Disputationes metaphysicae

1. Since good is a connotative or denominative name, we are not here inquiring what that is which is denominated good; for it is certain that that, speaking in common, is being, which precedes the good in nature or reason, as was said above and will be more evident from what follows; but we inquire what that form or notion is from which a thing is denominated good. In explaining which there is the same variety of opinions as in the other attributes of being.

2. The first opinion says that goodness expresses no real notion, but only a relation of reason of the fittingness of one thing to another. Which opinion is indicated by Capreolus, In II, dist. 34, q. 1, and is explained in this way. For goodness, as is evident from the word itself and from the common mode of conceiving, does not add to being some privative notion, because privation rather expresses the lack of perfection or goodness; it expresses, therefore, a positive notion. Again, it does not formally express the very notion of entity, both because these two are conceived and explained by us by diverse concepts and definitions; and also because otherwise goodness would not be a property of being, but rather those words would be synonyms. Nor can goodness include entity in its concept and add something to it, because a property does not intrinsically include in its concept the nature or essence of its subject. It is necessary, therefore, that goodness express something superadded to being; but this cannot be something real, because, as was shown at length above of the attributes of being in common, to real being as such there cannot be added some real notion, distinct not only from the nature of the thing but even by reason, which would be its attribute. Likewise, because such a notion can be neither absolute nor a real relation, as we shall prove below; therefore the good can add over being only something of reason, which can be nothing but the aforesaid relation of fittingness. Which discourse seems to be St. Thomas’s, De veritate, q. 1, a. 1, and q. 21, a. 1. And it can be confirmed because the good and the desirable are the same in the thing, although the same respect is not signified by these names; for desirable expresses the formal denomination from the appetite, or the respect to it; but good does not express this formally, but that which on the side of the object is the foundation of such denomination or relationship, on account of which this causal statement is true: Because it is good, it is desirable. But every thing is desired on account of the fittingness which it has with the one desiring; for each one loves what is fitting; therefore the notion of good consists in this notion of fittingness; but this notion of fittingness is nothing but a relation, as the word itself shows; and it can be explained, because the same thing as regards all absolute things is fitting to this and unfitting to that, as heat is fitting to fire and unfitting to water; therefore fittingness consists in relation; and not a real one, as we shall show; therefore one of reason.

Goodness is not a relation of reason

3. But nevertheless this opinion has virtually been disproved above as regards two things. First, that it denies that these attributes of being include entity in their formal and intrinsic concept, which we have shown to be false both in common and in each of those treated above, and in the present case it seems more manifest; for what does not include entity is nothing; but who would conceive goodness to be nothing, since it draws the appetite and is said to have the notion of final cause, and is the very perfection of the thing, either integral or in part, as we shall explain? Whence St. Thomas, I, q. 48, a. 5, says that the good per se and chiefly consists in perfection; but perfection without entity cannot even be understood. Whence Augustine, De doctrina Christiana I, c. 32, says that in so far as we are, we are good. The second is that a relation of reason is an attribute of being; for, speaking properly of a relation of reason as it expresses something feigned by the mind and as it were added to things, we have shown this to be false, and in the present case it is also evidently established. First, because, as Aristotle teaches, Metaphysics VI, at the end, the good is in things, and in this he distinguishes it from the true; it is not, therefore, formally only a relation of reason. Next, because, as from Augustine, De natura boni, c. 3, St. Thomas treats, I, q. 5, a. 5, the good consists in mode, species and order, which we shall also expound below; but these are not feigned by the intellect, but exist in things themselves; therefore neither is the notion of good. Likewise, because this is the difference between the true good and the apparent, that the apparent is feigned and apprehended by the intellect alone, but the true good subsists in the thing itself and is supposed before every feigning of the intellect; whence it is said of God: He saw all things that he had made, and they were very good; but he did not see in them a relation of reason; goodness, therefore, does not consist in a feigned relation, nor is this required for it.

4. There are some, however, who say that, although some relations of reason are such that they depend on the feigning and thinking of the intellect, as the relations of genus or species, there are others which are in things themselves without the thinking of the intellect, as the relation of creator or lord in God. But these either speak equivocally of relations or involve a repugnance in words. For how are they in things themselves before the work of reason, if they are said to be relations of reason? Or in what do they differ from real relations, if they are subjectively in things and not only objectively in the intellect? Nor are those denominations of creator or lord, as they are understood to precede the thinking of the intellect, taken from relations of reason, of which elsewhere. Add that, of whatever kind this relation is feigned to be, the notion of goodness cannot consist in it, which will be more evident from what we shall say of real relation. But the foundation of this opinion at most proves that the good, besides the whole intrinsic entity of the thing, connotes something else extrinsic, or a denomination taken from the association of several things, especially when one thing is said to be good to another, as we shall declare below.

Goodness is not a real relation

5. The second opinion places the notion of goodness in some real relation superadded to being. Which opinion is to be founded and declared, the principle proved against the preceding opinion being taken, that goodness must consist in some real notion; for that cannot be merely absolute, as the argument made sufficiently proves, that the same thing is good with respect to one and evil with respect to another; it will be, therefore, a real relation. Which opinion is attributed to Durandus, In II, dist. 34, q. 1. But since Durandus in other things too denies proper real relations, his mind in the present case is other, as we shall see below. But whosever that opinion is, it is manifestly false. Which can be shown here by the same arguments by which we proved it of truth, applied with proportion. First, because God from eternity is good with the transcendental goodness common to the three persons, and yet in him there is no real relation common to the three persons. Secondly, because heat, wherever it exists, has its whole goodness, even if fire does not exist nor any other subject to which heat is fitting; therefore then too it does not have a real relation of fittingness; therefore goodness does not consist in this relation. Thirdly, even when heat exists in fire or justice in man, it is not its good on account of a real relation, for by the very fact that such a form through its absolute entity informs such a subject it is its good and perfection, every arising relation being prescinded either according to real duration, if in truth there is no such relation, or according to the intellect and the order of nature; for such extremes are according to their absolute entities and perfections prior in nature to a relation arising between them. Fourthly, because either that real relation expresses a real perfection and entity, or not. If it does not express (as many think) some real perfection, how can it be the goodness of some thing, since goodness expresses perfection? But if it expresses perfection, then also goodness; it expresses, therefore, a real relation of fittingness, and that relation will be its goodness; and so one will proceed to infinity, which argument is common in relations. Or, if that relation is fitting and good without such a relation of fittingness, the same could most easily be understood in any form or absolute thing whatever.

Goodness expresses nothing absolute distinct in the thing from entity

6. The third opinion is that goodness expresses a certain absolute and real property superadded to being and distinct from it from the nature of the thing, or formally; which opinion is attributed to Scotus, In I, dist. 3, q. 3, and in other places which were treated above; and it may be seen in Capreolus, In II, dist. 34, q. 1. And it can be proved from what has been said by a sufficient enumeration, because goodness must be something real; and it cannot be a relation; therefore it must be absolute. And in order that it be a property, it is necessary that it be in some way distinguished in the thing. But against this opinion proceed all the things which have been said in common of the attributes of being and in particular of unity and truth. And moreover, in order that it may be more clearly understood to be false in the present case, we can distinguish that some being is called good in two ways: in one way absolutely and in itself, namely because it is good in itself, in which way God is called good or a man good. In another way something is called good because it is good to another, in which way virtue is said to be good because it makes the one having it good; and so St. Thomas says, De veritate, q. 21, a. 1, that the good expresses the notion of what is perfective of another. Of which distinction we shall say more immediately. The thing, then, which is called good to another cannot be denominated good from some real and absolute mode distinct from the nature of the thing from its entity, because such a thing, precisely conceived in its entity, is by reason of it fitting to that to which it is called good, as health by itself, and not by reason of some superadded mode, is fitting to the animal; and virtue or science, from the precise fact that it is virtue and science, is fitting to man; it is altogether feigned, therefore, to posit in forms of this kind superadded modes by which they would be good; for let us prescind by the intellect such a mode and consider in science its essence alone, and we shall find it fitting and much proportioned to the human intellect. And similarly a form, from the precise fact that it is a form, is good and fitting to matter, and so of the others. Add that here too that argument has place, that it can be asked of that superadded mode whether it is fitting to another or not; for if it is not fitting, how can the form affected by that mode be fitting by reason of it? But if that mode too is fitting by itself (lest we proceed further and to infinity), the form too by virtue of its essence or ultimate difference will be able to be fitting by itself.

7. And hence it is easily understood that in the thing which is called good in itself and absolutely, too, that mode is feigned. For either the thing is called good essentially or accidentally, in which way a studious man is called good. In this latter way goodness is indeed something distinct from the thing which is denominated good, as health is distinct from the healthy and beauty from the beautiful; whence sometimes it is a mode of the thing so affected, as figure, but sometimes it is an entity added to another being to perfect it, as science is added to the intellect. Yet this is not the goodness which we are now considering, because such goodness with respect to that being to which it happens is not an intrinsic attribute of being, but is a certain accident of it; whence it is not transcendental goodness, but can be called formal or material goodness, or objective, or another similar one, according to the various respects of fittingness which one thing can have to another. Unless perhaps that goodness is considered with respect to the very thing or form which is called good to another, of which it has already been said; or with respect to the whole constituted through it, in which way it is an intrinsic part of its entity, as the form is an intrinsic part of the composite and can be called a certain good or its goodness; and in this way it now pertains to the essential goodness of that constituted thing as such. Of this, then, too it is evident that it cannot add an intrinsic and absolute mode distinct from the nature of the thing from the entity of the thing, because the goodness of the whole is nothing but that which arises from the goodness of the parts; but it has been shown that the goodness of the form adds nothing intrinsic beyond the form, and consequently neither does the goodness of matter over matter, nor the goodness of union over union; therefore neither will the goodness of the composite add some distinct property over the whole entity of the composite as such. And it is declared by applying the argument made; for, that property being prescinded, there remain in that composite the whole goodness of the matter and form united among themselves; therefore also the goodness of the composite. But if neither in composite being does goodness add that mode, nor in simple being which is ordered to composing another, it is evidently inferred that also in simple substances substantial, or essential, or transcendental goodness adds nothing intrinsic to their entity; for the reason is the same or greater, because these beings are both simpler and more perfect.

8. And hence a fortiori is attacked the opinion which Soncinas reports, Metaphysics IV, q. 19, which asserted that this transcendental goodness is a certain accident truly and properly pertaining to the predicament of quality. Which is evidently false, both because a transcendent predicate cannot be limited to one genus; and also because each thing is good by itself, which is not only most certain in God, but also in the other beings, from the discourse made. For the soul, for example, precisely by reason of its substance has something of perfection and is good and fitting to man and desirable by him; and the same holds in quantity and in qualities themselves; for in individual species there is proper goodness and perfection; whence goodness does not constitute a proper genus or species of quality; otherwise one quality would be good through another, which is ridiculous; especially since the same quality can be good to one and evil to another.

Goodness absolutely does not consist in the real perfection of being

9. There is, then, a fourth opinion, that goodness expresses nothing other than the intrinsic perfection of the thing, which is absolute in absolute things and relative in relative ones. Whence it seems to come about as a consequence that the good is nothing other than being itself in so far as it has in itself something of perfection. This opinion is attributed to Hervaeus, Quodlibet III, q. 2; yet there he rather thinks that goodness expresses entity in so far as it is perfective of another, or in so far as it is ordered to the perfection of another, than as it has in itself some perfection, of which sense I shall speak below. Otherwise, then, this opinion can be explained, that the goodness of each thing is that perfection by which each thing is perfect in its entity; whence, if it is being simply, it will have in itself so much perfection by reason of which it will also be in itself a certain good; but if it is being in a certain respect, or being of a being, as the part of a whole or the accident of a subject, so it will be the good of that whose being it is; and by reason of the entitative perfection which it has it will be called in itself a certain good; but by that reason by which that perfection either is instituted or is apt to perfect another, it will be called the good of another. Whence, just as an accident by the same entity is in itself a being and the being of another, so by the same perfection it is in itself, that is, intrinsically, a certain good and the good of another. In this way, then, it is rightly understood and explained that goodness in each thing is nothing besides the perfection of each.

10. But the proof of this opinion so expounded can be taken, first of all, from what has been said, from a sufficient enumeration; because goodness is neither a relation of reason nor a real one, nor something absolute added to being; nothing else, then, remains which it can be except the perfection of the thing. Next, because good and perfect are the same, as St. Thomas teaches, I, q. 5, aa. 1, 3 and 5, and as we shall declare below; therefore goodness and perfection too are the same; for good and perfect are the same not only materially but formally, because each thing is good in so far as it is perfect. Finally, in this way the notion of goodness can easily be conceived and declared, and there is no reason which compels the addition of something else, nor can what that would be easily be explained or understood; it is therefore a sign that the notion of goodness consists in this.

11. But, although this opinion seems of itself easy and perspicuous and in great part declares the matter, it does not altogether do so, and therefore it is necessary to add something else on account of two things. First, because according to this exposition the good is not an attribute of real being, but its essence. Whence good and being will be convertible rather as synonyms than as subject and attribute. The sequel is evident, because nothing is more essential to real being than to have something of perfection, and until something is conceived as a being of some perfection it is not conceived as real being; whence in this sense, if there is some difference between these two names, it will be rather in etymology than in the thing signified, because being has been taken from the act of being, but good from the perfection which the act of being formally and of necessity includes. The second is the argument proposed above, that the same thing is called good to one and evil to another, although it includes the same perfection.

The good adds to being the notion of fittingness

12. It must be said, then, that the good can add over being only the notion of fittingness, which is not properly a relation, but only connotes in another a nature having a natural inclination, capacity, or conjunction with such a perfection; whence goodness expresses the very perfection of the thing, connoting the aforesaid fittingness or denotation arising from the coexistence of several things. Durandus intends this conclusion in the place cited, and it can be proved, first, from a sufficient enumeration from all that has been said against the other opinions, and because nothing else can be thought out, those being excluded. Secondly, because the things which were adduced in favour of the last opinion without doubt prove that perfection is included in the concept of goodness; and the things which were said against the first opinion also confirm the same, because goodness cannot not include entity and consequently perfection. Again, the things which were objected against the last opinion are excellently saved, the aforesaid connotation being posited; for that suffices that there be some distinction of reason founded in things between the good and being, so that the good can thus be attributed to being as a property and not be synonymous with it, because formally it is one thing to be or to have entity, another by reason of entity always to have some fittingness, which the notion of good declares. Next, this is enough for the same thing, retaining the same perfection, to be good to one and evil to another; for when it is called good to one, besides the perfection of that which is called good, there is connoted in the other, to which it is called good, the connatural inclination or capacity of the other; but in another, to which it is called evil, there is connoted the lack of such capacity or inclination, or rather a contrary inclination; therefore in this way all the things which are found in goodness are saved without another relation adjoined, as was said also in a similar case of truth. Finally this can be declared by induction in all goods; for the honest good, by the opinion of all, expresses the good which is per se fitting to rational nature as such; likewise the delightful good is nothing other than the good having fittingness with sensible nature, as Cajetan treats at length, I-II, q. 32, a. 1, explaining how this is not a relation, but the thing itself as accommodated to such a nature, which can express nothing other than the mutual connection of things and fundamental proportion; and the same is found in its own way in the useful good, which expresses only the good apt and accommodated to the end intended. The fittingness, therefore, which the good expresses is rightly declared in the aforesaid way.

13. An objection.—Only one difficulty remains, because in this way the notion of good is explained not adequately but only in part: for, as I was saying above, the good is wont to be said of things in two ways, namely either because the thing is good in itself, or because it is good to another; which division is taken from Augustine, De Trinitate VIII, c. 3, and from St. Thomas, In II, dist. 27, q. 1, a. 2, ad 1, De virtutibus, q. 1, a. 2, ad 1, and I-II, q. 26, a. 4, where he also adds that what is good in itself is absolutely and simply good, but what is good to another is only good in a certain respect. In which sense the same St. Thomas is wont to say that an accident is not good as having goodness, but because it contributes to the goodness of the subject, as may be seen in III, q. 11, a. 5, ad 3; and I-II, q. 55, a. 4, ad 1, he says that the virtues are not so much certain goods as certain goodnesses, which was said not because they do not have perfection in themselves, but because they have it accommodated to perfecting another. As accidents are said to be beings of a being rather than beings, because each thing has as much of goodness as it has of being, as the same St. Thomas says, I-II, q. 18, a. 1. Scotus has the same distinction of the good according to itself or with respect to another, Quodlibet XVIII. But the aforesaid notion of good, as it has been explained by us, belongs to the thing only as it is called the good of another; for under this notion it is excellently explained that for a thing to be good expresses the perfection of such a thing, connoting in another a capacity, inclination or other similar connection; but this cannot belong to that goodness by which a thing is called good in itself, because this goodness is said altogether absolutely and without any respect to another, even fundamental or according to expression; in that way, therefore, neither the adequate nor the chief notion of good is explained.

14. Answer.—To this difficulty it can be answered, first, that we are here describing the goodness which is an attribute of being; but that the good is an attribute of being only as it expresses fittingness to another, or as it is the good of another; for in this way the good is in some way distinguished from being and belongs to every being, even the most perfect; for God, who is supremely good, is also the good of others, for God clearly seen is the supreme objective good of the rational creature, and the divine Word is the greatest good of the humanity of Christ. But the good absolutely taken, namely as it is good in itself, does not seem to pertain to the attribute of being but rather to its essence or entity, as I argued above, because the good in this way is the same as the perfect, as St. Thomas often says, I, q. 5; but the perfect is included in the essential concept of real being, because being with entity cannot be conceived without being conceived with essential perfection; both because being itself is a perfection, and also because essential perfection belongs to being per se primarily and in this differs from accidental perfection, whether it be extrinsic or intrinsic after the manner of a proper attribute. Whence through this essential perfection each thing is constituted in a certain grade of being, and through the same beings are distinguished and ordered among themselves. For so (as we were saying above) being is first divided into infinite and finite according to essential perfection; therefore essential perfection of this kind adds nothing over being and essence; therefore the good under this notion does not seem properly to be an attribute of being, but being itself. And in this way Scotus said, Quodlibet 6, that the magnitude of essential perfection is not other than the essence, even in creatures. Which all the others teach. And this can be explained by a similar case from the things which we were saying above of truth, namely that in so far as it expresses the absolute notion of true entity, that is, not feigned but ratified, as such it does not express an attribute of being, but only declares the very notion of real being, and therefore it is only an attribute as it connotes in some way fittingness to the intellect; so, then, it seems it must be said of the good, proportion being kept.

15. How the good and the perfect are compared.—Which answer will become more likely if it is exactly understood how the notion of the good and the notion of the perfect are related; for Aristotle says, Metaphysics V, c. 16, that that is called perfect outside of which no part can be taken, or to which nothing is lacking. In which sense not every good is perfect, as is self-evident, nor is every being perfect, although it is good; for a boy is a being and a man, yet not yet perfect; and a man having perfect quantity, but not the qualities or habits consonant with his nature, although he is in some way good, is nevertheless not perfect. In this sense, then, that is called perfect not which is any good whatever, but that which is consummated on every side, which is the simply good. Yet in another way that can be called perfect which under some notion of being has the perfection simply necessary and essential, in which way a boy can be called a perfect man as regards essence; and similarly the theologians say that remiss charity, although it is called imperfect with respect to intense, is nevertheless simply and as regards essence perfect, in which way John says, 1 Epistle, c. 2: He who keeps his word, in him truly the charity of God is perfected. And in this way the good and the perfect are convertible, indeed are altogether the same, as the good expresses that which is good in itself, or which has goodness, that is, the perfection due to it; but this is nothing other than to have the essence or entity due to it; therefore the good under this notion essentially and formally expresses nothing other than being; for to be perfect charity in the said way is in truth nothing other than to be charity, and so of the others. Indeed even to be perfect in the former way, or simply good, is nothing other than to be a being having the whole entity which is required for its completion.

16. And in this way St. Thomas is to be understood when he is wont to say (as may be seen in I, q. 5, a. 1, ad 1) that being simply and in a certain respect are compared otherwise among themselves in creatures than good simply and in a certain respect; for the thing has that it is being simply through substantial being, but in a certain respect through accidental being; but it has that it is good in a certain respect through substantial being, but simply through accidental being. Yet this last is to be understood not precisely of accidental being, but as conjoined to substantial being; for a man would not be good through accidental virtues unless he were supposed a man and consequently substantially and naturally good. Whence in those words in a certain respect and simply there seems to be an equivocation; for when they are said of being they seem to be said of substance and accident precisely compared; but when they are said of the good, they are said of created substance either solitarily taken or as affected by the dispositions and faculties connatural to it. Whence it comes about that, although in the mode of speaking there is diversity, in the thing nevertheless there seems to be no difference, because the goodness or perfection which an accident confers, if it is precisely compared to that goodness which substance confers, is also in a certain respect. For so it is universally true, what we reported above from St. Thomas, that each thing has as much of goodness as it has of being, and what we also reported from Augustine, that in so far as we are, we are good.

17. And so finally it comes about that the good absolutely said is nothing other than being itself, in which way things are called naturally good or perfect if they are consummated in their entity, and a man is called morally good if he has moral virtues or perfections, which are nothing but certain real forms and entities; so also God is called supremely good and perfect by reason of his entity, even if he is compared to nothing else, and so of the others. This doctrine and answer, then, expounded in this way, is probable and bears a certain clarity and facility, and Henry indicated it in the place cited above.

18. Nevertheless, on account of the use of words, another answer can be applied. For, although the former has this true, that the good under that notion does not differ in the thing from being, nevertheless they can be distinguished by reason, which is enough for the good to be assigned as a property of being after the manner of the other transcendentals. It is to be noticed, then, as regards the imposition or signification of the name, that being is said only from to be or entity, as we expounded above; but perfect expresses more clearly the perfection of being, in which it includes a certain negation, or at least without it its significate cannot be explained by us, namely that nothing is lacking to it according to that notion according to which it is called perfect. But good expresses some fittingness, by reason of which the thing has it that it is desirable; for the good is said through some order to appetite, as St. Thomas taught, I, q. 5, a. 1, from that saying of Aristotle, Ethics I: The good is that which all things desire, and it will be explained more immediately. Whence it is necessary that those things too which are called good absolutely and according to themselves are so denominated because they have perfection fitting to them and desirable; and so it also comes about that the good in this way formally signifies the perfection existing in such a thing, connoting in the same thing a capacity, inclination, or natural connection with such a perfection. Which is more clearly evident when such a perfection is distinct from the very thing which is denominated good by it; for when a man is called good by reason of virtue, there is formally signified virtue not in any way whatever, but as a certain goodness, in which is imported not only the perfection of virtue but also the fittingness which it has with human nature, connoting on the side of the nature itself a capacity or propensity to such a perfection. But in those things in which there is no distinction between the perfection and the thing which is called perfect, this fittingness or connotation seems more difficult to explain; yet it must be said that, although in the thing there is no distinction, they are nevertheless conceived and signified by us after the manner of distinct things, that is, after the manner of a denominating form and a denominated thing; and therefore that form is signified as a perfection accommodated to that in which it exists, in which its natural connection with such a form is reckoned; and so such a good is distinguished from being, at least by reason.

How the good and the desirable are compared

19. From the things which have been said of the notion of good, it may be understood how the good and the desirable are related. For some think that the same thing is formally and synonymously signified by these words, and consequently say that the good adds over being a respect to the desirable; whom St. Thomas seems to favour, in the said I, q. 5, a. 1, saying: The notion of good consists in this, that something is desirable; and a. 3, ad 1, he says expressly: The good does not add anything over being, but only the notion of the desirable; and a. 4, ad 1: The good (he says) regards appetite. He has similar things in I, q. 16, aa. 1 and 3, and Contra Gentiles I, c. 4, third reason; Aristotle favours it, Ethics I, c. 1, defining the good as that which all things desire. And it can be confirmed by taking a proportional argument from what has been said of the true; for the good is so compared to appetite as the true to the intellect; but the true adds over being only conformity to the intellect; therefore the good adds only fittingness to appetite. Others distinguish between the good and the desirable, as Cajetan, I, q. 5, a. 5, where he says that desirable is taken in two ways, namely fundamentally and formally. In the former way he says that the good and the desirable are the same, and so he expounds St. Thomas there; for the proximate reason on account of which the thing has it that it can move appetite is its goodness which it has with respect to the one desiring, in which is included not the mere entity and perfection of the thing according to itself, but as it has some fittingness with the one desiring. But in the latter way he says that the good is distinguished from the desirable at least by reason or denomination, because the desirable as such imports a respect to appetite and an extrinsic denomination coming from it, or arising from the fittingness and proportion between the good and the appetite; the desirable, therefore, formally explains something which the good as such does not express, by reason of which this causal statement is true: because the thing is good, therefore it is desirable; as this causal statement is also true: because the thing is lucid and coloured, therefore it is visible; for so the desirable is compared to the good as the visible to the lucid. Whence St. Thomas, Ethics I, c. 1, declaring that description of Aristotle, The good is that which all things desire, says that it was taken a posteriori, because the notion of the desirable is posterior to the notion of the good. And this opinion is true, which Capreolus had taught before, In I, dist. 2, q. 3, and afterwards Ferrariensis, Contra Gentiles I, c. 3.

20. The difference between the good and the true.—From which it is understood that the good is compared otherwise to appetite than the true to the intellect; for the transcendent true (for we are speaking of this) includes in its notion and denomination some conformity to the intellect; but the good formally in its notion and denomination does not include conformity to appetite, although this follows upon the notion of good. Whence the notion of the transcendent true is not properly supposed in the object so as to be formally attained by the intellect, but is a denomination taken from the proportion or conformity between the object itself and the power or its act; and therefore that truth is wont to be called a condition consequent upon or concomitant with the object of the intellect rather than formally constituting it; but goodness is supposed in the object of appetite and is the formal reason of attaining it; but desirability expresses a denomination taken from the proportion of such an object with such a power; whence it does not express the formal notion of the object, but a concomitant condition.

21. How the good is related to the notion of end.—From these things it is also evident how the notion of end is compared to the good. For St. Thomas says, I, q. 5, a. 2, ad 1, that the good, since it has the notion of the desirable, imports the relationship of final cause. And in the same sense he says, Contra Gentiles I, c. 38, third reason, that the good has the notion of end, namely in the way in which it has the notion of the desirable. For if the relationship and denomination of end is taken formally, it is not of the notion of good, but can follow upon it; for the end as such expresses the notion of cause in order to the means or to some action which comes about for the sake of the end, which relationship the good does not express, but only the notion of the fitting. But if the end is taken fundamentally, then it is attributed to the good, by which reason of goodness the end has the power of causing finally. But this is to be understood of the good simply, such as is the per se good; for if the good is taken in its whole breadth, it embraces not only the end but also the means, as will be evident from the following section.