Disputationes metaphysicae

1. The first division.—Before we treat how the good is an attribute of being, it is necessary to declare some divisions of the good, so that it may thus better be evident which notion of good is attributed to being. And first indeed the good is wont to be divided into the true good and the merely apparent good. That is called the true good which is such as it is thought and known to be; but the apparent that which is thought, yet is not in the thing. But this division belongs to the good in the same way in which it can be attributed to any being or notion of being; for there is true and apparent gold, and so of other things. But by a peculiar reason this partition is wont to be declared in the good, because, since the proper causality of the good is to move and allure the appetite, the good thought to be such does this almost equally with the true, because, since it is applied through knowledge to move the appetite, it moves as much as it is judged or thought to be, although in reality it is not such. Of the merely apparent or supposed good, then, there is nothing for us to say, because its notion consists only in this, that it is thought to be such as the true good is wont to be, although in truth it is not such. Whence as many as are the true goods, so many can be feigned by supposition, because in every genus of goods error and false estimation can be found.

2. The second division.—Secondly the good can be divided into that which is good in itself and that which is good to some other. Of which division enough has been said in the preceding section, where we indicated that, although the notion of good which is an attribute of being can be accommodated to each being in so far as it has perfection fitting to itself, it is nevertheless found more clearly in any being in so far as it is fitting and consonant to some other. To this is added also that this notion of the good of another supposes or includes the notion of good in itself; for nothing is properly and rigorously good to another except what is good in itself and has perfection fitting to another. I said properly and rigorously, because sometimes the lack of some form is thought good to something, although formally it confers no perfection on it nor has any in itself; but privation is not properly good, but is sometimes so denominated because it deprives of an unfitting form and under that notion is desirable. The good of another, therefore, supposes the good in itself, and therefore the other divisions of the good seem chiefly to be of that which is good to another, and they will be explained by us in it; yet at the same time we shall declare those which pertain to being in so far as it is good in itself.

The division into the honest, the useful and the pleasant good is expounded

3. Thirdly and chiefly the good is wont to be divided into the honest, the delightful and the useful. St. Thomas hands down this division, I, q. 5, a. 6, and II-II, q. 145, a. 3, and adduces it from Ambrose, De officiis I, cc. 9 and 10, where he indicates it obscurely enough; Aristotle taught it more clearly, Ethics II, c. 3, and Book VIII, c. 2, where he calls the honest absolutely good, distinguishing it from the pleasant and the useful. But St. Thomas notices there that this division was chiefly handed down of the human good, yet that it can be accommodated to the good in common or according to itself. We shall first, then, declare it in the human good, in which those notions of good are found properly and without metaphor; afterwards we shall see how it can be applied to the good as such. But it is to be supposed that the discussion is of man in so far as he is man, that is, in so far as he uses reason; both because reason is the supreme rule of every good fitting to man—reason (I say) either natural, if man is considered only philosophically, or illumined by divine light, if he is considered theologically—and also because the proper and formal notions of these goods, especially of the honest and the useful, cannot be discerned except through reason.

4. In how many ways something is fitting to another.—Since, then, the good is the same as the fitting, something can be fitting to man in two ways: in one way through itself, namely because that perfection which it has in itself is of itself consonant and fitting to man. Which can still happen in two ways: first, that it be fitting in order to the delight which such a good brings with it, and this is the delightful good. Secondly, without order to delight, but only because it of itself becomes or is fitting to man as such, and this is the honest good. But in another way something is fitting not through itself, but only by reason of another good which can be obtained through it or by means of it, namely because, although regarded of itself it brings no delight nor of itself becomes or is fitting to man, nevertheless, as it can contribute to obtaining another good, it is thought fitting; and this is the useful good. And so it is evident both that those three members are contained under the notion of good and that they are in some way distinct among themselves, at least by formal notion conceived or by relationship; for it is not always necessary that they be distinguished in the thing or in the subject; for it is evident that the same thing, for example love or devotion toward God, is honest and pleasant and useful.

5. Finally, from the said declaration it is easily understood that those members exhaust the thing divided, because neither can a medium be found between the good per se or in order to another, since these are opposed immediately and as it were by contradiction; nor besides the good fitting on account of delight or without it, but only on account of itself, can another member be thought out, since these members too are distinguished as it were by contradiction or immediate negation, because every good which is per se fitting, the reason of delight being prescinded, is reputed honest. I say, however, delight being prescinded, because these members are to be distinguished by prescissive rather than negative abstraction, if they are compared to the thing which is denominated good, because in order that a thing be honest it is not necessary that it be pleasant or useful, but only that it have some notion of fittingness on account of which it is lovable, even if it is neither pleasant nor useful; and so of the rest. Whence formally and as it were conditionally these members can be distinguished even by negative abstraction; for it is of the notion of the honest as honest that for its notion and fittingness sufficient to move right appetite it does not require delight or utility, whether in the thing it has them conjoined or not; for even if it did not have them, it would be sufficiently good and fitting and in its order; and the same holds proportionally of the rest. And in this way the aforesaid division seems sufficiently expounded.

Various difficulties about the aforesaid division

6. The first difficulty, about the honest good.—But in order that it may be more exactly declared, some difficulties arising must briefly be treated. The first is how the honest good is said to be per se fitting. For either it is said to be per se fitting as a form almost agreeing with the nature of man as he is rational, in the way in which heat is per se fitting to fire; and so it follows that the very powers of intellect and will are honest goods, which is against Augustine, De libero arbitrio II, c. 19, where, distinguishing all the goods of man into greatest, middle and least, he places the powers of the soul in the middle order, because we can use them badly, whereas those seem to be the greatest goods which are honest. Next it follows that God is not the honest good of man, because he is not per se fitting to him after the manner of a form. It follows also that the action of giving alms is not an honest good, because it is not some form per se fitting to man. Or the honest good is said to be per se fitting not as a form, but as an operation becoming to man; and so first of all the same inconvenience follows concerning God. And further it follows that the virtues, especially infused ones, are not honest goods, because they are not operations of man, which is plainly false and against Augustine in the place cited. Or the honest good is said to be per se fitting objectively, namely because it is a good per se lovable, which notion is more universal; for it can belong both to operation, both internal and external, and to any form whatever, and to God himself. But not even in this way are all the difficulties touched upon avoided, because it follows that the powers of the soul are to be reckoned among honest goods; indeed also health and the other goods of the body, which are per se lovable. And moreover another difficulty arises, because this notion, namely that some object is per se lovable without order to delight, cannot be the first notion of good which is found in such an object, because it supposes the notion of good on account of which such an object is per se lovable. As in the preceding section we were saying that the notion of the desirable supposes the notion of the good and fitting; for the thing is desirable because it is good and fitting; but it is the same to be a good per se lovable as to be per se desirable; this, therefore, cannot be the first notion in which the honest good consists.

7. The second difficulty, about the delightful good.—The second difficulty is about the delightful good, how it has a peculiar and proper notion of good in itself and per se desirable; for by the delightful good is to be understood either the object about which delight is concerned, or the delight which arises from such an object. If the first is said, it follows that this good is no more per se and in itself good than the useful good. It is proved, because it is not good because it has delight in itself, which is a thing distinct from it, but because it is apt to generate delight, which seems to be a certain utility consisting in a relationship to delight itself, by reason of which such an object is lovable. As food, for example, if it is loved because it confers health, is said to be loved as a good useful for health; therefore, if it is loved in so far as it brings delight, it will be loved as useful for delight; therefore the delightful good taken in this way is not per se and in itself good, nor does it differ formally from the useful good, but only materially, or as the particular from the common. But if delight itself is said to be the delightful good, as St. Thomas indicates in the cited place of the First Part, it is indeed true that delight is a certain act per se fitting and consonant to the nature or appetite which delights; yet no reason appears why this peculiar fittingness of such an act is distinguished from others and constitutes its peculiar notion of good more than the fittingness which any other act has with the faculty of operating, as the understanding of truth with the intellect and the vision of a beautiful object with sight. And moreover the notion of the delightful good does not seem able to consist primarily in delight itself; for delight is concerned with some good as good, since it is the rest of the appetite, which does not rest except in good attained; therefore delight supposes in the object a notion of good prior to delight and which is such in itself and not through order to delight; for the good in which we delight is not therefore good because it delights, but rather therefore delights because it is good; delight, therefore, supposes in the object a fittingness and goodness distinct from delight itself. Of that, then, I inquire whether it constitutes the delightful good or not; for, if it constitutes it, then delight itself is not the first delightful good; indeed it does not even seem to have a similar fittingness or notion of good, because when we delight, for example, in the vision of a beautiful thing, the fittingness of the vision is of a far other notion than the fittingness of the delight, although the vision is the object of that delight. But if that goodness or fittingness which is in the object of delight does not constitute the delightful good, there will now be another good distinct from the three enumerated.

8. The third difficulty, about the useful good.—A third difficulty can be about the useful good, how it is denied to be good in itself and in this is distinguished from the rest; for the useful good, although it is useful to another distinct from itself, nevertheless has in itself its utility, which consists in some power or efficacy of providing that thing to which it is useful. It will perhaps be said that the goodness of the useful thing does not consist in the utility itself, but in the fittingness and desirability which such utility has with respect to man, and consequently it will be said that the useful good does not have this fittingness of itself, but from the end to which it is useful. Against this, however, is the fact that, although the fittingness of the useful good supposes the fittingness of that thing to which it is useful, and is perhaps derived from it, nevertheless, that being supposed, in truth the useful good itself, in so far as it has a relationship to such a thing, has in itself a proper fittingness, by reason of which it is good and lovable; therefore in this there is no formal difference between the useful good and other goods; for the honest or delightful good too can sometimes receive its notion from a relationship to something extrinsic. Indeed the honest good is sometimes such from conformity to an extrinsic law, or at least from the fittingness which results in it, such a law being supposed. Whence it also comes about that some useful good has no other fittingness or goodness except that of honesty; as, for example, the affliction of the body, in so far as it is useful for satisfying God, has no other goodness except honest; and by the same reason a means which is only useful for taking delight has no fittingness or goodness except a certain participation of that delight; therefore the useful good is not rightly distinguished from the others.

9. The fourth, about the same.—And hence arises a fourth difficulty, why the useful good is not divided into two; for the useful good is such as is that to which it is ordered; therefore, just as of the good per se lovable one is honest and another delightful, so of the good from utility to another, one is honest, another delightful.

10. The last difficulty, about the sufficiency of the division.—The last difficulty is that the aforesaid division seems insufficient; for besides the said notions of good there seems to be another which can be distinguished or prescinded from them; for there are certain goods per se lovable, not because they delight, nor because they are honest, but precisely because they perfect nature, as health, science, integrity of body, and being and living itself; for even if we prescind in the mind every delight, these are goods and lovable, as is self-evident; and similarly, although we prescind all notions of virtue, these are lovable as connatural goods, and on account of them other things can be loved as useful, honesty being prescinded. A sign of which is that sometimes they are sought through honest means, sometimes through base ones, not for delight but only for natural fittingness; there is, therefore, some notion of good distinct from those three.

The first difficulty is dispatched

11. In order to satisfy the first difficulty and to declare what properly the honest good is, it is to be noticed that the honest good can be said or taken in two ways. In one way, in order to human and moral actions as they can be regulated by right and prudent reason; and in this way that is called the honest good which per se and of itself becomes a man or a person using reason, as is taken from St. Thomas, II-II, q. 145, a. 1 and following. In which fittingness no advantage is considered which would accrue through such a good to that person with respect to whom it is said to be a good of this kind; for this, although it often intervenes, is nevertheless per se and formally not necessary for honesty, but that becomingness and proportion suffices which is found between such a good and the nature which directs its operations by right reason. As to give alms is honest because it is per se consonant to rational nature, even if per impossibile the man so operating took no utility or advantage thence besides the right operating itself. In which way too with respect to God it is said to be fitting and honest to communicate himself, to do good and to show mercy, not because it is advantageous to him, but because it is per se becoming and proportioned to his goodness. The honest good, then, explained by this reason, expresses a peculiar notion of fittingness, and on the side of the thing which is called honest it includes its perfection with all the conditions, either physical or moral, necessary for the aforesaid fittingness with rational nature.

12. But this good is wont to be declared through fittingness to the dictate of right reason; for that good is honest which right reason dictates is to be done or loved, etc. Yet, if this saying is understood of right reason as it expresses the judgement or knowledge of that which it is expedient to do, then honesty does not consist in conformity to the dictate of reason, nor is that the first rule or first reason of such honesty. For the good is not therefore honest because right reason judges it to be such, but conversely, because the good itself is truly and in the thing such, therefore it is judged to be such by right and true reason. And therefore as regards us right judgement is the rule of the honest good, because it manifests it to us; yet according to itself that judgement supposes the proper fittingness from which the honest good has it that it is such; but this we say is to rational nature in so far as it is such and has such properties or attributes. But if the dictate of reason is taken not formally but as it were radically, then it is well and a priori said that the honest good is that which is conformed to reason, that is, which is conformed to rational nature, which for that reason is apt by nature to judge that this is to be done or desired by it.

13. But the honest good taken in this way can be distinguished into honest act, habit and object; for there are acts formally good and honest, as are the acts of the virtues, especially of the will; and to these correspond the habits of the virtues, which are deservedly reckoned among the greatest goods and honest ones, because they most of all become a man using reason; and to these acts or habits honest objects are supposed; for from these the acts and habits take their honesty, as St. Thomas indicates, I-II, q. 19, a. 1, ad 3, where this matter is disputed more fully, and q. 20, a. 1, ad 2, and De malo, q. 2, a. 3, in the body and ad 8. For the honest act as such is not concerned except with the honest good; whence it is necessary that it suppose such goodness in it, for the act of the will does not confer goodness on its object, but rather is founded in it, and therefore St. Thomas above calls this honesty primordial goodness.

14. And from these things the answer has been given to that whole first difficulty, in so far as it pertains to the honest good taken in this rigour and propriety. For we concede that this good is not limited to operation, or habit, or form, but belongs to every thing which is honestly and according to right reason desirable by man. We concede next that this good is not therefore such because it is per se fitting to the will or appetite of man in the notion of desirable object; for, as the argument made there rightly proves, this notion of per se desirable formally taken supposes fittingness with rational nature, by reason of which such a good is per se desirable to it.

15. But in another way the honest good can be taken, not in order to morals but in order to nature, and it is that which per se perfects nature and is advantageous to it even when the notion of virtue is set aside, as is health, integrity and life itself, which sometimes it is base to love or protect, even if of itself it seems most fitting to nature. And this good the ancient philosophers seem to have called the good of nature, which they distinguished from the honest good, which they called per se becoming, as is gathered from Cicero, De finibus III and IV. Yet, because this good of nature is per se fitting and lovable, therefore the appetite of nature is thought to be so compared to this good as the rational appetite to the per se becoming good; and by this reason, in order to nature, this good is comprehended under the honest good. To this is added also that this notion of good is sufficient for it to be honestly desired, if from elsewhere some impediment does not intervene; because, since right reason is that by which man ought to be ruled or governed, to it pertains also to propose the things which are advantageous and consonant to nature, unless from elsewhere something stands in the way or some greater disadvantage follows. Speaking in this way, then, of the honest good, it must be conceded that the powers of the soul are certain honest goods, not indeed in the way in which the virtues are, which we cannot use badly as we can the powers themselves, on account of which the latter are called by Augustine middle goods, the former the greatest; but by that reason by which goods pertaining to the integrity and completion of nature are per se fitting and, as far as depends on themselves, rightly lovable. And in this way being itself, living and knowing are honest. And not only inhering goods, but also extrinsic things which are sometimes per se fitting, at least as objects of vital acts, are reckoned among these honest goods; and so the first difficulty too has been dispatched as far as can pertain to this good, of which we shall say more in the solution of the last difficulty.

The second difficulty is treated

16. Concerning the second difficulty two things are to be distinguished which are touched upon there, namely delight and the object of delight; and of each it must be said that it is a good of itself in some way fitting and per se desirable. And indeed of delight itself this is self-evident; for it is an act which of itself greatly invites and draws the appetite, which is a sign that of itself it has great proportion with it. But of the object of delight it is proved, because the object of delight is good; therefore delight supposes goodness in that object, because the acts of the soul do not constitute their objects but suppose them; the object of delight, therefore, is not good and fitting because it is the object of delight, but conversely, because it is good and fitting, therefore it can be the object of delight. It is therefore of itself good and desirable, and not through mere denomination or relationship to delight, although perhaps the etymology or imposition of the name was taken thence. Hence, then, it is evident that, whether the delightful good is taken for delight itself, or for the object or that good which delights, or (which is probable) for both after the manner of one, namely for rest in such a thing—as beatitude is sometimes taken for objective, sometimes for formal, sometimes for the whole beatitude which after the manner of one embraces both—in whichever (I say) of these ways the delightful good is taken, it is deservedly called per se good and not only by extrinsic relationship or denomination, in which it is rightly distinguished from the useful good.

17. Again, the goodness or fittingness of delight itself is easily distinguished from the goodness or fittingness of honesty, either moral or natural; for the fittingness of delight consists only in that sweetness and vital rest (so to speak) which the appetite has in the good attained, whether it has other conformity with reason or rational nature or not; for these are accidental to the notion of delight as such. And for this cause the delightful good, at least by reason of delight, is deservedly distinguished from the honest good, both moral and natural; both because it has a peculiar fittingness, as I said; and also because it has a peculiar power of moving the appetite, from which it comes about that sometimes it moves not only against reason but also against the advantage of nature.

18. But of the goodness of the delightful object which is supposed in it in order that it cause delight, it is not easy to judge what it is and how it is distinguished from honesty either moral or natural. And the reason of the difficulty is that delight is of the fitting good attained or present, as is taken from Aristotle, Rhetoric I, c. 10; and St. Thomas at length, I-II, q. 31, a. 1 and following. But the fitting good, whose attainment is supposed to delight, is nothing other than the good fitting to nature, either to spiritual nature, if the delight is spiritual, or to corporeal, if it is sensible; but the good fitting to nature is nothing other than the honest good, either moral, if it is so fitting to rational nature as such that it is per se becoming, or natural, if it is only per se advantageous to nature, as pertaining to its perfection; therefore delight does not suppose the delightful good as delightful; indeed this rather seems to be an extrinsic denomination from delight itself in potency, as the visible from vision; but it supposes only the good fitting to the one desiring, in whose attainment he delights. And this is confirmed by examples; for when a sick man delights in health attained, he considers no other notion of good in order to delight except that advantage which health brings to his nature; therefore in health, as it is the object of delight, there is no other goodness besides the natural fittingness of health with the nature of man. In a similar way the beatific vision, or God clearly seen and possessed, is the object of perfect joy by no other reason than because it is a good supremely proportioned and fitting to the nature of man; therefore universally the delightful good fundamentally (so to speak) and in so far as it is intrinsically supposed to delight itself on the side of the object, is nothing other than the good per se fitting to nature, and so honest, either moral or natural.

19. To this it can be answered in two ways. First, by conceding the whole discourse made, and consequently saying that the delightful good is not distinguished from the good per se fitting to nature except as it includes delight, which is considered in such a good as the proper reason moving to its desire. Which seems to be the opinion of St. Thomas, I, q. 5, a. 6, and I-II, q. 32, a. 1, ad 3, where he says that operations are delightful in so far as they are connatural and proportioned to the operator; and in that whole question he indicates the same; and Cajetan signifies the same in the things which he notes about that first article. From which it must further consequently be said that the delightful good, in so far as it is called per se good and lovable, intrinsically includes delight itself, whether delight alone is apprehended as such a good per se fitting on account of what it is, that is, on account of that sweetness which it formally confers, or this whole, namely such an object as it has delight adjoined with it, is apprehended after the manner of one object which is called the delightful good, of which delight itself is as it were the form. Whence Aristotle, Ethics X, c. 2, says that pleasure is desirable for itself, and makes any good more desirable if it is added to it. In which words he indicates that delight indeed supposes a good; but that it itself, added to it, makes it more desirable, because, namely, it constitutes it pleasant and delightful; therefore such a good is completed and as it were formally constituted by delight itself. And St. Thomas signified this very thing, I, q. 5, a. 6, when he teaches that the delightful good terminates the appetite by reason of the delight, which is rest in the thing desired.

20. And he adds there, in the solution ad 2, that those things are properly called delightful goods which have no other notion of desirability, although otherwise they are both harmful and dishonest. Which words favour the said opinion, in so far as it is said in them that delight is the whole reason of desiring the delightful good as such; but in this, that it is said in them that there can be a thing in which there is altogether no other notion of the desirable besides delight, they seem to contradict what was said above; whence they seem false on account of the reason made above, that delight results from good attained and therefore it is necessary that it suppose another prior notion of good by reason of which it is desirable; there cannot, therefore, be a thing which brings delight and yet has no other notion of the desirable besides delight. But it can be said that St. Thomas did not intend to exclude from a thing of this kind every notion of fittingness prior to delight in which delight is founded, but wished to indicate that sometimes it happens that this fittingness is such that, delight being set aside, it does not make the thing simply desirable, because it is harmful or dishonest. According to this mode of speaking, then, to the second difficulty it must be conceded that that thing or operation which is the object of delight, although it has another prior notion of good, is nevertheless not a delightful good except only by that reason by which it has delight adjoined. Nor does it come about thence that this good is confused with the useful good, or has only an extrinsic notion of good in the way the useful good has, because the thing is compared to the delight which follows from it as its object, and therefore from both one delightful good, intrinsically and per se desirable, is thought to be constituted.

21. Another mode of answering can be that in the object of delight there is always found a certain special fittingness, by reason of which it can be the object of delight and from it be properly and intrinsically denominated a delightful good; and that that fittingness is distinct and can be separated or prescinded from the proper fittingness of honesty, both moral and natural. For, as Cajetan treats well, I-II, q. 32, a. 1, the object of delight is a thing or operation apprehended as fitting; but it is not necessary that this fittingness be in some way honest or advantageous to nature, but it is enough that it be proportioned to taste, for example, or to another sense or power. There seems, then, to be in these delightful objects a certain special mode of fittingness sufficient to constitute a special notion of good, which seems to be comprehended under delight, whenever delight is said to be the whole reason of the desirable in the delightful good as such. And so St. Thomas favours this mode of speaking, in the words cited above from I, q. 3 [recte q. 5], a. 6, ad 2.

22. But (to confess the truth) this latter mode of speaking can be neither sufficiently founded nor declared, because it cannot be understood what that special fittingness is besides that which is in the good constitution of nature, or in being or operating proportioned to nature. Which is taken from Aristotle, Ethics VII, cc. 12 and 13, and Book X, cc. 4 and 5, and Rhetoric I, c. 10, at the end, where in this sense he says that pleasure is an affection proceeding into nature all at once and sensibly, as St. Thomas expounds and treats, I-II, q. 31, a. 1, and q. 32, a. 1, and Cajetan there. Likewise, because delight tends into the same good and fitting thing into which love or desire tends; for it only differs from them because it tends into that good as present and attained; but with respect to love or desire, delight being set aside, no other notion of fittingness is understood besides that which pertains to moral or natural honesty, or at least it is most certain that love and desire can be directly borne into fittingness of this kind, or into the good under such a notion; therefore it is equally certain that delight does not require in its object another notion of fittingness; therefore to think out or feign it as prior to delight itself neither has foundation nor can be sufficiently explained. For that some delights arise from a peculiar fittingness of the object with some faculty, as with taste or touch, is only either because that quality which is perceived by the sense and produces delight is the connatural and per se fitting object of such a faculty, or because the operation upon which such a delight follows is similarly a natural perfection proportioned to the power. And so always a notion of good of this kind which is supposed on the side of the object to delight is reduced to the good per se fitting to nature. The former answer, therefore, is more solid, and through it satisfaction is sufficiently made to the second difficulty posited above.

The third difficulty is dispatched together with the fourth

23. To the third difficulty, about the good and the useful, some concede that the useful good has its proper and intrinsic goodness by reason of which it is in itself desirable, although not for its own sake. For these two are diverse; for the means is truly loved in itself, that is, it terminates in itself the movement of love; whence it is necessary that it have in itself a useful goodness distinct from the goodness of the end, by reason of which it can terminate the affection of love or election; yet it is not loved for its own sake, because that goodness is not absolute, but respective to the end, or for the sake of the end, and because the end is the first cause of loving the means or useful good. Whence it comes about that according to this opinion the useful good is not distinguished from the rest by this, that it is only good with the extrinsic goodness of the end, but because it has its whole goodness in order to the end. And this opinion can be confirmed, because it is repugnant to be good and to be good with another’s goodness; for good is the same as perfect; but no thing is perfected by mere extrinsic denomination from another’s perfection; but the useful good is truly good; therefore it is not good by mere denomination from the goodness of the end, but has in itself its proper goodness. But this opinion is false, as we shall say more fully below in disputing about the final cause. And it is against St. Thomas, I, q. 5, a. 6, especially in the solution ad 2, where he speaks thus: Those things are called useful which have in themselves nothing whence they are desired, but are desired only as they lead to another, as the taking of bitter medicine.

24. Rightly, then, in proposing the third difficulty, it was answered that it is one thing to speak of utility as it signifies the power which is in the useful good for the effect to which it is called useful, another to speak of that utility in order to the one desiring, to whom such a good is useful. In the former way it is true that utility can be some power and perfection intrinsic to the useful good itself, which perfection, compared to the very good which is denominated useful, is fitting to it, not as a useful good, but as a good per se proportioned and connatural to it; as in medicine, for example, which is useful for health because it has the power of expelling some humour, it is clear that that power is some intrinsic property of such medicine, which with respect to it is not useful but per se fitting and desirable to it; but with respect to man that power can be called the utility which is in such a thing in order to such an end. But this whole utility, compared to man and considered per se alone, will not be found good, fitting or desirable to him, but is only thought fitting in so far as health itself, the diminution or expulsion of such a humour, is fitting. Whence, if man now does not need such a purgation for health, that power of the medicine is not fitting to man; but if he needs it, it is thought fitting only on account of health. Therefore the whole power, although intrinsic to the medicine, is not of itself fitting to man nor desirable to him, but only in so far as it is in a certain way informed and denominated by the goodness of the end; therefore the goodness and fittingness which is in the useful good formally taken, as it is useful, is not intrinsically in it completely and formally; but there is in it as it were materially the utility itself or active power of another thing; but formally the fittingness and the whole notion of desirability is the goodness of the end. An argument of which too is that the useful good as useful does not excite nor draw nor move the appetite to itself; otherwise the means as means would have the causality of the end, which is false; but it is the end which moves the will to desire the means or useful good; whence, although the will tends into the useful thing as into the material object, and in this way the useful good is said to terminate in itself the movement of the will, nevertheless formally that movement too is terminated at the end, because it is the whole reason of tending into the means, and therefore in the useful good an intrinsic and formal goodness is not required for determining such an act.

25. To the fourth difficulty, then, the answer is by denying that the useful good as such has of itself a proper fittingness with respect to the one desiring, by reason of which it is good and desirable to him; but it has it from the end not only as from a radical and remote cause, but as from a formal and proximate one, because it not only has its fittingness and goodness through a relationship to the end, but has it from the end itself as from an extrinsic form and reason on account of which it is lovable. And in this the useful good properly differs from the honest and the delightful. Wherefore, if sometimes there is some useful good which of itself has a proper fittingness with nature or right reason, under that notion it is not useful but honest and per se lovable. Whence that among useful goods some can be honest, others delightful, happens only materially, in so far as these notions of good can be conjoined in the same thing, indeed even denominate one another; for both honesty and delight can be useful for the salvation either of soul or of body, and utility itself can be honest. Formally, however, these notions are diverse, and the notion of the useful good is found in the same proportion whether the utility is to delight or to honesty or to another advantage of nature; and therefore it was not necessary to divide the useful good into various members.

The fifth difficulty is dispatched

26. The fifth difficulty has been dispatched from what has been said. For we distinguished the honest good in order to virtue or the rule of right reason, which is the same as per se becoming and consonant to right reason, and the good in order to nature, which is per se fitting and advantageous to it. If, therefore, the honest good is taken in the former way, we confess that it is not an adequate member of this division, not only with respect to inferior things which do not use reason, but not even with respect to man himself, who (as the argument convinces) can love some good as per se fitting to himself not on account of honesty nor on account of delight, but only on account of the preservation or advantage of his nature. But the honest good taken in the latter way is thus an adequate member of that division, which St. Thomas declared in this way above, where he says that everything is called honest good which is desired as ultimately terminating the movement of appetite, as a certain thing into which the appetite tends per se.

27. The natural honest good is diffused through all beings.—The useful good is found in all things.—Only knowing things are properly capable of the delightful good.—And hence it is understood, first, in what way this division has place in the good in common as it abstracts from the human good, and in what way its members are found in other things than man. For the natural honest good is properly found in inferior things, not only sentient but also inanimate; for in all is found some perfection which per se terminates animal or natural appetite, as is being itself or being preserved, which any thing whatever desires. Whence it comes about that in any thing whatever too the useful good can properly be found through a relationship to this good of nature; for so the swallow gathers straws to build a nest, which action is good by no other reason except because it is useful; and downward motion with respect to the stone is compared as a useful good, because per se it does not pertain to its perfection, but only that it be constituted in its proper place. But the delightful good is properly found in knowing things, more perfectly indeed in those using reason than in those only sensing; yet truly and properly in both; but to things lacking knowledge it can be attributed only through metaphor and a certain analogy, in so far as each thing has rest in its proper good attained; yet, because that rest is not through a proper act but through the mere lack of motion, therefore it cannot have a proper and special notion of good. Wherefore, when this division is given of the good in common, the sense is not that all these three goods are found in each thing, but that simply there are given in things or beings such notions of goods; and conversely that all notions of goods found in any beings whatever are sufficiently comprehended under the three aforesaid. But whether these three notions of good can be apprehended and discerned only by the intellect, or can also be known by sense, and how, does not pertain to this place, but is to be treated in the science of the soul. Let St. Thomas be read, I, q. 78, a. 4, q. 81, a. 2; and Cajetan there, and I-II, q. 40, a. 3.

28. Whether the division of the good into the aforesaid members is analogical, and by what analogy.—Secondly it is gathered from what has been said of what kind the aforesaid division is; for St. Thomas, in the cited place, ad 3, absolutely says that the good is not divided into these three as univocal but as analogous, which is said first of the honest good, then of the delightful, lastly of the useful. But if we speak of proper and rigorous analogy, by which one thing is said to be such through denomination from another, then there is true analogy between the useful good and the rest, because the useful good is not good except through denomination from another which is per se good and fitting. And this is proved by a certain argument made above, that no thing is good through extrinsic denomination; for that is true of the good simply, yet not of the good in a certain respect and analogically; for nothing forbids a good of this kind to be constituted through denomination from extrinsic goodness. But in this way there does not seem to be proper analogy between the delightful good and the honest; for the delightful good of itself and per se is simply good, not through denomination from the honest good, but from its own extrinsic [recte intrinsic] conformity and goodness, a sign of which is: for, all honesty, true or supposed, being taken away, if some delight remains, it is per se good and lovable; therefore it is not denominated good through analogy to the honest.

29. Wherefore it can be said, first, that this analogy is not equal in each good, but that in the useful good it is proper, but in the delightful it is taken more broadly, to indicate that it is an imperfect good in comparison with the honest good, not that it is not absolutely and simply good, since of itself and without relationship to another it has whence it is desired; just as conversely pain, which is opposed to delight, is simply evil, although it is not the greatest evil; and so in Scripture the evil of punishment is called simply evil. Or otherwise it can be said that in each good, the useful and the delightful, there is analogy, yet not of the same mode; for in the useful good there is the analogy of attribution, taken from an extrinsic form, such as is in healthy as it is said of medicine; for so medicine is called good or useful as it is called healthy. But in the delightful good analogy can be saved, not indeed through extrinsic denomination, as the reason made above proves, but through the intrinsic relationship of one to another, such as is found in accident with respect to substance. For so the delightful good intrinsically supposes another good per se fitting, in which the appetite rests through delight; and by its nature delight was instituted only for this, that it be as it were a certain grace and as it were a certain seasoning of another superior good. And therefore it is an imperfect order to desire operation for the sake of delight, stopping in it, since rather delight is to be loved for the sake of operation, as it was instituted. But especially with respect to man, the delightful good which does not have honesty adjoined cannot be thought simply good, because it both deprives of a greater good and does not conduce to the good simply of man, which is to live according to reason, as St. Thomas said in a similar case. And in this sense the Fathers sometimes say that nothing is good but virtue, as is evident from Jerome, on Isaiah 11; and Ambrose, De officiis I, c. 9.

30. What the natural good and what the moral good is.—Thirdly it is understood from what has been said another division of the good into natural good and moral good, which, although it can be understood of the good in common, because the delightful and useful good too can be either natural or moral, is nevertheless properly wont to be given of the honest good, generally taken, which can be the ultimate term of appetite as per se fitting. The moral good, then, is the same as the honest good more strictly taken for that which per se becomes and is consonant to rational nature as such; but the natural good is that which is per se fitting to any nature whatever. You will say that according to this description the moral good too is a natural good, because rational nature is a certain nature, and the moral good is consonant to it after the manner of a form or operation. The answer is, first, that nature can be taken as it signifies only the essence of the thing, and in this sense it is true that every good can be called natural in so far as it is fitting to some nature, or in so far as it has the perfection which its nature postulates; and in this way the objection made proceeds. But otherwise nature is taken as it expresses not only the essence of the thing but also the mode of operating or desiring from the mere impulse of nature and a certain necessity; and in order to nature taken in this way natural operation is wont to be distinguished from free or moral; and in the same sense the division of the good into moral and natural is given; for the goodness and perfection of a thing is chiefly discerned from operation, or sometimes is even consummated through it, and therefore according to the diverse modes of operating the division of the good into natural and moral has been taken. That, therefore, is called natural good which is consonant to any nature whatever according to that which it naturally is or can naturally operate; but that is moral good which is consonant to a thing as it operates freely; for custom, whence the moral is named, consists in free operation, as is evident.

31. Although, then, the natural and the moral good agree in this, that each is per se fitting to some thing or nature (for this notion cannot be excluded from that good which is per se and simply such), they nevertheless differ because the natural good precisely regards nature as such, or as operating naturally; but the moral good regards it as it is elevated to the mode of operating freely, which belongs to it most properly as it is rational; and therefore the moral good is said to be consonant to rational nature as such, both in grade and in mode of operating. Whence it comes about that the moral good chiefly consists in free operation; but it belongs in its own way also to its proper object in so far as it is honest, and to the virtue which is its principle. In which way Aristotle said, Ethics II, c. 6, that virtue is that which makes the one having it good, and renders his work good. But what in all these moral goodness as moral is, or what this denomination adds to goodness itself, does not pertain to this place but to moral philosophy, and is treated by the theologians on I-II, q. 18.

32. Fourthly, from what has been said other divisions of the good can easily be declared, which are material rather on the side of the things which are denominated good than formal on the side of goodness or fittingness itself. So the good is divided into transcendent good and good of the genus of quality by St. Thomas, De potentia, q. 9, a. 7, ad 5. For this division is not given according to diverse formal notions of the good, but according to the same more or less contracted. For the transcendent good expresses in common the fitting perfection of the thing, especially that which each thing has through its entity, as will be declared in the following section. But the good of the genus of quality expresses the perfection which the thing has through some quality fitting to its nature, in which way the good of the genus of quantity could also be distinguished; but it is wont to be attributed rather to quality, because the greatest perfection of the creature is wont to be consummated by qualities.

33. Goods of body, of soul and of fortune, what they are.—The praiseworthy and honourable good, what it is.—Again the good is wont to be divided into the good of the body and of the soul and the extrinsic, which is wont to be called the good of fortune, as is evident from Aristotle, Ethics I, c. 8, who again, c. 12, distinguishes the good into praiseworthy and honourable. Which division seems to be taken a posteriori from the effect and as it were the reward of goodness, and does not seem to exhaust all goods; for the delightful good of itself is neither honourable nor praiseworthy, except in so far as it is either useful, or is conjoined with honesty or accompanies it and helps it. The honest good, then, is properly honourable in so far as it is desirable for its own sake; but that is called praiseworthy, as Aristotle wishes above, which is good as it is referred to another. Whence it is commonly wont to be said that useful goods are praiseworthy, which seems to be understood with a certain prescission; for those as such are only praiseworthy; but others are also honourable; for the honest good too is worthy of praise, yet not of praise alone, but also of honour; each good, therefore, is praiseworthy, but the one also honourable; and so the division is to be understood.

34. What the good simply and what in a certain respect is.—Moreover the good is wont to be divided into good simply and good in a certain respect. Which division can be understood in various ways; for, first, it can be applied to the three members posited above; of which the honest good, as we have said, is good simply, but the others only in a certain respect. Secondly it can be attributed to the transcendent good, in so far as it is said absolutely of being as it is good in itself. And this in two ways; one is that those members be referred to the whole breadth of being and of the good as such, in which sense that will be called good simply which contains in itself the whole goodness and perfection of being; but that is good in a certain respect which is good only in part. And in this way God alone is good simply; but every creature is only good in a certain respect. In which way that of Mark 10 can be understood: No one is good but God alone, who also alone by this reason is called the supreme good. And in this sense this division coincides with another which the theologians use, from Dionysius, On the Divine Names, cc. 1 and 4, and Augustine, De Trinitate VIII, c. 3, and Boethius, De hebdomadibus I, c. 2, dividing the good into good by essence and by participation. For the good by essence is the good simply; for it is the very essence of goodness, which sends forth the rays of goodness into all other things according to the capacity of each, as Dionysius says; whence it essentially includes in itself whatever can pertain to the notion of good and perfect, which is proper to God; and therefore he alone both is good by essence and good simply and supreme, but the others are goods in a certain respect and by participation.

35. The other sense of that division is that the members be referred not to the whole breadth of being, but to a determinate genus or species; and in this way the division can be applied to all genera or species of beings; and that will be called good simply which is a being having every perfection due to it in its order; but that will be good in a certain respect which has something of due perfection and lacks something. And in this way created substance is not good simply unless it is affected by its due accidents; nor is accident good simply unless it has due intension, or another similar perfection. And in this way Dionysius said above: The good is from an integral cause, but evil from any defect whatever.

36. What perfection is simply simple, what in a certain respect.—Thirdly it can be understood that in that partition the good is divided as it is fitting to another, and it can also be referred either to being as such or to determinate being. In the former sense that division almost coincides with another which the theologians hand down, dividing perfection into perfection simply simple and perfection in a certain respect, with Anselm, in the Monologion, c. 14. That good or perfection, then, is called simply such which in each being is better than not it, that is, which in the genus of being expresses such a perfection that it excludes no greater or equal one. But perfection in a certain respect, or in a certain genus, is that which, although it brings some goodness, nevertheless is repugnant with another greater or equal one, or has some imperfection admixed, as are all the perfections of creatures as they are in them. But in the latter sense the division can be applied in almost the same proportion to any genus of being; for to each thing that is good simply which brings some goodness to it and does not exclude a greater or equal one; so it is good for fire to be hot and for man to be temperate; but if it brings some goodness, yet excludes a greater of which that thing would be capable, it will not be good simply but in a certain respect; so to be black, although in itself it is some good to the man having it, is nevertheless not simply good, because it excludes being white, which is better for man. But in this sense simply and in a certain respect are only distinguished as more and less perfect, in which sense also sensible goods are called goods in a certain respect with respect to spiritual ones, and temporal with respect to eternal.