Disputationes metaphysicae

1. Various partitions of matter.—Since prime matter includes two things, it is necessary before all else to expound the signification of the word as regards each part. Matter, then, is wont to be divided into matter from which, in which, and about which. Which division can be explained in various ways; first, so that it is not a division of things or matters, but of the respects and functions of the same matter. For the same matter is called matter from which either with respect to the composite which consists of it, or with respect to the form which is educed from it. Whence in the former respect the body of man is matter from which, yet not in the latter consideration, because the form of man is not educed from the potency of matter. Whence with respect to such form it will be called the matter in which the form is introduced; so that in which expresses a respect of union, not of eduction. In which can also be taken abstractly so as to include the relationship to form as inhering in matter. But with respect to the agent the same matter will be called matter about which the agent operates. According to this interpretation of the terms, then, no member of those mentioned is excluded from the present consideration; for we are treating of matter according to itself, or as it includes in its adequate concept all those relationships; but whether these pertain to various causalities distinct from the nature of the thing we shall see afterwards. Otherwise matter about which is wont to be taken as it is distinguished from matter from which and in which according to real union and inherence, and so it properly expresses a respect to an agent by immanent action, and is nothing other than the object about which such an agent is occupied. Which signification of matter is metaphorical and matters nothing at present, because as such it does not exercise material causality, but either efficient or final, as we touched upon above; the discussion here, then, is not of objective but of subjective matter.

2. Again, matter from which is wont to be divided into transient and remaining. In the former way wood, for example, will be called the matter from which fire comes about; and in that signification from which designates not only the relationship of material cause, but includes also the relationship of the term from which; and on this side that signification does not pertain to the present disputation. But remaining matter is the proper and internal material cause which remains in the composite or in the term of generation, conferring in its own way to its constitution. Finally matter is wont to be divided into metaphysical and physical: the metaphysical is the genus with respect to the difference; but that appellation is only through analogy and proportion to physical matter, which is properly and simply the matter of which we are here treating; but of the metaphysical, besides the things which we said above in treating of universal unity, we shall add some things in Disp. XV, last section, in treating of metaphysical form.

3. But matter can be called prime both through the negation of a prior and through the respect to a second; since, then, matter expresses the notion of subject, that will be called prime which supposes no prior subject; and so Aristotle, Physics I, c. 9, defined matter as the first subject from which something comes about. But that will be called second matter which supposes a prior subject. And so many call the substantial composite second matter with respect to accidents, because it is so the subject of accidents that it consists of a prior subject; and by a similar reason those who admit several substantial forms in the same supposit call the composite, for example, of matter and the form of corporeity second matter with respect to the soul. Often too disposed matter, or matter affected by accidental dispositions, is called second matter, not because the composite itself of matter and accidents is the subject in which the form is received, but only because the reception of such dispositions precedes in the order of nature and constitutes matter proximately capable of such form; whence such matter is properly called proximate. But Aristotle, Metaphysics VIII, text 11, called proper or proximate matter the transient matter accommodated to the generation of the thing, as wine is the matter of vinegar, of which matter the Commentator says, Physics II, comm. 31, that it is the matter of alteration, not of composition. Every second matter, therefore, supposes prime and adds some form or disposition.

Resolution of the question

4. Prime matter is gathered from the necessity of a first subject in any change whatever.—And hence it is evident that, if we speak in common and as it were formally of prime matter, that is, of the first subject of changes or forms, abstracting from the question which such a subject is and of what kind the form which is received in it, then it is as evident that there is prime matter as it is evident that there are in things changes to various forms; because to every change some subject is supposed, as was proved above and is evident by experience. Therefore either that subject supposes another or not; if it does not suppose, it is first, and the intent is had. But if it supposes another, I shall ask of that; but it is evident that one cannot proceed to infinity; therefore one must necessarily stop at some first subject or prime matter. The minor proposition last assumed is demonstrated by Aristotle of all causes in Book II; yet it is in a certain way more evident in the material cause, which is the intrinsic foundation of the whole composite; but a composite standing per se cannot be perceived by the intellect, one part of which rests on another and another again on another, without finally stopping at some one which underlies the others. Since, therefore, every natural composite is so per se that according to its whole self it does not depend in the genus of material cause on some subject which is outside itself, it is necessary that it have below itself some subject which is first with respect to all the other entities of which it consists and which are in a subject. So, then, it is evident that there is prime matter, or a first subject, in natural things.

5. Matter is gathered from the continuous vicissitude of things.—Secondly, it is principally proved, for it is evident that generable and corruptible things are so transmuted that some are generated from others reciprocally and mutually, at least mediately; therefore it is necessary that they agree in some common subject which remains in all of them, by reason of which they are capable of that mutual transmutation; therefore that subject is first, and so the first material cause of things of this kind. The antecedent is evident by experience; for the elements act mutually among themselves, and one is converted into another, whether mediately or immediately, and mixed bodies too are generated from them, and consequently are also resolved into them; and so it comes about that all sublunary things, as far as depends on the force of their nature and composition, are mutually transmutable. I say as far as depends on the force of their nature, because it can happen that some parts of the elements are never transmuted because they are in hidden and most remote places to which the actions of contrary agents do not reach.

6. The first consequence is proved, first, because no natural transmutation can come about unless a common subject remains under each term; both because otherwise the thing which is corrupted would perish altogether according to its whole self, and another which begins to be would come about according to its whole self, and so the one would pass into nothing, the other would come about from nothing, no common thing remaining under each; one, therefore, would be annihilated and another created, which is naturally impossible. And also because otherwise the whole action of the natural agent would be either impossible or irrelevant to the generation of things. The sequel is declared, because we can speak either of the accidental alteration which we experience, which it is evident does not come about except in a subject and from a common subject which remains under each term, because it is evident by experience that this action does not come about unless a subject is supposed; for the accident which comes about through it cannot naturally be except in a subject which sustains both the action and its formal term, from which subject the opposite form or privation is expelled; there is, therefore, a common subject in an action of this kind. Or we speak of that substantial action or transmutation which comes about in the term of alteration, in which the thing which perishes loses the being simply which it had before and another thing simply begins, as when fire comes about from tow. And there too it is necessary that a common subject remain; otherwise the whole preceding alteration or heating of the tow would be irrelevant to the procreation of the fire, because it would in no way contribute to it if it itself and its whole subject altogether perished; but at most it could serve to empty the place or space into which the thing to be procreated could be introduced; but to this the destruction of the thing would be irrelevant; for local expulsion would suffice, which could come about through the introduction of another thing into that space, as happens in local motion.

7. Such a destruction of the thing through alteration would also be impossible, because an accident cannot, speaking per se, destroy its subject, since it is sustained by it and receives being from it. Either, then, that subject is simple or composite; if it is simple, it can in no way be destroyed through the action or accident which comes about in it, because it is necessary in order that such action or such accident can be. But if that subject is composed of a prior subject and another form, it will indeed be able to be destroyed by reason of the alteration and accident introduced into it, yet not per se but per accidens, by reason of another action and form following upon the prior alteration; but this consequence cannot be understood unless the subsequent form is introduced into the same subject in which the prior was, because otherwise there would be no cause why the union between the prior subject and its form would be dissolved; therefore this whole natural transmutation must necessarily be founded in some common subject which remains under each term.

8. From some special changes.—And this very thing can be declared by induction made in some transmutations; when an animal, for example, is nourished from food, either something of the food remains at the end of nutrition and is conjoined to the living substance, or the food and everything which is in it is altogether destroyed through the action of the living thing. If nothing of the food remains, the whole action of the living thing is superfluous, and nothing can be helped from the food so as thence either to grow or be strengthened, because from that which perishes in the food nothing is strengthened or grows. But if something of the food remains, that can be nothing but common matter or subject. The same argument can be taken from the visible and improper nutrition of fire; for it does not grow unless wood or something similar is supposed, nor is it preserved unless it is nourished by oil or similar matter; this matter, therefore, cannot be transient according to its whole self, otherwise it would be useless, and no reason could be given why it is necessary for such effects, nor could it be declared what it contributes to them; that matter, therefore, is in some way remaining under the form of the thing generated or nourished; it remains, therefore, according to some common subject.

9. Which finally is confirmed, because otherwise the transmutation of things would not be corruption and generation but a certain transubstantiation, because the whole substance of one thing would perish and the whole of another would begin. Indeed it would be more than transubstantiation, because not only in total substances but also in all their accidents there would be that succession; because, if no common subject remained, much less could the same accident naturally remain, which depends on its subject in being and being preserved. But this genus of transmutation is foreign to all philosophy and to every natural action; and besides the notion of annihilation and creation which it includes, as I was saying above, no reason can be thought why those two are so connected in the nature of things that for the production of one the destruction of the other is necessary, and conversely; natural transmutation, therefore, is not through total destruction and inception, but through transformation from some common subject. And to this the demonstration of Aristotle almost tends, that this transmutation always comes about from contrary to contrary (including under contraries privative opposites), which have a common subject. It is evident, therefore, that there is a common subject or material cause.

10. Matter is gathered from the resolution to one first subject.—It remains to prove the second consequence of the principal reason, by which we inferred that this matter is the first cause in its order, and in that sense is most truly called prime matter; but this can be shown in no more evident way (whatever some may wish) than that touched upon above, namely, because one cannot proceed to infinity in proximate and remote subjects, or in subjects and subjected things (so to speak), but one must necessarily stop at some subject which is not subjected, nor yet composed of a part which is in a subject, because every such composite can finally be resolved into simple things, in which there must be something which is altogether not in a subject. Nor does this discourse suppose that in the substantial forms of the same composite there is not a process to infinity; for, although this too is evident, nevertheless, if per impossibile infinite forms were feigned in the same composite, on the side of the potency receiving them one would necessarily have to stop at some simple subject which is not in a subject; because the whole collection of such forms is in some subject; therefore that is simple, as we shall demonstrate more immediately; this, then, we call prime matter. But besides this, that consequence can also be proved from the community of this subject; for, since all these inferior things are mutually transmuted immediately or at least mediately, as has been said, it is necessary that that subject which is supposed to these transmutations be first in the notion of subject or matter; for, if it consisted of another prior subject or matter, either that too would be transmutable, and so it would not be the common subject of all transmutations, but that which would remain after its resolution; or it would not be transmutable, and so not every corporeal being would be transmutable into any other whatever, the opposite of which we were supposing; but of this more fully in the third section.

11. What is inferred in all the premises.—From all that has been said, then, it remains generally proved that in every order of transmutations some first material cause is to be given; but it cannot be concluded from what has been said that there is a true prime matter which is the material cause of some substance, unless something is adjoined. Whence the discourses made, formally taken, prove equally that in each heavenly body there is some first subject of those changes which come about in it; indeed with the same proportion they prove the same of any spiritual substance whatever in so far as it is capable of real change, either local or intellectual or affective; for, although that change is not corruptive but perfective, it nevertheless necessarily supposes some subject, and therefore it is necessary that it be reduced to some first subject in its order, which can also be called the first material cause of that change, although it is not called prime matter according to the common use of this word; for it properly signifies the material principle of substantial transmutation or constitution. From which it also comes about that, although things which are in some way transmuted have a material cause of their transmutation proportioned to themselves, nevertheless, if the transmutation is not of one thing into another, by virtue of transmutation it cannot be concluded that there is some first material cause common to things of this kind; as, although the angels have a first subject of their changes and corporeal things similarly, nevertheless, because neither can these be transmuted into angels nor conversely, it cannot be concluded from transmutation that there is some first subject common to all of them. And the reason is the same of the heavenly and sublunary bodies, because neither can these pass into those, nor conversely; indeed the same holds of the heavens themselves among themselves, because they are not mutually transmutable, but each can only be accidentally changed in itself. Which very thing is true a fortiori in spiritual created substances. In all these, therefore, it is only concluded that there is one common subject of the accidents among which change comes about. But in these inferior substances and bodies, since they are mutually transmutable, some common and first subject is rightly concluded. But in order that it be concluded that this subject is the material cause of the very substance of such things, it is necessary to add that their mutual transmutation among themselves is according to substance and not only according to accidents; because, if they were transmuted in accidents alone, it would be enough that there be given in them a first subject of such accidents, whether that were a simple or a composite substance, and whether it were of one notion in all or diverse.

12. There is in things not only accidental but also substantial transmutation.—In order to conclude, then, that there is prime matter such as Aristotle posited, it remained to be proved that the transmutation of these inferior bodies which we experience is not only accidental but also substantial. But this, besides experience, which by itself seems sufficiently evident, not only in the elements and in inanimate mixed bodies, but much more in living things, animals, and in ourselves when we are generated and die—besides this experience (I say), it is to be proved by reason from the necessity of substantial forms distinct from accidents; for, if these forms are given, it is necessary that there be given prime matter which is their subject and composes with them one integral substance, which is to be the material cause of substance. But that there are substantial forms is to be proved below, Disp. XV; and therefore let it now be supposed, and only from that hypothesis let it be held demonstrated that there is a true and proper prime matter in these things which are generated and corrupted; for the consequence is evident and lacking all difficulty; but the antecedent is to be proved in the said place.

1. In this section and the following, the opinions of the ancient philosophers are briefly to be touched upon, which Aristotle in various places treated and attacked at length, especially Metaphysics I, c. 3 and following, and Physics I, from c. 2, and De generatione I, c. 1 and following, and De caelo III, c. 7; and in Diogenes Laertius, in the lives of these philosophers, the same things are read, and in Plato in the Theaetetus and Sophist, and Plotinus, Enneads II, Book 9, and Theophrastus, in his Metaphysics, c. 3; and Plutarch, De placitis I, c. 3; and of the Fathers Augustine touched upon them, City of God VIII, from the beginning; and Epiphanius, Against Heresies III, in 80; and Irenaeus, Against Heresies II, c. 19; and Clement of Rome, the book of the Recognitions, and Clement of Alexandria, Stromata I; and Eusebius, Praeparatio evangelica XIV, from the beginning; and Ambrose, Hexaemeron I, c. 2. The opinions of these philosophers, then, we reduce to two heads: one, of those who posited several first material principles, of whom we shall treat here; the other, of those who posited only one, but erred in assigning it, of whom we shall speak in the following section.

The opinion of those constituting infinite material principles

2. The first opinion, then, was that the material cause of all things is put together from indivisible little bodies or atoms, which Leucippus, Democritus, Epicurus, Metrodorus and Anaxagoras posited to be infinite. Who almost all thought that these little bodies are similar among themselves and of the same notion, and only according to the variety of position, figure and order compose various beings; and that the corruption of things is nothing other than the dispersion or disordering of atoms, but generation is their new composition. But Anaxagoras posited atoms partly similar, partly dissimilar, so that from similar ones homogeneous things would come about, but from dissimilar ones dissimilar things, as in the organic body the heterogeneous parts, for example flesh from fleshy atoms, but bone from bony ones, and so of the others. Again, some of them seem to have posited these atoms altogether indivisible; and therefore, in order that they could compose a body, they said that a body coalesces not only from them but also from some void or empty; for, if all of them were immediately and solidly conjoined, the bulk would never increase, as is taken from Aristotle, Metaphysics I, 4. But others seem not to have posited them mathematically indivisible, but only physically; according to which interpretation it is not necessary to interpose some void between the atoms themselves in order that the magnitude of a body might increase from them. Again, of these philosophers some posited no efficient cause of things besides these atoms, nor any final cause either, but that from their various concourse and perpetual agitation some things are dissolved and others arise by chance; and therefore, as Aristotle reports,¹ Epicurus said that these little bodies have a natural weight by which they are always borne. But others, as Anaxagoras, posited an efficient cause operating by intellect and will and composing various things from these little bodies.

3. The proposed opinion is refuted.—Absurdities following from the opinion asserting atoms as the material cause.—But this part pertains to the disputations on the efficient and final causes. Now, as regards the present matter, these philosophers first of all did not know the true material cause which is a potency physically receptive of some act; for those atoms are not in potency to receiving some physical form, nor can they be called the matter of the whole composite except in the way in which integral parts are called the matter of the whole and stones and timbers the matter of the house. Whence it further comes about that, according to that mode of philosophizing, the forms of natural beings are only as it were artificial, namely certain figures arising from the various position and order of the atoms. And so there will be no true substantial generation and corruption, but only various coordination or disordering of atoms. And although Anaxagoras posits atoms of diverse notions, nevertheless it is necessary that he posit all of them confused and intermixed in each thing, so that through their eduction one thing can be generated from another. And so all things differ only in this, that some have certain atoms more evident or in the exterior parts, but others more hidden and in the more secret parts, which whole diversity is only in the position and coordination of the atoms. Add that it cannot be understood how such various little bodies, having repugnant conditions, are intimately conjoined in each thing. Nor is it less inexplicable how from any thing whatever these hidden little bodies are brought forth to light, so that other things seem to be generated, or rather composed.

4. This too is absurd in all these philosophers, that they posit an infinite multitude of these little bodies; for either they understand that in individual natural beings there is an infinite multitude of these atoms, or only in the whole universe, but in individual bodies or its parts a finite multitude. In the former sense it is altogether absurd; for infinite atoms could not compose any body without it growing into infinite magnitude; for, if the atoms are feigned to be not mathematically but physically indivisible, each will have some magnitude, in which either all will be equal, because there is no reason of inequality, or at least a least atom could be assigned to which the others are either equal or greater; therefore from such infinite atoms a magnitude actually infinite will necessarily be composed. But if the atoms are mathematically indivisible, they cannot compose magnitude unless a void space is interposed, which space will be divisible and of some magnitude; from which it is similarly concluded that infinite atoms so distant among themselves necessarily effect an infinite body, occupying or including an infinite space, partly void, partly filled with atoms. Nor can an instance be brought forward of the infinite points existing in a line, for there there are no immediate points, because the whole line is continuous; but in atoms it would be necessary, any atom being marked, that there be some one proximately distant from it by some certain and definite distance, and so of the rest; it would therefore be necessary that those infinite little bodies occupy an infinite space in that way.

5. But in the latter sense too that opinion is improbable; and first of all against it proceed all the things which Aristotle wrote against the infinite magnitude of the world, Physics III and De caelo I. Next it is evident that the whole sphere of generable and corruptible things is finite, since it is terminated at the sphere of the moon; but to attribute also to the heavens a composition from atoms and to extend them to infinity cannot be philosophical, because neither experience nor reason leads us to so think. Finally, if any body of finite magnitude consists only of finite atoms, this fiction of atoms cannot suffice for the generations and corruptions of things, both because from the same thing various things can be generated almost to infinity; and also because it would be necessary that the magnitude of the body always be much diminished in every generation and corruption through the dispersion of atoms, although it is evident by experience that this does not always happen. Unless perhaps it be said that there always comes about as it were a certain circulation of atoms, while the interior ones are brought out to the external parts, but the exterior ones are driven into the inmost parts, and therefore the magnitude of the thing is not diminished. But nothing can be more absurd than this; for thence it comes about that in truth nothing is changed except according to place or appearance. And that inducing and educing of atoms is against experience; for when fire is generated from tow, the generation comes about not only in the exterior parts but intimately and in the whole magnitude; and when a man dies, corruption comes about in all parts, both internal and external. This opinion, then, is altogether absurd, nor does it have a foundation which it is necessary to satisfy. For that principle on which both the cited philosophers and others were founded, From nothing nothing comes, what true sense it has we shall declare below.

The opinion of those positing several finite material principles

6. The preceding opinion is refuted.—The second opinion also posits several principles, or several first material causes of generable things, yet in finite number. So Empedocles thought, who said that the four elements, fire, air, water and earth, are four first material causes from which mixed bodies are generated, but that they themselves have no prior cause or material principle. But this opinion is false and can be evidently refuted; for first of all, although he touched upon the composition or generation of the mixed from the elements, he did not consider the transmutation of the elements among themselves, although it is evident that both air is converted into fire and water into earth, and conversely. But of transmutation of this kind the elements cannot be the material principles, but some subject common to all of them. But if perhaps Empedocles thought that the elements are not substantially transmuted, and therefore do not consist of matter and substantial form, but are certain altogether simple beings subject to accidents, against this first of all we shall show below that it is no less certain that there are substantial forms of the elements than of other natural beings, and consequently that they are truly and substantially transmuted among themselves. Next, although we admitted it, there would be no foundation for multiplying matters or first substantial subjects; but it would rather have to be said that in all the elements there is the same substantial subject, which, affected by diverse accidents, is called a distinct element. And since that subject is also the material principle of mixed bodies, it comes about that in truth and substantially there is only one first material cause of all things.

7. But if perhaps Empedocles said that that diversity of natural accidents which is seen in the elements indicates the essential distinction of substantial subjects, from this very thing an efficacious argument ad hominem is taken; when air is so transmuted by fire that it remains affected by the proper accidents of fire, the change comes about not only in the accidents but also in the substance itself; but it cannot come about in the whole substantial entity, on account of the reasons made in the preceding section about annihilation and creation; it is necessary, therefore, to confess that also in the elements themselves there is some subject prior to them and common to them, by reason of which they can be mutually transmuted; therefore those are not the first material causes, but there is another prior one of which they consist. And hence it is also concluded that these elements are not the first material causes of mixed bodies, because in them there is matter prior to them, and this is also the material cause of mixed bodies, which remains in them and is informed by their forms; that, therefore, is the first cause in that order also of mixed bodies, all the more because according to the true opinion the elements do not remain formally in the mixed body, that is, according to their proper substantial forms, because the substantial form of the mixed body cannot fall (so to speak) upon the form of the element, or inform matter as already informed by the form of the element; therefore the elements according to their proper substances are not the remaining and proper material cause of mixed bodies, but the same matter which is the first material cause of the elements themselves is also of mixed bodies.

Resolution of the question

8. It must be said, then, that the prime matter, or material cause, of all sublunary things is only one. Which is the common opinion of all the philosophers whom we shall report in what follows. And it is sufficiently proved by the reason now made against Empedocles and by the latter discourse made in the preceding section. Where from the common and mutual transmutation of sublunary things we showed that there is a common matter; for that reason equally proves that the first subject which remains under all these transmutations is only one. Both because the contrary principles from which generations and corruptions come about must be concerned with the same thing. And also because that subject is of itself indifferent to any forms whatever of corruptible things and their dispositions; therefore it does not require in itself distinction or multiplication, indeed it has nothing whence it would have it. And conversely every form of a generable thing of whatever species can be introduced into any part whatever of this matter if it is fittingly disposed; it is therefore a sign that this matter according to itself is one and of the same notion and sufficient in its genus for causing all the effects which can be materially caused in these things, if the other causes necessary in other genera are applied or concur.

9. An objection is satisfied.—It can only be objected that the material cause is intrinsic and essential; but these generable and corruptible things are essentially diverse; therefore one and the same matter cannot be in all of them. But this objection touches that question whether matter is part of the quiddity of material substances, which we shall treat below in a more convenient place;² now it is briefly answered that the essences of these material things are diverse and dissimilar as regards their forms, but similar as regards prime matter. Nor does this stand in the way of essential diversity at all; for this does not exclude agreement and likeness in some part.

1. The ancient philosophers (as Aristotle and the other authors cited in the preceding section report) who posited only one material principle of natural things almost all thought that it is some integral substance or simple body, such as Averroes thinks the heavenly body is. But concerning that body or material cause there was among them a manifold opinion.

Opinions of the philosophers about one material principle

2. The first asserted that this principle is water, whose author was Thales of Miletus; but others, as Plutarch, think it is more ancient and drew its origin from Orpheus. The second opinion attributes this function to air, which Anaximenes and Diogenes of Apollonia taught, as Aristotle reports, Physics I, c. 3, and Simplicius declares in the same place. The third opinion was that fire is a cause of this kind, which Hippasus and Heraclitus taught, and the Stoics followed the same, as is in Cicero, De natura deorum II. A fourth opinion could choose earth for this function, because it underlies all things and is as it were the common mother of all. Aristotle, however, Metaphysics I, c. 7, says that this was the opinion of the common people, but that none of the philosophers inclined to it, because earth on account of its excessive density and dryness seems unfit for receiving the forms or figures of other things. Hesiod, however, in his Theogony, absolutely calls earth the material principle of all things, and Theodoret reports that Pherecydes thought the same, in the book On matter and the world. The fifth opinion attributes this function to none of the four elements, but to a certain insensible body intermediate either between water and air, as Aristotle reports, Metaphysics I, c. 7, or between air and fire, as Anaximander, who added that this intermediate body is infinite, lest generation should ever fail; against which infinity Aristotle disputes elsewhere. But it seems to be gathered thence that this philosopher did not posit this body incorruptible; otherwise there would be no reason why he should fear that through the succession of generations it could be consumed if it were finite; although it can scarcely be understood how he made it corruptible, if he thought it to be a simple and common subject of generation.

3. Judgement is passed on the aforesaid opinions.—It would be prolix and superfluous to report the proper motives of all these philosophers, because they are both uncertain and show no probability or likelihood, as will be evident in passing from what is to be said. But this seems to have been common to all, that they thought nothing comes about simply anew, since from nothing nothing can come about; and therefore they seem to have recognized neither substantial forms nor substantial generation or corruption. Indeed many of them indicate that there are no accidental forms which are true beings, because they did not understand that any true thing can come about anew, but they thought that every change which we experience consists in various modes of being related of that thing which they thought to be the common matter. From which some went further, so that they said not that the material cause of all beings is one, but that all beings are one, not in number but in substance and essence; who, although they said a false and improbable thing, nevertheless spoke consistently, if they were treating only of general bodies. For, if these are not transmuted substantially, nor differ through substantial forms, but through accidents or diverse modes of being related, in truth there is no material cause of substance, but there is only a simple substance which is not essentially one and another, but one related otherwise and otherwise under diverse accidents.

4. And this was the opinion of Xenophanes, Parmenides and Melissus, who in this sense said that all things are one being, and that whatever is besides that is non-being; for they did not number the accidents or modes of that being among beings. And consequently they took away altogether every generation or change simply, because they made that being ingenerable and incorruptible; and accidental changes, because they do not give being simply, they did not judge worthy of the absolute appellation of changes. There are those who interpret the opinion of these philosophers in other ways, namely that by one being they understood one universe which embraces all things, as Aristotle indicates, De generatione I, c. 8, and Simplicius, Physics I, c. 2; or that by one being they understood God, who alone truly is. For Aristotle reports, Metaphysics I, c. 5, and Cicero, Academica II, that Xenophanes called that one being God. And so many and weighty authors think that these philosophers spoke through enigmas and hid the truth in figurative expressions; but that Aristotle attacked their opinions in so far as they seemed to be uttered in the very appearance and surface of the words. On which matter may be read St. Thomas, In Metaph. III, text 15; Philoponus and Simplicius, Physics I, c. 2; Eugubinus, De perenni philosophia III, from c. 5; Mirandola, Examen vanitatis VI, c. 1; and Bessarion, in the books Against the Calumniator of Plato. It matters little to us what these philosophers thought or what mysteries they hid in their words. There is no doubt, however, that, if they were ignorant of substantial forms, as they seem to have been ignorant, since they made no mention of them, they could easily and sufficiently consistently have fallen into that opinion as it has been explained by us. Whence by the proof and confirmation of substantial forms alone both this opinion and the others are refuted.

5. The opinion asserting a form of corporeity coeval with matter.—Another opinion, however, can be reported in this place, which many of the modern philosophers have followed, positing in prime matter a form of corporeity coeval with it and inseparable from it. For, although with respect to such form its material cause is simple, that is, without essential and physical composition, nevertheless that common subject which remains under every transmutation, and is the universal material cause of every generation and of every substantial form which comes about through eduction and of every composite which is generated—that subject (I say), according to the aforesaid opinion, is not simple but essentially composite, and some body, not mixed, nor yet any of the elements, nor intermediate between them through their participation, but absolutely body through prescission from all inferior forms. Which opinion Avicenna held, Sufficientia I, c. 2. Whose foundation is that the subject of generation must be corporeal and extended, and consequently quantified; but it cannot be such unless it has some substantial form. And Scotus and Henry followed this opinion in part; for the former, In IV, dist. 11, q. 3, a. 2, thinks that in all and only living things such a form of corporeity, or of mixture (as he speaks), is necessary; but the latter, Quodlibet I, qq. 2 and 3, and Quodlibet III, qq. 13 and 14, judges that it is to be admitted in man alone on account of the indivisibility of the rational soul. Whence these two authors do not posit this form inseparable from matter, nor as per se necessary for the first material causality of the subject of generation, but on account of other special causes; and therefore their opinion does not pertain to the present place.

Resolution of the question

6. The first conclusion.—It must be said, then, first, that the material cause universal and first in its order is not any of the sensible bodies or elements which are affected by contrary qualities. This assertion is against four opinions and is evident from what was said in the preceding section; for, if these elements and all sensible bodies are transmuted into one another substantially, none of them can be the first subject of transmutation; for the first subject, which is the first material cause which we are inquiring into, is not transmuted nor does it recede from its substance; otherwise it would be resolved into another prior subject, and so it itself would not be first. Moreover, since generation comes about between contraries, it is necessary that the common subject of generation have none of the contraries naturally innate in it; otherwise either it will never be capable of the other contrary, or it would be corrupted through the casting off of that which is connatural to it, as an element is destroyed when the quality necessary to it is taken away. Since, therefore, the individual elements are affected by proper qualities having a contrary, none of them can be an apt subject of generation; therefore neither can it be the first material cause of natural beings.

7. And hence arises a third reason, because there is no reason why this causality should be attributed to one element rather than to the others, nor yet why it should be more repugnant to all at once than to any one of them; but it has been shown that it cannot belong to all; therefore it is truly attributed to none. The former part of the major proposition is declared, because the individual elements are simple bodies, and each is apt and instituted for the generation of mixed bodies, and none of them can in any way consist of the others; for each has proper qualities repugnant to the others; therefore in all there is equal reason or repugnance against its being able to be the common matter of all generable things. For that in some there are certain conditions accommodated to the function of common matter—as is, for example, in fire subtlety, by reason of which it can easily penetrate all things; in air, that it is almost the common place of all things and easily receives external impressions; in water, humidity conjoined with that density which seems proportioned to constituting the nourishment of all things—these conditions (I say) matter nothing, both because they help rather either to the notion of effecting or to the notion of transient matter than to the proper and intrinsic notion of material cause, and also because those conditions, as they are accommodated to some things, so they are repugnant to others; for the subtlety of fire has proportion with the matter of subtle things, but not with the matter of dense things, and so of the others. But the first material cause, since it is common to all, must of itself be indifferent to all.

8. The other part of the major proposition is proved, because all the elements together cannot be the common matter, because they are transmuted into one another substantially; indeed neither can they compose a mixed body unless substantially transmuted; but this reason proves equally of each element taken by itself; therefore. Whence finally it is confirmed, because no element can be the matter of the other elements, as seems self-evident, since they are repugnant to one another. Nor, remaining in its nature, can it be the matter of any mixed body, since the form of the mixed body too fights with the form of the element; therefore no element can be the common matter of all natural things. And these reasons convince a fortiori of all mixed bodies, especially since those consist of elements; and therefore no one hitherto has attributed this causality to any mixed body.

9. The second conclusion.—I say, secondly: prime matter is not some body or substance complete and integral in the essence and species of substance. It can be understood in two ways that matter is a substance of this kind. First, so that it alone is the substance of all generable things and is only formed by their distinct accidents; and in this sense the assertion is to be proved from this, that natural things differ not only by accidents but also by substance and essence, as we argued in the preceding section against Epicurus and others. Likewise it is to be rejected (and it comes almost to the same) from the truth of substantial forms, which we are going to demonstrate in Disputation XV. For, that truth being supposed, it evidently follows that matter is not the whole substance of material things, and that these things differ not only by accidents but also by essence and substance, and are transmuted not according to accidents alone but also according to substance. Which is sufficiently evident also from experience itself; for, when a thing is changed in accidents alone, there remains in it some vestige of its properties and operations, or at least, contrary agents being removed, it is brought back to its state and nature; but we see some things so changed and destroyed that they altogether lose their prior properties and operations, nor ever return to them, even if every contrary action ceases; and conversely other things are so produced and generated that in that being which they acquire, as in their proper and connatural one, they remain constant, and according to it have proper and connatural operations and dispositions, which they preserve as far as they can; if sometimes they are weakened or diminished by some contrary, as soon as the contrary action ceases they recover them from their proper and intrinsic nature; it is therefore a sign that things are corrupted and generated not only in sensible accidents but also in their proper substance. And in these ways both the fifth opinion recited above and that which asserted that all things are one in the sense declared are attacked.

10. In another way, then, someone could feign that matter is a substance integral and complete in some species of substance, and nevertheless apt to receive further substantial forms and to compose with them the various substances and essences of material things. And this sense too is improbable: for either matter would be a complete substance altogether simple, or it would be composed of some substantial potency and act; this latter cannot be said, first, because then not that whole composite, but the potency of which it consists, would be the first material cause. It will perhaps be said that this is true with respect to that composite which is feigned ingenerable and incorruptible, but that with respect to all generable beings, or their generation, the first material cause is the whole composite. But against this it is objected, secondly, that such a composite is feigned without any foundation; for there is no indication or sensible sign of that form interposed between pure matter and the other forms which are induced through generation. Because that form has no sensible property by which it might be discerned; for the first qualities follow per se upon the form of the elements, and the temperaments composed of those qualities upon the forms of mixed bodies; but all the other qualities or properties which we experience suppose, at least in the genus of material and dispositive cause, the prior qualities; there is, therefore, no sensible or material indication of such a form. Whence it comes about, thirdly, that it is altogether superfluous, because there is no physical effect on account of which it is necessary: not for effecting, since it has no quality through which it could effect; from elsewhere, to each quality its proper form, to which it is connatural, suffices. Nor yet for receiving, for for this that potency suffices which is said to underlie such a form; for why could not that too be immediately subjected to the form which is induced through generation? And for the same cause such a form is not necessary for preserving that potency of which it is said to be the act, because for this too the form which is induced through generation is enough. Such a form, therefore, is feigned superfluously and without foundation.

11. Fourthly, there is added the impossibility of conjoining those two forms in the same potency or matter; for, although it is in question whether a form as it were generic and specific can at the same time actuate matter, which we shall touch upon a little below, nevertheless that two specific forms be conjoined at the same time to actuate the same substantial potency is plainly impossible naturally, and in this almost all authors agree. Because either those two forms would immediately actuate matter, or one would be the act of the other, or of matter as informed by it. The first cannot be said, especially according to that opinion, because otherwise the prior form would not necessarily be supposed to the posterior, nor would the composite of matter and such form be the proximate potency and material cause of the subsequent form. The second too cannot be said, because a substantial form constituting an integral and complete substance has the notion of last act in the notion of substantial and essential act, because it constitutes some last species of substance; therefore it cannot be compared after the manner of substantial potency to a further form. Finally, the general reason is that one and the same substance cannot be essentially and per se constituted in two lowest species; but through either form of those it is constituted in a proper and complete species of substance; therefore those two forms cannot be conjoined at the same time in the same matter. Otherwise any substance whatever, however complete, could be actuated by a further substantial form, because no greater reason can be given of one than of another. And to this also pertains that common reason, that a form coming to a being already constituted in act does not make one per se, but per accidens, from Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, text 49, and De Anima II, text 7; and therefore it cannot be a substantial form, but accidental, because a substantial form constitutes one per se, not per accidens. And the reason is that a substantial form gives being simply and essential being, and therefore cannot suppose a thing constituted in being simply and in complete and consummated essence. But an accidental form gives being in a certain respect, which is adjoined per accidens to a consummated essence. It is impossible, therefore, that the subject which is the material cause of generable things and of substantial generation be a complete substance constituted by a proper and specific form.

12. And these reasons prove equally efficaciously that that subject cannot be a simple substance integral and complete in the notion and species of substance, because it would be impossible that such a substance be further actuated and completed by a substantial form. For, if this is repugnant to a composite substance, much more to a simple one, which through itself is in complete and perfect act. For that repugnance does not come from composition, but from complete actuality in the notion and essence of substance, which cannot within that genus be further actuated substantially and essentially; but this reason of repugnance has place by the same or greater reason in a simple substance, if it is supposed integral and complete in the genus of substance. And by this reason an immaterial substance cannot have the notion of substantial potency to a further form, because it is a complete simple substance; and the same holds of the substance of the heaven, if it is physically simple, as many hold; for it is complete in some species of substance, and therefore cannot be further substantially actuated; prime matter, therefore, which can be actuated substantially and compose with substantial form a being per se one, cannot be such a simple substance, which is integral and complete in the genus of substance.

13. The third conclusion.—I say, thirdly: the material cause of generable things is not a substance composed of substantial potency and some incomplete and as it were generic substantial form. Almost all authors commonly approve this assertion against Avicenna, especially those who deny that there are several substantial forms in the same composite, as St. Thomas, I, q. 76, aa. 3 and 4, Contra Gentiles II, c. 58, and In Metaph. VII, lect. 12, whom the Thomists follow: Capreolus, In II, dist. 15, q. 1; Cajetan, in the said place of the First Part, and De Anima II, c. 1; Ferrariensis, in the cited place of the Contra Gentiles; Soncinas, Metaphysics VIII, q. 8; Javellus, q. 4; Soto, Physics I, q. 7; Astudillo, De generatione I, q. 1; and in the same place Marsilius, q. 6; and Albert of Saxony, q. 5; and at length Giles, treatise De pluralitate formarum, and De Anima II, dub. 6. The same was taught by Philoponus, De generatione I, at the beginning; Themistius, Physics V, text 7; and the Commentator, book De substantia orbis, and Metaphysics I, text 17, and Physics I, texts 65 and 69. Indeed Avicenna too, De Anima I, part I, c. 3, signifies that in corruption matter alone remains; and Sufficientia I, c. 3, he doubts whether in corruption corporeity perishes, as he speaks. Aristotle too, De generatione I, text 12, and in other places cited above, openly indicates the same opinion. Various reasons are brought forward by the Doctors; but two seem to suffice, which can be taken with proportion from the proofs of the preceding assertion.

14. The first reason is that in nature there is no indication of such a form perpetually coeval with and inseparable from matter, nor any effect on account of which it is necessary; therefore such a form is feigned without foundation or necessity. The antecedent is proved, because that form has no quality proper to itself through which it may be known, nor can it be gathered from substantial transmutation; because from transmutation of this kind it is only gathered that there is some substantial subject of it. But that it is composite is neither necessary for the notion of subject, nor can it be inferred from any other indication. You will say that for the notion of a subject of physical change it is required that it be extended and divided from others; and for this it is necessary that it have some form, because matter alone through itself is not capable of extension and division, for it is act which distinguishes; for this was the foundation of the contrary opinion. But this reason is of no moment, because, whether we think that quantity and extension precede simply in the order of nature in prime matter for substantial generation, or think that it follows upon the form introduced through generation and affects the whole composite, in neither way is it necessary that the subject of generation be composed of matter and some form. Each part is declared; for, if quantity is supposed to the form to be induced through generation, it can easily be understood as inhering in the very entity of matter; for, as we shall show below, it has a true and substantial entity.

15. And it is confirmed, for that composite which is feigned of matter and the form of corporeity is something incomplete and so potential that it naturally desires a further form, without which it cannot be either at all or at least in a connatural way. And nevertheless that composite is said to be a sufficient subject of quantity prior in nature to receiving the further form; much better and more easily, therefore, will that whole capacity be attributed to the simple entity of matter, because no greater repugnance as regards this can be feigned in a simple entity than in that composite; nor will the actuality of such an entity, whatever it is, be more repugnant to union and per se composition with the last substantial form than the actuality of that composite of matter and form of corporeity; therefore, according to this mode of opining, that form is not necessary. But it is less necessary if we think that quantity follows upon the form which is introduced through generation; for according to this opinion quantity supposes in the order of nature a substance composed of matter and proper form. Whence it will consequently have to be said, according to that opinion, that before the instant intrinsic to generation, in the whole time in which the previous alteration comes about, matter is supposed extended in itself and divided from others through quantity and the form of the thing to be corrupted; but in the instant of generation it is preserved extended and divided through the form introduced and the quantity accompanying it in the same instant; there is, therefore, no natural effect, nor any sign, by reason of which such a form or composition on the side of matter is to be admitted.

16. The second reason is that a form of this kind is incompossible in matter with the subsequent forms. But this is commonly wont to be proved from that maxim, that from two beings in act one per se does not come about; for the first substantial form constitutes being in act absolutely and simply, because it gives being simply; therefore no supervening form can constitute a being per se one and simply. But to this reason it can be answered that it only proceeds of a substantial form giving specific and ultimate being; for that which gives precisely generic being, although it has the notion of act with respect to matter, is nevertheless compared as potency to the inferior form, and because it is of the same genus it will be able to constitute one per se with its act. For so these authors philosophize about physical forms, as we all reason about metaphysical differences, in which the subaltern difference is an act actuating the superior genus and constituting its proper species, which nevertheless is a potency to the inferior difference, with which it metaphysically composes a being per se one. So, then, it must be said, according to the aforesaid opinion, of physical forms. Whence, when it is said that every substantial form constitutes being in act simply, it will be answered that this is true, proportion being kept; for the generic form constitutes being in act in the generic grade, but the specific form in the specific grade. And with similar proportion that maxim will be distinguished: What comes to a being in act comes accidentally.

17. No form can give a precisely generic grade.—Wherefore, in order that that opinion may be radically attacked, it must be proved by us that there can be no form which gives precisely generic being without also giving some specific being in that genus; for, this being proved, the discourse made proceeds excellently, because every substantial form constitutes being in act simply and in some lowest species of substance, and therefore it is impossible that the composite constituted through such a form be further actuable through a substantial form. But that assumption is proved, first, by induction, both in accidental forms and also in separated forms. For qualities too are conceived to give specific being, as to be white, and generic, as to be coloured, etc.; and yet there is no accidental form which in the thing gives precisely generic and not some specific being. Similarly in the angels there is the generic notion of spirit and the proper specific difference; but there cannot be, indeed not even be conceived, some separated form which is a spiritual substance and which in the thing itself stops at this precise and generic notion; by the same reason, therefore, in substantial forms which are as it were intermediate there cannot be a form which in the thing precisely gives the generic grade; for no reason of diversity can be assigned. Whence I argue, secondly, from the proper notion of form itself, because a form existing in the thing itself cannot be understood which is not essentially constituted in some lowest species of substantial form; but every form communicates to the composite its whole being and its whole essence; therefore it constitutes it in some lowest species of composite substance. The consequence with the minor are evident, and can excellently be declared by the induction made in the first reason. But the major too seems most certain, because every substantial form has a proper entity distinct in the thing itself from matter or other forms; therefore it is necessary to understand in that entity an ultimate and proper difference or notion through which it is essentially distinguished from other forms having a diverse essence, with which it agrees in the common notion of substantial form; therefore every substantial form is necessarily constituted according to its entity in some lowest species of substantial form.

18. The prime matter of generable things claims for itself a stable and atomic species.—You will say: prime matter too has its proper substantial entity, and yet according to itself it is not constituted in some lowest species, but is only reduced to the genus of material substance, until it is determined by the form to some particular notion; therefore the same could be said of the common form coeval with matter. I answer that the assumption is false; for the prime matter of generable things, of which we are now treating, is essentially constituted in some lowest species of matter, which it retains under every form, nor can it vary it, but at most by superadded accidents it can be accommodated to this or that form. But because that essence of matter, although in itself specific and lowest, is such that in the thing itself it can be communicated to several substances essentially diverse, therefore, regarded according to itself, it is said to be reduced to material substance of generable things as such, and not to some species of it. Whence in passing it is gathered that the concept of generable substance as such is not generic by reason of matter, but by reason of the common grade or agreement in form.

19. You will press: matter, even if in its essence it has the ultimate specification of matter, is nevertheless common to many substances essentially diverse; by equal reason, therefore, although the form of corporeity in its entity and essential concept has some ultimate specification, it will nevertheless be able to be common to many substances having further diverse essential notions.¹ I answer that the reason is unlike; for the essence of matter is to be as it were the foundation of an integral and composite substantial nature, and therefore it is only a certain inchoate essence (so to speak) after the manner of potency, and on that account is of itself indifferent to being completed by various acts; but form is the complement of the substantial nature and essence, and therefore, by the very fact that it has a determinate and specific notion of form, adjoined to matter it completes with it an integral substantial nature constituted in some lowest substantial species, and therefore does not leave that nature indifferent to a further species. Wherefore all who posit a form of corporeity in all or in some natural beings consequently say that that form is constituted precisely in the subaltern grade of corporeity without any essential contraction, which in truth is unintelligible.

20. And consequently they will also admit that the composite of matter and such form, if in the thing itself it is preserved without a further form, is an individual of the genus of corruptible body and is constituted in no lowest species of it. But that it can be so preserved by absolute power seems evident, speaking consistently, since the inferior forms are really distinguished from that composite, and it will be evident a fortiori from what we shall say below of matter. But Scotus thinks that this is possible even naturally, as, for example, in the death of a man or another similar case; for he admits there substantial corruption without generation, and that the corpse is nothing other than this individual body affected by these accidents and constituted in no inferior substantial species. But this consequent seems to me of itself absurd and incredible; for this individual body existing per se without any specification can no more be conceived than this spirit outside every species, or this coloured thing affected in the thing itself by this colour and by no species of colour. And the reason is that touched upon above, because an individual entity necessarily differs essentially from others, and therefore it is necessary that it be constituted in itself in a proper essence not common to others. Whence it is confirmed, for from the said position it follows that the generic and specific notion are really distinguished in one and the same thing, because they are taken from really distinct forms; but the consequent is evident to be false from what was said above of universals, and it will also be declared in the following reasons.

21. Absurdities from the opinion asserting a form of corporeity.—Worthy of note.—The third reason is taken from the difference between essential physical and metaphysical composition, which to wish to equate in this is the cause of error, since the one exists in things, the other in concepts. I argue, then, for if there can be given a physical form which confers only the generic grade, then as many as are the generic and specific grades of material substances, so many substantial forms really distinct will have to be multiplied; the consequent is false; therefore. The sequel is proved from parity of reason; for what reason can be brought forward on account of which some generic grade is given through a proper form really distinct and not others? Especially because, according to the opinion which we are attacking, not only in things which seem to be elevated to a higher grade of bodies, as are living things, but also in the lowest and inanimate bodies, the form giving the being of body is distinguished from the form giving the being of fire or of stone or something similar; which contraction is with the least diversity which can be between some genus and a substantial difference; if, therefore, that suffices for a real distinction of forms, any whatever suffices; whence there have not been lacking philosophers who admitted that consequent; yet it is not only false but also ridiculous. First, because it is evidently established by the induction made above that for abstracting the concepts of genus, difference and species that real distinction of forms is not necessary, as is evident in the angels and in accidents. Secondly, because it follows that three souls are to be multiplied in man, which is an altogether false opinion, as I suppose from the science of the soul. Indeed even more will have to be multiplied; for in the grade of sensing some essential agreement can be abstracted between man and some perfect animals which is not common to all animals, and in the notion of understanding a generic notion common to man and the angels can be abstracted, which is contracted to man through a proper difference. Whence it further follows that innumerable forms really distinct are to be asserted in individual composites, because generic and specific differences can be multiplied in various ways according to the various agreements and differences which can easily be considered in things, and according to them various common or particular concepts can be abstracted. It is, therefore, a great error in metaphysics and philosophy, on account of our confused or distinct mode of conceiving, from which the multiplication of genera and differences often arises, to distinguish real and physical forms. Otherwise not one only, but two or three forms of corporeity would have to be posited: one of body in common, as it is genus to corruptible and incorruptible, simple or mixed; another of corruptible or mixed body as such. All which are ridiculous. Whence not only is it not necessary on account of these operations of the mind to multiply the forms themselves, but it is even repugnant to them, because it is of the notion of proper genus and proper difference that they express the same essence of the thing diversely conceived.

22. Which finally is confirmed, because it is impossible that there be given a substantial form giving the specific grade of substance which does not give also that generic grade and the formal effect which the distinct form of corporeity is feigned to give; therefore such a form is both superfluous and impossible. The consequence is evident, because the same essential predicate and the same formal effect cannot belong to the same thing through two forms really distinct. But the antecedent is proved, because there cannot be given a substantial form conferring the specific grade which does not essentially include the common and generic notion of substantial form informing matter; but this precise notion suffices for constituting the form of corporeity; therefore the form of corporeity is not a special form, but is any substantial form whatever considered according to the common notion of informing substantial form. The minor is proved (for the rest are clear), for from the precise fact that some substance is understood as composed of matter and substantial form, it is essentially a corporeal substance, or a body of the predicament of substance; for by virtue of such composition it is both essentially distinct from incorporeal substance and capable of quantity or threefold dimension, in which the notion of corporeal substance consists. Whence the form of corporeity as such neither expresses nor requires that it itself be corporeal or extended, but only that it inform matter, by reason of which the composite resulting thence is capable of threefold dimension; there is, therefore, no necessary or possible intermediate form which gives the generic being of body, but any substantial form whatever by virtue of its generic notion confers it.

23. The conclusion is inferred from all that has been said.—It remains, therefore, from all that has been said, that the first material cause of generable substances is not some integral substance, nor any body or composite of matter and form; and accordingly that for the generation of substances there is not supposed, after the manner of a subject in which generation is received, some ingenerable and incorruptible body, but prime matter alone—alone (I say) as regards substance; for as regards accidents what is to be said we shall see afterwards.

1. Hitherto we have explained rather what matter is not than what it is; now this second is to be inquired into, because we cannot declare the causality of matter and its notion of causing unless we first know what of entity matter itself has.

Some certain things are established

2. In order, then, to begin from those things which seem certain, first it seems indubitable that the matter which is actually under a form and composes with it a corporeal substance has something of real and substantial entity, really distinct from the entity of the form. This whole assertion is taken from Aristotle, Metaphysics VIII, text 3, and Metaphysics XII, text 14, and De Anima II, text 2, and other places, in which he divides substance into matter, form and composite. But because matter is not a complete substance, therefore, Physics I, texts 66 and 69, he says that matter is being not as a this something but as a subject, and explains its entity through analogy to the matter of artificial things; and in text 79 and following he says that it approaches more nearly to the notion of substance; and Physics II, text 10, he calls matter a certain nature. Similarly Plato in the Timaeus placed matter under being, and declares its nature fully and excellently; sometimes, however, he calls matter non-being; in which he is reproved by Aristotle, because to be non-being belongs rather to privation than to matter. But the dissension is in word only; for it is called non-being, being being taken by antonomasia for complete being, which is being simply; all the interpreters of Aristotle also agree in this assertion: Averroes, Physics I, text 66, and De substantia orbis, c. 1; Simplicius, Physics I, text 69; Philoponus, text 60; Themistius, text 61; and St. Thomas, question De spiritualibus creaturis, a. 1, says that prime matter is in the genus of substance; and the same is gathered from other places which I shall immediately report.

3. And the individual parts are briefly proved. The first indeed, because matter is not altogether nothing; otherwise it would exercise no true and real function in nature; and while the things which are corrupted are said to be resolved into matter, they would be reduced to nothing, and while they are produced from matter they would come about from nothing; and so matter would serve nothing for generations and corruptions, nor for avoiding the perpetual creation and annihilation of things; matter, therefore, is something of thing; therefore it has this most of all when it is conjoined to form and composes the composite. Whence Augustine, Confessions XII, cc. 7 and 8, says that matter was created by God, not as something which is nothing, but near nothing, nor no thing, but almost no thing. And it is certain by faith, and will also be proved below by reason, that matter was created by God, as is evident from I, q. 44, a. 2, and q. 46, a. 1, ad 3; but what is created receives something of real entity; otherwise it would remain as unmade as before.

4. The entity of prime matter is substantial.—The second part is evidently proved from this, that prime matter essentially composes substance, Metaphysics VIII, texts 15, 16 and 36, and Book IX, at the end, and it will be treated more fully below. But substance is not composed except of substances, at least incomplete ones. Likewise composite substance adds something of thing besides the form, and that is not an accident; it is therefore something substantial. Finally prime matter, in the way in which it is being, is not in a subject; for this is most of all repugnant to it, since it is the first subject.

5. The last part too is clear, because matter is an entity really separable from any particular determinate form, which is enough for it to be distinct in the thing itself from the form; but they are not distinguished only modally; for the substantial form is not a mode but a true thing having a proper entity; whence sometimes it can also naturally be preserved separated from matter, as the rational soul, and by absolute power any form whatever can be preserved separated. Matter, therefore, is distinguished from form as thing from thing. And it is confirmed; for the composition of substance from matter and form is real and physical, and not of thing and mode; therefore of two things. Finally, since matter is perpetual and before the form, it is evident that it is really distinguished from the form, supposing that the form is not only some mode but true act and proper entity, which is also certain, since it is a more perfect thing than matter, of which more fully below. Soncinas, however, Metaphysics VII, q. 19, although he concedes that this part is true, adds nevertheless that someone could defend that matter is not actually distinct from form, because it does not have distinct being. But, whatever may be the case with the being of existence, of which it will be said immediately, no one can deny that according to the entity of essence the entity of matter is other than the entity of the form, as the reasons made demonstrate.

The point of the difficulty and the view of some

6. These things, then, being posited beyond controversy, the difficulty of this question is whether matter of itself has some actual entity. But that particle of itself can express the negation either of a formal or of an efficient cause, and in each sense the question is to be treated, but especially in the former. For about the latter there is no controversy among Catholic philosophers, although some pagans erred in it. But in the former sense many think that matter of itself has no actual entity, but altogether from the form. Which opinion seems to be St. Thomas’s, I, q. 44, a. 2, ad 3, where he says that matter of itself is only in potency and therefore cannot be created except under a form; and he signifies the same in q. 45, a. 4, and q. 66, a. 1, where from that principle he concludes that matter cannot be without form; the same De potentia, q. 4, a. 1, and Quodlibet III, q. 1, and often elsewhere; and so the Thomists think: Cajetan, on De ente et essentia, c. 5, q. 8, and I, q. 76, a. 1; Ferrariensis, Contra Gentiles II, c. 66; Soncinas, Metaphysics VII, q. 17; Javellus, q. 5; and Durandus holds the same, In II, dist. 12, q. 2, and In IV, dist. 44, q. 1. The foundation of this opinion is that matter is pure potency; therefore it cannot have of itself any act; therefore neither actual entity. The first consequence is proved, because act is opposed to potency, and when it is called pure potency, that addition includes the negation of every act. The second consequence too is proved, because actual entity is some act; for it is being in act. But the antecedent is as it were a common axiom of all philosophers, and is taken from Aristotle, Physics I, text 69, where he says that matter of itself is so related to natural things as natural things of themselves to artificial ones, to which they are only in potency; and Metaphysics VII, c. 3, he says that matter per se is neither a what nor anything else of this kind. And De generatione I, c. 3, he says that the essence of matter consists in being able itself; and Metaphysics VIII, text 3, and Book XI, c. 2, and Physics V, text 8, he thinks that matter is not being in act but only in potency. The Commentator too teaches the same in the same places, and therefore in the book De substantia orbis, at the beginning, and Physics II, comm. 12, he says that matter is substantiated through being able. Plato seems to have been of the same opinion in the Timaeus, and he proves it from this, that the receptive must be devoid of all those things which it can receive.

7. Next the same antecedent is proved by reason, because, if matter is not pure potency, then either it is composed of potency and act, or it is some act. The first cannot be said, as is evident from the preceding section, and because otherwise there would be another potency prior to matter itself. Again, if it is act, it is either informing act or subsisting act. Not the first, as is self-evident; otherwise it would be the act of another subject, and consequently there would be another subject prior to matter, which is repugnant to the notion of matter. Nor can the second be said either, first, because subsisting act is more perfect than informing act: whence, if it is so subsisting that it cannot inform, it is always a complete substance; for by this reason angelic substances are perfect and complete, because they are subsisting acts; and those who posit the substance of the heaven to be simple say that it is complete because it is act subsisting per se. Finally God himself, who is the most perfect act, is subsisting and not informing act; it is therefore a sign that subsisting act from its notion is more perfect than informing. But prime matter is most imperfect, and so less perfect than any substantial form whatever, which is informing and not subsisting act. And it is confirmed, for every act, whether informing or subsisting per se, has some operation, as is evident by running through all acts of this kind; but prime matter has no proper action; it is not, therefore, act, but pure potency.

Resolution of the question

8. In order to answer the question, all ambiguity of terms being excluded, let us distinguish the question about the entity of essence and about the entity of existence; for it is much controverted how these two are distinguished in creatures, and therefore the resolution about the one is more certain than about the other. Again, when it is inquired whether matter has entity of itself and not from the form, that negation can be understood in two ways: in one way, that it does not have it from the form intrinsically, or as from an act informing and giving being to matter through its intrinsic information; in another way, that in no way does it have its being through the form, or through a relationship to the form, or through dependence on it.

9. Matter has an actual essence distinct from form, but dependent on it.—I say, then, first: prime matter has its actual entity of essence of itself and not intrinsically from the form, although it does not have it except with an intrinsic relationship to the form. I speak in this assertion of the actual being of essence, so that in names and in the mode of speaking I may agree with the authors of the contrary opinion; although in this sense and as regards this part I do not see how there can be a diversity of opinions. It is proved, first: matter has some real essence, otherwise it would not be real being; but the essence of matter is not constituted intrinsically in its being of essence through the form; therefore through itself it has its entity of essence, whatever it may be. The minor is proved, because a form does not intrinsically constitute any nature in its being of essence except by composing it after the manner of act; but the form does not compose the essence of matter, as is self-evident, because matter is essentially a simple entity, as is the form too, and from both arises the composite. Whence the second reason is taken; for every simple entity necessarily has its essence through itself intrinsically, and not through another entity, because in this the very notion of simple entity or essence consists; but matter is a simple essence; therefore. Thirdly, matter is essentially an incomplete entity; therefore it is not intrinsically constituted through the form. The consequence is evident, because, if it included the form, nothing would be lacking to it for the notion of complete essence. Finally this very thing is gathered from the very notion of pure potency; for, if matter created by God and existing in the composite had its being of essence intrinsically through the form, it would include in its essential concept the act of the form, not as an extrinsic term or something added, but as an intrinsic formal act constituting it, and so it would not be pure potency.

10. You will say that these arguments rightly prove of potential being of essence, not of actual. The answer is that, if the discussion is of being in objective potency, or in the power of the cause, and of being in act opposed to this potency, then the reasons made proceed not only of potential being but most of all of actual, because, whether matter exists through an entity distinct from itself or not, it is nevertheless certain that, when it is actually conjoined to form, it has its actual essence, of which (whatever may be the case with existence) all that has been said proceeds: that it is essentially a simple entity, actuable indeed through form, yet not including the form intrinsically in its essence. And therefore, the same entity of essence in number being preserved, it can cast off one form and acquire another; therefore through that simple entity of its own it has a proper essential perfection, distinct from that which the form confers; and similarly according to it it has actual being of essence; for every essence includes some being, at least essential. But if the discussion is of potential being, as it is said from receptive potency and is distinguished from actuating act, then it is true that matter only expresses a potential entity; yet this does not exclude that in that essence, whatever it may be, it is intrinsically constituted through itself and not through the form.

11. But that matter does not have its very entity of essence without a transcendental relationship to form is proved because it is essentially potency, as will be shown below, and is evident from the definition of Aristotle, saying that matter is the first subject, etc.; but every potency expresses an intrinsic relationship to its act; but the proper act of matter is form; matter, therefore, has its proper essence through itself with a relationship to form. But this relationship is not per se primarily to this or that form, but to form absolutely, and consequently to any generable form whatever, or which can be united through generation; and therefore, although forms are varied in matter, the essential notion or relationship of matter is not varied. Which is also a clear argument that matter does not have its entity of essence from the information of form.

12. An objection is dissolved.—But some object: for every being of essence must be constituted in some certain species; but every species is through form; therefore no being of essence can be fully constituted except through form. Whence St. Thomas, I, q. 44, a. 2, says that matter is contracted through form to a determinate species. To this it has almost been answered above that the matter of generable things is constituted in a lowest species of matter, in which species it is not constituted through the form by which it is informed; for it always has the same under any form whatever. But when it is said that the form is that which gives the species, it is understood of complete and perfect species. And in the same sense St. Thomas understands that matter is contracted through form to a determinate species, as he openly declares by the following words, saying: As the substance of some species is contracted by an accident coming to it to a determinate mode of being, as man is contracted through white. Which example is adduced only to declare that this determination of matter through form is not as regards the intrinsic essence of matter itself, but as regards the essence of the composite, which in a certain way happens to matter according to itself, in so far as the mode of existing of matter under this or that form is not of the essence of matter but variable in it. Whence St. Thomas in that same article openly supposes that matter of itself has some being besides that which the form gives; for thence he concludes that God is the cause of matter, because he is the cause of things not only according as they are such through accidental or substantial forms, but also according to all that which pertains to their being in any way whatever. And the same, I, q. 14, a. 11, ad 3, says that, although matter recedes from the likeness of God according to its potentiality, nevertheless, in so far as even so it has being, it has a certain likeness of the divine being; and De veritate, q. 3, a. 5, ad 1, he says: although prime matter is formless, nevertheless there is in it an imitation of the first form; for however weak a being it has, that nevertheless is an imitation of the first being.

13. I say, secondly: prime matter also has in itself and through itself an entity or actuality of existence distinct from the existence of the form, although it has it dependently on the form. Henry holds the former part, Quodlibet I, q. 10, and Quodlibet IV, q. 16; Scotus, In II, dist. 12, qq. 1 and 2; and in the same place Gregory, q. 1; Gabriel and others, in the same place. The foundation of this conclusion, the preceding being supposed, is that the being of existence adds no thing or real mode over the entity of essence as actual and placed outside its causes, because, by the very fact that an entity is conceived as actual outside its causes, it is conceived as existing. Which principle is to be professedly proved below, Disp. XXXIV. But from it it evidently follows that matter, as it has an actual entity of essence distinct from form, so it has its proper being of existence, which it retains under any form whatever. Whence it is confirmed: for matter has the same actual entity in number under the form of the generated as it has under the form of the corrupted; therefore it also has the same being in number by which it is constituted in such actual entity. But that being is of existence, as is proved in the said place. It is confirmed, secondly, for matter as it is presupposed to form and is the subject of generation is not altogether nothing, otherwise generation would come about from nothing; it is, therefore, some created entity; therefore an actual and existing entity, because creation is not terminated except at actual and existing entity. Nor can there be a real subject unless it is existing in the nature of things. Finally, such is the existence of the thing as is its actual essence; as, therefore, the essence of corporeal substance is composed of the partial essences of matter and form, so also the integral existence of the same substance is composed of the partial existences of matter and form. Which is to be proved more fully in the cited place; for it follows manifestly from the said principle, that existence and actual essence are distinguished not in the thing but by reason; therefore matter, as it is an actual entity really distinct from form, includes in its entity a proper partial existence, also distinct in the thing from the partial existence of the form.

14. But that this existence of matter depends in some way on the form and on its information Scotus, Henry and Gregory seem to deny in the places cited above; but the contrary opinion, which we posited in the second part of the assertion, is commonly received, because matter, although it has its proper existence, nevertheless that is so imperfect that it cannot naturally be without the support of form; and this is called in the present case the dependence of matter on form. But of what kind this mode of dependence is cannot fittingly be declared unless we first explain the causality of form; and in the same place we shall also treat whether there is so great a dependence of matter on form that without it it can in no way be.

15. I say, thirdly: matter does not have actual entity or existence of itself without an efficient cause, but it is necessary that it receive this being from another, namely from God. This assertion according to faith is most certain; but according to philosophy not all admit that it is demonstrable. Whence according to the opinion of Plato¹ matter is supposed to every action, even of God, and therefore is thought to be unmade, as of the Fathers Justin reports, in the Hortatory Oration to the Gentiles; and Ambrose, Hexaemeron I, c. 1; and Athanasius, book On the Incarnation of the Word, at the beginning; and of the philosophers Plutarch, De placitis I; Philoponus, Physics I, text 6; and Themistius, text 32. But of the opinion of Aristotle the matter is doubtful, which we shall treat below in treating of the efficient cause. But the assertion posited is sufficiently demonstrated from this, that there can be only one being by essence and necessary from within, as we shall show below in demonstrating that God exists; but that being cannot be prime matter, unless we fall into the error of those who said that prime matter is God, which St. Thomas deservedly calls most stupid, I, q. 3, a. 8, and Contra Gentiles I, c. 17; for there is no substantial being more distant from God than prime matter, nor is anything more repugnant to God than that function on account of which matter is posited, which is to receive and to be passive potency, to be actuated and perfected; therefore matter is not being necessary per se and by essence; therefore it is not actual entity of itself, until it is made by another and receives existence. And it is confirmed, for to be being in act of oneself and by virtue of one’s own essence alone is a great perfection, which the most perfect finite beings, as are the heavens and the angels, do not have; indeed it alone is an indication of infinite perfection; since, therefore, matter is imperfect, this perfection cannot belong to it; but all these are to be treated more fully below in the places cited.

Corollaries from the above doctrine

16. The first.—From this conclusion it follows, first, that matter was made through creation and could not have been made otherwise; and in this sense must be taken what Aristotle calls it, ingenerable, Physics I, c. 9; for, if he understands that matter is altogether unmakeable, he altogether errs, as we have shown; it must therefore be understood that in such a way, namely through generation, it is not producible. Which is evident, because matter, since it is the first subject, cannot be produced from a subject, otherwise it would suppose another prior subject, which is repugnant; therefore it cannot come about through generation; for that comes about through generation which comes about from a presupposed subject; it remains, therefore, that it can only be effected through creation, because it can only come about from nothing. You will say: this is repugnant to the axiom received by all philosophers: From nothing nothing comes. I answer that this is true only with respect to natural agents, which are finite and have power of acting only through form; but not with respect to God, who is of infinite power and supreme actuality and the first and per se being, which is the first cause of all participated being in so far as it is such. But thence it is rightly concluded that God alone can be the effector of prime matter, because it is proper to him to create, as will be shown below.

17. The second.—Secondly it is inferred from what has been said that the entity of matter is incorruptible, which can be proportionally demonstrated by the reason made above; for what can be corrupted can be resolved into pre-existing matter; but matter cannot be resolved into a prior matter. Whence to be corrupted, if it is taken properly, belongs only to the composite of matter and form, whose union is dissoluble. But if it is extended to those things which are co-corrupted (so to speak), it can thus also belong to the form which depends on matter in its being, because it is so destroyed that at least its subject remains; but if the first subject too were destroyed, it would not be corruption, but annihilation. You will say that by this reason it is rightly proved that matter is not corruptible in the said propriety, but not that at the corruption of the composite it cannot be altogether destroyed or lose being; but it seems that in this way it can be corrupted or destroyed; for a natural agent is often able to expel one form and not to introduce another; therefore in this way it is able to destroy matter, since it cannot be preserved without form. I answer that a form can never naturally be expelled from matter except through the introduction of another, whether this introduction comes about from the proximate agent principally or only instrumentally or dispositively; and the natural order of things itself postulates this mode of generation and corruption. All of which are to be professedly declared in what follows. But thence it comes about that matter cannot naturally be corrupted or destroyed according to its proper being, but only according to its union to this or that form, or according to the privation of some form, as Aristotle said in the cited place; but God by his power could destroy matter, not by corrupting but by annihilating, by suspending the influx by which he preserves it, and the concurrence by which he introduces form into it; but this is only through the extrinsic power of God; whence it does not prevent matter from being of itself perpetual and incorruptible.

1. The solution of the arguments which were posited in the preceding section against our opinion depends on the resolution of the present question; for it is not to be denied by us that matter is pure potency, since all philosophers seem to agree in that assertion; but the true sense of that expression is to be explained.

Various opinions

2. The disciples of St. Thomas, then, commonly interpret that matter is called pure potency because neither of itself nor in itself does it have any existence except through form.¹ But Scotus, Henry and others cited above distinguish a twofold act, namely formal and entitative, and teach that matter of itself has entitative act, yet not formal, and consequently they say that matter is called pure potency in order to formal act, not in order to entitative act.

3. But some modern authors,² although they do not dissent from Scotus in the thing, nevertheless do not approve his mode of speaking; for they confess that matter has a proper existence distinct from the existence of the form, and consequently teach that matter is actually outside nothing; yet they deny that it is to be called entitative act, both on account of the reason made above, that it is neither informing nor subsisting act; and also because, although matter has an act of existence proper to itself, it is nevertheless not its own existence, because in every creature existence is distinguished at least from the nature of the thing from essence.

4. Nevertheless, if the thing which those authors teach does not displease, I do not see why the mode of speaking can displease, because neither is such a mode of speaking repugnant to Aristotle, as we shall show, nor does it disagree with the common and received use of terms. For in as many ways as potency is said, in so many can act also be said; but a thing is said to be in potency either passive, because it can receive act, or active, because it can effect, or objective or logical, because, although it is not, it is not repugnant to it to be; so, then, a thing can be said to be act or in act either with respect to receptive potency or to objective potency, active potency being omitted for now, which matters nothing at present. Prime matter, therefore, although it is pure receptive potency, and so in its essence includes no formal act, which is signified by that particle pure, nevertheless, after it has been created, cannot be said to be in pure objective potency; therefore by this reason it is rightly said to be, or to have, entitative act.

5. Nor does it matter anything to this whether it is or is not its own existence. First indeed, because when matter is called pure potency it is denied not only that it is act, but also that it consists of act and potency; but if matter has a proper existence, although we grant that it is not its own existence, we cannot nevertheless deny that it consists of its essence and existence; therefore it includes act; for actual existence is the act of essence according to all, and most of all in that opinion; therefore matter cannot be called pure potency in order to entitative act. Next, according to that opinion act is not sufficiently divided into formal and subsisting; for besides these there is the act of existence, which is not subsisting, since it is received in the essence, nor is it properly formal, since it is not a form, but it can be called the terminative act of the essence; therefore, since matter as it is distinguished in the thing from form includes this act, it cannot be called pure potency in order to entitative act. Moreover, according to that opinion about the real distinction, or from the nature of the thing, of existence from actual essence, it cannot be denied that actual essence as it is co-distinguished from existence has some actuality which essence conceived in objective potency alone does not have; therefore actual essence itself, granted that it is not its own existence, is some entitative act, that is, something else besides pure objective potency; indeed, unless actual essence is so conceived, that opinion which distinguishes it from existence as thing from thing or from real mode cannot be understood.

6. Whatever, then, we think of the distinction of essence and existence, certainly matter as it is in the thing distinct from form is some entitative act, yet in a diverse way; for those who do not distinguish existence from essence from the nature of the thing but only by reason will say that matter as it is actual entity is its own existence and actual essence, which in the thing are the same. And because according to this opinion the entitative act of the thing is nothing other than its existence or actual entity, therefore it is rightly concluded that matter is some entitative act. But according to the other opinion distinguishing existence from actual essence from the nature of the thing, and nevertheless admitting that prime matter has its proper existence which it retains under any form whatever, it must be said that matter, besides the act of form, both is its actual essence and has besides a proper act of existence. But those who so posit a real distinction between essence and existence as to deny that matter has a proper existence besides the existence which form brings, will consequently say that matter is pure potency in order to act both formal and entitative or of existence; yet they cannot deny that it is some actual entity in the being of essence. Although, because they think that the actuality of essence depends altogether on distinct existence, by that reason they can say that matter, even if in the thing it has an entity of essence, nevertheless has it so potential that it is not capable of existence except by means of form; and in this sense they can call it pure potency even in order to entitative act.

7. Matter existing in the thing is through itself entitative act.—Since, therefore, we think that matter has its partial existence and that existence is not distinguished on the side of the thing from actual essence but only by our mode of conceiving, we judge it also most true that matter as it is actual entity in the thing is also in the thing some entitative act, and according to reason, or in our mode of conceiving, is composed of being and essence as of terminating act and as it were objective potency. And each is sufficiently evident from what has just been said against the above opinion. But I always speak of matter as it is actual entity, because, if it is conceived according to that only which it has of itself, all efficiency being excluded, then it has no actuality in itself, but is only in the power of the cause, and of itself has only the non-repugnance of being; but this is not proper to matter; for form too, indeed every creature regarded according to itself, is in this way in pure potency; it is necessary, therefore, to speak of matter as it is actual entity, or, what is the same, in so far as according to itself it has a proper act of existing distinct from the act of the form.

8. But in order that the difficulties touched upon in the above section may be solved, and the mode of speaking of the philosophers explained, and all ambiguity of terms taken away, I notice that the name of act can be taken in many ways; for sometimes it is said absolutely, sometimes respectively; for sometimes something is called act because it actuates something, in which way form is the act of matter. And this I call respective act, because it is the act of another. But sometimes something is called act because in itself it is something actual and not potential, although it actuates nothing else, in which way God is called act; and this I call act absolutely said. Again, each of these acts can be subdistinguished; for actuating act is one physical and formal, as is the physical form; another metaphysical, which is manifold; for one is the act of essence, as the difference; another of existence, as existence; and there can be added also the act or mode of subsistence. But act absolutely said is one act simply, another in a certain respect. The former is that act which in the genus of being simply, or of substance, is so complete that it is neither constituted through a physical act distinct from itself, nor actuated by it, or needs it in order to exist. Or otherwise it can be explained that that being is called act simply which by virtue of its actuality alone includes the formal perfection which other composite beings are wont to have through informing substantial act. Whence, although an absolute act of this kind is not actuating or informing act, it can nevertheless be called formal act in an eminent way, that is, having through itself that complement of perfection which is wont to be conferred through informing act on those beings which are completed through composition. But that being will be called act in a certain respect which has some actuality in so far as it is actually outside nothing; but it has it incomplete and imperfect, because it is not so sufficient that it does not need another act, both in order to be completed in the notion of being simply, and also in order to exist.

Resolution of the question

9. Matter does not exclude every act.—It must be said, then, first, that matter is not called pure potency with respect to every metaphysical act, that is, because it includes no metaphysical act; for this cannot be true. First, because prime matter in its essential concept can be understood as composed of genus and difference; as, for example, if the matter of the heaven and of these inferior things are distinguished in species, this matter of generable things of which we are now treating consists of the common genus of matter and a proper difference, which can be taken from its order to the form of generable being; this matter, therefore, has its formal metaphysical act, by which it is constituted in its essence. And it is confirmed, for matter by its nature has some transcendental perfection and goodness, as St. Thomas also taught, Contra Gentiles III, c. 20. For it is certain that the composite of matter and form is something more perfect than the form alone; therefore matter has something of perfection which it adds to the composite. Likewise matter itself is desirable and fitting not only as a means but per se, because by reason of its perfection it is fitting to this form or composite; therefore matter by its nature has some proper perfection; but perfection cannot be understood without some actuality, at least transcendental. Moreover matter has a proper act of existence, as has been shown. Finally it has a partial and proportioned act of subsistence; for it altogether needs it in order to be able to be the first subject; for the first subject underlies all; but to subsist in itself is prior to underlying others. Of which matter we shall say more below in treating of subsistence. Prime matter, therefore, cannot so be pure potency that it excludes every actuating metaphysical act.

10. What act matter admits.—I say, secondly: matter is not so pure potency that it is not some entitative act in a certain respect. This assertion has been sufficiently declared and proved from what was said about the opinion of Scotus. And it is sufficiently gathered from the notion of first subject; for in the first subject there is necessary a real passive potency, or rather it itself is essentially passive potency; but a real passive potency cannot be understood without some entitative actuality. For how can it be understood that something is truly and really receptive of another unless in itself it is something? Whence the Commentator rightly says, De caelo III, comm. 29, that every passive potentiality is founded in some actuality. And St. Thomas, I, q. 45, a. 1, ad 1, says that matter is not called being in potency in the way in which a possible being is said to be in potency from the mere non-repugnance of the terms; he supposes, therefore, that it is some being in act founding real passive potency, or rather that it is real passive potency in the genus of substance.

11. How matter is pure potency.—I say, thirdly: matter is said to be pure potency with respect to informing or actuating act and with respect to act absolutely and simply said. It is declared, for first of all matter is not actuating act nor informing, as is self-evident from the notion of first subject. Next, in its intrinsic and essential concept it does not include informing physical act; for we have shown that it is a simple entity, which is also gathered from the notion of first subject. Moreover matter is such an entity that through itself alone it is not sufficient for existing without a substantial act perfecting and actuating it; whence by virtue of its precise entity it includes no formal act formally or eminently, and therefore it is not act absolutely simply. Finally, whatever of entity is in prime matter, all of it is for exercising the function of potency receptive of substantial form; for to this it was primarily and per se instituted, and therefore, as we were saying above, in its essential notion it includes a transcendental relationship to form. From these, then, it is evident that it is deservedly called pure potency in the genus of substance and is excellently explained in the aforesaid way; for, since matter is a simple entity and the whole of it is receptive potency, it is excellently called pure potency. But just as it is wont to be said that an exclusive expression does not exclude concomitance, so that expression pure does not exclude the entity and actuality in a certain respect necessary for the notion of real potency, but excludes first of all every other function besides that of passive potency, and next excludes the notion of complete act, or act simply and absolutely said, and (what comes to the same) excludes every formal act, both properly informing and simply constituting a perfect and complete act.

12. In what to be potency and to be in potency differ.—To be act and to be in act differ.—But on account of the use of words it is to be considered that in rigour one thing is signified when matter is called pure potency, another if it is said to be in pure potency. For the first is simply true and has the legitimate sense expounded; but the second is at the least ambiguous; for to be in pure potency in rigour signifies the privation of actual existence; whence it is only said of that which actually is nothing, yet can be, which cannot be said of matter after it has been created or concreated. For, although it is near nothing, it is nevertheless not nothing but a true thing, as we were saying above with Augustine. And in a similar way we can distinguish these expressions, to be in act or to be act; for that matter is in act is simply true, because this signifies nothing other than that matter is in the nature of things and exists, which is true; as it is true that matter was created, receives form and composes the composite, all which include existing; but that matter is act is at the least ambiguous; for absolutely it seems to signify to be actuating act or certainly to be act simply; and therefore it is not to be admitted absolutely, but with some diminishing addition, namely, to be imperfect entitative act and in a certain respect.

13. The premised explanation of the potency of matter is consonant with Aristotle.—But that this explanation of matter in the notion of pure potency is consonant with the sayings of Aristotle and the other philosophers is evident. For Physics I, text 69, comparing prime matter to the matter of artefacts, he says that it is so related to form and essence simply as wood to the statue or the form of the statue. Whence he concludes that matter is something formless; but through these and similar sayings only every formal and complete act is excluded from matter, not incomplete and as it were inchoate entitative act, without which there cannot be real receptive potency. Next it is evident from the definition of matter which he hands down, Physics I, c. 9, text 82, saying that matter is the first subject from which something per se comes about, being present in it. For matter is said to be present in the thing generated because through its entity it remains in the thing generated, per se composing it; and according to that entity Aristotle says in the same place that matter is prior to the thing generated and is ingenerable and incorruptible. And finally he says that matter per se is being, but per accidens non-being by reason of privation; he does not, therefore, exclude from matter every entitative actuality, but formal, to which it is in potency. Finally, Metaphysics VII and other places, when he says that matter is neither quantity nor quality nor a this something, he only excludes from the entity of matter composition from informing act and every formal act. Nor in truth is anything else necessary for the function and office of matter, as is evident from that reason which Plato too brings forward in the Timaeus, and from that of Aristotle, De caelo III, c. 8, namely, that because this is receptive of other things, it must not have in act those things of which it is susceptive, but in potency only; but matter is susceptive of formal act and of complete being; therefore with respect to these it is said to be pure potency, not with respect to its own entity. Moreover in the same sense Averroes said that matter is substantiated through being able, because it is such a substance that the whole of it is ordered to receiving, and therefore is essentially incomplete and potential. And in the same way St. Thomas declares the potentiality of matter, question De spiritualibus creaturis, a. 1, citing Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram I, cc. 14 and 15.

The arguments left from the preceding section are solved

14. Matter is metaphysically, not physically, composed of act and potency.—Through these, then, sufficient answer has been given to all the testimonies which in the preceding section were brought forward against our opinion. Indeed the reasons too have almost been solved; for they excellently prove that matter is pure potency, yet not in another sense than that which we have explained, which will be more clearly evident by answering in form to the reason made there. For when it is said that matter is not composed of act and potency, we concede this to be true of proper physical act and potency; but metaphysically it must be conceded that matter is composed of act and potency proportioned to itself, that is, of genus and difference, essence and existence, nature and incomplete subsistence. But when it is inferred that there would be a potency prior to matter, the answer is that of physical potency this is inconvenient and plainly repugnant, yet it does not follow from what has been said, since we do not say that matter is composed of potency and physical act. But if the discussion is of metaphysical potency, then it is true that matter in common is conceived as prior to this species of matter, and the essence of matter as prior to its existence, not in so far as it is being in act but absolutely, and similarly that the nature of matter in some genus is prior to its partial subsistence. Nor yet in rigour does it follow that there is in the thing itself some potency prior to matter, but that in matter itself there is one notion prior to another; yet always in that notion which is conceived as prior the very potency of matter is included, either confusedly, as in the concept of matter in common, or as possible, as in the precise concept of the essence of matter, or after the manner of partial nature only, the partial mode of subsisting being prescinded.

15. Whether every act is the principle of some operation.—But to the other part, by which it is proved that matter is in no way act, we concede that it is not actuating or informing act, nor yet act simply consummated and perfect in itself. Which at most the reasons show by which it is proved there that matter is not subsisting act; yet it is not proved that it is not incomplete and entitative act. Whence in this sense I deny that a partial entity or subsisting act is more perfect than any informing act whatever, because that very partial entity participates less of the notion of act than informing act. Next I deny that there cannot be an incomplete subsisting act; for the very essence of matter subsisting is its proper partial subsistence, and with that addition can be called act in a certain respect, that is, according to its entity, by which it is separated from nothing and from possible being. But all the other things which are adduced there proceed of act completely subsisting and including formal act through a simple and more excellent mode. And in the same sense is true what is subjoined in a certain confirmation in the same place, that every act is the principle of some operation; for this is true of formal act, whether informing or completely subsisting; yet it is not necessary that it be universally true of every partial and entitative act, because it is not necessary that every entity be the principle of some operation properly and in the genus of efficient cause; for it can be instituted for exercising another genus of cause, and so the entity of matter is for receiving, not for acting.

Objections against the above resolution

16. But there still remain to be solved some other objections which are wont to be made against the last assertion of this section. The first: nothing has actuality except in so far as it is, and therefore being itself is the actuality of all things, as St. Thomas says, I, q. 4, a. 1, ad 3; but matter has no being except through form, as Avicenna says, Metaphysics II, c. 2; and Boethius, book De unitate et uno, says that all being in created things is from form; therefore. The second, that otherwise from matter and form there would not come about one per se, because from two beings in act one per se does not come about; for on this account one per se does not come about from subject and accident, because the being of the subject is one thing, of the accident another. The third: matter is physically altogether simple; therefore either it is wholly act, or wholly potency, because a simple entity cannot consist of physical act and potency. But it cannot be said that it is wholly act, since it is essentially potency; therefore it is altogether potency including nothing of act. The fourth, that pure act is so act that it has nothing of potentiality or receptive potency admixed; therefore conversely pure potency is so potency that it has nothing of actuality admixed; for the reason of opposites is the same; and because pure potency must be supremely distant from pure act; but it would not be supremely distant if it included something of actuality. The fifth, that, if matter is something in act, then either substance or accident; not the second, as is self-evident; nor yet the first, because it is potency to substance; but what is potency to something is not actually that very thing, for these two are repugnant. The last, that otherwise matter could be known through itself and directly and by proper knowledge, which the philosophers seem commonly to deny with Aristotle and Plato in the places cited.

17. How all being is from form.—The first and second objection are to be professedly treated below, in the disputation on the essence and being of creatures; now briefly that principle, All being is from form, can be expounded in two ways. First, of specific and complete being. Secondly, that all being is from form either intrinsically giving and composing it, or at least in some way terminating its dependence; and in this way the very being of matter can be said to be from form in so far as it depends on it, as has been said. But the other axiom, From two beings in act one per se does not come about, cannot be understood of any actual entities whatever; for rather it is impossible that a being per se and complete in act be composed except of incomplete actual beings; for what is nothing, as we have often said,³ cannot really compose, and especially a being per se one. It must therefore be understood of beings in act complete in their genera; for these neither are per se ordered nor rightly cohere to compose one per se. But we do not say that matter is being in act in this way, but rather that it is as it were a certain inchoation of being, which naturally inclines and is per se conjoined to form as completing the integral being, as we shall explain more fully afterwards.

18. To the third the answer is that matter is wholly potency and wholly act such as we have explained, not through the composition of act with potency, but through identity and (so to speak) through intimate and transcendental inclusion; for not every potency is opposed to every act, but with proportion; receptive potency, therefore, is not opposed to incomplete entitative act, but rather essentially includes it.

19. How pure potency is equated with pure act.—To the fourth it is said, first, that, as pure act includes no potency receptive of another act, so pure potency includes no act actuating another, and as regards this the proportion holds, but not as regards entitative act. Whence, if the discussion is of this, the consequence is denied, because it involves a repugnance that there be a real receptive potency, however pure, which does not intimately include the actuality of being. But conversely it is not repugnant so to include the actuality of being as to involve no potentiality. For potentiality expresses imperfection; but it is not repugnant that there be given a perfection so pure that it excludes every imperfection; but it is repugnant that there be given a pure real imperfection without any perfection; for it would rather be nothing and the pure negation of all perfection. Whence, just as the theologians say that there is a supreme good which includes nothing of evil, yet that there is not a supreme evil which is such that it has no goodness or is founded in none, so, although there is a pure act which excludes every potency, nevertheless there cannot be a pure potency which excludes every actuality, even entitative and incomplete. But what was objected about the supreme distance between pure potency and pure act can first be dispatched by denying that it is of the notion of pure potency that it be supremely distant from pure act; for the matter of the heaven is pure potency, and yet it is not supremely distant from pure act; for the matter of these inferior things is more distant, since it is more imperfect; and it is still uncertain whether another matter less perfect than this inferior one could be made, and consequently more distant from the perfection of God. Accidents too are more distant from the divine perfection than prime matter. Likewise a twofold distance can be distinguished: one can be called negative, such as is between being and nothing; the other positive on the side of each extreme. It is not, therefore, of the notion of pure potency that it be distant from God in the former way, but in the latter; and therefore, although we admit that pure potency is supremely distant from pure act, it does not follow that pure potency must include no actuality, because that distance is not supreme compared to negative distance, but among positive ones; and therefore it requires some agreement between the extremes in entity, granted that that agreement is very small.

20. To the fifth the answer is that matter is substance, as Aristotle expressly teaches, Metaphysics VIII, from the beginning, and often elsewhere. Whence matter is not potency to the whole breadth of substance, but to form and to the being of the composite; but to the substantial entity of matter it is not in potency, but is actually such an entity. For it is repugnant that there be given a real and receptive potency with respect to the whole genus and breadth of substance as it comprehends complete and incomplete, because substance is prior to accident, and therefore such a potency, since it is the first subject, cannot be an accident but substance; nor can it be in potency to itself; therefore neither can it be in potency to the whole breadth of substance. In which there is a great difference between substantial and accidental form; for the accidental supposes a being of a nobler genus, namely substance, and therefore it can happen that the subject or potency to an accident is in no way an accident, that is, neither complete nor incomplete; but the substantial form does not suppose a being of a nobler genus, and therefore the potency to such a form cannot not be some substance, at least incomplete.

1. Matter of itself can terminate direct knowledge.—God has an idea of matter.—The last objection requires that we say a few things of the knowledge or knowability of matter. Of which many things are said by authors; briefly, however, it must be said that it is one thing to speak absolutely of the knowledge of matter according to itself, another of the mode in which it can be known by us. In the former consideration I concede that matter can be known by direct and proper knowledge; for so it is known both by God and by the angels through a proper species or concept. For, although the theologians dispute whether God has a proper idea of matter, and some seem to deny it with Plato in the Timaeus, nevertheless in truth they cannot deny it, except perhaps as regards the mode of speaking. For Plato denied that matter was created by God, and therefore it is not wonderful that he denied to God an idea of matter, although it is not likely that he denied to God proper knowledge, at least speculative, of matter. But since according to true doctrine God is the creator of matter, he cannot altogether lack an idea of matter, since he operates all things through intellect and will. But that idea is wont to be said not to be proper, that is, adequate to matter itself, because God does not have another idea of the whole and of the parts, but through the idea of the composite represents matter, as St. Thomas says, I, q. 15, a. 3, ad 3. This, however, does not prevent it from representing matter exactly, directly and as it is in itself; whence Cajetan there admits a speculative notion of matter, although not an idea. But Albert, In I, dist. 35, a. 10, did not hesitate to concede also an idea of matter. In a similar way the angel can be said to know matter directly and through a proper species, not because that species represents nothing else—for perhaps the same species which represents the whole composite is the principle of knowing matter—but because such a species represents matter according to its proper notion and leads directly and without any metaphor or analogy into its knowledge.

2. Matter cannot be comprehended without the form being known.—You will say: matter cannot be known without form even by God or an angel; therefore it can never be known by proper knowledge. Some answer by denying the antecedent; for, since matter has its absolute entity distinct from form, according to it it can be precisely conceived, either by a concept really distinct from others, as in the angel, who can voluntarily contemplate matter alone, or at least distinct by reason, as in God; which Scotus thinks, in the Prologue, q. 1, and In II, dist. 12, q. 1; and Themistius inclines to it, Physics I, text 61; who speak absolutely of the knowledge of matter. But it seems more probable that matter cannot be conceived essentially and comprehensively as it is in itself without form, at least as the term of the essential aptitude which matter has to form, as authors more frequently teach and is taken from Aristotle, Physics II, c. 2, where he says that matter is of those things which are toward something, namely by transcendental relationship, as we declared above; but things which are of this kind cannot be known without their terms. Whence, the antecedent being admitted, the consequence is denied, because a proper concept is accommodated to each thing, and therefore, if the thing is respective, it is then understood by a proper concept when it is conceived through the respect to another. Nor does it follow thence that matter does not have in itself and of itself a proper actuality of its entity, but only that it does not have it without a transcendental relationship to form; for conversely form too, as informing or as informative, cannot be conceived without respect to the matter of which it is the act.

3. But if we speak of the knowledge of matter as regards us, in that knowledge we can consider either the mode of inquiring and finding the knowledge of matter, or the term of this inquiry, or the ultimate concept which we can form of matter. As regards the first, what Aristotle says is true, Physics I, c. 7, text 69, and from him Damascene, in his Physics, c. 3, that matter is known by us through proportion or analogy to the matter of artificial things or to the subject of accidental changes; for we do not arrive at the knowledge of matter except by way of change, as was declared above. But this does not come from this, that matter has no entity and actuality, but from this, that substantial change is more hidden and cannot be perceived per se; and therefore it is not perceived by us except through order to accidental and sensible changes. Indeed thence it also comes about that substantial form is not known by us directly, but through sensible indications, as we shall immediately see. And by this reason Plato too said, in the Timaeus, that matter is known by a bastard reasoning, as Simplicius noted, Physics I, text 96.

4. What concept we can form of matter.—But as regards the second it must be said that we arrive indeed at some proper concept of prime matter, yet not altogether distinct and as it is in itself, but partly negative, partly confused. This whole assertion is evident from the definition of matter handed down by Aristotle, namely, that it is the first subject, etc.; for through that description we explain some objective concept; but that is proper to matter, as is the definition itself. But in that definition subject is something confused and common; but it is added that it is first in order that it be limited to matter; but first imports the negation of a prior subject. It is the same that we commonly declare the nature of matter through the notion of pure potency; for the notion of potency is confused and common; but the expression pure expresses the negation of every form composing or constituting matter itself. But the reason is that we scarcely know simple things by proper concepts except by adjoining some negation; wherefore this is the more frequent mode of declaring the nature of matter, through the lack of form and of complete actuality, etc. And so Aristotle describes it, Metaphysics VII, text 8, saying that matter is neither quantity nor quality, etc.; and therefore perhaps he said in the same book, text 35, that matter is of itself unknown. But sometimes, as St. Bonaventure noted, In II, dist. 3, a. 1, q. 2, we seem to declare the nature of matter through purely positive concepts, as if we say that it is incomplete substance receptive of substantial form; but what is said, incomplete, imports negation. And finally we never declare the nature of matter unless we adjoin the negation of every formal act constituting it. And therefore Augustine said, book De natura boni, c. 18, that matter can scarcely be thought through any species, but through the privation of every species. And Confessions XII, c. 5, he says that we try to know matter by not knowing, or to not know by knowing. For as darkness is seen by us while light is not seen, so while we understand something formless, which is to be ignorant of form, we know matter in some way.¹ And conversely, when we know something formed or composed with form, we are ignorant of matter, or rather we know that it is not matter, and remove something, so that we may conceive matter alone. But this does not come from this, that matter has no entity, but from this, that it has it so simple and potential and hidden under substantial and accidental forms that it cannot be investigated or conceived by us in another way.

1. We have explained the nature of matter and in passing touched upon all its causes, namely the efficient, which is form or the composite, and in some way the formal, which is also form, of which we are to say more below. But it has no material cause besides itself or its integrating parts, since it is simple and the first subject. It remains, then, that we declare its causality (which in this section is chiefly intended). But four things can be desired in this causality, as in the others: first, what matter causes; second, by what it causes, or what is on its side the principal and proximate reason of causing; third, what is the necessary condition; fourth, what the causality itself is through which the cause in act is constituted.

Various opinions

2. About the first part, some say that the proper and only effect of matter is the composite itself, which can be taken from the definition of matter, namely, the first subject from which something comes about, etc. For properly only the composite comes about. Likewise matter is an intrinsic cause; but it is compared only to the composite as an intrinsic cause. Likewise matter is not the cause of form; therefore of the composite alone; the antecedent is evident, because matter is not the principle of form; for Aristotle says, Physics I, that one principle is not from another. Finally, because matter has a single causality; therefore also a single caused thing or adequate effect. So thinks Major, In II, dist. 12, q. 2, citing Avicenna, Metaphysics VI, tract. 2, c. 4. Likewise Albert, Physics II, tract. 2, c. 1. Who nevertheless seems to speak equivocally; for he says that matter is not the cause of form except per accidens, because form does not come about but the composite; whence he does not seem to deny that form, in the way in which it comes about, is caused by matter.

3. But others will have it that form too is a proper effect of matter, not every form, however, but that which is educed from the potency of matter. Which opinion seems common. For no one whom I have seen excludes the composite from the causality of matter. For, although Averroes and others say that matter is not of the essence of the composite, which we shall dispute below in its proper place, they nevertheless do not deny that matter is the cause of the composite, nor can they deny it, since it is evident that it consists of it. This second opinion, therefore, does not differ as regards this from the first, but adds the causality of matter into the form which is educed from its potency. And it is proved as regards this part, because a form of this kind depends on matter; therefore it is its effect. Likewise this form is educed from the potency of matter; therefore matter conduces in its genus to its eduction; therefore it is its cause. From which reasons it seems conversely to be concluded that matter is not the cause of the rational form, because this neither depends on matter nor is educed from its potency.

4. But Fonseca judges this opinion too insufficient, Metaphysics V, c. 2, q. 1, sect. 2, whom the Coimbrans imitate, Physics II, c. 7, q. 8, a. 1; and therefore he adds that matter is the cause of every form, even rational, namely as informing, and he says this is the general causality of matter. Which opinion seems to be convinced by this reason alone, that, although the substance or existence of a form sometimes does not depend on matter, nevertheless the information of a form always depends on matter as on its proper potency and subject; therefore form as informing depends on matter as on its material cause; it is therefore its effect. This can be confirmed, because the soul depends on matter as on the term of its being, to which it has an essential relationship, as St. Thomas speaks, question De anima, a. 1, ad 12. The rational soul also has in a certain way to depend on matter as regards the beginning of its being, because naturally being is not due to it except in such matter, on which it depends in union; therefore.

5. Besides these we can also add that matter is the material cause of generation itself, which is distinct from the nature of the thing from the form and from the composite. And it is proved, because matter is the principle of generation, on the testimony of Aristotle, and is a per se principle and one on which generation essentially depends; it is therefore a true and proper cause of generation, for it flows into it most properly in its own way.

6. How many and what are the effects of matter.—From these, then, there seem to be gathered four effects of matter distinct from the nature of the thing, namely the composite, the form which is material, the union of the form with matter, and the generation of the whole composite. For that all these are caused by matter seems sufficiently proved. But that all of them are distinct, at least from the nature of the thing, can easily be shown. For form is distinguished from the composite as part from whole. But union is distinguished from form, at least as a mode distinct from the nature of the thing and separable from it, as is evident in the rational soul, and the same could happen in other forms, at least by absolute power, as has been done in the quantity of the Eucharist, of which more below in treating of the formal cause. But generation differs from all the aforesaid as becoming from the thing made; whence in the thing itself it is separable from them, for, generation being completed and the action of the agent ceasing, the form remains united to matter and constituting the composite in completed being. Nor does it matter that, generation ceasing, there remains in its place the conservation by which the effect is preserved at least by the first cause; both because this is as it were per accidens to the proper notion and distinction of generation; for, although per impossibile we understood that the thing generated does not depend in being preserved on another cause, but only in becoming on the generator, union, form and composite would remain when generation ceases. And also because, although after generation, which is from the proximate cause, there succeeds conservation, which is from the first cause alone, nevertheless the union of form with matter perseveres the same in number, as the form too is the same in number and the composite the same; and this is enough for generation to be understood to be a mode distinct from the nature of the thing from all of them; those four, therefore, which we have shown are caused by matter, are distinct from the nature of the thing.

Resolution of the question

7. Generation is rather a way to the effects of matter than one of them.—But although these are true in the thing, nevertheless the adequate effect of matter is contained in the composite itself. Which is caused by matter in two ways, namely in becoming and in completed being; in becoming indeed in so far as matter is the cause of generation; for it does not cause it except in so far as it is the way to the composite, or in so far as through it the composite depends in becoming on matter itself. Whence, although generation is caused by matter, it is nevertheless not so much caused as an effect as a way to the effect; and therefore, although it is distinguished from the nature of the thing, it is not judged to increase the number of effects, because where there is one on account of another, there there is only one. As with respect to the efficient cause the action is something distinct from the nature of the thing from the term, as heating from heat, and both are from the agent; for heating flows and comes about from the heater, yet not properly as an effect, but as a way to the effect, and therefore it is not judged to be placed in number with the effect. But in completed being matter is the cause of the composite in so far as it composes it; but it does not compose it except in so far as form is united to matter itself, sustaining the form itself if it is such that it needs that foundation. Therefore in this adequate effect, which is to compose the composite, is included the causality of matter with respect to the form, either as informing or also as existing, according to the exigency of the form. Indeed these effects are so conjoined and as it were ordered to composing one adequate effect that the causality of matter about them does not seem distinct from the nature of the thing, but only by relationship or prescission or the inadequate conception of our intellect, by reason of which we explain this causality by diverse formulas of speaking. For we say that form depends on matter as on the recipient or as on the co-part, but the composite as on the composing part; by which words we explain that the relationship of matter to form is one thing and the relationship of matter to the composite another; yet with this it stands that the mode of causality in which these relationships are founded is in the thing the same. Which we shall show to be so a little below, and consequently we shall also declare, in speaking of actual causality, that the causality of matter with respect to the composite in becoming is more distinguished from the causality of the same composite in completed being than the causality with respect to the composite and to the form differ, each being taken in becoming or each in completed being.

Judgement on the other opinions

8. In execution the prior effect of matter is the material form, in intention the whole composite.—From which finally it is easy to reduce all the opinions adduced to truth. For the first considered the adequate and per se primarily intended effect of matter, and therefore said that it is the composite itself. Yet it did not deny, or could deny, either the twofold notion and as it were state of the same composite, namely in becoming and in completed being, or that matter is in each way its cause, or that it is a true cause of generation and eduction, as universally the mobile is the material cause of motion. Nor does that opinion deny either that matter, by composing the composite, flows in its genus into the form, at least as informing. Indeed it seems it must be said that in the order of nature, and as it were by way of origin, the causality of matter is proximately begun hence, because matter, by receiving the act, composes the composite. But in the order of intention it tends primarily into the composite and is ultimately terminated at it, and therefore that is properly designated and named the effect of matter. As the agent is said properly to effect the composite, although its causality is proximately concerned also with the form, by educing it and uniting it to matter. This understanding being supposed, there seems to be a dissension only about a name, whether matter is to be said to cause form or not, as Major too confesses in the cited place, indicating that in the thing he does not dissent; yet there is no reason why we should hesitate about that expression, because the verb to cause is most ample, which is wont to be attributed not only to the ultimate term of generation or composition, but also to action and to any thing whatever which truly depends on another.

9. Matter can be called the principle of form.—Nor do the arguments of that opinion prove anything else; for the first two only prove that matter is primarily and per se the cause of the composite. But to the third the answer is that the same must be said of principle as of cause; for matter too can be called the principle of form, either because it is educed from its potency, or because it is united to it. But what Aristotle says, that one principle is not from another, is to be understood either as regards composition, because one is not composed of the other, or as regards the effecting simply and primarily intended by nature; for so one principle does not come about from another, but that which consists of them. But the arguments of the other opinions are not to be solved, for they rightly prove some causality of matter into all those things; yet they do not exclude that all that causality is included in the causality of the composite and ordered to it. Someone could only specially doubt about the union of the rational soul, how it depends on matter, since in itself it is spiritual; but of this union, what and of what kind it is, it will be professedly treated below; now it is briefly said that the union, not only from its material (so to speak) entity but from the formal notion of union, has such a mode of being that it depends essentially on the other extreme to which the union comes about, and in that genus and mode in which the union to it comes about. Whence, if it comes about to a subject, it depends on it in the genus of material cause; if to a form, in the genus of formal cause; if to a subsistence, as on a pure term; in which way the union of the humanity, although it is created, depends essentially on the uncreated Word; so, then, the union of the rational soul, although in itself it is spiritual, can depend on matter as on the subject to which that form is united.

1. The opinion of some.—Just as in the created efficient cause there are wont to be distinguished the principal principle of acting, the proximate principle, and the conditions necessary for acting, so some think that all these can and must be distinguished in the causality of matter. For the principal reason of causing materially (they say) is the very essence of matter; for that is the first foundation and base of the whole material causality and sustentation, and of it as such the composite essentially consists. But the proximate principle of this causality they say is the potency of matter; for through it it proximately receives form; for every act is proximately received in a potency proportioned to itself; but that potency is a property of matter itself given to it by nature for causing its effect, as the Commentator thinks, De substantia orbis, c. 1, and Physics I, text 70; and there Themistius, text 69. Whose reason is that every potency is founded in some entity and essence. But some add that this potency through which matter proximately causes is its quantity, because prime matter precisely considered without quantity is not apt to be the subject of generation, because it is not extended, nor does it have parts; but through quantity it becomes apt, because it becomes extended.

2. What conditions some require in matter in order that it cause.—But among the conditions required for this causality some posit the existence of matter, because for causality and real composition real existence seems necessary. Others do not think existence is to be required, because its being of essence suffices for matter to cause; but existence it has not as prerequired, but only as following upon form. Again, others require quantity as a necessary condition on account of the reason made above, because the agent cannot act except on an extended subject; therefore it presupposes in the subject quantity at least as a necessary condition. But others do not think this condition necessary either, because they think that quantity follows upon form and depends altogether on it. Wherefore they require no condition for the causality of matter besides its entity and potency. There could also be reported here the opinion of those who require in matter a sealing by which matter, which of itself is indifferent to every form, is determined to this individual rather than to others, because an indifferent cause, remaining indifferent, cannot cause a definite effect; of which opinion enough has been said above in treating of the principle of individuation.

The potency of matter, undistinguished from it, is its reason of causing

3. It must be said, first of all, that prime matter does not have two reasons of causing, one principal, the other proximate, but through itself and its entity it causes its effect in its genus both principally and proximately. This opinion is taken from St. Thomas, In Phys. I, text 79, where he says that the potency of matter is not something added to matter besides its substance and essence; and he has the same in I, q. 5, a. 3, ad 3, and q. 77, a. 1, ad 2, and Contra Gentiles I, c. 43, and In I, dist. 3, q. 4, a. 1; and the Thomists commonly think the same: Hervaeus, De unitate formarum, q. 16; Capreolus, In I, dist. 42, q. 1, on the arguments of Aureolus against the fourth conclusion; Soncinas, Metaphysics VIII, q. 6; Henry, in the Summa, a. 5, q. 8; and Averroes signified this very thing, De substantia orbis, when he said that matter is substantiated through being able. From this principle, then, the conclusion is proved in this way. Matter primarily and principally causes through its essence, but proximately and immediately through its potency; but the potency of matter is not other than its essence, neither really nor from the nature of the thing; therefore in matter the proximate reason of causing is not other than the principal reason, but they are altogether the same. The consequence is evident, and the major too is beyond controversy; for, as regards its former part, nothing prior or more principal can be thought out in matter which would be the first root and as it were origin of its causality than its essence itself. But as regards the second part, since the causality of matter is the causality of a subject and recipient, it is also evident that the receptive potency or capacity of matter is the proximate reason of causing. Likewise, because matter causes by receiving act; but act is proximately received in potency; therefore matter through its potency proximately regards act and causes its effect.

4. But the minor is asserted by the said authors. And it is proved by reason, first, because matter is essentially ordered to form, as was said above with Aristotle, Physics II, text 26; but it is not ordered except as receptive potency; therefore matter is essentially a potency of this kind. Secondly, form through its essence is the act of matter, whence the soul is defined as the act of a physical body, etc.; therefore conversely matter is essentially potency to form; for they have among themselves a proportional correlation, and so are essentially instituted that through their essential entities they are immediately conjoined; and thence it is that they compose one essence per se and essentially; but they compose as act and potency united among themselves; matter, therefore, is essentially potency as form is essentially act. Thirdly, to confirm this can be adduced all the things by which we proved that matter is pure potency; for the philosophers do not only say that matter has potency, but that the whole of it is nothing other than potency, and this very thing is what Aristotle said, that matter is the first subject. Augustine too, book De natura boni contra Manichaeos, c. 18, says that matter is called in Greek hyle (ὕλη), because it is apt for those operating, not that it itself makes something, but whence something is made. Damascene too, in his Physics, c. 3, says that matter, as regards that which is potency, is endowed with substance.

5. Finally it is declared in this way: for either the potency of matter is the very substance and essence of matter, or it is some accident really distinct from it, or some mode at least diverse from the nature of the thing; for besides these nothing else can be thought out; but neither the second nor the third can be said; therefore the first is true. The minor as regards the former part is proved, first, because potency is proportioned to act; therefore to substantial act the potency must be substantial. Secondly, because otherwise form would be united to matter by means of some accident and so would not compose with it one per se, because their union would not be substantial but accidental. Whence Aristotle, Metaphysics VIII, text 15, teaches that substantial matter and form are per se immediately united in order that they compose one per se. Thirdly, because, if it were some accident, it would be most of all quantity; but not this; therefore. The major is evident, because no accident is nearer to matter than quantity. But the minor is proved, because quantity is not per se ordered to receiving substantial form, but is rather either a property following upon it, or at most a disposition preparing the subject for its reception. And it is confirmed, for otherwise, just as whiteness, for example, is received in quantity, so also substantial form would be received in it and would communicate its substantial being to it; and consequently, just as, the substance being taken away and the quantity preserved by itself, that quantity remains white without a new miracle, so, the matter being taken away and the quantity preserved, it would remain informed by the substantial form without a new miracle; all which are absurd. Finally, whatever that accident is which is interposed after the manner of potency between the substance of matter and form, it is necessary that it be received in matter, because it must be received in some subject, and there there is nothing else, since such a potency is supposed to form and consequently also to the composite; therefore there is in matter a potency to receive in itself such an accident, since it is subjected in matter; I inquire, then, whether that potency of matter is the very substance of matter or another accident; this latter cannot be said, otherwise one would proceed to infinity; but if the former is said, then some receptive potency of matter is its very substance; therefore this is rather to substantial act than to accidental, or at least is primarily ordered to that act; it is, therefore, per se and immediately receptive of it.

6. And hence the other part of the minor is easily proved, namely that this potency is not a mode distinct from the nature of the thing from the substance of matter. First indeed, because there is no necessity nor vestige of such a distinction. For such a potency is connatural to matter and altogether inseparable from it, even by the absolute power of God; indeed matter complete in the essence of matter cannot even be conceived by the intellect without its being conceived capable of form; therefore that capacity is not a mode distinct in the thing from matter, but is as it were its essential difference; for matter is essentially a substantial entity, not complete but partial, not after the manner of act but after the manner of potency; matter itself, therefore, through its essence is both the principal and the proximate reason of receiving form and causing materially.

7. Matter essentially requires existence in order to cause.—I say, secondly: the existence of matter is also necessary for the causality of matter, yet not properly as a condition only which is outside the notion of the per se principle in the genus of material cause, but as intimately and formally included in it. The former part is proved, because matter cannot be a real subject or actually exercise its function as it is in objective potency alone or in the power of the first cause, because according to the former consideration it is nothing, but is only conceived as not repugnant to being; but according to the latter it is not other than the creating essence itself; therefore, in order that it actually exercise the function of a real subject, it is necessary that it be in itself actually outside its cause and outside objective potency; but this very thing is to exist; therefore, in order that matter cause materially, it is necessary that it actually exist. And it is confirmed, for natural things are not created for this reason, that they come about from matter; but not for this reason are they not created, that they come about from possible matter; therefore because they come about from actually existing matter; and consequently matter itself does not cause materially except as actually existing. The minor is proved, for matter itself, while it is made by God, comes about from possible matter, and nevertheless is created, because to come about from possible matter is to come about from nothing, since possible matter as such is nothing. Whence the expression from in that locution does not express the relationship of material cause, but of the term from which. When, therefore, it expresses the relationship of material cause, it is necessary that it designate a thing which is not only possible, but also actual and outside its causes. Finally matter cannot cause materially unless it is created by God; but creation is terminated at an existing thing; therefore matter cannot cause materially except as existing. Which reasons formally and immediately prove that matter does not cause materially except as it is outside its causes as an actual entity in its being of essence; but consequently they prove it of the being of existence, because every actual entity outside its causes is formally constituted through existence, as we shall prove below in its place.

8. How matter depends on form.—And hence the latter part of the assertion is also easily proved; for that matter is an actual entity is not as it were an extrinsic condition necessary for causing, but is an intrinsic and proper reason of causing; for matter through its actual entity receives form; but through existence it is constituted in the being of actual entity; therefore the existence of matter is not in any way whatever a necessary condition, but as per se and formally pertaining to the principle of causing. Which matter will be more fully evident from what is to be said below of existence. It can only be objected that matter depends in its existence on form; therefore it cannot exist even prior in the order of nature to receiving form; therefore existence cannot be necessary for causing. The consequence is evident, because a condition necessary for causing is supposed to the effect. Nor can it be understood that a cause in its being necessary for causing depends on its effect. The answer is that an exact answer to this objection cannot be given until we explain the causality of form toward matter, and that proposition of Aristotle: Causes are causes of one another; therefore it is briefly said that it is probable that matter does not depend properly on form as on its cause, which can be called antecedent dependence, but only as on a connatural act and as it were a disposition and necessary condition, which can be called consequent dependence, according to which it is not inconvenient that the material cause depend on its effect. But whether matter can be said to depend also a priori on form we shall see below.

9. Matter requires nearness to form for its causality.—I say, thirdly: the necessary condition for causing in matter is intimate nearness or indistance from form. So that, just as in the efficient cause application to the patient is called a necessary condition for acting, so in the material cause application to the form; for with respect to it or with it it exercises its causality. But this application is through intimate nearness and indistance, because matter and form cannot be united unless they are indistant and as it were intimately penetrated through their entities. You will say that this is not a necessary condition, but the very conjunction of matter and form. The answer is that it is not so, because intimate presence is something distinct from the nature of the thing from union; for when the soul is created in the body, it is not united to the body by virtue of creation in such a place, but through another action, and yet it is created intimately indistant from the body. Whence in the thing itself too that intimate presence is separable from union. For just as an angel can be intimately present to matter and not inform it, so also can the rational soul, indeed any other form whatever, at least by the absolute power of God; that intimate presence, therefore, is something distinct from union and a necessary condition for it and for the causality of matter. But this condition in the generation of man is manifestly prior in nature, because there the form is supposed created without the causality of matter about it; but in other forms it does not seem so much a condition prior in nature as concomitant, because other forms absolutely and simply and according to the order of causality are not or do not come about prior in nature to their being united, as we shall see afterwards. But there intervenes there another priority of nature, which is called in the consequence of subsisting; for intimate presence is such that it can at least by the divine power be preserved without union and consequently without material causality; but conversely material causality can in no way be actually preserved without intimate nearness, as is self-evident.

10. Matter does not require quantity as a necessary condition for causing.—I say, fourthly, that besides this condition no other is simply necessary for the causality of matter, as far as depends on its side. It is briefly explained, for as regards quantity, it is a sufficiently controverted matter whether it is in matter or in the composite and how. And although it is probable that it is in matter and is not naturally separated from it, nevertheless this is not because quantity is a condition necessary for material causality, formally speaking, but because matter is such an entity which by its nature postulates such a property, so that quantity is rather a property following upon such a material cause than a condition antecedently necessary for its causality. Whence it comes about that either the form, if it too is material, or at least in its own way the information of the form, participates the effect or mode of quantity, not because that mode is per se necessary for union with matter, but because the form accommodates itself to matter, in so far as whatever is received is received according to the mode of the recipient. And in a similar way a material agent needs the extension of quantity in the patient in order to be able to act on it; yet this comes from this, that the agent itself, by reason of such a property following upon matter, has a mode of existing and acting accommodated to it according to all the faculties which depend on matter. And so (whatever may be the case with that question, about which we now define nothing) we now say only that quantity is not per se and formally necessary on account of material causality. Whence, if matter is preserved by the power of God without quantity, as far as depends on its side it will be able to exercise its function of sustaining the form or its information.

11. Again, a sealing of matter which would be something distinct from quantity and from the qualities disposing matter is altogether something feigned and fictitious, as was shown in the place cited above. But the qualities, if perhaps the same do not remain in the generated and the corrupted, do not seal matter otherwise than because these qualities which precede the instant of generation strip matter and leave it free and unencumbered so that the agent may introduce its form into it; but the qualities which are introduced in that instant only follow upon the form and as it were cherish and retain it in matter. But if the same dispositions in number which were begun in the corrupted remain consummated in the generated, then they can more easily be said to determine matter to such a form; yet this is not because matter of itself needs them for its causality, but either because by the natural mode and order of acting by means of accidents they are necessarily so premised, or because the form itself postulates such dispositions. But matter, although of itself it is indifferent to several effects or forms, is not of itself insufficient or incomplete for its individual effects, but rather in its genus is as it were a universal cause, sufficient for its individual effects; but a cause so indifferent can well cause a determinate effect if from elsewhere other causes necessary for that determination concur, as are in the case proposed the agent or the dispositions. Therefore per se and intrinsically, by virtue of material causality, no sealing is required for it as a necessary condition. But besides these conditions no others have hitherto been thought out, nor can they easily be feigned, since no reason or foundation of such necessity appears. For I omit the general and as it were transcendental condition with respect to every created cause, namely that it be preserved by God; for this is both common and is comprehended under existence. I omit also the necessary relationship or relation to form, and (so to speak) the concausality of form; for this is rather something necessarily following than a condition required for causing. Nothing else, therefore, is necessary for the causality of matter on its side. And let these suffice on this point; for the foundations of the other opinions, which were indicated in reporting them, have been sufficiently solved and dispatched from what has been said.

1. The causality of matter is not the very entity of matter.—There are various opinions on this matter. For some say that the causality of matter is nothing other than matter itself, which offers itself to the composite and through itself sustains the form, because its causality does not consist in the production of some thing distinct from itself, as the causality of the efficient does, but in this alone, that it offers itself to its effect. But this opinion cannot be true; for, although it is true that matter does not cause otherwise than by sustaining or composing that which it causes, nevertheless this which is to sustain or to compose is something distinct in the thing itself from matter itself; for matter can be in the nature of things and not cause this form or this composite, and successively vary its causality about various effects, its entity remaining unvaried; therefore causation itself is other than its entity. Indeed by absolute power matter can be preserved without any form, as we shall show below, and then it would actually cause nothing, but would only of itself be able to cause; therefore that by which it is constituted actually causing is other than that by which it is constituted able to cause; for by this reason alone we prove in the acting cause that action is other than the power of the agent. But if someone perhaps says that for matter to cause does not add something to matter itself, but connotes the existence of the form in it, he will not satisfy. For, whatever may be the case with that addition, which we shall see afterwards, for form to exist in matter, formally and precisely speaking, is not for matter to cause, but rather to be caused or informed; but it is necessary to designate something from which that denomination of causing is formally taken, and to declare whether that is intrinsic or extrinsic to matter.

2. The causality of matter cannot be a predicamental relation.—Secondly, others say that actual causality adds nothing to matter besides the relation of cause to effect. But if the discussion is of a proper predicamental relation, this opinion cannot be true, because this relation follows when the effect has already been caused and foundation and term posited; therefore it supposes causality as the proximate reason upon which it follows; therefore causality cannot consist in this relation. Which was also said above of cause in common, and is to be understood as said for all causes, lest it be necessary to repeat it further. But if the discussion is of some transcendental relation, this opinion coincides with the fourth, immediately to be reported.

3. The causality of matter is not the same as its every effect.—There can, then, be a third opinion, asserting that this causality of matter is its very effect, signified and conceived in a diverse way, because this suffices for explaining this causality, and scarcely can another be found or thought out. But, although of some effect this is perhaps true, as I shall immediately declare of generation and union (for these are so related as action to the acting cause, which can also be called its effect), it cannot nevertheless be universally true, both because causality in all causes is something intermediate between cause and effect, and also because the material form is an effect of matter and cannot be its causality. For the soul of a horse, for example, which is now caused materially by its matter, can in the thing be preserved without such causality; therefore that causality is other in the thing from that soul and from its entity. As the quantity of the Eucharist, which before was preserved by means of the material causality of the substance of bread, afterwards is preserved, that causality ceasing, which is a sign that that causality is something diverse from the reality of the quantity. But if the form according to its absolute entity is not the causality of matter, neither can the whole composite be; most of all because in the composite matter itself is included, which is not caused by itself; and in some composite, namely man, the form too is included, which is not caused by matter; how, then, could the whole composite be the causality of matter?

4. The opinion of some.—A fourth opinion can be that the causality of matter is a certain real mode of matter itself, distinct from the nature of the thing. For, the absolute entity of matter being considered, this mode is only contained in potency by it; but, the occasion of an agent inducing a form being offered, matter actually exhibits this mode, by which it receives and cherishes the form in itself and consequently composes the composite. But if such a form recedes, another form coming, matter also loses the prior mode and exhibits another about the coming form. So think the Coimbrans, Physics II, qq. 6 and 8. The foundation is taken both from a sufficient enumeration of the parts, and also because such a mode is necessary, since it has been shown that this causality is something, and it is not necessary that it be a distinct entity, since matter through itself is immediately united to form; therefore it is necessary that it be some mode really identified indeed with matter, but modally and from the nature of the thing distinct, since it is separable from it.

Resolution of the question

5. The causality of matter with respect to generation is generation itself.—Nevertheless this opinion seems partly false, partly doubtful. In order to declare which and open my opinion, I distinguish those four things which I said above are caused by matter: generation, the union of the form, the entity of the form and the composite itself. As regards generation, then, I think that it is caused by matter through itself, no other thing or mode being added to matter besides generation itself inhering in it; and so that the causality of generation itself by matter is nothing other than generation itself, as it is eduction from matter. For just as action is from the agent not through another action but through itself, and has the notion of action as it is the very emanation from the acting cause, and as such is the very causality of the agent, as I shall say below, so eduction or passive generation, in so far as it depends essentially on the subject and through itself is necessarily conjoined to it, is caused by it materially not through another causality but through itself. This is proved first of all from the very declaration of the thing; for in this way the causality of matter about generation is excellently understood, and nothing else is necessary; therefore it is superfluous to feign something else. Secondly, this is declared from accidental changes and unions; for when wood is heated, the heating comes about in such a subject and from the subject; but two changes do not then come about in that subject, one which is the passive heating itself, another which is some mode by which such a subject causes the heating materially or is united to it; for it is superfluous to multiply these changes, for, by the very fact that the heating is such that it intrinsically expresses a relationship of actual union and of dependence on such a subject in the genus of material cause, both it itself is caused by the subject and the subject causes it, and it itself is united to the subject and the subject remains united to it; it is superfluous, therefore, to add another change in the subject; the same, therefore, holds in the material causality of substantial generation. Whence it is confirmed, thirdly, because through the same or through the same mode by which the effect is caused the cause causes, because causation itself as such essentially includes that twofold relationship, to the cause as to the principle and to the effect as to the term, and therefore it denominates each, the one cause, the other caused; but generation, by the very fact that it is intrinsically and essentially dependent on matter, through itself is caused by it; therefore by the same, as it is from matter, matter is denominated causing it; therefore no other thing or mode is necessary in order that matter be denominated actually causing generation. Indeed neither can it be understood how matter causes generation through another mode. Which is declared, fourthly, for for matter to cause generation is nothing other than to sustain it as a subject; but it sustains it immediately in its entity and through its entity, by the very fact that generation comes about in it; therefore every other mode is irrelevant to this causality, nor can it confer anything to this sustentation.

6. An objection is answered.—Finally I argue, because, if besides generation itself the causality of matter were a distinct real mode, it would have to be made by some agent; for every new real mode must be made by a new cause; but there is no agent by which such a mode is made; therefore. The minor is proved, because the agent, as it acts only through its substantial or accidental form, so it does not concur effectively except to the eduction of the form, which is heating, for example, or generation; therefore besides that it does not make any other mode. You will say: although that other mode does not come about per se primarily, it nevertheless results; for, by the very fact that this thing is united to that, the union of that to this results. But against this, first, because it has been shown that there is no necessity of such resultance for causality, nor does it seem necessary for union either, because another thing can be denominated united through the union of another to it without a new mode of union in it, as the theologians say in the mystery of the Incarnation, and in natural things when a man sits, for example, the sitting is united to the man and the man to the sitting; but who would feign that the man is denominated united to the sitting through a new mode distinct from the sitting, and not rather through the sitting itself, which through itself is united to the subject? Otherwise one would have to proceed to infinity. So, then, matter is denominated united to generation because generation comes about in it, nor is another mode necessary which results in matter. Next I shall inquire of what kind that resultance is and by what; for it can be understood in two ways: first, that, the action of the agent educing the form being posited in matter, that mode results from matter; and so matter would effectively make its material causality, which cannot be said, even if that efficiency is said to be through natural resultance. Secondly, that resultance can be thought out as coming about from the extrinsic agent by means of the form which it induces into matter, and so the induced form would effect the material causality through which it itself is caused, and would be prior in nature in matter to that mode resulting; from which it is easily convinced that such a mode is irrelevant to the causality of matter.

7. Generation cannot even supernaturally be preserved outside the subject.—From these, then (as I think), it is sufficiently evident that in the material causality of generation causality of this kind is not distinguished from generation itself as it is in matter, from which matter is denominated actually causing in so far as it is from it, as by the same the generator is denominated actually acting in so far as it is from it. Whence, just as the denomination of agent is not from some mode which is in the agent itself but extrinsically from the action, so the denomination of actually causing in matter itself is not from some mode which is so intrinsic that it is in the thing the same with it, but from generation itself in so far as it is from it; and by this reason such a denomination can be called extrinsic, although, because generation is in matter itself, by that reason it can be called intrinsic, in which it differs from the denomination of agent. You will say that God can preserve the same generation in number separated from matter; but then it would not be caused by matter and consequently would not denominate it actually causing; therefore it is not denominated actually causing precisely from generation as such; it is necessary, therefore, to adjoin some other mode. The answer is, first of all, that the assumption is false; for it implies that the action of generation be or be preserved outside the subject and without the causality of matter, both because generation is essentially a change; but change cannot be understood without a subject. And also because generation in all others besides man is essentially eduction from the potency of matter; but in man it is the uniting of the form with matter; but in each way it is repugnant to be understood without the concurrence of matter. And finally because action without the concurrence of a subject is creation, either productive, if it is new, or conservative, if it is about a pre-existing thing; therefore, by the very fact that a form which was in a subject and depended on the subject is preserved outside the subject, the action is necessarily varied. Whence it is concluded that that change which is generation essentially includes union to matter and the causality of matter, and therefore from it, precisely taken, matter is denominated causing. Add that, although we gratuitously granted what is assumed, it would not be inferred thence that for that denomination a special mode is necessary in matter itself, but that in generation itself the entity and formality of generation is distinguished from its union with matter, as we shall say below of form itself; but because in the change which is generation this is not true, we shall not now linger on this.

8. Matter flows into form and composite by generation as causality.—From these it is further concluded that the causality of matter, in so far as it is the cause in becoming either of the form or of the composite, is nothing other than generation itself as essentially dependent on matter; for by means of it matter concurs to the eduction of the form or the composition of the composite; but the causality of a cause is nothing other than its concurrence. Likewise, because to cause some thing in becoming is nothing other than that the becoming of such a thing is from such a cause; therefore through the same causality the thing is caused in becoming through which the very becoming of the thing is caused. Which is evident by a similar case from the acting cause; for the very action which through itself is from the agent is its active causality with respect to the term or the thing in becoming; the same proportion, therefore, is to be kept in material causality. Finally many of the arguments made can be applied to this, especially that this reason of causing suffices for that denomination by which matter is said to cause the thing which is generated, and, that reason of causing being posited and every other mode whatever being prescinded by the intellect, that denomination necessarily follows; therefore whatever else is feigned is superfluous and without foundation. Only a difference seems to be noted in this causality with respect to the form and with respect to the composite, that with respect to the form matter in a certain way remains extrinsically, in so far as it sustains the form in itself or as informing, but does not intrinsically compose it; and therefore it seems most manifest that the causality of matter with respect to the form in becoming is nothing other than its eduction or uniting as it is from matter, which we have shown is in the thing nothing other than generation itself. But with respect to the composite, matter is compared more intrinsically, because through itself it composes it; and therefore with respect to the composite it seems necessary that matter itself be intrinsically included. But this is indeed true as regards inclusion in the effect caused, yet not as regards the way or becoming by which one tends to such an effect in this genus of material cause; for matter is not so the cause in becoming of the thing generated that it itself too comes about; for it is always presupposed made and only communicates itself to the composite which is generated in its genus of cause; and in so far as this communication is in becoming and matter is its cause, it is said to be the cause of the thing generated in becoming; but this communication is not in becoming except by means of eduction or generation; and therefore this whole causality, in so far as it is understood to be something intermediate between matter and the effect or composite in the thing, is not other than generation itself as it is from matter.

What causality of matter perseveres after the change

9. The union of the form to matter is caused by matter through itself and depends on it.—It remains to speak of the causality of matter in completed being, for explaining which one must begin from the causality of the union of the form with matter; for we said that this too is caused by matter; but now we add that it is not caused through some causality distinct from such union, but through itself. Which can easily be demonstrated from what has been said of generation itself; for there is the same proportional reason. Which I show thus: for this union of the form with matter too is through itself conjoined to matter in the way in which it can be; therefore through itself it is dependent on matter in the way in which it can depend; therefore through itself it is caused; for so far is it caused as it depends; therefore conversely matter causes that union through itself; for, as I said, the causality is the same from which both the effect is denominated caused and the cause causing. All the consequences have been proved above; but the antecedent is evident, first, a posteriori, because it is impossible that that union be preserved without the concurrence of matter, or without its being in matter in the way in which it can be; it is therefore a sign that through itself it depends immediately and essentially on matter; for, if it depended by means of some mode distinct from the nature of the thing, God by taking away that mode could preserve that union without matter; for by this reason he can preserve the form, as I shall say below. The antecedent is evident, because the union cannot remain without actually uniting; but it cannot actually unite without conjoining the extremes and attaining each in the way in which it can and ought. And this is the a priori reason on account of which that union through itself depends essentially both on the form and on matter, on each in its genus, because it is as it were the actual bond of them and does not need another interposed bond or mode by which it attains them or is conjoined to them, lest one proceed to infinity. Finally it is confirmed by the reason made above, because this suffices for this causality, and without it it cannot be posited, and, it being posited and every other mode prescinded, such causality of matter is sufficiently understood; therefore everything else is feigned and without foundation; nor is there in this any difficulty, besides that immediately to be touched upon.

10. The permanent causality of matter into the material form is union.—Of what kind is the bond of the rational soul with matter.—Hence I further add that the causality of matter into the form itself (when the form is such that it is caused by and depends on matter) is not other than the proper union of such form with matter, in so far as that very union is materially caused by matter, and by means of it the form itself also depends on matter. I said not other than the proper union of such form, because not any union whatever suffices for this causality; for the rational soul has a proper union with matter, which union is also caused materially by matter, and yet the soul itself is not caused; not any union whatever, therefore, is the causality of the form itself, but that which is through the eduction of the form. From which in passing we understand that the union of the rational soul with matter is singular and of a diverse essential notion from every union of a material form, which we can call substantial inherence, and this we say is the causality through which matter causes such a form.

11. An objection is met.—You will say: why can we not distinguish in a material form two modes, of which one would be the mere union of the form with matter, such as is in the rational soul, and through it that form would not depend on matter but only be united to compose the composite, but the other mode would be the dependence of such form on matter? I answer that it is either plainly impossible or altogether superfluous to distinguish and multiply such modes. First, because in an accident we do not distinguish two modes, of which one would be union, the other inherence or dependence of the accident on the subject, but by the same inherence it is united and depends; therefore similarly, etc. Secondly, because proper dependence on a material cause intrinsically and essentially includes union, so that it can neither come about nor be understood without intimately including it; therefore inherence, which is the same as material dependence, is not a mode distinct from the nature of the thing from the union of the inhering form, but is as it were a species of union in common; for one is inhesive, another not; just as, therefore, genus and species are not modes diverse from the nature of the thing in the same individual, so union and inherence or material dependence are not distinct modes in the same form. From these, then, the assertion posited remains easily proved, because this form through its union depends on matter; therefore by means of it it is caused by matter in its genus; therefore also matter causes the form by means of it, according to the principle posited above, that to be caused and to cause express the same causation under a diverse respect; therefore this union itself is the causality of matter about such a form. Secondly, because the causality of a cause in a certain way mediates between it and the effect; but between matter and form nothing mediates but this union and as it were inherence; therefore that is the causality of matter into the form. Thirdly, because this suffices for this genus of causality, every other thing whatever being prescinded even by the intellect.

12. You will say that neither does this seem necessary, because form and matter are immediately united, as was said above. The answer is that immediate union does not exclude a mode of union really or from the nature of the thing distinct from the extremes, but excludes an intermediate form which would intervene as a common term in which the extremes would be conjoined; but a mode of union cannot be excluded when the extremes are such that they can be separated, because unless either both or one of them is otherwise related than when they are disjoined, they will not be able to be really united; and therefore also in the mystery of the Incarnation the theologians posit this mode of union on the side of the humanity.

How manifold the union is in the material composite

13. But hence arises another difficulty, which alone seems to be of some moment in this opinion, and on account of which we said that the fourth opinion is in part doubtful, namely, because, if the form is united to matter through a proper mode of union, then matter too is united to the form through a proper mode of union; therefore matter causes not only through the union or inherence of the form, but much more through its proper union by which it itself is conjoined to the form; and so the causality of matter will rather be a proper mode of matter itself than of form. To this difficulty I confess that it is doubtful whether in the composition of matter and form matter has a proper mode of union distinct from the union of the form. I say, however, two things. One is that the negative part is very probable, because for the union of two extremes which are immediately united among themselves one simple mode of union suffices, and a special reason can be assigned on account of which such a mode pertains more to the form and is really the same with it than with matter; therefore it is not necessary to multiply several modes of this kind. The major is proved, because every mode of union is the bond of two extremes, whence it expresses a relationship to each, without which it cannot be; therefore any mode of union unites the two extremes of which it is the union; therefore one suffices for conjoining extremes of this kind. And therefore we were saying above that the union of the form to matter cannot be or be understood in the nature of things without conjunction and dependence not only on the form but also on matter; and therefore, if we prescind by the intellect every other mode identified with matter, through the union of the form to matter alone we shall understand matter and form to be perfectly united among themselves and matter to exercise into the form the whole causality which it has; therefore a twofold mode of union is not necessary, but one suffices. But the minor, namely that this mode pertains rather to the form than to matter, is proved, because the whole efficiency of the natural agent is terminated formally and proximately at the form, by educing it or uniting it to matter; therefore whatever it makes anew is in the form as in the formal term of the action, but in matter only as in the subject; and therefore it does not unite matter to the form by directly effecting in matter a special mode, but only by uniting the form to matter itself and effecting in it information and union or inherence. And this is consonant with the mode of being related and concurring of matter and form; for matter underlies the action of the agent and the coming and receding of forms. Whence as regards its entity and every intrinsic mode of its own it remains unvaried, and is only varied or changed by reason of privation or of the form receding or newly coming. Which Damascene seems to have said in these words, in his Physics, c. 3, where he says of matter: As that which obtains the notion of subject, and as regards that which is potency is endowed with substance and is with privation and remains with the form actually present, and preserves that which is its own, that is, potency, free from all change; and hence it comes about that it does not pass from that which is potency into act, but remaining in its state receives the form, and, the form receding, again retains its prior state. But form is that which comes to matter and recedes from it, and therefore every change which comes about in matter is by reason of form, and similarly every union is through the conjunction of the form to it. Which moreover can be declared by a material example: for the base which is placed under a column is not varied in itself nor changes place or any other mode from this, that the column is placed upon it or is taken away or varied, but the whole change comes about in the column which is placed upon it, from which comes every denomination into the base, which is said to sustain the column. And similarly in accidental changes, when wood, for example, is heated, there does not come about a twofold change in the wood, one in the adhesion of the heat, another in the union of the wood to the heat, but one only, which consists in the introduction of the heat.

14. I add, secondly, that, although we gratuitously admitted that there is in matter a proper mode of union distinct from the union of the form, nevertheless it cannot be attributed that it is the causality through which matter causes the form, because neither does matter through such a mode sustain the form, nor does the form through that mode depend on matter. The former part is evident, because matter does not through a mode, but through its entity, sustain the form. The latter is proved, because the form through its inherence depends on matter, whence, if there is such a mode of union in matter, it will rather be as an effect consequent upon the information, and as far as depends on itself it will be of the same notion whether the form depends on matter or not. Of which union of matter discussion will occur again in treating of the formal cause.

15. By what causality matter constitutes the composite.—From these it is further concluded that the causality of matter about the composite adds nothing at all to matter itself besides the union of the form, and so that there is no other causality of the composite except the very causality of the form or of the union, and that it only adds with respect to the composite that matter by means of the union offers itself to compose the composite intrinsically; whence the very entity of matter enters more intimately into the causality of the composite than of the form or of the union; yet in the thing nothing else intervenes but the entity of matter and the union or causality of the form.

16. Matter performs a twofold distinct causality.—An objection is satisfied.—Finally it is understood from what has been said, what was also indicated above, that there are only two causalities of matter distinct from the nature of the thing, although by reason more can be distinguished. For the material causality with respect to the thing in becoming and in completed being are distinct from the nature of the thing, as generation is distinguished from the nature of the thing from the form or from the thing generated, and the uniting in becoming from the union as made; but we have shown that the causality of the thing in becoming is not distinguished in the thing from generation itself or the uniting; but the causality of the thing in completed being similarly is not distinguished from the union as made and formally terminating the uniting; it is necessary, therefore, that causalities of this kind be distinct among themselves from the nature of the thing. You will say that these two causalities can be reduced to one, because the thing in completed being is not caused except by means of action; therefore the whole causality consists in action and in generation itself as it is from matter; for all the others are rather something caused than causalities, as with respect to the agent the whole causality consists in action or uniting, and the union in completed being is not the causality of the agent but something caused. The answer is that the reason is not equal, because the material cause per se is the cause of the thing in completed being even if all action ceases, so that if, per impossibile, the material composite did not depend on any agent in becoming or in being preserved, matter would nevertheless have its causality about such a composite or about its form; there is, therefore, in matter a certain proper causality, which is not concerned with action or change nor comes about through it, but is immediately about the very being of the whole composite, in so far as it includes the union of matter with form; and from the following section it will be evident that matter is sometimes the cause of the thing and not of the production of the thing; these causalities, therefore, are distinct from the nature of the thing. But each of them can be compared and precisely conceived in order to diverse things, and explained according to various relationships in order to the form or the composite; yet that whole distinction is through reason or through our inadequate concepts, as is evident from what has been said above.

1. Hitherto we have explained the material cause only in generable and corruptible substances, in which it is better known on account of continual transmutation; now it remains to be seen whether this genus of cause is also in incorruptible bodies. In which matter many questions are contained. The first, whether there is matter in the heavens (for by the name of incorruptible bodies we understand these). The second, of what kind it is, and in what it agrees with or differs from the matter of generable things. The third, how it exercises material causality with those bodies; and although the first two questions are physical and are wont to be treated in the books De caelo, nevertheless for explaining the third, which is proper to this place, the others must necessarily be premised.

The first opinion, of the Commentator

2. Concerning the proposed question, then, there was the opinion of the Commentator, denying that there is in the heaven the composition of matter and form. So he has it, Metaphysics VIII, comm. 12, and Book XII, comm. 20, and De caelo I, comm. 20, and in the book De substantia orbis, cc. 1 and 2. And all his followers follow him: Jandun, De substantia orbis, q. 1; Zimara, theorem 107; Cajetan of Thiene, Physics I, q. 21; and of the scholastics Durandus and Gabriel and others, In II, dist. 12, where St. Thomas too inclined to the same opinion, q. 1, a. 1, and in the disputed question De spiritualibus creaturis, a. 6, ad 2, and In Metaph. VIII, c. 14. This opinion is founded chiefly on various testimonies of Aristotle, on account of which Scotus, In II, dist. 14, q. 1, confesses that it is the opinion of Aristotle, although he does not approve it. The first is Metaphysics VIII, text 14, where he says: Nor is there matter of all things, but of those whose generation and transmutation are into one another; but of those which are or are not without being transmuted, there is not matter; and in text 4 of the same book he says: It is not necessary, if something has local matter, that it also have generable and corruptible matter, that is, which is the foundation of generation and corruption, which with him seems to be the same as matter composing substance, as I shall immediately show. And in the same sense he seems to subjoin, text 12, that perpetual substances either do not have matter, or not such, but only that which is movable according to place; and Book IX, text 17, he says that in perpetual things there is not potency to being simply, but only to where: Otherwise (he says) there would also be potency to not being; for every potency is a potency of contradiction. Finally Metaphysics XII, text 10, repeating the same opinion, he says: Whatever things are changed have matter, but diverse; for even of the everlasting things themselves, whichever are not generable but movable by local motion, have matter, yet not generable, but from whence to whither.

3. The reason of this opinion is that the philosophers did not arrive at the knowledge of matter except by way of transmutation, the proportion being taken from artificial or accidental transmutation to substantial; therefore in these substances in which there is no vestige of substantial transmutation matter is not necessary, nor can there be any foundation for asserting it. Secondly, this reason is declared more fully, because nature makes nothing in vain; but in the heavens this composition from matter is not necessary for any end; for in these inferior things, because there were to be continual generations and corruptions, on account of their contrariety matter was necessary, which would be their first subject and foundation; but since the heavens were instituted to be perpetual, as they were founded without contrariety, so also without that composition which is proper to those things which, as they are composed, so can be dissolved; for a simple entity is more apt for perpetuity than a composite one. Thirdly, because, if there were any sign of matter in the heaven, it would be most of all because it has quantity; but this is not a sufficient sign, because it is not repugnant that there be made an integral substance physically simple and capable of quantity; therefore quantity is not a sufficient sign of material composition. For, if that substance is possible, let God make it; therefore then the extension of quantity would not be a sufficient indication of material composition in such a substance; therefore neither is it now in the heaven. For why shall we not say that such is the substance of the heaven? For, if such a quantified substance is possible, it is better and more perfect if it is simple than if composite, other things being equal. Again, such a substance will pertain to the beauty and perfection of the universe; for there are in the universe certain simple substances not quantified, and other substances composite and corporeal; therefore, in order that there be in the universe the variety of all things or grades, it fits excellently that there be some substance simple as regards physical and essential composition, but quantified and composed of integral parts; therefore of this kind are those eternal bodies, which on this side seem to approach more nearly to the mode of existing of simple substances.

4. But that what is assumed in this reason is not repugnant, namely that there be given a substance not composed of physical and substantial act and potency and capable of quantity, is proved, because no repugnance is involved in these terms or conditions, nor can any reason be given on account of which such a being would not be comprehended under the breadth of creatable being. You will say that every substance is either form, or matter, or composite; therefore a substance which is neither composite nor capable of matter will be a subsisting form; therefore intellectual; therefore incorporeal; therefore it is repugnant that there be a substance simple and corporeal; whence it is the same to say an immaterial and corporeal substance as to say an immaterial and material substance. And it is confirmed (and it comes almost to the same), for every substance is either potency, or act, or composed of potency and act; but that substance would not be substantial and receptive potency, otherwise it would be matter; nor would it be composed of act and potency; therefore it would be subsisting act; but such act is not capable of quantity, otherwise the way is closed for proving that angelic substances are not capable of quantity. But these reasons do not seem sufficiently to show a repugnance; for the former division of substance into matter, form and composite is not adequate to substance in common; for Aristotle, when he hands down that division in De Anima II, at the beginning, and Metaphysics VII, text 7, plainly speaks of informing form; but in this way angelic substance is neither form, nor matter, nor composite; there, therefore, inferior substance, or substance in some way subject to generation and corruption, is divided. Otherwise, in order that the division be adequate to every substance, in place of that member, namely composite substance, complete substance would have to be posited; for every substance is either complete, or incomplete after the manner of potency, as matter, or after the manner of act, as form. But complete substance is again to be divided into composite of matter and form and simple according to the negation of such composition; but this can further be subdivided into incorporeal, which is so simple that it excludes even the composition of integral parts, and corporeal, which would have the composition of these parts without composition of the essential principles of matter and form; for no reason is brought forward on account of which it is repugnant that the same complete substance have one composition without the other.

5. Wherefore that repugnance, by which such a substance would be material and immaterial, seems to consist only in words. Whence that word material can be distinguished; for properly it signifies a thing composed of matter which is pure potency and of form, and in this sense that simple substance would not be material but rather immaterial, this privative word being taken in the contrary and proportioned signification; but in this way immaterial and incorporeal will not be convertible, according to the aforesaid opinion. But because integral parts are reduced by Aristotle to the material cause, therefore that word can be taken more broadly, and every substance which has integral parts can be called both material and in some way composed of matter. And in this sense that substance of which we are treating would not be called immaterial but material; for immaterial taken in the proportioned signification will be said reciprocally with incorporeal. Nor are these significations unusual, for the form of wood is called material although it does not consist of matter, because it is extended; but the form of man by the contrary reason is immaterial. But the other division of act and potency also suffers equivocation; for, if by the name of subsisting act is understood an integral substance which does not need another substantial and intrinsic act in order to be in act, in this way we concede that that simple substance of which we are treating would be subsisting act; yet we deny that such subsisting act cannot be capable of quantity; nor on that account is the way closed for proving that angelic substances are incapable of quantity; for this is not to be proved from the common notion of subsisting act in that signification, but from elsewhere, namely because they are more perfect and indivisible and intelligent acts. Whence, if by the name of subsisting act is understood a substance so perfect that it altogether recedes from the conditions of matter and from composition of integral parts, then we deny that that division is adequate, or that that simple and corporeal substance is subsisting act. And this is the whole probability of this opinion, according to which it is to be denied that the proper substantial material cause of which we are treating is found in heavenly or incorruptible bodies, but only reductively, in so far as integral parts, as I said, are reduced to the material cause. For it cannot be denied that corporeal substance necessarily has this composition; for the contrary involves a clear repugnance.

The second opinion, of St. Thomas

6. The second principal opinion is that all bodies, even incorruptible ones, are composed of true and proper matter which is substantial physical potency to form. This is the opinion of St. Thomas and his disciples, I, q. 66, a. 2, and In De caelo I, lect. 6, and In Phys. VIII, lect. 20; Capreolus, In II, dist. 12, q. 1; Soncinas, Metaphysics XII, q. 7; Javellus, Book VIII, q. 12; Soto, Physics II, q. 1. Scotus too holds it, in the place cited; and Giles, In II, dist. 2, and Hexaemeron I, c. 4 and following; Ockham, In II, q. 22; St. Bonaventure, In II, dist. 12, a. 2, q. 1. Avicenna too held it, Sufficientia I, c. 6; Paul of Venice, in the Summa de caelo, c. 2, where he reports Themistius, Theophrastus and others. And for this part too various testimonies of Aristotle are brought forward, so that what his opinion was on this point seems sufficiently obscure. For De caelo I, c. 9, texts 93, 94 and 95, he expressly says that the heaven consists of matter, and thence proves that there cannot be another heaven, because it consists of the universal matter. Moreover, Metaphysics XII, text 22, he says that of all sensible bodies there are the same principles, namely matter and form; and De generatione II, c. 9, text 51, he says that two principles, namely matter and form, are attributed also to eternal things and those holding the first place; but in these inferior ones a third is added, namely privation, for constituting generation. Finally Metaphysics VIII, text 10, he says that every sensible substance consists of matter. By reason this opinion is founded on two principles opposed to the preceding. One is that for the incorruptibility of the heavens or bodies the lack of matter is not necessary, which principle will be declared more fully in the following point. Now it is briefly proved, because, although the thing consists of matter and form, their union can be indissoluble, which is enough for incorruptibility. The other principle is that the quantity of bulk which all bodies, even incorruptible ones, have is necessarily conjoined with matter, so that it is a property so proper to matter, or to the thing composed of matter, that it is a certain indication of it. Which Plotinus wrote in these words, Enneads II, Book IV, c. 6: Whatever has bulk has matter.

Comparison of the above opinions

7. Of these opinions neither can be evidently proved, because there is no effect which evidently shows us that there is or is not matter in bodies of this kind, which has been sufficiently declared in reporting the opinions themselves. For the former infers the lack of matter from incorruptibility, which inference the latter opinion evidently shows is not good; for, although an immaterial thing is necessarily incorruptible, the converse does not hold; and so, although in an incorruptible thing as such composition from matter is not necessary, it can nevertheless be necessary for other causes, incorruptibility not impeding. Because, although this often arises from the simplicity of the thing, sometimes nevertheless it can arise from the indissoluble bond of form and matter, as the latter opinion rightly said. For neither can it reasonably be said to be repugnant to the union of matter and form that it be indissoluble; for what is this repugnance? For not every composition postulates that it can be dissolved, even in natural things, as is evident in composition from accident and subject. If, therefore, there is given an accidental form inseparable from the subject, why could there not also be given a substantial form inseparable from matter? Likewise composition from integral parts can be naturally indivisible, as it is in the heaven; therefore also the other composition from matter and form will be able to be naturally indissoluble; the inference, therefore, which is made from incorruptibility to the lack of matter is inefficacious.

8. The heaven is composed of matter and form.—But the latter opinion infers composition from matter from the quantity of bulk, which consequence too seems uncertain on account of the last argument of the former opinion. On account of which it is not evident to me that it implies a contradiction that there be made a simple and complete substance capable of quantity; but if this does not imply, that consequence is altogether weakened, since it is neither formal nor absolutely necessary. Nevertheless, as far as we can judge from signs and effects, it is more likely that the heaven is composed of matter and form. First indeed, because in it there are all the accidents which follow matter, corruptibility excepted, as are quantity, which is of the same notion in all bodies. Next there is in the heavens the rare and the dense, which are defined through matter; for that is dense which under a small quantity has much matter, as is evident from De generatione II. Further, in the heavens there are certain accidents which seem ordered only to receiving, as quantity, according to which they are physically movable; but others to acting, as light, and if there are any other faculties through which they influence; therefore, as these indicate form, so those indicate matter. Finally all physically movable bodies are natural beings; for on this account they are comprehended under the object of philosophy; whence Aristotle, De caelo I, c. 2, places the heavenly bodies among the natural beings which consist of nature; but according to the doctrine of the same, Physics II, cc. 1 and 2, nature is nothing but matter or form, nor do we know another physical nature; therefore all bodies, even incorruptible ones, consist of nature of this kind. Which reason at least proves that this opinion is more consonant with the doctrine of Aristotle. But what is to be answered to the former testimonies we shall see in the following section. And this resolution will be more persuaded from the following answers.

Solutions of the arguments

9. To the first reason of the former opinion, then, the answer is that, although the first knowledge of prime matter was found by way of motion and transmutation, nevertheless, this composition from matter being once known in inferior bodies, thence one reasoned to the superior ones, and from other likenesses and accidents of such bodies it was understood that this composition is common to all bodies. Whence to the second the answer is that it is not necessary that the composition from matter and form be for the sake of another extrinsic end, but for the sake of composing the substance itself which consists of them; and because the nature of such a substance postulates composition of this kind in order to have all things which are connatural to it, namely matter, in order that it can subsist, occupy place, be moved and similar things, but form, in order that it be in act and be able to act. Wherefore in that argument it seems falsely supposed that matter in these inferior things is only for the sake of generations and corruptions; for this is one of the properties of this matter, yet not the adequate notion of matter as such.

10. To the third the answer is, first, that it is probable that quantity and matter are of their nature so adequately connected that it is repugnant for quantity to be connatural to any being which does not have matter; for the things which we experience of bodies indicate this more, and there is altogether no sufficient foundation for feigning another genus of possible natural beings. Nor is this repugnant to the infinity of the divine power, as is sufficiently self-evident, because the infinity of the divine power does not change the natures of things; and although it can operate above them, it nevertheless does not make connatural that which is not congruous or consonant with the order of nature. Whence we shall show below that conversely it cannot happen that there be a substance composed of matter and form to which it is not natural to have quantity; what wonder, then, ought it to seem that conversely it is also repugnant that there be given an altogether complete and quantified substance which is not composed of matter and form as of its parts? Two orders of substances creatable by God, then, are to be conceived, namely of those composed of matter and form and of simple ones. To all the former this imperfection is common, that they are capable of quantity; but all the latter substances are so perfect (we are treating of complete substances) that quantity is repugnant to them; and therefore such substances are called by Aristotle separated and simple and intellectual acts. But it is repugnant to the natures of things that these two orders be confounded among themselves, and therefore one and the same thing cannot have the imperfection of one order conjoined with the perfection of the other.

11. I add next that, although we admitted this, namely that there can be given a simple and integral substance subject to the quantity of bulk, such a mode of substance cannot fittingly be attributed to the heaven, because it would be very imperfect, because it would not be a most perfect act, as is self-evident, because it would be more imperfect than intellectual substances, indeed even than many substances composed of matter and form, especially man, and from elsewhere it would also lack substantial act, which is the most perfect among informing acts. Just as, therefore, a created substance lacking all beauty of accidental form is very imperfect, so a corporeal substance lacking the beauty of substantial form would be very imperfect and as it were monstrous. And perhaps hence is taken a not light proportional argument, nor of small (so to speak) weight: just as there cannot be given a created substance incapable of accident, so there cannot be given a corporeal substance incapable of substantial form or not constituted through its actuality, if it is integral and complete; but if it is simple and subsisting under quantity, it is not integral but a potential part needing the actuality of form. And it is confirmed, for such a substance could not according to its whole self be active by any genus of action; not indeed by immanent action, since it would be an inanimate thing, nor yet by transient, because this exceeds the limits of natural agents such as are the heavenly bodies, and so it would rather be of no activity or efficacy. Just as, therefore, the heavenly bodies do not act except by inducing form into matter, so also they are not except through the existence of a proper form in proper matter. Wherefore, although simplicity, other things being equal, is an indication and argument of perfection, nevertheless that simplicity in a corporeal substance would not be an indication of perfection but rather of imperfection; for it is not always that beings are more perfect the simpler they are.

1. In this matter there was the opinion of Avicenna that the matter of all bodies, both heavenly and terrestrial, both corruptible and incorruptible, is the same according to species; which opinion many of the theologians have followed, especially Giles in the places cited, and Scotus and others incline to the same. But this opinion can be defended in two ways. First, by asserting that the heaven is a corruptible body and of elemental nature, and in this way Plato taught it, as St. Thomas, to be cited below, also mentions; and Nemesius, book De natura hominis, c. 5, reports that Plato posited the heaven to be of fire and earth. Secondly, that opinion can be defended together with the incorruptibility of the heaven, and in each way it will be treated by us, although at present we rather suppose the incorruptibility of some superior bodies, and, that incorruptibility being supposed, inquire into their material cause. But the aforesaid opinion can be founded partly on natural reason, partly on theological.

2. The first metaphysical reason is that a specific distinction between matters seems impossible, because, on the testimony of Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, text 49, it is act which distinguishes, especially specifically and essentially; but any matter is pure potency; therefore specific distinction cannot be found in it. And it is confirmed, because prime matter is the lowest substantial being that can be, and therefore is said by Augustine to be near nothing; therefore within the breadth of matter there cannot be specific distinction; otherwise, since two things diverse in species are necessarily of unequal perfection, one matter would be essentially more perfect than another, and so some matter would not be the lowest being nor supremely distant from God, which is repugnant to the imperfection of matter. For pure potency is extremely opposed to pure act, and they seem to be as it were the two extremes of the whole breadth of substances; whence, as in pure act there cannot be specific distinction, so neither does it seem possible in pure potency.

3. The second reason of the aforesaid opinion is that such a distinction is not necessary. For if anything compelled the introduction of it, it would be most of all the incorruption of the heavens; but not this. First indeed, because, although the heavens are never actually corrupted, it does not thence follow that they are incorruptible from within; for it can happen that, although by virtue of its substantial composition the heaven is corruptible, nevertheless in fact it is never corrupted, because, existing in its natural place and distant from all contrary agents, it is so disposed that it can resist all. Or secondly, because, although the heaven consists of this matter, it can be naturally incorruptible from within. Because prime matter alone is not a sufficient principle of corruptibility unless the form too is such that its union is separable from matter, which is wont to come from a twofold head, namely, either because it does not fill the whole capacity of matter, or because it is united to matter by means of dispositions having a contrary; which two reasons are found in the forms of generable things, but not in the forms of the heavens; for the form of the heaven, on account of its eminent perfection, virtually contains the inferior ones, and so through itself fills the whole capacity of matter, and moreover¹ is united to matter through dispositions not having a contrary; whence Aristotle proved the heaven incorruptible only from this, that it has no contrary. So, then, the reason is made up: for, in order that the heaven be incorruptible, it is enough that its union with matter be naturally indissoluble; but this can be without diversity of matter on account of the mode of information and of the dispositions; therefore on account of this cause it is not necessary to introduce that distinction of matters. Which can be declared by a theological example; for the union of the humanity of Christ to the Word is indissoluble, although that humanity of itself is capable of proper subsistence and lacks it, because the subsistence of the Word is such that it fills the capacity of the humanity and has no contrary; so, then, in the present case it can be understood of the information of the form of the heaven, even if it is in the matter of generable things. And it is confirmed, because otherwise, if on account of the incorruptibility of the heavens their matter had to be distinguished from inferior matter, by the same reason the matter of each heaven would have to be distinguished from the matter of the others, which seems very absurd; but the sequel is evident from parity of reason.

4. The preceding opinion is strengthened by a theological argument.—Thirdly, the theologians add a foundation taken from the first creation of things, which we cannot pass over here, in order that we may declare that metaphysics is not repugnant to theology. They say, then, that it is evident from the history of Genesis that God founded the heavens and the elements from the same matter, and therefore that there are no bodies which consist of distinct matters. The antecedent is proved from those words of Genesis 1: In the beginning God created heaven and earth, but the earth was void and empty, and darkness was upon the face of the abyss. Where Augustine, Confessions XII, c. 7, understands that by heaven the angelic nature is signified, but by the name of earth prime matter, from which all bodies were formed. But others, because that interpretation of the word heaven seems too metaphorical, say that by the name of heaven is signified the empyrean heaven, which is the seat of the blessed, of which many things are read in the ancient Fathers, as may be seen in Damascene, De fide II, c. 6; and Theodoret, Questions on Genesis, qq. 11 and 14; and Basil, Homilies 2 and 3 on Genesis; and Bede, in his Hexaemeron, at the beginning; and Chrysostom, expounding those words of Hebrews 8: A minister of the holy things and of the tabernacle of God, which God pitched and not man; and Hilary, on those words of Psalm 122: To thee have I lifted up my eyes, who dwellest in the heavens; and Diodorus, in Lippomanus, in the Catena on Genesis. But by the name of earth they say is signified prime matter, or the bodily mass from which God formed all bodies, in which they agree with Augustine. Which opinion Abulensis follows, on Genesis; and it is wont to be attributed to Bede, Strabo and Hugh of St Victor; and Theophilus of Antioch indicates the same, Ad Autolycum II, a little from the beginning; and Philastrius, in the book On Heresies, reports among the ignorances of certain heretics that they were ignorant of the twofold acceptation of earth: one, by which it signifies this element which we inhabit; the other, by which it signifies hyle, that is, invisible and uncomposed matter, which is as it were the womb of all things. Which opinion can be confirmed by a difficult place of Wisdom 11: Thy almighty hand created the world out of formless matter; this matter, therefore, was signified by the name of earth, and of it as of matter the whole world consists.

5. But others, since this interpretation of the name of earth too is very metaphorical and foreign to historical narration, understand properly that by that word is signified the element of earth which God created on the first day together with the empyrean heaven. They add, however, that together with them there was created water which filled that whole space which is interposed between the earth and the empyrean heaven, from which afterwards God created all the heavens and the element of fire and air; and so they conclude that all these bodies consist of the same matter. But they prove the assumption from those words immediately following: And darkness was upon the face of the abyss; for the abyss is copious water to whose bottom one cannot easily penetrate, as Basil declares on Genesis, and Augustine on Psalm 14. Whence it is immediately subjoined: And the Spirit of the Lord moved over the waters. The waters, therefore, were together with the earth and the heaven, and were procreated between the earth and the heaven; and since it is not likely that any space interposed between heaven and earth remained void, it is evident that the whole was filled with waters, because Scripture makes no mention of another body then procreated by which it could be filled. And so it is concluded that the heaven was produced from water. Which opinion those words of Peter favour, 2 Peter, last chapter: For this they are wilfully ignorant of, that the heavens were before, and the earth out of water and through water, consisting by the word of God. And the same Peter is reported to have said the same, disputing with Simon Magus, in the Recognitions of Clement, Book I, near the beginning. Finally the Hebrew word too by which the heavens are called Shamayim favours this opinion, for (as Jerome says, Epistle 83, to Oceanus) that name was taken from waters. But some add that that body by which the space between earth and heaven was filled was not the proper element of water, but watery matter, as it were a certain vapour or mist, according to that of Ecclesiasticus 24: As a mist I covered all the earth; and that of Job 38: Who shut up the sea with doors, when it broke forth as issuing out of the womb, when I made a cloud the garment thereof, and wrapped it in a mist as in swaddling bands? And from this misty matter they say all the heavens except the empyrean were created, and so it comes about that they consist of the same matter.

6. And this opinion is confirmed by another twofold opinion of Scripture. One is that there are true waters above the firmament, that is, above the eighth and starry sphere, as is evident from the same Genesis 1: Let there be a firmament in the midst of the waters, and let it divide the waters from the waters; and God made a firmament, and divided the waters that were under the firmament from those that were above the firmament; and in other places of Scripture mention is often made of waters existing above the heavens, as in Psalms 103 and 148, and in Daniel, in the canticle of the three children. From this opinion of Scripture, then, it is gathered that the heaven is not of another matter than the element of water, and was formed from water, and part of the waters was left above it. The other opinion of Scripture is that the heavens are sometime to be corrupted and burned by fire and transformed into a better substance, as Isaiah seems expressly to predict, cc. 51 and 65, and more clearly St. Peter, 2 Peter, last chapter, and it is indicated in many other places. Hence, then, it is rightly gathered that the heaven consists of matter capable of substantial change, and consequently has matter of the same notion with the matter of these inferior things.

The latter opinion, contrary to the former

7. The second opinion teaches that the matter of the heaven is of a diverse notion from the matter of these inferior things, or, to speak more universally and more metaphysically, that the matter of incorruptible bodies is necessarily of a diverse notion from the matter of corruptible bodies. So St. Thomas teaches, I, q. 66, a. 2, and I-II, q. 49, a. 4, and Contra Gentiles II, c. 16; and the authors cited in the preceding section follow it. Indeed even the Commentator, Metaphysics VIII, comm. 12, although he absolutely denies that the heaven has matter, nevertheless says conditionally that, if it has it, it is of a diverse notion. And this is without doubt the opinion of Aristotle in the places cited for the opinion of the Commentator in the preceding point; for in them he plainly denies that the heaven has such matter as these inferior things have; whence, since in other places he said that it has matter, it is necessary that he asserts it to be of a diverse notion. Which he affirms in almost express words, Metaphysics XII, text 12; and in this sense is commonly expounded what he says, Metaphysics X, c. 5, that the corruptible and the incorruptible differ in genus; for this is not true of the logical genus, since corruptible and incorruptible bodies agree in the genus of substance and of body; it must therefore be understood of the physical genus, which all understand to be matter, which is so called because it keeps that proportion to form which genus keeps to difference. Whence De generatione I, c. 6, he says more openly that things which cannot mutually act and undergo do not have the same matter. This opinion, therefore, is more consonant with philosophical doctrine; but in order that we may show it to be simply truer, we must proceed little by little according to the three foundations of the former opinion.

Specific diversity of matters is not repugnant

8. I say, first, that nothing is repugnant to the natures of things that there be given in substantial potencies and matters specific and essential diversity. It is proved, first, ostensively, from those things which were said above of the nature of prime matter. For we have shown that it has a true essence, real and substantial, and in the genus of being has its entitative actuality, although incomplete and with a relationship to form; therefore in that grade and mode of partial essence there can be diversity and greater and lesser essential perfection. The consequence is evident, because neither on the side of God is there impotence, nor on the side of the thing repugnance. For just as accidental passive potency can be diverse in species, because it is ordered to act diverse in species and genus, in the same way substantial potencies can be distinguished. Which is declared more fully; for some substantial forms are united to matter through the generation of the whole, which broadly can be called generable forms; but others are forms which cannot come about or be united through generation, but through creation or concreation only; therefore, if there is instituted a matter apt to receive only forms of the former kind and incapable of the others, it will be plainly of a diverse nature from matter capable of ingenerable forms; but it is not repugnant that matter of this kind be instituted with such a nature and capacity; therefore it is not repugnant that there come about matters of diverse natures and essences.

9. How act distinguishes is to be understood.—Secondly, this can be proved by solving the foundation of the first opinion and all the reasons by which its defenders try to prove that this is impossible. For when that principle is adduced from Aristotle, It is act which distinguishes, if we use the name of act in its whole breadth, we shall easily answer that one matter is distinguished in species from another through an intrinsic essential difference, which is compared to the genus of matter as metaphysical act; for we have already shown above that it is not repugnant to the pure potentiality of matter in the physical genus to be constituted of metaphysical potency and act. Nor is it necessary to have recourse to the analogy of matter in common with respect to matters of diverse notions, which Cajetan constitutes, I, q. 66, a. 2. For such an analogy is founded on no probable reason, since the essential notion of substantial potency belongs most properly to any matter whatever and without any relationship of one to another. And so, if we speak of metaphysical act, any matter whatever has in itself an intrinsic act by which it is distinguished from another, which is manifestly convinced from the essential distinction of matter from form; for, if it is act which distinguishes, it is necessary that matter have in itself an act by which it is distinguished from form. All the more because it is very probable that there is given a common, univocal and generic concept to matter and form, in that way, namely, in which genus can be found in parts, according to what was said above of universals; for of this kind seems to be the concept of nature, or of intrinsic and essential principle or cause; this genus, therefore, is divided through opposite differences as through acts; so, then, the common notion of matter can be distinguished through various differences. But if the discussion is of physical or real act, we can still distinguish entitative or formal act; and in the former way it is not necessary that any simple entity be distinguished from another of dissimilar nature through another act besides the very entity of the thing. Because a simple entity cannot be distinguished in the thing from another except by itself; for it is distinguished by the same by which it is. But speaking of the latter act, namely formal, then too every distinction can be attributed to it, in so far as it comes about either through it or through a relationship to it; for so the composite is distinguished through the form as through the constituting act; but one matter is distinguished from another through a relationship to a diverse generable or ingenerable form, as we have declared.

10. The matter of generable things is positively one.—And the conclusion is declared more fully, because specific unity with numerical distinction is not repugnant to prime matter; therefore neither will specific distinction with numerical unity be repugnant. The consequence is thence proved, because, just as it is act which distinguishes, so also it is act which gives unity and which constitutes the specific nature; for to constitute is prior according to reason to distinguishing. Likewise, because, just as the genus is compared as potency to the specific difference, so the species to the individual difference. And finally because numerical distinction too, since it is actual and real, must come about through act, as is evident from what was said above of the principle of individuation. But the first antecedent as regards each part is manifest. For as regards the former, all confess that all the matters of generable things are of the same species. First indeed, because they are altogether similar in essence, whence they also have the same definition. Secondly, because any portion of matter whatever is capable of all the forms of which another is, for any is the common subject of these transmutations; and therefore Aristotle rightly said that those things have one matter which are mutually transmutable, which must necessarily be understood of specific unity. Finally we proved at length above that the first material cause of generable things can only be one, namely according to species, which Aristotle teaches through the whole of Physics I, especially text 69, and the Commentator there and Metaphysics XII, comm. 14; and St. Thomas, I, q. 66, a. 2. Nor is the mode of speaking of some to be approved who say that the matter of generable things is one in species negatively, not positively; for they will have positive specific unity to be through form. But it is an inept distinction, for if they speak of unity as regards the formal, every unity is negative; but if as regards the foundation of unity, this is as positive in many matters as in many forms or composites, for it truly has a positive essence and a positive likeness or agreement in its whole essential nature. But as regards the other part too, about numerical distinction, the matter is most clear; for the bodies of two men differ in number, therefore also their matters, which distinction they retain even if they are deprived of their forms. Indeed even matters which are under forms diverse in species, although as regards the proximate dispositions they are said to differ in some way in species, as is taken from Aristotle, Metaphysics VIII, text 11, nevertheless as prime matters as regards their entities are only diverse in number, with which distinction they can be preserved without any form actually informing. Nor does it matter that this whole matter of generable things could be constituted under a form of the same notion and under the same continuous quantity, and so be one in number; for this unity or distinction in matter is such as is wont to be in homogeneous things, whose integral parts, if they are actually divided, are also several individuals simply and actually distinct in number; but if they are not disjoined but continuous, they are actually one in number and several in potency. So, then, it is evident that unity or distinction, both specific and generic or numerical, is not repugnant to the nature or essence of matter.

11. Matter is the most imperfect of all beings.—To the confirmation which was founded on the imperfection of matter the answer is, first, that it is probable that matter as such according to its common genus is so imperfect a being that nothing can be lower and more imperfect in the genus of substance, not only comparing genus to genus, which is most clear, but also comparing all and each of the things contained under the genus of matter to all the others which are contained under other genera or notions of substance. This is declared, for matter as such is distinguished within the breadth of substance both from form and from complete substance, either composite or simple; and in this way it is clear that the genus of matter as such is less perfect than the genus of form, and a fortiori than composite or complete substance. We can, however, further compare any form whatever with any matter whatever, and so it is not so evident that every matter is inferior to every form. For what if someone says that the matter of the empyrean heaven is a more perfect being than the form of earth? by what evident reason will this be demonstrated to be false? For that that form has more of the notion of actuating act does not seem sufficiently to convince, because accidents too have more of the notion of actuating act than matter, and nevertheless in their actual entity they are simply less perfect, because they absolutely confer less perfection in the genus of being. So, then, someone could say that that matter is better which as it were begins the most perfect body, such as is the empyrean heaven, than is the form which as it were consummates and completes the most imperfect body, which is earth. Nor does it stand in the way either that that matter is contained under a less perfect genus; for it often happens that a perfect species under a less perfect genus is simply nobler than some lowest species under a better genus, as the will is an absolutely more perfect power than sight, although this is contained under the genus of cognitive power, which is nobler. For the nobility of the genus is not to be taken from the comparison of all and each of the species, but either according to itself and comparing the precise notions, or certainly by comparing the supreme species of one genus to the supreme of another. But although this can be so disputed, nevertheless we admit as more probable that any matter whatever is inferior to any form whatever, because it is pure potency in the genus of substance, under which genus it can participate little perfection. Likewise, because otherwise someone could easily say that some matter is more perfect than some complete and integral substance, because, since it is posited to be more perfect than form and otherwise includes the whole perfection of matter, it can easily happen that at least intensively it exceeds in perfection some integral and composite substance, which is not likely. In this way, then, it is excellently explained that prime matter is the lowest being, not only by reason of this inferior matter of generable things, of which Augustine chiefly spoke when he said that matter is near nothing, but also by reason of the whole genus or the whole breadth of matter, for the whole pertains to the lowest grade of substantial being.

12. But it does not pertain to this lowest perfection of matter that in its breadth there cannot be grades or greater and lesser essential perfection, because it is not necessary that that perfection of matter be altogether essentially indivisible; for, as I have declared, it can be divided and contracted through various differences. Nor as regards this is pure potency to be compared with pure act, a manifest sign of which is that pure act is essentially one in number and singular, but not pure potency. But the reason is that pure act is constituted in itself through infinite perfection simply, including in itself every other perfection, to which infinity and containment multiplication both essential and generic is repugnant, as we shall see afterwards. But pure potency is not constituted through infinite perfection, as is self-evident, since it is of the lowest perfection; nor yet will it be constituted through the lack of all perfection, nor through the inclusion (so to speak) of all perfection, nor finally is it of the notion of matter as such that it have the lowest and indivisible physical perfection, for the notion of pure potency does not postulate this, and from elsewhere it does not have it. But here there immediately occurred to be asked which of these matters is less perfect; for they are not equal, as we have already conceded and as the notion of specific distinction seems to postulate. Again it can be asked whether there can be made another matter essentially less perfect than any created matter whatever, and consequently whether in these matters one can proceed to infinity. But these will be declared more conveniently in the following section.

The second assertion

13. All the heavenly orbs are incorruptible.—I say, secondly: if we regard reason alone, it is more probable that the matter of the heavens is of a diverse notion from the matter of generable things. To prove this conclusion we suppose that the heaven is ingenerable and incorruptible. Although, as I said, we are not treating in this place of the heaven as it were materially (so to speak), but formally of incorruptible body. But it is certain that it is not repugnant that there be given some incorruptible body, of which the proposed question proceeds, whether it is given in fact or not. Again, of some heavenly body, at least of the empyrean heaven, the theologians hold it as established that it is an incorruptible body, as is evident from the authors cited above. Finally, although of the inferior orbs many think that they are corruptible, and some of the ancient Fathers sometimes indicate this, and modern astrologers too think they demonstrate it from certain appearances of comets, nevertheless the opinion of Aristotle seems more likely to us, that all those bodies down to the heaven of the moon are by their nature incorruptible, both on account of experience—for we see corruptible bodies, either according to their whole selves or according to parts, either corrupted or altered, receiving foreign impressions or sometimes falling from their natural state; but by the most ancient experience it is established that the heavens, both according to their whole selves and according to all their parts, have remained integral from the creation of the world and are moved with invariable uniformity in the same way, and are not altered or cast down from their connatural state; from which experience arose the common consent of all nations thinking the heaven to be of itself perpetual, as Aristotle noted, book De mundo ad Alexandrum, and De caelo II, c. 1. And also because this is more consonant with the end for which those bodies were created, namely that they be certain universal causes which by their motion and uniformly variable influx may help all these inferior things to be preserved through continual succession and generation; but for this end it was necessary that the heavens be perpetual and be moved in the same invariable way. And finally because it is not repugnant that the heavens were created of an incorruptible nature, as is evident from what has been said and will be more evident from what is to be said; therefore it is more likely that they were created such; for, as I said, this is more consonant with their end and pertains more to the perfection and beauty of the universe, nor is there anything in divine Scripture which is repugnant to this philosophical reason, as I shall show in the following assertion. Indeed there are many expressions which favour it, as that the heavens are called most firm, 2 Paralipomenon 6, and most solid, Job 37, and eternal, namely for the future, Psalm 148, and 2 Corinthians 5.

14. Proof of the conclusion.—The answer of some is refuted.—This, then, being supposed, the conclusion posited is proved, because, if the heaven were composed of the matter of the elements, it would be as corruptible of itself as the elements themselves are. The sequel is proved, because the matter of the heaven would be capable of other forms, for example of the elements, and would lack them; therefore it would be subject to the proper privation of such forms, and consequently, as far as depends on itself, would desire them; but this is the whole root of the corruptibility of the elements; therefore. Some answer by denying the major, because matter, while it is under one form, is not capable of another, because it cannot have both at the same time, and therefore it does not properly have privation nor appetite of another, because it is content with the form which it has. But this is frivolous, for the capacity to several forms is not to be declared in the composite sense (as they say), but in the divided; for the same subject is capable of contrary forms, not because it can receive both at the same time, but because of itself it is indifferent to receive one or the other, and this is enough that, when it has one, it is truly deprived of the other, because it truly lacks a form of which it is capable. Otherwise neither would the matter of generable things be subject to privation, nor in any subject in which there is a form or positive quality would there ever be the privation of the opposite form, which is against the common sense and mode of speaking of all. Finally, the matter of generable things is not by any other reason the principle of corruption except because in this way it is capable of other forms which it lacks, and by that reason it is said to desire them, according to metaphor; for this appetite is not other than natural capacity, as was declared in the first prooemial disputation.

15. Others answer that the form of the heaven fills the capacity of matter on account of its eminence and virtual containment, and on account of this peculiar reason matter existing under such a form does not desire others, nor is properly capable of them. But this too is false, for the form of the heaven does not eminently and virtually contain all other forms; for it does not contain the rational soul, nor the other forms of more perfect living things, nor does the form of one heaven eminently or virtually contain the forms of the other heavens, supposing that they differ in species. Whence, when the form of the heaven is said to fill the capacity of matter, it can be understood intensively, and this is neither true nor enough, for the rational soul actuates matter more perfectly, and, since it is the most perfect, it alone can be said to fill intensively the capacity of matter, and nevertheless it leaves it so capable of others that it is a sufficient principle of corruption. It can be answered that the rational soul exceeds the form of the heaven in the grade of form, but is exceeded in the mode of informing. But we say that from this excess and mode of informing the diversity of matter is sufficiently gathered, and otherwise it cannot be explained of what kind that excess is, as will be more evident from what follows. Or, then, the form of the heaven is understood to fill the capacity of matter extensively, and this is impossible if that matter is of altogether the same notion and capacity with this our matter, because of itself it is plainly indifferent to all forms whose perfections the form of the heaven contains neither formally nor eminently. Wherefore it cannot happen that through itself alone and through its mode of informing it fills the capacity of such matter.

16. Another answer is that the capacity of matter can be considered in two ways: in one way, according to itself and as it were remotely; in another way, proximately and as it is reducible to act. In the former way they concede that the matter of the heaven is capable of other forms, as the argument made proves; and similarly that it has privation and as it were radical appetite; but proximately they deny that it has capacity, because that matter is already so effected, disposed and actuated that it is not reducible to another act, because it is not separable from that which it now has. But this comes partly from the dispositions which do not have a contrary, partly from the very information or mode of informing, which is such that it inseparably conjoins such form to this matter. But matter is the principle of corruptibility not as it is considered according to remote capacity, but as it is proximately disposed and affected. This answer indeed is probable, yet it does not so satisfy that the contrary opinion is not left more probable. First indeed, because, in order that the agent can alter the patient, it is not necessary that it suppose in it a positively contrary disposition, but it is enough that it suppose capacity with privation; for these, the form which the agent introduces being adjoined, are sufficient principles of natural change; therefore, although in the heaven there are not dispositions directly and positively contrary to the qualities of the elements, nevertheless, if there is in it matter capable of such qualities and lacking them, this is enough that the heaven can be altered by the elements and receive foreign impressions. You will say that the heaven has some noble qualities formally repugnant and resistant to all these inferior qualities. But this first of all is said voluntarily and without proof, and next from that answer it is at most had that the heavens cannot be corrupted because there is not in the inferior agent a power which can overcome the resistance of the patient; if, therefore, the active power were increased or rendered stronger, it could alter the heaven and dispose it to corruption.

17. And finally, although we granted that that mode of incorruption is possible, nevertheless it cannot be denied that it is an easier and nobler mode if the heaven is incapable of foreign impressions and forms not through the resistance of qualities, but through intrinsic and substantial composition. Since, therefore, the heaven was made so as to be abstracted from all these impressions and alterations and so that its matter never changes its form, it is more likely that it was made of itself incapable of all these forms and qualities, and so that the heaven is of another notion and order from all inferior bodies, not only as regards form but also as regards matter. But if someone says that this incapacity of foreign corrupting impressions is to be attributed neither to the incapacity of matter nor to resisting qualities, but to the mode of informing of the form, against this is the fact that, if the matter has the same capacity, it can scarcely be understood how through the mode of information alone the composite itself is rendered incapable of the inferior qualities, especially since the passive potency to receive these qualities belongs to bodies by reason of matter. And for this cause Aristotle, in the places cited above, deservedly thought that, as those things which are mutually transmuted have a common matter, so also conversely those which cannot be transmuted do not have a common matter, because diversity in form alone cannot suffice for this. To which is added that, although the form of the heaven has such a mode of informing that by its nature it postulates inseparability from the subject which it informs, nevertheless through this very thing it is sufficiently indicated that the matter subject to that form must be of a diverse notion, because potencies are distinguished through acts; but a form informing in that way is an act of a far diverse notion from a generable form, and postulates in the subject far diverse conditions, namely inseparability and full satiety, and (so to speak) perpetual rest under such act; therefore the potencies or matters ordered to acts of this kind are distinct.

18. All the heavenly orbs are ingenerable.—How many absurdities arise from the opposite.—Finally, reasons no less efficacious can be taken from this, that the heaven is ingenerable by natural generation; for hitherto we have weighed only its incorruptibility. If, then, the matter of the air and of the sun, for example, were of the same notion, the matter of the air would now be capable of the form of the sun and lacking it and desiring it, for there is no less reason of it than of the other forms of which it is the act. Therefore, as far as depends on the side of the material cause, the heaven is truly generable from air; therefore it is simply generable. The consequence is evident, both because this denomination is most of all taken from the side of matter, and also because to natural passive potency there corresponds natural active potency, otherwise such a potency would be superfluous and idle in the nature of things. Or certainly, although in fact such an active power were not given, it would nevertheless not be repugnant that it be given within the order of natural agents. And so, as far as depends on itself, the heaven would be naturally generable. Rather, no reason could be given why the heaven itself or the sun could not generate something similar to itself from matter applied to it, because there is given in nature a subject containing that form in potency and lacking it; therefore that form is makeable through eduction from the potency of such a subject; therefore it is finite both in its being and grade and in the mode in which it can come about; therefore it can be educed through the finite power of a natural agent; why, then, is there not in the heaven or in the sun such a power of generating something similar to itself? certainly no philosophical reason can be assigned. Since, therefore, the heaven is ingenerable, its form is such that it can neither be educed from the potency of matter nor be united through generation; therefore it is not contained in the potency of that matter which is the subject of generation, nor does it regard it or can actuate it; therefore conversely the matter which is subject to such a form is by its nature a subject incapable of generation, and consequently is of a diverse nature from the other matter which is the subject of generation. And these reasons, although they have been made by way of example about the matter of the heaven, nevertheless proceed universally and formally of a body incorruptible from within, which will be more confirmed by solving the second foundation of the former opinion.

19. The second foundation of the former opinion, then, has been solved from the confirmation of the preceding assertion; for we have already sufficiently shown how from the incorruptibility of a body, if it is altogether natural and intrinsic, the diversity of matter is inferred, and all the things which are touched upon in the discourse of that foundation have been treated and dispatched by us one by one. But the example which is adduced there of the indissoluble union of the humanity of Christ matters nothing to the present matter; for we do not deny that some union can be indissoluble by its nature, but we say that such a union of form with matter is an indication of diversity not only in the form but also in the matter, both because potency is proportioned to act, and also because such a union postulates matter incapable of foreign impressions.

The matters of the heavens are compared among themselves

20. But in the confirmation of that foundation a special difficulty is sought about the matters of the heavens, whether they too differ in species among themselves; in which we can speak either supposing that the heavenly bodies are of the same species, or on the hypothesis that they differ in species; and, as I have often said, it matters nothing to the present question what in fact is truer in this, for it is enough to speak of the possible, in which there is no doubt that there can be given incorruptible bodies both of the same and of diverse species. If, then, we speak of bodies having forms of the same notion, no question remains that the matters too must be of the same essential notion, because they have nothing whence they would be distinguished. Nor can such agreement in matter stand in the way of the incorruptibility of such bodies, because like does not undergo from like; whence between such bodies there cannot be natural action and transmutation, nor does the matter of one desire the form of another, since they are of the same species. And as regards this the reason is the same of diverse bodies as of diverse homogeneous parts of the same body; but the parts of the same homogeneous body have distinct portions of matter, yet of the same notion, as are the forms. But it is not improbable that this singular matter of such species is naturally co-adapted and proportioned to this singular form and has with it a peculiar bond and proper individual relationship, although this is uncertain and matters little to the present point.

21. The difficulty, then, touched upon in the aforesaid confirmation proceeds supposing a specific distinction between bodies of this kind, whether that intervenes between integral bodies, such as are, for example, the empyrean heaven and the heaven of the moon, which it is far more likely differ in species, or whether they are related as parts of the same body, as are the stars with respect to the other parts of the heavenly bodies. Of all these, then, there is the difficulty, because, if the reason made is efficacious, it proves equally that the matters of all incorruptible bodies differing in species are also different in species, which seems incredible.

22. The opinion of some on this.—In this matter the disciples of St. Thomas are divided, for Capreolus, whom Soncinas and others follow, does not think that that consequent is to be admitted, because, in order that matters be diverse in species, it is not enough that the forms be distinct in species, since it is evident that in these inferior things the same matter receives various forms; it is necessary, therefore, that there be diversity in the mode of informing; but all the forms of the heavens agree in the same mode of informing inseparably and of filling the appetite of matter; therefore, although those forms differ in the essential grade, nevertheless the matter of all is one, because it regards all as it were under one formal notion which is taken from the mode of informing, as the matter of inferior bodies is one because it regards several forms in so far as they agree in another mode of informing, namely separably. Whence Aristotle, although he said that the corruptible and the incorruptible differ in genus, never said that incorruptible things differ among themselves also in physical genus; therefore they do not differ in matter. Finally all those bodies, as they are incapable of corrupting alterations, so they are capable of those changes which do not bring corruption, as local motion and passive illumination; it is therefore a sign that they have matter of the same notion.

23. The matter of the heavenly orbs is diverse in species among themselves.—But Cajetan concedes the sequel of the argument and teaches that all incorruptible bodies diverse in species have not only forms but also matters diverse in species. And in that opinion he speaks more consistently, because the reasons made have the same efficacy in the present case. For if the matter of the crystalline heaven, for example, is of the same notion with the matter of the empyrean heaven, it is therefore naturally capable of its form and of all the dispositions which are required for it; therefore the form of the empyrean heaven, as far as depends on itself and on the side of such a subject, can be educed from its potency; therefore the empyrean heaven is naturally generable, and conversely the crystalline heaven will be naturally corruptible and transmutable into another. The consequence is evident, because matter is said to be of itself indifferent to all those forms and to be determined to them through the proper dispositions of each; therefore there will be as great a repugnance between the dispositions as between the forms; therefore through those dispositions that matter can be prepared to cast off one form and receive another. Nor for this transmutation does positive and perfect contrariety seem necessary, but proper privative opposition with natural repugnance and incompossibility of the forms and of the proper qualities or dispositions will suffice. But if on the side of natural passive potency this whole is true, no reason can be brought forward why the natural active potency corresponding to that passive potency is impossible; indeed neither can a reason be given why in fact it is not found in the heavens. Therefore, that such bodies are mutually impassible by such a passion as would dispose to corruption or generation comes from this, that each has a proper matter so accommodated and commensurated to its proper form and its dispositions that it is altogether incapable of others; whence it necessarily comes about that the matters of these bodies are as diverse in species as their forms.

24. Wherefore, although it is true that all the matters of the heavens agree in this, that they are ordered to a form informing inseparably, nevertheless this agreement cannot be specific in them, but generic, and from it specific diversity is inferred. For, in order that each matter be inseparably conjoined to its proper form, it is necessary that by virtue of its entity and essence it can contract a natural bond with that alone; for, if it were indifferent, by this very fact it could dismiss its form and cohere to another repugnant one. Therefore to regard a form informing inseparably is nothing other than to regard determinately a proper and unique form; and conversely, that the form informs inseparably is because it regards such a potency which is content with that act, nor desires another, because it is not capable of another. Nor can it be understood by any other reason that each form of the heaven satisfies the appetite of its proper matter. There is, therefore, in this a great dissimilitude between the matter of corruptible and incorruptible things, for the former regards a separable form for this reason, that of itself it indifferently regards several forms repugnant among themselves; whence the very separability of the forms requires unity in matter and such a capacity which is not altogether filled by one or another form. But the matter of each heaven regards an inseparable form for this reason, that it does not regard another but its own, and therefore it is satisfied by it, because it is not capable of others nor indifferent, but by virtue of its essence is determined to such a form. Nor can Aristotle be repugnant to this opinion, since he said generally that those things differ in matter which are not mutually transmutable. But that he said in Metaphysics X that the corruptible and the incorruptible differ in genus does not prevent incorruptible things themselves too from being able to be said to differ among themselves in physical genus, if this is nothing other than to differ in matter; but if by that expression something more is indicated, then by a special reason corruptible bodies will be said to differ in genus from incorruptible ones rather than incorruptible ones among themselves, because, namely, those are of diverse orders, but these constitute one grade. Likewise the matters of the heavens and of the elements differ in a certain way in physical genus, because one matter is the subject of generation, but the whole other matter is incapable of generation; and so there is also a greater specific and subaltern likeness between the matters of the heavens among themselves than with the matter of these inferior things. And that agreement is enough for them to be able to agree in some local or perfective changes, as is self-evident. And so satisfaction has been sufficiently made to the foundations of the others and our opinion confirmed.

The third assertion, by which the testimonies of divine Scripture are satisfied

25. The empyrean heaven far incorruptible.—I say, thirdly: it cannot be gathered from the divine Scriptures that the heavens were made from the matter of the elements, and consequently there is nothing in sacred Scripture which is repugnant to the proposed philosophical truth. This assertion indeed exceeds the limits of metaphysics; we cannot, however, pass it over, both in order that we may satisfy the foundations of the opposite opinion, and also in order that we may briefly touch upon the material cause of the whole corporeal universe and its condition, in which not only the theologians but also the philosophers have laboured from the beginning. First, then, as regards the empyrean heaven, the conclusion is beyond controversy; for the theologians who admit that heaven teach that in the first moment of the creation of things it was created together with the earth, and that it is either signified or at least comprehended in those words: In the beginning God created heaven. Whence, at least as regards this body, all the things said of the matter of the heaven proceed without any theological difficulty. On account of which the theologians also teach that that heaven at the end of the world will neither be burned by fire nor renewed, because it is always most pure and most clear, as becomes the seat of the blessed. But the philosophers could know nothing of the existence of that heaven, because it has neither motion nor illumination nor manifest influence by which it could be investigated by mortals through human discourse.

26. The inferior heavenly orbs created from nothing together with the empyrean.—But of the other heavens the conclusion is proved, because no reason compels that by the name of heaven in the cited words one heavenly body only be understood, and that the supreme and empyrean; for the frequent and usual mode of speaking has it that by the name of heaven simply said the whole order of heavenly bodies is comprehended. Which custom is also frequent in Scripture, all the more because that singular is plural in Hebrew, since the word Shamayim lacks a singular; and in another place it is translated in the plural, Psalm 101: In the beginning, O Lord, thou foundedst the earth, and the heavens are the works of thy hands; where it is signified that all the heavens were founded together with the earth. Nor does it stand in the way that a little after in the same c. 1 of Genesis the firmament is said to have been made on the second day and called heaven, and the sun, the moon and the stars to have been created on the fourth day; this (I say) does not stand in the way, both because it is more probable that these were not created on the second and fourth day as regards substance, but only as regards certain accidental functions, as we shall indicate a little later; and also because that firmament of which mention is made on the second day is not one of the incorruptible bodies of which we are speaking, as we shall immediately declare. It is more likely, therefore, that by the name of heaven Moses comprehended all the heavenly orbs, and spoke most of all of this visible heaven which is seen by human eyes; for this he chiefly did in that work, that he might show God the creator of all visible things, as Jerome noted, Epistle 139 to Cyprian. It is not, therefore, to be believed that Moses began his narration from the creation of the invisible heaven alone; he comprehended, therefore, under that word all the visible heavens, as Basil too interprets, Homily 2 on the Hexaemeron. Indeed it is sufficiently probable that by the name of heaven he comprehended all bodies down to the air inclusively; for it is frequent in Scripture that by the name of heaven the air is comprehended, Psalm 103: Stretching out the heaven like a skin, who coverest the higher rooms thereof with water. And frequently in Scripture mention is made of the birds or fowls of heaven, that is, of the air; and in the same place of Genesis it is said: And God called the firmament heaven; which firmament either is a certain part of the air or includes the air. Just as, therefore, a little below it is said: And he called the dry land earth, and nevertheless by the same name (as it were by anticipation) he called it in the beginning, so too of the name of heaven it can fittingly be understood.

27. And hence it is further gathered that it is no argument that the heaven was created from water, or that the whole space from the surface of the earth to the empyrean heaven was full of waters, because in that first narration Moses made mention only of heaven, earth and waters. This (I say) argument is not efficacious. First, because it has already been declared that by the name of heaven he comprehended all the superior bodies down to the air. Secondly also, because the exposition of many Fathers is probable who understand by the name of spirit the air to be signified, where it is said in the same place: And the spirit of the Lord moved over the waters, as may be seen in Theodoret, q. 8 on Genesis, and others whom Lippomanus reports in the Catena on Genesis. Thirdly, because the exposition of many is also very probable who think that by the name of earth Moses comprehended the four elements disposed in their natural sites and proper order. Which is the opinion of Basil and Bede in the Hexaemeron, and Damascene, De fide II, c. 5, and the more common opinion of the theologians; for, just as by the name of heaven he could comprehend the whole superior world, so by the name of earth the whole inferior world, understanding the intermediate things from the extremes. Especially because (as the philosophers say), one of contraries being posited in the nature of things, it is necessary that the other too exist; whence, mention being made of the creation of earth, fire too, extremely contrary to it in site and lightness, is understood as created, and in them the intermediate things are comprehended; or certainly under earth and water are comprehended air and fire, which in the first qualities are extremely opposed to them. I add finally that, if from this, that in those words: In the beginning God created heaven and earth, the element of earth alone was expressly named, it is rightly gathered that air and fire were not then created, by equal reason it could be gathered that neither was water then created, because neither is this narrated of it, but it is immediately subjoined: But the earth was void and empty, and darkness was upon the face of the abyss, etc. Whence some heretics took occasion to say that God did not create that abyss of which mention is made there, nor that invisible and uncomposed earth, because of these it is not said that they were created, but that they were, namely before the creation of things came about. And they said that by those words is signified that ancient chaos which the philosophers or poets thought out, or the prime matter which Plato thought uncreated, from which they said God created heaven and the elemental earth. Which exposition is heretical. It is necessary, therefore, that under heaven and earth we understand water too; whence, just as the immediately following words: But the earth was void and empty, are not understood of another earth than that which was created in the beginning, so the abyss of waters of which mention is made in the same words is understood as created in the same beginning together with the earth; therefore it is necessary that under those words: In the beginning God created heaven and earth, something else is comprehended besides that which the words expressly signify; therefore by the reason by which water is comprehended, the other elements too will be comprehended.

28. The received exposition of the Greeks and Latins.—And indeed, if we understand that by the name of heaven is signified the whole heavenly body down to the aerial heaven, by the name of earth earth and water are excellently signified, which are so conjoined that they in a certain way compose one body and the inferior world. Nor does it matter that in that beginning in which they were created they were not so disposed, nor had altogether that site which they now have; for it is enough that, when Moses wrote, they were already so constituted that he could speak of them after the manner of one. But if by the name of heaven only the proper heavenly orbs are understood, under the name of earth the remaining elements are comprehended by the reason already said. And so in each way it is concluded that by the name of heaven and earth there is comprehended the whole universe consisting of simple bodies as regards their substance, yet without the adornment and disposition which it now has. And this is the more received exposition of the Greeks and Latins on Genesis; nor does it displease Augustine, City of God XI, c. 33, and Contra Maximinum II, c. 3, although he sometimes adds something more, which does not pertain to the present disputation.

29. From these it is evident that no argument can be gathered from the history of the creation of the world by which it may be persuaded that the heavens and the elements were founded from the same matter; but if it is not had thence, it cannot be gathered from any other testimony of Scripture; but each will become more manifest by answering the third foundation of the former opinion. That exposition, therefore, which understands by the name of earth prime matter and says that from it all bodies except the empyrean heaven were formed is Augustine’s as regards the former part, but not as regards the latter. For, although he understands by the name of earth prime matter, it does not thence follow that he understood that the matter from which the heavenly and terrestrial bodies were formed is one and the same, but only that each was created from some formless matter. All the more because the same Augustine, book De Genesi contra Manichaeos, c. 7, judges that by the name of heaven and earth is signified the formless matter from which heaven and earth were formed, which he says is so called not because it already was this, but because it could be; therefore by the same reason it can be understood that Augustine thought that some diversity preceded in the formless matter itself, on account of which it was called by those distinct names. But (as regards the matter) that whole exposition of Augustine is very metaphorical and foreign to the historical sense, which must be proper and not turn aside to metaphors, especially obscure and unusual ones. Whence it is one thing to say that by the name of heaven the angels are comprehended, not excluding the proper sense of the word but adding that the contained is comprehended in the containing, or the located in the place; another to say that by the name of heaven the angelic nature alone is signified, which is incredible because that metaphor is very obscure and unusual, especially since in the same chapter it often signifies a visible body; but much more incredible is it that by the name of heaven formless matter is signified. And the same almost holds of the name of earth, which in that whole chapter signifies the element of earth, and this is its only proper signification, which must not be excluded, although under it water too or the other elements are comprehended, as we have explained. And this is, as I said, the common sense of the Fathers; indeed Tertullian, book Against Hermogenes, c. 21, vehemently inveighs against him because he interpreted formless matter by the name of earth. Likewise otherwise the name of abyss and the name of waters too would signify formless matter, which is very repugnant to the certitude and truth of the history.

30. The place of Wisdom 11 is expounded.—But to the place of Wisdom 11: Thy hand created the world out of formless matter, the answer can be given in two ways; first, so that those words out of formless matter do not signify a material cause pre-existing in the order of time to the creation of the world, but only in the order of nature, so that they do not properly signify the material cause of creation itself but of the things created, so that the sense is: Thy hand created the world consisting of formless matter, which the same hand of thine founded in order that from it it might form the whole world. Which exposition is consonant with the doctrine of Augustine, who in other places says that the formlessness of matter preceded the creation of bodies not in time but in nature, as we shall see below. But according to this interpretation it is not necessary that that word out of invisible matter, or formless (as the Greek has literally), signify some lowest species of matter, but matter absolutely, whether it is of one genus or species. Secondly and more literally, the answer is that the Wise Man is not speaking there of the first creation of things, which was made not from matter but from nothing, but of the adornment, disposition and distinction of things by which this world was founded and constituted in that state and beauty which it now has. For, although the Latin Vulgate translates created, it does not take that word in that rigour in which it signifies production from nothing, but as it is also wont to signify any effecting whatever; and so the Greek word κτίζω, which corresponds there, signifies generally to fabricate and to found. Whence by invisible matter is not understood there prime matter (of which divine Scripture never made express mention), but all the simple bodies are signified from which God constituted and adorned this world, in the way in which stones and timbers are wont to be called the matter of a house, and universally the thing which is supposed for action or fabrication is wont to be called the matter of the action. But that matter is called formless not by substantial formlessness absolutely and simply, but either by accidental formlessness on account of the lack of light, motion, etc., or also by some substantial formlessness, because the forms of mixed bodies had not yet been introduced into matter; and by a peculiar reason it could be called invisible matter on account of the darkness which was upon the face of the abyss. But this exposition can be declared from Paul, who seems to have alluded to the aforesaid words of the Wise Man when he wrote to the Hebrews 11: By faith we understand that the worlds were framed by the word of God, where, on the testimony of Cajetan, he notes that Paul is speaking of the work of distinction and adornment, and therefore does not say that all things were created, but that the worlds were framed, because in six days God framed and disposed this world that from invisible things, that is, from hidden and unadorned bodies, both on account of the darkness and because the earth lay hidden under the waters, visible things might be made, that is, might be constituted in that state in which they could be seen; and both simple and mixed bodies, and especially living things, could enjoy this visible world.

31. An inference to be noted.—Moreover from what has been said it is also evident that it is not gathered from the history of Genesis that that whole space which lies between the empyrean heaven and the earth was first full of waters, in order that from them the heavens might be procreated. For the abyss is sufficiently said of the whole element of water which then surrounded the earth and was enveloped in darkness; but above it were air and the other heavenly bodies. But those words of St. Peter: The heavens were before, and the earth out of water and through water consisting, do nothing to the matter, both because there the discussion is not of the ethereal heaven but of the aerial, and also because not the heaven but the earth is said to consist by the word of God out of water and through water, not indeed as regards its substance, but as regards the state which it now has, so that it is habitable and can be fruitful, as I expounded more fully in tom. II of the Third Part, disp. 57, sect. 2. But that the Hebrew name by which the heavens are named was taken from waters is not because the heaven was founded from water, but because the heaven was interposed between the waters, that it might divide the waters from the waters.

32. Watery vapour was not the matter of the bodies situated between the empyrean and the earth.—A place of Ecclesiasticus is expounded.—Nor is the other opinion more probable which says that all things except the empyrean heaven and the earth were made from watery vapour; for, if that watery vapour is something distinct from water, it is repugnant to Scripture, which says that water was created above the earth, not watery vapour. It is repugnant also to reason, because that vapour can only be some imperfect mixed body; but it is against reason to say that mixed bodies were made before simple bodies. Whence it is also repugnant to all the ancient expositors, because they made no mention of that watery vapour created in the first instant with heaven and earth. Nor do the testimonies of Scripture which are asserted to confirm it effect anything; for what Wisdom says of itself, Ecclesiasticus 24: As a mist I covered all the earth, is expounded literally in two ways. First, so that there is not signified some peculiar work of the divine wisdom, but its presence and majesty by which it fills all the earth, which is declared through the likeness and metaphor of a mist, as in the thing itself God sometimes showed his presence in the appearance of a cloud in the tabernacle; and according to this sense mist in the said testimony is not of the ablative case, but of the nominative. The other sense is that it is said not formally (so to speak), but effectively, that wisdom covered the earth with a mist; and so it can be referred to the first creation of the world, when darkness was upon the face of the abyss; or it can be referred to the continual succession of darkness and night after the illumination of the sun, which the immediately preceding words seem to indicate: I made that in the heavens there should rise light that never faileth, and as a mist I covered all the earth.

33. Where a place is elucidated.—But the other words of Job 38: Who shut up the sea with doors? etc., only commend the divine omnipotence by which on the third day of the creation of the world it gathered the water into one place, which on the first day as it were broke forth, so as to surround the universal earth. But when it is subjoined: When I made a cloud the garment thereof, and wrapped it in a mist, nothing else is signified but what is said in Genesis 1: And darkness was upon the face of the abyss. But someone can take occasion from that place to think that the water was then surrounded by some most dense cloud which was the cause of that darkness, and therefore that a cloud is said to have been as it were the garment of the water, etc. Which opinion, although it be admitted to be true, it is not necessary to feign that that cloud filled all the superior places up to the empyrean heaven, but only that it was next to the water in a density and magnitude which would suffice to wrap the water in mist. But if perhaps it was so done, the reason of the darkness which was then upon the face of the abyss is easily given; yet the reason is not easily given why God willed to create that cloud in the first instant and to cover the water with it. Nor do those words compel us to understand a cloud properly; for the misty and dark air which surrounded the water could through metaphor be called a cloud. But if this is so, the cause of the darkness could be either because God did not put light into the sun in the first instant, or because he did not concur with it to illuminate. However this may be (for this does not pertain to the present matter), no matter can be assigned, nor any body, from which the heavenly bodies and the elements were founded.

34. Whether there are true waters above the firmament.—To the other confirmation about the waters above the firmament, many things being omitted which can be disputed about that question and are learnedly treated by Benedict Pereira, On Genesis I, in the work of the second day, that opinion has always pleased me which denies that there are above the ethereal heavens true and elemental waters, because the opposite does not have a sufficient foundation in Scripture, which being taken away it is evident that that opinion is foreign to all philosophical reason. The major is now only shown by declaring the place of Genesis; for it is evident from the opinion of all interpreters and from the propriety of the word raqia that the firmament does not signify one body only, but this whole expanse of the heaven, both aerial and ethereal, of which whole it was said: Stretching out the heaven like a skin. But since in that expanse there are various parts, something is sometimes attributed to it according to the supreme part, as when God is said to have placed the stars in the firmament of heaven, but sometimes according to the lowest part, and so God is said to have placed the firmament, that is, this lowest region of the air, in the midst of the waters, namely the rain waters and the terrestrial. And in the same way it is added in the cited place: Who coverest the higher rooms thereof with water; for he calls them higher with respect to us, not with respect to the supreme bodies; and of these waters and the aerial heaven all the places of Scripture in which mention is made of waters existing above the heavens can be expounded with the greatest ease. And Jeremiah sufficiently indicates this interpretation, c. 10, saying: He that maketh the earth by his power, that prepareth the world by his wisdom, and stretcheth out the heavens by his knowledge. At his voice he giveth a multitude of waters in the heaven, and lifteth up the clouds from the ends of the earth; and c. 5 [recte 51]: When he uttereth his voice, the waters are multiplied in the heaven; he lifteth up the clouds from the ends of the earth. Some object that in Genesis 2, paradise having already been founded, it is said: The Lord had not yet rained upon the earth; whence they gather that the rain waters could not have been elevated and divided from the inferior ones on the second day. On account of which some concede that the vapours and clouds were not raised on the second day to the middle region of the air, but only that the air was designated to divide the waters from the waters. But this does not please, both because Scripture says that on that day the division of the waters was made, and also because, this division and elevation of the waters being excluded, that designation of the air is nothing but perhaps some extrinsic denomination. Nor do I see the force of the inference of that argument; for watery vapours are not so disposed as soon as they ascend to the middle region of the air that it rains at once; especially since it is written in Job 26: Who bindeth up the waters in his clouds, so that they break not out and fall down together.

35. Of what kind the change of all things on the day of judgement will be.—The last confirmation of that opinion was taken from the renewal of the world to come on the day of judgement, in which the heaven is to be burned according to Scripture, of which matter I disputed at length in tom. II of the Third Part, disp. LVIII, sect. 2, where I showed that on the day of judgement the heavenly bodies are not to be changed according to their substances, but only according to some accidents pertaining to the perfection of the state of glory, and that the fire of the conflagration will not ascend above the aerial heaven; where we also expounded at length the place of Peter and the other testimonies of Scripture, which it is not necessary to repeat here.