior cause should be necessary in order that that being be conserved. Especially because, according to that opinion, heat, in order to be absolutely and simply, does not depend essentially on God, but at most remotely and per accidens; but the necessity of conservative action arises from the intrinsic and absolute dependence which a thing has on such cause in order to have being, as was explained above.

9. And hence the first inference is proved secondly, because, if God does not inflow immediately into every action of a creature, then the created action itself, in order to be, does not per se essentially demand the influx of God, although it too is some participation of being; therefore there is no reason why the form which is made through such action should demand for its conservation the actual influx of the first cause, because neither does it demand this by reason of its becoming, according to that opinion, since the becoming itself is not immediately from God; nor by reason of its being, most of all from the fact that it is participated being; but this reason is not thought sufficient in the action itself, according to that opinion; therefore neither will it be sufficient in the form or terminus of the action.

10. Thirdly, the same deduction can be made thus, because created beings depend on God no less inasmuch as they are agents than inasmuch as they are beings, because they are no less subordinated to God by one notion than by the other, and, just as they are beings by participation, so also they are agents; but inasmuch as they are beings, they are wholly dependent on God intrinsically and essentially; therefore similarly they depend inasmuch as they are agents; therefore, while they act, they depend not only because they are conserved in being by God, but also because in their very acting they require per se and immediately the influx of God. And this is what Aristotle sometimes says, that in agents per se subordinated the inferior cannot act without the influx of the superior, bk. II Metaph., c. 2, VII Phys., c. 1, and bk. VIII, c. 5.

11. Fourthly, the same argumentation from conservation to cooperation can be confirmed by proportional reason; for, just as God can deprive a created thing of its being through the sole negation of action, so He can deprive a created thing of its natural action through the sole negation of concurrence; therefore, just as from the former power immediate dependence in being is evidently gathered, so from the latter immediate dependence in the action itself is gathered. The antecedent (to confess the truth) is not evident by any natural experiment; but from supernatural effects it is sufficiently evident; for God deprived the Babylonian fire of its action, no impediment being placed from without; therefore He did this through the withdrawal of concurrence; for in what other way could it have been done? And this is signified in Wisdom 11, when it is said that the fire forgot its power, because namely it could not exercise it without God. And this is per se very consonant with the divine power, that it have in its hand the actions of all things, as it has the being of all.

12. A fifth reason, very probable, is that the secondary cause cannot determine itself to the effect in the individual and in particular, because its faculty is always indifferent to several individuals, and is not sufficiently determined by the subject and circumstances; therefore the cooperation of the first cause is necessary, which by its will can determine it to the singular effect. Of the foundation of which reason what was said above, disp. V, while the principle of individuation was treated, may be seen.

13. Finally, there is an excellent reason, that this mode of acting in all and with all agents pertains to the amplitude of the divine power, and on the part of God supposes perfection without imperfection; but on the part of the creature, whether we consider the secondary cause, or the action, or its effect, although it says imperfection, yet that is imbibed in the very concept of the creature or of participated being as such, as the reasons made declare. And besides, in this way there intervenes perfect and essential subordination between the first and the second cause, and there is nothing which is repugnant, as will easily be evident from the solutions of the arguments; therefore this general influence is not to be denied to God. Hence neither does it seem to have been wholly unknown to the philosophers, as we touched upon about the mind of Aristotle in the third reason; and in the book On Causes, which is thought to be either Aristotle's or Proclus's, there are various propositions by which this truth is signified, which we shall treat in what follows. Plato too for this reason called secondary causes instruments of the first, because they depend on its concurrence in acting, as is taken from Damascene, in his Philosophy, c. 9; and Simplicius, II Phys., text 29, and others. Trismegistus too is reported, in the Dialogue Crater, saying that God, present everywhere, always acts all things; and other similar things. And Philo of Alexandria, in the book That the World Is Incorruptible, saying that God assists all the parts of the world by cooperating.

The foundations of the first opinion are solved

14. To the first argument the antecedent is denied; for the reasons made sufficiently declare the necessity of this concurrence. Nor on that account do we deny that created agents are principal in their order, as was declared above in the divisions of the efficient cause. But it does not follow that, if they are principal causes, they are also independent in acting, because much greater perfection is required for this latter than for the former, as is established per se. When, therefore, it is said that for acting a power equal to the effect suffices, we can first answer that it suffices in the notion of proximate cause,² but not simply. Next we say that it suffices with due proportion; for, just as the power itself is dependent, so it suffices for such action, yet not independently; and therefore besides it it is necessary that the first cause inflow, on which all things essentially depend. But someone will infer: then, whenever some form depends on its cause in being conserved, it depends also in operating. It is answered that this is to be spoken of in the last section of this disputation; now the consequence is denied, because on a created cause there is not dependence so essential and as it were transcendental as on the uncreated.

15. To the second it is answered that it involves repugnance that a creature be able to act independently of the creator, both on the part of the created cause itself, which necessarily has power of acting commensurate and proportioned to its being, and on the part of the effect or action flowing from it; for, since these are beings by participation, they essentially depend on the first being. Wherefore, just as it does not pertain to the divine power to produce a being independent of itself in being, so neither to produce an agent independent of itself in acting; indeed both are equally repugnant to the divine perfection and to the imperfection of the creature, as has been sufficiently declared.

How God concurs immediately

16. The third argument is wholly about the mode of speaking rather than about the thing. And in the first place it is inquired in it whether God is to be said to act immediately towards the action of the secondary cause. And indeed from what has been said it is plainly established that it must necessarily be confessed that God in some way inflows immediately, and also mediately in some way. For He acts mediately inasmuch as He gives and conserves to the proximately acting secondary cause the power of acting. And in this way it is true that He acts through it, and created it for this, that He might communicate the office of acting with it; but He acts immediately because the first cause itself too through itself and by its power inflows into such action or effect. But because mediate and immediate influx seem to involve a certain repugnance between them, therefore some theologians distinguish of action immediate by immediacy of power or by immediacy of supposit, and affirm that God acts by immediacy of power in all the actions of creatures, but not by immediacy of supposit. So thinks Ferrariensis, III Cont. Gent., c. 70, which mode of speaking some modern Thomists imitate. And St. Thomas seems to favour it in that c. 70; for, answering the first reason to the contrary, he says: It is not unfitting that one action proceed from an inferior agent and from God, and from both immediately, because this is in one and another way. But the reason is that it is repugnant that two operate immediately by immediacy of supposit; but the secondary cause acts immediately by immediacy of supposit; therefore the first in that action does not act immediately. The major is evident, because to act immediately by immediacy of supposit is that between the acting supposit and the effect another supposit does not intervene.

17. Nevertheless this distinction is not necessary in the present matter, and that mode of speaking is not to be approved, because it does not declare the matter, and is so equivocal that it can induce an erroneous sense. For in created things those are said to act by immediacy of power, and not of supposit, which touch the patient or effect through power diffused from them, yet not through their supposit, which it is wicked to attribute to God. Simply, then, it must be said that God acts with all created agents by immediacy of power and of supposit. And since in the former part we agree, about the latter it must be noted that a supposit can be called immediate either in acting or in existing,³ or in local distance. As, for example, if the opinion of Scotus were true, that the sun generates gold in the earth immediately through its substantial form, it would indeed act by immediacy of supposit, or immediacy of action, so to speak, because from that supposit immediately the action would proceed, yet it would not act by immediacy of supposit in being or in place, because it would be far distant from its effect.

18. God, then, necessarily acts, wherever He acts, by local immediacy of supposit, or in being, both because through His immensity He is necessarily present everywhere, and also because the action proceeds per se and immediately not only from the created power, which can be called as it were a power diffused from God, but also from the uncreated power, which is in God Himself; but an agent which so operates through its power is necessarily present there where it operates. Hence for this reason God is said to be in all things by essence and by power; and therefore also from the action of God suppositive presence is very well gathered, as was said above.

19. Again, if the discourse is of immediacy of supposit in acting, God too is a supposit acting immediately in the action of the creature. Which I prove, first, from the reason now made; for that action does not proceed immediately only from the power diffused from God, which is created, for this would be to fall into the opinion of Durandus; it proceeds, therefore, immediately from the uncreated power existing in God Himself; therefore He also acts by immediacy of supposit. The consequence is evident, both because then a supposit is said to act immediately as principle quod when it so acts through a power inhering in it that from that power immediately the action proceeds as from a principle quo; and also because the divine supposit is its own power; the action, therefore, cannot proceed immediately from the power without proceeding immediately from the supposit, as St. Thomas gathers, In I, dist. 37, q. 1, a. 1, ad 4. Secondly, between God and the action, as it is from Him, another supposit does not mediate; therefore that action is from God by immediacy of supposit. You will say that between the first cause and the effect the second mediates. It is answered that, formally and properly speaking, the antecedent is false, because it is one thing for the secondary cause to cooperate with the first, another to mediate between the first and the effect. The first is true, but the second false, considering the first cause according to this relation according to which it per se inflows into the effect, because as such that action says relation or dependence to the first cause as immediately and per se as to the second.

20. Wherefore, to act immediately by immediacy of supposit does not exclude the partnership of another acting supposit; otherwise, if two lamps produce the same light, neither will act by immediacy of supposit; indeed neither does the secondary cause so act, because it does not act without the partnership of the divine supposit. But if you say that God acts as a superior and universal cause, but the creature as an inferior and particular one, and that by that immediacy of supposit the partnership not of any supposit whatever is excluded, but of that which is inferior and subordinated in acting, which Ferrariensis seems to intend, this is strictly false (although perhaps we labour in an equivocation), because to be an immediate supposit in acting does not exclude the subordination and subjection of another, but only mediation in acting. Indeed this immediacy of supposit in acting under one notion does not exclude that under another it can act mediately, concurring to the action in two ways, as St. Thomas declared of this very concurrence, I, q. 105, a. 1. Nor does anything stand against this in the words cited from III Cont. Gent.; for when St. Thomas says in one and another way, he does not understand immediacy of supposit or of power, but the action as made by the secondary cause and dependently, or by the first and independently.

21. Hence it is also established that, although God, inasmuch as He gives the power of acting to the secondary cause and conserves it and institutes it for acting, can be said to act through it, yet, inasmuch as He cooperates immediately with the creature, He does not properly act through it, but through Himself and through His own power and might. Nor does there thence follow any of the imperfections which are inferred in that argument from the fact that both causes, the first and the second, concur through themselves immediately to the effect. For the first general drawback was that such agents would be imperfect. The sequel, however, is denied; but only that will be imperfect which from its intrinsic condition and nature needs the help of another, which therefore properly depends on another in acting; but the other will not be imperfect; for, as St. Thomas rightly said, III Cont. Gent., c. 70, it comes not from insufficiency of power, but from the immensity of His goodness, that He communicated to the creature the power of acting, and therefore wills to produce such effects not by Himself alone, but with it.

22. The other drawback was that such agents would be partial. But if it is understood on the part of the effect, it does not follow, because part of the effect is not made by one cause and part by the other, but the whole effect by each in its genus, as St. Thomas notes above. But if it is understood on the part of the cause, there can be a certain diversity in the mode of speaking; for some grant the sequel, because, considering absolutely the integral effective causality necessary for that effect, neither of those causes applies all of it, but from the concurrence of both the integral causality arises; and therefore they are said to concur partially on the part of the cause; which is not an imperfection in God, because, as we said, this is not from insufficiency, but from His goodness. Others, however, think the sequel is to be denied, because, since those two causes are of diverse orders, they are not properly said to compose one total cause, but each is an integral cause in its order. Which mode of speaking, because it is both more common and more apt for indicating the inequality and subordination of these causes, seems more to be approved.

23. The third drawback was that such causes would come together for acting without subordination and as it were fortuitously. This, however, does not follow, for, since one depends on the other, subordination is not lacking. Indeed sometimes there is wont to be subordination with some mutual dependence; for the instrument, especially a conjoined one, depends in acting on the principal agent, as the pen on the writer; yet the writer too in some way depends on the pen, inasmuch as without it he cannot write. And that dependence can be called a priori, because it is on the moving principle, but this a posteriori, for the contrary reason; but always that which depends on another a priori is subordinated to it. In the present case, then, the secondary cause depends on the first a priori and essentially, because it is per se insufficient to act anything without its help; but the first cause properly does not depend on the second, either a priori or a posteriori, because, although according to that mode of acting by which it accommodates itself to concurring with the secondary cause it cannot alone effect such effect, yet simply it is wholly independent and able to effect by itself alone every entity which it effects through the secondary cause. There is, therefore, between these causes not only subordination, but the most essential and most perfect. But since the first cause always acts from certain knowledge and its will, and according to the order instituted by itself, it cannot be said to come together fortuitously with the secondary cause for acting, but by the highest providence.

How God concurs with the material, formal and final cause

24. The opinion of Fonseca.—To the fourth reason, it is denied that there is anything in things which is true and real being which is not immediately from God. But to the first three examples, it must be denied that any action, whether natural or free, good or evil, inasmuch as it is real action, is without the first cause immediately concurring; of which we must speak at length in what follows. But about the fourth example Fonseca weaves a prolix disputation, V Metaph., q. 12, contending that God is the first cause in every genus, immediately concurring with the secondary cause to its effect or causality. But one thing in this matter seems to me most clear and needing almost no discussion; but the other I do not at all grasp, which Fonseca seems to have intended in that whole question.

25. That first thing is that God, by effecting, immediately concurs with all causes to their causalities. In which sense not only efficient secondary causes, but also the material and formal, are subordinated to God and depend on Him not only in being but also in causing. Which is nothing else than that, when matter causes, God concurs not only by conserving matter, but also by effecting the very causality of matter, whatever it be, and by effecting also the effect of matter, giving effectively that being which matter gives materially; and the same holds proportionally of the form, and indeed of the end, inasmuch as its causality can be something real, as we shall see below. And the reason is established per se from what has been said, because whatever is real must be immediately from the efficiency of God; therefore also the causalities and effects of all causes are necessarily immediately from the efficiency of God. In which sense there can rightly be understood of every secondary cause what is said in the book On Causes, at the beginning: The first cause helps the second over its operation.

26. But the other is that God not only as first efficient cause, but also as first material cause and as first formal cause, concurs with matter and form to all their causalities, so that those causalities, even as they are from God, are formally diverse from the effective. I omit formal and exemplar causality;⁴ for in them this is probable, as I shall expound below in their places. In the said sense, then, the said author speaks, who expounds this of matter and form, not inasmuch as they compose the composite—for in this way the imperfection which they include is so clear that it is evident that that mode of causing cannot be formally attributed to God—but of the causalities which matter and form exercise mutually on each other, while matter sustains in being the form dependent on it, or the subject the accidents, and conversely the form contains matter in being; for these causalities, taken per se and absolutely, do not include imperfection on account of which they could not formally belong to God.

27. Which he confirms by other reasons, but all, except the last, prove only our first assertion. But the last is that God supplies by Himself alone these causalities of matter and form, as is evident in the quantity of the Eucharist; and we said that God can conserve matter without form; but He cannot through effective causality alone supply the causalities of such causes; therefore, while He supplies the causality of matter in the conservation of quantity, He retains the same genus of causality; therefore He can also within that genus concur with matter to such causality. The minor, in which is the force of the argument, he proves because the causality of one genus is contained neither formally nor virtually in another genus. And God Himself, although He contains eminently all causalities, cannot yet, inasmuch as He has the notion of one cause, exercise the genus or notion of another. Likewise, because one cause cannot supply the place of another except by exercising the office which that exercised. Further, because, if God sustained accidents without matter and did not supply its office, there would be in the nature of things an effect in act without a cause in act. Next, because, if God conserved, for example, the form of the heaven without matter by efficient concurrence alone, either that would be the same as the prior one, and this cannot be, both because by the same concurrence only the same thing can be made, and also because now the causality of matter about that form would be supplied by no causality; or it is by a new effective concurrence, and this cannot be, because about the same effect new efficiency cannot be added to the old, or creative concurrence to creative.

28. The premised opinion is disproved.—If someone, however, considers what we said above about the causality of matter and form, he will at once understand the difficulty of this opinion and dissent from it, not only because it is new and beside the received dogmas about God, but also because it is false and relies on weak foundations. For in the first place none of the theologians or philosophers attributes to God, according to propriety, any other genus of causality than the efficient, final or exemplar, as is evident from what St. Thomas hands down, I, q. 44, and what is treated there. I say, however, according to propriety, for according to metaphor it is sometimes attributed to God that He is as it were the form of all things, and that He vivifies all things, or also that He sustains and is the foundation of all things, in which way Dionysius sometimes seems to speak,⁵ who is vainly twisted to another sense. Which is so true that the theologians for this cause deny that the divine Word exercises any proper causality by terminating the humanity, because, since it cannot be effective, because it is not common to all the persons, they evidently thought it followed that it is none; for that it is neither final nor exemplar was known per se. A similar argument is that, besides the goodness by which God has the power of causing finally, and the ideas by which He has the power of causing exemplarily, we do not recognize in God another power of causing ad extra except omnipotence, which is only effective power, whether it be executive power distinct in reason from will and intellect, or one of these, or all together. To add, then, to God another power of causing ad extra, by sustaining, for example, a form besides efficiency, is unheard of. Which, however, in that opinion, speaking consistently, is necessarily admitted.

29. Moreover I argue by reason, because every causality of matter (and the same holds of the causality of form) formally includes imperfection. And the reason is that neither in the composite nor in the form does matter cause anything except by means of intrinsic and formal union of one to the other, not as through a condition only required, but as through the formal causality itself, as was proved above; but God cannot so cause through formal union, as is known per se; therefore neither can He concur through proper and formal causality of that genus; but by the very fact that the causality does not take place through union, it is not material nor formal, and therefore in no way can it happen, as we also said above, that matter cause a form not united to it. Finally, that mode of causing of God ad extra without efficiency can scarcely be conceived, because neither in the effect is there anything with respect to God besides its entity and action, nor does it depend on God except by means of action, nor does action as action say relation except to the efficient, although, as ordered to such terminus or such form, it can regard a final or exemplar cause; what, then, is that other causality which is called sustentation? Plainly it is something feigned and not at all necessary. For the divine causality is most amply contained in those three modes. Nor because every cause gives being is it necessary to attribute to God formally the mode of every cause; otherwise, because matter and form too give being to the composite, it would be necessary that God give being within the same genus of material and formal cause, which is most absurd. From the fact, then, that every cause gives being it can only be inferred that God immediately gives that being, either in that or in a higher mode. Likewise, from the fact that every secondary cause depends on God not only in being but also in causing, it does not follow that it depends in the same genus of cause, but either in that or in a nobler one, or the effective.

30. The foundation of the aforesaid opinion is overthrown.—To the last reason to the contrary, then, the minor is denied; for God can by effecting supply, about the form, the sustentation of matter or of the subject. To the first proof it is answered that God through the power of acting contains eminently the effects of the other causes, and can cause in His perfect way that which the others cause in their imperfect ways, without them, where wholly essential dependence does not intervene, as is between the composite and matter or form. Nor on that account do we say that God through eminential containment of matter exercises the causality of matter, but supplies something by effecting which matter would cause by subjecting itself. Hence to the second proof it is answered that, although one created cause cannot supply the office of another except within the same genus, yet God can in another, where special repugnance does not intervene. Nor on that account is there an effect in act without a cause in act, but with the genus of cause changed. To the last proof it is answered that, when an accident is conserved without a subject, this takes place through new efficiency, not by adding it to the old, but by changing one into the other. Hence, if the form of the heaven were conserved without matter, this would indeed take place through an influx of its genus creative; but the prior would not remain, because it was not properly creative, but concreative of the form and having some agreement with the eductive. But whether one must philosophize in the same way about matter conserved without form has been treated at length in the foregoing.

1. Since it has been shown that this concurrence of which we treat is from the first cause, or belongs to it inasmuch as it is efficient, it is established that it can be nothing else than action or principle of action, comprehending under principle of action both the per se principle and every condition prerequired for acting; for besides these nothing is found in the efficient cause, as efficient, which could have the notion of concurrence. For we suppose that neither the acting supposit itself as such is the concurrence, nor yet the effect as such. For the supposit is as it were the first acting principle, while the effect is the last terminus of the effecting; but concurrence says something by way of influx or tendency from the acting supposit to the terminus.

The first opinion is proposed

2. There can, then, be three ways of speaking about this question. The first is that concurrence of this kind is something by way of per se principle. Which can be understood in two ways: in one way, that such principle is in God Himself. And this, rightly explained, can have a true sense; we are not, however, now speaking in it. For God concurs through His will with the creature for its action. Hence the very volition of God can in its order be called the concurrence of God with the creature, which by some is called concurrence ad intra; but the act of the will of God is in its way the per se principle of every action ad extra, a per se principle (I say) either by reason of itself or by reason of the executive power which it applies to acting, either according to the thing or also according to reason, according to the various ways of thinking about the executive power of God. Thus, then, the concurrence of God ad intra will be something by way of principle of action, not in the creature, but in God Himself. Now, however, we do not speak of concurrence in this sense, but as it is something flowing from God and received in the creature; and concurrence in strictness does not signify something ad intra, but ad extra. In another way, then, this opinion is understood: that concurrence is a certain thing flowing from the first cause and received in the second, completing it ultimately and determining it to effecting such effect. And for this reason this concurrence is said to be by way of principle, because it is the power of acting of the secondary cause, or at least formally completes it. And on account of this power all secondary causes are said to act in the power of the first, as is often said in the book On Causes; and conversely, by reason of the same power the first cause is said to act by immediacy of power, because this power inflowed into the secondary cause is the power of the first cause, and from it immediately the action proceeds. And this seems to be the whole foundation of this opinion. I find, however, no assertor of this opinion who expressly taught it, although those whom we shall at once cite for the second seem sometimes to favour it and to speak quite indistinctly.

The said opinion is refuted

3. This opinion, however, is false, and in one sense is as erroneous as the opinion of Durandus denying the actual concurrence of God to the actions of secondary causes, but in another is only improbable. The concurrence of the first cause can be understood in two ways to be a power implanted in the second as a per se principle of acting. In one way, that the concurrence of the first cause to the action of the creature stops in the influx of that power and does not concur more immediately to the action of the secondary cause itself. And in this sense I say that this opinion in reality falls into the opinion of Durandus and is equally false, inasmuch as it denies the immediate concurrence of the first cause to the action of the creature; but inasmuch as it posits something superfluous and without foundation, it will be more improbable, as I shall show in the other member. The said censure, then, is proved, because from that opinion it follows that only the created power is the per se principle of the action and effect of the secondary cause, but God only a remote principle and per accidens. But this is the opinion which is reproved in Durandus. The sequel is evident, because a cause which only gives another the power of acting, if it does not otherwise concur to its action, in truth concurs only remotely and per accidens, as fire which heats water does not otherwise concur to the second heating proceeding from the hot water; and the agent intellect which produced the intelligible species will not be said to concur per se to the act of understanding. Finally, in that way Durandus too says that God concurs to all the actions of creatures, by giving and conserving the whole power of acting up to its last complement, whatever it may be. For that that principle of acting be given prior in time, before the creature acts, or in the same instant or time in which it acts, matters nothing. Otherwise, because the sun illuminates in the same instant in which it is created and receives the power of illuminating, it would not need another concurrence besides the infusion of light. Similarly, whether that power be connatural and permanent, or extrinsically given by God and as it were transient (as some speak, and which is nothing else than to be dependent on God in becoming and being conserved), matters little for God, if He acts through that power only, to inflow per se and immediately as first cause. Wherefore, if perhaps some authors said in this sense that God acts by immediacy of power and not of supposit, they erred greatly, as is evident from what has been said and will be declared more at once.

4. In another way it can be understood that the concurrence of the first cause is by way of principle and implanted power, because in the conferring of this power it is as it were begun, yet does not stop in it, but proceeds further up to the action itself of the creature, so that into it there inflows immediately not only the power communicated to the secondary cause, but also the divine and uncreated power itself. And according to this sense it would have to be said that concurrence is not only something by way of principle, but also something by way of actual influx or action. Next, that multiplication of things in concurrence of this kind is improbable, for we are speaking per se and precisely of the concurrence necessary by virtue of the dependence of every effect and action on the first cause. Hence we suppose the secondary cause having complete power of acting in its order; for if the secondary cause itself is incomplete and imperfect, it will indeed need complement of power; yet that need does not arise from the dependence which the secondary cause has on the first, but from imperfection in the latitude of the secondary cause. And in this way it is true that God sometimes, at least supernaturally, supplies the imperfection of the secondary cause by adding power of acting, which He most of all does with us when He infuses supernatural habits; yet this is outside our purpose, because that infusion of power does not pertain to the concurrence of the first cause, but to the elevation or perfection of the secondary cause through the action of the first. Speaking, then, of the secondary cause perfectly constituted in first act in its order, it is irrelevant to adjoin another principle of acting received in it, because, by the very fact that it is something created, it pertains to the order of secondary causes, and so principles of acting are multiplied in the same order without cause or necessity. And against this concurrence so explained the arguments of Durandus made in the preceding section rightly proceed.

5. An evasion is refuted.—They will perhaps say that this power which the first cause gives to the second in order to concur with it does not pertain to the causality of the secondary cause as such, but to the causality of the first cause, because it is as it were its proper instrument for concurring with the second; and therefore, although that power is received in the secondary cause, the secondary cause does not act through it, but God, just as, although impetus is received in a thrown stone, the stone does not move itself through it, but he who threw it. Hence, just as the thrower is said to move immediately through the impulse, so God too will be said to concur immediately through this power, which immediacy, per se speaking, is of power, not of supposit. And similarly, although the power of the secondary cause is said to be completed through this power impressed by the first, yet not by a complement pertaining to the order of the secondary cause, but adding power necessary on the part of the first cause.

6. Nevertheless this reply either returns to the former sense, wholly reproved, or says something per se improbable and irrelevant; for if that power is said to be the instrument of God in such a way that the action of God stops in its effecting, but afterwards it alone concurs with the secondary cause to its action—as in the example adduced the action of the thrower stops in the impression of impetus, but afterwards the motion is from the impetus—if this (I say) is said, we return to the former sense, and so it comes about that the action of the creature says no immediate relation to the uncreated power of God itself as to its per se principle, which was reproved in the preceding section against Durandus. But if, besides the influx of that instrumental power, God is also said by His own uncreated power to inflow immediately into the action of the secondary cause, it at once appears per se how irrelevant is that instrumental power which holds itself on the part of God; for the divine power is there intimately present through itself, and on account of its eminence is sufficient and proportioned to inflow through itself into the action; indeed it must necessarily so inflow in order that any action can be made by the creature; therefore on the part of God that instrumental power is not necessary; it matters nothing, therefore, for the concurrence of the first cause, which is per se necessary and pertains to the essential subordination of the secondary cause with respect to the first.

The second opinion is proposed

7. The first foundation of the reported opinion.—The second opinion is that the concurrence of the first cause is something by way of principle in the secondary cause itself, ordered to its action, yet not as its per se principle, but only as a condition necessary for acting. So all seem to think who posit that the concurrence of God is concerned with the secondary cause antecedently to its action, by applying it or determining it to action. And this opinion is commonly attributed to St. Thomas, in places to be treated below; but undeservedly, as I shall show; Capreolus too is commonly cited, In II, dist. 1, q. 2, but equally unreasonably. Ferrariensis, however, II Cont. Gent., c. 70, at the beginning, distinguishes in created agents a twofold power of acting: one firm and permanent, which is proper and natural; the other he calls an intention of the divine power having incomplete being, and this he says does not belong to things except when they actually operate as instruments of the divine power. And at the end of § Ad secundum dubium, he says that God immediately acts in all inferior causes a certain participation of Himself, with which at the same time He immediately attains their effects; because the very power existing in God and its intention produced in the inferior causes are taken as one power; as art (he says) which is in the mind of the artificer and its intention received in the instrument are taken for one power. And through this power he says God applies secondary causes to operating, as the artificer his instruments. In which words he seems partly to allude to the former opinion, partly to this latter. But for positing this intentional power he is moved by no reason, but only by a certain testimony of St. Thomas, q. 3 De Pot., a. 7; and some later Thomists have followed this opinion. And they found it on certain received expressions of the ancient philosophers. The first is that secondary agents do not act except as moved by the first, and in this they constitute the per se subordination between these causes; and thence they conclude that one must come to one first agent not needing the motion of another. So Aristotle seems to have proceeded, VII Phys., c. 1, and bk. VIII, c. 5; and II Metaph., c. 2, whom St. Thomas always imitates, both expounding Aristotle and in other places to be cited at once; and in part Augustine, bk. VIII Genes. ad litter., c. 20, and V De Civ., c. 9. Indeed sacred Scripture too seems to attribute to God the premotion of inferior causes, as Job 13: Who changeth the heart of princes; and Prov. 12: The heart of the king is in the hand of God; whithersoever He will He shall turn it; Jer. 10: The way of man is not his; and the steps of man shall be directed by the Lord. Secondary causes act, therefore, moved by the first; but this motion cannot consist in the action itself of the secondary cause, both because motion is in the thing which is moved, while transient action is not in the agent by which it is done, and also because this motion precedes the action at least in causality, because secondary agents are moved for this, that they may act, because they cannot act unless moved.

8. The second.—The second principle is that the secondary cause is applied by the first to acting. Which is thought to be taken from the book On Causes, proposition 16, where it is said that the divine power is the power of all causes; because, namely, the divine power applies the other powers to their operations, as Giles expounded, Quodl. V, q. 1, and St. Thomas signifies, I, q. 105, a. 5, in the body, and ad 3. For in the body he says that the first agent moves the second to acting, and according to this (he says) all things act in the power of God Himself. But in the solution ad 3 he declares that this is because God not only gives and conserves the powers of acting, but also applies them to acting. And the necessity of this application, among others, is one, that to the power which regards the universal end it pertains to apply the inferior ones in order to its end; but God is the supreme agent regarding the universal end; therefore He applies the inferior ones to act accommodated to that end. This application, then, is not the action of the creature; for it is from God alone and precedes the action of the secondary cause; it is compared, therefore, to the action of the secondary cause as its principle.

9. The third.—The third principle is that the first cause arouses the second to the work; which mode of speaking is not so frequent among the ancient authors as the name of motion or application. It seems, however, to have the same force. And it can be declared in this way: the created power, while it acts, is in some way perfected in itself, because it is better to act than wholly to lack action; but this perfection does not consist in the action itself, especially in transient, since it is not in the agent itself; it consists, therefore, in this arousing by which such power is as it were ultimately actuated for acting. But this arousing cannot be from the created power itself, both because often it is not active upon itself, and also because for that efficiency it would also need arousing; it is, therefore, from the first cause.

10. The fourth.—The fourth and chief principle is that the secondary cause is determined by the first and per se and necessarily needs such determination. So St. Thomas thinks, I, q. 105, a. 1, ad 3, saying: This very thing, that secondary causes are determined to determinate effects, is to them from God. And a twofold reason of this necessity can be brought; one is universal for all secondary causes, because namely their powers are indifferent to producing various individuals, nor can they determine themselves to this individual rather than to that; nor can another sufficient determinant be thought of besides the first cause. But this determination does not take place except by adding something to the active power itself. The other reason is proper to the free will, which of itself is undetermined not only to individuals but also to species and to contrary acts, and therefore needs a predeterminer, because from an undetermined agent a determined effect cannot come forth. And this reason can be extended to universal natural agents, which also are indifferent to several effects diverse in species, whence they cannot determine themselves to one of them.

11. The fifth.—The fifth principle is that secondary causes are essentially subordinated to the first cause, as instruments to the artificer, as grave authors frequently speak, and especially St. Thomas, I-II, q. 6, a. 1, ad 3, and II Cont. Gent., c. 21, a. 4, and he indicates it in bk. III, c. 70. But this subordination cannot be understood unless the first cause premoves the second, and the action of the second depends on the motion of the first. Otherwise there would not be subordination, but a certain concomitance of two agents. Nor would the action of the first cause be prior to the action of the secondary cause; which is plainly repugnant to the dignity of the first cause and to the dependence of the secondary cause.

12. The sixth.—Sixthly we can argue that this mode of concurring of the first cause, using the secondary cause through its motion, and so perfectly subjecting it to itself, displays a certain greater perfection in the mode of acting of the first cause with the secondary ones, and includes no repugnance; therefore it is to be attributed to the first cause. The major is declared in various ways: first, because for this reason the dependence of the secondary cause on the first is greater, because it depends on the first not only in its effect and action, but also itself in causing; or, as others say, not only the effect or action taken incomplexly, but also this complex, the secondary cause acts, will be from the first. Or otherwise the first cause will not only make the effect or action of the secondary cause, but will also make the secondary cause make; which also is often attributed to God in sacred Scripture, and cannot be understood without that premotion. Again, conversely, it pertains to the perfection of the first cause that it use secondary ones for its ends and according to its will, as having supreme dominion over them; for the perfect act of dominion is the full use of the thing which falls under dominion. These are the chief reasons which can be brought for this opinion. Of which the first two seem most to favour this second opinion, but the third and fourth seem rather to proceed according to the former opinion; but the fifth and sixth are indifferent.

The preceding opinion is refuted

13. This opinion, however, is no more to be approved than the preceding; nor do I think it was the opinion of St. Thomas or Scotus or the ancient theologians. To prove which, I note that this latter opinion too can be taken in the two senses declared above.¹ The first is that the concurrence of the first cause is thought to consist wholly and precisely in acting, about the cause itself, that previous necessary condition, whether it be called by the name of motion, or application, or anything else, so that besides it the first cause has no other efficiency about the effect or action of the secondary cause. And neither Ferrariensis nor the modern authors seem to have intended this sense, as can be gathered from the last words of Ferrariensis cited above. And in truth in this sense such opinion would be no less false than the opinion of Durandus, because according to this explanation God would not concur per se to the action of the secondary cause, but only remotely and per accidens, namely by conserving the secondary cause and effecting in it a certain condition necessary for acting; but this concurrence is per accidens with respect to the effect of the secondary cause, as is evident in one applying fire to burning. For if he who gives and conserves the per se principle of acting, and concurs no further, causes only remotely and per accidens the effect flowing from that principle, much more he who gives a condition required for acting; hence he who does both will concur per accidens in two ways, but in no way per se. Of this sense, then, there is no need to dispute more; rather from it I elicit that, even if we grant that God effects that application or previous condition, the concurrence of the first cause does not consist per se and formally in it; for the first cause through its concurrence is the per se immediate cause, and total in its genus, of the effect and action of the secondary cause, as was demonstrated in the first section; but through the efficiency of this necessary condition God is not the per se and immediate, let alone total, cause of the action or effect of the creature; therefore the concurrence of God does not formally consist in this efficiency.

14. It remains, then, that we examine the other sense, namely, that the concurrence of the first cause is begun (so to speak) from this motion or application of the secondary cause, but consummated in the immediate and per se effecting of the effect itself or action of the secondary cause itself. In which sense we say that that opinion indeed differs extremely from the opinion of Durandus, but adds something to the truth which is neither necessary nor can be sufficiently understood, and can offer occasion of falling into some error, especially about the use of human freedom. In order, however, that we may prove all these things distinctly, we must proceed gradually, declaring and proving the third and true opinion.

Resolution of the question

15. The first conclusion.—I say, then, first: the divine concurrence, inasmuch as it is something ad extra, is per se essentially something by way of action, or at least by way of a certain becoming flowing immediately from God. I declare the single particles: for I say inasmuch as it is something ad extra, in order to omit the disputation about the very act of the will of God, whether it is to be called concurrence or not, and whether it is to be said to inflow by way of action or by way of principle; for as to this sense what was said above about creation suffices. And for almost the same cause I said or at least by way of a certain becoming, namely, in order to abstain from that question whether the action received in the creature is compared to God by way of action or only by way of effect; for, although it is truer that it is compared by way of action, as I shall also touch upon in the following section, yet for the present it does not matter. And the conclusion so explained is most received and to me most certain, and sufficiently proved from what was said in the preceding section against Durandus, and in this one against the reported opinions explained in the first sense.

16. And it is taken from St. Thomas, I, q. 105, a. 5, and III Cont. Gent., c. 70, inasmuch as he says that the first cause through its general concurrence inflows per se and immediately not only into the effect but also into the action of the secondary cause; because not only the effect but also the action of the secondary cause has something of participated entity, and for that reason it is necessary that it flow immediately and per se from the first being by essence. From which principle the reason is concluded thus: the concurrence of God is intimately and per se included in the very action of the creature, and per se also and immediately tends to the same terminus to which the action of the creature tends; therefore per se and essentially it is something by way of action, or the becoming of the very action or effect of the creature. And it is confirmed; for this concurrence cannot consist in all that or in that alone which is given to the secondary cause by way of principle in order that it can operate; therefore it consists essentially in something which is by way of actual becoming.

17. The antecedent has been proved against the above opinions, and again is declared thus: any entity being posited which concurs only by way of principle, it does not imply a contradiction that the action or effect not follow; for God can suspend from actual action every created principle of acting, however applied to acting with all prerequisite conditions, and impede the effect from being made. But, actual concurrence ad extra being posited, it implies a contradiction that the action not follow or the effect not be made; therefore it is an evident sign that actual concurrence does not consist per se and essentially in those things which are by way of principle, but in something which is by way of action. The major seems known per se from the terms, because in them no repugnance or implication of contradiction is involved. And it is certain of faith that God did this in many powers operating by natural necessity, nor is there greater reason of repugnance in some than in others. Unless perhaps someone says that this is specially repugnant to the intentional power which they say is impressed by God and is as it were transient or inflowing, which comes from the fact that it has being inseparable from actual operation, as the power of art impressed on an instrument is inseparable from the operation of the art; for Ferrariensis above likens that power to this. But certainly, if such power is inseparable from the actual action of the secondary cause, even by the absolute power of God, this sufficiently declares that it is not a thing distinct from it, and consequently is not its principle, but the actual emanation of it from the first cause. Or conversely, if that power is supposed a thing distinct from the action of the secondary cause and its true principle, it is denied without probability that God can bring it about that it be and that the action not flow from it, because the power does not depend essentially on the action which flows from it, but conversely, and is in reality distinct from the action and prior to it; what, then, is repugnant in its being conserved without it? Likewise, that power being posited, the immediate influx of God is still necessary in order that the action follow, which has often been proved; therefore God can suspend that influx, and so impede the action.

18. Nor does the example of the power of art impressed on an instrument help anything, for that power can only be either impetus impressed on the instrument for moving it locally, or the motion itself. But impetus can be impeded from effecting motion, as the reasons made prove; nor do I see what stands to the contrary. But motion itself cannot be impeded from the actual motion of the instrument, because with respect to it it is not compared as power, but as the action itself or becoming. But if from the instrument so moved some other action distinct from the motion and its terminus is apt to follow, to which the motion of the instrument is compared by way of principle or power, all that action is separable from such motion by divine power, for the same cause. But that, actual concurrence ad extra being posited, the action of the secondary cause is not separable is the common consent and evident, because that concurrence is not separable from some terminus and effect of the first cause; for if it is concurrence ad extra, something is made outside God; but this must be made by the secondary cause; otherwise it would not be concurrence with the secondary cause, but the action of God alone. Hence the very name concurrence sufficiently declares inseparability from the action of the secondary cause. Therefore concurrence is essentially something by way of action or becoming, as it is from the first cause.

19. The second conclusion.—I say secondly: the concurrence of the first cause, besides that which is by way of action, does not include from intrinsic necessity something newly implanted in the secondary cause itself which is the principle of its action or a condition necessary for it. I say newly implanted, because it is certain that the concurrence of the secondary cause supposes in it the power of acting given and conserved by the first cause, which we here suppose, and we inquire what beyond it must necessarily be adjoined on the part of the first cause.

20. This conclusion, then, can be taken from St. Thomas, I-II, q. 109, aa. 1, 2 and 3, where he says that for the actions of secondary causes only two things are required, namely, intrinsic connatural power (for he speaks of natural actions, of which alone our discourse is in this whole disputation) and the concurrence of God, which he there calls the motion or help of God moving; why he so calls it we shall see below. But that he understood nothing else by that word is evident, both because otherwise he would have passed over that which is per se and most necessary, and also because there would then be necessary for the action of the creature not two but three things, namely its power, the motion and the concurrence. And so Cajetan seems to have understood it there, saying that that help of God moving is His cooperation. Who teaches the same opinion, I, q. 14, a. 13, and q. 19, a. 8, where, expounding that axiom, The secondary cause does not act unless moved by the first, he says it is to be understood not of a previous motion, but of a motion intrinsically cooperating with the action itself. And he adds: Such, however, is the cooperation of the first cause, of which it is written that it reacheth from end to end mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly, cooperating with each according to the mode of each. The same is the opinion of Scotus in various places, but especially In IV, dist. 1, q. 1, ad ult., where he says that the secondary cause is not said to act in the power of the first because it then receives something from it, but because it has the order of the inferior to it; and he adds: From these it is evident that of the first cause into the secondary cause properly so called there is not a new influence which is the creation of something inhering in the secondary cause, but the influence there is the determinate order of these causes in acting the common effect. Almain thinks the same, tract. I Moral., c. 1; and Gregory, In II, dist. 28, q. 1, a. 3, ad 12, where he declares that the concurrence of God consists only in the partial co-efficiency of God, so far as concerns the essential subordination of the secondary cause to the first; which I note because from another head he requires for good acts a special premotion of God, of which elsewhere; the same, In II, dist. 34, ad 8. Capreolus too, In II, dist. 28, q. 1, a. 3, ad 12 against the second conclusion, where, reporting the opinion of Gregory, he approves it and says: St. Thomas agrees, I-II, q. 109, in almost every article. Gabriel too, In II, dist. 37, a. 3, dub. 2, imitates Gregory. Others I shall report in the following section.

21. It is proved by reason, first, because through this actual concurrence of God by way of action, as explained, every essential dependence is saved, both of the secondary cause on the first in causing, and of its action in becoming, and also of the effect in its whole being. Likewise by reason of this concurrence it is true that the first cause immediately and per se effects all things, and whatever else about it as causing all things is either believed on authority or can be proved by reason; therefore it is superfluous to feign anything else. The antecedent is sufficiently evident from what was said in the prior assertion, and more clearly in the solutions of the arguments. But the consequence is proved, both because nature abhors whatever is superfluous, as Aristotle too witnesses, I De Caelo, c. 4, and in other places; and also because the reasons made in the preceding section for the opinion of Durandus prove that only that efficiency of the first cause is to be conjoined with the secondary cause for its action which was per se necessary for the essential dependence of every entity or real mode on the first being; and finally because otherwise there would be no stopping-point, but any thing being posited someone could adjoin another, and, just as besides actual concurrence some require motion, others complement of power, someone could demand those three, and another at his pleasure could adjoin a fourth, as is sufficiently established per se.

22. The second reason is that nothing can be required as per se principle, nor as a necessary condition of the per se principle; therefore in no way; therefore the concurrence of the first cause as such requires nothing by way of principle, but only by way of action. The consequences are clear from sufficient enumeration. The major has been sufficiently proved in refuting the former opinion. But the minor is to be demonstrated by the same or a proportional discourse. For, just as the secondary cause in its order can be complete in power of acting, so it requires certain and determinate conditions necessary in the same order for acting, all of which we suppose it to have when we dispute precisely of the necessity of the concurrence of the first cause. For if any of them is lacking, it will indeed be necessary, if that cause is to operate, that that condition be first adjoined through the efficiency of the first cause, either alone or with another secondary cause; yet that necessity is not by virtue of concurrence or of dependence on the first cause, but from a peculiar defect. As, therefore, a cause complete in power does not need another complement of power, so a cause complete in the conditions prerequired for acting in its order prerequires no new condition. But to say that, besides those conditions known to us which secondary causes can procure per se or through other secondary causes, they require a certain other hidden condition which they can have only from the influx of the first cause, as it is said gratuitously, so it is easily despised, because it relies on no authority or reason of any weight or moment.

23. Whether and how secondary causes are applied by the first to acting.—An objection is dissolved.—But further we can show positively that no such condition can be devised, running through those four which were touched upon in the arguments made above. For first this condition was called the application of the secondary cause to acting. But we suppose every application known to us already made; but this application consists either in some local motion, or in a vital or animal action, as when the final cause is applied through cognition or the motive power through appetite. From which it comes about that, just as this application consists in some real action, so it cannot be without the efficiency of the first cause, ordinarily indeed through secondary causes, but extraordinarily through itself. But besides these, what other application could there be? For if it is real efficiency, it will be a real motion or change of the secondary cause. What terminus, then, does it have? Not local, nor of another genus outside quality, as seems known per se. Nor yet can it be some quality; for, if that quality is given as power of acting, it is no longer only a condition, but a per se principle of action, and the reasons made above return. But if it is given so as to act nothing, it is irrelevant to acting, nor can a reason be given why it is called a necessary condition. You will say that it is necessary in order to conjoin the second agent to the first, as an instrument to the principal cause. But these and similar things, which can be said in words, cannot be explained in reality, because that conjunction is neither some real union nor a more intimate presence, but only a certain new effect, whose office and necessity for the action of the secondary cause we are inquiring into.

24. Nor indeed can it be said that the terminus of that change which is called application is the very action of the secondary cause, both because one action is not the terminus of another, as I shall say more at length in the following section; and also because that application is a change in the secondary cause itself, while its action is often in the patient; and finally because that application is said to be a condition previous to the action; therefore its terminus too is previous; as, therefore, in the secondary cause there is nothing real which could terminate such change, so neither is there such application which is something real in it previous to the action.

25. How the first cause moves the second.—In another way that condition was called the motion by which the first cause moves the second to acting. And of this motion it can be inquired by the same discourse what terminus it has, and consequently to what species of motion or change it pertains, because it is necessary that every real motion tend to something and be in some species; but such motion is not local, because it is not necessary that secondary causes be changed locally whenever they act; of motion to quantity the matter is more certain; but of change to quality the reason made about application proceeds in the same way; but besides these there is nothing which can be made through that motion, as will easily be evident by running through all the genera of beings. Nor indeed can that motion be terminated per se at the very action of the secondary cause, both on account of the reasons made about application, and also because otherwise that motion would no longer be a condition prerequired for that action, but would be the intrinsic way to that action, since that action is said to be the proper and immediate terminus of that motion. From which it will further come about that, just as that motion is said to be from the first cause alone, so also its terminus, for the terminus is from the same cause from which the way is; therefore, if the action of the secondary cause is the intrinsic terminus of that motion, it will be from the first cause alone, which involves open repugnance; for how is it the action of the secondary cause if it is from the first alone? But if it is said that the action of the secondary cause is not the intrinsic terminus of that motion, but rather extrinsic or remote, another intrinsic and proper terminus will necessarily have to be assigned; but the discourse made by us sufficiently shows that none can be assigned.

26. How the power of the secondary cause is aroused by the first.—Thirdly, that condition was called the arousing of the power. Which, if it is posited to take place through true and real action of the first cause into the second or into its power, there will be made through that action some change in the cause, of which the whole argumentation just made will proceed. But if that arousing is not through true and real action into the secondary cause, then nothing is done in the secondary cause which behaves by way of principle, which is what we intend. And moreover it remains to be explained by those authors cited above by us, who require such arousing, how the arousing of power takes place without action or through extrinsic denomination, as they call it, and what is the necessity of such arousing coming from the first cause alone, besides all that which can be coming from the secondary cause. And in order that this be understood more fully, note that the arousing of a power to operate is found most properly in the powers of the soul, yet is extended in some way to some natural powers which do not act unless their subjects are first altered, as pepper does not heat unless it is crushed, and an odoriferous thing often does not send forth odour unless it is first heated.

27. This previous alteration, then, is commonly called arousing of power by metaphor; but in very truth it is either a complement of power through an added quality, or an application or disposition of the agent so that of itself it can emit some vapour or exhalation by means of which it acts, as while an odoriferous thing is rarefied by heating it can more easily exhale odour, and so of others. But the arousing of the first cause cannot be like this natural one through previous alteration, because neither is complement of power always necessary in the secondary cause, as has been shown, nor yet some material disposition; for in many secondary causes it is not necessary, as is evident in fire heating, the sun illuminating, and an angel moving the heaven; and where it is necessary, it is commonly made through other secondary causes, nor does it pertain to the subordination of the secondary cause with respect to the first.

28. But the arousing of the powers of the soul takes place in two ways. In one, by the object, either in the genus of efficient, as in the cognitive powers, or in the genus of end, as in the appetitive. And of this genus of arousing too it is known per se that the first cause does not arouse the second by virtue of general concurrence, because many secondary causes are not capable of objective arousing; and those which are capable are not always moved by the first cause as by an object. Nor yet does the first cause from its general office have to apply arousing objects except by concurring with secondary causes. For the works of grace God indeed arouses men in a peculiar way; nevertheless that arousing does not pertain to the concurrence of the first cause, but to supplying or helping the imperfection of some secondary cause; about which genus of divine arousing the theologians dispute specially in the matter of grace. In another way the arousing of the powers of the soul takes place through a certain as it were moral efficiency, through the natural sympathy which they have from the fact that they are rooted in the same essence of the soul, with subordination among themselves, which is also commonly called the motion or application of one power by another, in which way the motive power existing in the muscles is aroused or applied by the appetite, and the will is said in this way to move all the powers of the soul. But neither does this genus of arousing have place in the secondary cause with respect to the first, both because it intrinsically includes a vital mode of operating, and also because it requires the conjunction of the moving and moved faculty in the same radical principle. And so all the modes of arousing which we can explain or attain seem excluded; but to feign some other ineffable one and demand faith in it, when neither the Christian faith teaches it nor is reason or necessity of it given, is foreign to all reason.

29. A certain mode is objected in which God is said to apply secondary causes.—Someone can say, however, that there is found between the first and the second cause a certain sympathy arising not from the rooting of powers in the same essence, but from the essential subjection of the secondary cause to the first and the supreme dominion of the first over the second. And sympathy of this kind can consist in this, that, God willing that the secondary cause operate, at once by necessary consecution the secondary cause acts, not because it receives anything in itself by virtue of that will, but because it at once obeys by acting, as the motive power obeys the appetite. Through this will, then, God can be said to apply, move or arouse the secondary cause to acting. And because that willing of God always intervenes in concurrence with the secondary cause, therefore the first cause is said to concur by arousing the secondary cause. Nevertheless this mode of speaking, whether it is true or false, does not pertain to the present question; for here we treat only of external and transient concurrence; but that arousing explained in such a way takes place only through the internal willing. Likewise by virtue of that will the secondary cause receives in itself nothing by way of principle or of condition necessary for acting, of which we now treat. Therefore, in the way in which we now dispute, no arousing takes place in the secondary cause by virtue of the sole concurrence of the first cause. But whether that mode of arousing is true, because it is a difficult point and necessary for the completion of this matter, will be explained in section IV.

30. Fourthly, that necessary condition was said to be the determination of the secondary cause through the effecting of the first. But this is no more probable than the rest, and, arguing generally, if this determination is said to take place through true action of the first cause into the second, the arguments made above return, that that action brings in a change in the secondary cause, of which change no terminus can be assigned. But specially, this necessity of such predetermination is none in secondary causes acting naturally, because they are by their nature determined to one; which determination indeed they received from God not through concurrence, but through the influx and conservation of such nature. In which sense St. Thomas speaks, I, q. 105, a. 1, ad 3. But formally such causes have this determination from intrinsic nature. Hence under this consideration it is commonly said that the secondary cause determines the concurrence of the first to the species of action, rather than is determined by it, as St. Thomas seems to speak, In II, dist. 1, q. 1, a. 4, in the body, and ad 3, and I Cont. Gent., c. 66, reason 5, where he says: Secondary agents are as it were particularizing and determining the action of the first agent. And it is taken from Dionysius, c. 4 De Divinis nominibus, saying that the action of God is of itself indifferent, but is varied by the diversity of subjects and causes. But particular causes are said to determine concurrence, not because they effect something previous for this—for what can they?—nor because God does not determine it by His will,² which we shall declare in section 4; but because this cause by its nature demands this concurrence rather than another, but God accommodates Himself to the nature of each, and therefore also this determination, as it is from the secondary cause, is commonly said to be in the genus of material cause. In these causes acting naturally, then, that previous condition which was called predetermination is not necessary. But if sometimes these natural agents, on account of universal power of acting, have some indifference in the faculty of acting things diverse in species, naturally and physically speaking they are always determined to one effect in species, either from themselves or from the concurrence of other causes, either material or co-efficient, as was declared above, disp. XVIII, sect. 1.

31. How the secondary cause is determined by the first to the individual effect.—Finally, even if we grant (which is probable) that as to the singularity of the action or effect the secondary cause is determined by the first, as the nominalists affirm, and as seemed probable to us in the foregoing, it is not necessary to feign that that determination takes place through some action of the first cause into the second, namely by adding something to its power; indeed it can scarcely be understood in this way, because that added thing too will of itself be indifferent to making several like individuals; for no thing which in some species has active power is determined of itself to effecting only one individual, as is evident by running through all natural powers. But if someone specially excepted this entity or power which the first cause adds to the second, he would assert it gratuitously, and without cause would be involved in many difficulties. For it will have to be confessed that, whenever the action of a natural agent is varied at diverse times, or about diverse subjects, those predeterminative entities too which the secondary cause receives in itself from the first are varied. And similarly, if fire heats successively, it must also continuously receive and suffer something in itself by which it is determined to that successive action. Finally, either that mode of determination is superfluous, or it will have to be confessed that the natural faculty is of itself sufficient for the specific notion of the effect, but not for its singularity. But that that added thing gives power for singularity is not intelligible,³ since in the effect, as it is made in reality, the specific and singular notion are not distinguished.

32. It must be said, then, that that determination takes place sufficiently through the voluntary predefinition of the divine concurrence. Thus fire, for example, is indifferent to making this or that heat, not indeed negatively or privatively, that is, because it has complete power in its genus for neither, but positively, because it is sufficiently able for both in the notion of proximate cause and determined to neither; but God by His will has decreed to concur with it for this rather than for another, and this is enough for this numerical effect rather than another to proceed from the fire. There is not necessary, therefore, such a predetermining condition, which is some thing received in the secondary cause itself.

33. From what we have said about natural agents, however, it is gathered that a condition of this kind is much less necessary in free secondary causes by virtue of the subordination and essential dependence of the secondary cause on the first. For the dependence of a free and of a necessary cause on the first cause is of the same notion as to this. Hence, if in a cause acting naturally that dependence is sufficiently saved through concurrence, which consists in action, it will also be saved in a free cause. Nor indeed on account of the peculiar mode of acting of a free cause is such condition necessary in it, because, although the will, for example, which is a free power, is of itself indifferent, all requisites being posited, to acting and not acting, yet in truth it is as able to act as if it did not have the other faculty; and conversely it is as able not to act as if it could do nothing else. Thus for both and for each it has full power; therefore, just as other agents, through the power which they have for one thing, can execute it with the common concurrence without that previous predetermining condition, so the free agent, through the power which it has for several, can with the common concurrence exercise one of them (we speak of acts contained within the order of nature) without that condition. And so far is the peculiar condition and indifference of freedom from standing in the way of this, that rather in this is placed its excellence and dominion over its action.

34. Hence, when it is said that an undetermined faculty cannot effect a determined act or effect, it has place at most in a power so indifferent to several that it is per se incomplete and insufficient for each, which as such is rather a passive and imperfect indifference than an active and perfect one; on account of which such indifference is commonly called negative. But when a power is indifferent through complete force for both of opposites and through dominion over its act, it can very well, although in first act it is undetermined and indifferent, effect a determined effect or second act, by determining itself to it. For this is its proper force and power, from which it has that it is free; just as the divine will too is indifferent to several objects or created effects, and itself determines itself to one of them; for the created will has received a participation of this efficacy and dominion, although far unequal in perfection and mode. For the uncreated will is indifferent to several objects outside itself, but not to several acts of willing or nilling, while the created will is indifferent also to several acts. Next, the uncreated will is determined without a new act added, the created through a new act. And finally, the uncreated will does not depend on another in its determination, while the created depends at least on the concurrence of the first cause; with it, however, just as it can will those things which are proportioned to it, so also it can determine itself to them.

35. Physical predetermination would necessitate the free cause both as to exercise and as to specification.—Hence I further add that that condition which is called predetermination is not only not necessary to the free cause on account of its peculiar mode of acting, but also for that cause is repugnant, if it is to operate freely as to exercise and specification; for the use of freedom as to both parts would be impeded by such predetermination. Which is declared first in indifference as to the specification of the act; for since the first cause alone is said to effect this predetermination, the will is only in passive potency to it; hence with respect to it it is not free, but is passively or negatively indifferent, as matter to other forms; for in passive potency as such there is not freedom, as we showed above. It is not, therefore, in the active and free power of the will that it receive this or that determination; since, therefore, it is determined to one act only, it can effect that and not another, because neither can it effect that unless it is determined to it, nor yet can it bring it about that it be determined to another, but this is in the will of the extrinsic agent alone. Therefore it is never proximately and actively indifferent to several acts, or as to the specification of the act. This last consequence is evident, because the will, before this predetermination is received, is perfectly and actively indifferent to neither act, because, if that predetermination is necessary, without it there is not complete power of acting with all the prerequisites for acting, as is necessary for freedom.

36. Nor yet is it in the hand of the will to have this determination, or one rather than another; for what will it do for this, since it can do nothing unless predetermined? Or, if it receives determination to willing an evil object, why will it be imputed to it that it does not receive determination to nilling it? For neither can it be imputed on account of some prior act, both because it can happen that none preceded, and also because that could not have been made without another predetermination, about which the same difficulty returns. Nor yet can it be imputed on account of the privation of some act, both because neither is predetermination to that act in its power, and consequently neither can the lack of the act be imputed, because universally the first root of not operating in the will, even other prerequisites being posited, is that it does not receive this predetermination, for if it received it, it would operate; and also because not always does there precede a positive evil act the lack of a prior due act, but at the same time while one is chosen, another is omitted. And finally in that progress one must not proceed to infinity, but stop at some first acts, of which the will voluntarily effects one and omits another. And in these it cannot be explained in what way passive predetermination to one rather than another is in the power of the will. If, then, such predetermination were necessary, indifference as to the specification of the act would be taken away.

37. And thence it is further concluded that it is taken away also as to the exercise of the act. For, as has been declared, if that predetermination is necessary, before it is received it is not in the active and free power of the will to exercise such act, because it is not yet proximate power, that is, complete and with all the prerequisites for acting; nor is it even remote active power (so to speak), because it is not in the power of the will to do anything by which that condition or predetermination be applied, but it is only in passive potency to it, which does not suffice for freedom; all which things have been sufficiently declared and proved. Again, that condition which is called predetermination being posited in the will, it cannot happen that it does not exercise the act; nor can it resist the determination or motion of it; therefore it never has the power of exercising and not exercising the act; therefore indifference as to exercise, which consists in this power, is taken away. The antecedent is certain in the opinion which we are attacking, for this predetermination is said to pertain to the actual concurrence of God. Hence, just as it is impossible that God concur with the will and it not operate, so it is impossible that the will receive that predetermination and not go forth into the work. And it is established from the very name of predetermination; for if, after the predetermination has been received, the will can not operate, let us posit that it does not operate; then it still remains indifferent to operating and not operating; therefore it needs predetermination in order to operate, and it was false that it had received predetermination.

38. The reply of some to our reasons is refuted.—Someone will perhaps say that, after the predetermination has been received, the will can indeed not operate, but will not admit that in fact it will not operate, because, although it can, it never so behaves. But this is frivolous and not consistently said. First indeed, because, if it can by a true power which suffices for freedom, whence can it be affirmed that that power is never exercised? Secondly, because there is so necessary a connection between that predetermination and the operation that it is naturally impossible that this be separated from that; indeed they themselves say that it implies a contradiction, as to be at once determined and undetermined with respect to the same, or the agent to move and the patient not to be moved; therefore there is not in the will a power to resist the activity of this predetermination, because there is not in it a power for the impossible; therefore it is false that, predetermination being posited, it can not operate. Finally, because, if the will can not will that to which it is predetermined, either this is because it can have the opposite act—and this not, as is evident from the proof of the former part, because this already pertains in some way to indifference as to specification—or this is because it can suspend the act—and this too not, because the will cannot resist the efficacy of that predetermination. Nor is that subject to the use of freedom, but rather subjects it to itself; therefore in neither way is that power in the will, and consequently neither freedom as to exercise.

39. Which is also confirmed from the definition of the free power handed down above, namely, that it is of its notion that, all the prerequisites for acting being posited, it can act and not act; for in the present case one necessary condition is said to be the predetermination made by the first cause, which being posited the will cannot act and not act, but only act; therefore it acts without freedom as to exercise and of necessity. Nor does it matter that that necessity is from supposition, for that supposition is antecedent to all use of freedom and comes from without, as has been sufficiently declared; but such supposition, if it brings in necessity, induces necessity simply and takes away freedom, according to the doctrine of Anselm and others declared in the foregoing. And therefore Scotus deservedly said, In IV, dist. 49, q. 6, § Duo ergo, that the freedom of the will is taken away if it is predetermined to one by some inhering habit; but by the name of habit is to be understood whatever by way of principle or first act precedes the second act; for of any such the reason is the same.

40. Hence finally each part can be confirmed thus, because for the will of itself indifferent to several to be physically and intrinsically determined to one of them is nothing else than to will it; therefore neither can such predetermination be prerequired for willing, nor can it wholly come from without from the first cause alone; because willing is not in us without us; and, although we granted that this could be done by absolute power, at least it could not happen that that willing be free, to which the will would behave merely passively. The antecedent is proved, because in the will there is nothing except either second act or first, nor can a middle between these be devised; nor has it been found by Aristotle or another philosopher; therefore either that predetermination is second act, and this we call willing, under which we also comprehend nilling and similar acts; or it is first act, and so either it is subject to the use of the will, and so does not predetermine it, as is true of all habits existing in the will; or it subjects it to itself and its necessary efficacy, and so impedes the use of its freedom. Add that a first act in the will which is not its habit is unheard of; and that it can be declared by no reason for what such first act is necessary, especially in the order of natural acts, as we now speak.

41. I see that the occasion is offered in this place of treating very many difficulties pertaining to the freedom of choice, especially those which are disputed among the theologians about divine foreknowledge, predefinition, predestination and grace, and most of all about that which consists in efficacious help. But we have already premised that in this place we treat nothing of supernatural actions nor of the efficacy of grace, but only of the general concurrence of the first cause with the secondary ones; for which we deny that that predetermination is necessary, or that in free causes it can be brought into agreement with the use of their freedom. Nevertheless it is true that God has eternal foreknowledge of all things which take place in time; because they do not take place without Him acting, and He does not act except what He knows, because He operates through intellect; but He does not know anything from time, but from eternity; but that knowledge does not require physical predetermination of causes, but eternal foreknowledge of all things which are in time. Similarly it is true that God can by His eternal will predefine effects consonant with His providence; can likewise move the wills of men whither He wills, and when, and how He wills; and so can also, and often does, confer on men efficacious helps of grace according to the measure of His will; but these do not pertain to general concurrence. But how they take place pertains to the supernatural mysteries of theology. This one thing we believe, that for all these there is not necessary physical predetermination of free choice, nor anything similar which injures the freedom of choice; but of these elsewhere.

42. Whether without physical determination the subordination of the secondary cause to the first stands.—Fifthly, that condition was said to be necessary on account of the subordination of the secondary cause to the first, as if true subordination could not be understood without some impression (so to speak) of the first cause into the second, which is as it were its use. Nevertheless the arguments made under the name of motion, application, etc., proceed of any real impression, or by whatever other word it is signified. Next, that it serves nothing for subordination I show thus: for subordination between the secondary and the first cause can be understood as twofold. One is radical or aptitudinal, which consists only in this, that the secondary cause is not apt to act except dependently on the first cause. But the root of this subordination, on the part of the secondary cause itself, is the essential dependence which it has on God in its being. But on the part of any effect or action which can flow from the secondary cause, the root is to be being by participation, which cannot be except from being by essence. For this subordination, then, that action of the first cause into the second is indeed necessary by which it gives and conserves being and power of acting; but that suffices, nor is another per se necessary, because by virtue of this is posited the whole root and cause of that subordination in first act.

43. But the other is subordination in second act. But that this too does not require a new action by which the first cause confers on the second something by way of actual principle, as they call it, I show in two ways. The former is that this actual subordination is not an intrinsic denomination in the secondary cause, per se speaking. Which is evident because it consists only in this, that the secondary cause depends on the first in acting; if, then, acting itself as such is not an intrinsic denomination in the acting cause, dependence in acting itself as such will not be an intrinsic denomination, but extrinsic, consisting in this, that the very action of the secondary cause depends essentially on the first cause as on the first and chief source of its being; therefore, in order that the secondary cause, inasmuch as it is actually acting, be essentially subordinated to the first, it is not necessary that it receive in itself anything new by way of principle, because according to this notion it is subordinated not as receiving but as acting; therefore this subordination is placed in the action itself, inasmuch as it depends essentially on the first cause.

44. Secondly the same is declared; for, although we admit that the first cause effects something in the second by way of principle, still the secondary cause, as affected with that whole principle precisely conceived, is subordinated to the first cause only in first act; therefore in the action it must be actually subordinated through a new dependence in acting, as was proved in the foregoing; therefore the actual subordination of the agent, as it is agent, does not consist in that previous action, which pertains only to constituting or completing first act; therefore, although it is supposed constituted without that action, through the sole effecting and conservation of the cause and its power, the actual subordination in acting will still remain intact.

45. Thirdly this very thing is declared by examples; for heat, for example, is subordinated to the form of fire in acting fire, not because it receives anything in itself from the form while it acts, besides its entity, but on account of the dependence of the action on those two principles so constituted between themselves that one is under the other, that is, is inferior to it, and posterior to it, and depending on it. Similarly in supernatural things, the sacrament, for example, of baptism is subordinated to Christ in acting, not because in the actual action it receives anything in itself, according to the more probable opinion. And many similar examples could easily be found. Neither, then, by virtue of subordination is it necessary, or can it happen, that the concurrence of the first cause consist in something which by way of first act is given to the secondary cause in the actual action itself.

The foundations of the other opinions are satisfied

46. From what we have said in proving our opinion, the foundations of the contrary opinion have been virtually answered; in order, however, that we may declare in what sense the expressions of grave authors are to be understood, and how with concurrence consisting in action alone those expressions and denominations are saved, it will be necessary to answer each singly.

That axiom is expounded: “The secondary cause does not act unless moved by the first”

47. To the first, then, it is said, first, that that axiom, the secondary cause does not act unless moved by the first, understood in that propriety that the cause, besides its being and all connatural power of acting which it has, needs a new true and real motion received in itself in order to act, is false, as has been proved. Nor is it found handed down by Aristotle anywhere in that sense. Hence it is also false that on that principle so understood is founded either the reduction of all motions to the first mover or of all beings to the first being. For that argumentation is founded either on physical experience and the order of sensible motions, or on the proportional dependence of all effects on their causes, not on that most hidden premotion, founded on no reason. Thus the physical discourse of Aristotle was that everything which is moved is moved by another, and all motions of lower bodies are in some way reduced to the motion of the heaven, but the heaven itself is moved by another; and so, since one does not proceed to infinity, one must stop at some first mover. But the proportional metaphysical discourse will be that every being which is not from itself flows from another, and that other, if it is not from itself, is again from another, and since one cannot proceed to infinity, one must stop at a being from itself. And in a proportional mode the discourse can be made among agents as such, by virtue of the essential dependence explained by us; for what is not an agent from itself is to be reduced to another on which it relies in acting, until one stops at something which is an agent from itself and relies on nothing else. Finally a natural discourse can be made from the sensible motions of the bodies of the universe, through which these corporeal things are so applied to acting or suffering as is necessary for the conservation of the universe; for this is a sign that all these things are governed by one supreme prince; that proposition, then, in the said sense, is neither true nor necessary for the aforesaid reductions.

48. Whence the expression about the motion of secondary causes by the first takes its origin.—That proposition, then, contains a metaphor and a certain analogy taken from artificial instruments, as Fonseca well noted, bk. V Metaph., c. 2, q. 9, sect. 2. For, because we see that these sensible instruments, which depend on us in acting and are subordinated to us, do not act unless moved by us, therefore, to explain the subordination and essential dependence in acting of secondary causes on the first, secondary causes are said not to act unless moved by the first. But the proper sense is that they do not act unless helped by the first, or (what is the same) as cooperating with the first. Add moreover that it is necessary that the secondary cause have being given and conserved by the first. And this continuous influx of being itself, or of active power, can be called as it were a certain continuous motion of the secondary cause by the first. Again, if the secondary cause needs some new local application or vital arousing for acting, it has that too from the first cause, operating either through secondary causes or sometimes by itself alone; for often it so operates, not by virtue of general concurrence, but from some peculiar providence. In which sense Scripture speaks in the testimonies cited there, which therefore are not to the point. And in this sense too it can in some way be verified that the secondary cause does not act unless moved; for if it is spiritual, it acts with a previous immanent action which it receives in itself, and so is changed; but if it is corporeal, it needs local nearness, which it receives through some motion, either which then takes place or which preceded before. Hence some of the authors cited, especially Augustine, do not say that secondary causes are moved while they act, or moved to act, but that every secondary cause is so active that it is also passive and mobile by some motion; in which they do not explain some condition which such causes require for acting, but the imperfection and potentiality which they have by their nature. Which also is enough for us to understand that one must come to some cause which so acts that it can suffer nothing.

This expression is expounded: “The secondary cause is applied by the first to acting”

49. To the second, that proposition, The secondary cause is applied by the first, is to be explained as that one, It is moved to acting. And indeed St. Thomas, who seems most to have used that expression, I, q. 105, a. 5, in the first place corrects the word itself, because he does not simply call the first cause applying, but as it were applying the second. Next, he there makes no mention of another concurrence or motion, but only of that application. Hence what in I-II he called the help of God moving, in I he called the application of the first cause. And both are nothing else than actual concurrence itself, lest we say that St. Thomas either was ignorant of it or kept silent about it, which both is per se absurd and is repugnant to the same St. Thomas, the said a. 5, ad 2, where from that application he concludes that the action of the first and second cause is one and the same; which is true only on account of concurrence by way of action, as will be declared in the following section.

50. The actual and immediate concurrence of action itself, then, just as by transference it is called motion, so also it is called application, in order to signify that it is given by the first cause as by a superior, and is directed and ordered by it to the ends intended by itself, which is a certain genus of application. And the reason touched upon in that second argument proves this, and nothing else. And the reason of that word, or of application, will be understood more if we distinguish a twofold application, one previous, as a required condition, of which it cannot be understood, as has been shown; the other we can call actual or formal, intimately included in the action itself; for so he who begins an action is said then to apply himself to the action; which application is nothing else than the exhibition of that action; in this way, then, the concurrence of the first cause is called application; yet that application is not from the first cause alone, but also from the second, the first helping, and under this notion also applying. For under this notion of application the action is signified according to its first emanation from its agent, and therefore, in order to signify that God concurs to it according to its every notion, God is said to apply the secondary cause to acting. And these things suffice for that expression.

What it is for the secondary cause to act in the power of the first

51. But the other expression posited in the same argument, namely, that the secondary cause acts in the power of the first, or that the divine power is the power of every acting cause, and other similar ones which are found in the book On Causes, are expounded in the words of St. Thomas, III Cont. Gent., c. 70, where he says thus: The power of the inferior agent depends on the power of the superior, inasmuch as the superior gives the inferior the power of acting, or conserves it. And below: It is necessary, therefore, that the action of the inferior agent be not only from it through its own power, but through the power of all superior agents; for it acts in the power of all. For to act in the power is nothing else than to act through power participated from a superior power, and dependently in its action on its actual influx. And in the same way the divine power is called the power of all causes, because it conserves all and actually helps all. These two, then, suffice, and are per se required for the truth of similar expressions.

52. It is true that St. Thomas, q. 3 De Potentia, a. 7, adds a third, namely, a flowing instrumental power which the secondary cause receives from the first in order to act as its instrument; for he expressly numbers this as distinct from application and from the effecting or conservation of the secondary cause itself and its power. I think, however, that St. Thomas tacitly retracted that doctrine in the I, where, treating exquisitely every mode in which the first cause operates with the second, he omitted that power, which he could not have done in the proper and chief place if he had thought it per se necessary for the concurrence of the first cause; and similarly in III Cont. Gent., c. 70, he makes no mention of it. Nor is the discourse which he makes in the said a. 7 De Potentia efficacious. For it is founded on this, that the secondary cause cannot effect the being of existence except by way of instrument; which, speaking properly and strictly of instrument, is not true, as I shall touch upon in the solution to the fifth, and more at length below, disputing about the essence of the creature.

53. By what action agents are perfected.—To the third it is answered that that arousing is a fiction, unless metaphorically the natural inclination itself to acting is called arousing; but that inclination is not through an action distinct from those by which the secondary cause and its power are conserved and helped. But to the reason proposed there it is answered that created agents, while they act, are not perfected by a perfection distinct from the action itself; nor did any of the philosophers ever devise some prior perfection. But the action itself is immediately from God Himself, yet not from Him alone, but with the secondary cause itself. But if such action is immanent in the agent, it will be its intrinsic perfection; for such an agent has the power of perfecting itself, with the due and accommodated concurrence of the first cause. But if the action is transient, the question is whether according to something of itself it remains in the agent, or whether, although it wholly passes into the patient, it is also there to be called a perfection of the agent; of which we shall speak in its place, for for the present they matter nothing; for whichever of these is said, it suffices for this perfection of the concurrence of the first cause by way of action.

54. Why secondary causes are called instruments of the first.—The fourth and fifth reasons, with all that is touched upon in them, have been treated and dispatched in proving the second assertion, except for two points which are intimated in the fifth reason. One is that secondary causes do not act as instruments of the first, which is easy, for, although they are sometimes so called to indicate the dependence which they have in operating on the first cause, yet they are not properly and strictly instruments, but principal causes in their order; for they act through proper powers sufficient in their order, and produce effects like themselves, as St. Thomas noted, q. 24 De Veritat., a. 1, ad 4 and 5; and Scotus, In IV, dist. 1, q. 1, ad ult.; and above, explaining the divisions of the efficient cause, we declared the same. I omit also that in strict instruments it is not necessary that, before they act, they receive in themselves from the principal cause something by way of principle distinct from their entity, of which elsewhere. The other point was about the order of prior and posterior in nature which intervenes between the actions of the first and the second cause, of which I shall speak in the following section.

55. In what the perfection of the first cause concurring with the second is placed.—To the sixth foundation the assumption is simply denied, namely, that God would concur more perfectly if He concurred by inflowing something actual by way of principle; for greater perfection does not consist in the multiplication of entities, principles or influxes, otherwise these would have to be multiplied infinitely; but greater perfection consists in this, that each thing be made in due weight, number and measure. Two things, then, pertain to the highest perfection of the first cause, as operating and cooperating in causes and with secondary causes: one is that nothing of power or first act, or of required condition, which truly is something, be found in the secondary cause which has not been given and conserved by the first; the other, that the action of the creature cannot be made without the actual immediate influx of the first cause. But the multiplication of principles of acting, or of necessary conditions, does not per se pertain to perfection, speaking generally, but such principles are to be added only where some special and true cause and necessity, or at least utility, intervenes.

56. How it is from God that the secondary cause acts.—To the first proof, then, it is answered that it is the same for the secondary cause to depend on the first in causing and to depend in its action, or (what is the same) in its causality; for if it depends in its being, and in its whole power, and further in its action and causality, in what else should or can it depend? For what is added there about this complex, the secondary cause acts, is nothing new, for for the creature to act is nothing else than for the action to proceed from it. Hence the first cause, by effecting this action, effects it as proceeding from such cause. For, although the relation of the action to the secondary cause precisely conceived does not regard God as the terminus of that relation, yet, as it is something in reality, it is made by God Himself, just as passion as passion does not regard God, yet is made by God; in this way, then, it is also from God that the creature acts.

57. And the same holds of that expression, The first cause makes the second make, if the particle so that (ut) denotes nothing else than the conferring of power and of the physical concurrence necessary for operating. But if it denotes a peculiar relation of end, so that it is signified that the first cause peculiarly intends every action of the secondary cause in particular, this is indeed often true, yet is not always necessary; for some actions He does not intend, but permits; and then in that sense God does not properly make the creature make, but permits it to make and cooperates with it making. Hence it does not pertain to the perfection of the first cause that universally and for all things it concur in that way, but rather it is beside its wisdom and goodness. And so the argument can be retorted to the contrary, for from the opposite opinion it follows that God universally makes even those who do evil to do it; because by His proper action proceeding from His will alone He determines them so to do; of which reason we shall say more in the fourth section. In another, finally, and moral way God is said to make men make, by illuminations and inspirations, in which way that expression is found in Scripture; yet it does not pertain to the concurrence of the first cause, but to the order of grace or of special divine providence, whose consideration is not of this place.

58. How God uses necessary causes.—What finally is said in that argument, that it pertains to the perfect dominion of the first cause that it use secondary causes for its own ends, is most true; it is falsely and without foundation feigned, however, that this use consists in this, that it always acts about the creature something distinct from it and from its natural power. God can indeed sometimes in this way increase the power of acting, if He wills, or supply whatever was lacking to the creature; yet that this is always necessary does not pertain to dominion or the fitting use of creatures, but God will more easily use His creatures if we understand that He has given them complete powers in their genus and all the required conditions, with which, if He wills to adjoin concurrence, they will do what He has decreed; which is to use them for acting.

59. How free ones.—Although this mode of using the secondary cause requires something peculiar in a free cause, for it, all the prerequisites for acting being posited, and the concurrence of God also being prepared in the way which we shall explain in section 4, does not at once operate one thing determinately, and therefore, if God wills to use it for some determinate effect, He has a peculiar mode, moral rather than physical, by which He does this. Sometimes by properly acting and moving, as in good things, sometimes by letting and permitting, as in evil ones. Which pertains to that infinite wisdom of God by which He foreknows what the free cause, on whatever occasion and with whatever circumstances, will operate; which it is not of this place to expound further. This only I note, that when God concurs with the created will to an evil act, He does not properly use the will for that act (for far be it that God should intend that act), but uses the will so acting evilly for some good, which pertains both to perfect dominion and to the infinite goodness and wisdom of God.

60. How the action of the creature pertains to the dominion of God.—From which, finally, it is understood that the action of the creature does not always pertain to the positive use of the dominion of God, but a partition must be used; for inasmuch as that action is from God, it properly pertains to the use of His dominion, because it depends on His power and freedom; but inasmuch as it is from the created will, if it is good and conformed to the will of God, it will also be from the positive use of His dominion, inasmuch as He commands it or moves to it; but if it is evil, it will be only from negative use, because namely He does not impede it, although He can.

1. The reason for doubting on each side.—Many things are comprehended under this title which are necessary for declaring more exactly what this concurrence of God is, and they can be briefly dispatched from what was said in the preceding section, without a multitude of opinions and arguments. The first is whether the concurrence of God and of the creature are one action or several. For that they are several is indicated both by the multitude of principles and by the order of nature, by which the concurrence of God is thought prior to that of the creature. But that it is one seems to be convinced both by the immediate influx of God into the very action of the creature, and by the fact that there is no action to an action.

That the action of the first and of the second cause is one

2. And this latter part is without doubt true, and St. Thomas expressly teaches it, I, q. 105, a. 5, ad 2, where at the same time he answers the first reason for doubting posited by us, saying: One action does not proceed from two agents (supply: total ones) of one order, but nothing prevents one and the same action from proceeding from the first and the second agent. Add: Indeed it is necessary, because it depends on both essentially and immediately in its genus. St. Thomas has the same, III Cont. Gent., c. 70; and Giles, In II, dist. 1, q. 2, a. 6; and there Capreolus, q. 2, a. 3, to the argument of Durandus against the sixth conclusion. Finally, no one who thinks rightly about the divine concurrence dissents from this opinion in substance; yet, in order that the diversity which can be in the mode of explaining be understood, I note that about the transient action of God there is a twofold opinion.

3. Whether the action by which God concurs is immanent or transient.—Some assert that the action of God is never formally transient, but that only the will of God is His action, while that action which passes into extrinsic matter is not compared to God as action, but as effect of His action; according to which mode of speaking the action of God and the action of the creature are most of all distinguished, as uncreated and created thing. Nevertheless it is true, even according to this opinion, that the action of the creature through itself flows immediately not only from the secondary cause, but also from the power or internal action of God, whether that action of the creature, in comparison with God, is to be called action or His effect, which can pertain to the name. Hence, to remove equivocation, it can be said in that opinion that the internal concurrence of God is distinguished from the action of the creature, but that the external or transient concurrence is the same as the action of the secondary cause, whether it is in it by way of action or by way of first effect. The other opinion, and truer, which we defended above, is that the transient action flowing from God is truly God's action, but that His will concurs rather by way of principle; and so both in reality and in the mode of speaking it is evident that the action of the first and second cause is one and the same.

4. God is the cause of all the effects and actions of the creature.—Which I demonstrate further thus, because, if in that effect there are two actions, one of God alone and the other of the secondary cause, terminated at one and the same effect, I ask whether the action of the secondary cause is from it alone and not from God per se and immediately. And this can in no way be said; otherwise it follows that only the effect of the secondary cause is made by the first, but not the action itself; the consequent is wholly false and falls into the opinion of Durandus treated above. And therefore St. Thomas and other theologians teach that God is the per se and immediate cause in His order not only of all the effects of creatures, but also of all their actions; and so too Scripture speaks, when it attributes to God all the operations and motions of creatures; and in John 1 it is said: Without Him was made nothing; but the action of the creature as such is something; it is not, therefore, made without the actual influx of God. And it is evident by reason, because either the action of the creature in reality is not something distinct from its effect, and so it is necessary that they flow from the same causes, because they are the same; or it is a mode distinct by the nature of the thing from the effect, and so it has some real notion which must immediately depend on God, by the same or greater reason as the other beings by participation; because that being which it has according to its mode is diminished and participated being, and therefore per se depending on the first being. But if it is said that the action of the secondary cause is not from it alone, but at the same time per se and immediately from the first cause, then it is one and the same action of both causes, which is what we intend; and another distinct action which is from the first cause alone to the same effect is superfluous, because through the prior action it sufficiently inflows into it in its order.

5. The action of the secondary cause depends on God through itself.—It will perhaps be said that the action of the secondary cause is also from the first, yet in a diverse way; for it is from the second immediately through itself, but from the first through another action proper to God alone, also transient and existing outside God; for so we are now speaking. But this multiplication of actions is irrelevant and against all philosophical reason; for to a transient action there is no other action, especially also a transient one; otherwise we shall proceed to infinity. For I shall ask of that prior action which is said to be from God alone whether it is through another action, also transient, or through itself. If through another, we shall proceed further, and so to infinity; if through itself, the same will be said better of the first action, that, just as it flows per se from the secondary cause, so it flows per se also from the first, because there is no repugnance in its flowing per se from both, since they are of diverse orders, as St. Thomas said above. Nor can a greater repugnance be assigned in its proceeding through itself from the first cause than in its proceeding through another action; indeed this latter is much more repugnant, for it is against the notion of action as such to be the terminus of another action. It remains, therefore, that the concurrence of God ad extra is nothing else than the very action of the secondary cause, as flowing per se and immediately from the first.

Whether the action of the secondary cause is from the action of the first

6. And hence another point pertaining to this section is easily dispatched, namely, whether the action of the secondary cause can be said to be made, to flow or to be from the concurrence or action of the first cause, or conversely, whether the action of the first cause causes the action of the secondary cause. For all authors seem so to speak, and this seems to pertain to the universal influence of the first cause. Likewise, the action of the creature is from God; therefore it depends on the action of God. Finally, for this reason the divine action is prior in nature to the action of the creature.

7. But it must be said with Capreolus, In II, dist. 1, q. 2, a. 3, ad 7 of Aureolus against the sixth conclusion, that the action of God can be taken for the immanent act or volition of God Himself, or for the exterior action. In the former way the arguments made proceed rightly. In which sense not only the action of the secondary cause, but also the transient action of the first cause, both when it operates with the creature and when it operates alone, proceeds and depends from the internal action of God Himself. And in the same sense seems to be taken what St. Thomas says, In III, dist. 23, q. 3, a. 1, that the actions of all secondary agents are founded on the action of the first agent, because all are founded in some way on the divine will. Yet we have already said in the foregoing that this internal act of the will of God does not have the proper notion of action, which says flowing and tendency to a terminus, but has rather the notion of principle, because either it is the very omnipotence of God or, if they are distinguished in reason, it behaves as applying the omnipotence of God to acting.

8. But in the latter way the exterior action of God and of the creature is one and the same, as we have said. And therefore according to that notion the action of the creature cannot properly flow or depend from the action of God, nor conversely can the action of God properly cause the action of the creature, because the same does not cause itself nor depend on itself. Likewise, because action as action is only the cause of its terminus, and is not a cause except by way of way; but the action of God is not a way to the action of the creature, but to the effect, nor is an action the terminus of an action. To the universal influx of the first cause, then, it pertains only that every action of the secondary cause proceed from the will and power of the first cause itself, not that it proceed through another external action, but it can proceed through itself immediately from the will or power of God. Hence, when the action of the creature is said to depend on the influx or concurrence of God, either concurrence is taken for the immanent and internal act, inasmuch as it inflows into the external action, or the expression must not be taken transitively (so to speak) except according to reason. For it will more properly be said that the action of the creature is also from God, and as such is the very concurrence of God to the action of the secondary cause, from which it is not other according to the thing, but only according to reason or respect.

Whether there is an order of nature between the action of the first and of the second cause

9. Hence again the third point, often touched upon, is easily dissolved, about priority of nature between the action of God and the action of the creature. For one must distinguish, first, of internal and external action, to speak with many, in the said sense. Secondly, of priority of nature; for one is that which consists in proper causality and dependence of one on another; another which consists only in a certain greater dignity, or universality, independence, or another similar property. Comparing, then, the action of the creature to the internal action of God, it is clear that the action of God is prior in nature in both ways, namely, both in dignity and in causality; for in this way the action of the creature truly depends on the act of God. In this sense, however, not only the action of the creature as such, but also the exterior action itself of God, is posterior in nature to the interior action of God, for it is truly caused by it. And in this sense authors generally speak when they say that the action of the first cause is prior in nature to the action of the secondary cause according to causality, as is evident from Capreolus above. Nor does it stand in the way that the action of God in this way is prior not only in nature but also in time and eternity to the action of the creature, because in these expressions the internal action of God is not considered according to its absolute entity alone, but as it connotes the actual influx into the creature. In which way many say that active creation is from time, even if really it is immanent, because the actual influx which it connotes is temporal; and under that notion too it is said to be prior in nature, even if it is simultaneous in time with the effect.

10. But speaking of the external action, both of God and of the creature, one cannot so be called prior in nature to the other by priority of causality, because, as has been shown, since they are one and the same action, true causality cannot intervene between them. Nevertheless, distinguishing that action according to reason, as it is from the first cause or as it is from the second, it can be said to be first and more principally from the first than from the second; and in a similar way the first cause may be said to inflow into that action prior in nature to the second. First, because the first cause is higher, and inflows into the effect in a nobler and more independent mode. Secondly, because the first cause receives that action per se primo under a certain more universal notion; for the first cause inflows into any effect or action from the fact precisely that it participates something of entity; but the secondary cause always inflows under some posterior and more determinate notion of being. Hence it comes about, thirdly, that the influx of the first cause of itself and from its genus is said to be prior also by consequence of subsisting, which Aristotle placed among the priorities of nature; for the influx of the first cause absolutely does not depend on the secondary cause, but, so far as concerns its genus, can be without it, but not conversely. And in this way Cajetan explained this priority or subordination, I, q. 14, a. 13; and Scotus intimates it, In I, dist. 39, and In II, dist. 37.

11. A certain proposition taken from the book On Causes is explained.—And in the same ways is expounded that expression of the book On Causes, proposition 1, which is this: The first cause acts first on the caused, and enters it more vehemently; where St. Thomas too, in the Commentary, applies the same interpretation, adding from Proclus that the first cause inflows first, because the secondary cause does not act except in its power.

In what subject the concurrence of the first cause is

12. The fourth point pertaining here is whether the concurrence of the first cause is received in the second or in its effect. Which question has place only in transient concurrence; for the immanent is not received in a subject, but is the subsisting volition of God itself. In order, then, that we may abstract from opinions, it must be answered formally, according to what has been said, that the concurrence of God is in that subject in which the action of the secondary cause is. It is evident, because in reality they are not distinguished; therefore neither can they be distinguished in subject. Wherefore, if every action of the secondary cause is in it, as some hold, the concurrence of the first cause will be in the same, and through it will pass to the effect or to the passion or becoming of the effect, in the way in which (according to that opinion) the agent, by means of the action which it receives in itself, inflows passion into another. But according to the truer doctrine, which teaches that transient action is in the patient and immanent action in the agent, it must be said that the concurrence of God to transient action is not something received in the secondary cause, but in the patient; but that concurrence to immanent action is received in the agent itself, inasmuch as its action is received in it. And both parts are sufficiently established from what has been said, nor do they contain new difficulty.

1. We have declared so far whether there is, and what is, the concurrence of God with secondary causes; now it remains that we expound how God bestows or offers this concurrence to secondary causes. And at the same time it will be declared how the first and the secondary cause come together and are conjoined for effecting the same effect and the same action. Nor is there difficulty in conjunction as it were local, or through undistance or presence of entities; for so it is easily understood that God, by reason of His immensity, can be conjoined to all secondary causes in order to operate with them, because He is intimately present by essence in all of them and in all their effects and actions.

The difficulty of the question is opened

2. But the difficulty is about conjunction for causing one and the same effect and the same action; for when two causes come together for effecting the same action, either they concur by chance and contingently, or by design and per se. The former of these modes, however, cannot be attributed to the concurrence of the first cause with the second, both because this is repugnant to the perfection of divine providence and operation, and also because otherwise there would not be per se subordination in the secondary cause to the first, or every operation of the secondary cause would come about by chance and per accidens. The latter mode too has difficulty, because, if two causes come together by design for the same operation, either this is because both are subordinated to some superior which applies them together, which has no place here, as is established per se; or because both are by their nature determined so to operate here and now, which also cannot be said here, because neither is the first cause so determined by its nature, nor the secondary cause, at least to the individual effect or action; or because one, from its peculiar intention, determines the effect and action to be effected, and consequently determines also the other cause to cooperate in the same action. And this mode does not seem able to have place here, because neither can the secondary cause so determine the first, as seems known per se, nor conversely can that mode of acting be attributed to the first cause with respect to the second, both because otherwise the first cause would move and apply the second to acting, which we have denied; and also because otherwise the determination of the action would in no way be from the secondary cause, which all deny; and finally because otherwise the secondary cause could act nothing else than that which it acts, because for nothing else does it have the concurrence of God, without which it can act nothing.

The question is resolved as to natural causes

3. Why God is said to concur with necessarily acting causes by way of nature.—This difficulty with respect to secondary causes acting naturally can be very easily dispatched by noting that, speaking absolutely and simply, God gives this concurrence to secondary causes by His will; for He acts as an intellectual cause, which can absolutely be compelled or necessitated by nothing to act; nevertheless He is said in a qualified sense to concur after the manner of nature. And this for a twofold reason: first, because in concurring He accommodates Himself to the natures of things and gives each a concurrence accommodated to its power; secondly, because, after He has decreed to effect and conserve secondary causes, He concurs with them by an infallible law for their operation, which law, if it is taken absolutely, supposing no particular and definite will of God, does not induce necessity, but is only as it were a certain debt of connaturality. Hence God sometimes dispenses in that law by denying concurrence of this kind. But, the efficacious will of God being supposed of concurring with this cause for this action here and now, the action now proceeds of necessity at such time and place, both from the secondary cause and from the first; but with respect to the secondary it is natural necessity; with respect to the first, however, it is only necessity from supposition, or of immutability.

4. This being supposed, then, the mode is easily explained in which the first cause gives its concurrence to these secondary causes; for God from His eternity, just as He decreed to produce these things and not others, and at this time, and with this order, and with these motions, etc., and not in another way, so also decreed to concur with the same things for their actions according to their capacity. And because, just as the knowledge of God is most distinct and in particular of all things, so too His will decrees all things distinctly and in particular, and descends to each according to the capacity and need of each, therefore in giving this concurrence He also decreed from eternity in particular to concur with this cause at such time, in such place, and about such subject, for such action and effect in the individual, and at such time for another, and so of all. I say, however, always for such action, because determination to one numerical effect would not be enough, because the same effect can be made through numerically diverse actions, or perhaps also specifically; but by determining the action it follows that the effect is necessarily determined; because the same numerical action cannot tend to another terminus except to that with which it is identified.

5. That the first cause does not concur by chance with necessarily acting causes.—And hence it comes about, first, that the first and secondary cause come together not by chance, but per se and by design for effecting the same action, which comes most of all from the mode of operating of the first cause, or from its knowledge and providence. Nor for this is another motion of the secondary cause necessary, but only this will of God as it were preparing and offering concurrence according to the laws of His divine wisdom and providence. It must be added, however, that this determination of concurrence, as to two things, has foundation in the nature of the secondary cause. For first, because it is of such power, therefore God decreed to give concurrence of such species, and as to this, as I noted above, it is said to determine the concurrence of God as to the specific notion, not because it absolutely determines the will of God to give such concurrence in species—for so God alone determines Himself voluntarily—but because it is the objective reason demanding such concurrence. Secondly, in the same way, because such cause is naturally acting, therefore God too absolutely and definitely wills to concur with it. And as to this the secondary cause can be said in the same sense to determine the concurrence of the first as to exercise, because by its nature here and now it determinately demands the exercise of such action. But the determination as to this individual action and effect does not seem able to be founded in any way in the secondary cause, for the same numerical cause here and now in this subject is able to produce several numerically distinct effects, nor does it demand concurrence more for one than for another; and therefore the determination of concurrence and of action as to this part is attributed to the first cause alone, as Gregory probably taught, In I, dist. 17, q. 4, a. 2, ad 7, and as was said above.

6. Natural causes, while they act this, can do nothing else even in the divided sense.—Secondly, it follows from what has been said that these naturally acting causes, in that instant or time in which they act, all things simply weighed, can do nothing except that thing in species and in individual which they do. And of the species indeed the matter is clear, because they have power determined to such effect in species—determined (I say) either simply, as in particular and univocal causes, or at least here and now about this matter so disposed, or with other causes concurring together. But of the individual it is proved by the reason made above, because, although a natural agent has active power for several effects in the individual, yet that power by itself alone is insufficient without the concurrence of God; and therefore, if it does not have it, it will not constitute the thing in proximate but in remote potency for acting; for so fire deprived of the concurrence of God will not be called simply able, indeed will be called absolutely unable so to heat. Thus, then, because causes of this kind have the concurrence of God prepared only for one numerical effect, they can absolutely make only that by proximate power, namely, which includes not only the bare faculty of acting, but also all the prerequisites for operating.

7. What divine concurrence is required for being able, what for acting.—You will say: concurrence is the action itself; but action is not required for being able, but for acting; therefore concurrence is not required for being able. I answer that it is one thing to speak of concurrence itself in itself and in second act, of which the objection proceeds, and as to it concludes rightly; but another to speak of concurrence in first act and in proximate application, in which way we say it is required for being able simply; which concurrence does not consist in action, but in the divine power or will, as proximately applied and as it were conjoined at such time with the secondary cause, by virtue of His eternal decree, to concurring with it; which others also call the preparation or offering of concurrence.

8. The concurrence of God is manifold according to the variety of secondary causes.—Thirdly, it is inferred by the way from what has been said that the concurrence of God is not one and the same with all secondary causes, but varies according to the diversity of secondary causes, because God so concurs with them that He accommodates Himself to each according to its need. And therefore, just as for numerically diverse effects He gives numerically distinct concurrences, so for specifically diverse actions He gives specifically distinct concurrences. And it is openly confirmed from what was said above, for the concurrence of God ad extra is nothing else than the action itself, and tends to the same intrinsic terminus; therefore according to the variety of actions concurrence too will be various. It cannot, therefore, truly be said that there is the same concurrence of God for all the actions of secondary causes, unless the discourse is either of internal concurrence or the will by which God concurs, or of only proportional identity, as to the mode and general reason on account of which all secondary causes need concurrence, namely, because they are beings and agents by participation.

9. God by Himself alone inflows into the effect otherwise than with the secondary cause.—Indeed hence too it may be inferred by the way that God inflows with respect to the same effect in one way if He effects it by Himself alone, in another with the secondary cause; because, when He acts by Himself alone, He applies an influx per se sufficient for the effect; but when He concurs with the secondary cause, He accommodates such activity as by itself alone would not suffice without the secondary cause, which is manifest from what has been said, because He does not will to act except by that action which is common to the secondary cause. But although that same effect could be from God alone, and therefore the influx of God for such effect absolutely and according to itself could be without the secondary cause, yet such action, which is from the secondary cause, cannot be without it, and therefore neither is the concurrence which God gives for such action alone absolutely sufficient for the effect, but only in its genus. The opposite of which Cordova seems to opine, q. 55, dub. 4; yet, if he is read attentively, he does not in reality disagree. It is sufficiently established from these things, then, how God gives His concurrence to natural agents.

The difficulty in free agents is treated and explained

10. But what we have said has the greatest difficulty in free agents; because, if the first cause determines concurrence for them in the same way as for the other agents, they will be no more indifferent in the use of their actions in particular, and in proximate power, which includes all the prerequisites for operating, than the other agents, and so they will never have the use and exercise of freedom. The antecedent is declared as to both parts, for God as first cause is conjoined to the secondary cause for cooperating through His will, which will is eternal and preventing the secondary cause; but it is absolute and efficacious, namely, that by which God wills such effect to be, because God operates ad extra through this will alone; but this will draws the secondary cause with it to operate, so that it cannot resist; therefore from this side the secondary cause is determined to one as to exercise by the first cause, even if it is free. And this is confirmed, for in order that two free causes concur per se and by a certain law for one work, the purpose and preventing will of one is not enough, unless it has efficacy over the other to draw it whither it wills; therefore, if in the present concurrence only the will of God precedes, by which He efficaciously wills to concur with the secondary cause for such effect, in order that the effect follow per se it is necessary that that will of God have efficacy over the free secondary cause, so as to draw it with itself to operate; and so indifference in the exercise of the action is taken away. Again, since God through that will defines the concurrence to be given, He defines it for one thing only, because He does not will several effects, but one only; therefore from this side indifference as to specification or variety of actions is also taken away. And it is confirmed, for it has been said that the first cause defines its concurrence to the individual and singular effect; which necessity has place also with respect to the free secondary cause, because it cannot itself choose one individual act before others of the same species.

11. Various opinions of the Doctors.—In explaining this difficulty the scholastic Doctors write many things. And some of them seem plainly to admit all that which is supposed in the difficulty touched upon about the mode in which God through His will gives this concurrence to secondary causes. Which Scotus seems most to think, In I, dist. 39, § Viso de contingentia, and dist. 41, § Primum istorum, and § Sed contra, and dist. 47, at the end, and Quodl. 14, letter S; and the Scotists follow, especially Bassolis, In I, dist. 38, a. 2, and dist. 39, a. 2; and Mayronis, dist. 38, q. 1, a. 4, and q. 3; Richard too, dist. 38, a. 1, q. 5, seems to suppose the same, while he says that God sufficiently knows all future things in His will. Which Durandus also asserted there, q. 3, even though otherwise he does not require the concurrence of God for the actions of secondary causes. And many modern Thomists follow this opinion and attribute it to St. Thomas. But in him no mention of it is made in his whole doctrine, nor can they bring anything besides those things which we treated and expounded in sect. 2, and what the same St. Thomas treats about the motion of the human will by God, I, q. 82, a. 2, q. 104, aa. 3 and 4, and q. 105, a. 4, and I-II, qq. 9 and 10, especially a. 4, ad 3, and q. 109, in the first articles, especially a. 6, ad 3. But in all these places he never explained that mode of giving general concurrence, but at most calls it the motion of the human will, and often does not speak of it, but of other modes in which God can morally move the will, especially through the helps of grace, which do not pertain to the present.

12. How the aforesaid authors satisfy the proposed difficulty.—This opinion being supposed, however, its authors answer the proposed difficulty in two ways. The former is that that will of God by which He determines concurrence for the action of the secondary cause is from the freedom of the same will, and therefore does not impede but conserves similar freedom in the secondary cause, if otherwise it has it. This reply has foundation in the doctrine of Scotus, who, as we saw above, for this cause asserted that, if God acted from necessity of nature, He would take away by the concurrence or motion by which He moves the secondary cause its freedom, but now does not take it away because He acts freely. Nevertheless this reply does not satisfy; for the freedom of God can contribute to His giving concurrence accommodated to the secondary cause and to its freedom. But if the concurrence or motion is such that, if it were given by God from necessity of nature, it would necessitate the created will, then, even if it is given by God freely, it will necessitate it, as I proved above, because, if the motion is the same, it has the same effect in the secondary cause; but the free relation to the first cause will make the action free to the first cause, but not to the secondary cause. Thus, then, in the present case it matters little that God freely gives concurrence in the way explained above, for thence it is only had that the action is free to God, but not to the secondary cause itself, because the proposed difficulty seems to show that that mode of concurring takes away its indifference. And it is confirmed, for God can bring in necessity to the created will, and nevertheless will bring it in freely; and then the action will be free to God, but necessary to the created will; therefore the relation of freedom to the first cause is not enough for the action to be free to the secondary cause, unless the mode of moving it and concurring with it is such as to be accommodated to conserving the use of its freedom; therefore from divine freedom alone the aforesaid difficulty is not sufficiently solved.

13. Another unravelling of the difficulty.—Another reply is that God, although He gives definite concurrence to natural and free agents through His will, yet gives it in a diverse way; for to necessary agents He wills to give concurrence by which they act necessarily, to free ones by which they act freely; and so God wills not only the action but also the mode of the action; and because the divine will is efficacious for both, therefore it achieves both together. And for this reason it is said of divine providence that it reacheth from end to end mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly. Which reply has foundation in St. Thomas, I, q. 19, a. 8, ad 2, and in other places, where he teaches that it pertains to the efficacy of the divine will that what it wills come about, and in the way in which it wills. Which doctrine, so taken generally, is most certain; yet it is also certain that, when God wills something to come about in a certain mode, it pertains to His wisdom and efficacy to apply causes accommodated to that mode of operating; for He would be repugnant to Himself if He willed something to come about in such a mode and otherwise impeded or took away the causes for that mode of operating. This, then, is what we are inquiring in the present case: how, since God wills the secondary cause to act freely and with indifference, He can define His concurrence without repugnance being involved in this. Hence it is not enough to say that it pertains to the efficacy and sweetness of divine providence to conjoin those two; but either it must be explained how there is no repugnance in them, which is not done by that reply, or another mode must be sought by which God can efficaciously and sweetly move the creature to act and to act freely.

14. The author's reply to the preceding difficulty.—On account of the proposed difficulty, then, I think with many other theologians that the mode in which God gives or offers His concurrence to free causes is to be explained otherwise. Which mode differs in two things from that which we explained in natural agents. First, in the determination as to exercise, because namely God, by virtue of that will by which He decreed to give concurrence to the free cause, does not wholly absolutely decree that the free cause exercise that act, nor simply wills that act to be, but wills that act to be with a condition as it were understood, so far as concerns Himself and on the part of His concurrence, which He has decreed to give, and to it by virtue of such will He applies His power, if, however, the secondary cause or created will also determines itself to it and inflows into it; for it can always not inflow, by its freedom.

15. The first reason.—And this difference is founded, first, on the diverse modes of operating connatural to these agents. For natural agents are by their nature determined to the exercise of their actions; and therefore, as I said above, the first cause, accommodating itself to them, absolutely defines concurrence for them; but free agents are not so determined by their nature to the exercise of their actions; since, therefore, God gives concurrence to each in a mode accommodated to its nature, to these agents too He offers concurrence without complete determination to exercise.

16. The second.—Secondly, the reason made seems to convince this; for if God offered concurrence by an absolute and efficacious will physically determinative and effective of such act, He would necessarily draw the secondary cause with Him; which necessity would be absolute with respect to such cause, because, although it would be from some supposition, that would yet be wholly antecedent, and so efficacious that the inferior cause could in no way resist it.

17. The third.—Thirdly, because, although actual concurrence is not among the prerequisites for acting, but included in the action, yet concurrence in first act, or (what is the same) to have concurrence so offered and prepared that it is in the power of man to have it if he wills, is one of the things necessarily prerequired for acting, as was proved above. For in truth it is not understood by any other reason how it is in the proximate power of man to begin his action. Therefore this concurrence must be offered so, and through such a will of the first cause, that, it being so posited, it is still in the power of the secondary cause to operate freely with it or not to operate; because otherwise this indifference with all the prerequisites for acting is not saved, which is of the notion of free action. Therefore it is necessary that it be understood to be offered through a will including a condition, as declared by us. For if it were wholly absolute, that offering of concurrence could not fail to pass to exercise or second act.

18. The fourth.—Fourthly, this is most necessary on account of the evil acts of the created will. For it cannot be said that God of Himself, by His absolute will, decrees that these acts be wholly made by the secondary cause; otherwise He would not only permit them, but also will them, which is foreign to sound doctrine. Moreover, because otherwise the first root and origin of the evil of our will would be reduced to God, for since the will of God is simply prior, it will always determine the created will to will; therefore the created will always wills because God wills it to will; therefore also when it wills evil, it wills because God wills it to will. The first root, therefore, of every evil will would be poured back into the divine, which is impious.

19. Nor will he satisfy who answers that all these things are true and to be admitted of the evil will as to the material, but not as to the formal, that is, inasmuch as it is evil. For in the present case one follows from the other, because the free act of the created will about this object and with these circumstances cannot be had without having concomitant malice; he, therefore, who wills by absolute will that act to be elicited by the created will about this object and with these circumstances, and especially if he so wills it as to draw the created will with him to exercising that act, plainly wills morally or virtually the malice necessarily conjoined to the act, and is its root and cause. But it is otherwise if God offers concurrence through that will including a condition, as explained by us; for then He simply does not will the evil act, nor determines or draws the created will to its exercise, but only offers concurrence by which He inflows into the act of the created will while it elicits it. And this is the most known difference on account of which God, being just, wills to permit the act of sin, as it is from the created will, which yet as such He cannot will, as the theologians to be cited at once explain more at length.

20. The fifth.—We can apply a fifth reason, because God can necessitate the created will even when it would suffer no necessity from the object, intellect or some intrinsic disposition, as was seen in the foregoing; but there does not appear a mode in which God could more efficaciously bring in necessity as to exercise to the created will than by His absolute will, efficacious and operative ad extra, drawing the created will to will that which He wills it to will. Therefore, conversely, when God wills so to concur with the created will as not to necessitate it as to exercise, He does not give concurrence through a will so absolute and efficacious; therefore He gives it through a will accommodated to the freedom of the human will, and so including on its part a virtual condition, such as we have explained. And in this way almost all the ancient theologians explained the mode of God's concurring with a free cause, whom I shall report at once, having first declared the second difference proposed above.

21. The second difference in the mode of divine concurrence with free causes and with necessary ones.—There is, then, another difference between the mode in which the divine will offers concurrence to natural and to free agents, because to the former it gives concurrence only for one act, but to the latter it offers sufficient concurrence for several acts, so far as concerns itself, which the difficulty posited above rightly proves. And moreover it can be proved by applying with proportion almost all the reasons made in the preceding. First, because God gives to each secondary cause concurrence in a mode accommodated to its nature. But this is the nature of a free cause, that, all the other prerequisite conditions being posited, it is indifferent to several acts; therefore it must also receive concurrence in first act in an indifferent mode; therefore concurrence must be offered, so far as concerns God, not only for one act but for several. Secondly, because otherwise the created will would never be proximately able to effect several acts; therefore it would never be free as to the specification of the act. The second consequence is evident from what was said above about the free cause. But the first sequel is evident, because a secondary cause is not proximately able for any effect unless it has the concurrence of the first cause prepared for it. And therefore a little before we said that a natural cause is always proximately able for only one singular effect, because for that alone does it have the concurrence of God prepared.

22. Thirdly, there is an evident argument, because the created will can will nothing without the concurrence of God; therefore, unless in some way it has in its power the concurrence of God for several acts, it can never simply and proximately elicit any of those acts; but it can never have the concurrence of God in its hand and power unless it first and antecedently has it offered, so far as concerns the will of God, because it is not given, nor can be given, except through the will of God. Nor yet can the created will as it were prevent the divine will, or effect something by which it may draw it to giving general concurrence, because the created will can effect nothing without that very concurrence. The will, then, in giving concurrence, must always precede, nor with respect to it, at least in the first volition, can the created will in any way prevent the divine. If, then, that divine will is defined to one act only or its concurrence, the created will can effect only that by proximate power, nor does it have concurrence for another in its power, and consequently the same holds of the other things which either follow upon it or are made per se by the same genus of concurrence.

23. Fourthly, the reason taken from evil acts is also applied here most efficaciously; for it is incredible that God should will to concur with the will of man here and now for an evil act, and for that alone,¹ even so far as concerns Himself. For neither can this be poured back into the will of the sinner himself, because the will of God concurring wholly precedes the will of the sinner and every free use of it. For I consider a man actually thinking of an evil object with all the prerequisite circumstances in order that the will can assent to it or dissent; but neither can it do through a positive act without the concurrence of God, and before it does either, it cannot be imputed to it that God wills this or that about the concurrence to be given; therefore, if God had purposed to concur with him for the evil consent and not for another act, this would be from the will of God alone, nor could it be imputed to the will of man; but how foreign this is to the divine goodness I leave to all to consider.

24. The authors who embrace the aforesaid mode.—Hence grave theologians declare in this way the concurrence of God with a free cause, most of all when they speak of concurrence for the act of sin. And it can be taken from St. Thomas, In I, dist. 47, q. 1, a. 2, where he says that something takes place beside the consequent will of God's good pleasure, although nothing takes place against it, which he says on account of the evil act; but the consequent will of God is called absolute and efficacious will. And therefore in I-II, q. 89, a. 1, ad 3, he says that the will of God is the universal principle of the interior human motion, but the determination to such evil act is directly from the human will. As if he said that God of Himself offers indifferent concurrence, but that it is determined as it were materially from the cooperation of the free will. And generally he signifies such to be the motion or concurrence of God with a free cause, I-II, q. 9, a. 6, ad 3, and q. 10, a. 4, and III Cont. Gent., cc. 73 and 90, and q. 3 De Potent., a. 7, ad 13, and q. 5 De Verit., a. 5, ad 1. Capreolus thinks the same, in the places cited above, sect. 2, and especially In II, dist. 28, q. 1, a. 3, ad 12 against the second conclusion; Conrad expressly and at length, I-II, q. 79, a. 2; and Soto, I De Natur. et grat., c. 16, who more expressly than the other Thomists, and more generally, says that God does not concur with the free will through the will of good pleasure, which cannot be resisted, but by another will, which can be resisted; his words are: Whatever God wills by absolute will, and that which is called of good pleasure, comes about, according to that: Who resisteth His will? But when He concurs with free man, He does not will it to come about except with human nature and free will safeguarded, which can therefore resist God.

25. Scotus too, although in the places cited above he seems to think otherwise, yet In II, dist. 37, § Ad solutionem istorum, in order to declare concurrence for the act of sin, says that the secondary cause has in its power to concause and not to concause with the first; and if it does not concause as it is bound, thence it comes about that there is not rectitude in the effect common to both. Where Lychetus expressly so declares the divine concurrence and the will of God through which it is given, and Mayronis also signifies it, In II, dist. 43, q. 4. Hence Vega, bk. VI On Trent, c. 7, for this cause says that the general concurrence of God is immediately in our power even when we do not operate; and he thinks this is necessary for our freedom. Cordova holds the same, q. 55, doubts 8 and 10, although he speaks less properly about the order of nature between the causality of the first and the second cause.

26. Almost all other authors too so declare the divine concurrence, especially Gregory, In II, dist. 28, q. 1, a. 3, ad 12; Gabriel, In II, dist. 1, q. 2, a. 2, concl. 4, and a. 3, doubt 1, and dist. 87, a. 3, dub. 2; Marsilius, In I, q. 40, a. 2, part 1, concl. 4, at the end; Adam, In III, dist. 14, q. 3, doubt 2; Almain, tract. I Moral., c. 1. Alexander of Hales also favours it very much, I, q. 24, memb. 5, and q. 26, memb. 4, a. 3, and q. 40, memb. 4, ad 3; Bonaventure, In II, dist. 37, a. 1, q. 1, to the last; and many others, whom I omit for the sake of brevity.

Objections against the above doctrine

27. But the things which can be objected against this mode of explaining the divine concurrence with free causes will be easily solved from what has been treated in the foregoing. The first can be that it follows that the free act takes place without the absolute and efficacious will of God, which seems repugnant, since all things depend on this will of God. Secondly, because it follows that the free act takes place as it were per accidens or contingently with respect to God, because God of Himself does not prescribe what is to come about from His concurrence, and as it were tends uncertainly to that which the created will shall have done. Thirdly, hence it seems to follow that God applies His concurrence to these acts only in a general and confused mode, namely, to that which the created will shall have effected; but this seems to be a great imperfection. Fourthly, it follows that God does not have perfect providence in particular of these free acts, since He does not dispose of them in particular that they be or not be, but only confusedly, leaving the determination in particular to the secondary cause. Hence further it comes about, fifthly, that the determination of such act, both as to exercise and as to specification, is wholly to be attributed to the secondary cause. Sixthly, this seems to be repugnant to what we said above, that the determination of the effect in the individual proceeds in a peculiar way from the predefinition of the first cause; for this is no less necessary in free acts than in others, because, when the will loves, it is not in its power to choose this act of love in the individual rather than another which it could make. Seventhly, because it follows from what has been said that, the will of God concurring with the created will for its act being posited, it can happen that the act does not follow, even if on the part of the will there is sufficient power and all the other requisites; and by the same reason it will come about that God and the divine will on its part behave in the same way towards the man with whom He does not actually concur and towards him with whom He concurs, which is absurd, since He operates something in the one which He does not operate in the other.

28. Eighthly, it can be directly shown that that mode is not necessary; for God in His eternity foreknows what the created will will will on any occasion about any object and with any circumstances; therefore God can by absolute will will to give concurrence for that act alone which He foresees it will operate. Nor is it necessary that He offer concurrence for other acts which He certainly knows will never be future. And by the same reason it is not necessary that He attach some condition tacitly or expressly to His will, since He already foresees that that condition which could intervene there is future, namely, that the created will will cooperate. And for the same cause through this mode of concurrence the indifference of freedom is not taken away, because both that will of God is posited with some respect to the future cooperation of the will, and God would be ready to give other concurrence if the will were going to operate something else.

The objections are satisfied

29. To the first it is answered that it is one thing for a free act to take place without the absolute will of God by which He wills such act to be, another that God does not concur to such act from that absolute will. From our opinion, then, only this latter follows, which we admit as most true, because in order that God concur the will of concurring suffices, which, as to that which holds itself on the part of God, is absolute and efficacious, because by virtue of it God applies His power to concurring, and in reality in time concurs according to the purpose of the same will. Yet, because in the object of that will, as is established from the very word concurring, the concomitance or cooperation of another is comprehended, therefore on the part of the other is understood a condition without which that will of God will not have effect ad extra, and therefore from this side it can be called conditional. For since the transient action by which God concurs with the created will depends both on the divine will and on the created, in order that God concur to it it is not necessary that He absolutely will that action inasmuch as it is from both principles, but only inasmuch as it is from Himself, letting or granting to the other will that it too inflow, and consequently understanding the condition of the cooperation of the other will. For so God behaves about evil wills. On account of which Augustine said, V De Civit., cc. 8 and 9, and often elsewhere, that all powers are from God, but not all wills. And the Council of Trent, sess. VI, can. 6, for the same cause defines that God works these acts only permissively. And hence we openly gather that, by virtue of general concurrence and of the necessary subordination between the first and the second cause, the said will of concurring on the part of God suffices, whatever be the case as to whether about good acts God for special reasons has another mode of absolute will.

30. Hence the other proposition, namely, that the free act takes place without the absolute will of God, does not follow from our opinion, because, although that will is not necessary for concurrence, God can have it for another reason. And in good acts indeed God has it, whether it precedes knowledge by way of predefinition or follows by way of approbation, for this does not pertain to the present. But about evil acts God does not have that absolute will, because God does not simply and absolutely will these evils to be made, nor in those which He foresees as future does He simply take pleasure, for it is repugnant to His goodness; although neither does He absolutely will these acts not to be made, but wills to permit them, as St. Thomas rightly said, I, q. 19, a. 9, ad 3. And after He foresees that they are future, He takes pleasure in them inasmuch as they are from Him, which is only to take pleasure in the concurrence which He gives to them.

31. To the second it is answered by denying the sequel, because God from certain knowledge and His will concurs with the created will for any act of it; and therefore He does not concur with the created will by chance or contingently, but from most wise providence. And although He does not always by absolute will predefine what the created will is going to operate, yet He does not on that account tend uncertainly, because He either predefines or at least permits whatever such secondary cause is going to act, and also sees most clearly and most certainly what it is going to act; and to that He concurs by His will.

32. Hence too the third drawback is solved by denying the sequel. For not confusedly, but distinctly and in particular God voluntarily applies His concurrence to this or that act; always, however, with the condition of the free cooperation of the created will itself understood. For this condition has no less place in the will of concurring distinctly and in particular for such or such act than in a confused will of concurring, which need not be attributed to God except inasmuch as it is included in the will of concurring in particular for this or that act.

33. Wherefore what was inferred in the fourth place, about the imperfection or confusion (so to speak) of divine providence, by no means follows; for God provides about all things in particular, but not about all in the same way. Hence about good acts which are going to be He disposes simply and absolutely that they be; but about evil ones, although He also disposes in particular, yet not simply and absolutely that they be, but that they be permitted to be; and about them, inasmuch as they are already foreseen as future, God disposes how they be either cured or punished. Thus, then, God has perfect providence about all and each in particular, yet accommodated to each. And for this cause certain grave ancient authors, especially Greek ones,² deny that these evil acts are from providence, because by that word they understand peculiarly that absolute disposition by which God not only permits but absolutely wills something to be; or, as that particle from providence sufficiently indicates, they only intend that the root and origin of these evil acts is not from divine providence, nor are such acts to be attributed to it as to their proper cause. It is true that they sometimes extend that mode of speaking to good acts, but then they use that word more strictly for an efficacious predetermination of God bringing in necessity to the created will, as St. Thomas expounded, I, q. 23, a. 1, ad 1.

34. To the fifth, about the determination of the created will, it has already been said in the foregoing how this determination can in some way be attributed to the secondary cause; for the same mode proportionally has place in a free cause. And by a certain greater and peculiar reason it is said to determine itself to its action. Not because it determines itself without the concurrence of God (for its determination is nothing else than its volition, which it is established cannot take place without the concurrence of God), but because the will and power of God, as so applied to concurring, is as it were indifferent and waiting so as to cooperate according to the free use of the will; which is not from imperfection, but from the most wise providence of God accommodating Himself to the secondary cause. Hence, although simply the concurrence of God is prior in nature, in the way explained above, yet in a qualified sense and in its genus this determination can in a peculiar way be attributed to the secondary cause. We speak, however, generally by virtue of concurrence, for in other ways or through other helps God is often the principal cause of every good determination of the will, and especially in those things which are done through grace, of which elsewhere.

35. To the sixth, we grant that the determination of the act or effect, especially as to the individual, arises from the determination of the divine concurrence. Nor is this repugnant to what has been said about concurrence for free acts; for that very determination of concurrence to the singular and individual act can be from a will not wholly absolute on every side, but including a condition on the part of the free cooperation of human choice. Again, that concurrence can be offered not only for one individual act of one species, but also for several of diverse species, as for this act of love and for this act of hatred; and so in each species the will is determined to such act in the individual, and nevertheless remains indifferent either to using the concurrence or not using it, or to using it in this or that species.

36. To the seventh, we grant the former part of the inference, namely, that, after the concurrence has been sufficiently offered on the part of God, the will can not operate, even in the composite sense. Nor is this a greater drawback than that, the permission of God being posited, the will can still not sin; which is true and necessary, because permission regards the power of the cause behaving towards both of opposites, as St. Thomas said, In I, dist. 47, q. 1, a. 2. Finally, just as, all the prerequisites being posited, the will can operate and not operate, so also, the concurrence of God being sufficiently offered and prepared, it can not operate with it, because that is one of the prerequisites. I say, however, transient concurrence offered, not posited in reality, because then it is now impossible in the composite sense that the will not operate, because such concurrence is not distinguished in reality from its action. In which sense St. Thomas said, I-II, q. 10, a. 4, ad 3, that if God moves the will, it is impossible that the will not be moved. For this concurrence is not among the prerequisites for the action, but intrinsically included in the action itself.

37. Hence, to the other part of the inference, the sequel is denied, for into that man who actually operates God also actually inflows, but not into him who does not operate. And so God does not behave equally towards both as to the external action with respect to God Himself. But if the discourse were of the will of God ad intra alone, by which He offers concurrence, it can happen that on its part it is equal, and that in one it has effect and not in the other, from their freedom, which is no drawback, because in the will of God itself that condition was included, as has been explained. But whether in another electing or predefining will, or in some help flowing from it, there is always inequality, it is not ours to dispute.

38. To the eighth it is answered that the conditional foreknowledge which is supposed in it, and which we willingly admit, does not impede the mode of concurring explained by us nor give place to another. For when God foreknows what the created will is going to do if it is applied with such circumstances, among the other conditions this one is to be posited, namely, if God offers sufficient concurrence, because without it it can operate nothing. But this sufficient concurrence, as included in this conditional, must be such as to be indifferent both to exercise and to the species of act; and therefore it must not be absolutely defined to one act only and its exercise. Although, then, God foresees what the will is going to operate here and now, if He Himself gives concurrence, it is necessary that He give it in that way which the nature of the will itself demands, and which was understood included in the aforesaid hypothesis. For if God changed the mode of concurrence, the effects would no longer follow in the same way. The will, then, by which God offers concurrence remains of itself always conditional in virtue, although from foreknowledge it is equivalent to absolute, because God foresees that it will have effect, the other will concurring together.

39. And by the same reason, notwithstanding that foreknowledge, God, so far as concerns Himself, offers concurrence for other acts, although the created will is not going to effect them, so that it can simply effect them, nor does it rest with God that it does not effect them. Just as God also wills to give sufficient helps to those whom He foreknows will not use such helps well, so that they can simply so operate; because otherwise it could not in fact be imputed to them that they did not operate, if on account of the said foreknowledge alone they were deprived of such helps. Indeed this very thing is supposed in that argument, when it is said in it that God is ready to concur for other acts if the created will were going to do them, for God is not so ready except through His will and free determination, not that which He would have in that event—for who can judge of that?—but that which He now already has. God, then, offers to free causes His sufficient concurrence not only for those acts which they do or are going to do, but also for those which they could do if they willed.

1. It remains to be seen in the last place in this disputation whether it is proper to the first cause to concur in the said way with secondary causes for their operations, and that the others depend on it, or whether among created causes too there is this dependence and this mode of concurring. Where the occasion also occurs of declaring the common distinction of efficient causes into those which are per se and essentially subordinated, and those which are only per accidens.

The reason for doubting

2. For from this division is taken the first reason for doubting in the proposed question, because not only are secondary causes essentially subordinated with respect to the first, but also among secondary causes themselves particular causes are subordinated to universal ones; but this essential subordination consists in the aforesaid dependence of the operation of one on the influx of another; therefore that mode of dependence is not only with respect to the first cause. The major seems to be taken from Aristotle, II Metaph., where, proving that there is no process to infinity in efficient causes per se ordered, he supposes that there is some subordination not only between two, namely the first and the second, but among several. And hence in II Phys., text 26, he says: The sun and man generate man. And II De Generat., text 55, for this reason he calls the sun the author of things to be procreated; and sect. XXVI of the Problems, q. 35, he calls it the author and parent of motions. And sect. XI, q. 5, he says that it is the sun which moves all things. And finally II De Generat., text 56, and XII Metaph., text 34, he says that the motion of the heavens is the cause of all generations and corruptions; and I Meteor., c. 9, he attributes this peculiarly to the motion of the sun. Similarly St. Thomas, III Cont. Gent., c. 67, says that lower bodies act in the power of the heavenly bodies. And bk. IV, last chapter, he says that the generation and corruption of lower bodies is caused by the motion of the heaven. Finally all philosophers seem so to think of the causality of the heavens, and therefore call them universal causes with respect to all lower things.

The various senses of the question

3. In order to reduce this question to certain heads, it must be noted that the comparison can be made either between causes distinct in supposit, which are called causes ut quod, or between powers of the same cause or of the same supposit. This question, then, is chiefly treated in the former sense, and therefore we shall speak of that first; but we shall add something about the latter, in order that a full resolution may be had. Next it is to be observed that it is one thing to speak of causes concurring partially to the same action in the same order, another of causes essentially subordinated, with intrinsic dependence of one on another in operating. In the former way it is certain that several created causes often concur to the same action or effect; which can sometimes be per accidens from a fortuitous concurrence of causes otherwise per se sufficient; but sometimes it can be per se and from the institution of nature. And in this way several stars often concur to one effect, because each by itself would not suffice. Of this mode of partial concurrence, then, there is no difficulty; indeed perhaps the concurrence of the heavens is to be understood in great part in this way, as I shall say below.

4. In the latter sense, then, the present question is treated. In which the whole difficulty is about the dependence of lower bodies on heavenly bodies. For of immaterial substances it is a certain matter that they do not depend per se in operating on any created agent; because they do not depend on it in being nor in the faculty or power of operating; therefore neither are they subordinated in acting. Again, of the heavenly bodies themselves, by the same reason, it is certain that they do not depend per se in their actions on other created agents, because they do not depend on them in being; but operation follows being and imitates it. Likewise, because the heavens do not depend per se in their actions on the created intelligences, because neither do they depend on them in being or in their powers, nor can these effect per se in bodies anything besides local motion. You will say: at least by means of motion the action of the heaven can depend on the intelligence. I answer, according to the truer opinion, that that motion serves the action of the heaven only by way of application to diverse bodies¹; but that dependence is not per se, but per accidens, as is established. But if it is true that the heaven is the instrument of the moving intelligence for some actions, as to those there will be essential dependence; yet in truth there are no actions of this kind, as we touched upon above; because neither is there in the intelligence principal power for effecting corporeal effects of this kind, nor can local motion alone per se serve for communicating this power.

5. And by almost the same reason one heaven does not depend per se on another in its action, because it has neither being² nor power of acting from another. You will say: the heavens do not act except through the stars; but these do not act except through light, which they have only from the sun; therefore all depend on the sun in the power of acting, and consequently in action. It is answered, first, by denying the minor; for each star has its own innate and connatural power through which it inflows; for, just as they have proper forms diverse in species, so consequently proper powers and faculties diverse in species. Nor is it likely either that all the stars have power of acting through an extrinsic accident coming to them accidentally, or that the same quality of light, merely from being received in diverse subjects, has effects as various and diverse as diverse stars have; but of this elsewhere. And moreover, whatever be the case about this, the action of the moon, for example, illuminated will depend on the sun only as the action of heated water depends on fire, which is not dependence immediately from essential subordination, but only remote dependence, such as there is in every effect with respect to the remote cause which gave the proximate cause the power of operating.

6. Moreover, no question remains about the dependence of lower corporeal agents on the intelligences, because from what has been said it is established a fortiori that they do not depend on them per se, but at most per accidens, as on those applying active things to passive ones; and in this way too not always nor regularly, except as to the motion of the heaven. Finally, of lower bodies among themselves it is also a clear matter that they do not have the aforesaid dependence in operating, because none of them is compared to another as universal cause to particular, or has any reason of such dependence.

Diverse opinions about the difficulty of the question

7. The whole question, then, is reduced to the subordination of lower bodies with respect to the heavenly. For there are those who opine that essential dependence of this kind intervenes between these agents, so that the heaven actually inflows into all the actions of lower bodies. So opine Javellus, XII Metaph., q. 13; and Soto, II Phys., q. 4, concl. 1, and In IV, dist. 48, q. 2, a. 2, where from this principle he says that, the motion of the heaven ceasing, every action of lower natural agents would suddenly cease, and all living things would at once breathe out their souls, because they cannot live without some motion. Ferrariensis also signifies it, IV Cont. Gent., c. 97, § Advertendum tertio; for he says that in the generation of man the creation of the soul is from God, but the dispositions of the body are from the generator and from the motion of the heaven per se and immediately.

8. Javellus to prove this brings this reason (for the other authors bring none): every action of generable bodies is necessarily reduced to some ingenerable cause; but this is none other than a heavenly body; therefore. The major is evident, because, just as it is necessary that every motion be reduced to some immobile principle, so every generation to some ingenerable principle. But the minor is proved because that ingenerable agent is not a created intelligence, because that cannot immediately transmute matter to form. Nor yet is it the first principle itself, because that does not act through itself immediately on these lower things, but through intermediate causes; but here we treat of a cause immediately concurring to all the actions of lower generators; therefore it is the heaven. And it is confirmed from Aristotle, VIII Phys., text 1, saying that the first motion is life, that is, the fount and universal principle of things existing in nature, and so is compared to the universe as the motion of the heart to the animal, which ceasing every action ceases. Hence the Commentator, I De Caelo, comm. 63, says that the principle of life which is in the orb is the cause of all life; and he has almost the same in XII Metaph., comm. 18. It is confirmed secondly, because otherwise the essential order between the parts of the universe is taken away, which is against its due constitution, as is taken from Aristotle, XII Metaph., last text.

9. The contrary opinion is taken from Scotus, In II, dist. 14, q. 3, at the end; and from Richard there, a. 2, q. 6; and Durandus, there, 2nd part of the distinction, q. 3; Henry, Quodl. XI, q. 15, and Quodl. XIV, q. 1. For although in this latter place he seems in part to be opposed, yet, if rightly understood, he is not opposed, as we shall see. And this opinion seems to me most true; it needs, however, some explanation.

The full resolution of the question

10. The first assertion.—I say, then, first: no secondary cause depends per se and intrinsically in acting on another created agent, but only on the first cause, namely, as on the universal agent, immediately in its order inflowing into the action of the lower cause. The conclusion is first explained; for we treat of a secondary cause having, in the notion of proximate cause, sufficient power for some action or effect. For this must be supposed before all in order that essential subordination be understood; for if the particular cause is insufficient in its order, and as to that which is lacking is helped by another superior one, there will not on that account be essential subordination in acting, but a concurrence of partial causes. This being supposed, then, the conclusion is proved, first, because the secondary cause does not depend in its being on another created cause; for above we proved that elements and mixed bodies do not depend in being conserved on the heaven. And by the same reason the intrinsic and connatural powers of these things do not depend on it; therefore by parity of reasoning neither do their actions depend from their intrinsic notion on the heaven, and consequently neither on another created cause; for the others we have already excluded. The last consequence is evident, because operation is proportioned to being itself.

11. You will say: sometimes a form depends in being conserved on its agent, as light on the sun; therefore then at least it will also depend in its action on the immediate influx of the sun. It is answered that, even if the whole is granted, it matters nothing, because it is not unfitting that some quality depend in the said way on its agent in operating. But secondly it is said that from the force of the antecedent the consequent does not follow; for visible species depend in being conserved on the object, and yet they do not have a new immediate dependence in operating. From the negation of dependence in being, then, we believe independence in operating is excellently inferred; but not conversely, from any dependence whatever in being, a new and immediate dependence in operating is inferred. Because this is often not possible with respect to a created agent; but with respect to the uncreated agent that consequence is excellent, on account of the essential dependence of every participated entity on the first being.

12. The second reason, similar to the preceding, is that the effects of these natural agents do not depend per se and essentially in being on the heaven, as was also proved above, because as to this the reason is the same of univocal causes and their effects; therefore neither does the action of such causes per se and intrinsically depend on the heaven. The consequence is evident, because such as being is, such is becoming. And both reasons take their foundation from what was said in sect. 1, that the dependence of the secondary cause on the first in its operation is founded on this, that both the secondary cause and its action and effect are beings by participation, and therefore per se and immediately depend on being by essence. But this reason has no place with respect to another created cause, and, it being set aside, none sufficient remains for introducing that genus of dependence; but a multitude of causes is not to be demanded for some effect without reason and necessity. Hence for this too the reasons can avail by which Durandus, cited above, tried to take away this dependence on the first cause.

13. A third reason can be that, if the heaven inflows per se and as a universal cause into the actions of all lower things, it is understood to do so either immediately by immediacy of supposit, or only of power; not in the former way, because, as we suppose, no cause acts immediately by immediacy of supposit on a thing distant in place; but the heaven is far distant from lower agents and their actions. But if it acts in the latter way, it is necessary that it do so through diffused power; for the power inhering in the heaven itself is also far distant from lower causes and their effects, hence it cannot be understood to inflow immediately except inasmuch as it diffuses some participation of itself through intermediate bodies up to the particular cause proximately acting, and from the power, inasmuch as it reaches there, the action will immediately flow. But the influx of this power cannot be universally and generally affirmed with foundation; for who would believe that fire needs power superadded by the heaven in order to heat or illuminate? And where it intervenes, it does not pertain to the dependence of the particular cause on the universal, but to supplying the insufficiency of the particular cause, as I shall declare at once.

14. And the reason is clear, because, after that power has been impressed by the heaven on the lower body or agent, that composite of innate power and power infused by the heaven is a sufficient proximate cause for such action, in which it no longer depends per se on the heaven, but only remotely, inasmuch as it received the power of acting from it, as heated water depends on fire in heating. It is a sign, therefore, that that is not per se dependence in acting of one cause on another. And next it is also a sign that, if the particular cause in its order has complete and sufficient power, it will not need (per se speaking) another power inflowed by the heaven; for that multiplication of powers is superfluous. And this is what we directly intend in this assertion.

15. The second assertion.—I say secondly: it often happens that the power of some lower secondary cause is per se mutilated and imperfect in its order and insufficient for the effect, and for that reason needs the help of another created cause which completes or supplies the power of acting. And in this way lower bodies need the influx of the heavens for many of their actions, especially for the generations of mixed bodies, and most of all of living things. The arguments of the former opinion prove this conclusion; for it cannot be denied that there is some per se order between sublunary and heavenly causes; but, the former intrinsic and essential dependence being set aside, no other mode of per se subordination between causes of this kind can be understood. It can also easily be declared by induction; for the elements by themselves alone, and through their mutual action and reaction, cannot suffice for substantial mixture, so that from them and by them a true substantial mixed body be generated, both because neither in any one of them nor in all together is the form of the mixed body formally or eminently, and also because, since the elements are transient matter with respect to mixed bodies, the whole active and material power of the generation of the mixed body cannot be in them alone. Heavenly power is necessary, therefore, which helps to perfect the mixture. Again, inanimate mixed bodies, generally speaking, are very weak for generating things like themselves, as is established by experience. And the reason seems to be that they are both little active, because they have the primary qualities broken and remiss, and are much impeded in their action by surrounding bodies and by the contrary qualities of the patient bodies. For this cause, then, heavenly power was also necessary, which would either help these agents, or certainly wholly effect the generation of these things, as seems to happen in the effecting of gold and metals.

16. Again, of vegetable things it is perspicuous how much, as to their generation or increase, they depend on the heavens, which takes place in no other way than because through heavenly influence they either receive in themselves qualities like their own in power of acting, or receive increase or intensification of their qualities, or because the matter from which these living things are generated or nourished is disposed by heavenly power so that it can more easily be changed by their action. Again, in this way too the generations of animals depend much on heavenly influence, and so it is excellently understood how the sun and man generate man, because namely human seed has imperfect force unless it is fostered and helped by the heat of the sun to perfect that action. And in this way Henry above says that heavenly power inflowed into these seeds is necessary, by which they may be determined to their various actions; for, since seed has so various and manifold an action in the organization of the body, particular and intrinsic power does not seem to suffice for it, and therefore heavenly power is thought necessary. Which is probable, although it is no less obscure how power inflowed by the heaven, if in itself it is simple and naturally acting, suffices for that variety. But whatever be the case about this (which was touched upon above), it is established that the necessity of this heavenly influx always comes from the insufficiency of the particular power, either for overcoming the resistance of matter, or for protecting itself from contraries, or for completing the whole disposition as is necessary for perfecting generation.

17. And it is confirmed from the contrary, for where the power of the particular agent is found sufficient for its action, either less or no heavenly influence is necessary for it, so far as can be gathered from reason or experience. For thence it is that fire generates fire in the same way from the same matter, or other things being equal, in whatever aspect or disposition of the heavenly stars. And in the same way colour effects visible species, and sight elicits the act of vision, and the same holds of other vital actions, provided the disposition of the organs is conserved the same and other things are equal. And in this way St. Thomas said, Opusc. 10, a. 8, that if the living body of a man and with the same disposition of the members were conserved, the motion of the heaven ceasing, the man could move his hand or tongue in the same way; and q. 5 De Potent., a. 10, ad 8, he says that in that case the motion of the heart would last in a man.

How among created causes some are called universal

18. From these, then, it is established in what sense some universal causes besides the first can be admitted, and some per se subordination among some secondary causes among themselves, and what in this is proper to the first cause, or what is the difference between it and the others. For it is proper to it that every operation depend on it per se, immediately and essentially, so that, however great the inferior power may be, it cannot act without that influx, nor can it be supplied by another agent, nor through some created power even implanted by God Himself. But in this way the operation of one creature does not depend on another, as has been declared, and therefore it is proper to God alone to be in this way the universal cause of all actions. Yet, because natural, generable and corruptible things have imperfect powers for acting, and have many contraries by which they can be impeded from effecting their actions or generations, whose continuous succession is necessary for the conservation of the universe, therefore the author of nature provided certain superior bodies which should have various powers of acting and be applied in various ways through continuous motion, so that they might in various ways help lower agents for their generations or corruptions. And therefore those superior bodies are deservedly called universal causes, because they operate in some way towards the effects of all lower causes. In which way Dionysius says, c. 4 De Divinis nominibus: The ray of the sun contributes to the generation of sensible bodies and to life itself, it moves and nourishes, and increases, and perfects.

19. What subordination there is in lower agents to superior ones.—And in a similar way natural causes are understood to be per se subordinated to heavenly ones according to the order instituted by the author of nature. Not because either the powers or the effects of lower bodies per se and intrinsically say relation or dependence on the heavenly bodies, but because in fact, according to the order of the universe, they have been so instituted under them as to be helped and fostered by them in their actions and powers. But if God had instituted another order, either helping or supplying the defects of lower agents by Himself or through other bodies, these agents would perfect their actions equally well and connaturally according to their proper and particular natures. And by the same reason, if sometimes it happens in fact either that a lower particular cause is sufficiently helped by another lower cause, or is per se sufficient for its action, it will be able to exercise it without the concurrence of the heaven. And similarly, although the power of the lower cause is insufficient to perfect the whole generation, and heavenly help is wholly lacking, indeed rather resists it, and for that reason it cannot perfect the generation, nevertheless it effects some alteration or remote disposition for which such power per se suffices.

The opposed reasons are solved

20. The reason for doubting posited at the beginning, then, remains solved from what has been said; for all the sayings of Aristotle and of other philosophers about the influx of the heavens and about the dependence of lower agents on them are sufficiently understood according to the mode of subordination and dependence explained by us. But to the reason of Javellus it is answered that the action of a generable and corruptible agent does not per se and intrinsically necessarily depend on another incorruptible agent besides the first cause; but if sometimes it depends, it is only when the power of such agent is per se insufficient and is helped by the partnership of a superior incorruptible body. But the proof which Javellus adduces from immediacy of action is improbable, and rather persuades the opposite; for the first cause acts more immediately in the actions of all corruptible bodies than the heaven. But the other confirmations have been solved from what has been said about per se subordination and about the mode in which the heaven inflows with lower causes. But what is touched upon there about the cessation of all lower actions when the motion of the heaven ceases is improbable in that sense, namely, of momentary cessation on account of essential dependence; for the motion of the heaven is not per se a cause, but only an application to acting. It could only be said, then, that from that time or moment all things would cease, because from then they would begin to be corrupted and to fail; of which elsewhere. See St. Thomas, who intimates it in the said Opusc. 10, a. 23, at the end; and Soncinas hands it down more at length, XII Metaph., q. 13, with others cited above.

21. How the faculties of the same supposit happen to be ordered among themselves.—Finally, from these another point touched upon above about subordinated powers of the same supposit can easily be resolved; for in them there happens to be essential dependence in acting among several powers, because they are much more connected among themselves than diverse supposits. Always, however, in subordination of this kind, if it is per se and physical and in the genus of efficient cause, the inferior power is compared as instrumental to the superior to which it is subordinated. And in this way the faculties of the soul depend essentially on the soul in the operations of life, and the intentional species on the power in which it exists as in a subject. And to the same is reduced the dependence which a habit has in acting on the power which it affects. I said, however, if it is per se, etc., because the intellect is in some way subordinated to the will in some of its actions, yet not as to one per se and principally cooperating, but as to one only applying and moving to acting. And conversely the will is subordinated to the intellect, yet not as to a co-efficient, but as to one applying the final cause. Wherever, then, there is per se subordination, there intervenes some notion of conjoined instrument and principal agent; under which notion such instrument by itself alone is an insufficient principle of such action and effect.