Disputationes metaphysicae

1. Reasons for doubting.—The reason for doubting is, first, because substantial forms cannot be known by any experience, nor are they necessary for all the actions and differences of things which we experience; therefore they are not to be introduced without cause. The antecedent is evident, because fire, for example, is sufficiently understood to be constituted in its being if we conceive a certain substance having perfect and supreme heat conjoined with dryness, even if the substance subject to these accidents is simple; and this is also enough for every action of fire which we experience, and for the distinction between fire and water, and for the transmutation of one into the other, which seems to consist in this, that that substance passes from supreme cold into supreme heat, and conversely. This, therefore, is enough for the constitution, distinction and action of the elements; therefore the same will proportionally suffice for the composition of mixed bodies, for these are procreated from the mixture of the elements.

2. Secondly, a repugnance seems to be involved when a form is called informing and substantial; for either it is a subsisting thing needing no sustaining subject, or it needs it; if the first, it cannot be an informing form, because it is repugnant that what is subsisting be received in another. If the second, it is an inhering form; therefore accidental; there is not, therefore, a substantial form.

3. Thirdly, because, substantial forms being posited, it cannot be understood in what way the transmutations and generations of things come about unless something comes about from nothing, which cannot be according to natural principles. The sequel is evident, because either the substantial form pre-exists generation, or something of it, or nothing. The first cannot be said, otherwise infinite forms would pre-exist in matter, and in the thing nothing would come about anew, but would appear. Nor yet can the second be said, both because in the same part of matter there cannot be something of the form without the whole form being there, since it is indivisible; and also because, even if part of the form pre-exists and part is to be induced, this part will come about from nothing; for it cannot come about from the worse part; it remains, therefore, that the third be said, which nevertheless is repugnant and exceeds the power of natural agents.

4. The ancient philosophers did not know substantial forms.—In this question almost all the ancient philosophers were ignorant of substantial forms, as is evident from what we reported above of their opinions about prime matter or the first subject of natural transmutations; for, since they thought that that subject is a complete being in act, they could not recognize substantial form; for substantial form and prime matter which is pure potency are as it were correlatives. Some also of the later philosophers, at least in the elements, denied substantial forms. So Alexander of Aphrodisias indicates, Metaphysics XII, comm. 12, although there he seems to speak only by way of example and according to proportion; and Philoponus, De generatione II, comm. 7; and earlier Galen held the same opinion, De elementis I; and before that Empedocles thought the same, who did not deny the forms of mixed bodies but of the elements, as Aristotle indicates, Physics I, text 51, and Physics II, text 22.

Resolution of the question

5. It must be said, however, that all natural or corporeal things consist of substantial form (besides matter) as an intrinsic principle and formal cause. This is the opinion of Aristotle in innumerable places, who often reproves the ancient philosophers because, substantial form being almost passed over, they applied their whole inquiry to matter, as is evident from the whole of Physics I, and Book II, c. 1, where he says that form is a more perfect nature than matter. He has the same in De partibus animalium I, c. 1, and Metaphysics VII, c. 4, and Book XII, c. 2, where he calls form a this something, because it completes substance, which is a this something; and in the same places, especially Metaphysics VII, he calls form the what it is; and gives the reason, because it is that which constitutes and distinguishes the essences of things. Moreover, De Anima II, c. 1, he distinguishes substance into matter, form and composite, and calls form ἐντελέχεια, of which name Fonseca writes many things learnedly, Metaphysics I, at the end; commonly, however, writers teach that the word entelechy is more general and comprehends more than substantial form; for it properly signifies perfection, or act perfecting a thing. But by antonomasia it is wont to be attributed to substantial form, because it is the chief act and the greatest perfection of the substantial thing. By other names too substantial form is wont to be named by Aristotle, which we shall note below in explaining its causality. Yet Aristotle was not the discoverer of this truth, for before him Plato recognized substantial form, as is evident from the Timaeus, where he calls forms images of the truly existing, that is, participations of the ideas, while he himself posits ideas only of substances. And before Plato some of the philosophers are believed to have touched upon substantial forms, as is evident from Aristotle, De partibus animalium I, c. 1, and other places cited above. And now this dogma is so received in philosophy that it cannot be denied without great ignorance; and it is so consonant with the truth of the Christian faith that its certitude is not a little increased thence; wherefore it pleases me to begin the proof of this truth from a certain principle certain by faith and evident by natural light.

From the rational form the other substantial forms are gathered

6. Let the first reason, then, be: man consists of substantial form as an intrinsic cause; therefore also all natural things. The antecedent is proved, for the rational soul is a substance and not an accident, as is evident, because it remains per se separated from the body, since it is immortal; it is therefore per se subsisting and independent of a subject; it is not, therefore, an accident, but a substance. Again, that soul is the true form of the body, as faith teaches and is also evident by natural light; for it cannot be a substance assisting or extrinsically moving the body, otherwise it would not vivify it, nor would the works of life depend essentially on its presence and conjunction; nor finally would it be the man himself who understands, but some other assisting substance. Man, therefore, consists of body as matter and rational soul as form; this soul, therefore, is a substantial form; for, as we shall declare below, by the name of substantial form nothing else is signified than a certain partial substance which can be so united to matter that with it it composes a substance integral and per se one, such as is man.

7. But the first consequence is proved, supposing that the discussion is of natural generable and corruptible things, for these as regards this part are of the same order with man, and among them there can be transmutation and vicissitude; but thence it will easily be concluded a fortiori that the same is to be said of incorruptible bodies, supposing the opinion which we treated above about their matter. The composition of man, then, from matter and substantial form shows that there is in natural things a certain substantial subject by its nature apt to be informed by some substantial act; therefore such a subject is imperfect and incomplete in the genus of substance; it seeks, therefore, always to be under some substantial act. But this subject is not proper to man, but is found also in other natural things, as is self-evident; whence it is supposed both for the generation of man and for nutrition, and remains after his corruption; therefore all natural things which consist of that subject or matter consist also of substantial form actuating and perfecting that subject. Moreover, from the same composition of man it is gathered that an aggregation of several faculties or accidental forms in a simple substantial subject is not enough for the constitution of a natural thing; for in man there are those faculties and accidental forms, perhaps more and more perfect than in other natural things, and yet they do not suffice for the constitution of some complete natural being, but there is required besides a form which as it were presides over all those faculties and accidents and is the fountain of all the actions and natural motions of such a being, and in which that whole variety of accidents and powers has its root and a certain unity; therefore by the same reason in the other natural beings there is necessary some substantial form distinct from accidents and more intimate and perfect than they. Thirdly, by the same example it is evident that the substantial generation and corruption of man does not consist in the acquisition or loss of some accidents, but in the union or disjunction of the rational soul substantially informing the human body, to which certain accidents prepare, which being taken away, the soul recedes and the man is corrupted; therefore in the same way the corruption and generation of other natural beings is to be understood to come about. For, as far as can be gathered from experience, the same mode of generation and corruption is in other things as is in man, except the difference in the perfection and subsistence of the human form, which we would not gather from the mode of generation and corruption unless it were known to us from elsewhere. And on that account it is said in Ecclesiastes 3: The death of man and of beasts is one, and the condition of both is equal; as man dies, so they also die, etc. Finally all the indications and signs of substantial composition which can be thought out in man are in the other natural beings, and especially in animals, as will be evident from the following reason.

Various indications of substantial form

8. The return of an altered patient to its pristine state.—The second principal reason, then, is taken from various indications arising from the accidents and operations of natural beings, which indicate that substantial form lies hidden beneath them. The first is seen even in the elements; for if water, for example, is heated, and afterwards the agent is removed, it is brought back from within to its pristine coldness, as is evident by experience; therefore it is a sign that there is in the water some more intimate principle from which again the intension of cold emanates, extrinsic impediments being taken away; but that principle can only be the substantial form; therefore. The first consequence is proved, because there can be no extrinsic principle of that reduction, both because, if that reduction were from without, it would not be per se and necessary, but by accident, as an extrinsic agent happened by chance to occur; and also because, running through all the extrinsic principles which commonly occur, there is none from which that action could come; for proximately only the surrounding air is wont to occur, which either naturally is not as cold as water, or by accident is wont to be left as hot as the water itself; whence it too brings itself back to its pristine state as far as it can; but remotely only heavenly and universal causes intervene, which of themselves are not determined to an action of this kind, as is known.

9. Various causes of such reduction are refuted.—But the second antecedent, namely that no other intrinsic cause of that action can be thought out besides the very form of the water, is proved, for what will that be? Some say that in some parts of the water intense cold always remains, and that from those parts the others which were heated are cooled, which Cajetan thinks probable, I, q. 54, a. 3; and it is attributed to Averroes, De Anima II, comm. 1. But this is frivolous and against experience; for we perceive by sense that the whole water poured into some vessel is very hot, from whatever part it is touched; but if there were some parts so cold, either they would be perceived by sense, or at least they would temper in some part of the water the sense of heat; but neither happens. It is also against physical reason, for the whole water according to all its parts is uniformly-difformly applied to the fire acting naturally; therefore according to all its parts it undergoes uniformly in the same way; for what is there which could either impede that action or so interrupt it that it would come about in some parts and not in others? Likewise, either those parts which are said to retain cold can be heated, or not; if not, then neither could they be corrupted; but if they can be heated, then, if the whole water is sufficiently applied to the fire, those too will be heated, or certainly a state can be given in which that potency is reduced to act, and, that being posited, the water will still be brought back to its pristine coldness, the contrary agent being removed, provided it has not come to the corruption of the water.

10. Others answer that that action does not come from any principle distinct from coldness; for coldness always remains in some degree, and itself, as soon as it is not impeded, recalls itself to its pristine state. For in coldness itself two things can be distinguished, namely the essence and the mode of intension; and the essence always remains integral, even if the intension is diminished, and therefore from the same essence the mode of intension can emanate. But this answer too is false. First, because from a remiss quality a more intense degree cannot proceed; otherwise air too would make itself supremely hot, and so of all other things. Secondly, because it often happens that there are more degrees of heat in the water than of cold; therefore, even the extrinsic agent being removed, the coldness could not overcome the intense heat, because it would in no way be helped by the subject, since matter alone of itself is indifferent to each accident. Thirdly, because otherwise cold and heat in remiss degrees could never remain quiet in the same subject, but always one quality would expel the other, perfecting itself up to the ultimate intension, because on the side of the subject (if it were matter alone) there would be no impediment, and we suppose that all other extrinsic things are taken away.

11. In the elements no qualities virtually contain the first qualities.—Others finally answer that there is indeed necessary another internal principle prior to coldness, which remains integral even if the coldness is remitted, from which that reduction is derived; but they deny that that principle is the substantial form, for from it alteration could not immediately come, but they say it is a certain quality of a superior notion, virtually containing the first sensible qualities. But this opinion can be understood in two ways: first, not denying the substantial form, but positing that virtual quality intermediate between the substantial form and the first sensible qualities, and in this sense it is not repugnant to the truth which we intend to prove; yet it weakens the reason which we are pursuing, and moreover is to be rejected as superfluous and gratuitously feigned, for it multiplies qualities without foundation or any experience, for the emanation of an accident from the intrinsic form does not need another intermediate accident; otherwise one would proceed to infinity. Likewise, because it is repugnant that there be given in the elements any qualities prior to the first; but the first qualities of the elements, on the testimony of Aristotle, are formal heat, coldness, etc. Whence, although perhaps in mixed bodies there is sometimes given a quality virtually containing heat or cold, nevertheless that is both posterior to the temperament of the first qualities connatural to the mixed body and is not for the intrinsic emanation of the first qualities in the same subject, but for effecting by proper action in extrinsic subjects. That answer can be understood otherwise, so that it intends to take substantial form out of the way and in its place posit a quality. But understood in this sense it is easily refuted, because that quality is not immediately and per se sensed, but is discerned from this effect of natural emanation; on what foundation, then, is that internal principle said to be an accidental quality and not a substantial form? Likewise, that principle is the first act of matter, completing with it this natural being which we call water; therefore it is substantial act and not accidental. Likewise, that form is not only the root of cold but also of humidity, density and the other properties which the element of water requires; for of them the same argument can be made, that if through contrary action they are changed from that natural state which water postulates, as soon as the contrary recedes they return to the natural state; therefore they have another prior form from which they are derived, which remains unchanged; therefore either to each correspond individual radical (so to speak) or virtual forms, which nature abhors and is altogether superfluous, or there is one form in which all those properties are rooted and as it were bound together, which is most true; therefore that form is not accidental but of a superior order. It is, therefore, the substantial form from which such a reduction comes, as the common opinion holds, of Avicenna, Sufficientia I, c. 5; Soncinas, Metaphysics IX, q. 8; Soto, Physics II, q. 1, and others.

12. And hence can be taken another indication, which is a confirmation of the preceding; for by almost evident experience it is established that even in these inanimate things or elements substantial corruption is distinct from alteration; I speak specifically of inanimate things, in order that the induction may be universal a fortiori; since in animate things the matter is more evident, as will be evident. We experience, then, that alteration, for example the heating of water or iron, is sometimes so vehement that most intense heat is sensed in them, and nevertheless, if the action of the contrary agent ceases, those things remain either integral or almost integral in their substance, and easily also return to their accidental state; but sometimes the alteration proceeds so far that a complete transmutation of the thing comes about, so that, although the agent is removed, that patient can never return to its pristine state nor recover its prior actions or similar accidents; sometimes too it is changed into a viler sensible substance, as ashes, slag, etc.; but sometimes it is altogether consumed insensibly, because it is transformed into another subtler and insensible body; therefore it is an evident sign that alteration is sometimes pure and remains within the breadth of accidental change, but sometimes has conjoined a greater change of the thing. But this can be nothing else but because the substantial composite itself is dissolved, the substantial form receding; there are, therefore, substantial forms. The last subsumption is proved, because, if the whole substance of the thing always remained equally integral, however far the alteration proceeded, it of itself would always have the same relationship to the accidents; therefore either it would always remain quiet after any alteration whatever under any accidents whatever, as far as depended on itself and the contrary agent being removed, or certainly, the same agents being removed, it would always return to the same accidents.

13. And this reason is confirmed, for we see that some accidents are so inseparable from some subjects that, if they are taken away or too much diminished, a complete transmutation comes about in the subjects, so that they cannot by intrinsic power return to their pristine state; therefore that inseparability comes from the connection of such accidents with some internal principle of such things. Which cannot be prime matter or that first subject which remains under every transmutation, because with respect to it no accident is inseparable of those which can be acquired or lost through alteration. Nor yet can that principle be some accident, if the discussion is of the first and radical principle; for, although one accident is inseparable with respect to another, as rarity with respect to heat, or whiteness with respect to such a temperament of the first qualities, nevertheless that temperament is inseparable from another prior form left to its nature; one must necessarily stop, therefore, at some form which is first with respect to the inseparable accidents; that, therefore, is the substantial form and not an accidental, since it constitutes the proper essence in which such accidental properties are connaturally and inseparably.

14. The subordination of properties among themselves an indication of substantial form.—Finally another reason can be formed from this indication, because in one natural being many properties are conjoined, which sometimes are so subordinated among themselves that one arises from another, as the will from the intellect; but sometimes they do not have subordination among themselves, as heat and humidity in air, whiteness and sweetness in milk, or several senses in an animal; therefore this multitude and variety of properties, especially when they are related in the latter way, requires one form in which all are united; otherwise they would be merely accidentally gathered in the same subject, and, one being altogether taken away, another would not on that account recede; but the opposite is evident by experience; therefore it is a sign that such accidents, in such number, weight and measure required in such a subject and being, do not have that connection with respect to the first subject alone or prime matter, but with respect to some composite which by reason of the form requires that order of accidents among themselves. And this reason is wont to be specially confirmed in mixed bodies, in which we see contrary accidents reduced to certain degrees preserved in the same mixed body; but this cannot come from the qualities themselves, as is sufficiently self-evident, since by their nature they rather fight. Nor yet does it come from an extrinsic cause nor from matter, as is easily evident; therefore it must come from the form. But this confirmation either has no force at all, or is not a reason distinct from the preceding, for the four first qualities, reduced to that temperament in which they can be at the same time in the same subject so as to be perpetually preserved in it in the same state, do not need another internal cause or principle, but only the removal of the extrinsic corrupting agent, because those qualities constituted in that degree are neither properly contrary nor can have action among themselves; indeed, if they could have it, the substantial form could not impede or reconcile it. Whence it comes about that in living things, even in man, where the form is supremely one, it cannot impede action between heterogeneous parts, because, although in the individual parts the qualities are so tempered that they agree among themselves with respect to their proper subject, they are not so tempered with respect to the qualities of another dissimilar part. From this preservation of a temperament consisting of contrary qualities, then, precisely taken, substantial form is not inferred. Yet it is excellently inferred from this, that in such a temperament the qualities are not only permitted (so to speak) to remain in that degree, but also are so connected in it and so require it that, if one of them is extrinsically either increased or diminished, the extrinsic agent being removed, the temperament at once returns to the prior proportion, which is seen most of all in animals; this, therefore, is an evident sign that such a temperament belongs to some form in which those qualities are connected. But this sign coincides with that of the reduction of the thing to its natural state.

15. That a thing acting intensely by one faculty is remitted in the action of others is a sign of substantial form.—Lastly this reason is confirmed by another indication taken from the action of certain natural things; for we experience that a thing having several faculties of operating, while it operates intensely through one, is impeded from being able to operate through another, or not with so great effort; therefore it is a sign that those faculties are subordinated to the same form, which principally operates through them; for, if they had no subordination among themselves nor with some common principle, each of them would have its operation independently of the other, nor would there be any reason why the effort of one should impede the effort of the other more than if they were in diverse subjects; but from subordination to the same form an excellent reason is given, because, since that is of finite power, while it is intensely applied to one operation it is distracted from another, and can incline to one with so great effort that its power is exhausted there. The antecedent is declared by some in natural things or agents, which, while they act intensely to overcome a contrary, cannot altogether protect themselves from being in some part overcome or suffering from the contrary. But this experience of the reaction of natural agents does not come from the subordination of several faculties to one form, but from this, that a thing is not always as powerful to resist as it is to act. Whence even the hottest iron, while it heats water, suffers from it in return, although the form of the iron contributes nothing at all to that action; indeed there the operations of diverse faculties do not intervene, but the action of one quality, namely heat, and a passion in some part contrary to it, which comes from this, that heat is not so powerful to resist as to act. Wherefore in inanimate things I scarcely believe that any experiment can be found by which that antecedent may be proved, because in accidental actions which do not proceed from life there does not seem proximately to intervene any concurrence of the substantial form by reason of which the action of one faculty is remitted from the effort of another. But in living things, and especially in ourselves, we manifestly experience an effect of this kind; for sometimes attentive interior thought impedes our seeing even present things; indeed even prolonged meditation is wont to impede the action of the nutritive part. Nor does it matter if someone says that this comes from the concurrence of the vital spirits, which are necessary for the operations of these faculties, and, while they flow together to one, they abandon another; both because that very concurrence of the vital spirits to one faculty rather than another is a sign of one form using those spirits and faculties for two actions, otherwise there would be no reason why the spirits should flow together to one faculty more than to another; and also because intellectual operation does not come about by means of spirits, and yet effort and attention to it impedes the inferior actions. Nor can this be attributed to the cooperation of the phantasy, which requires the concurrence of spirits; for intellectual attention, especially if it is vehement and about things of a superior order, also greatly diminishes the action of the phantasy itself; therefore it does not come from the spirits, but from the occupation of the same soul about some operation.

The causes of substantial form clearly show it

16. It is not repugnant that there be substantial form.—A third principal reason can be given a priori from the proper causes of substantial form, which are the final, efficient and material; for it does not have a formal cause, since it is itself the form, whence from it no positive reason can be taken. We can, however, suppose that on its side there is no repugnance that such a genus of being or incomplete substance be given in the nature of things; for what repugnance can be feigned or thought out in this? Likewise, because it is not repugnant that there be given in the nature of things substantial acts of the supreme order which are subsisting and not informing, as angels, and a substantial act of the middle order which is at the same time subsisting and actuating or informing, as has been said of the rational soul; therefore it will not be repugnant that there be given substantial acts of the lowest order, that is, which are actuating acts and not integrally subsisting, and these we have called substantial forms. Likewise, either such an act would be repugnant because it is act, or because it is substantial, or because it is repugnant that these two be conjoined in the same thing; none of these can be said with probability; therefore neither is it repugnant that there be given a substantial form, as far as depends on its side. But if on its side it is not repugnant, it will at once easily be proved from the other causes either that it is not repugnant or even that it is necessary. The first two parts of the first antecedent seem self-evident. The first indeed, because it is self-evident that there are given in things entities which are acts and perfections of others; for so whiteness is the act of the white and intellection of the understanding. But the second, because it is also self-evident that there are given in things substantial entities, since these are the foundation of all others. The third part, then, remains to be proved, namely that it is not repugnant that these two properties or notions be conjoined in the same entity; but this is evident, both because nothing can be assigned in one of those notions which is intrinsically repugnant with the other, and also because the notion of act of itself expresses perfection; therefore, if it is not repugnant that it be conjoined with accidental being, why is it repugnant that it be coupled with substantial? And finally because, since the notion of substantial entity looks to perfection simply, it seems more repugnant to the notion of potentiality than to the notion of actuality; but the first is not repugnant, as is evident in prime matter; therefore neither will the second be repugnant. And hence a new reason arises; for potency and act correspond to each other with proportion in every genus; but it is not repugnant that there be given in natural things a substantial potency which in the genus of substance is an incomplete and imperfect being, as was shown above and is manifest from the composition of man; therefore it will not be repugnant that there be given an act proportioned to this potency, by which it can be actuated in any natural thing whatever and exist and be preserved in a way connatural to itself.

17. It is demonstrated from the material and efficient cause.—And hence the reason taken from the material cause is easily concluded; for, since matter is substantial potency, it contains in its genus and in receptive potency every act proportioned to itself; therefore it is able to cause it in its genus, if from elsewhere it is not repugnant; therefore on this side the material substantial form has a sufficient cause in order that it can be. Again the reason is concluded from the efficient cause; for, if the discussion is of the first cause, there cannot be lacking the power by which it could effect in the universe substantial forms actuating matter, either dependently or independently of it, according to the various grades and perfections of such forms, their non-repugnance being supposed; therefore, since such forms are necessary in the nature of things, they have been effected by such a cause. But if the discussion is of the proximate cause, it is to be seen afterwards which can intervene with respect to each form. Now let it suffice to say that such a cause cannot be lacking if such an effect is necessary for the constitution of natural things; whence, if sometimes this power is lacking to created causes, it pertains to the causality of the first cause to supply also the function of the proximate cause, which, speaking per se, it only does in the rational soul as regards its effecting; for to other forms, from the mode in which they come about, it is not repugnant that they come about from created agents, since they come about with the concurrence of matter, as we shall immediately explain. But whether in such agents there is sufficient power we shall say in treating of the efficient cause.

18. The chief indication of form is its end.—The chief reason, then, is to be taken from the end of the substantial form, which is to constitute and complete the essence of the natural being, which end or effect is absolutely necessary in the nature of things; otherwise there would be nothing in corporeal things complete and perfect in its substantial nature; nor would there be the multitude and variety of substantial species in which most of all consists the wonderful disposition and beauty of this corporeal universe. For this end, then, substantial form is altogether necessary, because, since matter is a very imperfect being, the integral essence of each thing cannot consist in it alone. Next, because matter, in so far as it is the first subject, is one and the same in all natural things; therefore their essence cannot consist in it alone; otherwise all would be of one essence and would differ only accidentally, which is repugnant to the amplitude and beauty of the whole universe, which arises most of all from the variety of species. Which seems to be signified in Genesis 1, in those words: Yielding seed according to its kind, or according to its species. And that repetition is often made, according to their species and in their kind, and finally it is concluded: God saw all things that he had made, and they were very good, because surely the complete goodness of the whole universe arises from that variety. Which also the various powers and operations of things and the mutual generations and corruptions sufficiently show, as has been declared. Something, therefore, besides matter must be added to it by which the essence of each thing is completed; but, since matter is potency, that which is added to it to complete the essence will be act, because potency expresses an essential order to act.

19. But that act which is adjoined to matter to complete the essence of the thing cannot be an accidental act. First indeed, because from act and potency of diverse orders an essence truly and per se one is not completed; but the essence of a natural and substantial thing must be truly and per se one; otherwise it would not be one substance. Secondly, because, since matter is substantial potency, it is not filled by accidental act; therefore with it it cannot complete the true essence of a natural thing. Thirdly, because, if such an act is accidental, I ask to what it happens. For either it happens to the composite of that act and potency as such, and this is repugnant, because, since that composite intrinsically consists of such form, it cannot happen to it; in which way too whiteness is not an accident of the white as white, but of the white subject. Or it happens to matter or the substantial subject, and so I ask again why it is said to happen to it. Either because matter can be with such act and also without it. And this is not enough; otherwise the rational soul too would be an accident of the body; this, therefore, can be common to substantial act as well as to accidental. Or it is because such form depends on matter in its being, and this too is not enough, because even parts of substance can depend on other parts, and matter itself depends in its way on form; there are, therefore, various modes of dependence, and it is not repugnant to some incomplete substance to depend on a subject of the same order. Or finally it is called accident because in its being it has an entity so imperfect and diminished that it is of an inferior order than the whole breadth of substance. And this first of all is said gratuitously and without foundation; for whence is it evident that that act of matter, to which it is primarily and per se ordered and which with it completes the essence of the natural thing, is so diminished and incomplete an entity? Next it is repugnant to the end of such form, because, as I said, one substantial essence cannot be composed of a substantial subject and an accidental form, especially since the form is that which gives the ultimate grade and complement of the essence. On account of which Aristotle rightly said, Physics I, c. 6, that substance is not composed of non-substances; but it is evident that natural things and their essences are substantial and per se one; the philosophical dogma of substantial forms, therefore, is most certain.

The arguments are solved

20. Of the reasons for doubting posited at the beginning, the first two remain solved from what has been said. For to the first it is denied that sufficient indications and effects are lacking in natural things, through which one can sufficiently arrive at the knowledge of substantial forms, and it is consequently denied that all actions or transmutations can be saved without substantial forms. To the second it is denied that it is repugnant that some form be subsisting and informing, either in diverse states or even in the same, as we shall declare more fully below in treating of subsistence. It is also denied that it is repugnant to be a form dependent on a subject and to be substantial, as was said a little before; but how this dependence differs from the inherence of an accident we shall say in the following disputation. But in the third argument a special difficulty is sought, which it is necessary to treat in the following section.

1. The reason of the difficulty.—The reason for doubting was touched upon in the preceding section; for the substantial form is a thing distinct from matter; either, then, that thing is something before generation, or nothing; if it is something, then it is a substantial form before it comes about; for that thing is indivisible and essentially is a substantial form; that thing, therefore, cannot be something before generation without being a substantial form; but this is impossible, both because otherwise there would be no substantial generation, and also because otherwise repugnant forms would be in matter at the same time. But if the other part is chosen, namely that the form before generation is nothing, it follows that the form comes about from nothing, which is repugnant to the axiom of the philosophers: From nothing nothing comes. Nor does he satisfy who answers that the form does not come about, but the composite; and the composite comes about from matter, and therefore there is nothing which comes about from nothing; this (I say) does not satisfy, because it consists more in words and in the mode of speaking than in the thing, for the form truly before was not and afterwards is; therefore it has been made. Likewise, because the composite does not come about except in so far as it is composed of matter and form; but it is not composed except of beings made. Likewise, because, when the whole is corrupted, the form truly ceases to be and passes into nothing; for what before was something afterwards is nothing; therefore, when the whole begins to be, the form too comes about.

2. The view of the ancient philosophers is rejected.—On account of this difficulty the ancient philosophers denied substantial forms and thought that all things come about through the change of accidents alone. Whose opinion has already been disproved from the demonstration of substantial form and of generation and corruption; but now we add that they did not solve the difficulty by denying substantial forms unless they also deny accidental ones which truly and really come about anew, and consequently say that there is no change in things except perhaps local, but that things seem to be transmuted because those which appeared are hidden and those which were hidden appear, which, how absurd it is, is clear. The assumption is evident, because the same difficulty can be objected of the accidental form; for that form too, when it is, has its reality and entity. Either, then, before it comes about it was something, or nothing. If something, then it does not come about; if nothing, then it comes about from nothing. Whence Anaxagoras, as we saw above, conceded that all the forms of things are actually in the atoms, from whose various concourse he composed all things; but that view has been sufficiently refuted above.

The first opinion is proposed and explained in various ways

3. Albert the Great is extricated from this opinion.—The ancient philosophers, then, being omitted, among the later ones there are various opinions on this matter. The first is that all forms are actually in matter, not indeed integral and perfect, because they see that this takes away true generation and corruption of things and involves a manifest repugnance, since the forms themselves fight among themselves, and since the reason is the same of accidental ones, which are sometimes properly contrary. But they say that the forms are actually in matter according to certain inchoations of them. This opinion Soto, Physics I, q. 7, attributes to Albert, in the same place, tract. III, c. 3; but Soncinas, Metaphysics VII, q. 28, denies that Albert is of this opinion. And in truth Albert only says that in matter, which is the subject of forms, there is a confused habit of the same forms; but this habit he declares to be nothing else than the habitual potency by which matter encloses forms in itself; but he indicates that that confused habit is something distinct from the nature of matter, by reason of which the form is said to pre-exist in matter: Nor do I intend (he says) to say that part of the form is from within and part from without, but the whole is from within and the whole is from without. Which declaring, he indicates that the form is from within, that is, pre-exists in matter according to the being of essence, and therefore he says that the agent does not act to produce the essence of the form, but its being; and in this sense he had said that the whole form is from without, that is, comes about from the efficient as regards the being of existence. All which, although they are said most obscurely, can be drawn to a right sense if by the being of essence we understand only being in potency, which does not come about from the natural agent, but is supposed in matter. Whence the same Albert, Metaphysics V, tract. II, c. 12, says that the whole form is from within according to potential being and from without according to actual being; in Physics VIII too, c. 4, he calls the potency to form the inchoation of the form. Rightly, therefore, by that confused habit we understand the very potentiality of matter, which Albert himself calls habitual power. He only seems to distinguish the potency of matter from matter, which pertains to another question treated above, and could sufficiently probably be expounded of a distinction of reason and not of thing; for in the same place he distinguishes in the same way in the genus the nature of the genus from the power by which it contains the differences.

4. Another opinion is reported by Durandus, In II, dist. 18, q. 2, which posited in matter certain possibilities of forms, which do not remain when the forms are produced, but are converted into them; and so it saved that forms do not come about from nothing, but from those possibilities. But Durandus does not report any author of this opinion, and therefore we cannot certainly affirm its sense; yet it can scarcely be believed that those authors understood by that possibility some true thing distinct from matter and form, but only the possible essence of the form, which others call in objective potency; although, if this opinion wished only this, it brought forward nothing peculiar by which it would explain that the form is not created; for even things which are created come about from such possibility. Finally Soto reports another opinion of Aureolus, In II, dist. 18, that the form pre-exists in matter according to a part, from which it is perfected through the action of the agent, and therefore does not come about from nothing; but neither does Capreolus report that opinion from Aureolus, nor could I find it in any other author.

5. In whatever sense, then, it is asserted that there precedes in matter some thing distinct from matter itself in order that from it the form may be produced, it is improbable and serves nothing for unravelling the difficulty in which we are occupied. The first is evident, because it cannot be understood what or of what kind that entity is, because either it is substance or accident; this latter is not said by those authors, nor can it be said, both because an accident is not an intrinsic inchoation of the substantial form, but at most can be a disposition; and also because on account of a pre-existing accident it is not avoided that the whole reality of the form come about from nothing of itself, because the accident is not anything of the form itself. But if the second is said, it will be asked again whether that substance is matter, or form, or composite; it cannot be the composite, as is self-evident; not matter, because it is supposed to be a thing distinct from it; nor form, because this begins to be through generation. It will perhaps be said that it is the form in imperfect being. But against this one urges further, supposing that the discussion is of actual being, by which a thing is a true actual entity outside its causes; for it would be very frivolous to speak only of possible being, because according to that being there is not posited in matter some true thing distinct from it which is outside nothing and is form in imperfect being.

6. Speaking, then, of such a thing having true actual being, although imperfect, I ask how from that thing the form in perfect being comes about, whether through intension or through the transmutation of one into another. Nor besides these modes can another be thought out; for in the former mode the prior entity, which was imperfect, remains, the imperfection being removed by something which is superadded to it; but in the latter mode that imperfect entity is taken away and the perfect succeeds to it, whether through the conversion of one into the other or by whatever other reason; the two modes, therefore, include an immediate contradiction; whence another cannot be thought out which is not reduced to one of them. But the first mode has no likelihood. First, because the substantial form is not intensible and remissible, as I shall show below. Secondly, because otherwise all the substantial forms which can be educed from matter would pre-exist actually in it, in a remiss degree indeed, yet according to some true and actual entity, and so there would be at the same time in matter infinite actual entities, for forms can be multiplied to infinity. But this is plainly absurd, both on account of the infinity of entities, and also because matter of itself does not have such forms congenital as it were emanating from its proper entity; nor is there any agent by which they were made; nor are they due to matter itself, so that we might feign that God infused or concreated them. Thirdly, because, even those imperfect entities being posited, the same difficulty remains, how that degree or part of entity comes about which is added to the preceding, because it altogether begins to be, since before it was nothing; for in forms which are intensified the second degree does not properly come about from the first, except perhaps as from the term from which; in which way the posterior degree rather comes about from the remission or limitation of the prior, which is the privation of the further degree, than from the positive entity itself of the prior degree; therefore that one degree is supposed does not take away that the second before is nothing until through the action of the agent it receives being; therefore of that degree the same difficulty remains, how it does not come about from nothing. Finally, according to that opinion true substantial generation and corruption is taken away, because there will only be a certain intension or remission of forms.

7. Nor are reasons equally efficacious lacking against the latter mode; for first it follows from it that infinite entities are supposed in matter; for it cannot be feigned that one and the same is the inchoation of all forms; for, if, when one form comes about, its inchoation is taken away and destroyed, the others remaining, and so in all it can happen in turn and mutually, it is necessary that all those entities be distinct among themselves. Secondly, because, if the perfect form comes about from the inchoate through transmutation or conversion, then the one only comes about from the other as from the term from which; therefore the whole entity of the form comes about, which before was nothing in act; for on account of the pre-existing inchoation it cannot be said to have pre-existed in act, since they are distinct things, of which one perishes when the other begins; therefore that imperfect entity is irrelevant to the form's not coming about from nothing; for that inchoation too is not something, that is, some part or some degree of that form which comes about. But if a relationship to a positive term from which is necessary or suffices in order that a thing not come about from nothing, for this too that inchoation is not necessary, because the contrary or repugnant form suffices, which is always expelled when another is introduced, because the generation of one is the corruption of another. Thirdly, it can be asked whether that imperfect entity which is cast off and the perfect form which is introduced are of the same essential species or distinct. For, if they are distinct, then each is perfect in its species; and if one casts off the other, they will be repugnant among themselves; therefore to posit those inchoations is nothing other than to multiply forms in matter without utility; for in order that one form come about from a repugnant term, one contrary or incompossible form suffices, which is always supposed. But if those entities are of the same species, no reason can be given why one casts off the other or why one comes about in a subject in which another actually pre-existed.

8. What difference Aristotle posited between the matters of diverse artefacts.—But you will object Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, text 21, saying that in matter there is some part of the thing to be made, and constituting in this the difference between artificial and natural things, that in artificial things only matter apt to obey the artificer is supposed, but in natural things there is in matter something of the form to be introduced. And it is confirmed, because otherwise the generation of a complete substance would not be more natural than the effecting of an artificial thing in its matter. The answer is that Aristotle calls the very aptitude of matter to form a part of the thing to be effected. So St. Thomas and Alexander of Hales expound, and it could be understood of a part not of the form itself but of the whole composite. But the proper sense is that Aristotle does not call matter itself the part, but some active power which is sometimes conjoined to matter and cooperates in the generation or effecting of the thing. For Aristotle there doubts why the things which come about by art sometimes come about also by chance and without art, as health, but sometimes it does not happen that they come about without art, as a house; and he answers that the reason is that sometimes in the matter from which or about which art operates there precedes some part which can be a principle of moving or operating about that matter, as in health animal heat precedes, which it happens can be excited or helped from elsewhere besides art, and so without it and by a certain chance effect health. But sometimes in the matter of art there is no active part, as in stones and timbers, and therefore a house cannot be effected from them without art. Aristotle, then, does not speak of the inchoation of forms, as St. Thomas and Scotus rightly noted, but of the power which is sometimes in matter for beginning action. And this exposition too the Commentator and Alexander of Aphrodisias handed down. Whence it is false and altogether beside the letter of Aristotle that there a difference is constituted between artificial and natural things; for it is only constituted among artificial things themselves, and rather, text 31, Aristotle indicates that the same happens in natural things, as St. Thomas noted; for sometimes the patient from which a natural thing is generated is in passive potency alone, and then nothing can be generated from it except by an extrinsic natural agent; but sometimes it has adjoined an active seminal power, which is as it were a part of it, as is evident in seed or in a grain of wheat, and then it happens that the effect comes about without another extrinsic agent. To the confirmation the answer is that generation is natural on the side of natural passive potency, and consequently also on the side of the natural active potency which corresponds to the passive; but to artificial things as such there is not so much natural passive potency as obediential, to which there corresponds not natural active potency, but rational or ideal, which we shall declare a little below.

Not all substantial forms are created

9. Plato and Avicenna are vindicated from error.—The second opinion was of others who, overcome by the difficulty touched upon, said that all substantial forms come about through creation. Which opinion Albert reports, In II, dist. 18, a. 12, and some attribute it to Plato in the Phaedo, because he said that forms are induced into matter by separated ideas, and to Avicenna, Sufficientia I, c. 10, and Metaphysics IX, c. 4, who said that the same forms are induced by a separated intelligence, which he said was the tenth after the nine which preside over the nine heavenly bodies, and presides over the sublunary world. But these two philosophers, although perhaps they erred about the effective principle of substantial forms (of which we are going to speak afterwards about the efficient cause), nevertheless it is not established that they erred about the mode of effecting these forms; nor does Aristotle attack Plato on this title, but because he introduced separated ideas without cause, since things of this kind can be generated by things similar to themselves. Which reason urges more against Avicenna; for Plato perhaps did not posit ideas outside the divine mind, and said that forms are induced by them as by a universal principle, which does not exclude proximate agents; but Avicenna indeed erred in attributing to the superior intelligences the creation of the inferior ones, and to the lowest the introduction of substantial forms; yet it is not established that he said that all inferior forms come about through creation. Whence Soncinas, Metaphysics VII, q. 29, judges that his opinion can probably be defended; of which we shall speak in the cited place on the efficient cause, and again below in treating of created intelligences. But whosever that opinion was, understood universally it is improbable; for of the rational soul it is true and Catholic, but of the others it is false, because otherwise all substantial forms would be subsisting and independent of matter in becoming, and consequently also in being, which is most absurd; otherwise all the souls of brutes would be immortal. The sequel is evident, because creation both is of subsisting things and does not depend on a material cause, as we shall say below. Secondly, the reason indicated above urges against this opinion, because, if substantial forms are created on account of the said cause, it is necessary that accidental ones too be created, because the accidental form too comes about from nothing of itself and does not actually pre-exist in the subject, neither according to its whole self nor according to a part. But if this is conceded, it further follows that, just as the introduction of substantial forms on that account is not from natural agents, so neither is the effecting of accidental ones. And so it finally follows that natural agents act nothing at all, which we shall show below is most absurd.

Resolution of the question

10. The first assertion, about the rational soul.—The true and Peripatetic opinion, then, is that among substantial forms some are spiritual and substantial and independent of matter, although they truly inform it; but others are material and so inhering in matter that they depend on it in being and becoming. Of the former order are human souls alone (for we are treating only of informing forms), and of them the consequent inferred in the difficulty touched upon is to be conceded, namely that they come about from nothing through true creation, which is to be shown more fully in its proper place; now let it suffice to say that this necessarily follows from the principle posited, supposing that these souls do not pre-exist before they are united to bodies, which is certain from faith and from that principle that they are true forms of the body. Indeed, even if they pre-existed, they could not exist except through creation, because they are not beings necessary of themselves and having being from their quiddity, as we shall demonstrate universally below, partly in the disputation on the efficient cause, partly in demonstrating that there is only one uncreated being. But if the rational soul does not have being except through the efficiency of another, and is feigned to be before the body, in a certain way it is clearer and more evident that it has being through creation, because it has been made from nothing and without the concurrence of a subject or material cause. But I say in a certain way clearer, because now, while the disposition of the body is awaited in order that the soul come about, it can seem not to be so proper a creation, because it comes about with some concurrence of matter. Nevertheless it is true creation, because on the side of the body there is no concurrence per se and in the genus of material cause into the very being or becoming of the rational soul, but it is as it were a certain occasion requiring the creation of that soul, without which occasion neither would it be due to the soul itself to come about, nor would its cause be determined to its effecting. But that the body or matter does not flow per se into the becoming or being of the soul is evident from this, that the rational soul, separated from the body, retains its being; therefore it does not depend on a sustaining subject in its being; therefore neither in becoming, because such is the becoming of a thing as is its being; therefore conversely the subject itself or matter does not have per se influx into the being or becoming of such a soul; for these two are correlatives, or rather the same, the dependence of the effect and the influx of the cause.

11. From nothing nothing comes, an axiom to be limited.—Wherefore that principle, from nothing nothing comes, understood universally of every cause and of every effect, is false and against natural reason, as is shown by this very example of the rational soul, and also by the example of prime matter, as was touched upon above, and we shall bring forward more in what follows. But understood of the power of a finite and natural agent, it is true. Whence, as regards this form, it is to be conceded that there is not in proximate natural agents a power to effect it, but that the proximate agent disposes matter, but a separated intelligence effects the form, not indeed a created intelligence, as Avicenna thought, nor an idea separated and existing outside God, but God himself, who alone, as we shall show below, is the effector of all things which come about through creation.

12. Prime matter is natural potency to the rational soul.—You will say: hence it comes about that prime matter is not in natural potency to the rational soul, which seems inconvenient. The sequel is evident, because to every natural passive potency there corresponds a natural active potency; but there is no natural active potency which can effect this form in matter; therefore neither is there in matter a natural passive potency to it. Some concede the sequel, both on account of the reason made, and also because, if matter were in potency to the rational soul, when this soul comes about it would be said to be educed from the potency of matter. But this opinion does not please; for, if matter were not in natural potency to the rational soul, the generation of man would not be natural, because it would be natural neither from the active principle nor from the passive. Likewise, because matter is naturally disposed ultimately to receiving the rational form, and to matter so disposed according to the order of nature such a form is due; it is therefore in natural potency to it. To the difficulty, then, the answer is by denying the sequel. To the first reason the answer is that natural potency is first and per se to be attended to in order to connatural and proportioned act; but the rational soul is a natural act proportioned to matter, and therefore matter too is natural potency to that act; whence from both there comes about a certain natural being per se one, and matter itself is connaturally preserved under such act. But as regards active potency, first of all there can be given a natural active potency for uniting such an act to such a potency, and in this way a natural active potency now corresponds to the natural passive potency. Next, although this form can be made by God alone, nevertheless God in that action operates according to the mode and order due to the natures of things, and this is enough that he be said to operate after the manner of a natural cause and that a sufficient active power correspond to the passive potency. To the other reason the answer is that it is one thing for matter to contain the form in potency, another to be in potency to the form; for the first indicates power of causing the form, for the cause contains the effect in its genus; but the second indicates only capacity for receiving the form. Matter, then, is in natural potency to receiving the rational soul, yet does not contain it in its potency, since it cannot cause it; and therefore the rational soul is not educed from the potency of matter, because nothing is educed except whence it is contained, and because eduction indicates the causality of matter into the form, as we shall say at once.

13. All substantial forms, the rational excepted, come about from an underlying subject.—Secondly, of all other substantial forms it must be said that they do not properly come about from nothing, but are educed from the potency of the underlying matter; and therefore that in the effecting of these forms nothing comes about against that axiom, from nothing nothing comes, if it is rightly understood. This assertion is taken from Aristotle, Physics I throughout, and Metaphysics VII, and from other authors whom I shall report at once. And it is briefly declared; for to come about from nothing expresses two things: one is to come about absolutely and simply; the other is that such effecting be from nothing. The first is properly said of a subsisting thing, because becoming belongs to that to which being belongs; but that properly is which subsists and has being; for what lies alongside another is rather that by which another is. On this side, then, material substantial forms do not come about from nothing, because properly they do not come about. And this reason St. Thomas gives, I, q. 45, a. 8, and q. 90, a. 2, and it will be more explained from what is to be said. Taking, then, becoming in this propriety and rigour, to come about from nothing is to come about according to its whole self, that is, no part of itself being presupposed from which it comes about. And by this reason natural things, while they come about anew, do not come about from nothing, because they come about from presupposed matter of which they are composed, and so they do not come about according to their whole selves, but according to something of themselves. But the forms of these things, although in truth they receive anew their whole entity, which before they did not have, yet, because they themselves do not come about, as has been said, therefore neither do they come about from nothing. Nevertheless, because, taking the word to come about in a broader way, it cannot be denied that the form has been made in the way in which it now is and before was not, as the reason for doubting posited at the beginning of the section also proves, therefore it must be added that, to come about being taken in this amplitude, to come about from nothing denies not only the relationship of material cause intrinsically composing that which comes about, but also the relationship of material cause per se causing and sustaining the form which comes about, or co-comes-about. For we said above that matter is the cause both of the composite and of the form dependent on it; in order, then, that a thing be said to come about from nothing, each mode of causality must be denied, and in the same sense that axiom is to be taken in order that it be true: from nothing nothing comes, namely that by the power of a natural and finite agent nothing comes about except from a presupposed subject concurring per se both to the composite and to the form, if each in its way comes about from the same agent. From these, then, it is rightly concluded that material substantial forms do not come about from nothing, because they come about from matter, which in its genus concurs per se and flows into the being and becoming of such forms, because, just as they cannot be except affixed to matter by which they are sustained in being, so neither can they come about unless their effecting and penetration is sustained in the same matter. And this is the proper and per se difference between effecting from nothing and from something, on account of which, as we shall show below, the former mode of effecting exceeds the finite power of natural agents, but not the latter.

14. What it is to be educed from the potency of matter is explained in various ways.—First.—From these it is also evident that it is properly said of these forms that they are not created but educed from the potency of matter, and what it is to be educed from the potency of matter; in explaining which many labour, both on Physics I and on Metaphysics VII. But St. Thomas briefly declared each, I, q. 90, a. 2, ad 2. For, since those forms do not come about from nothing, they are not created, because to be created is to come about from nothing. But since those forms are contained in the potency of matter, and through the action of the agent come about as it were outside that potency—not that they exist outside matter and do not actuate and adhere to its potency, but that, whereas before they were only contained in potency and in the cause, afterwards they are in act and outside the cause—and so from potential being matter, in which they were contained, they are educed into act by the power of the agent, the same matter concurring. You will say: then by the same reason things will be said to be educed from the potency of the agent, because in it too they were contained by power and potency, and from this being in potency they are educed into act through the action of the agent itself. The answer is by absolutely denying the sequel, because those words in all propriety signify the relationship of material cause and not of efficient. And so both the efficient and matter can be said to contain the effect, yet in a diverse way; for the agent contains eminently or virtually, but matter only in receptive or passive potency; when, therefore, the form is said to be educed from the potency of matter, this relationship of material cause is peculiarly denoted; but the agent is properly said by its power to educe the effect from potency into act.

15. Secondly.—Otherwise too it is wont to be explained what it is for the form to be educed from the potency of matter, namely, that it is to come about in matter with dependence on it in being and becoming, which belongs to all substantial forms except the rational. Which explanation differs from the preceding in words only; for (as I was saying above) for matter to contain in its potency imports on the side of matter causality or power of causing in its genus; for the form, then, to be drawn or to come about outside the potency of matter in which it is contained is nothing other than to come about in act in matter, matter itself concurring in its genus through its potency to the becoming and being of such form; but this very thing is for the form to come about with dependence on matter in becoming and in being; and it is only a diverse mode of explaining through the relationship of effect to cause, or conversely through the relationship of cause to effect. Another explanation too occurs, which, although it does not contain a thing diverse from the preceding, nevertheless declares it more and is apt for explaining some difficulties arising. For the form, then, to be educed from the potency of matter is to come about by the same action by which the composite comes about from preceding matter, which through that action does not come about; which exposition St. Thomas seems to have intended when he said that the form is not created but educed, because it is not that which is per se produced, but the composite, while the form is co-produced from the underlying matter. And by induction it is evident that it so comes about in all forms which are educed from the potency of matter. But the reason can be given, because eduction consists in this, that it is an action or change per se and essentially depending on matter; but through this action the form at the same time comes about and is united to matter; and therefore through the same the composite comes about per se primarily and such form is co-produced, and comes about in act outside the potency of matter; therefore the eduction of the form from the potency of matter is excellently declared through that action.

Corollaries from the preceding resolution

16. The rational soul is not educed from the potency of matter.—And hence it is understood, first, more fully what we were saying above, that the rational form is not educed from the potency of matter, because neither is it contained in its potency so as to be educed outside it, nor does it come about or exist dependently on matter, nor does it come about by the same action by which the composite comes about, or by which it itself is united to matter; for first, at least in nature, it comes about in itself and receives its being independent of matter, and afterwards by another action it is united, by which the whole composite is generated.

17. Whether the heavenly forms are educed from the potency of matter.—Secondly, another difficulty which occurred here is dispatched from what has been said, about the heavenly forms, namely whether they can be said to be educed from the potency of matter; for according to the prior interpretations it seemed that it must be so affirmed; for those forms depend in becoming and being on their matter; therefore they are educed from its potency; for, if they depend in becoming and in being, then they are caused by matter; therefore they are contained in its potency; therefore, when they actually come about, they are educed from its potency. Nor is it enough to answer that those forms do not come about, but co-come-about with the composites, because the forms of generable things too do not come about, but co-come-about, and nevertheless are said to be educed on account of the said dependence and containment. But it must be said with the common opinion that those forms are truly not educed, because where there is not the generation of the whole composite neither can there be the eduction of the form. But the reason a priori is that, as was touched upon above, there is a single action by which the heaven according to its whole self is produced, and not only the form but also the matter comes about, which action is the integral and perfect creation of the whole and the concreation of matter and form, and therefore there is there no eduction from the potency of matter. When, therefore, a form is said to be educed which depends in becoming and being on matter, it is understood when to the form itself, or to the formal being which is communicated through it, there tends a proper becoming and a proper action, which so presupposes matter that through it matter does not come about. And similarly, when a form is said to be educed from the potency of matter because it was contained in its potency, matter is supposed existing in potency to the form before it actually has it; but the matter of the heaven, although it is potency to its form, postulates from its nature that it not be in potency to it, because this being in potency includes privation.

1. This difficulty arises from the preceding resolution, and its knowledge is necessary for comprehending more fully the origin or eduction of a form of this kind. And the difficulty is best explained in the forms of the elements, under which this matter of generable things was created when it was first produced, of which it is asked whether they were educed from the potency of matter. For to some it seems that the judgement is the same of these forms and of the heavenly forms, because the elements too were not then generated but created; therefore their forms were not educed but concreated. Likewise, because matter was never in potency to those forms, because it was always actually under them; therefore they were not educed, because, as we were saying, eduction from the propriety of the word expresses a relationship to a subject which was before in potency. Likewise, in that beginning by the same action by which the earth was created its matter and form were concreated together; therefore there there is not eduction. Thirdly, when an angel or a soul is created, its powers are not educed from the capacity of the subject, because they are concreated; therefore much less will substantial forms be said to be educed, which are concreated with any matter whatever. Fourthly, when an angel is created, subsistence or personality is not educed from the potency of the nature, although it is concreated; therefore similarly, etc. And so by these reasons it seems to be concluded that for eduction it is necessary that matter precede the form in time.

2. But from elsewhere the reason seems to be very unlike of the forms of the elements and of the heavenly bodies; for the latter are such that by their nature they postulate to come about by the same action by which the matter comes about, but the former not at all, but rather suppose matter created by a proper and distinct action, and by another are induced into it, even in their first condition; therefore that action by which the form is induced can only be true eduction. The antecedent is proved, for that action by which the elemental matter was created is such that until now the same perseveres in preserving matter itself; but the action terminated at the form or composite ceased when that composite was corrupted; therefore it is a sign that those actions are diverse from the nature of the thing. Nor can it be said that those were partial actions composing one; otherwise it would have to be said that even now one action is composed of the conservation of matter and the eduction of form or generation. For, if it was one composite action by which this part of earth was created, and afterwards this earth is corrupted and converted into grass, the action ceases as regards that part through which the form of earth is preserved in that matter, and in its place another succeeds, by which¹ the form of grass is induced into the same matter; but the action terminated at the entity of matter always remains the same; therefore, if that of itself is partial and composes one complete action with the action inductive or conservative of the first form, by the same reason it composes one action with that through which the second form is induced which succeeds to the prior. The consequence is proved, because the reason, proportion, conjunction and aptitude between these actions is altogether the same as between those; and also because otherwise that conservative action of matter would be of itself partial and apt to compose one total action, and yet now it would perpetually remain incomplete and without due composition. The consequent too seems plainly false, because the action by which matter comes about is true creation, and the same persevering is that by which it is preserved; but from creation and generation one action is not composed; they are, therefore, two actions and not two parts of the same action; therefore also in the first condition of things these actions distinct among themselves intervened, although conjoined in time. According to this discourse, then, it is plainly concluded that for true eduction it is not necessary that matter precede in time; for of those two actions that which is posterior in nature has the true notion of eduction; for it depends essentially on matter, which through it does not come about, but is supposed created. And it is confirmed, for, if we feign that God produced that matter first formless and after some time induced the form into it, no one would deny that it was true eduction; but, although this posterior action is conjoined in the same instant with the prior, it is of the same notion; therefore it is true eduction.

3. You will say: by a similar argument it would be proved that the form of the heaven is educed from the potency of matter, because, if God had first in time created that matter without form and afterwards induced the form into it, then he would educe it from the potency of matter. The answer is by denying the sequel, and to the proof the assumption is denied, because even then the heaven could not be said to have been made through generation, and consequently neither its form made through eduction, because that action from its nature does not suppose matter made; but that in that miraculous case it supposes it is per accidens and does not change the nature of the action. And perhaps that action by which matter would come about or be preserved without form or under another distinct form would not be of the same notion with that by which it comes about under its proper form. And therefore in the said case, when the form of the heaven were induced into pre-existing matter, the prior action by which it was preserved bare would cease, and there would begin a new action by which thenceforth the whole heaven would receive being, which in the thing would be true and total creation, although perhaps it would not be so named on account of the pre-existing matter. But if anyone contends (which is probable) that God preserves that matter by the same action by which before he preserved it, and induces the form of the heaven by another total action altogether distinct, in that case (if it is possible) we shall confess that that posterior action is the eduction of the form of the heaven, and consequently that the heaven is generable in a miraculous and extraordinary way; we deny, however, that the form of the heaven from its nature comes about through such an action, as the form of an element comes about; but the heaven now has been made in a mode proportioned to its nature, and therefore there is not a similar consequence. But that difference between the heaven and the element we gather from the incorruptibility of the one and the corruptibility of the other; for when matter and form are inseparable by their nature, they postulate to come about through one action of itself indivisible, either altogether or at least from the nature of the thing. But when matter of itself is separable from any form whatever divisively, under the same matter the actions inductive of forms can be varied, and therefore the action through which such matter comes about and is preserved is distinct and by its nature presupposed to any action inductive of form whatever.

4. An instance is satisfied.—But someone will say again: granted that these are true, nevertheless the first form concreated with this inferior matter cannot be said to be educed from the potency of matter, because that matter did not precede in time as existing in potency to such form; for it is not enough that it precede in the order of nature; for the matter of the heaven too precedes its form in the order of nature in the genus of material cause. Indeed some add that for the eduction of form it is necessary that dispositions too precede in matter, which cannot be said in the creation of the elements. But this about dispositions seems irrelevant; for remote dispositions are wont to precede in time as it were per accidens on account of the inefficacy of the agent; but if God in one instant transmutes water into wine, those dispositions do not precede in time, and nevertheless that is true generation and true eduction. But the ultimate disposition never precedes in time the introduction of the form; but in the way in which in natural generation it precedes in the order of nature, it preceded also in the first creation of the elements. For in truth that union of form with matter which was then made was made with the same dependence on the ultimate disposition which it now has in any element whatever; therefore with the same causality on the side of the disposition; therefore with the same order of nature, for this is taken from causality. But of prime matter itself this is what we contend, namely that, in order that the form be educed from its potency, it does not seem necessary that matter precede in the order of time under privation, but that it is enough that it precede in the order of nature; in which way it is evident that the creation of the matter of the elements was prior to the induction of the form; for those were two actions, as we have declared, so subordinated that the induction of the form essentially supposes the creation of matter, on which it depends as on an altogether necessary cause.

5. The difference between the matter of the heaven and elemental matter as regards concurrence to the effecting of their forms.—But that this antecedence suffices can be confirmed in many ways. First a priori from what has been said; for that suffices that that induction of the form is an action of the same notion with that which would be posterior in duration, if God first created matter without form and afterwards informed it. For interruption of time alone does not suffice to vary actions essentially; therefore the same antecedence of nature suffices for the eduction of the form. Secondly, from a similar case, because, if in the same instant in which air is created it is illuminated by the sun, that light is educed from the potency of the air; for I suppose that other illuminations come about through eduction, which I shall show below; but the air then would only precede in the order of nature the introduction of the light, as is evident; therefore. The major is evident, because that illumination is a proper and per se action distinct from creation. Thirdly, from the difference between the matter of the heaven and the matter of the element as regards antecedence to form; for there is a twofold difference to be noted, and which pertains most of all to the matter. The former is that the matter of the heaven even in the order of nature does not simply precede the introduction of its proper form, because it has a necessary connection with it, so that without it it cannot be created in a connatural mode; but the matter of fire simply precedes in the order of nature, because it does not have an intrinsic connection with the form of fire, but could be created under others. The latter difference, which declares the preceding, is that the matter of fire is so prior that by virtue of the action through which it is created it could be under the privation of the form of fire. And in this way not only matter, but matter as in potency, is said to be prior in nature, not because in the thing it first has privation annexed, but because by virtue of the action through which it is created it does not lack privation, but another action is necessary by which it is informed, which can have the true notion of eduction; but the matter of the heaven is informed by the same action by which it is created, and, although according to its proper notion of causing it is said to be prior in nature, nevertheless, as existing in potency and in some way under privation, it is in no way said to be prior in nature, and therefore it does not have that priority of nature which is necessary for the eduction of the form. Wherefore I judge it most probable that the reason is far unlike of the first information of the matter of generable things and of heavenly things.

Resolution of the question

6. In this matter I judge it true first of all that in the creation of a corruptible thing, whether an element or any other, those two actions declared above intervene. Which Henry indicated, Quodlibet I, q. 10, citing Augustine, Confessions XIII, c. 33, saying that matter was made from altogether nothing, but the species of the world from formless matter, although there Augustine speaks indifferently of the heavens and the elements. Nor is there reason why this should seem wonderful, since in the conservation of fire or of another similar thing two actions intervene, as that reason sufficiently declares, that, one ceasing, the other perseveres. But according to the doctrine of St. Thomas conservation, speaking per se, is the same action with production; therefore. Indeed in the conservation of man three actions intervene, namely the conservation of matter, and the conservation of the soul, and the conservation of the union or of the whole, which it is rightly gathered are distinct from this, that, this ceasing, the other two remain; and thence too the argument is rightly made that the same three actions intervene in the production of man; therefore the same proportionally holds in others.

7. Next I judge it also true that that action through which the matter of generable things is informed in the first instant of its creation is of the same notion with the action by which it would be informed by the same agent God even if the creation of matter had preceded in time. That reason persuades this, that the interval or concomitance of time matters nothing to varying actions essentially. Likewise, because those actions agree in the formal or total term and in the principles or causes on which they depend; therefore there is no reason for distinguishing them essentially. From which it is further concluded that that action by which this matter is informed, even in the first instant in which it is created, is not creation, speaking in rigour and considering that action precisely. It is proved, because, if that action came about at a posterior time, it would not be creation according to the opinion of all; therefore neither when made then, because it is of the same notion. And the reason a priori is that that action is from matter presupposed in the order of nature. Nor does it stand in the way that the earth is absolutely said to have been created in the beginning, both because shrubs and animals too are said to have been created, although it is certain that the forms of these things were not introduced through rigorous creation; and also because the earth is said to have been created not on account of that union precisely taken, but as conjoined with the action by which the matter of the earth was created; for, because those two actions were made at the same time and after the manner of one, from them the earth is said to have been created. Whence, although by the same word it is said, God created heaven and earth, it is not necessary that the mode of creation or of action which intervenes in the production of each be the same, except as regards that which is common to each, namely to come about from nothing; but as regards the rest each is created according to the mode and capacity of its nature.

8. And hence finally I draw that the question remains only about the name whether the eduction of form from matter has place even if matter does not precede in duration but in nature only, or (what is the same) whether that first effecting of the form of earth is to be called eduction from the potency of matter; for, if by the name of eduction there is signified only the positive notion of that action through which the form comes about dependently in becoming and being on matter which through that action is not created but is supposed created, in truth that is eduction, as the discourse made shows. But if by the name of eduction, besides the said positive and real notion, a negation or extrinsic denomination is connoted, namely that with that action the subject itself is not produced at the same time, even if it is created through another action, in this way that cannot be called eduction, as is self-evident, but is called concreation in a sense to be declared at once. And the name of eduction seems indeed to be taken more frequently in this latter signification, and therefore one must speak so with many, although one must understand and explain the thing itself with few. And according to this form of speaking the reasons made for the former opinion are easily reconciled and conceded; yet, lest they seem to proceed against the thing declared by us, it will be necessary to touch upon their solutions.

Solutions of the arguments

9. And the first indeed, which is taken from the heavenly forms, has already been dispatched, and the difference constituted between incorruptible and corruptible bodies. But the second, which is taken from the propriety of the word to educe, is also admitted by us if it looks only to the mode of speaking and to extrinsic connotation; but if to the thing and positive action, then we deny that it is of the notion of eduction that the subject precede first in time; for priority of nature suffices, as it has been declared by us. The third reason relied on the name of concreation, in which it is to be observed that something is said to be concreated with another in two ways: in one way, because by the same action by which something is created it itself comes about, in which way the matter and form of the heaven are concreated with the heaven, and when the form is so concreated it is not educed, as was declared in the form of the heaven. In another way that is said to be concreated which comes about at the same time with the thing which is created, although it does not come about by the same action, as grace is said to be concreated with the angels, and in this way too the form of earth is said to be concreated with matter, and what is so concreated can come about through an action which in the thing is of the same notion with eduction, although on account of the concomitance of the creation of the subject it is not called by that name. And hence too the solution is evident to the fourth reason, which was taken from the concreation of the powers in the substance of the soul or of the angel. But in that last reason a special difficulty is sought, which could have been treated here in the fourth place, of the eduction of the accidental form from the potency of the subject; yet, because we are going to institute the following disputation on the accidental form, we shall explain this difficulty more conveniently there.

10. Whether substantial modes are educed from the potency of matter.—But the fifth reason seeks another difficulty about substantial modes, namely whether they are to be said to be educed from the potency of the subject, as, for example, subsistence from the potency or capacity of the nature which it terminates; and the same holds of the mode of union of the form with respect to the potency of the form itself or of the subject; indeed even of substantial generation itself it can be asked whether it is educed from the potency of matter. Of all which it must briefly be said that in them there is a certain mode or participation of eduction, yet it does not belong to them so properly as to the substantial form; for subsistence does not come about through a proper action, and moreover does not properly inform, and consequently is not compared to the nature as to a subject and proper material cause, wherefore on this side it is not properly said to be educed; but in this it imitates eduction, that in its being and becoming, whatever that is, it altogether depends on the nature which it per se terminates and in its way actuates, as we shall declare more fully below in treating of subsistence. Substantial generation likewise does not so much come about as it is the way through which substance comes about; whence it is not so much educed as it is eduction itself; yet in the way in which generation itself comes about while through it the term comes about, it too is educed from the potency of matter, by which it is materially caused, as was said above, and on which it essentially depends in becoming and in being, which two in generation are the same. Finally the judgement is the same of the union of form with matter, which nevertheless is not per se educed, but the form is educed as united to matter, and so also (so to speak) the union itself is co-educed. Which indeed seems rightly said in material forms.

11. Whether the union of the rational soul is educed from the potency of matter or of the soul itself.—But in the rational soul it has a peculiar difficulty, because on the one side that union seems to be educed, because it comes about per se through a proper action distinct from that by which the form comes about; but I say that the union comes about per se as the formal term, for the adequate one is man; but that is enough for proper eduction, because, as we shall say at once, a form is never per se the term of action except formal and as that by which; that union, therefore, of the soul to the body is properly and per se educed. Likewise, it depends essentially in becoming and in being on the body as on a material cause; therefore it is properly educed. But on the contrary is the fact that that union is a certain spiritual mode; therefore it cannot be educed from the potency of matter more than the soul itself. The consequence is evident, because it is repugnant that a spiritual thing be contained in the potency of matter. But the antecedent is evident, because that mode proximately affects the soul itself, which it unites to matter; it is therefore proportioned and consequently spiritual, as the soul itself is. And it is confirmed, because, if the form is not contained in the potency of matter, neither can the union be contained, because the union is nothing but a mode of the form; therefore, if the form is not educed, neither can the union be educed. To this it must be said that this mode of union is as it were a certain medium or bond between form and matter, and therefore attains and in some way affects each, and therefore depends on each in becoming and in being. Whence it comes about that this mode of the rational soul, although in its entity it is spiritual, nevertheless participates the conditions of a material thing, because it both altogether depends on matter and in its way is co-extended, although on the side of the soul it does not have extension. For this cause, then, that mode can be educed from the potency of matter, although not adequately nor primarily from that alone; for it is educed also from the potency of the soul itself, which it per se primarily affects and unites to matter.

1. This difficulty arises from the foregoing and conduces to explaining them more fully. For, since it has been said that eduction is an action by which the form so comes about in matter dependently on it that through that action matter itself does not come about, thence it seems to follow that through such an action the form alone comes about per se primarily, which is repugnant to Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, texts 26 and 27, and Book VIII, text 4. The sequel is evident, because through that action the form alone according to its whole self is educed from non-being to being, but the whole does not come about except in so far as it coalesces from parts already made; therefore the form is that which comes about, and both prior and more properly. Prior indeed, because, in order that the whole be composed of parts, it is necessary that the parts be supposed having being. But more properly, because that which according to its entity is educed from non-being to being comes about more properly than that which is only composed of things already existing.

2. In this matter the former opinion admits, what the reason made seems to prove, that the form properly and per se comes about; so it is taken from Albert, De Anima II, tract. I, cc. 1 and 3, where he says that among these three, matter, form and composite, the form is properly and primarily being, which Zimara also defends at length, theorem 20. Others distinguish two actions, even in the effecting of material forms: one by which the form comes about, another by which it is united; and of the former they concede that it is terminated per se primarily at the form, although the latter is terminated primarily at the composite. This opinion is taken from Durandus, In II, dist. 1, q. 4, ad ultimum.

Resolution of the question

3. Each opinion, however, is false. And of this latter indeed we shall speak at length below, explaining the various modes of causing of the efficient cause. Now let the reason suffice against it which can easily be gathered from what has been said hitherto; for material forms (for of these alone is the discussion) are not even as regards their entity without the material concurrence of the subject; but the subject does not flow into the form except in so far as it is united to it, as is evident from what was said above of the material cause; therefore such a form cannot come about through any action which is not unitive of the form to the subject; therefore two actions cannot be distinguished there according to the thing, but only according to reason or inadequate concepts, or at most according to parts which are essentially conjoined among themselves, as we shall declare in the said place.

4. The twofold term of action.—But the former opinion is truly repugnant to Aristotle in the places cited, whom the Commentator follows in the same places and Metaphysics XII, comms. 12 and 18, and St. Thomas, in the same places, and I, q. 45, aa. 4 and 8, where in the solution ad 1 he adds that forms do not come about per se but only per accidens, which is to be understood in a sound way, using the word per accidens broadly as it is the same as with another; but more properly this form is said to be co-generated, as the same St. Thomas signifies in that a. 4, and q. 65, a. 4. The same is expressly held by Scotus, Metaphysics VII, q. 10; Antonius Andreae, q. 9; Zimara, theorem 100; Soncinas, Metaphysics VII, q. 23. But the reason is that becoming per se primarily belongs to that to which being belongs, since becoming tends to being; but that properly is which subsists, therefore that properly comes about; but these forms do not subsist, but the composites of them; therefore the action is terminated properly and principally at the composites. It is confirmed, for the action is one, as we suppose; therefore the adequate term too is one; but this cannot be the form, because the composite truly comes about and is not the form; therefore. But for the sake of greater clarity a twofold term is wont to be distinguished, namely as which and as by which, or that which absolutely comes about or by which another comes about. The composite, then, is the term which or as which, because that per se primarily comes about; for that is most of all intended through generation and at it generation is ultimately terminated, and by a like case it is evident in artificial things; for the house is that which per se primarily is built, etc. But the term by which is the form, because it comes about in order that through it the composite be constituted. Whence, because the verb to be educed properly indicates only a relationship to this term by which, therefore the form is properly and simply said to be educed from the potency of matter, but not the composite; but the verb to be generated or to come about expresses a principal relationship to that which is or which comes about, and therefore is said simply of the form and not of the matter.

5. To the argument to the contrary the answer is by denying the sequel, because, speaking of the order of time, the form does not come about before the composite, nor conversely. But speaking of the order of nature, the composite not only comes about first but also absolutely it alone comes about through this action; but the form only co-comes-about. And although we grant that in some genus of cause the form is educed prior in nature as it were in the order of execution, nevertheless absolutely the action is not understood terminated nor that made which is per se primarily intended until it is the whole composite. Nor does it matter that some part of the composite is supposed and not of the form; for it is necessary to distinguish four genera of actions; for one is an action only productive and not unitive, and this is always terminated at a simple thing, and therefore of itself it can be terminated at a partial entity, if it is apt by nature to be produced in this way; and such is the creation of the rational soul, and the same holds of the creation of prime matter, as I think. Another is an action only unitive and not productive of the components, as is the generation of man, and this without controversy is terminated only at the composite as which and at the union as by which. Again, there is another action so productive of some composite that it is at the same time unitive and co-productive of all the components; and of this kind is the creation of the heaven, which it is evident is terminated per se primarily at the composite, but concomitantly at matter and form. Another finally is an action at the same time unitive and co-productive of one component part on the presupposition of the other; and of this kind is the eductive action of which we are now treating, and therefore it is not of its notion that its adequate term so come about anew that no part of it is presupposed to be.

6. And hence it is gathered in passing that this opinion is true not only in substantial but also in accidental forms, even if Scotus above, Antonius Andreae and others indicate the opposite, because from accident and subject there comes about one per accidens, which does not seem able to come about through per se action and causality. But the proposed opinion is true, for Aristotle speaks universally and most of all adduces examples in accidents. And finally in text 32 he teaches this expressly and in particular of accidental forms. For (as he says in the same place) the reason is the same, because much more do accidents not come about per se, but as united to subjects and from them. Nor does it matter that they are beings per accidens, for they have real and true and physical composition, which that action per se includes; and therefore through it the accidental composite comes about per se primarily, for the action itself too is accidental.

1. The description of form in genus.—From what has been said of the existence of substantial form and of the mode in which it comes about, it can easily be understood what it itself is and what mode of causing it has; but we can comprehend each in this brief description: form is a certain simple and incomplete substance which, as the act of matter, constitutes with it the essence of the composite substance. In which description substance is posited in place of genus, in the way in which it is distinguished by the Philosopher into matter, form and composite. And by that particle this form is distinguished from accidental ones, which are not substances; it can also be distinguished from substantial modes; for, although these are reduced to the predicament of substance, they are nevertheless not substances in that propriety; whence neither are they enumerated by Aristotle in that partition, because they are not properly substantial entities, as is the form, which by this reason is called substance. But simple and incomplete is added in order that by the former particle it may be separated from composite substance, but by the latter from separated substances, which sometimes are wont to be called assisting forms, as those which move the heavenly bodies, which in truth do not exercise the function of formal cause but some efficiency; wherefore they are not substantial forms as we are now speaking of them.

2. How the form is said to be the act of a physical body.—The remaining part of the definition distinguishes the form from matter, which too is a simple and incomplete substance, yet as potency; but the form as the primary act of that potency. And therefore Aristotle, De Anima II, defined the soul to be the act of a physical body, etc. Which definition can easily be accommodated to form in common if by the name of act we understand substantial act, as it must be understood, and only say that form is the act of a physical body, taking away the remaining part which separates the soul from the forms of inanimate things. But by physical body we can understand either matter itself, in so far as it is the other part of the natural composite, which, in order that it be informed by the form, is always supposed in the order of nature in its genus of cause affected by quantity and some proximate dispositions, and by that reason can be called a physical body; or we can also understand by physical body the natural being itself which consists of matter and form, whose act the form is said to be as constituting it; in which way Aristotle too defined it to be the act of the living, or that by which we live. Each relationship, then, we have explained in the said part of our description; for the substantial form is so an incomplete substance that it is the act of matter—act (I say) either actually informing or by its nature instituted to inform matter, for words (as they say) in definitions express aptitude, and so the rational soul is comprehended, even if it is separated from the body. And hence it consequently has that with matter it composes the essence of the natural being, which is composite substance; and therefore Aristotle, Physics II, c. 3, says that form is the notion of the essence or quiddity, that is, which completes the essence of the natural composite and distinguishes it essentially and quidditatively from others.

3. And hence the causality of form too has been explained; for, because the form is essentially act, therefore it intrinsically includes a transcendental relationship to that whose act it is and to the actuation which it exercises in it; and therefore the notion of form can scarcely be declared except through the relationship to its causality. In which we can consider those four things which we expect in every cause, namely the formal principle of causing, the condition necessary for causing, the causation itself, and the effect which is caused, all of which are to be explained one by one, as we did in matter, although, the things said there being supposed, they can be dispatched more briefly here.

1. Under this title we can comprehend three things, namely the principle of causing, which is as it were first act, the conditions necessary for so causing, and that causality in second act.

2. As regards the first, it must be said that the principle of causing is nothing other than the entity and nature of the form itself, which causes through itself and its entity, exhibiting (so to speak) its whole self to matter or the composite. For which it does not need another faculty or potency distinct from itself, but through itself is essentially apt for exercising this causality. Whence, just as we were saying above that in matter the principal and the proximate principle of causing are not distinguished, because the receptive potency through which it causes is not its property but itself essentially, so in the form there can be considered as it were a certain potency or aptitude for causing formally, which remains, for example, in the separated soul, even if it does not actually inform, and that aptitude is the proximate principle of causing formally. Yet it is not distinct from the principal, because that aptitude is not a property superadded to the entity of the form, but is its essential notion and specification; for the form is essentially actuating act; but of the essence of such act is aptitude for actuating. Likewise, because from matter and form there comes about one per se because they are not united by the intervention of some property or accident, but immediately through themselves, on account of the proportion and mutual aptitude which they have to each other through their incomplete entities pertaining to the same genus, as is taken from Aristotle, Metaphysics VIII, c. 6, and De Anima II, c. 1, where the Commentator notes it, comm. 7, and other writers on Metaphysics VIII; St. Thomas, Contra Gentiles II, c. 70, and I, q. 76, a. 7; and other theologians, In II, dist. 12, especially Scotus, q. 1, and Durandus, q. 2; therefore, just as in matter no distinct potency is to be feigned which mediates between it and the form, so neither in the form is an aptitude to be thought which is something distinct from the form itself. You will say: how can the form, which in its nature is so distant from matter, be immediately united to it through itself? Which can seem most of all difficult in the rational soul, which is spiritual. I answer, first, that there is not so great a distance that they do not agree in the same genus. Next, that distance does not stand in the way, if there is due proportion; for, as Plato said in the Timaeus, mutual proportion is as it were a bond between things which are proximately and per se united; but this proportion consists in the notion of act and potency and in the natural and essential aptitude and mutual relationship which they have among themselves.

Conditions necessary in order that the form cause

3. Actual existence.—As regards the second, of the conditions necessary for exercising this causality, three conditions seem able to be assigned. The first is the actual existence of the form itself, of which one must judge diversely according to the diverse opinions on the existence of the creature and its distinction from essence. Although in no opinion does existence seem properly to be called a condition necessary for the causality of the form; for, if existence is a thing distinct from essence, it cannot be called a condition of the form for causing, but rather an effect, either in the genus of formal cause, in so far as the form is said to give being, or in the genus of efficient cause, in so far as some say that existence emanates from essence, or, as others will have it, in the genus of material cause, in so far as the form completes the essence, which is the proximate receptacle of existence. But if existence is not distinguished in the thing from actual essence, the existence of the form cannot properly be called a condition necessary for causing; for a required condition, if we speak properly, is distinguished from the very notion of causing; but existence cannot be so distinguished according to that opinion, because the form causes through its actual entity, because it cannot be understood actually to cause except as having its actual entity and outside its causes; therefore as having existence. And this opinion is more to be approved; because, just as the actuality of the form is not a condition distinct from the notion of causing or actuating, so neither is existence, which is intimately included in actuality itself. But whether it is necessary that the existence of the form be previous to its causality, it must be said that it is not necessary that it be previous in the order of duration, because such antecedence is irrelevant; indeed naturally it is not possible, because being is not due to the form until a proximately apt subject postulates it, which being posited, the form, as soon as it is, naturally informs it. Again, neither is it necessary that the existence of the form be so previous in the order of nature that some sign or moment be understood in which it exists and does not inform, because neither is this necessary for priority of nature, nor can it be understood in forms which depend on matter, as is evident from what was said in the preceding section. But antecedence of nature according to some genus of causality can intervene and is necessary; for the causality of the form depends on its entity and existence; whence it is necessary that between the existence and the causality of the form there be an order of nature from which is taken the priority (as they say) from which, not in which. Of which priorities more in what follows.

4. Intimate nearness of the form to matter.—Another necessary condition can be assigned: the presence or intimate nearness of the entity of the form with the entity of matter; which condition is most truly assigned and so necessary that without it, even by the absolute power of God, the form cannot provide its formal effect. For who would understand a substantial form distant in place from the body composing a substance per se one? This composition, then, comes about through intimate union, which is not indeed local presence, but something distinct from it, yet necessarily requires it. Which can be further declared and persuaded from what was said above in a similar case of matter; for as regards this the reason is the same of the form.

5. Dispositions connatural to the form.—A third condition can be assigned: a disposition accommodated on the side of matter, which the form necessarily requires in order that it can confer its formal effect. Which disposition some think is so necessary that even by absolute power the form cannot inform matter lacking every disposition, especially quantity. So Henry, Quodlibet VII, q. 17. Nevertheless, whatever may be the case whether on the side of matter or of quantity it is repugnant that the one be separated from the other, which we cannot treat until the disputation on quantity, nevertheless, if it is once supposed that matter can be preserved by God without quantity, which we judge truer, it will not be repugnant that such matter be preserved by God in that state also informed by substantial form, because there is no so essential connection between the form, as exercising its intrinsic formal effect, and these accidents that it cannot be preserved by God without them. So absolute a necessity, then, does not intervene; but that this condition is necessary in the natural and physical mode experience itself teaches. For hence arises the natural corruption of a thing, through which the form is separated from matter, which begins through the casting off or corruption of the dispositions; therefore it is a sign that dispositions of this kind are at least conditions necessary from the nature of the thing in order that the form inform matter. But whether they are conditions previous to or consequent upon the form in the order of nature is to be sought from what was said in the preceding disputation.

The causality of the form is explained

6. As regards the third, the actual causality of the form itself, what it is is not easy to explain; yet from those things which have been said of matter we can proceed proportionately to declare it. And first of all it seems certain that such causality is something in the nature of things distinct from the nature of the thing from the entity of the form. It is proved, because, just as to act is something in the nature of things, so also to inform, because it is truly really and physically to cause. Again that, whatever it is, is in the thing itself separable from the form; for in the rational soul it is in fact separated and in any substantial form whatever could be separated by the absolute power of God; for it can be preserved outside matter, as quantity has been preserved; for the reason is the same or greater; therefore it is distinguished from the nature of the thing from it.

7. The union of the form to matter is the causality of the form.—A difference to be noted between the causality of the efficient and of the form.—Next it must be said that this causality can be nothing other than the actual union of the form to matter. It is proved, first, from a sufficient enumeration, because it is neither matter, nor form, nor composite; therefore it is the said union; for besides these nothing else can be thought out; and the antecedent as regards all its parts is self-evident. For of the form it has already been proved; and the same reason proves it a fortiori of matter; but the composite is the ultimate effect of this causality, as will be said at once; it is not, therefore, the causation itself. Likewise, the composite includes the entity of matter and of form; but the causality of the form precisely taken cannot include all these. Moreover, the union being posited and any other thing whatever being prescinded, besides those which have been said, the form necessarily exercises its causality; but all the others being posited and the union being taken away, it is impossible that the form exercise its causality; therefore it is a sign that such causality consists in the union. The major is evident, because, if the form is united to matter, it necessarily communicates itself to it through itself, that is, not by effecting another similar thing, but by communicating to it its own perfection and entity and in this way actuating it. And thence too there necessarily arises a composite substantial nature per se one; but in this consists the whole causality of the form and its whole effect, which, the union being taken away, cannot remain, as is self-evident; therefore. Whence in this is to be noted a difference between the union, which we have said is the causality of the form, and action, which we shall say afterwards is the causality of the efficient, that action is so the causality of the agent that the agent, in so far as it is agent, altogether remains outside the effect; because, although through action it communicates itself, yet not by giving itself through itself to the effect, but by conferring on it some similar entity; but the union is so the causality of the form that by means of it it offers itself either to matter or to the composite; for it is an intrinsic cause causing through itself. In which sense it could also be said that the causality of the form embraces in itself the entity of the form, or that this causality is the form itself, not absolutely taken but united. But in this mode of speaking the cause is confused with the causality and the notion of causing as it were in first act with the causation, which is as it were second act; and therefore it is said more formally and more precisely that this causality consists in the union itself.

8. A small doubt.—But a difficulty occurs, for this union happens in a twofold way in diverse substantial forms. For in some it is pure union, that is, without inherence or dependence of the form, as in rational souls; but in others it is union which at the same time is dependence and as it were inherence of the form in matter. The former union, then, cannot be the formal causality of the rational soul, because it is from it effectively; but effective causality is far diverse from formal. The antecedent is evident, because by the very fact that the soul is created by God in a disposed body, at once it itself as it were by a natural impetus unites itself to matter, effecting the union; for, since the soul is naturally inclined to that union and has its proper subject perfectible by it applied, there is no reason why it could not itself as by a natural weight couple itself to the body, as Henry thought, Quodlibet XI, q. 14; and Aureolus, in Capreolus, In IV, dist. 43, q. 2; and Richard there judges it probable, a. 3, q. 2. The latter union likewise cannot be the formal causality with respect to the other forms, because those forms through the union itself are caused by matter and depend on it in their being; therefore the same forms cannot be causes of the same union; therefore the union cannot be the causality of such form; for causality is from that cause whose causality it is, as action is from the agent, and therefore supposes the being of such cause. Nor can it be understood that the same thing or mode is the reason or as it were the way both for the form to be caused and through which the form causes. And it is confirmed, for above, disp. XII, sect. 1, we were saying that the form cannot be the formal cause of generation, because through generation it comes about and is educed from non-being to being; therefore by the same reason it cannot be the cause of the union, and consequently neither can the union be its causality. The consequence is evident, both from parity of reason, and also because generation itself seems to be the same as union, since it has been said that these forms come about and are united by the same action.

9. Whether the rational soul intimately unites itself to the disposed body.—To the former part the answer is that the opinion of Henry which is mentioned there is sufficiently uncertain, as can be seen in Scotus, In IV, dist. 43, q. 3, a. 3; and Capreolus, there, q. 2, a. 3. For perhaps the union of the rational soul and the body comes about either by virtue of the seed and of the dispositions from the generator itself, or, if from this only dispositively, it will come about effectively from God alone, by whom the soul is created. But that it comes about from the soul itself is shown by no sufficient reason; for, although the form by its nature is apt to be united, and therefore is naturally inclined to union, it does not thence follow that it is powerful to unite itself; for these are diverse aptitudes or powers, of which one is not necessarily inferred from the other; as also matter is apt to be united and is in its genus inclined to union, and yet is not powerful to unite itself. For, just as receptive potency and the appetite founded in it are of a diverse notion from active potency and its propensity, so the formal potency (so to speak) or aptitude and the propensity founded in it are of a distinct notion from the active; nor is there any sufficient reason why the latter should be inferred from the former, especially since in all other forms it seems more probable that the union is not effectively from the form. Secondly, even if that opinion is admitted, the consequence is to be denied; for, even if the union to a sufficiently disposed body emanates effectively from the rational soul, it can nevertheless be the formal bond by which the soul is conjoined to matter as act to potency. And nothing is repugnant that the same union be from the soul in a twofold genus of cause, namely effective and formal, or that it be the effect of the soul as efficient and that it be the reason of causing formally the whole composite; for no repugnance is involved in these diverse relationships.

10. The union which is the causality of the form is caused by it and by matter.—Various acceptations of union.—To the latter part the answer is that the same union is caused both by the form and by matter and by the efficient, by each in its genus of cause, because it depends on all of them; and therefore it is not repugnant that the same union, in so far as it is from the form, be as it were the way or reason by means of which the form causes the whole composite; and, in so far as it is from matter, be the reason by means of which the material form depends in its being on matter. For that union is the bond of each, namely of matter and of form, and therefore, when the union is such that it is also inherence, it can at the same time be the way (so to speak) of matter to form and of form to matter. Nor does it matter that the causality of the form must be from the form and therefore must suppose it prior in the order of nature; for, as we touched upon above, this priority is not in which but from which; but it is not repugnant that the same union both be from the form as informing matter and be such a bond of the form with matter that by means of it the form is sustained by matter. And so the same union, in so far as it is from the form, is the medium or reason by means of which the form actuates matter and composes the composite, and in this way is said to be the causality of the form; but, in so far as through it the form adheres to matter and is sustained by it, it is the dependence of the same form on matter. For there is so intrinsic a connection between such a form and the union that they depend on each other mutually by diverse reasons. To the confirmation the answer is that union is sometimes taken for the action, which to take away equivocation is wont to be called uniting; but sometimes and more properly it is taken for the very mode of union or inherence permanent in completed being between matter and form; and sometimes it is taken also for the consequent relation, as is noted more fully on III, q. 2, a. 8. When, therefore, we say that union is the causality of the form, the discussion is not of the relation, as is self-evident; for this, if it is taken as something distinct from the others, is either nothing or something posterior. Nor yet is the discussion of the action, of which the said confirmation proceeds; for we confess that the form, especially that which is educed from the potency of matter, is not properly the formal cause of that action through which it is educed, as we showed in the cited place, because it is its term, whence that action is in some way actively compared to the form itself, and therefore cannot truly and properly be caused by the form itself. We are speaking, then, of the mode of union, of which the reason is far diverse, because it is not compared actively to the form, but is as it were the formal bond between it and matter, and therefore can have dependence on each, as has been declared.

11. Here a difficulty at once occurred, why this mode of union is attributed to the form rather than to matter. But this has been satisfied in Disp. XIII, sect. 6 [recte 9]. Nor does anything occur to be added here.

1. Only two effects can be attributed to the form, namely the composite and matter; for of generation or uniting it has already been said that it cannot properly be its effect. But of the union itself in completed being it is evident from what has been said that it cannot properly be called an effect, except perhaps in the way in which action is called the effect of the agent, in so far as it is from it, although more properly it is called the way to the effect.

The former effect of the form is explained

2. The primary effect of the form is the composite.—As regards the composite, then, it is sufficiently clear from what has been said that it is the proper and primary effect of the form; for it consists intrinsically and essentially of it, and from it has its species and (so to speak) its beauty; for it completes its essential nature and notion, as is evident from the definition of Aristotle handed down above. Likewise matter is the cause of the composite, as was shown above; therefore much more the form, because it confers more to the being of the composite; therefore conversely the composite itself is the effect of the form, for in its being it depends most of all on it.

3. By a single union the form causes both matter and the composite.—But some object: for, if the composite is the proper and primary effect of the form, then the proper causality of the form will be to constitute the composite; but this cannot be true, because the form prior in nature actuates matter before it constitutes the composite; for, since it is essentially the act of matter, it regards matter first, and through it the composite; therefore the composite is not the primary effect of the form, but matter as actuated or as informed; from which effect the composite follows as a posterior effect. I answer that by these words two causalities as two effects of the form are not explained, but only one under diverse relationships. For the union of the form to matter is single, and, that being posited and every other thing or real mode being prescinded, matter remains informed by the form, and the composite results from both, although in the form itself diverse relations can be considered with respect to matter or the composite. Again, that matter is actuated by the form is not an effect distinct from the nature of the thing from the composite, because by matter as informed we do not understand matter alone with some as it were extrinsic denomination; for this concept is either none or is not a concept of some real effect, but of a denomination which the intellect can feign from concomitance or relationship to the form as present; but by matter informed we understand matter as intrinsically affected by the form; matter as informed, therefore, includes both matter itself and the form and the union. But the composite includes these three and nothing else; therefore these are not distinct in the thing; therefore they are not two effects, but one, diversely conceived and declared by us.

4. And it is confirmed and explained by a like case; for in the accidental form it is not one thing to inform the subject and another to compose with it the accidental composite; as in whiteness to whiten the snow and to constitute this white thing as such are the same; therefore the same holds proportionally in the substantial form. They answer that the reason is unlike, because from subject and whiteness there comes about one per accidens, which is not something distinct from the extremes taken together and united; but from matter and form there comes about one per se, which must be something besides those three, even taken together, in order that it can be more one. But this answer supposes a false doctrine; for it is impossible that composite substance in the thing include something besides those three taken together, which I shall show below, disputing of the essence of material substance. Nor can the difference between being per se and per accidens consist in that, but in this, that the union itself and the extremes of the union are all of the same order in a being per se one, but not in a being per accidens. Whence too it comes about that in a being per se one the union is more intimate and arises from a greater proportion of the unitable things among themselves. But that the difference is placed in this alone and not in another can be demonstrated, because both a being per se one, as we are now treating of it, and a being one per accidens are not one by the unity of simplicity, but by the unity of composition or union; therefore the greater unity of the composite being per se consists in a nobler union and a greater proportion of the unitable things, and not in the addition of a third intelligible entity, which, if it is simple and it alone precisely taken is said to be per se one, will not be one by composition, and so will not be that composite which is constituted through the form. But if that third is one intrinsically including matter and form and their union, nothing must be added to these in order that it be per se one; indeed thence this unity would rather be diminished, for more things would be aggregated in that composite without any necessity. The reason made, then, retains its force, that, if in the accidental form for the subject to be actuated and for the accidental composite, for example the white, to be constituted are the same in the thing, also in the substantial form for matter to be actuated and for the composite to be constituted are the same. Nor does unity per se prevent this, but with greater reason postulates it.

5. To the reason to the contrary, then, the sequel is to be conceded, namely that the composite substantial essence is the primary effect of the form in its genus, and consequently that the chief causality of the form is to constitute the same composite, not in any way whatever, for this absolutely said is common to matter, but as perfecting and completing the essence; for matter begins it, but form completes it. But when it is added that the form prior in nature actuates matter before it constitutes the composite, the assumption is denied, because those are not two, but one in the thing, whence there is not causality between them and consequently neither order of nature, but at most there can be an order of reason according to inadequate concepts. Nor does it stand in the way that the form is essentially the act of matter, for it is equally essentially part of the composite; indeed, if a comparison had to be made between these, it is more essentially part of the composite than act of matter, because the form is not for the sake of matter but for the sake of the composite; yet in truth these are not two in the form itself, but one founding two relations. From which the argument is rather retorted; for, just as the form by one and the same aptitude is part of the composite and act of matter, so by the same exhibition it gives its whole self to matter and to the composite, to the latter as to the whole, to the former as to the co-part; therefore also in the effect it is the same and altogether simultaneous that matter be informed by the form and that the composite be constituted; the composite, therefore, is the proper and primary effect of the substantial form, and perhaps the only one in the genus of formal cause; but of this last point one must speak in the following section.

Whether the form is more perfect than the composite

6. But first an objection which occurs must be solved; for the cause must be nobler than the effect, on the testimony of the Commentator, Physics II, comm. 4; but the form is not nobler than the composite; therefore the composite cannot be the proper effect of the form. To this objection some answer by denying the minor; for Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, texts 7 and 8, prefers the form to the composite, saying that it is more being and prior to it. And so the Commentator thinks there, and Zimara absolutely defends it, theorem 10, who also reports Lincolniensis. And he proves it because whatever of perfection is in the composite is in the form alone, and matter adds no perfection; and from elsewhere that whole perfection is in the form as in a cause, and it is that which brings being with it, which does not belong to the composite except by reason of it; therefore it is simply more perfect. But this answer relies on a false foundation; for without doubt the composite is more perfect than its form. Which is the open opinion of Aristotle; for in De Anima II, at the beginning, and wherever he distinguishes substance into matter, form and composite, he prefers the composite to the form and the form to matter; indeed below, treating of substance, we shall show that they are said analogically of them, and so the Commentator explained, De Anima II, comm. 3; and therefore Aristotle said in the predicament of substance that first substance is most of all substance, where, although he compares first to second, he nevertheless also prefers first and complete substance to parts and incomplete substances. Whence the Commentator too, Metaphysics XII, comm. 15, says that the composite is of greater nobility than is matter or form, and Alexander is reported for the same opinion. Which Simplicius too holds, Physics I, text 70, and Physics II, text 4.

7. But the reason is that the composite includes whatever of perfection is in the form, and adds something; therefore it is more perfect. The antecedent is proved by some¹ because the composite includes being, which the form does not include. But this reason is of no moment; for either existence is distinguished in the thing from actual essence or not; if it is not distinguished, just as the composite essence includes its adequate being, so the form its proper being; but if it is distinguished, first that reason has no place in man, because being belongs to the soul before the man. Next, in order that the comparison be rightly made, it must be made between the essence of the form and the essence of the composite precisely, and so that reason does not proceed; or, if the comparison of the form is made to the composite as it includes being, the form too must be taken as including in its way being; for per se primarily it is due to it as to the first root of being itself; which also exists through it, although the denomination of existing simply is attributed to the composite on account of the mode of subsisting. The antecedent, then, is proved, because the composite includes the perfection of the form and moreover includes the perfection of matter. Zimara answers that from matter no perfection is taken, but rather every imperfection. But he is deceived, because, as was shown above, matter has true reality and partial essence; whence it is necessary that it have some perfection in the breadth of being, and greater than accidents. Likewise subsistence is a perfection; but material substance has this most of all by reason of matter. Likewise matter brings with it its partial being, all which will be evident below, treating more fully of subsistence and existence. And applied in this sense the prior reason is efficacious; for the composite has complete being, but the being of the form is incomplete. Finally the union of the form to matter is some perfection; otherwise why would the form naturally desire it? But this perfection the composite includes, but not the form. The said author answers otherwise, that, although the composite formally includes some perfection besides the form, it does not follow that it is more perfect than the form, because all that perfection is from the form and is virtually contained in it. As (he says) God and the world are not something more perfect than God alone. But first of all, at the least, what he asserts will be false, that the form is more perfect than the composite; as God alone is not more perfect than God and the world together. Next it is false that the form contains eminently or virtually the whole perfection of the composite; for it does not have in power the perfection of matter, nor can it in any way supply its causality, especially since it itself depends on matter. Finally the form is for the sake of the composite as for its proper and chief end; but such an end is something more perfect than that which is ordered to the end, Physics II, text 31.

A place of Aristotle from Metaphysics VII is expounded

8. The first exposition.—To Aristotle in Metaphysics VII the answer is that that place is expounded variously. The first exposition is that Aristotle in that text 7 does not speak of the priority of perfection, but of the priority of causality; for so the Philosopher virtually gathers: the form is prior to matter and matter prior to the composite; therefore the form is prior to the composite. But if he spoke of the priority of perfection, the minor would be false; he speaks, therefore, of the priority of causality. So Albert the Great and Scotus, and St. Thomas indicates it. But the exposition does not please. First, because that reason of arguing is not formal, since the genus of cause is changed. Next, because he would conclude better and more briefly that the form is prior to the composite because it is its cause. Thirdly it is proved, because Aristotle does not only say that it is prior, but also that it is more being. It is true that Aristotle in the inference does not repeat that it is more being, but only that it is prior; and therefore Javellus there, q. 4, says that the comparison between form and matter is made in priority and perfection, but between form and composite in priority only. But this is beside the exposition of all; for from the mode of gathering and arguing which the Philosopher uses it is evident either that for the sake of brevity that particle was omitted in the consequent, which was understood from the force of the antecedent, or certainly that under priority the priority of perfection was comprehended. The second exposition is that the form is prior and more perfect not simply but in a certain respect, so that the Philosopher virtually so gathers: the form is prior and more perfect than matter, because the former is act, the latter potency; therefore the form is also more perfect and prior than the composite, at least according to something, namely because the form is simple act not including potentiality; but the composite includes the potentiality of matter. So St. Thomas and Alexander of Hales there; and Soncinas, Metaphysics VII, q. 28. But two things stand in the way of this exposition: one is that on account of an excess in a certain respect Aristotle ought not to have affirmed and gathered it simply, especially since in the antecedent the comparison is absolute, because the form is simply more perfect than matter. The other is that even in a certain respect the composite does not seem less perfect than the form, for to include the potentiality of matter is not an imperfection in the composite in comparison with the informing form, but only in comparison with complete immaterial substance. As for a thing to be simpler is not always greater perfection, even in a certain respect, when such a thing is ordered to composing something one simply more perfect.

9. Wherefore I judge that Aristotle in no way there prefers the form to the composite, but either makes no comparison between them, or rather prefers the composite to the form, which Simplicius noted in the cited place, and is evident from the version of Argyropoulos, which has thus: If the form is prior to matter and more being, that too which is from both will be prior for the same reason. Whence the ancient version deceived the expositors, because in place of the nominative it has the ablative ipso. And as regards the context, this reading too is more consonant with the intention of Aristotle; for he chiefly intends against the ancients to show that matter is not most of all substance, but is less perfect than the others. Whence afterwards, in text 8, he reports the ancients saying that matter is most of all substance; but he himself teaches that it is impossible, and concludes: on account of which the form and that which is from both seem to be substance more than matter. Whence in the prior comparison, when he concludes that the composite is prior for the same reason, formally indeed and immediately the composite seems only to be compared to matter, yet virtually he also prefers it to the form, while he so gathers: the form is prior to matter; therefore also the composite, by the same (I say) reason, namely because it includes the form itself; and consequently it is also prior in perfection and nobility to the form itself, since it is compared to it as whole to part.

10. Not every cause is nobler than its effect.—To the objection posited at the beginning, then, the answer is by simply denying the major; for it is not necessary that every cause be nobler than its effect, but only in some efficient and final cause; but not in the material, as all confess, nor also in the formal, for almost the same cause, namely because these intrinsic causes are so causes that they are also parts, and neither per se gives to the effect its whole entity or perfection, but constitutes it by giving it that which it has of entity; but it, because it arises from many, turns out more perfect than each. Whence it can also be added that the effect does not exceed the cause according to that which it receives from it, but can exceed according to that which it has from another cause. Of which more fully below, Disp. XXVI, sect. 1.

1. Reasons on each side inducing difficulty.—Here we are no longer treating of matter as informed, for of this it was said in the preceding section, but of matter as regards its entity or as regards its being. And the reason for doubting is that the whole entity of matter is supposed to the eduction or introduction of the form; therefore that entity cannot be caused by the form, especially since matter receives being through creation, to which the form cannot cooperate by concausing. But on the contrary is the fact that it is not repugnant that the form be the cause of matter, since causes are causes of one another, Physics II, text 30, and Metaphysics V, text 2. Likewise, because, if the form were not the cause of matter, matter could naturally be without form; because, if there is no causality, there is no reason why there should be dependence.

Opinions are reported

2. About this question there are various opinions, according to the diverse mode of thinking about the being of matter. For those who think that matter of itself has no being of existence say that the form is properly the cause of matter, because that is the cause of a thing which gives being. This opinion seems to be St. Thomas's, I, q. 66, a. 1, and De potentia, q. 4, a. 1, which all the Thomists hold: Capreolus, In II, dist. 13, q. 1; Cajetan, De ente et essentia, c. 5, under q. 9; Ferrariensis, on Contra Gentiles III, c. 4; Soncinas and Javellus, Metaphysics VIII, q. 1. Durandus followed the same, In II, dist. 12, q. 2; and Thomas of Strasbourg, q. 1. But the mode of explaining this formal causality according to the opinion distinguishing really the existence from the actual essence of the creature must here be that the partial entity of the essence of matter is of itself incapable of existence until it is informed by substantial form; but the form itself according to its entity of essence is per se primarily united to matter and with it composes one integral essence; and this is the primary formal effect of the form. From which it further follows that the form communicates the being of existence which it brings with it per se primarily to the composite and by participation to matter, whether that being emanates actively from the form or through resultance, or only formally, which can consist in this alone, that to such a form or to the thing informed through it such being is due by natural necessity, even if it is conferred by the extrinsic cause alone from which the form comes about. And this explanation Cajetan indicated in the said place, nor does it seem able to be more conveniently expounded in the principles of that opinion; for, if existence is an entity distinct from the form, the being of existence itself cannot be the first effect of the form, but the being of essence, which is distinct; for the first effect of the form is essential to the thing, because the form as form is of the essence of the thing; but existence is outside the essence according to this opinion; it does not, therefore, pertain to the first formal effect.

3. Whence according to the principles of this opinion the rational soul in Christ the man has a proper and primary formal effect; for it cannot be deprived of that if it actually informs, and yet according to this opinion it does not have a proper created existence; therefore the form can only give existence formally secondarily, namely because it itself is or constitutes the proper susceptive of substantial existence, or (which comes almost to the same) because to the essence completed through the form substantial being is intrinsically due, and not to another. But this opinion so declared is proved, first, because matter is pure potency; therefore of itself it does not have act, but from the form; therefore, since existence is a certain act, it cannot belong to matter except through the form. Secondly, because existence is a posterior act, if it is compared to essence; therefore it supposes essential act; but this act is the form. Thirdly, because substantial being is complete and perfect being; therefore per se it is due only to a complete and formal nature; therefore it is due only to the form or by reason of the form.

4. But Durandus adds that, even if existence is said not to be distinguished in the thing from essence, it is nevertheless to be asserted that the form is the formal cause of the actual existence of matter; for, although the essence is its existence, that nevertheless must be understood with proportion; for essence in potency will be existence in potency, and actual essence will be actual existence; therefore the form alone will be the actual existence by which it formally is in matter. And from this opinion, explained in either way, it follows that matter naturally depends on the form in its whole entity, so that it cannot remain without it, because it cannot remain without existence; but it does not have existence except from the form and through the form, on which existence itself depends; therefore. Whence too it comes about that, the form being changed, matter changes its existence, although under diverse forms and existences the same essence of matter is preserved. But whether this dependence is so great that it cannot be supplied by God without the form we shall say in the following section.

5. The second opinion, altogether contrary, is that the form does not give being to matter nor is its proper cause. So holds Henry, Quodlibet I, q. 14; and for that opinion Avicenna is cited, Metaphysics VI; and Scotus holds the same, In II, dist. 12, q. 2, at the end; and Gregory there, q. 1, a. 2, ad 1 Aureoli, and q. 2, a. 3. The foundation is that matter has its proper being, which it formally receives from no cause, since it is simple and partial being and co-distinct from the being which the form gives, but has it effectively from God alone, and according to that being matter is supposed to the form absolutely and simply in the order of nature; therefore in no way is that being caused by the form, but is completed or actuated through the form.

6. Who assert, and how, that matter can be naturally without form.—But if against this opinion you infer that matter can naturally be without form, since the form is not its cause, some answer by conceding the sequel, which Marsilius seems to have thought, In II, q. 9, a. 2, when he asserts that in the beginning God created the matter of generable things without any substantial form and after some time formed it. Which also pleases Gabriel, In II, dist. 12, qq. 1 and 2; and seems sometimes to have pleased Augustine, De Genesi contra Manichaeos I, cc. 5 and 7, and Confessions XII, c. 8. But if God did this in the creation of the world, it is to be thought that it is not beyond the natures of things, because, as Augustine notes at the beginning of his exposition of Genesis, God then did not operate as a worker of miracles but as the author of nature. Nor does Henry above seem to dissent from this opinion, when he says that matter according to the common course of nature cannot be stripped of every form, because the corruption of one thing does not come about without the generation of another following. If, then, corruption could naturally come about without the generation of another, as far as depends on the side of matter, it would naturally remain without form. Which Marsilius holds happened in fact in the death of Christ, In III, q. 3, a. 1, and q. 13, a. 1, and Henry judges it probable, Quodlibet I, q. 4, indeed even true as regards this, that there the separation of one form was made without the introduction of another; which nevertheless he thinks was singular and preternatural in Christ, Quodlibet II, q. 2, ad 4. But Scotus thinks it natural in any death of man, especially violent, indeed also of other animals, as is evident In IV, dist. 11, q. 3. These, however, do not say that in that case matter remains without form absolutely, but without specific form and with the form of corporeity which they posit. Others use a distinction: for something is called natural either according to the particular or according to the universal nature; for to water according to its private condition it is not natural to ascend; yet to fill a vacuum this is natural according to the propensity of universal nature. So (they say) to matter according to its private nature it is not repugnant to be preserved without form, if it is deprived of it; but from the due order of universal nature this cannot come about, because, if it is repugnant that a vacuum be given in local space, much more in the capacity and potency of matter. Others finally say that even according to the particular condition of its nature matter cannot be without form, although the form is not its proper cause, unless every condition necessary for existing is called a cause. And this mode of speaking seems to approach more nearly to the truth.

Resolution of the question

7. I say, then, first: the form is not the proper cause of matter, giving formally the proper being by which matter exists. It is proved, because the form does not give to matter that partial essential entity which it has in itself, as was shown above, and which it retains under all forms; but that entity includes its partial¹ existence distinct from every existence proceeding formally from the form; therefore. The major is evident, both because that entity of matter, as regards its proper partial being of essence, is simple and co-distinct from the form; and also because it is supposed to the form, and remains unvaried as regards that being under any form whatever; whence too the authors of the first opinion say that the form constitutes with matter one complete essence, but does not give its proper essential being to matter, which it rather supposes; therefore the form cannot be the formal, proper and intrinsic cause of that being of matter. But I say proper and intrinsic, because extrinsically after the manner of a term this being of matter can be said to be taken from the form, because the essence of matter consists in aptitude to form, but this respect is not to the form as actually informing, but in aptitude. Whence the same specification would remain in matter even if it were without form. But the minor is proved, because the real being of essence, if it is actual, that is, outside its efficient cause, is intrinsically the being of existence, as will be proved at length below in treating of being and essence; but matter, as it is supposed to the form according to the proper being of partial essence, has actual being, as it is distinguished from potential objective being, because without such being it could not be a true and real subject of transmutation and of form; therefore. And it is confirmed and declared; for God, by the same action by which he created and preserved matter under the first form, preserves it under all the forms which afterwards succeed; therefore that action of God is terminated at some being of matter which remains the same under all forms; for creation and the corresponding conservation are terminated at some being, and the action cannot remain the same unless the term is the same; therefore that being is not given formally by the form, for the being which the form gives is varied when the form is varied; but that being is the being of existence, because it is temporal and actual being outside the efficient cause; therefore.

8. Wherefore Durandus does not speak consistently when he says that, even if being is not distinguished from essence, matter has being from the informing form. But he labours in an equivocation when he says that matter has only essence in potency, and therefore of itself has only being in potency; for matter according to itself has in potency the essence of the form or of the composite; but the essence of matter it does not have in potency but in act, by the very fact that it has been created; for it is one thing for matter to be essentially potency, another to be only essence in potency. For the first is universally true, even of actually existing matter, because in it nothing else is signified than that matter is essentially the subject or receptive potency. But the second is false of actually created matter, even as it is pre-understood to the form; for, although the essence of matter of itself, that is, efficiency being removed, is only in potency, which is common to every created essence, nevertheless through its creation it becomes essence in act, although partial and subjectively potential; therefore as such it has its proportioned being of existence; that, therefore, does not emanate formally from the form. But of this point, that is, of the existence of matter, more below.

9. Matter depends on the form and cannot naturally be without it.—I say, secondly: nevertheless matter depends in its being in some way on the form, in so far as it cannot naturally be without it, not only from the order of universal nature, but also from the debt and need of the proper and peculiar nature of matter itself. The former part is more frequently received by philosophers and theologians, who by this reason say that there is a mutual and necessary connection between matter and material form, as can be seen in the authors cited, and Avicenna, Metaphysics II, cc. 2 and 3; the Commentator, Physics I, comm. 56, and Book II, comm. 13; Themistius, Physics I, last digression; Plotinus, Enneads III, Book VI, c. 14; Soncinas, Metaphysics V, q. 1. And it is proved by reason, because the entity of matter would be idle in the nature of things if it remained without form; for it could exercise no operation; but nature abhors this; therefore it is against the order of nature that matter be without form. Many use this reason; yet it does not seem efficacious, because, although that is in vain in nature which is not apt for some function of nature, nevertheless that is not in vain nor simply idle which of itself is apt to exercise some function to which it was instituted by nature, although sometimes it does not execute it. So, then, although matter sometimes remained without form, it would not be idle in nature, because of itself it would be apt to receive it, if an agent were present who would introduce it, and it would happen by accident that it lacked it, because perhaps the agent which was disposing to introducing it first took away the disposition necessary for the conservation of the other before it could introduce the other. As Scotus thinks happens in the death of man or of another animal; nor on that account does the corpse remain idle, or would the matter remain, especially because little by little it will again be able to be disposed to receive another form.

10. Whence neither does the reason seem efficacious which is wont to be given from the continual succession of generation and corruption, both because it is not certain that generation immediately and in the same instant follows every corruption, as is evident from the said opinion of Scotus; for, although nature per se does not intend corruption but generation, it can nevertheless happen that a thing is corrupted before another can be generated. Wherefore what Aristotle said, namely, the generation of one is the corruption of another, perhaps is not converted, or will have to be understood speaking per se, although by accident it could fail.

11. Another reason is wont to be made, because what is not apt per se to operate without another is not apt either to be per se without it; but matter by its nature can operate nothing without form; therefore by its nature it needs form in order to exist, nor can it be without it. But I ask whether the discussion is of operation properly taken, which expresses a relationship to the efficient principle; and in this way it is not to the point; for matter neither under form nor without form can have any operation. Or operation is taken broadly for any causality whatever; and so the assumption is false; for often one thing needs the company of another in order to cause and not in order to exist, as the agent intellect needs the company of the phantasy for abstracting species, and yet remains without the phantasy and is not thought to be idle, even if then for that state it does not exercise its operation. The rational soul too needs the company of the body for exercising formal causality, but not for existing, and so of others; so, then, matter could need the company of form for exhibiting material causality, even if it does not require it for existing. And the reason is that causality expresses a relation or transcendental relationship, and therefore can postulate the company of another; but the thing from which the causality is can be more absolute and postulate the society of another not in act but in aptitude only.

12. From which too another common reason seems weak, which is thought to be most of all a priori, namely that matter is pure potency, and therefore by its nature must depend on the act of the form. For what is called pure potency does not exclude the actual entity of matter itself, but only expresses that that entity is such that it is essentially potency and altogether instituted for the function of receiving and sustaining form; but it is not of the notion of potency, speaking generally, that it always be under its act; whence, then, is it shown that this is of the notion of this potency? For from this, that it is substantial potency, this cannot be gathered, since thence rather it is had that it is subsisting potency, although partially and incompletely, and therefore can exist per se, even if it does not actually exercise its causality, as the rational soul remains, because it is subsisting, although it does not actually inform.

13. A reason proving that matter cannot naturally be without form.—It seems difficult, then, to give a reason which convinces this natural dependence of matter on form, on account of which at this time it pleases many, especially in Italy, that matter indeed is never separated from form on account of the necessary order of natural agents, both inferior and heavenly, which always introduce one form when another recedes, but not on account of the intrinsic dependence of matter, which they say would not be reduced to nothing if, one form being taken away, another did not succeed in it, but naturally would have remained with its entity and existence. Nevertheless one must not recede from the ancient and common opinion, which we can explain and confirm in these ways. First, it is not likely that this inferior matter is more independent of the form of a generable thing indefinitely taken than is each matter of the heaven of its proper form, since it is less perfect; but each matter of the heaven depends naturally on its form; therefore. Secondly, it is not likely that this matter depends more on accidental forms than on substantial, since it regards this per se primarily and principally; but this matter so depends on accidental form that it cannot naturally be without all of it, as is evident, at least of quantity.

14. Augustine finally asserted that formless matter preceded by no real duration.—Thirdly, there is an excellent physical conjecture that this matter was instituted to this, that it always be under some substantial form and never be separated from them; it is therefore a sign that it was also made such that from its nature it postulates the company of form in order that it can be. The antecedent is evident by induction, because matter, from the beginning in its creation, was founded under forms. Nor is the contrary opinion likely; for Scripture does not say that God in the beginning created matter, but heaven and earth; which words cannot be expounded of matter, as was shown above. And although Augustine sometimes seems to have doubted in this, nevertheless, Confessions XII, cc. 17 and 29, he rejects the former opinion and concludes that matter preceded its formation not in time but in nature only; whence, Confessions XIII, c. 33, he so concludes: Since the matter of heaven and earth is one thing, the species another, the matter indeed from altogether nothing, but the species of the world from formless matter, yet thou madest both at the same time, so that form followed matter with no interval of delay. He has the same, De Genesi ad litteram I, c. 19, and Book IV, c. 22 and following, and City of God I, c. 7. But after that first creation matter never lacked every form; and so natural causes have been disposed by the author of nature that one form can never desert matter without another being introduced. For that axiom of Aristotle, De generatione I, text 17: the generation of one is the corruption of another, is universally true, nor can it be true of generation that corruption always follows it unless generation too always follows the corruption of one; for, if something were corrupted and no generation came about, afterwards from the same matter something could be generated without a new corruption. And since it is true that there is in matter no form of corporeity or generic form, as was shown above and we shall also show below, it is necessary that in matter form always succeed form, unless we wish to say that in fact matter often remains without any substantial form with accidental ones alone. Which would be absurd and paradoxical in philosophy.

15. This matter, then, has been made so that it be perpetually under form; therefore it is likely that it was made such that it needs form in order to exist. The consequence is proved, because it is not repugnant to understand that prime matter is such that it has this need, which that reason rightly proves, namely because it is pure potency, that is, imperfect in its entity, and incomplete and potential; for with these imperfections that need and dependence does not fight, indeed fits excellently. Nor does it matter that it is partially subsisting; for subsistence excludes dependence on a subject, but not on an act or form. Nor in this is matter to be compared with the subsisting soul, because this is far more perfect and more actual and simply immaterial. This mode of dependence, then, not only is not repugnant, but is also most of all consonant with the entity of matter and its imperfection and function; therefore it is more likely that the nature of matter is such. Finally, in physical things, what always happens in the same way and not otherwise, it is likely is naturally necessary; but that matter is under some form naturally always so happens; therefore it is from the necessity of nature and not from the necessity of the form, because, when one form perishes from defect of dispositions, there was no necessity on the side of the other of introducing a new form. Nor likewise can the necessity be attributed to the extrinsic proximate agent alone, because often there is no private agent from which such a form is; therefore that necessity is founded in the intrinsic need of matter itself. Nor is it enough to say that this effect is natural from the order of the universe or from universal nature, or that that necessity arises from universal agent causes, which are always ready to introduce some form when particular ones fail; for this universal institution of nature is founded in the proper need of matter; for, because it pertained to the universal good that no portion of matter ever fail or be reduced to nothing, therefore nature provided that it could never be deprived of every form, but, one receding, another would always succeed, because this was necessary in order that matter could be naturally preserved perpetually. Otherwise why would nature have been so provident in the succession of such forms, especially when the form which succeeds was not per se necessary for expelling the other, which recedes on account of the defect of the necessary disposition or organisation?

16. Nor is what was adduced about the ascent of water to fill a vacuum similar; for universal nature avoids a vacuum on account of the perfect unity and integrity of the universe and on account of the necessity of action and influence, and not on account of the advantage of some private being. But that matter be as it were void of every form, if nevertheless it could be preserved and undergo and be disposed to generation and in its genus concur to it, would be no disadvantage to universal nature. Therefore the universal reason is none other than the conservation of matter. I confess that this whole discourse supposes that in fact matter never remains without substantial form, and thence gathers that this comes from the need of matter, which collection I judge to be sufficiently proved; but I doubt whether the antecedent has been sufficiently demonstrated; for we do not experience substantial form except from effects or accidents; but often there is no effect which evidently shows the introduction of a new form after the receding of the prior, as in the death of man; and therefore Scotus and others deny that a new form is introduced, although, lest they confess that matter remains without form, they posit a form of corporeity or of mixture, which being set aside, we convince by no other reason that in every death or corruption a new form is introduced except because otherwise matter would remain without form; and so we seem in these proofs to commit a circle. But, although it is true that this is not evidently demonstrated from effects, nevertheless that axiom is so consonant with the natures of things and with the end and use and imperfection of matter that by the unanimous consent of almost all ancient and recent philosophers it has been received as certain and undoubted, which is enough for founding a philosophical reason.

Of what kind is the dependence of matter on form

17. A twofold mode of dependence.—Arguments proving that matter depends on the form only as on a condition.—But it remains to explain of what kind this dependence is; for it can be understood in two ways, namely either as on a proper cause or as on a condition so necessary that without it being is not due to such a thing, which two modes of dependence I explained at length in tom. I of the Third Part, disp. VIII, sect. 1, and Fonseca seems to signify them, Metaphysics V, c. 2, q. 3, sect. 1, when he says that matter can be understood to depend on the form either as on a true cause or as on something concomitant; and in sect. 3 he seems to make mention of the same, when he says that accidents preserve substance, not a priori, but a posteriori. It can be doubted, then, in which of these modes matter depends on form. And indeed, that it is only dependence a posteriori and on a necessary condition seems probably to be persuaded. First, because this mode of dependence is possible; for the substantial form or its union to matter, and therefore the whole composite, depends in this way on some accidental forms as on necessary dispositions by way of conservation, as they say, not because they are proper and direct causes of such conservation, but because they are dispositions so connatural that they are also necessary; therefore with greater reason matter can have such dependence on the form as on a necessary and primary disposition. Likewise in this way matter depends on quantity; therefore it can also depend on the form. Next, this mode is sufficient to save all the things which are said of the dependence of matter on the form, and all the reasons made prove no more. It is also an easy and clear mode; for according to it the two conclusions posited are easily reconciled. It is also rightly understood how in turn the form depends on matter and matter on the form: for one will be said to depend a priori and the other a posteriori; one as on a true cause, and the other as on a concomitant condition.

18. But according to the other mode this mutual dependence is difficult to understand; for, since matter is simply supposed to the form in order that this can be educed from its potency, it can scarcely be understood how matter can depend a priori on the form. And the difficulty is explained more fully and increased from this, that matter comes about through true creation and is preserved by the same permanent action; therefore it does not depend in its becoming on the form as on a true cause, because no created cause can naturally concur to creation. Some answer that this is true of the efficient cause, but not of the other genera of causes; for a creature cannot be the efficient cause of creation; yet it can be a final cause, as is self-evident; and by the same reason it can be a formal cause, indeed also material; for, when the whole is created, the parts concur to its being and becoming in the genus of material cause. But, the final cause being omitted, whose causality has a peculiar notion, because it is not through a real and proper motion distinct from the action of the efficient cause, and therefore does not prerequire real being in the thing which exercises such causality, of the material cause its concurrence seems directly repugnant with creation as it is proper and true creation; which is easily evident from what was said above of the eduction of form from the potency of matter, and will be shown more fully below in the proper disputation on creation. But I speak of creation as it is properly creation; for under the notion of concreation it can have dependence on a material cause, as was declared above in treating of the matter of the heaven, because concreation as such supposes creation in the order of nature, and therefore can have some dependence. By the same reason, then, creation as such cannot have dependence on a formal cause, because the formal cause supposes the material, although concreation can have dependence on the form, as was declared above in the cited place. But the matter of generable things is truly and properly created, and not properly concreated, that is, it is not produced by one and the same action by which the whole is created; therefore the form cannot concur as a true cause to its creation.

19. Which is declared and confirmed in this way from what has been said; for the creation of this matter of generable things and the induction of the form are distinct actions, both now in the conservation of matter and the generation of things, and in the first production of sublunary things; but the action inductive of the form cannot be a true cause of the action creative of matter; therefore much less can the form which is induced through that action be a true cause of the creation of matter. The minor is evident, both because the induction of the form altogether supposes the creation of matter or matter created, nor can it be understood that the induction or union of the form is supposed in some genus of cause to the creation of matter, because the induction of the form as such expresses a transcendental relationship to matter already created; whence, just as a relation cannot be presupposed to its term in some genus of cause, so neither the induction of the form to the creation of matter. And also because otherwise the creation or conservation of matter would per se depend on the eduction of the form; therefore also on the agent educing the form; and so natural agents as true effective causes would preserve matter. Whence too it would come about that as often as the form is changed in matter the action by which matter is preserved by God would be changed, because, the dependence of the action being changed, the action is changed, because it itself is essentially dependence, as we shall declare below. But the consequent is false, because matter, as it is the first subject of generation, is something ingenerable and incorruptible, because it is supposed to generation and corruption; therefore by the same reason it is something immutable as regards the action through which it comes about and is preserved, because it is supposed made and preserved; otherwise through any generation of a natural being whatever matter would be concreated, or would be related as if it were concreated, because through a new action terminated at the whole it itself would begin to be preserved, which is plainly repugnant to the action of a natural agent; otherwise by the same reason it could be said that through such action new matter is always co-produced. Therefore the creation or conservation of matter does not depend on the eduction of the form as on a proper cause or per se action; therefore much less can it depend on the form as on a true cause, since the form in every genus of cause is posterior to the action through which it is educed from the potency of matter; therefore from first to last, neither can matter itself depend on the form as on a per se cause, but only as on a concomitant cause or condition well disposing and actuating matter itself.

20. Reasons persuading that matter depends on the form as on a proper cause.—Yet arguments are not lacking by which it seems to be persuaded that matter can depend on the form as on a proper cause which through its information holds it in being. And especially because the material substantial form depends on matter as on a proper and per se cause in its genus; therefore conversely matter depends on the form as on a true cause, because, although it does not sustain it as a subject, it can as act hold it. For, just as effective act holds the effect in being through its causality, so informative act can in a mode proportioned to itself hold its subject in being; therefore the substantial form is so compared to matter. The consequence is proved, first, because the material form is more perfect and more actual than matter; therefore matter depends more per se on the form than the form on matter. Secondly, because such a mutual bond between matter and form as between causes which mutually and in turn are per se causes of each other is not repugnant. Which is evident both from that general reason, that in diverse genera of causes mutual priority is not repugnant, and also because in the heaven there seems to be this mutual connection between matter and form; for both in becoming and in being they depend mutually and per se, as was said above, so that the concreation of one depends per se on the concreation of the other, and conversely. From which example a third reason can be taken, because the matter of the heaven depends on its determinate form as on a per se cause; therefore the matter of these inferior things too will depend in the same way on the generable form, although indefinite. The consequence is evident, because the matter of the heaven is more perfect; therefore, if that depends, much more the other.

21. Judgement on the question and on the reasons proposed on each side.—These reasons are indeed probable, and so each part can probably be sustained from what has been said; to me, however (to confess the truth), the former seems more intelligible and easier, and, if the reasons made are attentively weighed, the latter can more easily be dissolved. Which task I leave to the reader, because the matter seems easy, because below, in explaining how causes are causes of one another, it must be declared radically what mutual priority can intervene between some two things and what cannot, on the understanding of which the present resolution most of all depends.

1. The rational form can be preserved separated naturally, the others supernaturally.—As regards the dependence of form on matter, one can only doubt of the material form; for of the immaterial it is evident that not only by divine power but also naturally it can remain without matter. But of the other forms Aristotle and the philosophers would perhaps deny that they can in any way subsist separated from matter, because they would think that actual dependence and inherence in matter is essential to them. But we Catholics, who believe that God preserves accident without subject, cannot doubt (although some moderns doubt) that God can also preserve the material substantial form without matter, because the dependence of accident on subject is greater, in so far as accident has less of entity and actuality than substantial form. Whence all the Doctors to be cited at once agree in this about the substantial form, although they dissent about matter.

The former opinion about matter is treated

2. Of matter, then, the first opinion is that denying that God can preserve matter without substantial form. St. Thomas holds it in the places cited in the preceding section, with the other followers of his cited there, and moreover Quodlibet III, a. 1; and the Master indicates it, In II, dist. 12, c. 5, where he only says that matter at the beginning of creation was not first lacking every form, because no such corporeal thing can exist which has no form; yet he does not declare whether he speaks of absolute power or according to the natures of things. And Hugh of St Victor seems to speak in the same way, De sacramentis I, part I, c. 4. More openly speak Bonaventure, in the said dist. 12, a. 1, q. 1; Hervaeus, Quodlibet VI, q. 1; Giles, at the beginning of his Hexaemeron, cc. 1 and 2; Jandun, Physics I, q. 26; Zimara, theorem 15. The chief foundation of this opinion is that matter formally of itself has no existence, but receives it formally from the form. But God cannot give a formal effect without the formal cause, nor can he preserve matter without existence; therefore he cannot preserve matter without form. Nor does it matter that the being of existence, according to this opinion, is not the primary formal effect of the form, both because, although on account of this cause the primary effect could by divine power remain without this secondary one, nevertheless conversely the secondary cannot be given without the primary, for it depends essentially on it; and also because to the primary effect of the form it pertains to be or to constitute the proximate susceptive of existence, which effect is never separated from it; for even in the humanity of Christ it has it; but God cannot constitute an act outside its proper susceptive. Secondly, from the Commentator, because matter is pure potency; but whatever exists is in act; therefore it is repugnant that matter exist without act, because otherwise it would at the same time be in act and without act; but the act of matter is the form; therefore it is repugnant that it be without form. Thirdly, even if matter has some partial existence, it has it dependent on the form in the genus of formal cause; but God cannot per se supply the effect of the formal cause; therefore. Fourthly, this reason is wont to be made, because, if matter were preserved without form, there would be in the nature of things some individual under the genus of substance and not under some species; for matter would be in the genus of body, for example, and would not pertain to any species of it. Fifthly, all accidental being is from accidental form, and therefore nothing can have such being without it; therefore all substantial being is from substantial form, and cannot be without it; but matter has some substantial being; therefore that cannot be without substantial form. Other reasons are wont to be multiplied, but they do not bring in a new difficulty, and therefore I judge it useless to linger on them.

The latter opinion is treated and preferred to the former

3. The contrary opinion is sufficiently common. Henry holds it, Quodlibet I, q. 10; Scotus, In I [recte II], dist. 12, q. 2; and there Lychetus, Mayronis, Bassolis and other Scotists; Richard, q. 4; Gregory, q. 1; Gabriel, q. 1; Marsilius, In II, q. 8; and Soto inclines to it, Physics I, q. 6; and to me this opinion seems altogether true, because I find not only no clear implication of contradiction, but not even a sufficiently likely reason which would persuade it. And first of all, even if we held that existence is a thing distinct from essence, no sufficient reason could be given why God could not posit that act in matter alone; because, although according to the connatural order that act would have to be received in the whole nature or integral supposit, nevertheless by divine power it could be constituted in one part, just as accidental existence cannot naturally be received except in the accidental composite or in the substantial supposit by means of the accidental form, and yet God can make it remain in the separated accident alone, and with greater reason could preserve substantial being in the material substantial form alone; therefore also he could posit the act of existence in the essence of matter alone, because, although matter is potency to form, it is nevertheless truly a certain partial substantial essence; in so far, then, as it is some essence, it will be able to be actuated by existence; for existence is the act of essence. Nor is there any reason which proves that order between substantial form and the act of existence, or the dependence of that existence on the form, to be so essential that it cannot be changed or supplied by God; for the form is not so the cause of existence that it intrinsically composes it, since they are supposed to be simple co-distinct entities; but the causality of the form which is not through intrinsic composition, but either through emanation or another similar reason, can be supplied by God, as I shall show at once.

4. Nor can it be said that matter existing through an act of existence really distinct already has a form, because every act is a form. For this axiom is false according to that opinion, even of actuating act; for the authors of that opinion posit in one substantial supposit the substantial form and the act of existence really distinct, and do not admit two substantial forms; therefore substantial existence is not a substantial form. And therefore they also say that the existence of the created humanity can be supplied by the uncreated existence of the Word, because existence is not a form; therefore, if matter were preserved with an act of existence really distinct from its essence without another form, it would truly be preserved without form, and so would be in act without informing act, but not without terminating act. Add that some of the authors who posit existence really distinct from essence concede that God can preserve essence in the nature of things and outside causes without existence. In which, although they say an open contradiction, nevertheless, the false principle being supposed, they seem to speak consistently. Why, then, will they not also admit that the essence of matter can be preserved in the nature of things and outside causes without a distinct act of existence? For in order that a thing be in the nature of things and outside causes, the being of essence suffices according to them; but matter of itself and through itself formally has some being of essence, although partial and diminished.

5. The genuine and a priori proof of the conclusion.—But these proceed as it were ad hominem from others' principles; but from our own the a priori reason of this opinion is that matter, as it has its partial entity of essence, so also of existence; for the existence of substance is so composite as the essence of substance, and therefore without any implication or repugnance God can preserve matter without form as he can form without matter. Because, although the proper susceptive (so to speak) of complete and integral existence is the complete nature or substantial supposit, nevertheless the part of the nature or partial nature is capable of a partial existence proportioned to itself, in which it can by divine power partially subsist alone, as quantity exists separated by divine power in its proportioned existence. For no greater repugnance can be brought forward in the partial existence of matter than in the partial existence of the form or the accidental existence of quantity. For this partial existence of matter does not emanate intrinsically from the form, but only naturally depends on it, either as on a condition or actual disposition naturally due, or at most as on a cause informing and through its information per se concurring and helping to the being of matter; but this mode of dependence can easily be supplied by God without repugnance. And of the former indeed, which seemed to us more probable, the matter is clear, because that mode of dependence is very extrinsic and a posteriori, and consists only in this, that to a thing constituted in such a state or lacking such a disposition or act being is not naturally due. But God can confer being even beyond the natural debt or beyond the natural order, and so can preserve the form in matter without the natural disposition and the soul in the body without natural organisation.

6. But of the latter mode of dependence the same is proved, because, although according to that mode the form concurs in some way as a cause to the being of matter, yet not as a cause intrinsically composing that being or its proper subject, but as a cause only informing or actuating and as extrinsic, in this sense, that it is altogether co-distinct from the effect itself; but God can supply such a cause by effecting, even if it causes by informing. Which is proved from the contrary of the material cause, which is intrinsic as is the formal, and therefore God cannot supply it with respect to that effect which it intrinsically composes. Yet he can supply its causality with respect to the other component or form, even if matter in its genus flows per se and as a true cause into the being of the form itself. And in this way God supplies the dependence of accident on subject, even if it is in the genus of material cause; and in the same way he can supply the dependence of the corporeal substantial form on matter; because, although it is truly per se and material causality, nevertheless it is not altogether intrinsic, that is, such that matter itself is an intrinsic part of such effect, but is about a thing altogether co-distinct, by sustaining it. But this causality which matter provides by sustaining God can supply by effecting; therefore by the same reason he will be able to supply the causality of the form, not into the composite but into matter, nor by informing but by effecting. The consequence is evident, because the whole reason of repugnance equally ceases, which consists in this, that God cannot be united after the manner of form to matter, which would be necessary for preserving or composing the composite, but not for preserving one part of the composite without the other. In which the reason is equal of matter and of form, because it is not of the notion of an essential part actually existing that it be form or have form, because neither does the essence of such part postulate this, since it consists only in aptitude to form, but not in actual union, nor yet existence, since it only extrinsically depends on the form in the mode already explained. And then matter would indeed be in entitative act or of existence and in potency to formal act, in which there is no repugnance or difficulty, since receptive potency necessarily includes some entity and entitative actuality, as was declared above.

7. What new thing God must provide in order to preserve matter without form.—And hence it is understood in passing through what action God could preserve matter without form, or what new thing he must exhibit in order to preserve it. For one must speak diversely according to the diverse modes of dependence of matter on form touched upon above. For, if matter depends on the form only as on an act or consequent disposition, no new action is necessary on the side of God for preserving matter without form; but, if from the beginning he created matter alone without form, the action would be altogether the same as that by which God actually created matter under forms, and the miracle or preternatural work would only have consisted in this, that God would make that action without the concomitance of the other through which he would induce the form into such matter. As, if God created the substance of the soul without the intellective power, he would create it by the same action, and the miracle would only be to impede the natural emanation of the faculty from the essence; indeed in fact the soul of Christ was created by the same action without proper subsistence as the others are created, and in it only the action or emanation of proper subsistence was impeded. And in a proportional way one must speak if God wills to preserve without form matter which already is under it; for, by expelling one form and not concurring to the introduction of another, it would only be necessary that God continue that very action by which he now preserves matter, because through it he would sufficiently preserve the entity of matter in the nature of things and outside causes; and the miracle would only be placed in this, that God would continue the conservative action of matter in that state in which being would not be due to it and without those conditions which are necessary for the natural mode of existing.

8. But if matter depends on the form as on a proper cause per se flowing into its being, then it will be necessary that God supply that causality of the form by another genus of efficiency and action; because, if that causality of the form is per se necessary besides the common influx by which God now preserves matter, matter could not be preserved with this common influx of God alone without the causality of the form unless the necessity of this is supplied by another genus of causality. As, when God preserves quantity without the material concurrence of the subject, it is necessary that he supply by special efficiency that concurrence of the subject without which quantity naturally could not be, and therefore we say that God preserves quantity without subject by a far diverse reason from that by which he preserved it in the subject, as I treated at length in tom. III of the Third Part. So, then, it would be necessary in the present case, proportion being kept. But what that new action would be which God would apply to preserving matter without form is not easy to explain; but we say that it would be an action after the manner of absolute and altogether independent creation, and would be distinguished from the action by which matter is now preserved, because this is after the manner of concreation; which indeed in heavenly matter, if it had to be preserved without form, can easily be understood; but in this matter of generable things it is more difficult, for the action through which it comes about is truly absolute creation, as was declared above, and therefore the former mode of speaking always seems more likely as regards this matter.

The reasons of the former opinion are satisfied

9. The reasons of the contrary opinion have almost all been solved from what has been said. For to the first it has already been answered that it assumes something false, namely that all existence is from the form as from an intrinsic and as it were essential cause (for this is true of complete substantial existence, but not of any partial one whatever), and that the inference is not necessary, because, granted that that natural order intervened between form and existence, it would not thence be immutable by the omnipotence of God. To the second Scotus and others answer that an equivocation is committed in the name of potency and act; for matter is called pure subjective potency, which, if it is in its purity, will lack informing act; but when it is said that every existing thing is in act, it is understood of entitative act, which is not opposed to subjective potency, but only to objective. Which answer Javellus and others think sufficiently excluded by attacking objective potency; but there is no reason why we should stick at the word of objective potency, about which perhaps the controversy is about a name, as Javellus too confesses, and it is to be treated below; but we must attend to the thing signified, which is the thing in possible being, whether it is called possible from objective potency or from the active potency of the agent; for now it matters nothing. But to the possible thing so taken the thing in act is opposed, and in this sense it is true that the existing thing must be in act; but this being in act is not opposed to pure subjective potency. But if in this sense matter already created is called pure potency, the assumption is false. To the third it has already been sufficiently declared how God can supply the natural dependence which matter has in its partial existence on the form.

10. Matter claims for itself a proper and stable substantial species.—To the fourth the answer is that that argument does not proceed more in matter without form than in formed matter. For matter does not have another substantial and essential species for itself on account of this, that it is under form or under this or that form. But I say substantial and essential, because we are treating of prime matter, not of proximate matter, which includes accidental forms or dispositions, by reason of which it is sometimes said to differ in species; but that in truth is not diversity in the substantial difference of matter, but in accidents. The form, then, does not give the specific difference to matter, but to the composite. Whence, just as the same matter in number remains under diverse forms, so also the same in species; if, then, matter existing without form would be an individual of a genus contained under no species, it is so now too; or certainly, if now it is not such an individual (as in truth it is not), neither would it be then. Whence the sequel is to be simply denied, because to the notion of matter it does not pertain that it be in the species of man or of horse, but in the species of matter; but that matter would be in some ultimate species of matter, either heavenly or elemental. Wherefore it is one thing to say that in that case there is given matter which in its breadth of incomplete essence would be contained under no ultimate species proportioned to itself, and it is false that this follows; another to say that there is given matter of which no complete individual contained under some ultimate species of complete substance would actually be composed, and this we confess follows; but it is no inconvenience, but is our assertion itself, because it is not of the essence of matter that it actually compose such an individual, but that it be apt to compose it. To the fifth the answer is that there is a difference between substance and accident, that accident and accidental form taken in their whole breadth are convertible, because every accident in some way inheres, and therefore it is repugnant that accidental being be given without accidental form; but substance and substantial form are not convertible; for there is given a substantial subject which in no way is form, and therefore substance is divided into matter, form and composite. Wherefore it is not necessary that every substantial being be intrinsically and formally form; for in the breadth of substantial being there is given being simply and complete, and this is from the form properly and per se in its genus; there is given also partial being, which is not always from the form, except speaking broadly, in so far as it depends in some way on it, which dependence God can supply, as has been shown.

1. Several partial homogeneous forms are found in the same composite.—The causality of the form having been explained, it is necessary to expound unity or multitude in the same effect or composite, so that from this it may at the same time be evident whether within this genus of cause there is some subordination or dependence of causes with respect to the same effect. But it can be understood in two ways that in one substance there are several forms, namely either in diverse parts of matter or in the same matter. Of the former mode we do not dispute here, because, even if in diverse parts of matter diverse forms are given, nevertheless each of them has only one proper effect in its matter. But if from all those substances one is composed as from parts integrating it, it is necessary that those forms be not total but partial, integrating one total form. And so that multitude of parts will not prevent one adequate formal cause from being given of one total effect. And indeed, if such partial forms are of the same notion, there is no doubt that in material forms they can be multiplied according to the diversity of the parts of matter and be united to compose one substance. But whether forms of diverse notions can be partial and be united among themselves to compose one substance, and how great that union can be, namely whether through true mathematical continuation or through some lesser physical conjunction, all these do not pertain to the present matter but to the science of the soul; for all those things are chiefly wont to be asked on account of the heterogeneous parts of living things, and most of all on account of the blood and other humours existing in the animal, of which I touched upon some things in tom. I of the Third Part, disp. XV, sects. 5, 6 and 7.

2. The present question, then, is concerned with the formal cause with respect to altogether the same matter, namely whether in one matter there can be only one substantial form, in which question several are involved according to the variety of opinions which are briefly to be touched upon. But several forms in the same matter can be thought out in three ways: in one way, with per se and essential subordination, after the manner of superior and inferior form, of which the former, although with respect to matter it is act, is nevertheless with respect to the further form compared after the manner of potency. Secondly, with subordination not indeed essential, but after the manner of disposition to the form principally intended. Thirdly, merely per accidens and without any order among themselves. And to these three heads are reduced all the opinions which are or can be in this matter; and in the individual ones there is a variety of opinions.

3. For to the first head pertains the opinion treated above, Disp. XIII, of the form of corporeity per se necessary for the introduction of the ultimate forms, which it will not be necessary here again to report and attack.

The opinion of the multiplication of forms according to essential predicates is rejected

4. There too was treated and cursorily attacked the opinion which affirms that substantial forms are really multiplied in the composite according to the multitude of essential predicates, which is reported from Avicebron, in the book Fons vitae; and John of Jandun held it, Metaphysics II, q. 10, and De Anima I, q. 8; and Paul of Venice, Metaphysics VII. Nevertheless this opinion is now antiquated and rejected as altogether improbable; for, besides the general reasons which we shall make below for the unity of form, this reason convinces that opinion of falsity, that it multiplies forms without foundation and necessity; for in the foregoing it was shown that universals are not distinguished really from particulars, nor genera from species; therefore, since these predicates are multiplied only through the abstraction and prescission of our intellect, it is vain to think that forms really distinct correspond to them in the thing. Otherwise also in separated substances and in accidental forms forms really distinct and subordinated among themselves would have to be multiplied according to the multitude of essential predicates which our reason distinguishes also in these things. Indeed also matters would have to be really distinguished and multiplied in material substances, because from them diverse essential predicates can be taken, as to be a material thing, which is common to heavenly and inferior bodies, and to be a generable thing or something similar. Finally these predicates can be abstracted in very great number according to the various agreements of things; therefore it is impossible that forms be really multiplied according to their number. I omit other reasons which we made above, Disp. XIII, sect. 3.

5. That the parts of the thing correspond to the parts of the definition.—What order of inference essential predicates and substantial forms keep.—But you will object Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, c. 10, saying that to the parts of the definition correspond parts of the thing; but the parts of the definition are genus and difference; therefore to these parts correspond in the thing defined parts really diverse, which are not matter and form alone, for animal, for example, does not signify matter alone, but the composite of matter and sensitive soul. Likewise the same Aristotle, Metaphysics II, c. 2, proves that there is no process to infinity in formal causes because there is none in quidditative predicates. Likewise, because the properties which belong according to these predicates are distinct in the thing itself, as, for example, to sense, to understand, to be moved, etc.; therefore also the forms from which those predicates are taken. To the first testimony of Aristotle the answer is either that he does not speak generally of every definition, but of that which is given in the physical way and through physical parts, as when man is said to be a being composed of soul and body; or, if he speaks universally, it is not necessary to understand it of parts distinct in the thing, but in thing or reason, as is taken from St. Thomas there and more clearly from Alexander of Hales, who calls them real parts or of reason. But to the other testimony the answer is that from the negation of several or infinite essential predicates the negation of several or infinite forms is rightly gathered, because from any form whatever at least one quidditative predicate can be taken; if, therefore, there are not infinite quidditative predicates, neither will there be able to be infinite forms. But conversely from the multitude of quidditative predicates the multitude of forms cannot be gathered, because from the same form several predicates can be taken according to the various agreements and differences which it has with other forms. Wherefore what is adduced from Aristotle is not similar.

6. But hence it is excellently inferred that, just as from the unity of the form it is not gathered that the quidditative predicates are not several but one only, so too it is not gathered that they are not infinite or that there cannot be a process to infinity in them, because, the unity of the form standing, these predicates can be multiplied; but whether from elsewhere there is a term in these predicates, and how Aristotle proved it, we shall say in the following section. To the last the answer is by denying the consequence, for, just as from the same cause several effects, so from the same form diverse faculties can arise, as is known by experience, for sometimes several faculties belong to the same thing not only according to the same physical form but also according to the same specific difference, as to man intellect, will, risibility; but sometimes these faculties arise from the same form according to its various grades, which are often distinguished by us through order to the faculties themselves or actions, although in the thing the grades themselves are not distinct in substantial forms, of which matter enough was said in treating of universals.

The opinion of Scotus on the form of corporeity is rejected

7. Thirdly, to this head pertains the opinion of Scotus and Henry touched upon above, Disp. XIII, who also posit a form of corporeity or of the mixed as per se necessary between matter and certain substantial forms, although not in the same way; for Scotus thinks that it intervenes between matter and every soul, but not between matter and the forms of inanimate things; but Henry requires that form in man alone. The foundation of Scotus, if it is explained a priori, seems to have been that the soul is a form transcending the common grade of body and requires in matter a disposition and a certain variety of organs which other forms do not require; therefore the soul as such does not give the being of body but presupposes it through another form, by reason of which matter is supposed capable of the organisation and disposition necessary for the soul; but in inanimate things this necessity ceases. And this can be confirmed from the common mode of speaking; for we say that the living thing consists of body and soul, yet we do not say that water or air consists of body and such a form, but of matter and such a form; it is therefore a sign that body, which in living things is said to be the other part of the composite, includes besides matter a certain substantial form intermediate between matter and soul. Of which body that definition of the soul is excellently understood: it is the act of a physical, organic body, having life in potency. For, since that body which is co-distinguished from the soul is a physical part, it does not include the soul itself, even as giving the superior grade, because otherwise there would not be physical composition of them, but metaphysical; nor does it express matter alone or bare, because in this way it is common to all natural things, or with accidents, because these do not pertain to the essence of substance; therefore it includes a special substantial form distinct from the soul. Secondly and principally Scotus was moved by an a posteriori argument, because in the death of an animal the soul recedes and a new form is not at once introduced; but it is not to be said that matter remains without form; therefore it is to be said that it remains under the form of corporeity which was present in the animal. The major is proved, because, if a form were introduced, it would be diverse according to the diversity of dispositions; but we see that it is not so, but in the death of man the same corpse remains whether he dies from excess of heat or of cold. There is added also that often there is no agent from which such a form is educed. Thirdly, Scotus uses a theological argument, which most of all moved Henry; for it cannot be said that the body of a dead man is always distinct in species or number from the body of the living; therefore it is necessary to confess that the same form of body in number remains without a new form, because, the form being varied, the individual is varied, indeed also the species. The antecedent is evident, because otherwise there would not have been in the sepulchre the same body in number which was in Christ living. And if a host had been consecrated before the death of Christ and kept during the triduum, the same body in number would not have remained in it, which seem to be against the sayings of the Saints.

8. Two principles of Aristotle which are destroyed by positing the form of corporeity are strengthened.—But this opinion too multiplies forms without sufficient foundation, and can be attacked by the same reasons which we used in the said Disp. XIII against Avicenna. And moreover Scotus in his opinion supposes two things which are repugnant to Aristotle. One is that sometimes substantial corruption comes about without subsequent generation, against Aristotle, De generatione I, c. 3. The second is that substantial corruption comes about while a complete sensible substance composed of matter and form remains, against the same Philosopher, De generatione I, c. 4. To which the Scotists answer that Aristotle speaks when integral corruption comes about; but when an animal dies, integral corruption does not come about until so great a transmutation comes about in matter that the form of corporeity too is cast off. But this same distinction of integral or halved substantial corruption is foreign to the doctrine of Aristotle, who always defines substantial generation and corruption to be the beginning and ceasing simply of the whole substance. And moreover it follows, thirdly, that there remains in fact in the nature of things an individual of the genus of the predicament of substance constituted under no species of body, which is no less impossible than to understand some animal in the nature of things of no species of animals.

9. It can be answered from Scotus that that composite of matter and that form of corporeity is not an individual contained under the genus of body of the predicament of substance, as Avicenna thought; for that individual must be a complete substance really including some specific form which body of the predicament of substance confusedly expresses, and therefore it is predicated in recto of its inferiors; but that body consisting of matter and the form of corporeity alone is only an incomplete and partial substance; for it is part of a certain substantial composite. Whence, just as matter, because it is a part, can be reductively under the genus of body and not under some species, so that body which is part of the composite.

10. But this answer does not satisfy, first, because in order that some individual be contained directly under some species, it is enough that it contain actually the whole actual essence of that species, nor is it necessary that it contain actually whatever the species contains in potency, as is self-evident; but body of the predicament of substance is a subaltern species contained under the genus of substance, of whose actual notion it is only that it be a substance composed of matter and substantial form, or that it be a substance existing per se and capable of quantity; but this whole actual notion belongs to that individual; therefore. Secondly, because, although a part of substance can reductively be under the genus and not under the species, nevertheless, if genera and species are directly and proportionately assigned to it, it is impossible that it be under the genus without being in some species of it, as we were saying above that matter, even preserved by the absolute power of God without form, cannot not be in some ultimate species of matter. So, then, that form which constitutes that body or corpse cannot be under the common genus of substantial form without being in some ultimate species of substantial form; therefore the composite of such form and matter will also be in some ultimate species of composite substance; therefore not only reductively in the genus of body. And this reason, as I was saying above, convinces also that that composite is not further actuable through a further substantial difference, nor through a form from which such a difference is taken, and therefore is not a part nor a potency per se ordered to a further substantial act, but is a complete substance constituted in ultimate act; for no substance is so complete in act except because it has some substantial form constituted in some ultimate species of such form.

11. Thirdly, there is an argument ad hominem against Scotus, because, if he does not think it inconvenient that this body, which he says is a part of substance, remain without a further form, there is no reason why he should judge it inconvenient that matter remain without form; therefore, to avoid this inconvenience he ought not to have introduced this form of corporeity. The antecedent is evident, because, just as matter is potency per se ordered to form, so that body is potency per se ordered to soul. And just as matter under that form of corporeity has some actuality, so through itself alone it has its proper entitative actuality, which suffices for existing; therefore there is no reason why the entity of matter should depend more on that form of corporeity than the form of corporeity itself on the further form, that is, the soul; if, therefore, the form of corporeity can remain without the soul, matter too will be able to remain without the form of corporeity. That form, therefore, is irrelevant. Fourthly, it follows from the opinion of Scotus that in substantial generation two forms really distinct are often introduced; since, therefore, changes are multiplied from their terms, there will be two substantial generations for constituting one substantial composite.

12. Fifthly, it can happen that the same body in number, consisting of the same matter and form in number, now lives the life of a man, afterwards the life of a brute; for, when a worm is generated from a corpse, there is no reason why the form of corporeity should be changed; for, if it remains in the corpse without the dispositions of man, it will be able better to remain under the form of any living thing whatever. Indeed thence it seems further to follow that this form is limited without cause to living things alone, but must at the least be extended to all mixed bodies, even inanimate; for, as Scotus himself also speaks, that is a form of mixture arising from the mixture of the elements; therefore, wherever this mixture is, there will be in matter a sufficient disposition to this form; it will therefore be in all inanimate mixed bodies; otherwise it is necessary that Scotus declare what transmutation made in the matter of the corpse suffices to expel this form. Certainly none can reasonably be assigned, except perhaps resolution into the first simple elements; for such a form seems indifferent to all other dispositions which arise from the mixture of the elements, since it is said to remain in wood, bone and flesh, etc. But if this consequent is admitted, scarcely will a reasonable difference be able to be assigned why such a form is not in matter with the form of gold or of another homogeneous mixed body, etc. Whence, if a form of corporeity had to be posited, he would speak more consistently who posited it in all natural beings with Avicenna than in some, as others do. And these reasons suffice also against the opinion of Henry; for the things which have been said of living things in common can easily be applied to man alone.

13. The arguments induced for the form of corporeity are weakened.—There is added that the reasons by which these authors were moved to introduce that form are very weak. For to the first the answer is that, although the soul is a superior form to the forms of inanimate things and requires in matter the organisation of members, the form of corporeity is not on that account necessary; for per se it suffices to actuate matter immediately and to preserve it in being or terminate its dependence, and consequently it is also enough that the composite of such matter and form be capable of threefold dimension, which is to be body of the predicament of substance; it suffices finally that such form require in diverse parts of matter diverse accidental dispositions, through which diverse organs are completed, whether because the soul itself, if it is divisible, has various parts of diverse partial notions, to which those dispositions correspond; or because, if the soul is indivisible, in its eminent and perfect entity it contains virtually that whole variety. But whether those accidental dispositions precede in matter in the order of nature or altogether follow the soul as regards the proximate and ultimate degree, the reason is the same of heterogeneous dispositions as of homogeneous; and therefore it is not necessary on account of this cause to introduce a particular form in living things, but one must philosophize in this according to what was said in the preceding disputation on quantity and accidents in prime matter.

14. In what sense the living thing is said to be constituted by body and soul.—To the confirmation, as regards the thing, when the living thing is said to consist of body and soul, if by body the physical part is to be understood, it includes essentially nothing besides matter, because, the form of corporeity being set aside, nothing else essential can remain in the body as it is a physical part, as the argument made there rightly proves. Whence Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, text 39: It is manifest (he says) that the soul indeed is the first substance, but the body matter; but man, or animal, that which is from both. And although in such matter organic dispositions are required as ultimate dispositions and necessary conditions, nevertheless they do not pertain to substantial composition; and consequently neither are they essentially included in the essential physical part. Yet there is nothing which compels us to understand by the name of body the pure physical part, which is matter, but as it stands under a certain metaphysical grade of form, or (what is the same) it expresses the composite of matter and soul, for example, not in so far as it is soul, but in so far as it gives the grade of corporeity; for in order to declare the proper notion of the soul and the singular grade of perfection which it adds beyond the common grade of body, we distinguish peculiarly in living things the soul from the body, and signify the body after the manner of a physical part, not because the form included in it is a physical part compared to the soul, but because it is so conceived and prescinded as if it were a distinct form. Of which matter more could be said, which I omit, because I wrote them in tom. III of the Third Part, disp. LI, sect. 4.

15. In the death of any living thing whatever the form of the corpse is introduced into matter.—Of what species it is and from what agent it comes about.—To the second the answer is that the assumption is false; for in the death of man and of any animal whatever the form of the corpse is introduced, lest matter remain without form. Of which form, and of its unity or distinction and its efficient cause, this is not the place to speak, and it matters little to the thing of which we are treating. It is probable, then, that in living things diverse in species the form of the corpse which is introduced in place of the soul is distinct in species, as is evident of plants and also of animals. But whether with respect to the same living thing a form of the same species succeeds, each can probably be said, as Cajetan disputes against Scotus, I, q. 76, a. 4. But as regards the efficient cause, it must be said that it is produced by some proximate temperament with the concurrence of some universal cause, as must generally be said of those things which are generated per accidens from putrefaction. To the third it must be said that the dead body is diverse in species, and consequently as regards the substantial form also distinct in number. Nor does what is adduced about the body of Christ matter; for that is said to be the same in number dead and living either sensibly, on account of the identity of matter, quantity and sensible accidents, or suppositally the same, on account of the identity of the supposit. Of which matter I spoke in tom. III, in the cited place, and more fully in tom. II, disp. XXXVIII, sect. 3, where I also declared whether the form of the corpse which was in the body of Christ during the triduum was hypostatically united to the Word. Which Henry too touched upon in the place cited above. It is not, therefore, necessary on account of theological expressions, which can have a convenient sense, to feign in man a new form without philosophical foundation, indeed against the true notion of substantial and essential composition, as has partly been shown and we shall show more fully in what follows. But the special physical reason which can be taken in man from this, that his soul is spiritual, will be treated in the following point. The opinion on the multiplication of forms according to the grades of things is treated

16. The last mode of speaking in this first head can be that in each thing as many substantial forms per se subordinated are multiplied as there are grades of natural things and according to the number of grades which are participated by one and the same substance. But there are four grades of material substances, namely of inanimate bodies, of vegetables, of sensibles and of rationals. Again some natural beings participate only one grade, and in them there is only one form, and these are inanimate bodies; but vegetating things participate two grades, whence they are constituted by two forms; animals by three, men by four. Which opinion so integrally declared I do not find; yet the authors who taught that there are in man three souls really distinct, if they speak consistently, must embrace the whole discourse made; for by the reason by which they distinguish three in man, they must also distinguish two in brutes; and by the reason by which they separate the souls themselves among themselves, they must also distinguish the grade of soul from the common grade of corporeal form; for in all these there is the same proportion. Nor can another reason of distinction be given except the subordination and distinction of grades. But that opinion of the distinction of three souls is held by Philoponus, De Anima I, text 91; whom Jandun follows, chapter De Anima, q. 12; and Paul of Venice, in the Summa de Anima, c. 5. Whose foundations I shall not report in this place, because they almost coincide with those which were touched upon in reporting the opinions of others.

17. Only in man there seems to be found a peculiar necessity of several souls, at least two, on account of two chief causes proper to man. One is that the rational soul is perfectly spiritual and indivisible and most distant from the imperfection of matter; and therefore extremes so distant do not seem able to be immediately conjoined; there is necessary, therefore, some form by means of which they may be united. And this reason peculiarly favours the opinion of Henry treated above, for the rational soul, since it is incorporeal, cannot give corporeal being; therefore neither can it be the form of corporeity. And by the same reason it cannot be the vegetative or sensitive form formally; for such forms are material and corruptible; therefore on account of these there is required in man some material form besides the soul, whether that be one or manifold.

18. The Manichees posited two souls.—The other cause is that in man there are contrary operations, for the flesh lusts against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh; but contrary operations cannot proceed from the same principle, but from contraries. Which argument Ockham uses, who teaches this opinion, Quodlibet II, q. 10, and in q. 11 he adds also that these souls are distinguished from the form of corporeity, and in brutes too he makes such a form distinct from their sensitive soul. But of the sensitive and vegetative soul he denies that they are distinct. In which certainly he does not speak consistently; nor does he declare either whether in plants the soul is distinguished from the form of corporeity. The Manichees too asserted that there are in man two souls, one spiritual, implanted by the good God, the other animal, contrary to it, and proceeding from a contrary principle, namely the evil God whom they feigned, as Augustine reported, in the book De duabus animabus contra Manichaeos, and De Genesi ad litteram X, c. 13, and the book De vera religione, c. 9; and that several Catholic Doctors followed this opinion of two souls in man, spiritual and sensual, Jerome testifies, Epistle 150 to Hedibia, q. 12, treating the place by which they were moved, 1 Thessalonians 5: May the God of peace sanctify you, that your whole spirit and soul and body may be preserved blameless unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ. To which testimony they joined that of Daniel 3: Bless the Lord, ye spirits and souls of the just. Philo held the same, in the book That the worse attacks the better.

19. The adduced opinion is disproved with its explanations.—But this opinion is not only improbable in philosophical reason, but also little safe in our faith, as regards that part in which it posits in man several souls. And indeed, as regards that general reason of distinguishing several substantial forms from the grades of things, it is rightly disproved a posteriori from this, that from that principle it follows that souls really distinct are necessary in man, which is foreign to sound doctrine. Next, all the reasons by which we proved that in living things the soul is not distinguished from the form of body prove a fortiori that the addition of a new grade does not suffice for distinguishing forms really.

20. Indeed the reasons made against the first opinion, by which it was shown that forms are not really distinguished on account of diverse quidditative predicates subordinated among themselves, prove the same, even if one predicate adds to another a new grade, for, when those two grades are conjoined in one and the same thing, one is compared to the other as the specific difference to the generic, and so from both one substantial species is constituted as from universal and particular; therefore in the thing the grades or differences as conjoined in such a species are not distinguished; therefore neither are the forms, which are the principles of such grades or differences, really distinguished in such a substance. Which finally is declared by applying with proportion the reason made above, for, if in the horse, for example, there is a vegetative soul, it is necessary that it be contracted through some specific difference, for the vegetative soul as such expresses only a generic notion, which is distinguished through various species, as in trees and plants is most evident; but there cannot be in the horse an individual and real soul constituted under the genus of vegetative soul and not under some species of that genus; therefore it is necessary that it be contracted and constituted through some specific difference. Either, then, that difference would so constitute some ultimate and lowest species of vegetable thing, which would not be capable of a further difference and consequently neither of a further soul; nor would that grade be compared to the subsequent as genus to species, but they would be opposed as two co-distinct ultimate species; therefore it is necessary to say the second, namely that the vegetative soul according to its generic notion is contracted in the soul of the horse through the specific grade itself. From which it is openly concluded that the vegetative soul in the horse is not really distinct from the sensitive, because no thing can be really distinguished from the difference through which it is essentially constituted.

21. And this reason has the same force in the rational soul, and can be applied in the same way; for, if the sensitive soul, for example, were in man really distinct from the rational, that would be specifically contracted within the sensitive grade; whence it would be a certain irrational and bestial soul, which, the rational being set aside either by the intellect or really at least by the power of God, would truly constitute a certain brute as integral and complete in the species of animal as is the horse; in which way Augustine rightly says, Eighty-three Questions, q. 8, that Apollinaris, when he asserted that the Word assumed a sensitive soul without the rational, really said that he assumed a certain beast. How, then, could the composite constituted by such a soul be further informed by the rational soul?

22. Moreover there is an excellent reason, common indeed to all, but which is seen more evidently in man and is taken from the subordination and dependence of all human powers and faculties; for from too much attention to the action of one faculty, for example the intellective, the operation of sense is impeded, indeed even nutrition itself; and from the operation of one power, for example the operation of the phantasy, the heart is moved and other natural faculties are excited. From which experience we proved above that there is a substantial form distinct from accidental faculties, so that there may be one principle in which all faculties are rooted and from which that sympathy of actions comes.

23. There could moreover be adjoined here theological arguments, as is that which is taken from those words of Genesis 2: God formed man of the slime of the earth and breathed into his face the breath of life, and man became a living soul; for that spirit which God breathed was the rational soul, and through the same man was made living and consequently also sentient. Another is from the Eighth General Synod, which is Constantinople IV, can. 11, which has thus: It appears that some have come to such impiety as to dogmatize that men have two souls; such inventors of impiety, then, and those similarly wise, since the Old and New Testament and all the Fathers of the Church assert that man has one rational soul, the holy and universal Synod anathematizes. Whence in the book De ecclesiasticis dogmatibus, c. 15, this too is handed down as certain dogma; but because Ockham says that there the discussion is of two rational souls, in order that it may be evident that this is false, I shall report the words: Nor do we say that there are two souls in one man, as James and others of the Syrians write, one animal, by which the body is animated and which is mixed with the blood, and another spiritual, which ministers reason; but we say that there is one and the same soul in man, which both vivifies the body by its society and disposes itself by its reason. Augustine has similar things, De spiritu et anima, c. 3; Damascene, De fide II, c. 12. There is added that otherwise, when man died, some soul would cease to be, and Christ dying would simply have laid aside some substance united to the Word. Whence Ockham, in order to avoid this disadvantage, says that the sensitive soul of Christ was preserved in Christ, either with the rational or with the body. But if he understands that it remained united to the body, it is heresy, otherwise that body would not have remained dead, but would sense. But if he understands that it remained separated, he says an unheard-of miracle, that a material form was preserved without matter. Likewise it is unheard of in the Church that two souls of Christ were separated during the triduum. Wherefore it would be rash, not to say erroneous, to assert this.

24. Wherefore, when the spirit and soul of man are distinctly named in Scripture, they are not distinguished in substance, but in function and office, as Jerome indicates above, and we declared at length in tom. I of the Third Part, q. 6, in the Commentary on a. 2, and disp. XVII, sect. 4. But often the soul itself, as it absolutely vivifies the body, is called by the name of spirit, as Ecclesiastes 12: And the spirit returns to the Lord, etc.; which immortal spirit elsewhere is called soul, namely Matthew 10: Fear not those who kill the body, but cannot kill the soul. And of Christ the Lord it is said, Matthew 27, that he gave up the spirit, that is, the soul. Whence in the Clementine, sole chapter De summa Trinitate, Christ is said to have assumed the parts of our nature united, namely body and rational soul.

25. The rational soul, although unextended, is the form of matter.—Nor do the reasons made to the contrary have a difficult solution. For to the first the minor is denied, for, although the soul is indivisible and spiritual, it can be immediately united to matter, because it is essentially its act. For it does not matter that in the perfection of being matter and the rational soul are much distant among themselves, for for union one must not attend to distance or nearness in the perfection of entity, but to proportion and fittingness in the mutual respect of act and potency, which proportion is sufficiently found between matter and soul; indeed perhaps greater and more perfect than between matter and any other form whatever. Otherwise, even if matter is feigned already informed by any extended and material form or soul whatever, the soul will still be improportioned to be united to it; because, as regards extension, that form is as extended as matter; therefore, if improportion arose thence, it is not taken away, indeed it is increased from elsewhere. First, because, since that sensitive soul is a substantial and specific act, as has been proved, it is more distant from the rational soul as regards the proportion required for union than the soul and matter, and so rather impedes than helps union. Secondly, because, if a sensitive soul intervened, the intellective would be a pure principle of understanding; but a pure principle of understanding is not apt to inform a body, as we shall show more fully below, treating of separated intelligences. In order, then, that the rational soul be a true form of the body, it is necessary that it itself be the principle not only of intellections but also of the operations which are exercised through the body; therefore most of all of the sensitive operations, which are nearer to the actions of understanding. Which is so necessary that some have doubted whether the soul itself in so far as it is intellective informs the body. But there is no reason why they should have doubted, for the rational soul is essentially the form of the body according to its whole self and according to all its grades, which, although they are prescinded by us by reason, are nevertheless in the thing the same in the soul. Whence, although from the essence of this soul there do not emanate intellective powers which are received in the body, nevertheless the very sensitive powers, indeed also the vegetative, emanate with a certain singular perfection proper to the rational soul and proportioned to ministering to the actions of the mind. And this too is an argument that the sensitive soul is the same with the rational in man.

26. How the rational soul is the form of corporeity.—From which it is also understood how the rational soul, although it is incorporeal, can be the form of corporeity; for to be the act or form of corporeity is not to be itself corporeal or extended, but to be a form constituting with matter one composite substance capable of quantity. Whence, as I was saying above, Disp. XIII, it is altogether the same to be the form of corporeity as to be the substantial form of matter, because from the precise fact that it is the substantial act of matter, from both there is constituted an integral, material and corporeal substance. Since, then, the rational soul, even if it is indivisible, is the true substantial form of the body, it has whatever is necessary in order to be the form of corporeity. From which it can also be concluded that it also sufficiently contains the intermediate grades, namely the vegetative and the sensitive, so that it can confer them formally on the composite, because it cannot contain the extreme grades without these intermediate ones. But it is frequently wont to be said that the rational soul contains these grades virtually and eminently. Which nevertheless seems to others not to suffice for formal causality, although it is enough for efficient. And so without doubt it must be said that, just as it is not of the notion of the form of corporeity that it be formally corporeal, so it is not of the notion of the vegetative and sensitive soul that they be material and extended, but that they be the formal principle of vegetating and sensing, and that they constitute formally the living thing according to these grades of life, which the rational soul truly and formally has; yet it is said to contain eminently by comparison made to the forms of those grades which do not transcend their perfection, because it contains their perfections in a higher way. Whence, speaking generally, it is to be denied that it is of the notion of the vegetative or sensitive form that it be corruptible or educed from the potency of matter, but it would have to be added that this is of the notion of the soul which is only vegetative or only sensitive; but in man there is no form which is only vegetative or only sensitive. Wherefore there is in man no form educed from the potency of matter. Nor does this stand in the way, as others object, of the natural generation of man, because for this it is not necessary that the form come about through eduction; otherwise, even if there were in man a sensitive soul educed from the potency of matter, a man would not be generated, but that irrational animal constituted through such a soul. For natural generation, then, it is enough that the union of the soul to the body comes about in a natural way through natural disposition and action.

27. Contrary operations in man.—To the last reason of Ockham the answer is, first of all, that the diversity or opposition of operations indicates the diversity of proximate faculties, but not of forms, as was said above. Next it is said that it can be understood in two ways that there are in man contrary operations, namely either at the same time or at diverse times. This latter can happen not only in the same soul but also in the same power, as is self-evident; but the former is not true, understood of proper contrariety, for, when the will and the appetite are moved at the same time by contrary affections, they tend into the objects under diverse notions and also in a diverse way; for, if the affection of one is efficacious, that of the other is inefficacious, from which it is rather gathered that these appetites are rooted in the same soul, for the motion of one retards the motion of the other if it is in some way repugnant; but, if they agree among themselves, each comes about more easily and promptly. And these concerning the first head and mode of feigning several substantial forms in the same matter.

Of heterogeneous parts and their forms

28. The second mode of opining about the plurality of forms can be that it happens that two substantial forms remain in the same matter or in the same part of it, when one is imperfect and is compared to the other as a disposition preparing matter and not as generic and specific form; in which there is a great difference between this mode and the preceding, that in the former each form is essential to the composite, and the predicates taken from the individual forms are predicated quidditatively and essentially of one another, as that man is animal, etc., which would plainly be repugnant if the forms were distinct. But according to this second way, the form which is a disposition to the other is not of the essence of the substance composed of matter and the other form, as such accidental dispositions are not of the essence, but causes in some way extrinsic.

29. But I find two opinions which seem to pertain to this second head. One is that which in living things alone posits in the individual dissimilar parts individual partial forms distinct in species, disposing to the integral form, which is one, really distinct from all those partial ones. So holds Antonius Andreae, Metaphysics VII, q. 17; and Paul of Venice, in the Summa de Anima, c. 5; Niphus, De generatione I, text 78; and it is wont to be attributed to the Commentator, because, Physics VI, comm. 59, he says that heart, head and such parts differ in species; and Metaphysics II, text 17, where he says that the animal and its parts agree in the form of the whole and differ in their proper forms. And of these parts some understand what Aristotle says, De generatione animalium II, c. 3, that man first lives the life of a plant, afterwards of an animal, finally the life of a man. The reasons chiefly are that in these parts there are dispositions not only diverse but also contrary, and from the same come operations of diverse notions; therefore they also have partial forms of diverse notions. Likewise, because a heterogeneous part cut off retains the same nature of flesh or bone, and yet in it the form of the whole does not remain; therefore a partial form remains. Thirdly, because these parts differ in species; for on this account they are called heterogeneous or dissimilar parts; but they do not differ in the form of the whole; therefore they differ in partial forms.

30. But this opinion is deservedly rejected by all who deny the plurality of forms, whom I shall report below, and specially Javellus acts against it, Metaphysics VII, q. 16. And besides the general reasons which prove the unity of substantial form, it is attacked in this way. Either we speak of living things having an indivisible soul, or a divisible one co-extended with matter. If the discussion is of the latter, it can easily be conceded that in diverse heterogeneous parts there are diverse heterogeneous parts of the form; for in truth in a tree that part of the form which is in the leaf and that which is in the fruit, etc., are not of the same notion; yet those are partial forms apt to be united among themselves and continued, and therefore they compose one integral form of the whole. Wherefore it is false to feign another total form superadded to these partial forms and again informing all those parts; for to what end is such a form, or by what probable indication is it shown? For whatever is in the whole and in the individual parts, as regards accidents and operations, is sufficiently saved with those partial forms alone united among themselves, or (what is the same) with the integral form alone composed of those parts. Moreover I inquire whether that total form is indivisible or extended. The first cannot be said of these material forms; and, if it is said of some, that pertains to the second member proposed above. It will, then, be an extended form composed of parts; of which again I ask whether its parts which correspond to the diverse heterogeneous parts of the body are altogether similar and of the same notion among themselves or in some way diverse and dissimilar. The first cannot be said, especially speaking consistently in that opinion, for against it proceed the arguments on which that opinion itself relies, namely how a form which is in itself of the same notion requires in diverse parts diverse and contrary dispositions, especially since it is not whole in the individual parts, but according to diverse parts, which are altogether similar among themselves. Likewise, how that form has in diverse parts diverse actions; for, if this is attributed to diverse dispositions, then diverse accidental dispositions will suffice for that diversity of actions, since the actions themselves are also accidental; therefore it is superfluous to feign in the individual parts a twofold substantial form, namely partial and total, of which one would be a disposition to the other. And moreover against this mode of multiplying forms there will proceed a fortiori what we shall say in the following member.

31. The forms of all brutes are divisible.—In those living things, then, which have indivisible forms, there can seem to be some greater reason for doubting, which in truth only has place in the composition of man; for, although of the souls of perfect animals there is some controversy, I suppose nevertheless that it is more probable that no material form is truly and properly indivisible. For a form can be called indivisible in two ways: in one way, because, although it consists of parts, they nevertheless either cannot naturally be separated, as in heavenly forms, or cannot be so separated that they are preserved separated, but as soon as they are divided they are corrupted. And in this way perhaps the souls of perfect animals are indivisible; yet this indivisibility matters nothing to the thing of which we are treating, because it is enough that the soul itself consists of heterogeneous parts and arises whole from their inseparable union, so that it is superfluous to feign other partial forms in the individual parts, as the reason made above proves; for it proceeds equally whether that form is divisible or indivisible in the said sense, as is self-evident. In another way, then, a form is called indivisible properly and in rigour, because it consists of no parts, which it is necessary be whole in the whole and whole in any part whatever, and in this way we judge only the rational soul to be indivisible; although the reasons which will be made of it can be applied to any other whatever, if anyone thinks it indivisible.

32. In the heterogeneous parts of the human body there is a single form.—That such a form, then, does not require in the parts of its organic body diverse partial forms is proved, first, from the eminence and perfection of such a form, which, since it is in itself an indivisible act, per se primarily regards, as its adequate susceptive, that whole consisting of all those parts diversely disposed partially so that from them there arises an integral disposition consonant with the perfection of such form; therefore also in such a composite such partial forms are superfluous. The consequence is evident, both because the indivisible form itself is sufficient to actuate fully and perfectly any part whatever of that matter, even if it is variously disposed; and also because those partial forms do not take away that the indivisible form itself regards all those parts variously disposed as composing its adequate susceptive; nor do they take away that that same form is the radical and principal principle of all the actions which are exercised through those various members; in which genus it is also a sufficient principle of them; therefore those partial forms are superfluous.

33. Secondly, because it is repugnant that one substantial form be a proximate and permanent disposition to another substantial form. One form indeed can be a remote and transient (so to speak) disposition; for so the form of blood is a disposition and as it were a way to the form of flesh, yet remote and transient, because they do not remain at the same time, but flesh comes about from blood as from transient matter. Similarly the form of the embryo is a disposition to the form of man, and in the same sense is to be taken what we were reporting above from Aristotle, namely that man first lives the life of a plant, afterwards the life of an animal, etc.; for in this he signified the process of generation from the imperfect to the perfect through various dispositions, until one arrives at the introduction of the ultimate form; yet always the more imperfect form recedes when the more perfect comes. But that one substantial form be the ultimate disposition to another, remaining at the same time with it, can in no way come about; because each substantial form gives being simply and constitutes a complete essence in the genus of substance; therefore one form cannot be such a disposition to another. Nor does it matter if someone says that this is true of total forms, but not of partial ones; for, if in all the parts of the human body besides the soul there are such forms, from all those partial forms there will arise one integral form distinct from the rational soul; for, just as all the parts of matter are united among themselves and compose one integral body, so all those partial forms will be united among themselves, as the parts of matter which they inform; they will compose, therefore, one integral form constituted in its proper genus and species; therefore it cannot be a disposition to another total form of the same matter.

34. From which I argue, thirdly, for either that form composed of partial ones is a vegetative or sensitive soul, or it is the form of an inanimate thing. This latter cannot consistently be said, otherwise these partial forms would not serve the proper vital functions of the individual members, although it is said that they are posited chiefly for this cause. And moreover against such a form proceed all the things which were said above of the form of mixture or of corporeity. And in a similar way, if such a form is said to be a soul, against that position proceed all the things adduced above against those who posit in man two or three souls. Nor does it matter if someone contends that from those partial ones one is not composed, for then of each partial form taken by itself, as of flesh or bone, the same reason will proceed; because in truth in this consideration each of those forms is called partial in name only, since it is not a true part of some total form; in itself, then, it will be a certain integral form, of which it could be asked whether it is a soul or not, and the reason made will proceed.

35. And similarly it could be inquired whether these partial forms, or the integral one composed of them, remain in the body when the rational soul recedes, or perish. If the first is said, it follows, first, sufficiently consistently, that that body remains alive when the rational soul recedes; for (as I said) those forms, or that which arises from them, must be a soul, otherwise it would serve nothing for the operations of life. Likewise it follows that a part cut off and conjoined to the human body is univocally flesh or bone, etc., which is against Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, text 56, and more clearly De generatione animalium I, c. 19, and De Anima I, c. 1. But if all such partial forms recede when the soul recedes, first they are feigned without any indication or necessity. And next there follow the theological inconveniences which we inferred above, namely that in the death of Christ some substantial form was laid aside by the Word or remained separated together with the rational soul.

36. How Plato posited several forms in man, and he is refuted.—Add that Aristotle, De Anima I, text 91 and following, professedly attacks the opinion of Plato positing several souls in diverse parts of the body. But the reason is the same of many partial forms. It is true that Plato only posited diverse souls as it were partial in diverse parts, but not afterwards one integral one in the whole; but this mode of positing several does not pertain to the present disputation, because in truth according to it several forms are not posited in the same part of matter. But it is evident that it is altogether false, because from it it follows that the rational soul does not inform the human body, but some part of it, and consequently it follows that it is not the principle of all the vital acts of man, which is repugnant to sound doctrine, which defines that the rational soul is the true form of the body. And above too it was shown that from the connection of these operations their rooting in one principle is gathered. Finally the reason of Aristotle is that which most of all pertains to the matter; for so he gathers: either those souls informing diverse parts are united in one soul, or not. If they are not united, then they do not compose one per se. But if they are united in one soul, or are contained in one composite through one as it were common to all, that one suffices, and the several others are falsely and superfluously multiplied; and this reason proceeds equally of any partial forms whatever.

37. To the reasons of the contrary opinion the solution is evident from what has been said. To the first the answer is that those various dispositions of the organic parts complete one integral disposition of one total form, either divisible or indivisible, as has been explained. But as regards the operations of these parts, if the discussion is of merely natural and transient actions, as to heat, to cool, etc., these come proximately from the first qualities, by which these parts are diversely disposed and affected. But if the discussion is of vital operations, as are to attract, to expel, to touch, to see, etc., these come proximately from diverse vital faculties, which sometimes exist in the same, sometimes in diverse parts of the body; but of all the radical principle is one and the same form, because it is the universal principle virtually containing all these. And therefore on account of these dispositions or operations it is not necessary that partial forms be multiplied, especially since, these being posited, it is necessary to confess that the superior and total form informs those parts and requires in them those various dispositions, and can through them exercise those various operations.

38. If a part cut off is again united, whether this comes about substantially.—To the second the answer is by denying the antecedent, for in a heterogeneous part cut off the same form does not remain which was before, and therefore a hand cut off is equivocally a hand, as Aristotle said. But it is wont to be urged against this, that such a part cut off, if within a short time it is again conjoined to the whole according to the same part whence it was cut off, is truly and substantially united and lives as before; therefore it retained the same form, otherwise it could not again be informed by it, because from privation to habit there is no return. But this rejoinder has the same difficulty in every opinion, because it cannot be denied that that part through division lost the information of the total form, for example the rational soul; if, then, afterwards it is again united and informed by it, there comes about a return from privation to habit. But if it is denied that it is again informed by the rational soul, by the same reason we shall deny that it is again truly united. Whence Soncinas, Metaphysics VIII, q. 10, ad 7, thinks it more probable that a perfect physical union of such a part never again comes about. But to the experience, which is said to be that such a part again lives and senses, it will be answered according to this opinion by denying that there is sense in the part itself, but in the neighbouring ones; as in bones or teeth there seems to be a sense of pain from the nearness of other parts. But as regards nourishment and the conservation of the temperament, it will be said to come about through juxtaposition. But because these are difficult to believe, it is perhaps more probable that that part is again informed by the rational soul, nor is it inconvenient from that partial and as it were momentary privation to return to the habit, because the form remained integral in itself, and the dispositions which were in such part to that form in number remained the same, and in that short delay were also little diminished, and therefore it is not inconvenient that the same form at once return to that part of matter.

39. Whether heterogeneous parts differ in substantial species.—To the third the answer can be by denying the assumption, namely that heterogeneous parts differ in substantial species, but it is enough that they differ accidentally, whence they are called dissimilar on account of the diversity of dispositions. Nevertheless in living things having extended souls I judge it more probable that between the parts of the soul themselves which inform diverse organic parts there is some greater diversity than there is between the parts of a homogeneous form, and therefore that in the substance itself there is some diversity between these parts, which will rightly be called specific partiality. But in the human form it has a special difficulty how it informs these parts and is united to them diversely according to the notion of the dispositions. But this matter pertains to the science of the soul.

Of the forms of the elements, whether they remain in the mixed body

40. The second opinion, pertaining also to this second head, is that of Avicenna, the Commentator and others, who say that in all mixed bodies the forms of the elements remain; for it does not seem credible that they remain for another use than that they be dispositions to the form of the mixed body. But Avicenna holds this, Sufficientia I, c. 10; and the Commentator, De generatione I, chapter on Mixture, and De caelo III, text 67. Who differ, for the former posits the substantial forms of the elements indivisible, and therefore affirms that they remain in the mixed body integral and perfect substantially; but the latter thinks that those forms are intensible and remissible, and therefore says that they remain in the mixed body remitted, according to the proportion of their qualities. For he thinks that these forms of the elements are so imperfect that they are as it were intermediate between qualities and perfect substantial forms; on account of which perhaps they are called qualities by Plato in the Timaeus, and therefore they imitate qualities in gradual breadth, according to which they can be intensified and remitted; which opinion so expounded is followed by Niphus, De generatione I, text 118, and Metaphysics VIII, disp. IV, and Metaphysics XI, last disp.; Zimara, theorem 48. Many of the physicians too followed the same opinion, as can be seen in Thomas de Garbo, in the Summa medicinalis, Book I, tract. I, q. 1; and especially Galen, Methodus II, c. 2, and the book De substantia naturalium facultatum, toward the end; and of the theologians Aureolus followed the same, In II, dist. 15, as Capreolus and Gregory report there.

41. The opinion is explained in various ways.—But this opinion can be understood in various ways. First, that the forms of the elements remain in diverse very minute particles of matter. And in this way Avicenna posited that such forms remain in the mixed body, and perhaps he wished that the form of the mixed body inform all those particles and unite them among themselves, otherwise he could not save substantial mixture, but only through juxtaposition, as appears self-evident. For the individual particles, as they would be distinguished in matter and form, so also in quantity; therefore also in place, for they could not penetrate one another in place; therefore they would only be said to be mixed through juxtaposition, as water and wine while they remain integral in their substances; yet the individual particles would not be mixed, and consequently neither would the whole be substantially mixed nor be per se one, because the parts would not be per se connected; whence they would easily be dissipated through mutual action or local motion. There is necessary, therefore, another form proper to the mixed body, diverse from the forms of the elements, as again we shall show below against Aureolus. But this too is impossible. First, because the form of the mixed body and the form of the element require diverse and incompossible dispositions, to omit the general reasons against the plurality of forms. Secondly, because, since all the parts of the mixed body, especially in homogeneous things, have the same temperament of the first qualities, no reason can be given on account of which in one part of the matter of the mixed body there is the form of fire, in another of water, etc. Which reason proceeds also in heterogeneous things; for any heterogeneous part consists of homogeneous ones and is mixed. Thirdly, because, if in parts disposed in the same way diverse forms of the elements remain, it is a sign that that form in such a part is not a disposition to the form of the mixed body, since in a similar part there can be with a contrary form the substantial form of the mixed body; therefore it will equally well or better be able to be, even if in such part of matter no form of the element exists, provided there is there a proportioned temperament of the first qualities, which too cannot depend on the form of such element, since in another similar part it is said to be with a contrary form. From which it is also concluded that such a form is irrelevant to every action and conservation of that part of the mixed body in which it is said to be; and therefore from no effect or natural sign can it be gathered that the forms of the elements remain in this way in the mixed body.

42. In another way that opinion can be understood, namely that all the forms of the elements at the same time inform any part whatever of the matter of the mixed body, and afterwards the form of the mixed body supervenes, also informing that whole matter. And this mode contains so many absurdities that on that account it seems asserted by no one; for, first, it follows that formally repugnant forms are at the same time in the same part of matter in their integral and perfect being; for the forms of the elements formally fight among themselves; for, if their dispositions are formally repugnant, how will the forms themselves not be? Otherwise how will one element be generated from another? Or why will the generation of one be the corruption of another, if their forms are not repugnant in matter? Secondly, if such forms do not have their proper dispositions in the degree proper to themselves, and consequently not their proper actions either, they can confer nothing to the form of the mixed body; therefore they are not dispositions to it. Indeed it is impossible that the same form postulate in the same part of matter altogether repugnant dispositions and in their perfect being, as supreme heat and supreme cold; but no less repugnant among themselves are the substantial forms of water and fire, especially in their perfect being. Thirdly, the general arguments wont to be made against the plurality of forms most of all make against this opinion, because it posits in the same part of matter several specific forms per se sufficient to constitute a supposit having its proper being simply and requiring very repugnant dispositions; for the form of earth postulates the greatest density, but the form of fire the greatest rarity; this intense heat, but the form of water intense cold; how, then, can it come about that such integral and perfect forms at the same time inform the same part of matter?

43. The forms of the elements are most perfectly substantial.—In a third way this opinion can be understood as the Commentator expounded it, namely that all the forms of the elements are in the whole matter of the mixed body and in all its parts, refracted however (as he says) and in a remiss degree, and afterwards the whole matter so affected and disposed by those forms is informed by the form of the mixed body. In which opinion there is first wont to be attacked what the Commentator supposes, namely that the forms of the elements are not perfectly substantial but intermediate between accidental and substantial. Against which St. Thomas argues, De generatione I, text 84, because it is impossible that there be a medium between substance and accident, both because between contradictories there is no medium, but substance and accident are distinguished by immediate contradiction; and also because a medium is between extremes of the same genus, but substance and accident are of diverse genera. Next we can add that the substantial form of fire and of any element whatever is per se sufficient to actuate matter so that it constitutes or preserves it in being, and to constitute with it one supposit which is properly and univocally substance; therefore such a form is as properly and univocally substantial as any other whatever. And this very thing was confirmed above, when we showed that there are substantial forms.

44. Intension is repugnant to substantial forms.—But if perhaps the Commentator does not deny this, but calls them intermediate only because among substantial forms they have the least perfection, whence it comes about that in some properties they can have likeness with accidental forms, against this, the controversy about the mode of speaking being omitted, I show, secondly, that he falsely attributes to them likeness with accidental forms in this condition of intension and remission, because this condition is so proper to accidents or qualities that it is directly repugnant to substantial form in so far as it is such; if, then, the forms of the elements are truly and properly substantial, as has been shown, they cannot be similar to accidents in this condition. The antecedent is proved, first, from the Philosopher, in the Categories, chapter on Substance, saying that substance does not receive more and less; but if the substantial form of water were intensified and remitted, in truth, as water is more or less cold, so it would be more or less water.

45. Secondly, St. Thomas argues, I, q. 76, a. 4, ad 4, because the substantial being of any thing whatever consists in the indivisible, and every addition or subtraction varies the species, as in numbers, as is said in Metaphysics VIII, text 10. But this reason can suffer cavil, because by a similar reason it would be proved that quality cannot be intensified and remitted, since also in accidental forms it is true that their essences consist in the indivisible and that their species are as numbers, and consequently that any subtraction and addition varies the species; but it is to be understood of essential and formal addition, not of intensive; the same, then, could be answered of substantial forms. The answer, however, is that the reason is diverse of substantial and accidental form; for the former is that which first constitutes the essence of the thing simply, and therefore it is necessary that it be altogether indivisible and invariable as long as it remains in the same matter. Which is declared a posteriori from that effect from which we gathered above that there are substantial forms, namely from the reduction of water to its pristine coldness; for, if the substantial form of water were remissible, certainly it would be remitted when the coldness was remitted, because, just as the form depends on the disposition, so the intension of the form on the intension of the disposition; therefore it would be impossible that the water afterwards by intrinsic power should bring itself back to its pristine state, because a remitted form cannot intensify itself; nor does it have another prior principle from which that intension would emanate. In order, then, that water, however much heated, can, extrinsic agents being removed, restore itself from within to its connatural state, it is necessary that it remain integral and perfect in the notion of water, and consequently that the formal principle itself constitutive of water remain intact (so to speak) as long as it is not altogether corrupted. And in this sense we say that it is of the notion of substantial form that it be invariable and immutable in its entity when it essentially remains the same and in the same matter, because it is the radical principle of all the properties and constitutes the first essence of the thing.

46. And it is confirmed, because for this cause, on the testimony of the Philosopher, Physics V and De generatione I, the substantial corruption or generation of the elements does not come about successively with the alteration itself, but in a moment at the end of the alteration, when the sufficient disposition is completed, namely because the substantial form is not remitted nor taken away by parts, but whole at once; but if it were intensible and remissible, certainly it would be introduced successively, and similarly expelled; indeed, as often as water is heated by fire, so many degrees of the form of fire would be introduced into the water as of heat, which is incredible. Add that, if the forms of the elements can so be intensified and remitted, why will the forms of mixed bodies too not be intensified and remitted according to the intension and remission of the simple forms? especially since these are said to be required for those as necessary dispositions. For example, if the form of gold requires in its matter six degrees of the form of fire and two of water in order to be in its connatural state, if through contrary action those degrees of the form of fire are further remitted in the gold and the form of water is intensified, why will the form of gold not also recede from its natural perfection and be diminished in its very entity? Certainly no sufficient reason can be given; for that it is more perfect is not enough; for thence it only follows that the degrees of its breadth will be more perfect. It must be said, then, that it is of the notion of substantial form that it have or constitute an essence intensively indivisible, and therefore this belongs equally to the forms of the elements and to the others.

47. The forms of all the elements can in no way be in the same matter.—Thirdly, this opinion is to be principally attacked from the matter which we are now treating, because it is impossible that so many substantial forms be at the same time in the same matter. For, although they are said to be remitted, nevertheless each, if it is substantial, gives being simply and constitutes a true substance and substantial supposit; but it cannot be understood that one supposit is at the same time in four or five distinct species, and that there are many individuals of diverse substantial species consisting of the same matter. Which reason we shall declare more fully below. There is added moreover against Averroes that, if the forms of the elements in remiss degrees filling the breadth remain at the same time in the same matter, then the potency of matter is sufficiently actuated by them and the mixture too is sufficiently completed from them alone; therefore it is both superfluous and impossible that a new mixed form be added to all those forms.

48. The form of the mixed body is distinct from that of the elements.—Whence Aureolus (as Gregory above reports) said that the form of the mixed body is not some simple form, but only that commixture or aggregation of the forms of the elements in remiss being. But how absurd this opinion is is self-evident; for from it it follows that mixed substances are not true substances per se one. Next it follows that animals, even man himself, do not have one simple form. Finally it follows that all mixed bodies do not differ substantially and essentially, but only according to more and less, nor have properties or actions of a more perfect notion than are the qualities and actions of the elements. The very properties and faculties of mixed bodies, therefore, evidently indicate proper substantial forms of a nobler notion than are the forms of the elements.

49. And hence, by retorting the argument, it is concluded that those forms of the elements conjoined at the same time in the same matter and as it were supposed to the form of the mixed body are superfluous, even if per impossibile otherwise they were not repugnant, because both for the being of matter and for the substantial being of the composite, and for every physical action which can be known by experience of such a composite, the form of the mixed body suffices with the faculties which emanate from it and the temperament of the first qualities by which matter is disposed. Which temperament indeed, although it is not some simple quality virtually containing the first ones, as Avicenna thought, but is formally composed of the first in remiss being, as the true and common opinion holds, which is treated at length in De generatione I, nevertheless does not require the substantial forms of the elements formally existing there, but the form of the mixed body suffices, to which such a temperament is connatural and which has power and efficacy to preserve or recover it, if extrinsic impediments are taken away.

50. And as regards this the elements are rightly said to remain, as regards substantial forms, virtually in the substantial form of the mixed body, but as regards accidental ones formally, although they do not remain integral but remitted. Which Scotus declared well, In II, dist. 15, whom Gabriel and Gregory follow there; Giles, De generatione II, and others; and he is undeservedly attacked by Cajetan, I, q. 76, a. 4, at the end; for it is not repugnant to the doctrine of St. Thomas; for nowhere did he deny it, but rather indicates it in the sense expounded by us, Opusculum 33. Nor is there any difficulty in it, because the form of the mixed body is not said to contain the forms of the elements in the genus of formal cause or according to the whole perfection eminently contained, as Cajetan seems to have thought, but only according to a certain participation and fittingness, as has been declared.

51. From these, then, it is sufficiently concluded that it does not follow from the mixture of the elements that there are in the mixed body several substantial forms, because the forms of the elements do not remain in the mixed body formally, but in power only, which is the opinion of Aristotle, as I shall show below, and commonly received, as is evident from Alexander, Philoponus, St. Thomas, on De generatione I; and the same St. Thomas, I, q. 76, a. 4, ad 4, and De potentia, q. 5, a. 7, and other scholastics, In II, dist. 12, especially Capreolus and Gregory in the places cited; and Scotus, q. 1; Hervaeus, tract De pluralitate formarum, q. 15; Giles, Quodlibet IV, q. 11; Soncinas, Metaphysics X, q. 27, and Book XII, q. 68. But the discussion is of the substantial forms of the elements; for the accidental remain formally, but this matters nothing to the present question. Whence the philosophers who denied substantial forms in the elements consistently said that the elements remain formally in the mixed body, and in this way Galen proceeded, for, as we saw in sect. 1 of this disputation, he does not recognize substantial forms in the elements, but only the first qualities. Whence, as regards the present matter, he does not contradict us, but rather favours us. See him, Methodus I, c. 2, and the little book De substantia naturalium facultatum, a little from the beginning, and De placitis Hippocratis VIII.

52. An objection.—But they object Aristotle to us, who, De generatione I, c. 10, defines mixture as the union of altered miscibles; when, therefore, the elements are mixed, they are not corrupted but only altered; and so in that whole chapter Aristotle often repeats that the miscibles are not corrupted; but if one has perished, they cannot be mixed; for things which are not (he says) are not received into mixture. Secondly, the same Aristotle, Metaphysics V, c. 3, defines the element to be that from which something comes about, so that it is present in it, and into which the resolution finally comes about; therefore, if the elements do not remain in the mixed body, they are not elements, nor will the mixed body be able to be resolved into them, which is false and against experience; for, when wood is burned, we experience both smoke and a watery humour and ashes and fire to come forth from it. Nor is it enough to say that all those are contained in the wood virtually or in potency, otherwise even water would be called mixed, at least of air and water, both because it has in itself a certain quality of air, and also because when water is heated an airy vapour is exhaled from it. And it is confirmed; for from virtual containment it only follows that the elements can be generated from the mixed body; but this is not enough, for also the mixed body can be generated from any element whatever, and one element from another. Whence Aristotle, De caelo III, c. 3, says that the elements are contained in wood and flesh, because they are manifestly segregated from them; but conversely that flesh and wood are not contained in fire, because they cannot be segregated from it. It is one thing, then, to be segregated, another to be generated; therefore segregation requires formal containment. Thirdly, Aristotle says, De caelo I, c. 7, that the mixed body is moved by the motion of the predominant element; therefore it remains in it. Fourthly, De caelo III, text 67, and De partibus animalium II, c. 1, and Meteorologica IV, c. 12, he says that the elements are the matter of the mixed body.

53. The opinion of Aristotle, that the elements remain in the mixed body in power only.—The definition of mixture is elucidated.—The answer is that Aristotle, De caelo III, c. 3, asserts under a disjunction that the element is present in the mixed body in potency or in act; for this, he says, in which way it is, is still doubted; but the question which he left undecided in that place he resolved in De generatione I, c. 10, when he expressly says that the things which are received into mixture in a certain way are and in a certain way are not; for in act (he says) they are not, but in power or capacity they remain, and in this he constitutes the difference between mixture and other changes; and De partibus animalium II, c. 1, he says that the first composition of bodies is that which is made from the primordia which some call elements; I mean earth, water, air and fire, but perhaps it can better be said to be made from the powers¹ of the elements; for humidity, dryness, heat and cold are the matter of composite bodies. Of the opinion of Aristotle, then, it is sufficiently evident. When, therefore, Aristotle says that mixture is the union of altered miscibles, he said altered rather than corrupted in order to denote that they do not altogether perish, but remain in power and according to qualities. Nor did Aristotle in that chapter deny that in true mixture the miscibles are corrupted; nor could he deny it, for, since through mixture a new substantial form of the mixed body is introduced, it is necessary that the substantial corruption of the miscibles come about, because the generation of one is always the corruption of another. But he said that they do not altogether perish, because they remain in power.

54. The description of the element is explained.—To the second it can be answered, first, that that definition of element does not belong to these simple bodies which are commonly called elements, but to the first principles of which the natural thing is composed. Which opinion Averroes favours, Metaphysics V, comm. 4, saying that prime matter is properly element, but the simple bodies only in the opinion of men, for, because the ancient philosophers did not know another matter except these simple bodies, therefore they called them elements. And so Aristotle, De partibus animalium II, c. 1, does not call them elements absolutely, but which some call elements; and he speaks in the same way De generatione II, c. 1, and in other places. And this can be confirmed from that particle of the definition of element, namely that it is that from which something is first composed. But these bodies are not those from which something is first composed, since they themselves are composed of other prior things. Likewise Aristotle in the same place says that the element must be something indivisible; but these bodies are not indivisible, as is evident. And according to this opinion it is easily answered to the argument that it is not inconvenient that that particle of the definition of element, namely that it is present, does not properly belong to these bodies, because they are not properly elements. Secondly, lest we seem to stick at the word only, we admit that the name and definition of element properly belong to these bodies; indeed St. Thomas, In Metaph. V, lect. 4, will have them to be more properly elements than matter or form. For he will have it of the notion of element that it be directly and properly in some species. Which nevertheless I do not see why it pertains to the propriety of that word and why it is not enough that the element be in its species something partial or incomplete. So, then, element in Latin seems to be the same as the principle of some thing which in its order is first in composition and last in resolution, and therefore it is also of the notion of element that it be indivisible, not simply and in every way, but in its order and breadth. And similarly it is of the notion of element that it be present not always formally, nor always in power only, but in a mode accommodated to its composition. So, then, the four elements truly participate the notion of element, because in that genus of composition by which one body can be fused from many bodies they are first, because they do not consist of other bodies, and from them the rest consist. And similarly they are simple and indivisible, because they are not resolvable into several bodies. Finally they are also present in that mode which is necessary for that genus of composition which comes about through mixture. And so Aristotle, De caelo III, c. 3, expressly posits under a disjunction in the description of element that it is present in potency or in act.

55. The name of element belongs properly to prime matter.—Sometimes attributed to form.—Whence it does not stand in the way that prime matter is prior to these bodies and formally is present or remains in its composite; for thence it only comes about that matter too can truly and properly be called element, by another reason however and perhaps a prior one, in so far as matter is prior in composition and simpler, as St. Thomas noted, In De caelo III, lect. 8, where he seems to retract the opinion which he had held on Metaphysics V, as Soncinas noted, Metaphysics V, after q. 9, about text 4 of Aristotle, who also, Book XII, q. 27, ad 1, adds that the form can be called element, and so Aristotle names it, Metaphysics XII, c. 4; and St. Thomas, in the cited place. For, although the name of element seems chiefly to be attributed to the material principle, as is evident from common usage and from the propriety of that particle of the definition, from which something comes about, nevertheless, speaking more broadly, it is extended to any part whatever, as the whole too is said to be composed of its parts, both formal and material. Indeed by this reason any parts whatever, if they are considered absolutely under the common notion of parts, are said to have the notion of matter with respect to the whole. By this reason, then, any part whatever, if in its order it is first and indivisible, can be called element.

56. From which it follows, in order that we may answer the other part of the argument, that it is not of the notion of element that the composite or mixed body can be so resolved into it that the element in the thing itself is preservable separated from the elemented thing; for in this way every natural composite cannot be resolved into matter and form. And by equal reason, it is not necessary that the mixed body be resolvable into the same elements in number of which perhaps the mixed body was made, but it is enough that it is resolved into similar ones; which sometimes will happen if the efficient causes are accommodated and near to making that resolution; but often it does not so come about, but the whole mixed body is converted into some element, especially into earth. Wherefore, although the experience which is adduced in the argument were true, it would conclude nothing, because it is not necessary that the things which are seen to come about from wood when it is burned preceded formally in it, but in power according to some less remote disposition, by reason of which all those are generated anew; yet in truth those are not elements, but imperfect mixed bodies, because neither is smoke air nor ash earth.

57. In mixed bodies sometimes lesser little bodies are imbibed.—Add also that in these mixed bodies there are often several substances accidentally intermixed through the pores or through the division and interposition of parts, which substances afterwards through the action of some agent are not so much generated anew as separated, as happens in the concoction of wine and in the corruption of blood outside the veins, and perhaps so it happens also in that action of fire on wood, although it can also happen that not the same substances which were there are separated, but others which are easily generated from them according to their diverse dispositions. But this commixture of substances does not matter to the thing of which we are treating, because, although there are there several forms, they are nevertheless in diverse matters and make diverse composites, although locally conjoined.

58. How the mixed body is moved by the predominant element.—Nor finally does what was inferred in that argument follow hence, that one element is resolved into another or consists of another; for, although water agrees with air in humidity, it does not have it participated from air, but from itself and its simple nature. But when through heating a humid vapour is exhaled from water, water is not resolved into air; for that vapour is not air, but a certain imperfect mixed body; but when it happens that water is transmuted into air, it is not a resolution into miscibles, but a certain generation and corruption. Whence the elements are far otherwise in the mixed body than one element in another; for this is true only in passive potency; but that not only in this way, but also in power and by a certain participation of active potency; for in this way Aristotle is to be understood when he says that the elements are in the mixed body in act or in potency. And hence too the solution is evident to the third testimony. For, in order that the mixed body be moved by the motion of the predominant element, it is enough that it contain it in power and participate more of its qualities than of another's. Finally the elements are called the matter of the mixed body, transient formally, but remaining in power. Whence the same Aristotle, De generatione II, c. 5, denies that the elements are the matter of natural things. For if air (he says) remained, it would not be generation but alteration. It is evident, then, that on account of the disposition of one form to another several substantial forms never happen to be conjoined in the same matter.

Whether two forms not subordinated can at the same time inform the same matter

59. Matter can divinely be informed by two forms.—It remained to speak of the third mode of feigning two substantial forms in the same matter without any relationship among themselves or with respect to some third form to which they dispose, but by mere accidental concomitance, as whiteness and sweetness are related in the same subject. But it is not necessary to linger in attacking this mode; first, because I find no opinion in this matter; for no philosopher (as far as I know) has hitherto said that two substantial forms can in this way and naturally inform the same matter at the same time. But I say naturally, because of absolute power I do not think it implies a contradiction, whether that matter is posited in diverse places with diverse forms, which I showed elsewhere can come about,² or has each form in the same place; for unity of place does not add a special repugnance. Secondly, because from those forms existing at the same time in the same matter in truth one essence or one substance would not be composed, because neither form would be of the essence of the composite of matter and the other form, nor conversely. Whence, if we feign that one is the form of gold and the other of wood, neither would the wood be gold nor the gold wood, because essentially diverse forms are not predicated of each other, even in the concrete, except by reason of the same supposit in which they agree; but those forms would not agree in the same supposit, but only in the same matter, with which, as diverse natures, so also they would make diverse composites, other miracles being set aside. Whence, although matter could be called informed by the form of wood and of gold, nevertheless the wood would not be gold, because the wood is not matter, nor is the gold matter. And so, even that case being admitted, there would not be given two formal causes of one effect, which we are now inquiring, but each would constitute its own effect, which would have only one formal cause.

60. Why naturally the same matter cannot be actuated by several substantial forms at the same time.—Hence, however, is understood the natural repugnance on account of which such forms cannot at the same time inform such matter; for that one and the same matter successively composes essences even distinct in species with many forms is not inconvenient, indeed it naturally happens, because it is indifferent to any form whatever and can be actuated by any whatever. But that the same portion of matter at the same time compose diverse essences with diverse forms is repugnant to the natures of things for many causes. First, because the potency of matter is sufficiently actuated by one form and its dependence sufficiently terminated. Secondly, because diverse forms require naturally incompatible dispositions, which is a sign that their natural effects too are naturally incompatible. Thirdly, because matter serves the form for its natural motions and actions; but the same matter cannot at the same time serve distinct forms, which have diverse natural inclinations. Fourthly, because otherwise, if matter could in this way be under distinct forms, by the same reason it could be under any multitude of them to infinity, because things which are per accidens can be multiplied to infinity; nor can a greater repugnance be assigned in three than in two, and so of any number whatever. But this both is of itself very absurd and is repugnant to the end and institution of matter, for so it would be inept for the generations and corruptions of things. Whence this very thing, that the generation of one is naturally the corruption of another, sufficiently declares that matter is naturally incapable of several forms.

The true opinion and conclusion of the whole question

61. It remains, therefore, that that opinion is most true which asserts that of one composite substance there is only one formal cause and in one natural composite there is only one substantial form. Which St. Thomas holds, I, q. 76, a. 4; and there Cajetan and all the Thomists; most fully Capreolus, In II, dist. 15; and Ferrariensis, Contra Gentiles II, c. 58; Soncinas, Metaphysics VIII, q. 7. Likewise Gregory has it, In II, dist. 17, q. 2; Giles, De Anima II, q. 6, and the tract De pluralitate formarum; Hervaeus too treats it at length, De pluralitate formarum; Marsilius, De generatione I, q. 6. But from Aristotle we have nothing expressly on this matter; yet from his principles this opinion is clearly gathered; for he never attributes to the natural composite except one form, and in this sense he assigns three principles of the natural thing, namely matter, privation and form; for by this reason he says that as often as one is generated another is corrupted and conversely; he says moreover that the substantial form is the proper, per se and immediate act of matter, and therefore from them most of all one per se comes about, as is taken from De Anima II, text 7, and Metaphysics VII, text 49.

62. But the reasons can easily be taken from what was said in attacking the other opinions. The first is taken from a sufficient enumeration of the parts, because there cannot be in matter several forms essentially subordinated as act and potency, nor ordered as disposition and form, nor yet altogether through concomitance without any order among themselves; but besides these modes another cannot be thought out; therefore in no way can several substantial formal causes concur to the same effect.

63. The second reason is taken from the sufficiency of any substantial form whatever; for any substantial form whatever is necessarily such that through itself alone it suffices to constitute one complete substantial supposit in some ultimate species of substance; therefore not only does it not require another form concausing that effect, but neither can it admit it. The antecedent is evident from what has been said; for it has been proved that every substantial form must necessarily be constituted in some ultimate species of substantial form, and consequently that it is of its notion that it give being simply and complete up to the ultimate notion in the genus of substance. But the consequence is proved, because either the second form would come to the composite as constituted by the prior form and immediately actuating it, or it would come at the same time and as it were concomitantly to matter itself. The first is repugnant to the notion of substantial form, which per se regards substantial potency; but complete substance is no longer in substantial potency, but in accidental only; for of it most of all is true what Aristotle said above, namely that that which comes to a being in act does not come per se, but per accidens. But the second is repugnant both to the substantial forms themselves and to the capacity of matter; for those according to their specific differences are repugnant among themselves; for, by the very fact that each substantial form constitutes a complete substantial nature, it so determines for itself the matter which it informs and as it were draws it to its being that it does not admit in it another substantial form, or one of the same order. Matter likewise has a limited capacity and as it were power of causing, so that it cannot at the same time sustain more than one substantial form, nor concur except to composing one essence, which can also be seen in heavenly matter; and this is no less necessary in this inferior matter, which is the principle of corruption, in so far as it so underlies one form that it necessarily deserts it if it receives another.

64. The third principal reason can be put together from those things which we said above for proving that there are substantial forms in natural things; for the strongest reasons by which substantial form is shown rely on this, that for the perfect constitution of a natural being it is necessary that all the faculties and operations of the same being be rooted in one essential principle, which connection and rooting the natural effects themselves also show, as we deduced there; therefore the plurality of forms is altogether foreign to the constitution of nature. Nor is there in the whole of nature any indication for asserting it; for the subordination of essential predicates is no indication, as we have said; and therefore Aristotle said, De Anima II, text 31, that the posterior form contains the prior ones, because that which gives the ultimate difference gives also the superior ones. The multitude too of actions, faculties or organs not only is not an indication, but rather most of all requires the unity of the form. Finally the vicissitude or succession of generation and corruption indicates and requires the same unity; therefore there is nothing why we should doubt that one formal cause suffices for each natural effect. Nor do new objections occur against this truth which it is necessary to satisfy.

From what has been said it is concluded that there is no process to infinity in formal causes

65. And from these in passing is resolved that question which is wont to be raised about the formal cause, namely whether in such a genus of cause there can be a process to infinity. For, speaking of the proper physical formal cause, it is evident from what has been said that this question has no place; for it can only be asked when several causes can concur to the same effect; for where there is a single cause, what process can there be? But it has been shown that the formal cause can only be single; therefore in this cause the question of a process to infinity has no place. Next, this process is wont to be either between causes per se and essentially subordinated or between causes subordinated per accidens; but it has been shown that no substantial forms are per se subordinated. Whence those who distinguish them according to the order of essential predicates can suffer some difficulty in this; for perhaps in these predicates it is not repugnant that there be a process to infinity, as we shall touch upon in the following section; but according to our opinion this matters nothing, because we judge that these predicates, in whatever number they are multiplied, not only do not require distinct forms per se subordinated, but also that such predicates cannot be taken with respect to the same composite except from one and the same form, so that not only from the nature of the thing, but also by absolute power, formal causes cannot be given per se subordinated in this way, because there cannot be given a substantial form which is not constituted in some ultimate species of such form, and consequently which does not essentially include all the superior grades of such forms. Nor does it matter that Aristotle, Metaphysics II, c. 2, proves that there is no process to infinity in these forms from this, that there is no process to infinity in quidditative predicates, because, although from that negation this negation is excellently inferred, nevertheless from the opposite affirmation the opposite affirmation is not, as was said above. Again, neither in this genus are there given causes subordinated per accidens, because it has also been shown that several forms cannot concur at the same time, even altogether per accidens, to informing the same matter. But if anyone says that there can be given a process to infinity in forms contained under the same genus or species, and calls them formal causes subordinated per accidens, let him notice that it is necessary that those are not causes of one and the same effect, but each has its distinct effect; but when the subordination of causes is investigated, it is to be understood with respect to one and the same effect, otherwise it is not subordination but the multiplication of things or effects. Whence, even if by the absolute power of God forms were multiplied per accidens in the same matter, there would not be there subordination of causes, because, as I said above, they would not constitute one and the same effect, but diverse ones, and moreover would have no order among themselves, but would be multiplied altogether per accidens. In this genus of cause, then, there is no process of causes, neither to infinity nor in any finite number. A process to infinity is excluded from the material cause

66. From which finally it is understood that much less can there be a process to infinity in matter, because, if there were, it could only arise from the infinity of forms; for, as was demonstrated above, there must necessarily be given one prime matter which is not in another subject; but this prime matter in each composite can only be one, because one matter cannot be received in it, since this is against the notion of prime matter; nor yet can several matters be conjoined in the same composite and be informed by the same form unless one of them is united to the other so that from both one potency comes about, which can in no way be understood; therefore in substantial matters not only can there not be a process to infinity, but neither can there be any process at all or any plurality.

67. But if the discussion is not of prime matter but of proximate, either proximate substantially and as a potency immediately and per se receiving the form is understood, or proximate accidentally, that is, as affected by dispositions accommodated to the form. In the former way in truth only prime matter through its simple entity is also proximate matter to any form whatever, and so there is no process; and it could only be feigned if between prime matter and the ultimate substantial form some substantial forms intervened, of which one would be compared to the other as proximate potency to its act; but these forms are not given, as has been shown, and, although they were given, an infinite progress in them would not be intelligible, both because an infinite multitude of forms is no less repugnant than an infinite multitude in act of any beings whatever; and also because it is necessary that there be given some first form, that is, first informing matter; for, since matter of itself is immediate potency, it is necessary that it be immediately informed by some determinate form, otherwise information would never begin. Again, on the side of the other extreme it is also necessary that there be given a last form; otherwise information would never be finished nor would the thing be constituted in some certain and determinate species; therefore between those two extremes an infinite multitude of forms could not intervene, because to each there must necessarily be some immediate one which is compared as proximate potency and act. I omit other reasons which Aristotle makes in the cited place, because the matter is clearer than that it needs proof.

68. But if we speak of proximate matter by reason of accidental dispositions, the same reasons prove that in those dispositions one cannot proceed to infinity, because, if they are not subordinated among themselves but related concomitantly, as the four first qualities, in them such a process cannot be given, only because qualities actually infinite in multitude cannot be at the same time, and much less can a finite form postulate them; but if the dispositions are subordinated among themselves as act and proximate potency, as quantity and quality, the reason made of substantial forms proceeds, that in them it is necessary to give a first and a last, otherwise the disposition would neither be begun nor consummated; but between those extremes there cannot be an infinite multitude. Nor is what can be adduced about the infinite points contained between two extremes similar, because points are only infinite in potency, that is, constituting with the parts one finite continuous quantity, but the multitude of forms would be actually infinite. Likewise, because one point is not immediate to another, and so all the points intermediate between two extremes cannot be numbered;³ but one form, whether substantial or accidental, if it is compared to another as potency to act, must necessarily regard it proximately; in no way, therefore, can there be a process to infinity between matter and form.

69. But the reasons made proceed of permanent matter from which the thing comes about so that it is present in it; but Aristotle, in the said place of Metaphysics II, also speaks of the transient material cause when he denies that there is a process to infinity in material causes, because, if from water earth is generated, and from earth grass, and from grass something else, one does not proceed to infinity, but a circle comes about. Nevertheless, whether this process is given or not, it matters nothing to causality, because that process is merely per accidens, and therefore nothing would stand in the way of causality if it tended to infinity. But if it does not tend, it is only because there are not given infinite species of generable things nor a process to infinity in the generations of such species, but always a circle and return to the same species comes about. Which some think necessarily follows from this, that each of these species expresses a limited perfection. But this is no argument, because at least by divine power it is not repugnant that the species of mixed bodies be multiplied to infinity, even if each species is finite and in fact there is always given a highest and lowest species contained under that genus, although of the possible another could be made, either more perfect than all those made or more imperfect. Others say that it is established by experience that one does not proceed to infinity in the generation of one species from another, but that always a return to the same species comes about, of which experience I very much doubt whether it is evident to us; for many things are perhaps generated anew by the power of the heavens and the concurrence of the elements which lie hidden from us. Add that St. Thomas, III, q. 10, a. 3, says that infinite things are contained in the potency of the creature. And he speaks of substantial things; for of these he had said that the soul of Christ does not see infinite things in act. Whence, explaining that place there, we said that it can be understood both of infinite species and of infinite individuals. If, then, in the potency of the creature infinite species of mixed bodies are contained, it will not be repugnant to proceed to infinity in their generations. And perhaps Aristotle in the said place is not repugnant; for he only proves that this process is not necessary for the causality of things, because the generation of one is the corruption of another, and in this a reflection according to species easily comes about, although it does not come about according to the individual. Nevertheless it seems more probable, speaking naturally, that there is a stop in the generations of things according to species, because the powers of natural causes are finite and the modes or aspects and concurrences by which they are applied are determinate and finite; and therefore, although in the absolute potency of the creature infinite things are contained, if in created things and causes all the conditions and mixtures come about which absolutely can come about, nevertheless in fact according to the order of the universe they can only come about in finite ways, and therefore it is also more likely that in this process there is given a stop and term.

1. In any composition whatever something is as matter and something as form.—Since the distinction of form into physical and metaphysical is very common, and all the things which we have hitherto said apply to physical form, it seems to be a metaphysical business to say something also of metaphysical form, which, the things which we have said being supposed, can be briefly dispatched, because this is called form only through analogy and as it were a certain metaphor. It is to be noticed, then, from what was said above, that besides physical composition from matter and form there is another which imitates it, yet of itself abstracts from true matter, and therefore is named metaphysical. But this is twofold, as regards the present point: one from nature and supposit, the other from genus and difference; I omit that which is from being and essence, because it is more obscure and, as regards the present point, no special notion of form intervenes in it, as will be evident from what is to be said. Next it is to be considered that in every composition, in order that one be understood to arise from many, something is always considered as matter and something as form, both because composition from matter and form is the first real composition and most of all proper and per se, and therefore through a certain analogy to it every other composition is declared; and also because matter is something formless and imperfect and a certain inchoation and as it were foundation of nature; but form is as it were the beauty and perfection and consummation of nature; but in every composition there is something as it were potential, which is the foundation and inchoation of the thing, and something which is the term or consummation of the thing, and therefore something is always considered as matter and something as form. Which is so true that even in composition from integrating parts, which seems most of all material, one part is always considered as matter and another as form, which will appear more clearly in heterogeneous things, as in man the head is as it were the form of the other parts; and in artificial things the roof, for example, is as it were the form of the building; according to which analogy the theologians also distinguish the matters and forms of the sacraments. And in homogeneous things, where that diverse relationship cannot be distinguished between the parts on account of their likeness and uniformity, all the parts are said to be the matter of the whole, but the composite is compared as form to the individual parts. In all which no special causality intervenes, but union alone with analogy and proportion to matter and form.

2. From these, then, it is understood that metaphysical form in general is called that which in metaphysical composition essentially constitutes the thing itself, or completes or actuates the essence of the thing; nor can this form so taken in common be described otherwise. But there is a difference between the two metaphysical compositions said above, that the former, namely from nature and supposit, is a composition of the thing (we are speaking of creatures), that is, of those things which in the thing itself are in some way actually distinguished, as are nature and subsistence, of which we shall treat diffusely below; but the latter is a composition of reason, because its extremes are not actually distinguished in the thing but by reason only, as was seen above. There is also another difference, that in the former composition one extreme is the whole essence of the thing, but the other does not pertain intrinsically to the essence, but is a term or mode of the essence; but in the other composition each extreme is essential and neither expresses the whole essence of the thing explicitly or actually, although it can confusedly include it whole. Whence it comes about that the former is also wont to be called total form, real and most properly metaphysical; but the latter is rather form according to reason, and therefore can be called not only metaphysical but also logical.

The essence of metaphysical form is shown

3. Metaphysical form is the whole essence of the thing.—It must be said, then, first, that properly metaphysical form, which is the form of the whole, is nothing other than the whole essence of the substantial thing, which we also call the integral nature of the thing, which is not called form because it specially exercises the proper causality of form, but because it essentially constitutes the thing through itself. I declare and prove the individual parts; for in man, for example, this form of the whole is said to be humanity, which, since it consists of the matter and form of man, expresses the whole essence of man; for that which man adds to humanity is not of the essence of man, as we shall say below treating of subsistence, and in the mystery of the Incarnation is briefly evident; for in Christ there is the whole essence of man, although there is not created human subsistence. Moreover, this form of the whole is found not only in material things but also in spiritual ones; indeed not only in created things but also in God himself it is considered by us; for we conceive the Deity as the form essentially constituting God and any divine supposit whatever, in so far as he is this God; although it is proper that in the thing itself it is not distinguished from that of whose essence it is; in which it falls short of that notion of form which essence has in created things, because that does not pertain to perfection simply, but includes imperfection; therefore this form in immaterial things can be nothing other than their essence. But in material things this form of the whole differs from the physical and partial form, as is evident from the common use of these words, and from the very distinction of physical form from metaphysical; but it does not differ except because the form of the whole expresses the whole nature composed of matter and form, but the physical form only expresses the formal part; therefore this metaphysical form also in these things expresses their whole essence. Because, as we shall show below in the disputation on material substance, matter too is of the essence of this substance, and so the nature composed of matter and form is its whole essence; and so the first part of the conclusion is evident.

4. Metaphysical form is marked by the name of nature.—But that this metaphysical form is wont to be most properly called by the name of nature is evident, first, from usage; for so we attribute also to God the divine nature, to the intelligences the angelic, to men the human, and so of the other things. Next, in this way we distinguish nature from supposit, either from the nature of the thing, as in created substances, or by reason only, as in the divine; and in this way we say that in God the nature does not generate, but the supposit, and that the divine Word assumed a nature, not a human person. Likewise, each thing through its nature has that it is such and that it is essentially distinguished from others; therefore the nature of a substantial thing adequately (so to speak) is the total form itself by which it is essentially such. Finally nature, as is commonly thought, expresses order to operation, in which alone it differs from essence, that the name of essence was taken from order to being, but the name of nature was taken from order to operation; for nature was so called as it were making something be born; whence nature is said not to be idle, and to be the artificer of things, and to make nothing in vain, etc. Whence the theologians too say that faculties and operations are multiplied when natures are multiplied. But the first and adequate principal principle of operations in each thing is its essence; which in immaterial things is manifest; but in material things the form seems to be the principle of operating, which is the formal and active principle; yet, because matter too in its genus concurs in some way, especially to natural and intrinsic motions or acts, therefore I said that the adequate first and radical principle is the essence of each thing; therefore the essence itself and the form of the whole is the same as the nature of each thing.

5. The etymology of the name “nature” and its various significates.—I know that Aristotle, Metaphysics V, c. 4, assigns various significations of this name nature and among them places in the last place that by which it signifies the substance or essence of the thing, which he says is a transference from another signification by which nature signifies the form which is the term of generation. And in Physics II, c. 1, he restricts the notion of nature to the first intrinsic principle of motion only, and thence natural being is wont to be said of material substances only. I judge, however, that these are to be understood of this word nature as regards its imposition, but not as regards the thing signified; for these are wont to be very distinct in these analogous names, as St. Thomas rightly noted, I, q. 13, a. 6. As regards the imposition of the word, then, it is likely that this word first signified other things which Aristotle numbers there, as, for example, natural generation and especially the rise or birth of living things; for nature is so called as it were nascitura, and thence the word could be derived to signifying the intrinsic principles of the thing generated, namely matter and form. Or, as St. Thomas says, I, q. 29, a. 1, ad 4, because the birth of living things is from an intrinsic principle, therefore this word was derived to signifying the first intrinsic principle of motion, which is matter and form. And because through the form the essence of the thing is completed, finally that word was derived to signifying the essence of the thing. And because the ancient philosophers who disputed of nature did not know other substances except material ones, therefore they attributed nature to them alone and thence they peculiarly obtained the name of natural beings.

6. But if we regard the thing signified and speak of this word metaphysically rather than physically, this word absolutely and principally signifies the essence simply and integral of each thing, as it is signified after the manner of total form. And in immaterial things it is simple; but in material things it is composed of matter and form, because neither matter nor form is the integral nature of the thing, but partial; but the integral nature of the thing is composed of both; and therefore it is deservedly called metaphysically the total form. But accidents, as they do not have essence simply, so neither nature except with an addition, namely accidental nature, and more properly they are said to be according to nature, or against or beyond nature. Wherefore in accidents, as will be seen below, this notion of total form of which we are now treating does not properly have place (I speak according to the thing, whatever may be the case with our possible mode of conceiving); and the reason is that an accident is a form as it were partial and physical, whence in itself it is an incomplete nature and so imperfect that it does not make one per se but per accidens with its subject; and thence it comes about that from both one integral nature and form of the whole does not result, as from matter and substantial form.

7. Whether metaphysical form exercises any causality.—The last part of the conclusion finally can easily be proved from all that has been said, for first of all, since this form of the whole in material things includes prime matter itself, it cannot exercise proper formal causality, which consists in actuating some subject. Likewise in immaterial things, since the whole essence is simple and abstracting from every receptive thing, it cannot be called form on account of proper formal causality. And, if it is permitted to argue from theology, the humanity of Christ is the metaphysical form of this man Christ and yet is not a true form of the divine Word, having true causality into him, by reason of which it would be said formally to constitute this man. And the argument can be extended to any nature whatever with respect to its proper supposit; for the nature is compared either to the subsistence itself or to the composite of nature and subsistence. With respect to subsistence the nature does not have formal causality, but rather as it were material (I omit active, of which afterwards), because proper subsistence is not compared to the nature as its subject, but as its term. Whence rather subsistence is in some way the act of the nature than conversely. Likewise, because subsistence is a mode of the nature, whence it affects and in some way actuates it; according to this comparison, then, the nature does not exercise the causality of form. Whence in the said example of the mystery of the Incarnation the theologians say that the humanity is not only not compared to the Word as its form, but rather that the Word is related as form in so far as it in some way perfects and actuates the humanity, although no proper and true causality intervenes there.

8. And hence it further comes about that also with respect to the whole composite or supposit the integral nature is not called total form on account of the true and proper causality of form; because this causality is never with respect to the composite unless it is first and immediately exercised about some subject from which and the form the composite results. If, then, the total nature does not exercise formal causality about the other extreme of this composition, neither can it exercise it about the whole composite. It remains, therefore, that the integral nature is called form only because it is the whole quiddity, notion or essence intrinsically constituting the supposit in such genus or species. Which constitution is not through a causality in some way distinct from the nature itself, but is through the intrinsic actuality and entity of the total nature itself. And on account of this too this form is called metaphysical and not physical.

9. Whence too it is understood in passing that no proper matter corresponds to this form, because, as has been said, it is not called form because it informs some subject; but, if we speak generally, only the supposit corresponds to this nature as essentially constituted through it. But in material things the integral nature can be compared, as total form, to the partial natures of which it is composed; for, although one of them is form, nevertheless, in so far as both matter and form are a certain incomplete part and of itself imperfect, it can be compared as matter to the whole composite nature, and this as something whole and complete is compared to the parts as form; for the whole is related as form with respect to the parts, on the testimony of Aristotle, Physics II, text 31, although there he speaks chiefly of the integral whole with respect to its parts.

10. Metaphysical forms are single in individual composites.—Finally it is understood from what has been said that this form can only be one with respect to the same thing; it is evident, because it expresses the whole nature of the thing; but this in one thing can only be one. Nor does it matter that according to reason the specific and generic form of the whole can be distinguished in the same thing, as humanity, animality, etc.; for, if these are taken with respect to the same thing, they are not several forms in the thing, but one and the same diversely conceived; and in so far as it is conceived as several according to reason, it is not taken with respect to one but to several, even according to reason; for animality is not the total form of man, but of animal as such; and so, proportion being kept, the form of the whole is only one with respect to the same thing.

11. A doubt is met.—One can only doubt about the conclusion posited; for the total form, if it is the form of the supposit, does not only include the essential principles, but also the individuating principles, which are not of the essence of the thing, because the total form and integral nature of Peter is not only humanity, but this humanity; therefore it is false that this form only includes the whole essence of the thing. Next it follows that existence is not included in this form, because this too is not of the essence. But the consequent appears false; for, if it does not include existence, how does it really constitute? To these it must be said that this form is to be taken with proportion with respect to that which is constituted through it, and so it always expresses the integral and only nature and essence of it. For, if it is compared to the common species precisely taken, it includes only the specific essential principles, and humanity expresses the total form of man. But if it is compared to a determinate individual, so it includes the individual and particular essential principles, which, although they are not of the essence of the thing absolutely speaking, because in this word a certain prescission of the mind is included, are nevertheless of the essence of the individual as it is individual, as was declared above in treating of the principle of individuation. One must speak similarly of existence; for, although this is not absolutely of the essence of the created or creatable thing, it is nevertheless of its essence as existing or as constituted in the notion of actual entity; and therefore, although this form includes only the essence of the thing, nevertheless, in order that it constitute it actually, it includes existence, not only as a necessary extrinsic or concomitant condition, but also as intrinsically constituting the actual entity of the nature itself, through which it formally constitutes such a substance or substantial individual.

What logical form is

12. I say, secondly: metaphysical form according to reason (which is also called logical) is chiefly wont to be said of the essential difference; yet according to some respect it is attributed also to the genus, and also to the definition; whence this form does not have proper real causality, but of reason only, and a proportional matter corresponds to it. This whole assertion is most clear and is evident from the common use of speaking, the things being supposed which were said above of the thing itself in treating of universals, where we declared how genus and difference are compared among themselves and whence they are taken. Where among other things we said with Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, texts 42 and 43, that from genus and difference there arises one per se, because they are proximately compared among themselves as potency and act of the same genus and per se ordered among themselves, where St. Thomas, lect. 12, part. 5, declares that genus and difference are not compared as potency and act distinct in the thing, but because they express the same essence as determinable or after the manner of its determination. From which it is understood that the difference imitates form in the notion of actuating, terminating and distinguishing, and therefore that it is that to which this notion of metaphysical form belongs first; but the genus in comparison with it has the notion of matter, because it is something potential, actuable and indifferent to many, until through the difference it is understood to be contracted and determined; whence too it comes about that the difference of itself is more perfect than the genus, because that which within the same genus is related as act is more perfect than that which is related as potency. Whence too in the place cited above we said that the difference is taken from a nobler principle; in this, then, there is also proportion between form and difference, that, as form is more perfect than matter, so difference than genus. Again, as matter and form are really distinguished, so that neither one is the other nor intrinsically includes the other, so also genus and difference are separated by concepts, according to which they are so distinguished that neither in the concept of the genus is the difference actually included, nor in the concept of the difference the genus; otherwise it would not be a proper metaphysical composition, nor would they be compared as proper act and potency, because it is of the notion of these that they do not include each other; and this Aristotle taught, Metaphysics VII, above, Book III, text 10, and Topics VI, c. 3.

13. From which too it comes about that, as it does not belong to matter per se and necessarily that it be under this or that determinate form, so the genus per se and necessarily does not require determinately any one of the differences, although it necessarily requires some in confusion, as matter requires form. But in this is to be noticed a difference between matter and form on the one side, and genus and difference on the other, that, although matter naturally cannot be without some form, absolutely nevertheless it does not imply a contradiction that it be so preserved, and similarly form sometimes can not depend on matter even naturally, and that which so depends can nevertheless supernaturally be preserved without matter; but genus and difference are so per se conjoined that it is altogether repugnant either that the genus subsist without all differences, or the difference outside the genus which it actuates. And the reason is clear, because genus and difference are not distinguished in the thing, but express the same essence as determinable and determining, and therefore it is not wonderful that they cannot be separated in the thing in the said way. Likewise, because in the thing there cannot be anything which does not have a determinate essence and consequently constituted in some proper and ultimate species, in which it is necessary that both the common or generic and the proper predicates be included; these, therefore, cannot so precisely and abstractly subsist as they are conceived.

14. How genus and difference are understood to be united.—From which another difference is further understood, namely that between genus and difference there does not intervene a mediating union distinct from them, even according to the true reason of conceiving, as between matter and form we were saying above that there intervenes a mode of union distinct in the thing from them, because actual union between them is not of their intrinsic notion, indeed is separable from them, and therefore it is necessary that it mediate between them and be distinguished from them. But genus and difference are so per se united (or rather are one in the thing, although they are distinguished by reason) that they are altogether inseparable according to the thing and in a certain way according to reason; for, although by a prescissive concept the difference can be understood without the genus, nevertheless it cannot be conceived negatively as existing without the genus, or not actuating the genus. And therefore, just as in real modes, which are only modally distinguished from the things which they modify, we say that they are not united to those things through a distinct union but through themselves, so with much greater reason the difference is to be conceived as an essential mode of the species and through itself contracting and actuating the genus without another intermediate union.

15. The difference does not cause really.—Finally from these it is understood that the difference, in so far as it is called form, does not have proper real causality, because real causality is only between those things which are distinguished in the thing itself, or at least it is necessary that there intervene some real influx and causality distinct from the nature of the thing from the cause itself or the effect; but here none of these intervenes, because neither is the difference distinct in the thing from the species, nor from the genus as it is contracted through it. Nor yet does there intervene there some causality distinct from the difference itself. This, then, is only a certain constitution according to reason and our mode of conceiving, which only through analogy and proportion to the real cause is called form or formal causality. And the same is to be understood of the genus, in so far as the notion or causality of matter is attributed to it. Nor does it matter that the thing constituted of these is often a true and real essence, as man or horse; for, although such essence in itself is real, nevertheless as so composed it is not a being of the thing but of reason, since the composition itself is only of reason.

16. How the genus is predicated of the whole species.—But someone will object: for, if the difference is compared to the genus as form, and the genus to the difference as matter, then each is compared to the species or the thing defined as part to whole; therefore neither will be able absolutely and in recto to be predicated of the species, because the part, although it can be predicated obliquely or denominatively of the whole, cannot nevertheless absolutely and in recto; for we do not say: man is matter, but has matter, or is material; these expressions, therefore, will be false: man is animal, and similar ones. This objection has only been proposed in order to declare the other part of the conclusion, by which we were saying that both the genus with respect to the species and the definition with respect to the thing defined are wont to be called metaphysical form. The common distinction, then, is that the genus (and the same holds proportionally of the difference) can be considered in two ways: either precisely, as it expresses such a grade and as it were stops in it of itself; and in this sense it is a part, and as such also is not predicated of the whole, because it would give this sense, that man, for example, is animal precisely and solitarily and abstractly taken, or is not more than animal, which sense is plainly false. And the genus under this consideration is compared as matter to the difference, and conversely the difference as form to the genus. And so the things which have hitherto been said proceed. And in the same sense to the objection the whole which is inferred in it is conceded, namely that genus and difference are parts, and as such are not predicated; nor are they only parts, but are also called elements by Aristotle,¹ especially the differences and the highest genera, on account of their simplicity, and because in them the ultimate resolution in metaphysics comes about, as is evident from Posterior Analytics II, c. 14. But in another way the genus is considered as a whole, which they call potential or confused, because it confusedly expresses the whole quiddity of the species, and in this way it is excellently predicated of the species or the thing defined, because it is no longer predicated as a part, but as a whole; and this is the common sense of this expression; for when it is said man is animal, nothing is excluded from man, but it is affirmed that the same supposit which is man is also animal; or that man, by the same form and essence by which he is man, is also animal; but each of these is true. The genus, then, in so far as it can be predicated of the species, as something superior to it and as it were containing it, is said in some way to have the notion of form with respect to it; and conversely the inferiors, in so far as they are subjected to the superiors and in a certain way sustain them in themselves, have a certain notion of matter. And by a similar or greater reason the species is compared as form to the individuals, but these as matter.

17. And in this sense I understand Aristotle, Metaphysics V, c. 2, when he reduces each part of the definition to the formal cause; for, as regards the genus, I think it is to be understood not formally as it is a part, but as it is a certain whole, as I have explained. But the whole definition, because it declares the whole essence and is the proper notion of the thing defined itself and is most properly predicated of it, can therefore also be called metaphysical form, although it is not composite. And so it is easy to explain all similar expressions, which only consist in a certain analogy and transference.

18. The difference between metaphysical and physical form.—There only remains a brief doubt to be dispatched, which arises from a difference to be noted between this metaphysical form and the physical, that the substantial physical form is not multiplied in the same composite, as we said above; but this form can be multiplied; for both the genera of the same thing can be several, and the differences similarly; indeed even the definition, although it seems to contain and explain the whole essence of the thing, can nevertheless be manifold, as is evident from Posterior Analytics I, c. 7, and Book II, cc. 8 and 12, and De Anima II, c. 7. But the reason of the difference is easy, because physical forms really distinct are so compared that each constitutes a perfect and consummated species of substance, and their composition would have to be real and physical, and therefore they are repugnant in the same substance properly and per se one. But this metaphysical form, namely the difference, neither makes a real composition nor is distinguished from another difference except through the prescission and abstraction of the mind; but our mind can prescind and abstract the same thing in various ways, and therefore can conceive in the same thing several predicates of genus and difference; wherefore the multitude of essential differences does not stand in the way of the unity and composition per se from genus and difference.

Whether there is a process to infinity in essential predicates

19. But from this difference a difficulty at once arises; for it follows that there can be given a process to infinity in these metaphysical formal and material causes, that is, in quidditative predicates. But the consequent is against Aristotle, Metaphysics II, c. 1, where he thought it better known that there cannot be given a process to infinity in the parts of the definition, which are genus and difference, than in the forms themselves; and therefore from the negation of infinite predicates he proves the negation of infinite forms. But the sequel is proved, because it is no more repugnant that there be given two differences in one thing than three or four, and so of any number whatever; therefore in this number one can proceed to infinity. Especially because this number of predicates does not arise from things or distinct modes which are on the side of the thing in one and the same substance, but from our concepts with some foundation in the thing; but we can prescind and abstract in infinite ways, and in things there is a foundation for this to be done by us on account of the various agreements and dissimilitudes which one thing has with others, in which agreements these abstractions are founded. And the difficulty urges most of all if one species is compared not only to the other species made, but to all possible ones, which can be multiplied to infinity and in infinite ways.

20. Some reasons which are wont to be adduced for the conclusion are shown inefficacious.—Nevertheless it must be said absolutely with Aristotle that also in these formal causes there is not given a process to infinity. So teach all the interpreters, who adduce various reasons. The first is that otherwise the thing constituted would be infinitely perfect, because any predicate whatever adds some perfection. But perhaps the consequence will be denied, because one finite perfection can be the foundation of infinite concepts, which, although they express perfections distinct by reason, do not increase perfection in the thing. The second reason is that, if these differences are infinite, the properties too which follow upon them will be infinite. But it will be answered that from the generic and specific difference properties distinct in the thing do not always follow, as is evident in these predicates: substance, spiritual, of Gabriel, etc.; but it is enough that the properties too correspond proportionately according to universal or special notions, as was also touched upon above.

21. The true reason of the conclusion.—The third and most probable reason is that it is necessary that there be given a supreme genus which is as it were the prime matter of this composition and a specific and lowest difference which is as it were the ultimate form; therefore the intermediate forms too are necessarily in a finite and determinate number. The major is proved by Aristotle because in these quidditative predicates one is always prior to another, that is, more universal and extending to more; but it is not prior except because it approaches more to that which is first; therefore it is necessary that there be given also some supreme genus. Next this is evident by experience, running through all the predicaments, and especially in substance, which, as it immediately signifies complete substance, is the supreme genus; for nothing more universal with respect to substances can be thought; but I suppose that being is not a genus, although, even if it were a genus, nothing would stand in the way, for it would be the supreme; and so we have what we intend. And so too nothing will stand in the way if anyone contends that this resolution must be made as far as transcendental predicates, because, although this were true, one would stop at some last. And the reason is that in all things or substances there is given some first or least essential agreement according to which can be abstracted either a transcendental predicate or a supreme genus. But the minor is proved from the very constitution of the ultimate species, because there cannot be any thing which is not constituted in some ultimate species; otherwise it would not have a determinate essence, nor one diverse from the other determinate species; but the ultimate species must be constituted through some ultimate difference. Nor do I now dispute whether this ultimate difference is simple or coalescing from many, of which each is common, as Porphyry seems to have signified, in the chapter on Difference; and Aristotle not a little favours it, Topics I, c. 3, and Book VI, cc. 3 and 4, and Posterior Analytics II, c. 14; for this matters nothing at present, because one must necessarily stop at differences which are not actuated by others, although perhaps two or three of these agree to constitute the ultimate species; for now the reason made only proceeds of subordinated differences. But the first consequence seems self-evident, because between the extremes first and last there cannot be given infinite intermediates, as we said above of forms; for the reason made there proceeds equally here.

22. Objections against the aforesaid reason.—But this reason can be weakened in two ways: first by saying that, although predicates per se subordinated in one line after the manner of act and potency are finite, nevertheless those not subordinated or in diverse lines can be multiplied to infinity, as if someone said that there are given several supreme genera; or that to the constitution of the ultimate species several differences agree not subordinated among themselves, and these can be multiplied to infinity; or that one and the same genus, whether proximate or remote, can at the same time be contracted by several differences which are not altogether repugnant among themselves nor subordinated among themselves; as, for example, animal according to the ancient philosophers is contracted through rational and through mortal, which agree in man, in others are separated; and substance could be immediately divided through living and through corporeal, which agree in some substances, in others are separated. From which too it seems to follow that between the differences themselves there is a certain circle, and they are compared in turn and mutually as potency and act; for, if substance is immediately divided into living and not living, again living substance could be divided into incorporeal and corporeal; but, if conversely substance is divided into corporeal and incorporeal, corporeal will be divided into living and not living. But if this is not inconvenient, because they are reflections of the intellect, for the same cause that multiplication of predicates to infinity will not be absurd. The other evasion can be that, although there is given a supreme genus and a lowest difference, it is not repugnant that between them several intermediate predicates can be prescinded or distinguished by the intellect to infinity, as between the extreme points of a line there are given infinite parts or points; for, as these are infinite in potency, so those predicates, as they are in the thing, can be called several only in potency, because in the thing they are not actually many unless they are distinguished by the intellect; and therefore, although the intellect can distinguish more and more to infinity, it does not follow that in the thing they are infinite except in potency. From which too it comes about that those predicates which we actually distinguish are always finite, both because we cannot form except finite concepts of things, and also because all the agreements and differences of any species whatever to the others which have been made are in a certain and determinate number, even if with respect to possible things they can perhaps be multiplied to infinity. And so one could interpret Aristotle of the differences or essential predicates which in fact are abstracted or can be abstracted through human discourse or knowledge.

23. They are solved.—A saying of Aristotle is explained.—But nevertheless I judge the reason made to be efficacious and that it simply cannot come about that the predicates be multiplied to infinity. And first of all I take it that with respect to any thing whatever there is given only one supreme genus or predicate and one ultimate difference. And the former part indeed has been sufficiently proved both by reason and by usage or experience; but of the latter it has been doubted by some, yet to me it seems equally certain. First indeed, because the difference is taken from the form; but every form diverse in species from another has some essential grade proper to itself and not common to others; therefore from that there can be taken a difference altogether proper and common to no other. Secondly, because the ultimate species cannot be constituted by the conjunction alone of two common differences, because each of those differences constitutes a subaltern and generic species; but the ultimate species is not an aggregate of two subaltern species, otherwise neither would it be one proper and special essence, nor would it be one metaphysical composite constituted of proper act and proper potency. As, for example, in that example of man, if rational and mortal were taken as subaltern and common differences, man would never be constituted from their aggregation; but rational is to be taken as it is proper to man, that is, as it includes discourse or aptitude for it; and in this way rational will be the simple difference proper to man, but mortal is of itself a subaltern and common difference, not indeed to other users of reason, for there is no rational or intellectual mortal besides man, but to other sentient or living things. So, then, it happens in all species of things. And this is what Aristotle said, Metaphysics VII, text 43, that one must proceed in the division of common differences until one arrives at the indifferent ones, that is, at the ultimate and altogether proper differences, as St. Thomas and all expound; and then (says Aristotle) there will be as many species as differences. For each individual difference (adds St. Thomas) will constitute one most special species.

24. The intermediate differences are enclosed in a finite number.—But, this principle being posited, that the intermediate differences can only be in a finite number is declared in this way. And first, if the differential grades were distinct in the thing itself, it is evident that they could only be finite, because they would be actually several; therefore finite or infinite, but in a finite thing there cannot be infinite grades of distinct perfections; they will therefore be finite. All the more because those grades are not understood to be communicating among themselves, as proportional parts, but altogether co-distinct and indivisible; nor yet are they so compared to the thing as points to the line, which are so indivisible that they do not increase the quantity of the line; but each difference adds a certain grade and as it were a determinate part of perfection, from the conjunction of which parts arises the integral perfection of the species, which, since it is finite, can only arise from finite as it were parts. Whence, just as in the intensive breadth of a finite quality only finite degrees not communicating among themselves can be distinguished, from the conjunction of which arises the whole finite intension of the quality, in the same way one must philosophize proportionately in the differential grades. But although these grades according to the truer opinion are not actually distinguished in the thing, nevertheless the discourse made has the same force in order to the distinction and conception of our mind, because even as distinct by reason they are conceived as not communicating among themselves, if the grades themselves are taken precisely and formally, as they must be taken. For one subaltern difference does not include another, because neither is the inferior of the concept of the superior nor conversely; the intermediate differential grades, therefore, are altogether co-distinct and not communicating among themselves; therefore on this side their distinction, even if it is according to reason, cannot proceed to infinity nor can it be compared with the division of the parts of the continuum. But from elsewhere any of those grades whatever is indivisible according to concept; for any difference whatever, whether generic or specific, is indivisible, and is so indivisible that it increases essentially the perfection of the thing in order to the concept of the mind; therefore also in order to the concept of the mind a finite essence cannot be divided or constituted through such differences except finite in number, which, since they are indivisible, one cannot proceed to infinity in their division.

25. And so the consequence made in the third reason remains efficacious; and the objection insinuated in the second evasion ceases, because in a finite thing there cannot be contained, even in potency, infinite things not communicating among themselves and increasing the perfection or quantity of the thing. Wherefore, if once all the differences are conceived and distinguished by reason which can be founded in the essence of the thing, their number cannot be increased, either with respect to existing or to possible things; for through them it agrees or differs with all, both those which are and those which can be.

26. And thence too the former objection is easily excluded, for in whatever way differences are multiplied, and whether they are subordinated among themselves or not, they can only be in a finite number on account of the said cause; namely because a finite perfection cannot even by the mind be divided into several as it were parts not communicating among themselves except only in a finite number. But it is more probable that all the differences which agree to the constitution of one essence are in some way subordinated among themselves as potency and act; otherwise they could not constitute one per se. Nor yet is it likely that in this a circle is committed, since the relationships of act and potency are so opposed among themselves.

27. Wherefore, although the same genus is divided by us in various ways, it is nevertheless not always divided through the proper and immediate differences by which it is proximately contracted and actuated; and therefore it can sometimes happen that two differences are compared among themselves as act and potency. As in the example posited, although substance can be divided through corporeal and incorporeal, living and not living, the former division is always immediate and proximate; a sign of which is that it is taken as it were from the intrinsic principles and absolute entity of the thing, but the latter is taken in order to operation; and therefore the difference of the living, as it is in corporeal things, is always compared as act and not as potency to the corporeal grade. And although that difference is found also in incorporeal things, it is nevertheless found in a far diverse way, because incorporeal substance is (so to speak) totally living, that is, lives by reason of its whole substance, but corporeal by reason of a part; in which special way it seems to be taken when it is posited as a difference of body. And although we grant that there can be given a common difference of the living abstracting from those two modes, thence at most it comes about that some genera not placed subalternately have a common difference, which perhaps is not inconvenient; for so Aristotle thought, Topics VI, of which elsewhere.

28. Another reason of Aristotle for the conclusion.—So, then, the third reason remains sufficiently declared and confirmed; and the first too receives strength from the aforesaid discourse. But the second, if it is understood not of properties in rigour, as they express faculties of operating or some other thing distinct from substance, but of any mode of being or operating whatever, can be defended, because these genera and differences are most of all distinguished by us through order to some property of this kind. Finally Aristotle adds another reason, namely that, if in these differences there were a process to infinity, the thing could never be sufficiently distinctly known or defined by us, because knowledge or altogether distinct definition begins from the supreme genus and through the addition of all the differences arrives at the last; which could not come about if those were infinite. Which has place most of all in human knowledge, which proceeds little by little from one to another, in which way it is impossible to traverse infinity successively by numbering, as is evident from Physics III, c. 7, and is sufficiently self-evident.