Disputationes metaphysicae

1. There is falsity.—At the beginning, that falsity is something and is found somewhere, or at least that it is conceived by us after this manner, is evident from the common mode of speaking about things and about the speeches and judgements of things; for we say both that a judgement or composition or division is false, and similarly speech, and we also denominate some things false, as we say that brass is false gold; but these denominations are taken from some form or quasi-form, and it is of this that we investigate what it is. In order, however, that this may be done more conveniently, it is necessary first to declare whether this falsity is truly and properly attributed to things in the same way as truth; and at the same time it must be explained whether it is truly and properly attributed to the simple concepts of the intellect, and consequently also to the acts of the senses, or is properly found in composition or division alone.

Various opinions about what it is

2. The first opinion asserts that falsity is found no less properly in things or simple concepts than truth. So think some moderns on the First Part of St. Thomas, q. 17. And it is proved, first, from Aristotle, De Anima II, c. 7, saying that sense is not deceived about the proper sensible, but can be deceived about the common one; therefore he supposes that there can be falsity in sense, at least as regards some acts or some objects of it, although all its acts are simple; and in Book III, text 161, limiting the former opinion, he says that sense either is not deceived about the proper sensible or rarely; he posits, therefore, falsity in it, and he says the same there of phantasy. Whence St. Thomas, I, q. 17, a. 2, expounds that what Aristotle says, that sense does not have false knowledge about proper sensibles, is to be understood per se and for the most part; for per accidens and in fewer cases there can be falsity in sense even in the knowledge of the proper sensible. And the same argument can be taken on the side of the intellect, in whose simple knowledge, by which it apprehends or knows what a thing is, falsity is denied to be, De Anima III, texts 21 and 51, and Metaphysics IX, text 22, per se and for the most part; yet by accident and in fewer cases it is not repugnant that it be found in it, as St. Thomas indicates there and in Contra Gentiles I, cc. 59 and 60. Secondly, I argue by reason, because the reason of opposites is the same; therefore, as truth consists in conformity and adequation, so falsity in disconformity; but, as conformity is found not only between complex knowledge and the thing, but also between simple concepts and things, so disconformity is found not only in composition or division, but also in simple things, both things and concepts; therefore. The minor is proved, and first in simple knowledge; for that very imperfection which is wont to be the root of deception and disconformity in complex judgement can be found in simple knowledge, both of sense and of intellect, namely that the species of the object is imperfectly impressed; for this is the first root of all deception; for the power of itself would be sufficient if the object were sufficiently applied and united through the species; but this root is common to the simple as to the composite operation. Indeed the whole deception in composition is wont to come from this, that the simple concepts are unconformed to the things themselves; disconformity, therefore, is found in these concepts, and consequently also falsity.

3. Again, that falsity is also found in things is evident chiefly in those things which are made by art; for they are often unconformed to their rule and idea; therefore under that notion they have falsity. And the same is found in some natural effects which are called monsters or sins of nature; for they depart from the idea or rule which the natural secondary causes ought to imitate and to which they ought to conform their effects. In which way also a human action which deviates from the divine rules is wont to be called a lie, Psalm 4: Why do you love vanity and seek after a lie? Just as conversely an operation conformed to prudence or to the divine rule is wont to be called truth, John 3: He who does the truth comes to the light. Of which Paul, to the Ephesians 4: Doing the truth in charity, let us grow. And in this way St. Thomas philosophizes about the conformity and disconformity of things to the intellect, in the said q. 17, a. 1, indicating that this disconformity is as proper a falsity of things as that conformity is truth.

4. But if you object that it follows that falsity is to be placed among the properties of being as truth is, the consequence is denied, because not every being is false; but every being is true; for God can in no way be called false, neither in the notion of being, nor in the notion of God, or of any being in particular; indeed not all created things can be named false either, because the things which are made by God, if they are made immediately by him, cannot depart from his art; but if they are made by him by means of secondary causes, although they can depart from one rule or divine idea to which the secondary causes ought to conform themselves in acting, nevertheless, as they proceed from God himself, they cannot disagree with that rule and idea through which God operates when he flows into them, and in this way they have truth.

5. The second opinion denies that there is falsity in simple things, either concepts or things, but only in composition and division, which Albert thinks, De Anima II, tract. III, c. 5; and there Apollinaris, q. 13; Giles, Quodlibet IV, q. 7; Ferrariensis, Contra Gentiles I, c. 59; Fonseca, Metaphysics IV, c. 2, q. 6, sect. 1. And this opinion is more consonant with Aristotle and St. Thomas in the places cited, and also seems to me truer, if we speak of falsity in that rigour and propriety in which we spoke of truth in the preceding disputation.

What falsity attributed to things is

6. In order to the divine intellect there is no falsity in things.—In order to explain which I say, first, that in things outside the intellect there is not proper and rigorous falsity, but that things are called false through a certain metaphor and extrinsic denomination. It is proved, because, like truth, falsity too is to be taken through a relationship to the intellect, which can be considered in things, as we said above, either in order to the speculative intellect or in order to the practical. Again, that relationship can be either of actual conformity or disconformity, or only aptitudinal. And finally it can be considered either in order to the divine intellect or in order to the created. But in none of these ways can proper falsity be attributed to things. Which I briefly show by running through each. And first, in order to the divine intellect as speculatively knowing all things, it is self-evident that no thing can properly or improperly be denominated false, because the speculative science which God has of all things is necessarily most true and most proper; therefore things known in order to this science have no disconformity, but supreme conformity. Secondly, in order to the same divine intellect as practically knowing and operating, things cannot be denominated false, because either the things are made by God, or not. Things not made by God are only either the supremely good thing which is God himself, who is above every measure and above every idea and outside every causality of the practical intellect, and therefore cannot from this relationship have proper truth, much less falsity; or the supremely evil thing, which is fault as fault (if indeed it is to be called a thing); for this, as it is not made by God, so neither does it have a proper idea in him, but there is rather in God the idea of goodness and honesty, from which fault disagrees; from which it has it that it is true fault, because, as its being, so also its truth consists in privation and defect. But fault is sometimes wont to be called falsity and deception, not so much in the notion of evil or of fault as in the notion of good; for every sin has some notion of apparent good, under which it is wont to be called something false and counterfeit; but it does not have that denomination in order to God, but in order to the man whom it deceives, as we shall immediately say of other false things. But the other things which are made by God never disagree with his art or idea, because he is as powerful in executing as he is wise in knowing.

7. An objection is answered.—You will say: although this is true of the things which God works through himself, it is not true of those which he effects through secondary causes; for then he accommodates his executive power to the activity of the secondary causes, and therefore hence it can happen that the effect does not adequate the idea of the artificer, as seems to happen in the monsters of nature. The answer is that, since these do not happen by chance and fortuitously with respect to God, but from his true science and will, it is necessary that these too, in so far as they are beings, do not disagree with the divine practical science, because God, as he wills to flow with secondary causes not impeded for effecting integral and perfect effects, so he wills to flow with the same impeded for effecting monsters. Whence, just as, when an excellent painter paints a monster not from impotence but voluntarily, it is not said to disagree with the art, nor to be something false with respect to such a painter, so neither do the monsters of nature have falsity with respect to God the supreme artificer, because he fabricates them knowing and seeing, in so far as they are beings. Which I always add, because, if these are considered in so far as in them there is privation or lack of some perfection, as such they do not come about per se but per accidens, nor do they have a proper idea to which they would be conformed, so that with respect to it they could be called true or false; but they have such a defect in so far as they fall short of another more perfect idea; but this defect either is not from God, as in the defects of fault, or, if it is from him, as in the evils of punishment, it is not beyond his science and intention or will, and therefore with respect to him it cannot be called falsity; but whether it can be so called with respect to the secondary cause I shall say immediately.

8. No things are false in order to the created speculative intellect.—Thirdly, if things are compared to the created speculative intellect, they cannot be intrinsically and properly denominated false. Which I show thus, because either they would be denominated false from aptitudinal disconformity or from actual; neither can be said; therefore. The minor as regards the former part is proved, because every thing, as far as depends on itself, is apt to be known as it is and to generate a proper and adequate concept of itself. But that some intellect is sometimes deceived in knowing them does not come from them in so far as they are beings, but either from the defect of the intellect or from other impediments; therefore by reason of the aptitude which is in things to be understood falsity does not belong to them, which will be more evident from the confirmation of the other part. The other part of the minor is proved, then, first, by the reason touched upon in the preceding disputation, sect. 2, because, if things falsely known by a created intellect had proper and intrinsic falsity from this, that they disagree with such an intellect, there would be no thing which could not be denominated false, because there is none which cannot be falsely known; there would therefore be falsity even in God, which is most absurd. Likewise, if the thing is false with respect to an intellect, then either with respect to an intellect forming a true and proper concept of such a thing, and this not, as is self-evident, because it does not disagree with it; or with respect to an intellect truly conceiving another thing, as brass seems to be called false gold with respect to an intellect conceiving true gold; and in this way gold too can be called false brass with respect to an intellect forming a true concept of brass, and so the same inconvenience returns which was inferred above, that there is some falsity in all things. Finally, either the thing is called false in order to a simple concept, or in order to a complex concept. The first cannot be said, both on account of the reasons given, and because, as I shall show, in the simple concept alone there is not properly falsity; therefore much less will it be in the thing speculatively known in order to such a concept; and also because, if the thing is compared to its proper concept, with respect to it it will not be false but true; but if it is compared to the concept of another thing, through it it is not falsely known but rather unknown; therefore neither with respect to it can it be denominated false; but between these concepts no medium can be thought out, stopping at simple concepts; therefore through disconformity to them things do not have proper falsity. But if this denomination is taken in order to composition and division, as Aristotle said, Metaphysics VI, neither is truth in things, but only objectively in the intellect; much less, therefore, falsity.

9. No natural beings are false through order to human practice.—Fourthly, if created things are compared to the created intellect practically knowing, then first of all natural things are to be excluded, which do not depend on any created intellect as on their artificer; and so of all these things the conclusion posited remains proved, that with respect to no intellect do they have proper falsity. Whence I also infer that natural monsters do not have proper falsity, but imperfection or defect, and therefore are wont to be denominated not so much false beings as imperfect or evil ones. It is proved because they are not denominated false with respect to the first universal cause, as we have said, nor with respect to the secondary causes, because those do not operate through intellect; but falsity is to be taken in order to some intellect. You will say: as the work of nature is the work of an intelligence, so these monsters can be called false with respect to the natural power of the cause, not precisely taken, but in so far as it ought to be subordinated to the idea of the first artificer, who directs it to producing a perfect effect. The answer is, first of all, that this denomination is both only extrinsic and metaphorical rather than proper, as the work of nature is not properly and intrinsically the work of an intelligence, but extrinsically and metaphorically, or as the hand of one shooting an arrow is said to err when it does not hit the mark; for error is not properly attributed to it, but only through metaphor. Next it is said that that imperfection of the effect does not come from any defect of the intellect, and therefore cannot properly be called falsity, but imperfection or malice; and so these are wont to be called monsters or sins of nature, which words indicate malice rather than falsity.

10. Whether artificial things are false in order to human makers.—Only artificial and moral things remain, to which the created intellect can be compared practically and as their cause. Of artificial things, then, there is no doubt that they sometimes depart from the art. But this happens in two ways: in one way, that they depart from the art which is in the artificer, or from the idea which he has actually conceived; in another way, that they depart from the art which he ought to have and which another good artificer has. When it happens in this latter way, the denomination of falsity does not seem properly to have place, because then the thing made by art does not disagree with the idea from which it proceeds; but to other more perfect ideas which are in other artificers such a thing is not compared as to a practical principle, but as to speculative knowledge, and therefore with respect to them it does not have proper falsity, according to what was said in the third point. And it is confirmed, for if someone has at the same time the ideas of a perfect and of an imperfect artefact, and willingly makes an imperfect thing conformed to the imperfect idea, he will not be said to err in operating as he is an artificer, nor will the thing made be called false in the genus of artefact; therefore the same will hold when he has the imperfect idea alone and operates according to it. You will say that this artificer falls short of the art, either because, having only an imperfect idea, he wills to make the effect perfect and conformed to his idea, which is a manifest repugnance, or because he thinks that according to the true rules of the art the thing is to be made so. The answer is that in him who operates thus a speculative error intervenes rather than a practical one, or one antecedent to the conception of the idea through which the thing is to be fabricated; and therefore from that error the thing is not properly denominated false, but at most metaphorically and very extrinsically. A sign of which is that, if such a thing is made deliberately in that way for some end or will of the artificer, the thing will in no way be false, although in the thing it has the same conformity or disconformity with the idea. Likewise, because rules of art of this kind are often taken in order to some end, and supposing such matter or circumstances; but all these do not vary the intrinsic artificial form of the thing, nor the conformity which it has with the idea from which it proximately proceeds; therefore, whenever the thing made by art is conformed to the idea from which it proximately proceeds, then there is no falsity in it, even if otherwise it is simply an imperfect thing with respect to other perfect ideas, or if it is useless in order to the end intended.

11. But when the thing made by art comes out unconformed to the idea which is in the artificer as actually operating, or from which it proximately proceeds, then falsity seems most of all to be in such an artificial thing; but even so it cannot properly be called falsity; both because that defect in the effect does not proceed from the imperfection or falsity of the intellect, but from the weakness of the executive power or some other similar impediment occurring; and also because that artefact as such, or in so far as it comes about with that disconformity, does not proceed from the idea but comes about by chance; therefore it is not compared to it as to its cause and measure, so as to be denominated false through conformity or disconformity to it. And it is confirmed, for that knowledge or idea is not false through disconformity to that work, because in truth it did not have it for its object; therefore neither conversely can the work itself be denominated false in order to such knowledge, since it is neither its object nor its effect, as regards the imperfection according to which it disagrees with the idea. Such an artefact, therefore, will be called incongruous or bad in the genus of artefact, but not properly false. In the way in which the dialecticians say that a consequence or inference which does not come about according to the rules of the art is indeed bad, but not false.

12. Whether moral things are false in order to human makers.—And the same discourse can be made of the works of prudence, or moral ones; for those works which disagree with the rules of prudence, although they are sometimes wont to be called practically false, as we were saying above from that Psalm 4, Why do you love vanity and seek after a lie?, nevertheless this is only in so far as they follow from some practically false dictate, which dictate pertains to the judgement of the intellect through composition and division. Whence from it the work is only extrinsically and by analogy denominated false. But properly there is not falsity in the work itself, but malice; for, if it is compared to the dictate from which it actually proceeds, it is conformed to it, because that dictate is imprudent and erroneous; but if it is compared to that dictate through which such an act ought to be avoided, or to have rectitude in so far as it is a human act, with respect to it it is called not so much false as depraved; both because that obligation of operating according to the dictate of prudence pertains not so much to the truth of things as to the honesty of morals; and most of all because that work, in so far as it really comes about, is not the object of that dictate nor proceeds from it. Whence finally this whole conclusion can be confirmed from Augustine, Soliloquies II, c. 8, saying: If he says that the true is that which is, it will be concluded that the false is nowhere. Which words St. Thomas expounding, I, q. 17, a. 1, ad 1, says: A thing compared to the intellect according to that which it is, is called true; according to that which it is not, is called false; whence a true tragedian is a false Hector, as the same Augustine says, Soliloquies II, c. 10. Beings, therefore, in so far as they are beings, are not false; but if falsity is in some way attributed to them, it is only by a certain attribution and in so far as they are non-beings.

13. How many and what things the word falsity signifies.—But it remains to expound of what kind this analogous denomination is. In which it must briefly be said with St. Thomas, in the said q. 17, a. 1, that a thing is denominated false per se in various ways. The first and most usual is on account of likeness to the true thing, by reason of which it affords us an occasion of falsity, namely that we think that to be which is not. In this way brass is called false gold, not on account of the mere disagreement which it has with the true idea or concept of gold; for lead or tin have a greater one, which are not denominated false gold; therefore on account of the likeness and appearance of gold which it bears, by reason of which it is easily thought to be gold. And of this mode Aristotle said, Metaphysics V, c. 29, that those things are called false which by their nature are apt to seem either to be what they are not, or such as they are not, as a painting and dreams; and Augustine said, Soliloquies II, c. 6, that we name those things false which we find to be like the true. Secondly, something is called false because it is the object of a false enunciation, which object is nevertheless only objectively in the intellect. So Aristotle above, who adds that in false things of this kind there is a breadth; for some are also impossible, as that the diagonal is commensurable with the side; but others are only false, as that Peter is running if he is at rest. And in this way the idol is called a false god, because it is the object of the false opinion that the idol is God. In which sense Paul said, Romans 1, that the idol is a lie; and 1 Corinthians 8, he said that the idol is nothing. A third mode can be when a thing is called false because it is not adequated or conformed to the art. St. Thomas posited this, and says that it has place only in things made by human art; but Aristotle passed over that mode, and to me (as I said) it seems very improper and little usual in the common mode of speaking; yet such a metaphorical denomination is not repugnant, so that, because a thing is called true when it is conformed to the art, it is called false when it is not conformed; although this very thing belongs to it more in so far as it has something of non-being than as it has entity.

Of the falsity of simple concepts

14. In any simple knowledge whatever falsity is metaphorical.—I say, secondly: in simple concepts or acts of knowing, whether of the intellect or of sense, there is no proper falsity or deception, but it is attributed to them through metaphor, as to things themselves. This conclusion is Aristotle’s, De Anima III, c. 6, and more fully Metaphysics IX, c. 12; and it follows from the preceding, because simple concepts are equated with things in truth, as is evident from what was said in the preceding disputation; therefore also in falsity; for the reason is equal, and the whole discourse made in the preceding conclusion can easily be applied here. Secondly, the same can be proved by the reason treated at length in the preceding disputation, sect. 2, because, if in the simple concept there could properly be falsity on account of disconformity to some things, there would be no simple concept which would not be false with respect to some things, because there is no concept which does not have disconformity with some things, especially in creatures; but the consequent is absurd, as I showed in the same place. Thirdly, hence an a priori reason can be declared, because falsity is concerned with those things between which truth is concerned; for they are opposites; but truth is concerned between knowledge and the thing which is its object; falsity, therefore, ought also to be concerned between knowledge and the thing which is its object; whence, although knowledge has disagreement with a thing which is not its object, that cannot be denominated falsity, but will be (so to speak) a certain disparate relationship, as may be seen also in the composition and division of the intellect. Hence, then, an argument is made up; for simple apprehension or knowledge cannot have disconformity with the thing which is its object, granted that it can be unconformed to other things; therefore there cannot be falsity in it. The minor is declared in this way, because, since the relationship of this knowledge to the object is simple, or through simple representation, it cannot be unconformed to the thing as to the represented object, because either such a thing is represented through such an act of knowledge or not. If it is not represented, it is not the object, and so with respect to it such an act will not be false. But if it is represented through it, there will be conformity between them, because it is necessary that the representing and the represented have agreement among themselves; therefore also with respect to that object such an act will not be false; therefore with respect to no object can an act of this kind have falsity.

15. You will say that an act of this kind can represent the thing, yet not as it is; and therefore that it can be false with respect to its object. The answer is that in a simple act or representation a repugnance is involved, because in this mode of representing one thing is not attributed to another, nor one objective concept to another, but simply some thing is represented; therefore either it is represented as it is, or that is not what is represented; and consequently it is repugnant that it be the object and not be represented as it is. Just as a sensible image simply representing some person must represent him as he is; or, if in something it does not represent him as he is, in that it is not his image, and therefore cannot properly speaking be called a false image, but imperfect, or diminished, or not an image. Whence, when we call some image false, the falsity in truth exists in our attribution or composition, namely because we attribute such an image to him whom it does not represent, thinking it to be his image; and so that falsity is only objectively in the intellect, or denominatively from an act of the intellect; in the same way, then, one must think of simple concepts or acts of knowing, which are so related as simple images.

16. And St. Thomas plainly taught this, in the said q. 17, aa. 1 and 3, if he is attentively read and the solutions of the arguments are conjoined with the doctrine of the article. For although he says that sense is deceived about the common sensible or per accidens, and similarly that the intellect per accidens can be deceived in the simple apprehension of the quiddity of the thing, which Aristotle too taught in the places cited, nevertheless he does not understand that falsity properly taken is found in the simple apprehension itself, but that there is in these apprehensions an occasion of error and deception, and that thence they are named false. In the way in which Aristotle said that painting and dreams are called false, because the imagination which they effect is not of a being. And so there is no doubt that sometimes sense (and the same holds proportionally of the intellect) apprehends an exterior thing otherwise than it exists in the thing. Whence it comes about that it apprehends not so much it as another in its place, and therefore we say that it is not properly deceived, because it does not attribute that apprehension of its own to the thing existing in itself, but simply apprehends that object represented to it. Whence, just as the imagination apprehending a golden mountain is not deceived, because it does not compose nor attribute this to the thing, so neither is sense; yet, because exterior sense is moved by the exterior object and apprehends it after the manner of intuition, and so after the manner of something present and existing, therefore, when it apprehends a thing which in truth is not, or not in the way in which it is, it is said to be deceived, because it departs from that thing which it seems to have for its object, although in truth its apprehension is not terminated at it or at such a mode of it; and therefore there is not in it proper falsity, but a certain imperfection which is the occasion of falsity. Whence Aristotle says above: Sight does not err in saying that there is colour, but what that is which is tinged with colour, or where, that is, it errs about the subject which is affected by colour; but it is evident that sight does not have in itself error formally, but causally or occasionally, because it does not per se judge of the subject of colour; there is not, therefore, proper and per se falsity in these simple acts, and so the authors cited above also think.

Of the falsity of composition and division

17. Falsity is properly in composition and division.—I say, thirdly, that falsity is properly found in the composition and division of the intellect. This is the common and received opinion of Aristotle, St. Thomas and others in the places cited. And it follows from a sufficient enumeration from what has been said, because falsity is not in things nor in simple concepts; therefore it is necessary that it be at least in composition and division; because neither can another member be thought out, nor can it be nowhere in its own way, because the others are denominated false through metaphor and analogy; therefore through a relationship to, or imitation of, something which is properly named false; but this is nothing but the composition and division of the intellect. The a priori reason is taken from what has been said, because in composition or division of this kind there can properly be found disconformity between the knowledge and the thing which is its object; therefore also falsity. The antecedent is evident, because when the intellect composes things which in the thing are not conjoined, it has for its adequate object the union or conjunction of one extreme with the other. Whence it also embraces the extremes themselves in the actual object, one as the matter or subject with which it compares the other and judges it to have conjunction with it, and consequently in exercised act judges that the concept of one has conformity with the other; therefore, when between those extremes there is not that conjunction or conformity which the intellect judges, the judgement disagrees with its object; there is therefore in it proper and rigorous falsity. You will say: truth and falsity are in composition and division as in the knower, as we said above with St. Thomas; but when the intellect composes a predicate with a subject which in the thing are not composed, it in no way knows falsity; indeed it composes and judges so because it thinks this to be true; therefore either there is not properly falsity in composition of this kind, or the things which we said above are false. The answer is that neither follows, because, as was also declared above, truth and falsity are not said to be through composition and division in the intellect as in the knower because it is necessary that they be directly and formally known by the composition or division itself, which includes a special repugnance with respect to falsity; because there is falsity in composition or division when the intellect is deceived; but it is deceived because it thinks that to be true which is false; whence it is necessary that it be ignorant of the falsity which it has; for, unless it were ignorant of it, it would not have it; and therefore error is wont to be called the ignorance of a depraved disposition. Falsity, therefore, is said to be in composition and division as in the knower, not because falsity itself as falsity is directly known, but because one thing is known as conjoined or conformed to another which in truth is rather disjoined and unconformed; and therefore in exercised act that is known which is unconformed and false, namely that this is that which in the thing it is not, or is not that which it is.

Some things inferred from what has been said

18. And hence it is understood, first, the difference between simple concepts and the judgement of composition and division; for the simple concept, as it directly and positively tends into the object apprehended and known through it, only represents it and does not say or represent positively that it is so in the thing or is not (I speak of human acts); whence, if it happens to have some disconformity with the thing as it is in itself, it is rather after the manner of negation than after the manner of positive repugnance, namely because it does not represent that which is, but another. Whence it also comes about that it does not properly disagree with the object which it represents and into which it directly tends. But the judgement positively disagrees with its object, because it judges either that it has what it does not have or does not have what it has, and therefore proper falsity is found in composition and division, but not in simple conception. And therefore the theologians, although they think that in the intellect of Christ or of the Blessed Virgin there could not be error or false assent, nevertheless do not think it inconvenient that through the senses they could apprehend things otherwise than they are in themselves, because this is not proper deception nor falsity, nor an indecent imperfection; especially since through wisdom the intellect could correct the senses, lest they lead into deception. And the same is probable of Adam and of men existing in the state of original justice, if it had lasted.

19. What falsity strictly taken is.—Secondly, it is gathered from what has been said what falsity is; for if we speak of it in all propriety, it expresses that disagreement or inadequation which is between the judgement of the intellect composing and dividing and the thing itself as it is in itself. Yet this inadequation does not signify some proper relation, real or of reason, as is evident a fortiori from what has been said of truth. Nor does it seem to signify a mere extrinsic denomination either, because falsity is an intrinsic imperfection of the intellect. Nor a mere privation, both because falsity is distinguished in this from the ignorance of privation; and also because the act can become false from true without the real privation of any perfection, because it becomes false without real change of itself, as was said above. Therefore this falsity seems to include both a positive relation or comparison of one to another, which comes about through composition and division, and moreover to connote the object otherwise related. For so truth and falsity, which are opposites, are understood to have opposite notions. Whence this falsity is to be explained in the same proportion in which opposite truth has been declared by us above. But improperly so-called falsity, which is attributed to things or to simple concepts, is only an extrinsic denomination, either of sign, or of cause, or of occasion, or of the object of a false judgement; or certainly it sometimes signifies some negation of agreement between some thing and some simple concept, which consists rather in the lack of perfection or of perfect and integral adequation than in direct and opposite disagreement, and therefore does not deserve the name of proper falsity; all of which are sufficiently evident from what we have said.

20. And according to these things is to be understood what Augustine says, Eighty-three Questions, q. 32: Whoever understands any thing otherwise than that thing is, is deceived. For it happens in two ways that a thing is understood or conceived otherwise than it is, namely positively and negatively. I call it positively when the thing is conceived otherwise by attributing to it that foreign concept or removing its proper one, which comes about through false composition and division. But I call it negatively when, although the intellect conceives the thing otherwise, that is, not according to that mode which the thing has but according to another, it nevertheless does not attribute to it either that mode or any foreign concept, which happens in imperfect simple conception; but it is evident that this latter mode does not suffice for deception or falsity. Augustine, therefore, speaks in the former way, and in the same sense is to be understood what he subjoins: And everyone who is deceived does not understand that in which he is deceived. Whoever, therefore, understands any thing otherwise than it is, does not understand it; for propositions of this kind are true, although they are not convertible; for every error is ignorance, yet not every ignorance is error; and so every falsity includes the lack of some understanding, although the lack of understanding does not suffice for falsity.

21. Thirdly, it is gathered from what has been said that falsity or the false is said analogically of composition and division and of simple concepts and things. This is sufficiently evident from what has been said, because it has been shown that it is properly found only in composition and division, but in the others through extrinsic denomination and metaphor. Only in this is a difference to be noted between truth and falsity; for, although of truth too we said that under a certain notion it is said first of complex truth and analogically of its signs or causes in so far as they are precisely denominated from it, which we now teach in the same way of falsity, nevertheless under another consideration we admitted that proper truth is found in things and concepts, which we deny of falsity. But the reason of this difference is that between the intellect and the things which are objected to it there can be, indeed there must be, positive conformity in the notion of representing and represented, in which simple truth consists; yet there cannot be proper disconformity between object and act, because by the very fact that it is not represented it ceases to be the object; but the negation of agreement and conformity between knowledge and a thing which is not its object does not have the notion of falsity, although it is sometimes so named because the thing has a certain likeness or nearness to the object and seems to be represented otherwise than it is in itself.

22. How falsity is opposed to truth.—Finally, it is understood from what has been said what the opposition is between truth and falsity, for St. Thomas, in the said q. 17, a. 4, says that they are opposed contrarily: Because each (he says) is something positive and they are mutually repugnant. Which he confirms by the authority of Aristotle, Metaphysics IV, text 27, saying that the false is from this, that that is judged to be which is not, or not to be which is. From which it is understood that St. Thomas speaks of the true and the false properly so called, as they are in composition and division; for the improper or metaphorical false is not opposed to the true except either negatively or privatively, or as the imperfect to the perfect, or as the apparent to the existing, according to the various denominations of the false explained above. And it must further be added that also in the composition of the intellect, in order that the true and the false be contrarily opposed, they must be concerned with the same thing and according to the same; otherwise, if they are compared to diverse things, it happens not only that the true and the false are not contraries, but also that they belong to the same thing, at least at diverse times, as Aristotle said and as was explained above, that the same proposition can be changed from true to false from the change of the object without change of itself. And the reason is clear, because truth or falsity includes two things, namely the judgement or estimation of the intellect and such coexistence or connotation of the object; and therefore from the change of either, truth or falsity can be changed. And by the very fact that the judgement is compared to diverse things, or to the same for diverse times, it is not altogether the same truth which is seen in it, and therefore it is no wonder that it does not keep a proper absolute opposition to falsity, but only as it were a relative one. In order, then, that the true and the false be contrarily opposed, it is necessary that they be taken with respect to altogether the same object; for then the opposition arises not from relation alone or quasi-relation, but from the acts of the intellect themselves having opposite relationships to such an object, in so far as one is after the manner of assent, the other after the manner of dissent; and therefore there is then proper contrariety between such acts, in the way in which Aristotle said that opinions about contradictories are contrary among themselves.

23. A question.—Answer.—But someone will ask here in passing whether, just as the same judgement at diverse times can be true and false with respect to an object differently related, so it can be at the same time true and false with respect to diverse things. For some affirm it, because the reason seems similar in the aforesaid cases, and because, although the true and the false are not rigorously relatives, they nevertheless imitate them; but in relatives it happens that the same thing is at the same time similar and dissimilar with respect to diverse things; and St. Thomas is cited for this opinion, I, q. 17, a. 3. But neither does St. Thomas teach this there, nor is it true, as is evident from the inconvenience inferred above, that almost every knowledge would be at the same time false and true, as the same quality is almost always similar and dissimilar with respect to diverse things. Likewise otherwise a subcontrary proposition would be at the same time true and false with respect to diverse things. But the reason is that the truth of the judgement is not to be weighed by one or another part of the object, but by the whole adequate object. And if with respect to it it has conformity, it is simply true and in no way false; but if it lacks the aforesaid conformity, it will be false and in no way true; but it cannot happen that with respect to the adequate object it has at the same time conformity and disconformity; and therefore truth and falsity cannot be found at the same time in the same act with respect to its object.

24. You will say: therefore in the truth and falsity of propositions there is not more or less, because, if every truth is sincere truth and excludes every falsity, none can be greater; one enunciation, therefore, will not be truer than another, and the same will hold of falsity. But the consequent is against Aristotle, Metaphysics IV, c. 4, at the end, and against the sense and manner of speaking of all. The answer is by simply denying the sequel, because one of opposites is not always called greater or less on account of the greater or lesser admixture of the contrary. For one proposition is more certain than another, although neither has anything of doubt or fear, as was touched upon above, disp. I, sect. 5. I confess, then, that all true propositions are equal as regards the lack of falsity; likewise it is true that they have a certain equality in proportional conformity to their objects, because that consists (so to speak) in something indivisible, and therefore in this it does not receive more or less. Nevertheless one proposition is called truer than another because it is more immutable and has a more infallible conformity with its object. Likewise by reason of the foundation it can be called truer because it is founded in truer being; but conversely a proposition is called more false because it is more impossible and because it recedes more from the true; so it is called more false that a thousand are equal to two than that four are, although in the lack of truth they are equal.

1. I suppose, first of all, that the discussion is of falsity properly so called, which, as we have said, is found in composition and division; for of falsity as it is attributed to other things there is either no difficulty, because it is either only an extrinsic or metaphorical denomination, which, if it is in the notion of sign, as in words, arises from their depraved use; but if it is in the notion of cause or occasion of falsity, it arises from some likeness or proportion, which in diverse things, according to their truth and nature, will also be diverse, as can easily be considered by making an induction; or certainly, if that falsity consists in some imperfection, since it is thought by us rather to have the notion of malice than of falsity, there is no reason why we should declare its root in this place, although it can be indicated in a few words and remitted to the proper places. For if that falsity is in natural things, as in the monsters of nature, its root is commonly on the side of the matter or from the defect of the power of the proximate agent, to which is also reduced the concurrence of contrary agents impeding one another, as is treated more fully in Physics II. But if that falsity is in artificial things, it comes from the same causes, proportion being kept, namely from the defect of the matter, or from the defect of the executive power, or certainly from the defect of the art itself, or of its direction, as is self-evident and is treated in the same Physics II. But if this falsity is attributed to human moral acts, its proximate root is the liberty of the will, which does not have intrinsic or necessary conformity with its rule, some defect of the intellect concurring at the same time. Of which, what it is and how it is necessary, we shall touch upon below in disputing about free efficient causes, and the moral philosophers and theologians dispute more fully. Finally, if this falsity is attributed to the senses or to other simple knowledges, it seems proximately to come from some defect of the intentional species impressed on the exterior senses, as St. Thomas indicates, I, q. 17, aa. 2 and 3. For since every interior apprehension arises from the exterior, the defect in interior simple apprehension, speaking per se, arises from the defect of exterior sensation; but since the faculty of sensing itself is of itself the same and indifferent, but is constituted in act and proximately determined through the species, from the imperfection of the species the defect of sensation arises. But this defect of the species can consist either in some imperfection of its entity, or in the mode in which it is impressed, or in its intermixture with other species. Whence sometimes it comes from the imperfection or distance of the object, sometimes from some indisposition of the medium, sometimes from the injury of the organ, as is disputed more fully in De Anima II. Whence these are enough about this falsity.

2. Secondly I suppose, as regards us, that this question has place only in human knowledge; for it is certain that falsity can in no way fall into the divine, not only because that knowledge is most simple, but most of all because it is most perfect, infinite, and altogether immutable and eternal. But of angelic knowledge it does not pertain to us to dispute whether the intelligences, in some things which they do not perfectly know by their nature, such as supernatural or contingent things, can compose and divide and in this way incur error, or whether even without formal composition they can sometimes be properly deceived about some objects; for this disputation is proper to the theologians, and therefore it pertains to them also to declare the root of that falsity, if perhaps it can be in the angels by their nature, or is now in the evil ones; we are speaking, therefore, only of falsity in human knowledge.

3. Thirdly I suppose that the root of this falsity can be investigated both theologically and philosophically. For in the former way the theologian will say that the root of all error and falsity in men is original sin; for, if that had not intervened, men would have been preserved immune from every error through original justice. But let us omit this cause, both because it does not now pertain to us, and also because that is not properly a cause inducing into falsity, but one removing what prohibits. For, as is the more approved and almost certain opinion of the theologians, original sin did not induce into men some positive entity which either leads them to deception or pours darkness into their senses or intellects. It only deprived them of the justice which would drive away all falsity. Whence this very thing supposes that there is in human nature¹, if it is not prevented or guarded by an extrinsic gift, a sufficient principle or occasion of falsity; and this is what can be inquired into philosophically, whether that be some internal principle existing in man himself, or something external which can lead man into falsity.

4. Fourthly it is to be considered that composition and division can be found either in merely apprehensive conception prescinding from judgement, or in conception which is at the same time judicative; but we said above that complex truth is properly found in judicative composition; whence it comes about that the same must be said of falsity, for contraries are of the same genus. Whence no one is thought to be deceived or to err until he judges, however many false compositions he apprehends. But since that apprehension which comes about without judgement regularly comes about through concepts of words rather than of things, as I said above, just as in the composition of words there is falsity as in a sign, so it can be admitted in that apprehension, although in it it is as it were materially, that is, not as in one affirming or uttering the false, but as in a sign which according to itself signifies the false. As there is falsity in this proposition, There is no God, either written or materially uttered by him who reports: The fool has said in his heart: There is no God; and therefore of falsity of this kind the reason is the same as of the falsity which is in vocal composition as in a sign. But if the apprehension comes about through concepts of things, it can scarcely be understood how a proper apprehensive composition comes about without some judgement; because such a composition includes the knowledge not only of the extremes, but also of their conjunction among themselves; indeed in this last the composition is consummated; but as long as there is not judgement, there is not knowledge of such conjunction; therefore neither can there be a true composition through concepts of things stopping at apprehension alone, but it will be either a conception after the manner of simple apprehension, not only of the extremes but also of their union, or a certain complexion after the manner of a question rather than after the manner of an enunciation; and so the falsity of which we are treating will not be able to be there unless some judicative composition is admixed there, because that apprehended proposition is judged either possible or uncertain. In which way the theologians say that doubt in faith is heretical, because, although it does not have the judicative composition that some proposition of faith is false, nevertheless, while it apprehends the thing as doubtful, it judges that it is an uncertain thing, and this very thing is against faith and heretical. It remains, then, to speak only of the falsity of judgement.

Resolution of the question

5. It is to be noticed, then, fifthly, that man can acquire knowledge or judge of things in two ways, namely by discovery and by teaching or instruction; and by each way he can arrive at true and false judgement. But there is a diversity, for the judgement which is acquired by discovery alone is always founded in the things themselves, as they are represented to the knower; but the judgement through instruction sometimes comes about in this way, but sometimes rests on the authority alone of the one speaking or teaching, so that sometimes the teaching is related only as proposing and applying objects and means of judging, but sometimes is the whole reason of the judgement. When, therefore, the judgement is of this latter kind, so that it rests on the authority of the speaker alone, it is easy to find the root of falsity in it, for as regards specification (so to speak) it comes from the imperfection of the speaker or teacher, namely because he can either be deceived or lie; and therefore the origin of this kind is always some human or rather created authority, so as to include the angelic too, which, if from elsewhere it is not confirmed by uncreated truth, can be a cause of falsity. But as regards exercise the proper cause is the will of the man himself judging, which is universal in every false judgement, even if it is acquired by discovery.

6. Which comes from a difference to be noted between truth and falsity, for the intellect can be necessitated to truth, but to falsity it cannot, simply and absolutely speaking; and therefore as regards exercise it can never incur false judgement except through the free motion of the will; for, necessity being excluded, the intellect cannot be determined to judgement except through the will, since it itself is not free. But the reason of that difference is that the intellect is not determined of necessity to judgement except by means of the evidence of the thing known, as experience itself teaches and reason, because without evidence the object is not perfectly applied to the power so as to draw it to itself of necessity and determine it; but evidence cannot produce false judgement, because it is founded in the thing itself known as it is in itself, or must necessarily be resolved into some self-evident and manifest principles. And hence it also comes about that truth is far more immutable than falsity; for false judgement is of itself mutable, or rather the intellect, whenever it utters a false judgement, can be changed and utter a true judgement; but true judgement, if it is perfect, is of itself in a certain way immutable even in creatures; for although simply it can be changed, because it can cease to be, nevertheless, as far as depends on itself, it does not permit change into false judgement, by reason of evidence; for we are speaking of this judgement; for, if the judgement is free, however true it is, the intellect can from it be changed into false judgement, as far as depends on its force, by the efficacy of the will.

7. You will say: sometimes the intellect can be necessitated by an extrinsic cause, as by God, or by an angel, who, if he is evil, can so propose something false that the intellect cannot dissent. And it is confirmed, for evidence itself is sometimes only apparent; therefore then it can be concerned with the false, and yet it necessitates the intellect no less than if it were true. The answer is that God indeed can bring necessity on the intellect, even in things which are not evident; but this mode of operating is beyond or above the nature of the intellect, according to which alone we are now speaking. But that miracle being posited, the true and sound doctrine of the theologians teaches that God cannot lead the intellect to the false, because this is no less repugnant to his goodness than to lie. Whence it can in no way happen that the first origin of falsity is referred to God leading or operating to it in a special mode. But as regards the angel, it must be said that the angel cannot by natural power immediately change the intellect to judgement or second act; for this is proper to God, its author. Whence much less can an evil angel necessitate the intellect to false assent, but at most he can by suggestion and persuasion lead it to false assent after the manner of instruction; yet man can always dissent from him, or at least not assent, if he wills.

8. Finally, to that about apparent evidence the answer is that evidence can be called apparent in two ways. First, because in no order is it truly such, but from some error or precipitation of the intellect it is thought to be such. Secondly, because in the natural order it is truly sufficient evidence, yet, some supernatural work intervening, it can fall short of truth. In this latter way we confess that there can be some apparent evidence, especially when it is abstractive, as in the human intellect; such as can seem to the pagan when he judges that the consecrated host is bread. Yet this evidence, as far as depends on itself, does not incline to the false but to the true; and when it is concerned with the actual existence of some thing which is not seen in itself but is gathered from another, it always has a condition understood, namely that this is so as far as depends on the power of nature or on natural causes, or unless God makes some supernatural change in things. And so it does not simply necessitate the intellect, but on the supposition that it is established that no change of this kind has been made by God; wherefore this evidence per se is never the origin of falsity, but by reason of some defect which it has adjoined, of which kind is incredulity, or at least ignorance of the supernatural work. But in the former way there is no apparent evidence which simply necessitates the intellect, because those two are plainly repugnant among themselves. But sometimes it is so called through exaggeration and precipitation, which is more in words than in interior judgement. But sometimes this evidence is so called on some supposition, which is evidence of the consequence, not of the consequent; and therefore it is not repugnant in this way that the intellect be necessitated to the false, because that is not necessity simply but on a supposition, nor does the falsity arise from the evidence, but from some other prior error, which must be voluntary and free as regards exercise in the judgement itself.

9. Actual falsity, then, or that exercised through actual judgement, always has its proximate origin in the human will, although as regards specification (so to speak) or as regards the motive it arises from created authority or from its imperfection in the aforesaid mode of judging. But if it is further inquired whence falsity comes in him who testifies to it, the answer is that he can testify to falsity in two ways: first, without proper error of his own, but knowing that what he testifies is false, which is a proper and formal lie, and then its origin is the malice or liberty of the will. In another way it can come from a prior error of the speaker himself or of the master teaching, whose error could further have come from the teaching and false testimony of another; yet, lest in this genus one proceed to infinity, one must necessarily stop at some error committed or acquired by way of discovery by someone who, inquiring into truth, fell into error thinking that he had found the true. And in almost this way false opinions have in great part been mixed with true ones in human disciplines.

10. Sixthly, finally, it must be said that the origin of this falsity which is mixed in the knowledge of things themselves without extrinsic authority radically arises from this, that man does not conceive things through their proper species and as they are in themselves; but this comes from this, that he conceives and apprehends things not immediately, but through species received by the ministry of the senses; for hence it comes about that often from the imperfect apprehension of sense there arises imperfect apprehension of the intellect, and from imperfect apprehension false judgement; for in this way we sometimes judge something to be an animal which is not. But sometimes, there being perfect apprehension in sense and in the intellect about an object per se sensible, falsity can occur in the intellect from the inept composition of simple concepts; because their very conjunction among themselves is not always known or sufficiently represented through a proper species; and the same happens from a bad inference. And finally the whole reason of this defect is that man does not attain evident knowledge of truth; for every knowledge which is not of this kind and is taken from things themselves is of itself exposed to falsity. But that it is actually false comes as it were contingently and per accidens from this, that the thing is otherwise than it is judged; for per se this can never come from the intention of the one assenting, because he cannot tend into the false as false.

1. This doubt is annexed to the preceding, and therefore it is to be dispatched in this place; and Aristotle touched upon it, Metaphysics II, c. 1; and in Book IV, c. 5 and following, he disputes at length against those who thought it not only difficult but also impossible to attain sincere truth. Which, if they understood it collectively, as the theologians say, and through natural powers, they would not be to be disproved; yet, because they thought that in no thing at all could man attain truth as it is in the thing, and therefore that there is nothing true among men except what appears, they therefore erred greatly, as Aristotle there demonstrates at length. That error, then, being passed over, we must speak briefly of the difficulty which we have in the knowledge of things.

Various opinions

2. There are, then, three opinions on this matter. The first refers this whole difficulty of attaining truth to the imperfection of our intellect. Scotus, Major, Antonius Andreae and others hold this in the place cited. And Aristotle seems much to favour them in the place cited, saying: Since the difficulty happens in two ways, its cause is placed not in things but in us. But the reason is that all things are of themselves knowable, nor is there any difficulty in them if there is power in the knower. And so all things are known by God with equal facility, because to all there is on his side a most sufficient power; the angels too most easily know all those things to which the perfection of their intellectual power can extend. But if they either cannot understand some things or can understand them with difficulty, it is only because their intellective power is inferior to those things; therefore in us too the whole difficulty comes from our imperfection.

3. The second conversely thinks that this whole difficulty is placed in the things themselves, which Fonseca reports from Heraclitus. And it can be declared and persuaded thus, because our intellect suffers difficulty in attaining truths for this reason, that it does not have proper species of things through which it may know them; but that it does not have these does not come from itself, because, as far as depends on itself, it is in potency to all, but comes from the things themselves, which are not productive of proper species in our intellect; therefore this difficulty comes from the side of the things themselves. The matter is evident by examples, for material substance cannot be known by us for this reason, that it cannot impress a species of itself either in sense or in the intellect; which does not come from our side but from the side of the substance itself, and the same holds of the parts of substance, and in accidents which are not per se sensible. But the same holds also in spiritual substances, at least created ones, to omit God; for they do not have the efficacy to change our intellect and to impress their species on it; therefore this difficulty comes from the inefficacy of the things themselves.

4. The third opinion is intermediate, that some things are perfect and superior to man, others imperfect and inferior, and that man suffers difficulty in knowing all, but from diverse cause. With respect to the superior, then (this opinion says), the whole difficulty arises from our imperfection and not from the things, for they, as far as depends on themselves, are most intelligible. And Aristotle seems most of all to have spoken of these in the place cited, where he subjoins that common reason: As the eye of the owl to the light of the sun, so is our mind related to the things most manifest of nature. From which that common distinction of truths had its origin, for some are self-evident in themselves which are not so known to us, others conversely. But with respect to inferior things the difficulty of knowing them arises from them; for in our intellect there is truly sufficient power; yet, because they themselves are imperfect and little intelligible, therefore we know them with difficulty. The matter is declared by an example in sight; for it cannot see the light of the sun on account of its own imperfection, not that of the sun; but it cannot see the faintest light or some least object on account of the imperfection of the object itself, because it is most inefficacious for changing the power. And this is the opinion of St. Thomas, Averroes, Alexander, Albert the Great, in the cited place of the Metaphysics, whom the others, both Thomists and Averroists, follow.

5. But if you inquire in which order of those things are to be placed certain things which seem to be intermediate, as the elements and other natural things, some answer that they are comprehended in neither of those orders, nor is this necessary, because the question proposed does not pertain to these things, because in knowing them man suffers no difficulty, but knows them most easily. So thinks Fonseca, Metaphysics II, c. 1, q. 1, sect. 2. For he thinks that this question is not concerned with the difficulty which is in the exact and distinct knowledge of things, for in this way it is evident that it is most difficult to attain the perfect knowledge even of these sensible things; but he says that the question is of the confused and simple knowledge of things, which with respect to us is prior in order to the distinct. Because otherwise (he says) it would have to be said that the species of natural things are most difficult for us to know; because, since they are composite, their distinct knowledge depends on the knowledge of the principles and so is more difficult. Whence he infers that motion and time are not rightly numbered by St. Thomas and others among the things of the second order, which on account of their imperfection are known with difficulty; because, as regards whether they are and by simple and confused knowledge, nothing is known more easily than time and motion, although to explain what they are is most difficult, as Augustine said, Confessions XI, c. 14.

6. This opinion, however, does not meet with my approval; for it is against the mind of all the authors of this third opinion, as is evident from this very example of motion and time just adduced. Next, because it is proved by no reason that the discussion here is of confused and not distinct knowledge, in which chiefly is found the difficulty of attaining truth and manifold occasion of erring, of which thing the philosophers chiefly investigate the cause and root. Moreover, because otherwise they would have taken that distinction not from the perfection or imperfection of things, but from this, that things are more or less sensible, or more or less conjoined with sensible things; for we more easily perceive colours, the first qualities and similar things by confused and simple knowledge because they are per se primarily sensible. Next magnitude and the other common sensibles, per se secondarily, among which is contained motion and consequently time. After these, sensibles per accidens which are in reality conjoined with per se sensibles; and therefore among these it is easier to know the whole than the parts, because it is more sensible, and among wholes themselves, those which are nearer to the senses. And in similar proportion, in the way in which things separated from sensible matter are knowable to us, those are more easily known which have a greater and more intrinsic conjunction with sensible things. And therefore God is more easily known than the angels by that genus of knowledge, and among the angels those who are movers of the orbs rather than others.

7. And so we are dealing not only with confused knowledge but simply with the difficulty of attaining truth and the facility of erring, and therefore material things too are thought to be comprehended in the second order, as Javellus noted, Metaphysics II, q. 2, because they are not actually but only potentially intelligible. By which reason even the per se sensible qualities themselves are known with difficulty as regards their essence and nature. Indeed even the rational soul itself, which seems to be most proportioned and adequate to itself, knows itself with the greatest difficulty, because it is the material form of the body, in which it in some way falls short of the perfection of actually intelligible things. Nor does that reason stand in the way of this, that natural species would be most difficult to know. For either they are compared to other species of things, simple or less composite, or to the principles of which they consist; in the former way the sequel is to be denied, because the difficulty of knowing, neither according to itself nor as regards us, arises from greater composition with respect to other things which in no way enter such composition, because they are compared to those things altogether per accidens. But in the latter way the inference is to be conceded, which is no inconvenience, as is self-evident. For what wonder is it that the knowledge of a thing depends on the knowledge of its principles? Whence the comparison of the present question, in order that it be rightly made, must not be made between things of which one includes the other, but between co-distinct things; and so almost all the aforesaid authors speak.

8. A fourth opinion can be thought out, that the aforesaid difficulty comes from each head, namely from things and from us, which, in order that it be probable, must speak only of created things. For in God no reason can be thought out on his side on account of which he is difficult to know; none (I say) which pertains to defect or limitation; for so we are speaking. Because otherwise it is certain that God, on account of his infinite perfection, cannot be exactly known by a created intellect, much less by a human one; indeed neither can he be naturally seen as he is in himself; yet, as this impossibility comes from impotence, in this way we say that it is not to be referred to God, but to the defect of the power of the creature. And in the same sense this opinion says that in all other things the difficulty of knowing arises partly from the things themselves, partly from us. For that about immaterial and perfect things this comes in great part from our imperfection the first and third opinions cited confess, and it is self-evident. But that in some part it is also to be attributed to the imperfection of the things themselves is proved by the reason made in the second opinion. Which moreover is declared in this way, because among material qualities those which cannot in their mode impress their species on the senses are called insensible, not only from the defect of the senses but from their nature, and at the same time also from the defect of the power which they have for effecting their species and (so to speak) for manifesting themselves; but also created things, however immaterial, are unapt to manifest themselves (so to speak) intellectually and to produce their species; therefore on this side too a defect is to be attributed to them. It is confirmed, for knowledge arises from two principles, namely the power and the object; therefore, if both the object and the power are inefficacious for knowledge, the difficulty of knowing will come no less from the defect of the object than from the defect of the power, since the efficacy of each is necessary; but in the present case not only is our power inefficacious, but also the things themselves to be known are inefficacious either to communicate their species or to concur through themselves to the knowledge of themselves; therefore.

9. You will say: by these arguments it would be proved that not only in our intellect conjoined to the body, but also in the separated, indeed even in the intelligences themselves, there is a natural difficulty or unaptness to be known, because also in the separated intellects of others they cannot produce their species nor in any way manifest themselves to them. The answer is, first of all, that that is uncertain; for it is probable that one intelligence, as far as depends on itself, can manifest itself objectively to others and impress its species on them. But if now they do not effect this, it is because all have from the beginning the species of all substances infused per se; but with respect to our intellect, especially when it is in the body, they do not have efficacy of this kind. Secondly it is said, that antecedent being conceded, it rightly follows indeed that, as far as depends on the efficacy of such objects, the knowledge of other intelligences is difficult, indeed also impossible, for the intelligences themselves; nevertheless simply and absolutely it is not difficult for them, because, although they cannot take species from the objects, they nevertheless have another natural way by which they obtain them as due to them.

10. And hence it is easily proved that also concerning things of the inferior order the difficulty of attaining truth arises not only from the imperfection of things, as the second and third opinions asserted, but also from our imperfection, as the first teaches. For that the imperfection of things is a cause the reasons made about immaterial things prove a fortiori, because material things are much more unapt to manifest themselves to the intellect and to change it than spiritual things; and the more imperfect those things are and the less they have of entity, the less apt they are for the aforesaid effect. Likewise, because, in order that they can be understood, it is necessary that they be elevated to a superior order and become in some way immaterial, at least in representative or virtual being, which they have in the intelligible species; it is therefore a sign that they according to themselves are imperfect in the genus of intelligibles, and consequently that on their side there is great difficulty in understanding them and finding truth; and so much greater is this difficulty, the less perfect entity these things have in their order and the less representable they are through a proper species. But that this difficulty also arises from our imperfection, besides the things adduced in the opinion of Scotus, is declared from what has just been said, because, if our intellect were perfect, it would have some natural way by which it could obtain proper species of these things, even if the things themselves are unapt to provide them; therefore, that our intellect by no reason or natural way can obtain them is its imperfection; therefore that difficulty too is to be attributed to it. And it is confirmed because this whole difficulty in great part arises from this, that our intellect conjoined to the body depends in its act on phantasms; a sign of which is that, separated from the body, it will be able to know more things and more easily, even of these things which are imperfect and seem to be less intelligible; but this is an imperfection of our intellect; therefore that is always a cause or (so to speak) a concause of this difficulty. Add that the theologians teach that man cannot by the light of nature find all truths or avoid all errors, even in natural and speculative things, but with the help of God can do both; it is therefore a sign that this difficulty, or rather impossibility, arises from the limitation of our intellect and the dependence which it has on the senses.

Resolution of the question

11. In this matter I think that the third opinion, which is St. Thomas’s, is simply true, provided that the first is not altogether excluded; for the second is improbable, but the fourth in part less probable, although in many things it attains the truth. And so, that this difficulty with respect to all things arises in some way from our imperfection the reasons adduced in the first and fourth opinions prove, which as regards this convince; nor do I think that St. Thomas excluded this cause, but in some things adjoined another. Whence it is further true also that with respect to inferior things this difficulty is increased, or arises at the same time, from their imperfection, which the reasons of the third and fourth opinions also prove and experience itself sufficiently teaches; for some most imperfect things we know with the greatest difficulty, although we know some more perfect things more easily; it is therefore a sign that this difficulty arises from the imperfection of the things themselves. Nor could Scotus or the other authors of the first opinion deny this, or, if they deny it, they are false. But as regards this the reason is not the same concerning perfect and immaterial things, which St. Thomas also intends, and in this the fourth opinion falls short, because those things are of themselves most apt to be understood.

12. But the objection made about the production of species is to be dissolved in this way: for first of all, if we hold that those substances are productive of species representing themselves in the intellects of others, it must consequently be said that their not doing this about the human intellect, especially conjoined to the body, does not come from their inefficacy, but because it is not capable of such species, especially for that state; for, if in the state of separation it can receive them, those actually intelligible objects too will be able to impress them according to the capacity of the patient. But if we hold that these substances cannot impress their species, it must first of all be said that this does not properly come from their imperfection but rather from a certain perfection, although limited and finite. Just as that one immaterial substance cannot produce another similar to itself is not properly from imperfection, since some less perfect things can do this, but from perfection, by reason of which they have it that they cannot be produced except through creation; so, then, in the present case, although those substances are actually intelligible, nevertheless, because they are finite substances, they cannot be immediate principles for effecting accidents in other subjects. Or certainly, because per se they regard intellects altogether abstracted from matter, which by their nature postulate that from the beginning they be in first act, therefore such substances are indeed of themselves actually intelligible as proportioned objects terminative of intellection, which suppose first act in the one understanding, but do not confer it. Whence, if some intellect is in pure potency with respect to those things, it is to be attributed to its imperfection that it lacks first act, but not to the imperfection of the object. Or secondly it can be said that, just as first act, or the species by which they may be able to understand, is due to substances in so far as they are understanding, so to the same in so far as they are intelligible it is due that their species be communicated to other substances of the same order. Whence that our intellect, while it is conjoined to the body, cannot obtain their species is not properly from their impotence; but it is from its imperfection, because in that state it cannot use such species. Whence as soon as it is separated from the body it receives them accommodated to its capacity, which it can thenceforth use.

13. It remains, then, that this difficulty arises from the improportion which is between our intellect and intelligible objects; but this improportion is founded in each extreme, namely the intellect and the object; yet not in the same way; for with respect to inferior things it is founded in their imperfection, joined with the imperfection of the intellect not having the power to attain (so to speak) the least intelligibility of such things; but in superior things it is founded in the excess of perfection, which our imperfection cannot sufficiently grasp; and so it comes about that in almost all things it is difficult for us to find truth. To this is added also that in individual things and questions truth is one, but falsity manifold, because one can depart from truth in many ways, and many things which in truth are not can have an apparent likeness of some thing. And thence it also comes about that the finding of truth is difficult, but the lapse into falsity easier and more frequent.