Disputationes metaphysicae

1. There is evil in things.—That evil is in some way in things and sometimes denominates them evil is evident from the common sense and speech of all, which is also frequent in the divine Scriptures, Ecclesiasticus 11: Good things and evil, life and death, poverty and honesty are from God; and c. 39: He has tried good and evil in all things. Isaiah 5: Woe to you who call evil good, and good evil. Matthew 6: Deliver us from evil. Which we should say to God in vain if there were no evils, as Augustine rightly says, Contra Julianum I, c. 3. But what this evil is, and how it is in things, is obscure and placed in controversy. The question, however, is about evil as regards the formal from which evil is denominated; for as regards the material, or the thing which is denominated evil, it is evident that it can be any thing whatever which lacks due perfection, as we shall see.

The old error about evil is refuted

2. There was, then, the ancient error that evil is the positive nature of certain things which were thought to be altogether evil and to have proceeded from a certain supremely evil principle. Which was the error of the Manichees and Priscillianists, as was touched upon in the preceding disputation, sect. 3. And St. Thomas attributes the same to the Pythagoreans, I, q. 49, a. 1, ad 1; and it is taken from Aristotle, Metaphysics I, c. 5, where he reports that the Pythagoreans posited good and evil among the first principles of things. But since sacred Scripture openly teaches both that there is only one first principle of things, supremely good, and that all things effected by it are good, as is evident from the testimonies cited in the preceding section, therefore among Christian philosophers it is certain that evil cannot be some positive thing which by its nature and according to its whole self is evil; both because it cannot be good and altogether evil simply and according to itself; but it has been shown that any thing whatever is good of itself; and also because a thing cannot be evil on account of the natural perfection due to it; but whatever of such perfection is lacking to it, or whatever adverse it has, cannot be connatural to it, since it is supposed to be opposed to due perfection; no thing, therefore, can be evil in itself by its nature.

What evil is, is defined

3. But from this principle the Fathers further inferred that evil as regards the formal, or malice, from which some thing is denominated evil, is not some thing or positive form, nor yet is it a mere negation, but is the privation of perfection due in being. The reason of the first part is that every positive thing is good, as has been said. But the reason of the second part is that a thing is not evil because it does not have a more excellent perfection, if it is not due to it; otherwise every creature would be evil because it does not have the perfection of the creator. And so the third part remains, sufficiently confirmed by a sufficient enumeration of the parts. And Dionysius confirms it at length, On the Divine Names, c. 4, where in this sense he says that evil is not existing, nor is it something, but is the privation of perfection and of the proper and accommodated good; and again he adds that evil is the weakness of the good, which comes to the same; and St. Basil, Constitutiones monasticae, c. 3: Vice (he says) is nothing but the desertion of virtue; and in the homily That God is not the author of evils: Depravity (he says) does not subsist, nor can we produce its subsisting essence (that is, real and positive); for the privation of good is evil. Similarly Gregory of Nyssa, Homily II on the Canticle: There is no other substance of evil (he says) than separation from the good. And he has similar things in the Great Catechetical Oration, cc. 5, 6 and 7; Damascene, De fide II, c. 4, Book IV, c. 2: Nothing (he says) is evil but the privation of good, as darkness of light. Athanasius has the same opinion, Oration against the Idols; Nazianzen, Oration 9, near the end, and Oration 38; Epiphanius, Heresies 24 and 66; Chrysostom, Homily II on Acts, near the end; and Justin, qq. 46 and 73 to the Gentiles, says that evil is nothing but the corruption and depravation and privation of good. And in the former question he professedly proves that it is not a positive thing; but in the latter he excellently confirms that it is not a mere negation. But among the Latin Fathers the chief author and confirmer of this opinion is Augustine, City of God XI, c. 9: Evil has no nature, but the loss of good has received the name of evil; the same, Book XII, from the beginning, and in the Enchiridion, c. 11: Things, in so far as they are certain natures, cannot be evil; and c. 24, treating of sin, he says that it is the first evil of the rational creature, that is, the first privation of good; and Eighty-three Questions, q. 7, he says that the name of evil was taken from the privation of species. The same, Confessions III, c. 7, and Book VII, from c. 5 to 16, and Contra adversarium legis et prophetarum I, c. 5, De vera religione I, c. 40, and the book De natura boni contra Manichaeos, and De moribus Manichaeorum II, and De libero arbitrio, last chapter, where he disputes in particular of the evil of fault and says that it is nothing and therefore is not from God, accommodating to this that of John 1: Without him was made nothing, that is, sin. Ambrose, De Isaac et anima, c. 7: What is malice (he says) but the want of good? Jerome has the same opinion, on Matthew 27, Isaiah 18, Amos 3; Gregory, Moralia 36, c. 24, elsewhere 32, and on 1 Kings, Book I, c. 14, near the beginning, where he speaks specially of the evil of fault. Likewise Fulgentius, De fide ad Petrum, c. 21; Anselm, De concordia praescientiae et liberi arbitrii, c. 1, at the end, and De conceptu virginali I, c. 27, and professedly De casu diaboli, from c. 7; Bernard, Homily VI for Advent. And finally Pope Leo favours it, Epistle 93, c. 6. And all the theologians embrace this doctrine, especially St. Thomas, in the said q. 48 of the First Part, and I-II, q. 54, a. 3, q. 71, a. 1, q. 72, a. 1, and De malo, q. 2, aa. 2 and 9, and others on II, dists. 34, 35 and 40.

Difficulties about the above resolution

4. Whether the evil of fault and of punishment consist in something positive.—But concerning this received doctrine some difficulties occur. The first is that every evil is either of fault or of punishment; but each of them is something positive, even formally as regards the malice itself; therefore. The minor as regards the former part is proved, both because in moral things evil is contrarily opposed to good, on the testimony of Aristotle in the chapter on Opposites and Ethics II, c. 8; and also because in the act, for example, of intemperance the very positive conversion of the will to the inordinate object is contrary to reason, and so evil; and finally because the act of vice is not evil only on account of the privation of the opposite virtue, otherwise avarice would have the same malice as prodigality, because they deprive of the same virtue of liberality; it is therefore evil by reason of its positive entity. But as regards the other part, about the evil of punishment, it is proved by similar arguments, for pain is an evil of punishment and yet is something positive. Nor can it be said that pain is evil because it deprives of the opposite pleasure; for, although the privation of pleasure is some evil, nevertheless the existence of pain is a far greater evil and of another notion; therefore not that privation alone, nor the positive only by reason of that privation, is evil, but also the positive itself. Whence, even if we feign that pain does not exclude the contrary delight, nevertheless pain itself would be some evil; just as, therefore, the delightful good is positive, so the saddening or painful evil is positive. Likewise, if a sweet thing, for example, is positively fitting to taste, so a bitter thing is positively unfitting. Likewise error in the intellect is a certain evil of punishment and without doubt is a far diverse evil from the ignorance of privation; it is therefore a positive evil by reason of the positive relationship to such an object.

5. The second difficulty is that it seems proved by no sufficient reason that evil as regards the formal consists in privation alone, because, as the good is manifold, so also is the evil opposed to the good; although, then, there is no positive being in which some notion of good is not found, which alone the reasons adduced above seem to prove, nevertheless some being can be positively evil by some kind of malice. For, as we were saying above that the same thing can be good according to various notions of good, namely honest and delightful, so it can happen that the same thing is good on one title and evil on another, although each notion is positive, as if it is honest and painful, or conversely if it is delightful and base.

6. The former solution of the difficulties is rejected.—Moral evil according to the mind of the Saints placed in privation.—On account of these things some distinguish evil in the genus of nature and in the genus of morals; and of the former they say that it consists in privation, but of the latter that it consists in a positive form or difference. This was the opinion of some theologians, and its chief author is thought to be Cajetan, I-II, q. 18, a. 5, q. 71, a. 5, and q. 27, a. 1, who nevertheless does not distinguish evil of nature and of morals, but evil simply and evil of morals. But because this matter of moral evil as such pertains rather to the theologian or moral philosopher than to the metaphysician, it is not to be specially treated in this place. It must only briefly be said that those distinctions are not rightly nor consistently applied. First indeed, because the holy Fathers, in the places cited, speak chiefly of the evil of fault, which is moral evil, especially St. Augustine, and St. Thomas, whom Cajetan falsely adduces for his opinion from I, q. 48, a. 1, ad 2 and 3, and Contra Gentiles III, c. 9, although in the former place he says that good and evil specify moral acts, yet good per se, but evil in so far as it is the removal of the due end; but in the latter place he expressly says that the evil which is a difference in moral things is not something which is evil in itself, but in so far as it deprives of the order of reason, which is the good of man. Secondly, because the reason of the Saints, which is taken from this, that God is the author of every good and nothing can be from him which is not good, proceeds most of all of moral evil; for, if it is positive, it is from God, and consequently would rather be simply good than evil. Thirdly, because, as regards the former distinction, the reason of natural evil is the same as of moral; for, just as in man there are positive forms or qualities unfitting to rational nature as such, and therefore contrary to right reason, which is the rule of the things which become man, so in water, for example, there is a positive quality unfitting to it and contrary to its nature; whence, if water were capable of knowledge, it would rightly judge that it is to be avoided by it; if, therefore, for that cause moral evil is said to be positive, some natural evil will also be positive; or, if this is not enough for natural evil to be positive, neither will it be enough in moral.

7. An inept division of evil into simply and moral.—But as regards the words of Cajetan, it is scarcely understood what he understood by evil simply, or how the members of that partition are opposed. For if that is called evil simply which absolutely and without any addition is evil, no evil is more simply evil than moral evil; indeed in a certain way that alone deserves the name of evil, for the others in comparison with it are evil in a certain respect. But if evil simply is called evil in common, as it abstracts from all the differences of evils, evil is not rightly nor sufficiently divided into evil simply and moral evil, as animal would not rightly be divided into animal simply and rational, because on one side the thing divided itself coincides with one member of the division, and on the other the other members which could be numbered are omitted. And moreover it is not rightly understood how, if evil in common consists in privation, positive evil is directly contained under it, since privation cannot be of the essence of the positive. But if by evil simply is understood that evil which is purely evil and has nothing of good admixed, this first of all cannot be said of the thing which is denominated evil, or of the subject of malice; for in this way there is no evil simply, but evil is always founded in good, as St. Thomas teaches from Dionysius and other Fathers, and we shall declare below. It is necessary, therefore, that by reason of the malice itself pure evil be said to consist in privation. Whence it comes about that moral evil can be called positive only for this cause, that besides malice it includes something of good; and so that too which in it pertains formally to the notion of evil will be only privation, since whatever is positive is rather an admixture of good than formally constituting evil. Nor in this will there be anything special in moral evil rather than in natural; for heat too with respect to water is not evil simply, that is, pure and having no admixture of good, because it is a positive form.

What evil in itself and evil to another are

8. Otherwise, then, we can distinguish concerning evil, as it is said of that which is evil in itself and that which is evil to another; for in these two ways we said above that something can be good; but in as many ways as one of opposites is said, the other too can be said. That, therefore, which is called evil in itself can be denominated evil from privation alone; and by this reason it is truly said that evil formally is placed in privation alone. And this the reason indicated above excellently convinces, that a thing cannot be called evil from positive perfection due to it, since the notion of good consists in this, that the thing has perfection due and fitting to it; therefore it is necessary that from the privation alone of such perfection the thing be denominated evil in itself. And it is confirmed, for each positive thing has in itself its essence and its positive being; but each is good and fitting to it; and therefore there is nothing which does not desire its being and its essence; therefore nothing positive as such can be evil in itself. But speaking of that which is evil to another, it can thus be conceded that evil consists in the positive and is opposed to good not privatively but contrarily, as pain is opposed to pleasure, vice to virtue, and so of others. And the reason is that not only privation but also a positive form can be unfitting to some subject; but this notion of evil is the same as the notion of what is unfitting to something; just as, therefore, the good under the notion of what is fitting to another expresses nothing other than the perfection of one thing, connoting in another some condition by reason of which such perfection is due or congruous to it, so the evil opposed to this good formally and precisely expresses nothing other than the perfection of one thing, connoting in another some condition by reason of which it has repugnance or unfittingness with such a form; therefore, just as that good consists in the positive, so also the evil opposed to it.

9. According to this distinction, then, it must be said that the Fathers cited above speak of evil taken in the former way, namely of what is evil in itself; for that is properly and simply evil. But what is only denominated evil because it is unfitting to another, although in itself it is good, is not simply evil, but only in a certain respect and as it were per accidens. But the reasons and difficulties objected to the contrary proceed of the latter evil or the unfitting; for so pain in itself is a certain good, but is unfitting to the animal; and similarly heat is in itself good simply, although it is unfitting to water; and in the other natural evils, or those unfitting to nature, the same is found; and the reason is the same of moral evil, for the will of lying, as it is in itself a certain being, is some good; but it is unfitting to man using reason, and therefore is morally evil.

10. No substance is to be called positively evil.—This distinction indeed is excellent, and the things which are said in its former member are simply to be approved, but not those in the latter. In order to declare which, I infer, first, that no substance can properly and formally be denominated positively evil, but only privatively; because a substance is not properly and formally evil to another; but in itself it can be denominated evil only by reason of some privation; therefore. The major is evident, because substance is per se, not the being of another. You will say this is true of integral and complete substance. The answer is that matter and form too, by the very fact that one is ordered to the other, are not its evil but its good; for both matter is fitting to the form which it serves, and any form is fitting to matter, although it is unfitting to the opposite form or its composite; integral parts too are of themselves fitting to the composite and to the other parts; but how on account of disproportion some part can sometimes be unfitting, we shall say below. But I said properly and formally, because by extrinsic denomination substance can be denominated evil because it effects a form unfitting to something; in which way God too, in so far as he is the author of the evil of punishment, can in that genus be denominated, or rather apprehended and thought, evil, that is, unfitting; under which notion he can also be hated by an inordinate will; yet this is not true malice, but a denomination taken from external malice or unfittingness existing in another thing.

11. Any accident whatever is good to some subject.—Secondly I infer from what was conceded in that former member that every accident, by reason of its positive perfection, is not only a certain good in itself but is also good and fitting to some subject. It is proved, because there is no accident to which it is not connatural to be in some subject, with which it has either a natural connection or at least is ordered to it as its perfection; it will therefore be some good with respect to such a subject; there is, therefore, no positive thing which by reason of itself is evil or unfitting to all.

12. No being is evil in itself by reason of something positive.—And hence it seems to be concluded, thirdly, that no thing can be evil even to any subject by reason of the positive precisely taken. Which can be proved from the doctrine given in the former member of the distinction posited. Because otherwise it is necessary that there be some being evil in itself by reason of some positive form; for if a positive form as such is evil to some subject, then the composite of such a subject and such a form will be a certain evil being, since it is compacted of beings unfitting or not rightly cohering among themselves; therefore either it must be confessed that some being is evil in itself by reason of a positive form, or it must be denied that a positive form as such, and by virtue of its precise perfection, is evil. Likewise the subject affected by such a form is evil or badly disposed; therefore malice too, absolutely speaking, is some positive form, and some thing is evil in itself not because it is deprived of some perfection, but rather because it is affected by some positive thing. The consequence is evident, because malice seems to be nothing other than that by which some subject is badly affected; whence, just as St. Thomas, I, q. 5, a. 5, ad 2, and I-II, q. 51, a. 4, ad 1, and III, q. 11, a. 5, ad 3, says that the habits of the virtues are not so much certain goods as certain goodnesses by which the will is well affected, which affected by them is called good in itself, so that form which by reason of its positive badly affects some subject could be called a certain malice, and the subject affected by it, or the composite resulting from it, would have to be called a certain being evil in itself by virtue of its positive affection or composition. Moreover there is an excellent reason, because a form which is good in itself and expresses perfection cannot be evil to anything by reason of its goodness precisely taken; therefore, in order that it be thought evil and unfitting to something, it is necessary that something else intervene, which can only be some privation; for, if it is something positive, that too will express goodness and perfection; whence the same argument will return concerning it; therefore it is necessary that every malice be completed by some privation.

13. Which finally is declared by reason and examples taken from Dionysius and other Fathers; for in that which is called evil to another we can consider either that being which is called evil to another, or that which results from both; as, for example, it is evil to a man to have six fingers on his hand; if, then, that whole composite is considered, that is, a hand consisting of six fingers, it can be called a certain evil as a monster or sin of nature. Yet Dionysius says, in the said c. 4 of On the Divine Names, that such evil is constituted by privation, which he himself calls the inept composition of dissimilar things and the defect of due and fitting proportion according to the institution of nature. So too Augustine, De natura boni, cc. 3 and 4, says that evil is nothing other than the corruption of mode, or species, or natural order. Which St. Thomas explaining, I, q. 5, a. 5, ad 4, says that mode, species and order, in so far as they are such, are good, but are called evil in so far as either they are less than they ought to have been, or because they are not accommodated to those things to which they are to be accommodated, or because they are foreign and incongruous. So, then, that monster is called evil in so far as it lacks due species and fitting proportion of parts, and so it is not evil by virtue of positive perfection. And the same is found in any being whatever composed of parts which do not agree well among themselves, which universally can be called monstrous.

14. A thing which is called evil to another is such by reason of something privative.—And hence it further comes about that, if we consider that part of such a composite which is called unfitting or evil to another, as is the sixth finger with respect to the human hand or heat with respect to water, it does not have the notion of evil except by reason of some adjoined privation. For first of all the unfittingness itself pertains to privation, as universally contrariety, repugnance, dissimilitude and distinction include negation in their intrinsic concept. For contrariety includes the incompossibility of opposite forms in the same subject; but incompossibility includes negation; so, then, unfittingness expresses disproportion or ineptitude to fitting union or composition. Next, in that subject to which another thing or form is called evil, there is connoted the lack of natural propensity or connection with such a thing. And finally in the very thing which is called evil to another there is denoted the lack of perfection fitting to such a subject, which, although with respect to the form itself absolutely considered it seems to be a certain negation, nevertheless with respect to the subject has the notion of privation, because it is the lack of perfection due to it. And with respect to the form it can be called a privation not simply but hypothetically, or in order to such an effect, because, although absolutely such perfection is not due to such a form, nevertheless in order that it could fittingly inform such a subject, it would need it.

15. And in this way in moral things the act of intemperance is called evil to man in so far as it lacks the rectitude of temperance, and in natural things heat is the evil of water in so far as it lacks the perfection of cold; and so universally St. Thomas said, I, q. 5, a. 3, ad 2, that no being is called evil in so far as it is being, but in so far as it lacks some being; and he thinks the same, De potentia, q. 3, a. 6, ad 12, and clearly and excellently explains it, De malo, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1, saying that something is called evil in two ways, namely simply and in a certain respect. Simply (he says) that is evil which is evil according to itself; but this is that which is deprived of some particular good which is from the debt of its perfection, as sickness is the evil of the animal; but that is called evil in a certain respect which is not evil according to itself, but of something, because it is not deprived of some good which is of the debt of its own perfection, but which is of the debt of the perfection of another thing, as in heat there is the privation of the perfection due to water, and therefore it is not evil in itself, but to water. So, then, every evil includes privation, but proportionately; for what is evil in itself includes the lack of perfection due to itself; but what is evil to another includes the lack of perfection due to that to which it is evil.

16. Although, then, the distinction given of the twofold evil, namely what is evil in itself or what is evil to another, is good, nevertheless of neither evil is it to be conceded that it consists in positive entity alone, but it includes privation. Only a difference can be constituted, that when a thing is called evil in itself, there intervene only the thing which is denominated evil and the privation from which it is so denominated, which alone has the notion of evil formally, or rather of malice; but when a thing is called evil to another, there intervenes a positive entity or form which, as it underlies some privation, is called evil to another thing or subject. Whence not the privation alone, but the form itself too, as it underlies it, has the notion of evil formally with respect to another subject, because in truth it is a form badly affecting it; nevertheless in the form itself, in so far as it is evil to another, that which is positive is as it were material, but the privation as it were formal, constituting the notion of evil with respect to another; for what with respect to one is a form can with respect to another be compared as a subject or matter; and so it comes about that universally the formal constitutive of evil consists in privation, as the holy Fathers taught.

The difficulties posited above are satisfied

17. To the first difficulty, then, and its first member, about the evil of fault, the answer is that the evil of fault is properly the evil of man as he is rational and uses free will; and therefore it is not always said of privation alone, but also of a positive act, yet not by reason of the positive alone, but in so far as it lacks due rectitude. This evil, then, by reason of the act which it includes, can be contrarily opposed to a good act or of virtue, and the same holds proportionally of habits. And in the same way the act itself is called contrary to reason because it lacks due rectitude; whence it is not only evil because it excludes from the subject a contrary good act or habit (which seems to be supposed in the arguments), but because it itself is unfitting to rational nature; but it is unfitting not on account of the precise positive entity, but as underlying the lack of due rectitude, as has been said. And so there can be specific diversity in an evil of this kind, even if perhaps it does not exclude from the subject a form or virtue diverse in species; because this malice, as I said, does not consist in the privation of the contrary form which is caused in the subject, but in the privation of due rectitude, which is understood in the act itself, which can be diverse according to the diversity of acts.

18. To the other member, about the evil of punishment, it must similarly be said that pain is not evil in itself, for it has its perfection and whatever is due to it in the breadth of such perfection; pain, therefore, is something evil as unfitting to man or animal. Whence it must be conceded that it is not only evil causally, that is, because it excludes the opposite delight, but also because it itself is unfitting and disproportioned to the animal, which the argument made there rightly proves. Yet it is not unfitting by reason of the positive entity alone precisely taken, but because according to it it includes the lack of some perfection necessary in order that it could be a form fitting and proportioned to man. And in the same way the answer is to be given to the other examples which are proposed in that difficulty.

19. The same thing as positive can be good, as including privation evil.—To the second difficulty the answer is by conceding that it is not repugnant that the same thing be good and evil by diverse notions; but we deny that each can be altogether positive, because a thing cannot be evil under that notion under which it is good; but under every positive notion precisely considered it is good, as we have shown; and therefore under the notion under which it is evil it is not merely positive. And so, if the discussion is of a thing good or evil in itself, the same thing can indeed be good in itself essentially, but evil integrally or accidentally; yet the former belongs to it in so far as it has the essential perfection due to such a nature; but the latter in so far as it lacks due integrity or accidental perfection. But if the discussion is of a thing good in itself and evil to another, it has the former by reason of its proper nature and positive perfection, but the latter only by reason of some disproportion or unfittingness which it has with another thing, and so by reason of some adjoined privation; and the same almost holds, proportion being kept, when the same thing is good to one and evil to another. But that it be altogether evil in itself and good to something cannot happen, both because no thing is altogether evil in itself, and because we showed above that nothing can be good to another, properly speaking, which is not good in itself.

How good is opposed to evil

20. And from these things it is easily evident how good and evil are opposed, for this too was asked in the difficulties posited. Good and evil, then, can be compared either formally, according to goodness and malice, or only materially, as regards the things themselves which are denominated good and evil. Next, in order that good and evil be opposites, they must be compared with respect to the same thing, as the notion of opposites requires; whence a little before we were saying that the same thing can be good and evil with respect to diverse things, in which there is neither material opposition, since the thing is the same, nor properly formal; for, although those notions of good and evil are diverse, they are nevertheless not opposed but disparate, as to be similar to one and dissimilar to another. And of good and evil so considered holds true what Augustine said in the Enchiridion, c. 14, that in good and evil the dialectical rule fails that contraries cannot be in the same thing, because the same thing can be good and evil, although good and evil are contraries or opposites. For he is speaking of good and evil according to common notions, according to which they do not have perfect and complete opposition unless they are taken in particular and with all the required conditions.

21. Properly, then, comparing good and evil with respect to the same thing, they are opposed privatively in their formal notions; for the good is the same as the perfect as regards that in which it is good; but evil is that which lacks due perfection; and that is good to something which is fitting to it, but that evil which is unfitting. Whence it comes about that they have opposite properties; for the good of itself is desirable, for it is that which all things desire; and therefore it has the causality of end, or at least of means; but evil of itself is not desirable, but rather turns the appetite away from itself. Whence per se and as such it can have the notion neither of end nor of means, but only as it puts on some notion of good, for example in so far as it can be thought useful for avoiding a greater evil. But if the things are compared which are denominated good and evil, then they are not properly opposed in so far as they are called good or evil in themselves, but in so far as with respect to another one is fitting, the other unfitting; for so they mutually exclude each other, but not as they are good or evil in themselves. And in this way they can have in themselves contrary opposition both in moral and in natural things, as was said above.

22. And so Aristotle spoke in the chapter on Opposites of good and evil, not by reason of malice precisely, but by reason of the act or quality which is denominated evil to another, as true and false can be said to be contrarily opposed by reason of assents or judgements. So too Dionysius, On the Divine Names, c. 4, says that evil does not fight against good except by reason of some good, for according to itself it is impotent. And St. Thomas, Contra Gentiles III, c. 9: Evil is not positively repugnant to good except by reason of some goodness. The same, De malo, q. 1, aa. 1, 2, 3 and 4, and De potentia, q. 3, a. 6, ad 11, and In II, dist. 40; whence such opposition is not always necessary, but sometimes privative suffices, if that which is denominated evil is not a positive being but a privative one, in which way blindness or sickness is a certain evil; but sometimes another repugnance between positive forms suffices, although it is not properly contrariety; for so error and science are opposed as good and evil to man, although they are not properly contraries.

1. Evil in itself and evil to another.—This question is easily defined from what has been said, for it is about evil formally as it is evil; for material division on the side of things does not fall under science. So, then, evil is divided into that which is evil in itself and that which is evil to another, which St. Thomas called evil simply and in a certain respect; but others call them evil absolutely or respectively, whose notions have been sufficiently expounded from what has been said.

2. Evil to another as a natural being, and as a free agent.—Again, what is evil to another can be divided into that which is unfitting to another in so far as it is a natural thing, and that which is unfitting to another in so far as it is a free being or agent; and in this way evil is divided into natural and moral. Natural evil is every privation of the natural good due to nature, or everything which by its nature is unfitting to another nature. But moral evil is that which is unfitting to free nature in so far as it is free. Whence natural evil is found in all things lacking reason and extends itself also to intellectual things, in so far as they have a proper nature and require some natural perfection, of which they can be deprived without their consent or free cooperation; but moral evil is found only in free nature as free, because, as we said above, morals properly consist in free actions. Whence, although moral evil is unfitting to rational nature as it is rational, and in this can agree with some natural evil, it is nevertheless unfitting to such a nature as it has a peculiar mode of operating, namely with liberty, and in this it differs from natural evil.

What the evils of fault and of punishment are

3. In what the evil of fault and of punishment differ.—And hence further seems to have arisen another celebrated division of evil into the evil of fault and of punishment, which St. Thomas hands down, I, q. 48, aa. 5 and 6, where he constitutes the difference between those members, that the evil of fault expresses a defect in action or second act, but the evil of punishment expresses a defect in some form or integrity of the thing which pertains to first act. Which exposition has a difficulty, because neither does every defect of action pertain to the evil of fault, as is evident of error or of the action of writing or painting badly; nor conversely is every fault in second act, for original or habitual sin is an evil of fault and is not in action; and similarly not every defect in first act is punishment, for blindness, for example, is sometimes not punishment, but a merely natural evil; nor does every punishment consist in a defect of first act, for error too is an evil of punishment; indeed fault itself can be the punishment of a prior fault, as the same St. Thomas teaches, I-II, q. 87, a. 2, from that of Romans 1: Wherefore God gave them up to the desires of their heart.

4. But because this division pertains more to the theologians and moral philosophers, it must briefly be said that this division is properly given of the evil of the rational creature in so far as it is free or exercises its liberty; for in other things or actions there cannot properly be fault, since fault signifies a moral act, and consequently neither can there be punishment, because this expresses a respect to fault on account of which it is inflicted, as Augustine rightly said, Retractations I, c. 9. When, therefore, the evil of fault is said to consist in a defect of action, it is to be understood of free action in so far as it is free, whether this defect be the lack of free action due according to law or right reason, or the lack of honesty or rectitude due to such an action, that is, whether it be the omission of due action or action lacking due rectitude. For the actual use of liberty is only in action or voluntary lack of action, and therefore this evil of fault is per se primarily in such action, because it is the evil of the rational creature as free, that is, as using its liberty. Nor does what was objected about original or habitual fault stand in the way, because these do not have the notion of fault except through order to actual fault, through which they are voluntary. Whence they participate the notion of the evil of fault as it were only mediately, in so far as in them the defect of free action is morally thought to remain; and so it comes about that the evil of fault, which is such per se primarily and immediately, consists in a defect of human or free second act as such. But the evil of punishment is said to be in a defect of first act, not because it cannot also be found in actions, but because it can be sufficiently saved in any lack of due perfection, even after the manner of first act; or certainly because, just as the evil of fault is radically and primarily in action, so the evil of punishment is radically and primarily in first act. For, although it happens that a natural, that is, not free, action is defective, nevertheless that defect always proceeds from some prior imperfection and defect in first act or in the proximate cause. But if the defect of the action is not natural but voluntary, it will now either pertain to the evil of fault or will have no notion of evil, because it will not be a defect of due perfection. And although one sin is said to be the punishment of another, nevertheless it is not according to that which is formally fault in it, but according to some other notion; and so that punishment too is primarily in some thing which is related after the manner of first act with respect to the fault, such as is the denial of some help or the permission of an occasion of falling, which can be said to pertain to first act in so far as the removal of an impediment is supposed to the action and is a condition required in first act.

5. Where the evils of fault and of punishment are placed.—So, then, we can say briefly and perspicuously that the evil of fault is inordination in free action or omission, or the lack of perfection due according to free action; but the evil of punishment is any other lack of due good contracted or inflicted on account of fault. Whence it comes about that this division comprehends all the evils of rational nature, because it can easily be reduced to contradictory members, because every evil which is outside free action as such will pertain to the evil of punishment. And although, divine providence being set aside, there could be understood in the rational creature some natural evil which was not inflicted on account of fault, which accordingly would be neither fault nor punishment, nevertheless from divine providence we believe that there is no defect of due perfection in the rational creature which is not fault or has not drawn its origin from fault; and therefore Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram imperfectus liber, c. 1, says that every evil is either sin or the punishment of sin. Rather, not only the evil which is formally in man himself, but also that which is in irrational or inanimate things, if it turns to some harm of man himself, pertains to the evil of punishment, not with respect to the inferior things, but of man himself, on account of whose fault it is inflicted or permitted.

6. Fault the moral root of the evil of punishment.—Whether the evil of fault or of punishment is graver.—And hence it is also evident how these two evils are compared among themselves; for, formally speaking, the evil of fault is the origin of the evil of punishment and its cause, not physical but moral; for, just as merit is the cause of reward, so fault is the cause of punishment. But if these two are compared in the gravity or magnitude of evil, the evil of fault is far greater than that of punishment; for fault deprives man of due order to God; whence it turns to the offence and injury of God; but punishment as punishment does not have this from its notion, but stops at some detriment of the creature; but the offence of God is a greater evil of man than any other detriment whatever, and therefore any evil of punishment whatever is rather to be sustained than the evil of fault admitted. And for the same cause God can be the author of the evil of punishment, but not of the evil of fault. But let us leave these to the theologians.

7. The base evil opposed to the honest good.—The saddening opposed to the delightful.—Finally, according to the preceding division, it is easy to divide evil by a partition opposite to that by which the good is divided into honest, delightful and useful; for so one evil is the base, which is opposed to the honest, and taken in propriety and rigour is almost the same as the evil of fault. Although fault in rigour is said of the moral sinful action or omission which renders a man morally evil; but the base evil, as it is adequately opposed to the honest good, is said not only of actual or habitual fault itself, but also of the base object and of the vicious habit, which is the principle of the evil act and properly is not fault. Indeed, if the honest good is taken more broadly for that which is per se lovable and consonant to nature and per se fitting, then the evil opposed to it cannot properly be called base, unless whatever deforms (so to speak) nature is called base, but this evil will be called per se avoidable or worthy of hatred. But another evil is opposed to the delightful, which in common can be called unpleasant and saddening, which is to be declared in the same proportion as the good to which it is opposed. But to the useful good there seems to be no properly so-called evil opposed, because the uselessness which can be considered in some thing in order to another, which seems most of all opposed to the useful good, seems opposed not after the manner of privation but of pure negation, and therefore does not have the proper notion of evil. Which can be declared in this way, for a means or thing which is not useful to some end either by its nature lacks that condition or property which is necessary for such utility; and so for the thing to be useless to such an end is not a privation but only a negation, and so it is not an evil. Or by its nature it requires such a property and by accident lacks it; and then that lack has the notion of evil with respect to that thing which has been deprived of natural perfection; but that evil is not properly opposed to the useful good, but to the natural and per se fitting good of such a thing; but the uselessness which arises thence in order to the end is a certain negation. And perhaps for this cause this three-membered division is not wont to be assigned in evil, but only two-membered, namely of fault and punishment, base and unpleasant. But if anyone wishes to find in means some notion of evil opposed to the useful good as such, he can not improbably say that those are called by a peculiar reason useless evils which, although by their nature or institution they ought to be apt for acquiring some end, have from some accident been made disproportioned. And let these suffice about the divisions of evil.

1. The madness of the Manichees.—The Manichees, as we reported above, posited a certain supremely evil being, existing such of itself and having its origin from no other, which would be the first root and cause of all evils; for they thought that evil cannot arise from good, but only from evil. Whence, since one cannot proceed to infinity, they consequently judged that one must stop at some evil which is of itself. But this heresy, besides having already been attacked, because no being from the fact that it is such is evil, is repugnant to other principles of faith and known also by natural light, namely that, just as there is only one God, so there is only one first principle and first cause of things, and only one uncreated being and of itself necessary, and so all beings which are not God are from God. It is impossible, therefore, that there be some supremely evil being existing of itself and unproduced, as Augustine confirms at length against the Manichees, especially in the book De fide contra Manichaeos, from the beginning, and De natura boni contra Manichaeos, cc. 40 and 41; St. Thomas, I, q. 49, a. 3, and often elsewhere.

2. There is some cause of any evil whatever.—But from this foundation of faith two certain conclusions are inferred. The first is that every evil has some cause. It is proved, because it has been shown that no being is evil of itself; therefore, if there is evil, it must be such from some cause. Next, because a thing is not evil except in so far as it recedes from the perfection due to it, but a thing never fails of due perfection except on account of some cause, either acting or at least impeding; therefore. And this will be more evident in explaining in particular the causes of evil, where we shall also explain how Dionysius said, On the Divine Names, c. 4, that evil has no cause, namely per se, or which would directly intend it.

3. Some good is the cause of evil.—Secondly it is inferred from the said principle that some good is the cause of evil; for every evil has a cause, as has been shown; therefore that cause is either some evil or good; if good, the intent is had; if evil, it is necessary that it too have a cause, of which the same question can be asked. Since, therefore, neither can one proceed to infinity, nor stop at some evil which has no cause, one must necessarily stop at some good which is the cause of evil.

4. It now remains to explain how good is the cause of evil, and in what genus evil can have a cause or require it, whether final or material, formal or efficient.

What the end of evil is

5. Medicinal evil falls under ordered choice.—I say, first: evil formally, as it is evil, does not require a final cause; yet it can have it from the extrinsic intention of the operator. The former part is proved, because evil, since it consists in privation and defect, is not per se intended in things, whence is that axiom: No one intending evil operates; therefore, in order that it be, it does not require a final cause, but can follow beyond the intention of the agent. But the latter part is evident, because an agent, especially a free one acting on purpose, can directly intend some evil for the sake of some end; for that which in one genus is evil can be useful, at least as removing an impediment to obtaining some end. In order that this may be more clearly understood, let us distinguish between the evil of fault and of punishment; and again in the evil of fault let us distinguish its permission from its effecting or from the fault itself. The evil of fault, then, formally and as such (for so we are speaking), not only does not require a final cause, but also cannot rightly and orderly have it, because it cannot be directly intended except by a depraved will, because neither can it be intended as an end, since under that notion it does not have goodness, nor as a means, because evils are not to be done that good may come; but an inordinate will can intend this evil, indeed even malice itself, at least as a means and under some apparent and false notion of good, as, for example, for taking vengeance on another or inflicting injury on one whom it hates, or something similar. But it is otherwise with the permission of such evil of fault; for this can be intended orderly and rightly and have a good end, because of itself it is not evil, but can be good. And in this way God permits evil for the sake of some good, both because such permission pertains to the beauty and variety of the universe, as Dionysius said, On the Divine Names, c. 14; and also because God knows how to elicit many goods from evils permitted, if they happen, as Augustine discourses at length, Enchiridion, c. 27. But the evil of punishment, not only as regards permission but also as regards effecting, can be per se and rightly intended for the sake of an honest end, namely the just vindication of fault; and in this way this evil as such can have a final cause; and so God intends the evils of punishment of which he is the author. To this can also be reduced the evil which can be called medicinal, which is sometimes inflicted to impede a greater evil, as when an arm is cut off to preserve life; for that evil is then directly intended, yet not as an end but as a means, and so it then has its final cause from the intention of the operator. So, then, good, not only apparent but also true, can be the final cause of some evil.

What the subjective cause of evil is

6. I say, secondly: evil, in so far as it is evil, has a material cause, which is always some good; which in other words is wont to be said, that evil as evil is in good as in a subject. So Augustine speaks, Enchiridion, cc. 13 and 14, where among other things he says that evil cannot be except in good, because if it were pure evil it would destroy itself; which St. Thomas also teaches, I, q. 48, a. 3. And the reason is that evil as regards the formal is neither a purely positive thing nor a pure negation; it is therefore the privation of due perfection; therefore it requires a subject to which such perfection is due; therefore that subject must necessarily be some good in which evil or malice is understood to be. This last consequence is proved, both because that subject must necessarily be some positive being, and consequently some good; and also because this very thing, namely that the perfection of which evil deprives is due to such a subject, is a sufficient sign and testimony that such a subject is good, because goodness and perfection cannot be due except to that thing which is good. And in this way Augustine, Contra Julianum I, c. 3, and Enchiridion, c. 12, and often elsewhere, from the very evil which sometimes befalls nature or will proves that the nature or will itself is good; because it becomes evil while it is deprived of due goodness, and is not altogether destroyed, otherwise it would now not be evil, but would altogether not be; in order, then, that it be evil, it is necessary that it be some nature deprived of due perfection.

7. Some objections.—But someone will object: for evil as regards the formal is not a positive and real being; therefore it does not require, indeed cannot even properly be in, a real subject; for a being of reason is in no subject; therefore it cannot be in good as in a subject or material cause. Whence Dionysius, On the Divine Names, c. 4, near the end, absolutely says that evil is not in the things which are. Secondly, because evil destroys the good whose evil it is; therefore it cannot be in it as in a subject; for no form destroys its subject. Thirdly, because otherwise corruption and death would not be evil, which is against the common sense of all; the sequel is evident, because corruption is not the evil of that subject which remains under the corruption itself, that is, of prime matter, since that is indifferent to the form of the generated or the corrupted; but if it is said to be the evil of the corrupted thing, then it is now not in that good whose evil it is; therefore it is not necessary that that good remain under such evil. And it is confirmed, for otherwise the annihilation of a thing would not be its evil, which seems incredible, since it is most worthy of hatred and very disadvantageous and adverse to the appetite by which all things desire to be.

8. They are dissolved.—To the first objection the answer is that evil as regards the formal, or malice, is in the subject after the manner of privation, of which Aristotle said that it is lack in a subject apt by nature; which lack is said to be in the thing itself in exercised act, as corruption or removal, as Cajetan well declares, I, q. 48, a. 2. Where St. Thomas, ad 2, says that evil is not being as it signifies the entity of the thing, yet has such being as suffices for the truth of the proposition by which we say that blindness is in the eye, which being does not signify to posit something in the eye, but rather to remove. In this way, then, evil is said to be in good as in a subject, not as positing something in it, but rather as removing a further perfection due to it. But when Dionysius says that evil is not in things, he understands that it is not as a true being positing something in them.

9. Any evil whatever does not destroy any good whatever.—To the second it has already been said above that not every evil is opposed to any good whatever; whence it is not necessary that evil destroy every good, but that to which it is formally opposed, not that which it supposes in the subject; as darkness destroys the goodness of light, yet not the perfection of the air. You will say: often evil diminishes the goodness of the subject, because it not only takes away the opposite perfection, but also diminishes the ability or aptitude to such perfection; as sin both formally excludes the good act and diminishes the promptness to doing a similar one; therefore evil can be so increased or multiplied as to destroy altogether the goodness of the subject; it does not, therefore, always suppose it. The answer is that a twofold ability of the subject to good can be understood. One is superadded to it and distinct from it, as is a habit in a power or a fitting temperament of qualities in an organ. The other is an ability altogether intrinsic to the faculty or subject, which in the thing is not distinguished from its entity, but by reason only. Again, ability to good can be diminished in two ways. First, through subtraction and real diminution of goodness, in which way the good of water is diminished when its coldness is diminished. In another way, through the addition of impediments, in which way the ability of matter to the form of fire can be said to be diminished by excessive humidity. The former ability, then, distinct from the power, can be diminished through subtraction and properly in itself, whence it can also be totally taken away through contrary evil; which is not inconvenient, because that ability is not the proper subject of such evil, but rather is a form or disposition opposed to it. But the latter ability is not diminished through subtraction, because, since it is not a thing distinct from the subject, as that is not diminished in its entity, so neither is ability of this kind, but it is only said to be diminished in the latter way, and would more properly be said to be impeded; and therefore it can never be consumed or wholly taken away. And because the subject of evil is good according to this intrinsic ability to its proper perfection, therefore the whole good which is in its subject can never be destroyed by evil. And by this reason, although sins are said to diminish the ability of the will to operate well, they can never wholly consume it, even if they are multiplied to infinity, as St. Thomas hands down more fully, I-II, q. 85, a. 1, ad 2. As also the radical ability of matter to one form cannot be taken away, even if the dispositions to the opposite form increase infinitely.

10. You will say: sometimes an unfitting form altogether destroys its subject if it increases too much, as heat water; therefore evil too will be able to destroy altogether the goodness of its subject. The answer is by denying the antecedent in rigour; for a form never corrupts its proper subject in which it inheres, although it can be a disposition to the corruption of the subject which it denominates. Which answer proceeds according to the opinion asserting that heat inheres in prime matter. But according to the opposite opinion it must be said that the heat which truly inheres does not destroy it formally, although per accidens it disposes to its corruption, not proximately but remotely; for in the instant in which the water is corrupted, according to this opinion a new heat is introduced, which now does not inhere in water but in fire, and by it, or rather by the form of fire, the water is formally corrupted. So, then, evil never destroys the subject in which it is; but if sometimes per accidens it disposes to its corruption, it consequently also disposes to the destruction of itself, so that it never remains without a good subject.

11. How death is an evil, and to what subject.—Annihilation is the evil of nothing.—Whence to the third I answer that death or corruption can be considered in two ways. In one way, as it is in becoming through the alterations and dispositions which precede the instant of death; and in this way it is easily understood to have the notion of evil with respect to the subject which is little by little corrupted, against which the argument does not proceed. In another way death can be considered as it is in the instant in which the thing is destroyed; and so I concede (whatever others think) that death properly and in rigour is not the evil of that thing which is destroyed through it, on account of the argument made. Whence St. Thomas, De potentia, q. 5, a. 3, ad 14, concedes that annihilation is not an evil, because it does not leave a good in which it would be founded; which Augustine too thinks, Enchiridion, cc. 12 and 13, where he proves at length that, nature being altogether destroyed, evil does not remain. But speaking broadly, this corruption or destruction of a thing is wont to be called an evil, because it is the total taking away of good, which is a sufficient reason for it to be hated or fled.

Whether there is a formal cause of evil

12. I say, thirdly: evil does not have a proper and intrinsic formal cause besides itself or its malice; but it can have a formal cause in a certain way remote and extrinsic. It is declared and proved, because, since evil formally consists in privation, privation itself is its form; but of privation itself there is no other form by which it is constituted, as is self-evident. But it often happens that the privation of one form follows upon another positive form, not through effecting, but by virtue of formal causality alone; in which way the privation of cold follows upon the information of heat produced in water; and so heat inhering in water, according to true philosophy, expels cold not effectively but formally; and so that heat can rightly be called the formal cause of the privation of cold, which privation is the evil of water. In this way, then, there can be a formal cause of evil, which I call extrinsic and remote, because it is not properly and intrinsically constituting evil itself, but is only the form upon which such evil follows.

What the efficient of evil is

13. That evil follows upon the perfect causality of the agent.—I say, fourthly: evil always has some efficient cause, yet not per se but per accidens and beyond the primary and intrinsic intention of the agent. The former part is known from what we said at the beginning of the section; for the notion of evil does not belong to being per se and from within; therefore from without; therefore through some efficiency or efficient cause; for nothing can come from without which does not proceed from another efficient. But in order that the latter part may be declared, it is to be noticed that evil can befall things in three ways. In the first way, through the perfect efficiency of the acting cause, as when an efficient cause by perfect power introduces a form, and upon it follows the privation of another form which has the notion of evil; and in this way fire is the efficient cause of evil in water, namely the privation of cold; and God is the cause of every natural evil or of punishment which in this way follows or comes about, because he both instituted the causes effecting this evil and operates with them. But it is evident that this efficiency is not per se but per accidens, because the purpose of the agent is not to destroy another, but to communicate its own being; but it happens that thence follows the non-being of another, because it is incompatible with another. But if anyone wishes to say that this evil, although it is not intended for its own sake, is nevertheless in some way intended for the sake of another, that is, as a means and disposition necessary for introducing another good, whoever (I say) says this will not err much. And therefore I said that this effecting of evil is beyond the primary intention of the agent, which per se is not to evil but to good. But I added that the discussion is of the intrinsic intention of the agent, that is, of that which it has by virtue of its action; for, if it is a free agent, it can directly and per se intend the evil of another for the sake of another end, as we were saying above of the evil of punishment, which God directly intends, the evil of fault being supposed; but this intention is extrinsic to that action through which such evil comes about.

14. Some evil arises from the imperfection of the cause.—An objection is met.—In the second way it happens that evil follows upon the action of an efficient cause from the imperfection or defect of such a cause. And this happens when the evil itself is admixed with the action itself, or with the effect or form introduced and intended by the efficient cause itself;¹ so limping is a certain evil in the notion of progressive motion, which follows in the action from a defect of the principal or instrumental motive power; and then too it is evident that the evil is beyond the intention of the agent, indeed does not follow upon it as it is agent, but as it is deficient. You will say: although, comparing that malice of the action to the positive power and efficiency of the cause, it is per accidens, nevertheless, comparing it to the imperfection of the cause, it will be per se from it, according to that rule: As affirmation is the per se cause of affirmation, so negation of negation. The answer is that hence it is at most concluded that evil as evil has a per se deficient cause, which as such is rather a non-efficient than an efficient cause, which comes to the same; for that malice is joined per accidens with efficiency as such, although per se it follows from the defect and imperfection of the cause. Which consequence is called per se either in order to the moral notion, as I shall explain immediately; or certainly according to a certain accommodation and attribution, the necessary consequence of one from the other being supposed; for properly and physically privation does not flow into privation nor defect into defect; but because from a defective cause a defective action follows, therefore the perfection of the effect is per se attributed to the perfection of the cause, but the defect to the imperfection.

15. The malice of the effect does not necessarily suppose malice in the cause.—Someone will say again: therefore this evil in the action or in the effect always supposes evil in the cause. But the consequent seems false, for of that malice of the cause I inquire whether it has another cause or not; if it does not have one, then there is an evil which has no cause, which we showed above cannot happen; but if it has a cause, either that too will have a defect, and so the same question will return of it, and so one will proceed to infinity; or one will have to stop at a cause which, since it has no malice or defect, is the cause of a defective action and effect. The consequent is against what has been said and against reason; for, since any cause whatever acts toward what is similar or proportioned to itself, why will a good cause having no malice produce an evil and defective effect? The answer is by absolutely denying the first sequel; for it is not necessary that the malice of the effect always suppose malice in the cause, because, by whatever reason the cause is impeded from acting according to the whole perfection due to the action or effect, the action will be able to be defective and evil in its genus. But the cause can so operate or be impeded even if no malice properly taken is supposed in it; although this mode of acting always supposes some imperfection, which is not always proper malice or the privation of due perfection, but only the negation of greater perfection, naturally consequent upon the limited perfection of such a cause.

16. Whence the effects of necessarily acting causes contract malice.—In order that this may be more clearly understood, let us distinguish between causes acting naturally and free ones; for a cause which acts naturally, if it is perfect in itself and not impeded, will act as much as it can, and therefore will never commit a defect in action which has the notion of natural evil; and this the reason made rightly convinces, because from a good cause, acting as much as it can and not impeded, there is nothing whence malice could result in the action. From a twofold cause, therefore, such a defect in the action can happen. First, from this, that the cause itself is badly affected in itself, as if the eye, for example, is wrongly disposed; and then it is true that the malice of the action supposes malice in the cause, yet it is not necessary to proceed to infinity, because that malice of the cause can come from the action of another cause perfect in its genus, which, while it intends to produce its perfect effect, consequently introduces into the eye some disposition unfitting to it, according to the first mode posited above; or it could in the very formation have come from some natural impediment, as I shall now say. Secondly, then, this can come from some extrinsic impeding cause, whether this be material or efficient, whether it be in the patient itself or in the mode;² for from the concurrence of such causes resisting and impeding one another it happens that the action of one cause comes forth defective and monstrous, even if in the cause itself no natural evil properly taken precedes.

17. An evil effect always supposes a defect in a necessary cause.—Nor does the reason made proceed against this, because, although from a good cause as it is good nothing proceeds but good and perfection, nevertheless, because that cause can be impeded from acting according to its whole perfection, it can thence happen that the effect does not receive the whole perfection due to it, or does not receive it with the mode, species and order accommodated to its nature, in which lack the notion of evil consists. But although then the malice of the effect does not come from the malice of the cause, it nevertheless always supposes in it some imperfection, at least negative, namely the defect of power to overcome the cause impeding it, or the indisposition or resistance of the matter. And so it is easily understood whence this evil can come about in natural effects, so that it is not necessary either to proceed to infinity or to stop at some evil which has no cause; for one must stop at the natural imperfection of one cause, with the impediment of another adjoined; but this impediment can come from the natural course and order and power of natural causes. But that imperfection or impotence to overcome the impediment does not require any cause, because it is a mere negation intrinsically and necessarily conjoined with such a nature of the thing, of itself limited to such a grade and perfection of being. Nor is it inconvenient that an imperfection which in the cause is merely negative and does not have the notion of evil be the root and origin of privative imperfection having the notion of evil in the action or effect, because by reason of the intervening impediment it can happen per accidens that the effect is deprived of the perfection due to it, because the cause is impeded from being able to act according to its whole perfection.

18. The dominion of a free cause is the adequate origin of malice and defect in its action.—But in a cause acting freely there is another proper mode of failing in its action, namely from the dominion which it has over its act, without another extrinsic impediment. For, by the very fact that it is free, it does not always act as much as it can and ought; and therefore from the same root it can effect a sinful action without another impediment. And hence it also comes about that evil proceeding from a free cause, which is properly moral evil or of fault, does not necessarily suppose in the cause another similar evil; otherwise we could not stop at the first evil of fault proceeding from such a cause, which is impossible. Indeed neither is it necessary that this first evil of fault suppose in the cause some prior evil which is not of fault but of another genus, namely of nature; for, as I said, it can proceed from the liberty of the creature alone; but liberty is not an evil, but rather a good. Especially because, according to the doctrine handed down above from Augustine, every evil of the rational creature is either of fault or of punishment; but the evil of punishment according to its whole self supposes some evil of fault; therefore the evil of fault, if it is the first, cannot suppose another evil. It supposes, however, some intrinsic and connatural imperfection of the creature, which is to be mutable and defectible, which, formally speaking, it does not have from another cause, but from itself, because it is from nothing and of limited and finite perfection in its order; for from this limitation it has both that it is not the rule of its own operations but needs a superior rule, and also that it is not per se and infallibly conjoined to its rule, but can fail from it. But this natural imperfection, although it is not evil (for it is not a privation, but a mere negation), can nevertheless be the origin of moral evil, because, liberty being adjoined, by virtue of it, without another extrinsic impediment, the mutable will can fail to do all that it can and ought, or do it not as it can and ought, but in another more imperfect way.

19. Evil in the effect sometimes from the mere lack of the influx of the cause.—In the third way it happens that evil follows without any positive efficiency from the mere subtraction of efficiency or of the influx of due goodness. For, since evil consists in privation, per se it does not require a positive influx in order to be in its own way; for every positive influx is terminated per se primarily at a positive form or thing; but this, per se speaking, is not necessary for privation; therefore, in order that evil follow, it is enough that the good due to some subject is not made or not preserved, the subject being preserved with the same aptitude and (so to speak) right to such good. And in moral things indeed this can happen from the mere dominion of the free power over its action. Although it is a controverted question whether there can be a pure moral evil without any action, which is wont to be called pure omission, of which matter we need not discourse; for it is enough for the matter of which we are treating that this evil by virtue of its being does not require action, whatever may be the case whether on account of the notion of the voluntary an act is necessary. But in natural things, because a cause cannot suspend action of itself, but only because either the patient is removed, or it itself is distant, or some other impediment intervenes, which does not come about without some positive action, therefore, although evil proceeding from a natural cause per se and formally often comes from the mere lack of action, nevertheless that always follows upon some other action or change; as, although darkness follows in the air from the mere non-illumination of the sun, nevertheless this lack of illumination follows upon the motion of the illuminating body or of another body. In this way, then, the privation in which evil consists can happen; and then almost the same judgement holds of this mode of effecting evil as of the first; for this evil follows per accidens from the action of another cause, not because the action itself is defective, but because the term of such action is incompossible with the action of another cause, or with some condition required for it.

20. But hence it is inferred that, when evil is said to have an efficient cause, it is to be understood either of a cause either positive or privative, because privation is reduced to the positive, as St. Thomas said in a similar case, I-II, q. 71, a. 6, ad 1; or certainly, if it is understood of a positively acting cause, it is to be verified with proportion; for in natural things there always precedes some natural action, upon which follows, or to which is adjoined, the privation which is evil; but in moral things, if we speak morally, there also always intervenes an action of the will which malice accompanies, or at least that action or virtual will is necessary, although perhaps, speaking metaphysically, it is not repugnant that there be such evil without formal action.

How evil is from the first cause

21. And from these things it is sufficiently evident what the proximate and particular efficient cause of evil is; but how evil is also from the first and most universal cause, which is God, briefly remains to be explained. The effects of secondary causes are attributed to God in two ways, namely either mediately, because he gave the power of acting to secondary causes, or immediately, because he concurs with them and flows proximately into their actions and effects. Again, we have from what has been said that evil follows from the proximate cause in two ways, namely either by virtue of its activity and positive perfection, or only from the lack of perfection or action. It must be said, then, that God is in the aforesaid two ways the cause of the evil which follows by virtue of the perfect activity of some cause. It is evident, because God both gave that power or activity and concurs with it to that perfect action upon which the evil of another follows. But God so effects this evil as the proximate cause does, as regards this, that he causes it not per se and directly but consequently and per accidens, because evil itself, since it is privative, is not otherwise makeable. Which is to be understood as regards physical action; for as regards the intention of the agent, since God is an agent through intellect, he can directly intend evil itself for the sake of some good. And in this way God is the cause of any merely natural evil whatever, according to that: The Lord kills and makes alive, 1 Kings 1 [recte 2]. He is likewise and most of all the cause of the evil of punishment, in which way it is said: There is no evil in the city which the Lord has not done, Amos 3. But what is sometimes said, God did not make death, Wisdom 2 [recte 1], is understood that he did not intend nor will it from his primary intention, but was in a certain way compelled by the fault of men, which being supposed, he truly makes death and wills it in punishment of fault. Wherefore God can effect this evil not only through secondary causes, but also immediately through himself, because it requires no defect in the immediate cause, but can proceed from perfect efficacy alone.

22. But that evil which follows from the lack of perfection or action of the proximate cause per se does not require the influx of God, nor is it necessarily conjoined with the action of God as such, and therefore it is not necessary that it be attributed to God. It is proved, because this evil does not follow from the perfection or activity of the proximate cause, but from imperfection and lack; therefore it does not follow from what the cause has from God, but rather from what it has of itself, or rather because of itself it lacks perfection not due to it. Again, the secondary cause does not need the concurrence of God in so far as it does not act, but in so far as it acts something; therefore this evil per se has nothing whence it is attributed to God, either mediately or immediately. And by this reason the evil of fault does not redound to God; for according to faith God is not the author of sin. Indeed neither can any malice of action proceeding from a defect of the proximate power be attributed to God, as is, for example, limping, which St. Thomas teaches, I, q. 49, a. 2.

23. But in this is to be noted a difference between the evil of fault and others, that in the evil of fault the imperfection which is necessarily supposed in the cause belongs to it of itself and in no way from without, and on account of the special condition and liberty of such a cause it can be the origin of the evil of fault without extrinsic impediment. Whence it comes about that the first and sufficient root of such evil as such is the proximate cause itself without the intervention of the first. But in other evils of natural actions the imperfection which is supposed in the cause, if it is merely natural and negative, cannot be the root of defective action unless some extrinsic impediment intervenes, as was said above, which impediment always comes from some positive motion or effect of which God can be the cause; and from this side the root of such evil can be referred to God. Again, if the imperfection of the cause is preternatural to it and consequently has the notion of some evil in it, such a defect always comes from some other natural action or motion, which must necessarily be from God. And in this way every natural evil can finally be referred to God, not in so far as it comes from a defect which is not from God, but in so far as it comes from some effect or action which is from God. Whence in the said example of limping, although the defect of that motion is not in that action by virtue of the emanation which it has from God, but from a weak or defective leg, nevertheless, because this defect of the leg can have been made by God, or by a secondary cause perfectly operating or intending its effect, therefore limping itself can finally be reduced to the first cause, which cannot have place in the evil of fault.

24. To this is added also another difference, that the evil of fault, on account of its baseness, cannot be intended or willed by God, but only permitted; but the other evils, whencesoever they come, if they do not include fault, can be directly willed and intended by God, because they do not have a baseness repugnant to his supreme goodness; and therefore of the evil of fault alone God cannot be the cause, but of the others he can. And hence too it is that evil proceeding from the mere lack of action, if it is moral, cannot be either from God alone or from him as the primary cause and root, but from the defectible liberty of the creature. But if such evil is merely natural, it can be either from God alone, suspending the whole action by which he alone preserves the good, or from God as the first cause and root, as if a secondary cause omits to act only because God suspends his concurrence.

1. The reason of the difficulty.—The reason for doubting can be that evil, as is evident from what has been said hitherto, is distinguished by reason from being, and is attributed to it and denominates it; why, then, is it not numbered among the properties of being? For that the good too is its property does not stand in the way, since being can be good and evil by diverse notions. Nor does it stand in the way that it expresses privation; for one too formally expresses negation, and nevertheless is one of the chief properties of being. Finally it does not stand in the way that not every being seems to be evil, because, although no being is absolutely evil in itself, that is, defective, nevertheless every being, even God himself, is evil to something, that is, unfitting; therefore this is enough that evil in common ought to have been numbered among the properties of being.

2. The conclusion by which the doubt is dispatched.—It must nevertheless be said that evil is deservedly not numbered among the attributes of being. Of which matter several reasons can be given, but those which were touched upon in arguing can suffice. For first, evil as evil does not formally express something pertaining to the notion of being, but rather a tendency (so to speak) to non-being, or the defect and weakness of being; therefore such a notion cannot constitute a peculiar attribute of being as being, but could rather be attributed to some being as it is defectible. Whence the reason is not similar of unity, both because unity does not express negation alone, but entity under negation, but malice is sufficiently saved in privation alone; and also because through that negation which one includes we circumscribe the integrity which being has in itself, and consequently its entity; but through the privation which evil expresses we do not declare entity, nor circumscribe something pertaining to the constitution of being itself, but rather explain the defect of entity, which can sometimes be in some being.

3. Being on one side exceeds evil, by which on the other it is exceeded.—Secondly, hence it comes about that evil is not reciprocal with being, so that also for that cause it cannot be its attribute. But it is not reciprocal, both on the side of evil itself, which extends more widely than being, and on the side of being itself, which from elsewhere extends more widely than evil. The first is evident, because, since malice does not include entity in its concept, but is sufficiently saved in the privation of entity, it does not require real being for the proper denomination of evil; for the very privation of due perfection is not only malice, but is truly and properly called a certain evil; for, in the way in which it is conceived after the manner of being (although it is not true being), it is also conceived and denominated a certain evil, although it is not conceived as being evil in itself but as the evil of that whose privation it is. In which way too in moral things pure omission, if it were truly and properly sin, would also be an evil of man. The second is evident, because not every being is truly and properly evil, which indeed is most certain of God, for neither does he have in himself any defect whence he could be called evil, nor is he truly and absolutely unfitting to any being, but supremely fitting, indeed simply necessary for the good and perfection of any other being. But if sometimes he is apprehended as unfitting, that either is falsely apprehended, or can be attributed to God only in a certain respect and through a certain extrinsic denomination by reason of some effect unfitting to man which he causes in him; but this extrinsic denomination neither properly constitutes evil nor can pertain to the properties of being. And not only in God, but also in many created beings, integral goodness without any malice can be found. For, although outside God there is no created being which cannot be subject to some evil—evil (I say) either moral, if it is a created and intellectual supposit, or at least natural, or penal—nevertheless it can be communicated to many created beings that they have properly no malice, but all the perfection due to them, as happens in the blessed angels, to whom this is peculiar, that they have never been subject to any evil nor will ever be. For men, even blessed, although they now lack every evil forever, were nevertheless once subject to some evil, if not of fault, which is rare, at least of punishment, which none has escaped. But among the other beings only the heavenly bodies seem free from every natural evil, in so far as they are incorruptible and altogether free from foreign impressions. But it is to be considered that all these are to be understood of evil properly taken, in so far as it formally expresses the proper privation of due goodness; for, if we speak more generally of evil, as it expresses only the negation of some goodness and perfection simply, then indeed every being outside God can be called in some way evil, in which sense that could be understood: No one is good but God alone. Nevertheless that acceptation of evil is most improper, as is evident from what was said above; for on account of the mere negation of perfection not due, a being can be called either negatively imperfect or less perfect, yet not evil; nor is God alone called good because all other things are evil, but because he alone is good by essence, or by antonomasia or analogy. I add moreover that in the way in which created being is called evil in that impropriety, or rather imperfect, it does not have this from the notion of being but because it is from nothing.

4. The heavens endowed integrally with natural good.—Evil is in being only accidentally.—A third reason can be taken from what has been said, because the properties of being must follow being itself per se and from within; but evil is not so compared to being, but belongs to it altogether per accidens and from without. By which reason we proved above that evil is not without some cause, because it expresses a defect against the debt of nature, which does not happen without an extrinsic cause. Evil, therefore, comes to that being in which it is, not of itself but from without and by accident; it cannot, therefore, pertain to the properties of being. And although sometimes it happens from the intrinsic nature of two beings that one is unfitting to the other, and consequently its evil, in which way in moral things some acts are said to be intrinsically evil, nevertheless this very thing is very per accidens to the notion of being and peculiar to certain beings having among themselves some repugnance or disproportion. For these causes, then, evil ought not to have been counted among the notions of being.