Disputationes metaphysicae

1. Reasons for doubting.—We have said that truth is found in things and in knowledge; it is necessary, then, to explain in what order and mode it belongs to each, which will also help that the notion of transcendental truth may remain more fully explained. It seems, then, that truth belongs to things prior to knowledge. First indeed, because the true is the object of the intellect; therefore before every act of the intellect truth is supposed; therefore truth is in things prior to knowledge. Secondly, because the truth of things is more universal, since it is transcendent; therefore it is prior, because more universal things are prior by their nature. Indeed, since it has been said that the true is convertible with real being, and the concepts of the mind themselves are real beings, they seem to be true by no other reason than in so far as they are beings; therefore the truth of things is of itself more common and prior to the truth of knowledge. On the contrary, however, is the fact that all authors think that the true is something analogous, whose principal analogate is the truth of knowledge, from Aristotle, Metaphysics VI, at the end, saying that truth is only in the intellect formally and properly, but in things as in a cause, as he also says in Metaphysics IX, c. 12. But in words it is said to be as in a sign, in so far as they signify the true or the false, as is said in Peri Hermeneias I, c. 4.

Various opinions

2. It is, then, the opinion of many that truth is first and chiefly found in knowledge, but secondarily in things; indeed that it is intrinsically and formally in knowledge alone, but in things causally or objectively. So that, just as healthy is analogous by attribution, which is said of one analogate only intrinsically and formally, but of the others by mere denomination from it, so true is analogous by attribution of altogether the same notion, which will be said of knowledge formally, because it is true, but of things only by a denomination taken from the truth of knowledge, in so far as they are its cause. As it is also said of the truth of speech only in so far as it is its sign. So thinks Cajetan, cited in the preceding section. And it seems to be taken from St. Thomas, the said I, q. 16, aa. 1, 3 and 6, and De veritate, q. 1, a. 3, and on the places of Aristotle cited above. And it can be further declared from the very definition of the true as it is applied to all these. For knowledge is called true in so far as it is conformed to the thing which it represents, not as the thing itself is true, but as it is such as it is conceived in the mind and affirmed or denied, as St. Thomas noted, in the said q. 16, a. 1, ad 3. But the thing is called true in so far as it is conformed or conformable to the true concept which some intellect has or can have of such a thing. It is therefore a sign that the notion of truth is found per se in knowledge, but in things only by denomination from it, and that there is no notion of true common to both. For by a similar reason we conclude that truth is found in words only analogically as in a sign, because they are not true except in so far as they signify true knowledge. Finally, from the very mode of speaking and conceiving¹ of all this seems able to be sufficiently confirmed; for all, simply speaking, attribute truth to the judgement of the intellect, but to things only in a certain respect; and therefore we simply say that the intellect is true; but we do not say that other things are simply true, but with an addition: true gold, or something similar.

3. But others use a distinction. For things can be denominated true in two ways: in one way as the measure of knowledge; in another way as measured by knowledge. In the former way things are called true as the objects of speculative knowledge, in so far as they are either conformed or apt to be conformed to its truth; because the object is the measure of such knowledge, especially if it is its primary object. Which I say on account of the knowledge which God has of the essences of creatures, by which he is not measured, as I said above, because it does not regard them as its primary object, but as a secondary one eminently contained in the primary, by which that knowledge is proximately as it were measured. Indeed Giles adds, Quodlibet IV, q. 7, that neither is the knowledge which the angel has of the sun, for example, and of other things of which it has infused species, properly measured by their objects, but by the divine ideas from which those species flowed, of which elsewhere; for now it is enough that things of this kind are called true in so far as they can be adequated to the human intellect as its measure. But in the latter way all things are called true which flow from an intellectual exemplar or idea and are conformed to it as to their measure. They say, then, that truth is said equally primarily of every adequation of the measured to the measure which is found between thing and intellect or knowledge, whether it be of knowledge or of the thing; but of the adequation of the measure to the measured, whether it be of knowledge or of the thing, it is not truly and properly said that it is truth, but at most it can be said through the aforesaid analogy of attribution. The foundation of this opinion is only that truth, as the very name shows, expresses a relation of the measured; for it expresses the conformity of the intellect to the thing; for what must be conformed to another in order to be true regards it as a measure.

4. According to which opinion it follows, first, that God in the notion of being is not true, but only in the notion of science or of one knowing speculatively; because in so far as he is being he has no measure of his truth and of his being, nor is he conformed to any intellect, even his own, as measured by it, as was said above. Unless someone wishes to explain negatively that God is true because he is not unconformed to any measure or idea, as St. Thomas explained in a similar case, in the said q. 16, a. 5, ad 2. It follows, secondly, that the divine science as practical is not true simply speaking, because as such it is not measured but the measure of things. It follows, thirdly, that the essences of creatures considered according to the being of essence cannot be called true simply, but only through the aforesaid analogy, because they do not have a measure in the notion of essence. It follows, fourthly, that, absolutely speaking, there is not an order of prior and posterior between the truth of things and of knowledge, but between the truth of the measure and of the measured; because the latter, whether it exists in things or in knowledge, is said to be proper and formal truth; but the former, both in things and in knowledge, is said not to be truth, but only the relation of the measure, which through analogy is sometimes called truth. And many of the modern writers seem to follow this opinion.

5. A third opinion can be that it is one thing to speak of the first origin or imposition of this word true or truth, another of the proper significate which it now in fact has. For in the former way it is indeed true that through that word the truth of knowledge, or of composition and division, was first signified, because that is better known to us; nevertheless that word has now been extended, not through metaphorical transference but through propriety, to signify the truth of things, which in the notion of truth too can be more perfect than the truth of knowledge. As the theologians are wont to say that the names of paternity or mercy or similar ones were first imposed to signify these properties in creatures, but afterwards were extended to signify similar properties of God, not through metaphor but through supreme propriety and analogy, in which the first and chief analogate is God as having properties of this kind. The foundation of this opinion is that the adequation of the thing to the intellect is as perfect and proper as is the adequation of the intellect to the thing; therefore on this side nothing stands in the way that the notion of truth belong equally to each. Again, that this adequation is after the manner of measure or of measured seems to matter nothing to its being able in either way to obtain both the name and the notion of truth; both because it is proved by no sufficient reason that the notion of the true intrinsically expresses and postulates the notion of the measured, nor is it gathered from the common definition of truth, but rather the contrary; for it is called the conformity between thing and intellect, where nothing is said of conformity after the manner of measure or of measured. Indeed, as St. Thomas noted in the places cited above, by virtue of that definition truth is no more said to be the conformity of the intellect to the thing than the conformity of the thing to the intellect. And also because that notion of measure and measured adds nothing in one extreme rather than in the other except either a denomination taken from some causality of that thing which is called the measure toward the thing which is called measured, or some transcendental order according to which one thing is ordered to another rather than conversely, as science to the knowable rather than the knowable to science. But these respects do not change the truth or propriety of the adequation or conformity, which alone is per se required for the notion of truth. As, for example, if a thing made by art is compared to the intellect of the artificer from which it proceeded, and to the intellect of another who perfectly conceives the notion and idea of such an artefact, influencing and causing nothing in it, certainly the artefact in the thing is equally conformed to one and to the other intellect; therefore it is equally true with respect to each, even if to one it has the relation of effect and not to the other.

6. And to this are added the things which we inferred to follow from the second opinion; which, because they seem of themselves inconvenient, persuade that this difference does not pertain formally and per se to the notion of truth. But this difference being set aside, there is no reason why the notion of truth could not belong to every adequation between thing and intellect, whether it be between intellect and thing or between thing and intellect, and whether it be between measure and measured or between measured and measure, or between those things which have neither notion among themselves, as we were saying of the essences of creatures as such and of the speculative science of creatures in God. Indeed neither does a sufficient reason of analogy seem able to be assigned between the truth of the thing and of knowledge; both because, although the name of truth was first invented by us on account of knowledge, it does not therefore come about that it is said analogically of the truth of things, as has been explained; and also on account of the things which were proposed in the preceding section concerning the opinion of Cajetan, by which it seems to be shown that the truth of things cannot consist in a mere extrinsic and metaphorical denomination.

Resolution of the question

7. The truth of composition and division is not transcendental.—From these opinions we can take something which may help to explain this question. In order, however, that the resolution which seems truer to us may be understood, it is to be noticed, what we said above, that truth is found in a more special mode in composition and division than in simple things, either concepts or things. But that special truth which is in the composition and division of the intellect is in truth not the transcendental truth of that act or judgement which in composition and division is denominated true. Which is evident thus, for transcendental truth, since it is in its own way a proper attribute of being, is immutable and inseparable from being; but that truth which is in composition is separable from it as far as depends on its notion, because sometimes it is separated when, the same judgement remaining, the thing judged is changed and begins to be otherwise than it is judged, although before it had conformity with the judgement. But if sometimes this truth is immutable, that comes from this, that the thing about which the judgement is concerned is immutable either simply or as it falls under the judgement.

8. In composition, with its truth or falsity, transcendental truth always stands.—And hence it may be understood that in this very judgement or act of composition and division a twofold truth is found, one transcendental, the other special, which we can call the truth of knowledge or accidental, while others call it formal. Which is declared and proved thus, for when the judgement is changed from true to false, it loses some truth and does not lose all, but necessarily retains some; therefore it had a twofold truth. The major is self-evident, for falsity, since it is contrary to truth, excludes some truth from the act when it is changed from true to false. But the minor is evident, because the true is convertible with being, as we have said; but that judgement which is changed from true to false nevertheless remains a real judgement and a real being; therefore it is necessary that it remain true also with transcendental truth. Which consists in this, that in the notion of a judgement of the intellect that act has the true essence and species of judgement and conformity with the proper concept or idea of an intellectual judgement. Which can conveniently be explained in a vocal proposition; for this enunciation, every man is white, or another similar one, if you consider in it the conformity to the thing which it signifies, does not have truth but falsity, and in this sense is called not true but simply false; but if you consider in it the definition or essence of a proposition and the conformity which it has with the rules of the dialectical art or with the idea of a proposition, it is understood to have its truth as it were transcendental, according to which it can be called a true proposition, in the way in which gold is called true gold, and in the way in which a syllogism will be called a true syllogism if the inference is good, even if it concludes something false.

9. The primary signification of the word truth.—This distinction, then, being established, I think, first of all, that truth in its primary signification was said of the truth of knowledge which is specially found in composition and division. All the things adduced above prove this; for by this reason Aristotle often said that truth is in the intellect or in composition and division. Likewise for this cause a judgement having this truth is called simply true. But if it lacks it, it is called simply false, even if it has transcendental truth in the mode declared by us. Finally the reason seems to be that truth of this kind is better known to us and is more formally in our knowledge, as was explained above.

10. In its primary signification truth can extrinsically denominate real beings and beings of reason.—Secondly I think that things known can by extrinsic analogy and denomination from this truth of knowledge be called true, yet that the true is not taken according to this notion or denomination when it is said to be an attribute of being. The former part is proved from the things adduced in reporting the first opinion and the opinion of Cajetan treated in the second section. It is also declared by that example of the healthy; for, just as that is called healthy both which has health and which causes and signifies it, so in the present case both the judgement having this truth, and the vocal proposition signifying it, and the thing itself in so far as it causes or founds it, can be called true. Whence usage also confirms this; for we say not only that the judgement by which we believe that God is three and one is true, and similarly that the proposition by which we affirm this is true, but also that this very thing, that God is three and one, is true; which truth that thing has only as it is objectively in the intellect, that is, in so far as it is complexly known and judged truly and as it is; and of the true or the denomination of true of this kind Aristotle also said that it is not in the thing but in the intellect. Whence this denomination of true belongs also to non-beings; for so we say it is true both that a chimera is a feigned being and that man is not a horse. And hence the latter part is evident, that this denomination is not the truth which is an attribute of being. And that reason also confirms this, that the true is the object of the intellect; for, although some say that truth is only a condition of the object of the intellect, not antecedent but rather consequent upon the act of the intellect, as may be seen in Toletus, De Anima III, q. 20, nevertheless in this way the true would be called very improperly the object of the intellect; because the object of a passive power as such is supposed to the act, and therefore those conditions which are proper to the object must be supposed, not follow; therefore the true, as it is said to be the object of the intellect, is not in so far as it is denominated by the act itself, but according to some other notion according to which it can precede the act. Finally the things by which it was proved above that transcendental truth does not consist in this mere extrinsic denomination confirm this.

11. The transference of the word truth.—Thirdly, therefore, I think that from this truth of knowledge this name of true has been transferred to signify this property of any real being whatever, which is conformity with the intellect conceiving, in act or in potency, the thing under such a notion of real being. This is evident from what has been said and from a sufficient enumeration. You will say that this denomination in no way differs from that extrinsic denomination by which a thing is called true because it can found or cause the truth of the intellect. The answer is by denying the consequence, because that denomination is taken precisely from extrinsic truth as denominating the object or its cause; but this truth of things is not taken from that denomination, but from the very entity of the thing as having conformity to another. And so, just as knowledge or judgement is called true because it is conformed to the very being or not-being of the thing, yet is not denominated true from the truth of the thing itself but from its own being, connoting at the same time the being of the object itself such as is represented through the judgement, so in the present case the thing is called true because it has being conformed or conformable to such a concept, which denomination is not taken extrinsically from the truth of the concept, but from the intrinsic entity, as it is under a relationship or quasi-relationship to another. It is confirmed and declared, first; for, just as in relatives this white thing, for example, is called similar to another, not by extrinsic denomination from the likeness which is in the other, but because it has in itself a relation by which it tends to the other, or because it has in itself such a quality as is in the other, so in the present case it can easily be understood that the thing is called true on account of conformity with the intellect, although it is not denominated extrinsically from the truth of the intellect alone. Finally, if we prescind in the mind the truth of knowledge from the representation of the idea or concept, the thing would still be denominated true through conformity to the idea so representing; therefore this denomination is not formally taken from the truth of the intellect itself.

12. By what analogy truth is said of the truth of knowledge and of the thing.—Whence I further gather that the true, as it is said of the truth of composition or division and of the truth of things, or transcendental truth, is not properly said according to some analogy of attribution taken from some form which belongs intrinsically to one of the analogates, but extrinsically to the others, because, as has been shown, a denomination of this kind does not intervene in the present case. This word, then, seems to be said equivocally under these two notions, or at most according to an analogy of proportionality. Because here too there does not seem to intervene one objective concept according to some one common notion; for, as we have explained, the notion of truth in composition and division is far other than it is in other things. There can remain, then, only a certain proportional analogy, which consists in this, that, just as the truth of composition requires that conformity between the being of the thing and the judgement, so transcendental truth requires such an entity of the thing as can be adequated to the proper concept or idea, or to the intellectual representation of such a thing. But an analogy of this kind in no way stands in the way of the transcendent true being able to be a property of being, because, although the transference of the name was taken from that proportionality, it nevertheless does not formally signify it, but the property in which it can be considered. Just as in the healthy, besides the analogy of attribution declared above, another of proportionality can be understood, according to which an apple in which nothing is corrupt is called healthy, because, just as the health of the animal consists in the due proportion and disposition of the humours, so the apple is called healthy because it has the due disposition of all its parts; and yet healthy under this signification signifies some property or intrinsic perfection of the apple, namely its integrity or incorruption. So, then, the true, although it has been transferred through some analogy of proportionality to signify the truth of things, can nevertheless signify a property of being itself.

13. But what we say of the truth of things is to be understood also of the truth which is attributed to the senses or to the simple concepts of the mind; indeed also of the truth of composition itself, in so far as some notion of being is considered in it; for in all these the truth is of the same mode or notion as transcendental truth, and properly consists in the adequation of such a thing to the idea or relation which can be formed of it, although in sense or in the intellect it is sometimes explained through order to the objects, because the object is as it were the form of the act or concept, which takes its species from it. And often this transcendental truth is wont to be explained through the intrinsic principles, and especially through the form, as that is called true paternity which is terminated at a true son begotten by it, although the formal notion of truth, even in paternity itself, consists in adequation to the intellect.

The reasons for doubting posited at the beginning are solved

14. Finally from these things satisfaction has been made to the reasons for doubting posited at the beginning; for the former prove that transcendental truth according to itself is prior, yet not that this word was first imposed to signify it. And the reasons made in the second place about the truth of knowledge prove this likewise. But the question which is touched upon there about the true, how it is the object of the intellect, is not proper to this place, but is to be explained in the matter on the soul, although in the thing the exposition is easier from what has been said. For if the discussion is absolutely of the intellect, the true is not otherwise said to be its object than being, for by the name of true there is signified only that aptitude or proportion which is in being, that it can be understood; for in so far as it is such that it can have adequation with some concept, so far it can terminate the act of the intellect and be its object. Whence conversely the intellect then understands the thing when it forms that concept to which that thing can be adequated, and therefore it is said to understand it as true. And in this way truth is said to be a necessary condition in the object of the intellect, on which matter Cajetan can be read, I, q. 16, a. 3, ad 3, and II-II, q. 1, a. 1; and Capreolus, In I, dist. 2, a. 1; Giles, Quodlibet IV, q. 20. But if the discussion is of the intellect as properly judging, or as composing and dividing, then the true is called the object of the intellect because, in the way in which truth is said to be in composition, the intellect never gives its assent except by knowing the truth or conformity of one thing, or of its concept, to another in exercised act; by knowing, I say, or at least thinking that it knows; and in this way the intellect is said always to assent under the notion of true, and the true is said to be the proper object of the judgement or assent of the intellect.