Disputationes metaphysicae

1. Reasons for doubting.—The reason of the difficulty is that the good is taken either for that which has goodness or perfection in itself, or for that which is fitting to another; but in neither way does the good seem to be convertible with being as its attribute; therefore. The minor is proved as regards the former part, about the good absolutely taken: first, because real relations are beings, and yet by the opinion of many they are not good, because they have no perfection. Secondly, because mathematical things are true things, and yet, on the testimony of Aristotle, Metaphysics III, they are not good. Thirdly, because prime matter is in some way being, and yet is not good, because, as it does not have actuality, so neither perfection. Fourthly, the essences of created things are in some way real beings, since they are not nothing, and yet they are not good, because, existence being set aside, they do not have perfection; whence neither are they desirable except in order to being. Fifthly, we can add that there are many things which lack the mode and order due to their nature, which accordingly cannot be called good, since the good consists in mode, species and order, as Augustine says, De natura boni, cc. 3 and 4. But the other part of the minor is proved, first, from all the things adduced, because what does not have perfection in itself cannot be good to another either; as a relation, for example, if in itself it does not express perfection, will be able to contribute nothing to the goodness of that in which it is. Secondly, conversely, we can object that the good, as it is called fitting in this way, can be said not only of beings but also of non-beings, in which way it is said of Judas, Matthew 26: It were good for that man if he had not been born; not being itself, therefore, or not being born, in so far as it can be fitting for impeding greater evils, is called good by Christ. And in moral things not only to fulfil a precept, but also not to do what is forbidden, is thought good and fitting to man; therefore the good under this notion cannot be an attribute of being, since it extends more widely than being. And it is confirmed finally, for the goodness which is an attribute of being is only one in one being; but the fittingness of one being to another is not one but manifold and of diverse notions; therefore this goodness is not convertible with being as its attribute.

2. The opinion of some.—The distinction handed down above about the good is to be supposed, as it is said absolutely of a thing in so far as it is good in itself, or in so far as it is called good to another or with respect to another. For about these there are various opinions. For some think that the transcendent good, as it is an attribute of being, is taken in the latter way, under the notion of what is fitting to another, which Hervaeus, Capreolus and Durandus above think, yet they do not declare how the good as such is convertible with being. And therefore others reject this opinion on account of the arguments indicated above, who consequently think that the good under the latter acceptation is more than transcendent, because it transcends not only beings but also non-beings. Whence it comes about that according to this opinion there is a twofold good: one which is a property of being in the fourth mode; but another which is a property in the second mode, because it belongs to every being, but not to it alone.

Resolution of the question

3. The good is always founded in being.—I think, however, that it must be said that the good properly so called always supposes or includes being, or is founded in being, and therefore that the good under none of the aforesaid notions can extend more widely than being. This conclusion is taken from Aristotle, Ethics I, c. 6, saying that the good is divided through all the categories, as being is; and from St. Thomas, I, q. 5, a. 5, where he says that the notion of being is prior to the notion of good. And he wished to signify this very thing, De veritate, q. 21, a. 2, when he said that the transcendent good is founded in being. And the reason is that the good, whether it signifies that which is good in itself or that which is good to another, intrinsically includes perfection in its concept, for the good and the perfect are the same; but true perfection cannot be understood without entity, for what does not have entity is nothing. But how can what is nothing express or include perfection? Moreover, of that which is good in itself no one doubts, on account of the reason given, that it must be being; but hence it is rightly gathered that that too which is a true good to another must be being; therefore the good under each notion includes the notion of being and cannot belong to anything which is not being. The minor is declared, first, because what does not have perfection in itself cannot be the perfection of anything. Secondly, because the good as fitting expresses order to existence; for nothing is thought fitting except as existing or in order to existing; but what exists or can exist is being; therefore the good as fitting includes or supposes being. Thirdly, because those things which are reputed fitting to something, although they are not beings but rather privations or negations of beings, are in truth not good, and in the way in which they are sometimes called good, in so far as they are desirable, they are also called in some way beings; therefore the reason of each is equal. The minor is declared as regards the former part, because that which is called fitting as a privation is in truth not good, but the lack of some evil, if one stops precisely at the privation; but the lack of evil as such is not goodness unless something else is added. As in moral things too it is one thing to decline from evil, another to do good, and not to do evil is not virtue or good unless it includes a positive will of not doing evil. So, then, it is in natural things; for to lack heat is not properly a good of water, but is the lack of an evil or of something unfitting, and a certain condition necessary in order that it may have its goodness and perfection. Wherefore, if fittingness is taken in this amplitude, goodness and fittingness are not the same, even as goodness is said of that which is good to another; but goodness expresses entity or perfection as fitting to something; and therefore that which is fitting only after the manner of privation is in truth not good; or (to prove the other part of the minor), if privations of this kind fitting to things can be denominated good, in the same way they can be called beings. For, as we noted above from the doctrine of Aristotle and St. Thomas, that is sometimes called being which truly has being, but sometimes that which can truly be predicated after the manner of being, in which way a man is said to be blind or blindness to be in a man. On account of this shadow of being, then, it comes about that such a being, if it is fitting to something, is called good to it; the good, therefore, always keeps proportion to being and does not extend more universally than it.

4. Good and being mutually infer each other.—I say, secondly: every true being is good in itself, or has some goodness fitting to itself; and so it comes about that the good absolutely said is convertible with being. Concerning this conclusion can be reported the error of the Manichees and Priscillianists; for they said that there are certain creatures evil of themselves and procreated by a certain supremely evil principle, as Nicephorus reports at length, Historia VI, c. 31; and Eusebius, Book VII, c. 28; and more fully Augustine, tom. VI, book De haeresibus, heresy 46, and in innumerable opuscula against the Manichees; and St. Thomas, I, qq. 48 and 49, and Contra Gentiles III, cc. 7 and 8; and Pope Leo, Epistle 93 to Turibius, specially defines against the Priscillianists. The same the First Council of Braga, cc. 7 and 8; and it can easily be convinced from divine Scripture; for, Genesis 1, of the individual divine works it is said: And God saw that it was good; but of all together it is subjoined: He saw all things that he had made, and they were very good. Ecclesiastes 3: He has made all things good in their time. 1 Timothy 4: Every creature of God is good. The reason of the conclusion is that every real being necessarily has some perfection by which it is constituted in its being, which in the thing is nothing other than the very entity by which it is perfected; for the very entity of the thing, or the form, matter or nature by which the thing is constituted in its being, are called the perfections of the thing, because by them it is perfected in its being. Just as, therefore, real being cannot be understood which does not consist or is not constituted by its entity, so it cannot be understood without the real perfection by which it is perfected; but perfection and the goodness by which a thing is called good in itself are the same.

5. But this perfection in creatures can be either essential or intrinsic (under which I comprehend being itself), or accidental. The former is inseparable from each being, if it is preserved in its actual being. But the latter can often be separated. The denomination of good, therefore, which necessarily belongs to every being is that which is taken from intrinsic and essential perfection; but as it can be taken from accidental perfection (including under this notion whatever is distinguished from the nature of the thing from the essence of the thing and its actual entity), then it is not necessary that every created being be good, that is, affected by every perfection possible or due to it. And so it comes about that the good taken in the former notion is convertible with being; for we have shown that every being is good, and that nothing is truly good except what truly is. It follows next that the good taken under the same notion is in some way an attribute or property of being, because it both is convertible with it and according to reason supposes it, and is in some way distinguished from it according to the formal notion conceived and signified by us. And therefore I said that it is in some way an attribute, because it is not an attribute in that rigour in which an attribute requires some distinction from the nature of the thing from its subject, but only as it is said of any attribute whatever distinct according to reason from that to which it is attributed, as was declared above in treating of the attributes.

6. Every being is fitting to another.—Induction in all grades of beings.—I say, thirdly: every being is also good with respect to something, that is, fitting to something; wherefore the good taken under the notion of the fitting too is convertible with being and is its attribute or property. The former part is proved, first, by induction; for first of all every accidental being is good to some substance. Because, although sometimes it is not fitting to some subject, as heat to water, nevertheless an accident can never not express a relationship and aptitude to some subject which it affects well and fittingly according to some notion, either proper or common; for so heat, although it is not good to water, is nevertheless good to fire; and although it is not good to water as water, it is nevertheless good to water as it is a natural or material being. And an erroneous judgement of the intellect, although as erroneous it is not fitting to the intellect, nevertheless as it is a judgement or a certain representation of such an object is fitting to the intellect as it is in potency to second act and to intellectual representation; and the same holds of the acts of the will, however much some of them seem intrinsically evil. Again, created substances composed of matter and form are so related that both matter is fitting to form and form to matter, and their union similarly is fitting to each, and consequently the whole itself is not only fitting to itself but also to the individual parts. Whence it comes about that any part naturally desires the preservation of the whole more than the preservation of itself, as St. Thomas noted, II-II, q. 26, a. 1. And this mode of fittingness can be extended to every created substance, in so far as it is in some way composite, either of nature and some mode or substantial term, or of itself and its accidents, for which it is good and fitting.

7. But in the most simple substance, which is God, there is not properly found within it this mode of fittingness which is understood to be of one thing to another in some way distinct in the thing; but through supreme identity and simplicity God is fitting to himself, and his nature is fitting to his person, and personality to the nature itself; but this fittingness is rather according to that notion by which he is rendered good and perfect in himself than according to that by which he is said to be fitting to something. Although a theologian could doubt whether, the Trinity of persons with unity in essence being supposed in God, one person can truly be called the good of another or fitting to another, not only by reason of the essence, in which they are most simply one, but also by reason of the properties in which they are distinguished. For it does not seem inconvenient to concede that one person is a thing fitting to another, not as its formal perfection, but as principle to what is from the principle; or as the term can be called fitting to the relation; or the existence of one relative can be called fitting to the other correlative; and the society of several persons can be thought fitting to each; in all of which no imperfection is denoted nor dependence, but only the necessary coexistence of three persons in one essence. But let us leave this to the theologians.

8. But with respect to creatures God is the supreme good supremely fitting to them, not as their formal goodness. In which way some erred, thinking that all created things are good with the divine goodness, which is manifestly false, because the divine goodness cannot be a form inhering in creatures or come into composition with them so as to constitute them formally good. Nor can creatures be or be called good by mere extrinsic denomination from the goodness of God, because, as they have in themselves their proper being distinct from the being of God, although participated from him, so they have in themselves their proper goodness and perfection distinct from the divine goodness, but flowing from it and participated. God, therefore, is a good fitting to all creatures in the genus of efficient and of end; for from that good all the goodness of the creature flows and depends, and in the attainment of that good, or some imitation of it, the supreme perfection of the creature consists. And in this way Augustine said, De Trinitate VIII, c. 3, that God is the good of every good. But conversely creatures cannot be called fitting to God in the way in which he is fitting to them, namely as a good advantageous to them and communicating goodness to them; but nevertheless they can be called fitting to God as works becoming him and consonant with his goodness and wisdom; for so we say that the heavens are a work worthy of God and fitting to him, as we say that a rightly painted image is a work fitting to such an artificer. In which sense that of Genesis could be expounded: God saw that it was good, that is, fittingly disposed and fabricated as became such a maker.

9. And in this way it can easily be understood that one thing or substance, even distinct in supposit, is a good fitting to another, which can also be observed in creatures; for one creature is fitting to another either because it in some way contributes to its being, or to its perfection or beauty, or to communicating its goodness which it has participated from God, or to exercising its actions. No true and real being, therefore, can be thought out which is not in some way fitting to something. Whence a general reason can be given, because every being is in some way good and perfect in itself; but every good is not only fitting to itself but is also fitting to something, either so that it communicates itself to it in some way, or at least so that it is made by it and is ordered to the advantage of others, or at least to the beauty and some completion of the universe. And by this reason there is no being which cannot fall under the object of the will as fitting to something or to some end. So, then, it is evident that the good, also as it expresses the notion of the fitting, is convertible with being, because we have shown that everything which is truly and positively fitting is being, and conversely that every true being is in some way fitting. And hence finally it is concluded that the good also under this notion can be numbered among the attributes of being, in so far as it is a certain general attribute of being, which is not altogether synonymous with it, but connotes or includes something beyond the entity of the thing, as was declared in sect. 1.

10. Natural honest goodness chiefly constitutes the transcendent good.—I say, fourthly: the transcendent good seems to be taken chiefly from honest goodness, not in the genus of morals but of nature; although it can also be said abstractly and generally of goodness as it abstracts from all. It is declared, for if a being is called good in itself, that denomination is taken from this, that it has in itself perfection fitting to itself; but this fittingness pertains to natural honesty, in so far as every good of this kind is per se desirable at least by that whose good and perfection it is. Whence arose that axiom: The good is lovable, but to each his own. But it is sufficiently likely that the transcendent good was primarily taken from the relationship or denomination by which each being has in itself some perfection fitting to itself. So, then, goodness in some way honest in the order of nature is the universal property of being from which the transcendent good has been denominated. But if being is called good in so far as it is fitting to another, then every being seems to be per se fitting to something with which it has some natural proportion, either as cause with effect, or as effect with cause, or as part with whole, or whole with part, or in some other similar way; and so in every being there can be found some fittingness on account of which it is per se desirable with respect to something, which under that notion is reduced to the honesty of nature. And therefore from this goodness the denomination of good and fitting, in so far as it is common to every being, seems to have been taken, for it is most intrinsic and universal; but useful goodness properly taken is more extrinsic and only in a certain respect; but delightful goodness is not so common to every being, but seems to be particular, if the discussion is of delight properly and not metaphorically. From these things, then, the former part of the conclusion is sufficiently evident. But the latter is most easy, because, if the good is taken abstractly when it is said of every being, the sense is not that every notion of good, namely of the honest, useful and delightful, is found in any being whatever, but simply the notion of good; which will be true if at least some notion of good is found in each being. The transcendent good, therefore, taken in that abstraction, can be assigned as a property of being, although in particular it is to be attributed to each being according to the proper mode and determinate notion of goodness and fittingness.

Whether relation expresses perfection

11. The opinion of some.—The view of others.—To the reason for doubting posited at the beginning the answer is by denying that the good is not convertible with being. But to the proof about the former part, about the good absolutely said, it must be answered one by one. In the first is touched upon the common difficulty about real relation, whether it expresses perfection, which the theologians are wont to dispute on the occasion of the mystery of the Trinity, because, if relation as such expresses perfection, the divine relations too will express it; whence it will come about that some perfection is in one person which is not in another, and more perfections in many persons than in one, and in the Trinity than in the essence, all of which are repugnant to the equality of the divine persons. On account of this cause, then, many deny that relation, as it is relation, expresses perfection or imperfection, but say that it is related in neither way. So holds Cajetan, De ente et essentia, c. 2, around the middle, where he supposes this as commonly received in the school of St. Thomas and of Scotus. And St. Thomas indeed favours it, I, q. 42, a. 4, ad 2, where he thinks that perfection as such expresses something absolute. Of Scotus I shall speak below; the same is held by Cajetan, I, q. 28, a. 2, around ad 3; Capreolus, In I, dist. 1, q. 7, ad 3; Aureolus, Contra 1 conclus.; Durandus, In III, dist. 1, q. 3, n. 12; and Marsilius, In I, q. 32, a. 3. And, the theological reason being omitted, this opinion can be founded, because it seems incredible that from this alone, that another becomes white or black or changes place, I acquire or lose some perfection because I lose or acquire a relation of likeness, nearness and similar ones. But others use a distinction, because relation can be considered as regards being in the subject, and as such they say that relation expresses perfection; or according to being toward the term, and as regards this they deny that it expresses perfection, because being toward, as toward, posits nothing in the subject; whence of itself it is common to relations of reason; and Capreolus signified this, saying that relation in so far as it is such does not express perfection, because as such it posits nothing in that to which it is attributed.

12. But because of the nature of relation it is to be disputed below in its proper place, it must now briefly be supposed that this question proceeds of true and real relations, which are true things or real modes of beings, not now disputing which relations are of this kind or how they are, which will be done in the aforesaid place. This, then, being supposed, I do not see how according to the above opinions satisfaction can be made to the difficulty proposed, except by limiting the conclusion posited above, namely that the good is convertible with absolute being, but not with being as it is common to absolute and respective; or certainly that, although every being as it is distinguished from a mode of a thing expresses perfection, nevertheless the mode of the thing does not add a special goodness or perfection. But these limitations can have neither foundation nor truth. And the former indeed is repugnant to Aristotle, Ethics I, c. 6, saying that the good is divided equally with being, and wanders through all the predicaments; and he expressly says: The good is said both in substance and in quality and in that which is toward something, etc.; where St. Thomas says that the good is convertible with being, which is divided into ten predicaments; and this is the sense of all who say that the transcendent good is an attribute of being and convertible with it; that, therefore, is not a limitation but a destruction of the received opinion.

13. Moreover, that real being expresses some perfection does not belong to it only because it is absolute being, but simply because it has true entity, which constitutes such a being as it ought to be; and in this consists its being its perfection; and therefore Augustine said, Eighty-three Questions, q. 24: Everything which is, in so far as it is, is good; and De libero arbitrio III, c. 15, he said: Whatever is as it ought to be, is good; and De doctrina Christiana I, c. 32, when he had said that God is he who supremely is, he says: But the other things which are cannot be except from him, and they are good in so far as they have received that they are; and Boethius, De hebdomadibus, c. 2: Whatever is (he says), in that it is, is good; therefore goodness does not follow upon this or that mode of entity, but upon the entity due to the thing; but relation is supposed to have proper entity, through which it has such being as it ought to have; therefore also goodness.

14. Moreover, how can real being be understood without some real perfection? For, by whatever reason someone may have feigned that this can be understood in relative entity, although it is not found in absolute, someone will be able to feign the same in any accidental entity whatever, or also in any real mode whatever, namely that it expresses no perfection, even though it is something real; which nevertheless universally to concede of all accidents or real modes is altogether false. Nor can a sufficient reason of difference be assigned between relation and other modes, if we suppose that relation is a true thing or a real mode; for, although relation expresses order to the term, nevertheless according to the whole of what it is it affects the subject and is in it. Whence that distinction of relation according to being in or according to being toward helps nothing; for, if being toward is true and real, it is necessary that it affect the subject which it refers to the term; whence, just as relation, even according to being toward, posits in the subject something real, so also it posits something of goodness or perfection. Nor is it true that relation according to being toward prescinds from being in, as it does not prescind from the being of being or of accident, because that being in is transcendent to all accidents and their modes, as being itself is to all beings and modes of beings. Nor is it true either that being toward abstracts from real and of reason except in word only; for a relation of reason, as it is not a true relation, so neither does it have being toward, but is feigned to have it, or is conceived as if it had it.

15. True and real relation as such includes goodness and perfection.—It must be said, then, that relation as it is relation, as it expresses proper entity or a mode of entity, so also expresses proper goodness or perfection, as Ockham and Gabriel rightly taught, In I, dist. 19, q. 1; and Gregory, q. 1, a. 1; and Durandus indicates it, In II, dist. 34, q. 1, ad 3; nor does Scotus dissent, in the said Quodlibet V, for in his last words he leaves the matter doubtful and undecided; and In I, dist. 1, q. 2, first argument, he proves from the testimony of Aristotle, from Ethics I, adduced above, that relation has proper goodness, and in the solution he concedes that it has goodness speaking in common, yet not perfect goodness which would constitute a special notion of an object to be enjoyed, of which elsewhere. And certainly, if anyone considers the testimonies of Scripture and of the Saints by which we proved that every created being is good, and the reason and mode by which we declared that goodness belongs adequately to being, he will plainly understand that it proceeds equally of any being whatever which has some entity in itself, so that it is necessary that it have so much perfection in itself and be some good in itself, whatever may be the case whether it is fitting to some other besides itself or the thing constituted through it in so far as it is such. It is confirmed and declared, for on account of the same general expressions and reasons the entity of the act of sin cannot be excepted, nor any real mode or difference of it, from being, in so far as it is such, made by God and good; therefore the same holds of any other positive notion of being whatever, however respective it is.

16. Whether the divine relations express perfection from their proper concept.—The opinion of some is rejected.—But to the theological difficulty some answer that, although created relation expresses perfection from its proper concept and notion, nevertheless divine relation from its proper concept expresses no perfection. Which they say chiefly in order to avoid that inconvenience, that some perfection is in one person which is not in another. But they give the reason of the difference, because created relation expresses finite perfection; but uncreated relation cannot express finite perfection, because this is repugnant to the divine perfection; nor can it from its proper notion express infinite perfection, because this infinity can belong only by reason of the essence. But it is wonderful that they think it inconvenient that some divine thing express of itself finite perfection, and do not reckon it a disadvantage that the same divine thing express of itself no perfection, although nevertheless of its genus it is better to express some perfection than none. I add that it can easily be understood that relation from its proper concept is infinite in the genus of paternity or filiation, etc., yet is not infinite in the genus of being except by reason of the essence which it includes.

17. The view of others is refuted.—Others give the reason of the difference, because created relation is distinguished from the nature of the thing from every absolute thing and perfection, and therefore it is necessary that it bring with it its perfection. But divine relation is not distinguished from the nature of the thing from the absolute perfection of the divine nature, but includes it in itself with perfect identity and simplicity, and therefore it is not necessary that it bring perfection with it; and Gregory indicates this answer above. Nevertheless neither does that reason satisfy me; for, although it rightly concludes that divine relation cannot express perfection distinct from the nature of the thing from the essence, it does not conclude that it does not express perfection distinct by reason, namely in the way in which it expresses entity. And as regards this no sufficient reason of difference can be assigned why it is of the notion of created entity that according to every positive notion of its own it express some perfection, and not with greater reason belong to uncreated entity, since this of its genus is better, indeed necessary by virtue of the common concept of real being as such. Whence the reason made about the convertibility between being and good urges equally in the divine relations as in created ones. For if, as Aristotle said, the good is divided equally with being, just as in God there are absolute and respective being, although distinct not in reality but by reason, so there will be absolute and respective goodness and perfection, distinct not in reality but by reason; therefore divine relation too from its proper concept will express perfection. And it is declared in this way, for, if to regard a son by a created relation is formally some perfection, how can it be understood that in the eternal Father to regard the Son is no perfection? But if it is formally a perfection, it is necessary that it be relative, because it consists in a relationship to the term; therefore that as such comes formally from the relation and not from the essence as essence, although these are not distinguished in reality.

18. Since uncreated relation expresses perfection, how the divine persons are equally perfect.—I think, therefore, that it must be conceded that every real relation expresses proper goodness or perfection. Nor does it come about thence that the divine persons are unequal in perfection, nor, absolutely speaking, that some perfection is in one which is not in the others, because in each person there is the same perfection infinite in the genus of being, formally or eminently including every perfection of all, both absolute and respective, both personal and essential. But of this more fully on I, qq. 28 and 42. To the other reason, that it seems incredible that a man is rendered more perfect because another becomes white, I answer that this is incredible in so far as it is incredible that a man acquires in himself something of entity or some real mode distinct from the nature of the thing from all which he had before, from this alone, that another becomes white. Whoever, therefore, believes this of entity, why will he say it is incredible of goodness or perfection? But whoever says that there are some relative denominations which, besides all the absolute things which are in one term or subject, connote nothing but the coexistence of the other extreme with these or those absolute conditions—whoever (I say) thinks so, will rightly and consistently say that relations of this kind express no perfection besides the absolute things with some mutual denomination. But we are not speaking of these relations or denominations, but of true respective entities or modes, which truly and intrinsically are in some subject or supposit regarding another term; and this concerning the first difficulty.

Whether mathematical things as such are perfect

19. The second and briefer difficulty was about mathematical things, which Aristotle denies are good. Which St. Thomas dissolves, I, q. 5, a. 3, ad 4, and De veritate, q. 21, a. 2, ad 4, asserting that mathematical things indeed have goodness in themselves, but that through mathematical science they are not considered in so far as they are good or fitting, but precisely and abstractly in so far as they have magnitude and according to it obtain some properties. Aristotle, therefore, who says of mathematical things that there is no goodness in them, speaks formally and precisely of them as they are under mathematical prescission or abstraction. Whence it is the same as if he said that the mathematician does not consider in quantity the notion of good or fitting; for quantity does not have the notion of good or fitting except as it exists or can exist in the nature of things or in sensible matter; and therefore it also prescinds from the notion of good and from the notion of end and the desirable, which Aristotle intends there. And, although Aristotle does not say that mathematical things are not good, but that in immobile things the nature of the good is not found, and thence concludes that in mathematics nothing is demonstrated through the final cause, nevertheless by immobile things he understands whatever are abstracted from all motion and action, such as are mathematical beings.

20. Some objections are proposed.—But you will object: for magnitudes too, as they are under mathematical abstraction, are beings; for they are not abstracted from being, otherwise the mathematicians would treat of beings of reason; therefore as such too it is necessary that they have goodness. Likewise, if abstraction from sensible matter alone were enough for things so abstracted not to be called good, then universal things abstracted from singulars would not be good either. The consequence is evident, because, just as mathematical things do not subsist so abstracted, so neither do the other universal things; and so it will come about that all things, in so far as they fall under science, are not good. Likewise, if mathematical things are not good because they are abstracted from motion, immaterial things too and all those which are considered in metaphysics would not as such be good, because they are much more abstracted from motion.

21. The objections proposed are satisfied.—To the first some answer that mathematical things as such, that is, as they are considered and abstracted in that science, are not true beings, because as such they cannot be. But this is not rightly said, because whatever is considered by the mathematician is true and absolute being and is considered as such. Nor is it necessary that it can be in the way in which it is considered; otherwise neither would universals be true beings. It is enough, then, that the things which are abstractly considered can truly be. Especially because, although quantity cannot naturally be except in sensible matter, nevertheless absolutely it does not involve a contradiction that it be separated; through that abstraction, therefore, the true notion of being is not excluded, neither from the thing considered according to itself, nor as it falls under such consideration. But it is otherwise of the notion of good; for although this is not excluded from the things themselves, it is nevertheless prescinded by such a science or such a consideration under such abstraction. Rightly, therefore, St. Thomas above answers in form by denying the consequence, because the notion of being is the first of all; but the notion of good, in the way in which it is distinct, is posterior, and therefore the mathematical sciences, although they do not abstract from entity, can prescind from goodness.

22. To the second the answer is that the reason of the abstraction of universals is not equal or similar; for mathematical things are not said to abstract from goodness because they are abstracted from inferiors, nor because they cannot be so abstracted, but because they are prescinded from every order to motion or action, and consequently from every notion of the fitting or desirable; but other universal natures, although they are considered abstracted from singulars, are nevertheless considered with order to motion or action, which takes its first origin from the end, on the testimony of Aristotle. Whence it comes about that the things considered in other sciences have in singulars all the conditions which pertain to the notion of good or to the notion of end, which indeed are considered by such sciences, although not in the singular but in the universal. But mathematics neither in the universal nor in the singular considers in the things objected to it those conditions or relationships which pertain to the notion of good or fitting.

23. To the third the answer is, first, that, although in other things from abstraction from physical motion abstraction from goodness is not rightly inferred, nevertheless in mathematical things Aristotle inferred it, because, since these things are not capable of another motion or action, while they are abstracted from this motion they are abstracted also from every action and from the causality of the end, and so from the notion of good. Or it can be said that the intelligences and other things which are considered in metaphysics, although they are abstracted from material and physical motion, are nevertheless not abstracted from metaphorical motion, by which the end moves. Whence below, Book XII, c. 7, Aristotle said that the first mover moves the other intelligences as loved and desired, which pertains to the notion of end and good.

Whether prime matter is good

24. In what sense matter is said not to be good simply.—The third difficulty was about prime matter, of which those who think that it does not have proper being nor proper actual entity would perhaps say that it does not have proper goodness, or at least does not have it of itself, but from the form; for, since the good follows being and is founded in it, as we said above from Augustine, St. Thomas and Boethius, if matter does not have being except from form, neither will it be able to have goodness, at least in act, but at most in potency; and so St. Thomas speaks, I, q. 5, a. 3, ad 3, and De veritate, q. 21, a. 2, ad 3. But it must be said that matter of itself and by its intrinsic notion has proper goodness and perfection, as St. Thomas also noted, Contra Gentiles III, c. 20, because it has its proper entity and nature distinct from the entity of the form. Likewise because among prime matters one is more perfect than another; for the matter of the heavenly bodies is more perfect than that of these inferior ones; there is, therefore, some perfection in matter. Likewise because matter naturally desires form as the complement of its perfection, and form also desires matter; but neither is anything desired except the good, nor does anything desire the good except that which is in some part good. Finally, although matter does not have existence except dependent on form, it nevertheless has its proper and inseparable existence with intrinsic order and dependence on form; so, then, it also has its goodness, as Dionysius also taught, On the Divine Names, c. 4. But because matter of itself in the genus of being is simply imperfect and has being only after the manner of a potency receptive of form, therefore, compared to beings simply, it is said to be not simply good but in potency; which is to be understood not of potency to any goodness whatever, even incomplete and potential (so to speak), but of potency to actual or complete goodness, which is through form; but this potentiality to form is in the breadth of being some actuality, and so also some goodness, although imperfect.

Whether created essences are perfect

25. Existing created essences are good.—The fourth difficulty was about the essences of creatures, of which we can speak in two ways. First, as they are actually in the nature of things. Secondly, as they are in potency before they exist. In the former way it is certain that such essences are good with their intrinsic and essential goodness, which is especially clear if through their formal entity they are actual beings. But those who distinguish in the thing itself the entity of essence, even actual, from the entity of existence must consequently say that also in the entity of essence there is found a proper transcendental goodness and perfection distinct from the being of existence itself and separable from it, as many think of the humanity of Christ, of which matter we shall speak below. But speaking in the latter way of the essences of things not yet existing, some say that, although they are beings, they are not good, because the good is convertible with being in act, not with being in potency. Which St. Thomas indicated, I, q. 5, a. 1, saying that the good is the same as the perfect; but that each thing is perfect in so far as it is in act, because being is the actuality of every thing. He has the same in Contra Gentiles I, c. 38, where Ferrariensis adds or declares that not only being actually existing, but also that having order to existence, is good, as it is also desirable.

26. Non-existing created essences, as they are only beings in potency, so also are good.—It must be said, then, that in this too being and good are equated and reciprocated; for the essences of things not existing, as they are not actually beings, so neither are they actually good; and as they are in potency in so far as they can receive being, so also they are good in potency in so far as they can receive actual perfection and goodness. But as regards the use of words, that too is wont to be called being which does not exist, on account of the objective capacity of being; but nothing is wont to be called simply good except what actually exists, and so also nothing is desired except in order to actual existence, that is, in so far as it has it, or at least in so far as it is hoped to have it, or is in some way apprehended with it, as is taken from St. Thomas, I, q. 82, a. 3; and Cajetan noted it, I, q. 5, a. 3, at the end. Whence also the divine will is properly said to love those creatures which it wills sometime to be; but possible creatures which it has decreed never to produce it does not properly love, because it communicates to them no actual good; but that being in potency is not now in them some actual goodness. But if in some way God is said to take pleasure in them, it is either according to the being which they have in God himself, or according as they are denominated possible from the omnipotence of God, which is rather to take pleasure in his omnipotence, from which those things too which are not have it that they are possible.

Whether mode, species and order are necessary in every notion of good

27. The fifth difficulty has been dispatched from what was said above; for we said that the good, in so far as it is taken from proper entity and perfection, is convertible with being, and in this way every being is good; yet not as the good is taken in creatures from accidental perfection superadded to essence. So, then, when the good is said to consist in mode, species and order, if it is understood of accidental mode, beauty and composition or order, then it is true that not every created being has due mode, species and order; from which it only follows that not every created being is simply good, not that it is not in some way good. But if those three are taken more intrinsically and essentially, there is no thing which does not have a mode connatural to itself, as, for example, that it is substance or accident; and a species, that is, a form or species due to it; and is ordered to its proper end. And so the good too which includes these three is convertible with being. Wherefore, lest there be equivocation in the word by which something is called good simply, it is necessary to notice that simply can be taken either as adding something to the transcendent good itself, so that that is called good simply to which nothing is lacking for the consummated perfection due to it, and in this sense it is not necessary that every created being be good simply; or that word simply can be taken otherwise to signify that which absolutely and without addition can be called good; and in this sense we say that each thing is simply good as it is simply being, and in the same proportion has the mode, species and order due to its nature, as St. Thomas declares more fully, in the said q. 5, a. 5.