Disputationes metaphysicae

1. This doubt is annexed to the preceding, and therefore it is to be dispatched in this place; and Aristotle touched upon it, Metaphysics II, c. 1; and in Book IV, c. 5 and following, he disputes at length against those who thought it not only difficult but also impossible to attain sincere truth. Which, if they understood it collectively, as the theologians say, and through natural powers, they would not be to be disproved; yet, because they thought that in no thing at all could man attain truth as it is in the thing, and therefore that there is nothing true among men except what appears, they therefore erred greatly, as Aristotle there demonstrates at length. That error, then, being passed over, we must speak briefly of the difficulty which we have in the knowledge of things.

Various opinions

2. There are, then, three opinions on this matter. The first refers this whole difficulty of attaining truth to the imperfection of our intellect. Scotus, Major, Antonius Andreae and others hold this in the place cited. And Aristotle seems much to favour them in the place cited, saying: Since the difficulty happens in two ways, its cause is placed not in things but in us. But the reason is that all things are of themselves knowable, nor is there any difficulty in them if there is power in the knower. And so all things are known by God with equal facility, because to all there is on his side a most sufficient power; the angels too most easily know all those things to which the perfection of their intellectual power can extend. But if they either cannot understand some things or can understand them with difficulty, it is only because their intellective power is inferior to those things; therefore in us too the whole difficulty comes from our imperfection.

3. The second conversely thinks that this whole difficulty is placed in the things themselves, which Fonseca reports from Heraclitus. And it can be declared and persuaded thus, because our intellect suffers difficulty in attaining truths for this reason, that it does not have proper species of things through which it may know them; but that it does not have these does not come from itself, because, as far as depends on itself, it is in potency to all, but comes from the things themselves, which are not productive of proper species in our intellect; therefore this difficulty comes from the side of the things themselves. The matter is evident by examples, for material substance cannot be known by us for this reason, that it cannot impress a species of itself either in sense or in the intellect; which does not come from our side but from the side of the substance itself, and the same holds of the parts of substance, and in accidents which are not per se sensible. But the same holds also in spiritual substances, at least created ones, to omit God; for they do not have the efficacy to change our intellect and to impress their species on it; therefore this difficulty comes from the inefficacy of the things themselves.

4. The third opinion is intermediate, that some things are perfect and superior to man, others imperfect and inferior, and that man suffers difficulty in knowing all, but from diverse cause. With respect to the superior, then (this opinion says), the whole difficulty arises from our imperfection and not from the things, for they, as far as depends on themselves, are most intelligible. And Aristotle seems most of all to have spoken of these in the place cited, where he subjoins that common reason: As the eye of the owl to the light of the sun, so is our mind related to the things most manifest of nature. From which that common distinction of truths had its origin, for some are self-evident in themselves which are not so known to us, others conversely. But with respect to inferior things the difficulty of knowing them arises from them; for in our intellect there is truly sufficient power; yet, because they themselves are imperfect and little intelligible, therefore we know them with difficulty. The matter is declared by an example in sight; for it cannot see the light of the sun on account of its own imperfection, not that of the sun; but it cannot see the faintest light or some least object on account of the imperfection of the object itself, because it is most inefficacious for changing the power. And this is the opinion of St. Thomas, Averroes, Alexander, Albert the Great, in the cited place of the Metaphysics, whom the others, both Thomists and Averroists, follow.

5. But if you inquire in which order of those things are to be placed certain things which seem to be intermediate, as the elements and other natural things, some answer that they are comprehended in neither of those orders, nor is this necessary, because the question proposed does not pertain to these things, because in knowing them man suffers no difficulty, but knows them most easily. So thinks Fonseca, Metaphysics II, c. 1, q. 1, sect. 2. For he thinks that this question is not concerned with the difficulty which is in the exact and distinct knowledge of things, for in this way it is evident that it is most difficult to attain the perfect knowledge even of these sensible things; but he says that the question is of the confused and simple knowledge of things, which with respect to us is prior in order to the distinct. Because otherwise (he says) it would have to be said that the species of natural things are most difficult for us to know; because, since they are composite, their distinct knowledge depends on the knowledge of the principles and so is more difficult. Whence he infers that motion and time are not rightly numbered by St. Thomas and others among the things of the second order, which on account of their imperfection are known with difficulty; because, as regards whether they are and by simple and confused knowledge, nothing is known more easily than time and motion, although to explain what they are is most difficult, as Augustine said, Confessions XI, c. 14.

6. This opinion, however, does not meet with my approval; for it is against the mind of all the authors of this third opinion, as is evident from this very example of motion and time just adduced. Next, because it is proved by no reason that the discussion here is of confused and not distinct knowledge, in which chiefly is found the difficulty of attaining truth and manifold occasion of erring, of which thing the philosophers chiefly investigate the cause and root. Moreover, because otherwise they would have taken that distinction not from the perfection or imperfection of things, but from this, that things are more or less sensible, or more or less conjoined with sensible things; for we more easily perceive colours, the first qualities and similar things by confused and simple knowledge because they are per se primarily sensible. Next magnitude and the other common sensibles, per se secondarily, among which is contained motion and consequently time. After these, sensibles per accidens which are in reality conjoined with per se sensibles; and therefore among these it is easier to know the whole than the parts, because it is more sensible, and among wholes themselves, those which are nearer to the senses. And in similar proportion, in the way in which things separated from sensible matter are knowable to us, those are more easily known which have a greater and more intrinsic conjunction with sensible things. And therefore God is more easily known than the angels by that genus of knowledge, and among the angels those who are movers of the orbs rather than others.

7. And so we are dealing not only with confused knowledge but simply with the difficulty of attaining truth and the facility of erring, and therefore material things too are thought to be comprehended in the second order, as Javellus noted, Metaphysics II, q. 2, because they are not actually but only potentially intelligible. By which reason even the per se sensible qualities themselves are known with difficulty as regards their essence and nature. Indeed even the rational soul itself, which seems to be most proportioned and adequate to itself, knows itself with the greatest difficulty, because it is the material form of the body, in which it in some way falls short of the perfection of actually intelligible things. Nor does that reason stand in the way of this, that natural species would be most difficult to know. For either they are compared to other species of things, simple or less composite, or to the principles of which they consist; in the former way the sequel is to be denied, because the difficulty of knowing, neither according to itself nor as regards us, arises from greater composition with respect to other things which in no way enter such composition, because they are compared to those things altogether per accidens. But in the latter way the inference is to be conceded, which is no inconvenience, as is self-evident. For what wonder is it that the knowledge of a thing depends on the knowledge of its principles? Whence the comparison of the present question, in order that it be rightly made, must not be made between things of which one includes the other, but between co-distinct things; and so almost all the aforesaid authors speak.

8. A fourth opinion can be thought out, that the aforesaid difficulty comes from each head, namely from things and from us, which, in order that it be probable, must speak only of created things. For in God no reason can be thought out on his side on account of which he is difficult to know; none (I say) which pertains to defect or limitation; for so we are speaking. Because otherwise it is certain that God, on account of his infinite perfection, cannot be exactly known by a created intellect, much less by a human one; indeed neither can he be naturally seen as he is in himself; yet, as this impossibility comes from impotence, in this way we say that it is not to be referred to God, but to the defect of the power of the creature. And in the same sense this opinion says that in all other things the difficulty of knowing arises partly from the things themselves, partly from us. For that about immaterial and perfect things this comes in great part from our imperfection the first and third opinions cited confess, and it is self-evident. But that in some part it is also to be attributed to the imperfection of the things themselves is proved by the reason made in the second opinion. Which moreover is declared in this way, because among material qualities those which cannot in their mode impress their species on the senses are called insensible, not only from the defect of the senses but from their nature, and at the same time also from the defect of the power which they have for effecting their species and (so to speak) for manifesting themselves; but also created things, however immaterial, are unapt to manifest themselves (so to speak) intellectually and to produce their species; therefore on this side too a defect is to be attributed to them. It is confirmed, for knowledge arises from two principles, namely the power and the object; therefore, if both the object and the power are inefficacious for knowledge, the difficulty of knowing will come no less from the defect of the object than from the defect of the power, since the efficacy of each is necessary; but in the present case not only is our power inefficacious, but also the things themselves to be known are inefficacious either to communicate their species or to concur through themselves to the knowledge of themselves; therefore.

9. You will say: by these arguments it would be proved that not only in our intellect conjoined to the body, but also in the separated, indeed even in the intelligences themselves, there is a natural difficulty or unaptness to be known, because also in the separated intellects of others they cannot produce their species nor in any way manifest themselves to them. The answer is, first of all, that that is uncertain; for it is probable that one intelligence, as far as depends on itself, can manifest itself objectively to others and impress its species on them. But if now they do not effect this, it is because all have from the beginning the species of all substances infused per se; but with respect to our intellect, especially when it is in the body, they do not have efficacy of this kind. Secondly it is said, that antecedent being conceded, it rightly follows indeed that, as far as depends on the efficacy of such objects, the knowledge of other intelligences is difficult, indeed also impossible, for the intelligences themselves; nevertheless simply and absolutely it is not difficult for them, because, although they cannot take species from the objects, they nevertheless have another natural way by which they obtain them as due to them.

10. And hence it is easily proved that also concerning things of the inferior order the difficulty of attaining truth arises not only from the imperfection of things, as the second and third opinions asserted, but also from our imperfection, as the first teaches. For that the imperfection of things is a cause the reasons made about immaterial things prove a fortiori, because material things are much more unapt to manifest themselves to the intellect and to change it than spiritual things; and the more imperfect those things are and the less they have of entity, the less apt they are for the aforesaid effect. Likewise, because, in order that they can be understood, it is necessary that they be elevated to a superior order and become in some way immaterial, at least in representative or virtual being, which they have in the intelligible species; it is therefore a sign that they according to themselves are imperfect in the genus of intelligibles, and consequently that on their side there is great difficulty in understanding them and finding truth; and so much greater is this difficulty, the less perfect entity these things have in their order and the less representable they are through a proper species. But that this difficulty also arises from our imperfection, besides the things adduced in the opinion of Scotus, is declared from what has just been said, because, if our intellect were perfect, it would have some natural way by which it could obtain proper species of these things, even if the things themselves are unapt to provide them; therefore, that our intellect by no reason or natural way can obtain them is its imperfection; therefore that difficulty too is to be attributed to it. And it is confirmed because this whole difficulty in great part arises from this, that our intellect conjoined to the body depends in its act on phantasms; a sign of which is that, separated from the body, it will be able to know more things and more easily, even of these things which are imperfect and seem to be less intelligible; but this is an imperfection of our intellect; therefore that is always a cause or (so to speak) a concause of this difficulty. Add that the theologians teach that man cannot by the light of nature find all truths or avoid all errors, even in natural and speculative things, but with the help of God can do both; it is therefore a sign that this difficulty, or rather impossibility, arises from the limitation of our intellect and the dependence which it has on the senses.

Resolution of the question

11. In this matter I think that the third opinion, which is St. Thomas’s, is simply true, provided that the first is not altogether excluded; for the second is improbable, but the fourth in part less probable, although in many things it attains the truth. And so, that this difficulty with respect to all things arises in some way from our imperfection the reasons adduced in the first and fourth opinions prove, which as regards this convince; nor do I think that St. Thomas excluded this cause, but in some things adjoined another. Whence it is further true also that with respect to inferior things this difficulty is increased, or arises at the same time, from their imperfection, which the reasons of the third and fourth opinions also prove and experience itself sufficiently teaches; for some most imperfect things we know with the greatest difficulty, although we know some more perfect things more easily; it is therefore a sign that this difficulty arises from the imperfection of the things themselves. Nor could Scotus or the other authors of the first opinion deny this, or, if they deny it, they are false. But as regards this the reason is not the same concerning perfect and immaterial things, which St. Thomas also intends, and in this the fourth opinion falls short, because those things are of themselves most apt to be understood.

12. But the objection made about the production of species is to be dissolved in this way: for first of all, if we hold that those substances are productive of species representing themselves in the intellects of others, it must consequently be said that their not doing this about the human intellect, especially conjoined to the body, does not come from their inefficacy, but because it is not capable of such species, especially for that state; for, if in the state of separation it can receive them, those actually intelligible objects too will be able to impress them according to the capacity of the patient. But if we hold that these substances cannot impress their species, it must first of all be said that this does not properly come from their imperfection but rather from a certain perfection, although limited and finite. Just as that one immaterial substance cannot produce another similar to itself is not properly from imperfection, since some less perfect things can do this, but from perfection, by reason of which they have it that they cannot be produced except through creation; so, then, in the present case, although those substances are actually intelligible, nevertheless, because they are finite substances, they cannot be immediate principles for effecting accidents in other subjects. Or certainly, because per se they regard intellects altogether abstracted from matter, which by their nature postulate that from the beginning they be in first act, therefore such substances are indeed of themselves actually intelligible as proportioned objects terminative of intellection, which suppose first act in the one understanding, but do not confer it. Whence, if some intellect is in pure potency with respect to those things, it is to be attributed to its imperfection that it lacks first act, but not to the imperfection of the object. Or secondly it can be said that, just as first act, or the species by which they may be able to understand, is due to substances in so far as they are understanding, so to the same in so far as they are intelligible it is due that their species be communicated to other substances of the same order. Whence that our intellect, while it is conjoined to the body, cannot obtain their species is not properly from their impotence; but it is from its imperfection, because in that state it cannot use such species. Whence as soon as it is separated from the body it receives them accommodated to its capacity, which it can thenceforth use.

13. It remains, then, that this difficulty arises from the improportion which is between our intellect and intelligible objects; but this improportion is founded in each extreme, namely the intellect and the object; yet not in the same way; for with respect to inferior things it is founded in their imperfection, joined with the imperfection of the intellect not having the power to attain (so to speak) the least intelligibility of such things; but in superior things it is founded in the excess of perfection, which our imperfection cannot sufficiently grasp; and so it comes about that in almost all things it is difficult for us to find truth. To this is added also that in individual things and questions truth is one, but falsity manifold, because one can depart from truth in many ways, and many things which in truth are not can have an apparent likeness of some thing. And thence it also comes about that the finding of truth is difficult, but the lapse into falsity easier and more frequent.