Disputationes metaphysicae

1. I suppose, first of all, that the discussion is of falsity properly so called, which, as we have said, is found in composition and division; for of falsity as it is attributed to other things there is either no difficulty, because it is either only an extrinsic or metaphorical denomination, which, if it is in the notion of sign, as in words, arises from their depraved use; but if it is in the notion of cause or occasion of falsity, it arises from some likeness or proportion, which in diverse things, according to their truth and nature, will also be diverse, as can easily be considered by making an induction; or certainly, if that falsity consists in some imperfection, since it is thought by us rather to have the notion of malice than of falsity, there is no reason why we should declare its root in this place, although it can be indicated in a few words and remitted to the proper places. For if that falsity is in natural things, as in the monsters of nature, its root is commonly on the side of the matter or from the defect of the power of the proximate agent, to which is also reduced the concurrence of contrary agents impeding one another, as is treated more fully in Physics II. But if that falsity is in artificial things, it comes from the same causes, proportion being kept, namely from the defect of the matter, or from the defect of the executive power, or certainly from the defect of the art itself, or of its direction, as is self-evident and is treated in the same Physics II. But if this falsity is attributed to human moral acts, its proximate root is the liberty of the will, which does not have intrinsic or necessary conformity with its rule, some defect of the intellect concurring at the same time. Of which, what it is and how it is necessary, we shall touch upon below in disputing about free efficient causes, and the moral philosophers and theologians dispute more fully. Finally, if this falsity is attributed to the senses or to other simple knowledges, it seems proximately to come from some defect of the intentional species impressed on the exterior senses, as St. Thomas indicates, I, q. 17, aa. 2 and 3. For since every interior apprehension arises from the exterior, the defect in interior simple apprehension, speaking per se, arises from the defect of exterior sensation; but since the faculty of sensing itself is of itself the same and indifferent, but is constituted in act and proximately determined through the species, from the imperfection of the species the defect of sensation arises. But this defect of the species can consist either in some imperfection of its entity, or in the mode in which it is impressed, or in its intermixture with other species. Whence sometimes it comes from the imperfection or distance of the object, sometimes from some indisposition of the medium, sometimes from the injury of the organ, as is disputed more fully in De Anima II. Whence these are enough about this falsity.

2. Secondly I suppose, as regards us, that this question has place only in human knowledge; for it is certain that falsity can in no way fall into the divine, not only because that knowledge is most simple, but most of all because it is most perfect, infinite, and altogether immutable and eternal. But of angelic knowledge it does not pertain to us to dispute whether the intelligences, in some things which they do not perfectly know by their nature, such as supernatural or contingent things, can compose and divide and in this way incur error, or whether even without formal composition they can sometimes be properly deceived about some objects; for this disputation is proper to the theologians, and therefore it pertains to them also to declare the root of that falsity, if perhaps it can be in the angels by their nature, or is now in the evil ones; we are speaking, therefore, only of falsity in human knowledge.

3. Thirdly I suppose that the root of this falsity can be investigated both theologically and philosophically. For in the former way the theologian will say that the root of all error and falsity in men is original sin; for, if that had not intervened, men would have been preserved immune from every error through original justice. But let us omit this cause, both because it does not now pertain to us, and also because that is not properly a cause inducing into falsity, but one removing what prohibits. For, as is the more approved and almost certain opinion of the theologians, original sin did not induce into men some positive entity which either leads them to deception or pours darkness into their senses or intellects. It only deprived them of the justice which would drive away all falsity. Whence this very thing supposes that there is in human nature¹, if it is not prevented or guarded by an extrinsic gift, a sufficient principle or occasion of falsity; and this is what can be inquired into philosophically, whether that be some internal principle existing in man himself, or something external which can lead man into falsity.

4. Fourthly it is to be considered that composition and division can be found either in merely apprehensive conception prescinding from judgement, or in conception which is at the same time judicative; but we said above that complex truth is properly found in judicative composition; whence it comes about that the same must be said of falsity, for contraries are of the same genus. Whence no one is thought to be deceived or to err until he judges, however many false compositions he apprehends. But since that apprehension which comes about without judgement regularly comes about through concepts of words rather than of things, as I said above, just as in the composition of words there is falsity as in a sign, so it can be admitted in that apprehension, although in it it is as it were materially, that is, not as in one affirming or uttering the false, but as in a sign which according to itself signifies the false. As there is falsity in this proposition, There is no God, either written or materially uttered by him who reports: The fool has said in his heart: There is no God; and therefore of falsity of this kind the reason is the same as of the falsity which is in vocal composition as in a sign. But if the apprehension comes about through concepts of things, it can scarcely be understood how a proper apprehensive composition comes about without some judgement; because such a composition includes the knowledge not only of the extremes, but also of their conjunction among themselves; indeed in this last the composition is consummated; but as long as there is not judgement, there is not knowledge of such conjunction; therefore neither can there be a true composition through concepts of things stopping at apprehension alone, but it will be either a conception after the manner of simple apprehension, not only of the extremes but also of their union, or a certain complexion after the manner of a question rather than after the manner of an enunciation; and so the falsity of which we are treating will not be able to be there unless some judicative composition is admixed there, because that apprehended proposition is judged either possible or uncertain. In which way the theologians say that doubt in faith is heretical, because, although it does not have the judicative composition that some proposition of faith is false, nevertheless, while it apprehends the thing as doubtful, it judges that it is an uncertain thing, and this very thing is against faith and heretical. It remains, then, to speak only of the falsity of judgement.

Resolution of the question

5. It is to be noticed, then, fifthly, that man can acquire knowledge or judge of things in two ways, namely by discovery and by teaching or instruction; and by each way he can arrive at true and false judgement. But there is a diversity, for the judgement which is acquired by discovery alone is always founded in the things themselves, as they are represented to the knower; but the judgement through instruction sometimes comes about in this way, but sometimes rests on the authority alone of the one speaking or teaching, so that sometimes the teaching is related only as proposing and applying objects and means of judging, but sometimes is the whole reason of the judgement. When, therefore, the judgement is of this latter kind, so that it rests on the authority of the speaker alone, it is easy to find the root of falsity in it, for as regards specification (so to speak) it comes from the imperfection of the speaker or teacher, namely because he can either be deceived or lie; and therefore the origin of this kind is always some human or rather created authority, so as to include the angelic too, which, if from elsewhere it is not confirmed by uncreated truth, can be a cause of falsity. But as regards exercise the proper cause is the will of the man himself judging, which is universal in every false judgement, even if it is acquired by discovery.

6. Which comes from a difference to be noted between truth and falsity, for the intellect can be necessitated to truth, but to falsity it cannot, simply and absolutely speaking; and therefore as regards exercise it can never incur false judgement except through the free motion of the will; for, necessity being excluded, the intellect cannot be determined to judgement except through the will, since it itself is not free. But the reason of that difference is that the intellect is not determined of necessity to judgement except by means of the evidence of the thing known, as experience itself teaches and reason, because without evidence the object is not perfectly applied to the power so as to draw it to itself of necessity and determine it; but evidence cannot produce false judgement, because it is founded in the thing itself known as it is in itself, or must necessarily be resolved into some self-evident and manifest principles. And hence it also comes about that truth is far more immutable than falsity; for false judgement is of itself mutable, or rather the intellect, whenever it utters a false judgement, can be changed and utter a true judgement; but true judgement, if it is perfect, is of itself in a certain way immutable even in creatures; for although simply it can be changed, because it can cease to be, nevertheless, as far as depends on itself, it does not permit change into false judgement, by reason of evidence; for we are speaking of this judgement; for, if the judgement is free, however true it is, the intellect can from it be changed into false judgement, as far as depends on its force, by the efficacy of the will.

7. You will say: sometimes the intellect can be necessitated by an extrinsic cause, as by God, or by an angel, who, if he is evil, can so propose something false that the intellect cannot dissent. And it is confirmed, for evidence itself is sometimes only apparent; therefore then it can be concerned with the false, and yet it necessitates the intellect no less than if it were true. The answer is that God indeed can bring necessity on the intellect, even in things which are not evident; but this mode of operating is beyond or above the nature of the intellect, according to which alone we are now speaking. But that miracle being posited, the true and sound doctrine of the theologians teaches that God cannot lead the intellect to the false, because this is no less repugnant to his goodness than to lie. Whence it can in no way happen that the first origin of falsity is referred to God leading or operating to it in a special mode. But as regards the angel, it must be said that the angel cannot by natural power immediately change the intellect to judgement or second act; for this is proper to God, its author. Whence much less can an evil angel necessitate the intellect to false assent, but at most he can by suggestion and persuasion lead it to false assent after the manner of instruction; yet man can always dissent from him, or at least not assent, if he wills.

8. Finally, to that about apparent evidence the answer is that evidence can be called apparent in two ways. First, because in no order is it truly such, but from some error or precipitation of the intellect it is thought to be such. Secondly, because in the natural order it is truly sufficient evidence, yet, some supernatural work intervening, it can fall short of truth. In this latter way we confess that there can be some apparent evidence, especially when it is abstractive, as in the human intellect; such as can seem to the pagan when he judges that the consecrated host is bread. Yet this evidence, as far as depends on itself, does not incline to the false but to the true; and when it is concerned with the actual existence of some thing which is not seen in itself but is gathered from another, it always has a condition understood, namely that this is so as far as depends on the power of nature or on natural causes, or unless God makes some supernatural change in things. And so it does not simply necessitate the intellect, but on the supposition that it is established that no change of this kind has been made by God; wherefore this evidence per se is never the origin of falsity, but by reason of some defect which it has adjoined, of which kind is incredulity, or at least ignorance of the supernatural work. But in the former way there is no apparent evidence which simply necessitates the intellect, because those two are plainly repugnant among themselves. But sometimes it is so called through exaggeration and precipitation, which is more in words than in interior judgement. But sometimes this evidence is so called on some supposition, which is evidence of the consequence, not of the consequent; and therefore it is not repugnant in this way that the intellect be necessitated to the false, because that is not necessity simply but on a supposition, nor does the falsity arise from the evidence, but from some other prior error, which must be voluntary and free as regards exercise in the judgement itself.

9. Actual falsity, then, or that exercised through actual judgement, always has its proximate origin in the human will, although as regards specification (so to speak) or as regards the motive it arises from created authority or from its imperfection in the aforesaid mode of judging. But if it is further inquired whence falsity comes in him who testifies to it, the answer is that he can testify to falsity in two ways: first, without proper error of his own, but knowing that what he testifies is false, which is a proper and formal lie, and then its origin is the malice or liberty of the will. In another way it can come from a prior error of the speaker himself or of the master teaching, whose error could further have come from the teaching and false testimony of another; yet, lest in this genus one proceed to infinity, one must necessarily stop at some error committed or acquired by way of discovery by someone who, inquiring into truth, fell into error thinking that he had found the true. And in almost this way false opinions have in great part been mixed with true ones in human disciplines.

10. Sixthly, finally, it must be said that the origin of this falsity which is mixed in the knowledge of things themselves without extrinsic authority radically arises from this, that man does not conceive things through their proper species and as they are in themselves; but this comes from this, that he conceives and apprehends things not immediately, but through species received by the ministry of the senses; for hence it comes about that often from the imperfect apprehension of sense there arises imperfect apprehension of the intellect, and from imperfect apprehension false judgement; for in this way we sometimes judge something to be an animal which is not. But sometimes, there being perfect apprehension in sense and in the intellect about an object per se sensible, falsity can occur in the intellect from the inept composition of simple concepts; because their very conjunction among themselves is not always known or sufficiently represented through a proper species; and the same happens from a bad inference. And finally the whole reason of this defect is that man does not attain evident knowledge of truth; for every knowledge which is not of this kind and is taken from things themselves is of itself exposed to falsity. But that it is actually false comes as it were contingently and per accidens from this, that the thing is otherwise than it is judged; for per se this can never come from the intention of the one assenting, because he cannot tend into the false as false.