Disputationes metaphysicae

1. This question is chiefly intended in this disputation, for we have set out the rest beforehand in order to explain the truth of being. It seems, then, that it cannot happen that some truth be an attribute of real being: first indeed from Aristotle, Metaphysics VII [recte VI], at the end, saying that the true and the false are not in things but in the mind, and placing in this the difference, that good and evil are in things, but not true and false, but only in the mind. Secondly, because the true adds over being either nothing, or only an extrinsic denomination; therefore it can in no way be a property of being. The consequence is proved, because if it adds nothing, it is nothing other than being itself, and consequently is no more its property than being itself is a property of itself. But if it adds only an extrinsic denomination, that cannot suffice for the notion of a property of being; both because otherwise infinite properties of this kind could be multiplied, because there can be infinite denominations of this kind; and also because this denomination is common to non-beings or beings of reason; for, just as gold is called true gold, so a relation of reason can be called a true being of reason, and (as we were just saying) a negation has truth just as an affirmation; truth, therefore, by reason of this denomination cannot be a property of the real being of which we are treating. And finally because otherwise falsity too could be called a property of real being; for, just as being can be truly known, so also falsely; therefore, as thence it is denominated true, hence it can be denominated false.

2. But the first antecedent of this reason is declared and proved; for when some being, for example gold, is called true gold, such a denomination can be or be understood in two ways. First, so that it is altogether absolute and intrinsic, and in this way it can add nothing to such a being, but only explain more its entity and reality; because in this way to be true gold is nothing other than not to be only apparent or feigned, but having the proper and real nature and essence of gold. But this is nothing other than to be gold; therefore to be true gold as regards this denomination adds nothing over being gold. And by the same reason, universally, to be true real being expresses no other concept than to be real being, that is, not feigned nor chimerical. By which reason we were saying above that thing adds nothing over real being, because it expresses nothing except to have a ratified essence, which is nothing other than to have a real essence, and it is the same to say a true essence. And taking the denomination of true in this sense Augustine seems to have said, Soliloquies II, c. 5, that the true is that which is, not that which seems, or which is such as it seems; because, even if the thing is not seen nor has conformity with any knowledge, it is nevertheless true; in which he indicates that truth is not an extrinsic denomination. And in the same sense fits the definition of Avicenna saying: The truth of each thing is the property of its being which is established for it. For when he says that it is a property, he does not take that word as it is wont to signify an attribute or some faculty, but signifies its own being, that is, not extraneous nor foreign, which adds nothing over being itself but can be explained after the manner of a relation of identity; for so it can be called a relation of property; for in this way each thing so has that being which is its own or which is established for it, and this very thing is to have the truth of such a being.

3. But in another way that denomination can be taken not as absolute and intrinsic, but as coming from elsewhere, and in this way it cannot be except an extrinsic denomination of the thing, namely that it is truly enunciated or is enunciable as such. Which St. Thomas seems to have thought, I, q. 16, a. 1, saying that the true names that to which the intellect tends, and is in the intellect according as it is conformed to the thing understood, and is derived from the intellect to the thing understood, which is called true according as it has some order to the intellect. But it is evident that from the conformity of the intellect to the thing only an extrinsic denomination results in the thing known. Whence in a. 6 St. Thomas expressly says that all created things are denominated true by one and the same truth, namely by the truth of the divine intellect, from which nevertheless they cannot be denominated except extrinsically. And in the solution ad 2 he confirms this from Anselm, De veritate, c. 11, saying, as time is related to temporal things, so truth to true things; which St. Thomas understands of one common time, from which it is evident that temporal things are only extrinsically denominated. Finally it is evident by reason, because either the thing is true because it is conformed to the intellect, or because the intellect is conformed to it. The first cannot be said, because rather from the fact that the thing is or is not, the intellect is true; otherwise we should fall into the error of the philosophers saying that nothing is true except what is understood. But if the second is said, it openly follows that it is only an extrinsic denomination, because that the intellect is conformed to the thing posits nothing in the thing except only that it is truly known. But besides those two nothing else can be thought out, because by the common consent of all every truth is taken from the conformity of intellect and thing. And it is confirmed, because falsity cannot be in things except as an extrinsic denomination; therefore neither truth; for the reason of opposites is the same or proportional. On the contrary, however, is the fact that, on the testimony of Aristotle, Metaphysics II, c. 1, as each thing is, so also it is true; by which words he signifies that truth so accompanies being that according to the grade and notion of entity there is in each the grade of truth; it is therefore a sign that truth accompanies being as its attribute.

Whether there is transcendental truth

4. In this matter it is evident that the denomination of true is wont to be attributed to things; for so we are wont to say that it is true gold, in order to distinguish it from apparent gold, and a true man, in order to distinguish him from a painted one, and the true God, in order to separate him from false ones; and in this way speak not only sacred and profane letters but also all men. Whence it plainly comes about that the same appellation of true can be attributed to any real being, either in order that it may be separated from feigned and imaginary being, or in order that in its species and notion it may be judged to have the proper essence of such a thing; for as regards these two the reason of this appellation is the same in all beings. And hence again it is also manifest that the true under some notion is an attribute of being and is convertible with it. But in order that it may be declared of what kind this denomination is, it is necessary before all things to expound what this truth is which is attributed to being, so that it may be evident thence how it can be its property and be convertible with it. Various modes, then, of explaining truth can be thought out.

The first opinion about what it is is disproved

5. The first is that transcendental truth signifies a certain real absolute property distinct from being by reasoned reason. So think certain modern Thomists, I, q. 16, and they think it is the opinion of St. Thomas, De veritate, q. 1, a. 8; of Capreolus, In I, dist. 19, q. 3, concl. 3; Soncinas, Metaphysics VI, q. 17; Javellus, treatise De transcendentibus, c. 5. It is proved, because truth is a real perfection; therefore it expresses a real notion, not relative; therefore absolute; and it is not a synonymous name signifying the same as entity; therefore it expresses a perfection at least distinct by reason from entity. The first antecedent is evident, both because that a thing is true is not something feigned, indeed this very thing seems to be excluded by the name of truth; and also because all things are of themselves true and not from the consideration of the intellect; and moreover because truth in God is a great perfection and is the measure of created truth; and finally because, since truth is a property of being, it cannot not be a real perfection. But that it is not relative will easily be proved below. Finally, that truth and entity are not the same as synonyms is evident from the common mode of conceiving of all and from the diverse definitions by which their objective concepts are explained by us; it is necessary, therefore, that they be distinguished at least by reasoned reason. Indeed, according to the opinion of Scotus treated above when we dealt with these attributes in common, it would have to be said that they are distinguished formally from the nature of the thing.

6. But in this opinion and in all the following it is to be observed that it is one thing to speak of the whole of what truth in being includes, another of that which truth adds over entity or (what is the same) true over being. In the former way we admit that the truth of real beings expresses a real perfection, as the arguments made prove, and others by which we showed above that unity does not express a mere negation, but entity under negation; for so now it must be asserted that truth does not express a mere extrinsic notion or one fabricated by the intellect, but is entity signified under some other notion, or by adding something, which we are now inquiring into. In this sense, then, the said opinion is true, and in truth St. Thomas, Capreolus and the older Thomists intend nothing else, but the moderns seem to signify more.

7. In another way, then, it can be understood that truth adds to being, over the notion of essence or entity, an absolute and real property. And in this sense I think the aforesaid opinion false. And first, if it is understood of a perfection distinct from the nature of the thing, it can sufficiently be proved, both by the arguments made above against Scotus about the attributes of being in general, and from what was said above of distinctions from the nature of the thing. For here a real distinction of thing from thing cannot intervene, as all confess, because there is no foundation for feigning such a distinction; nor can it be a modal distinction either, both because no indication of distinction between such a mode and being can be thought out; for they are altogether inseparable, so that they can scarcely be prescinded even by the intellect, as I shall immediately say; and also because no thing is understood to be true through a superadded mode, but through its entity, which, if it has it, even if you separate every other mode, you will understand that a true thing remains either in the notion of being or in the notion of such being as is apt to be constituted by such an entity. And this reason, applied with proportion, also proves that truth cannot add over entity some perfection co-distinct from entity by reasoned reason; for if they are so co-distinguished that neither extreme is included in the precise concept of the other (for so we are speaking), let truth be separated by reason from being, and I argue of each extreme. Being so prescinded is intelligible as far as depends on itself, both because it is conceived by the intellect by a direct and proper concept, and also because, as much as each thing has of being, so much it has of intelligibility, as St. Thomas said elsewhere, I, q. 16, a. 3; therefore being in that precise concept includes every real perfection which is required for the notion of true, because by the very fact that being is intelligible it is true; for in this sense the true is said to be the object of the intellect, and because between every intelligible being and the intellect there can be conformity. But from the other extreme too an argument is taken; for either truth so prescinded is understood to include real entity, and so it is not prescinded in the said way; or it does not include it, and so it will not express a real perfection. And St. Thomas signified all this, in the said I, q. 16, a. 3, ad 3, saying that although being can be apprehended without the notion of true being apprehended, that is, by including it expressly and formally, nevertheless conversely the true cannot be apprehended without the notion of being being apprehended, because being falls in the notion of the true; nor can being be apprehended without the notion of true following upon that apprehension, that is, without being itself, however precisely conceived, being true and able to be apprehended under the notion of true, even if no absolute perfection is added to it. And he adds an example, saying: And it is similar if we compare the intelligible to being; for being cannot be understood without being being intelligible, but nevertheless being can be understood in such a way that its intelligibility is not understood; and similarly being understood is true, yet in understanding being the true is not understood.

8. Moreover I argue, secondly, by inquiring what this absolute perfection is which the true adds over being; for it cannot be understood to be so absolute that it does not include a transcendental respect, or one according to expression (as they call it), as the aforesaid authors too confess from the common concept of all; for all conceive truth through conformity between thing and intellect, or in order to it; nor could such a real notion, altogether absolute and distinct from the notion of being, in which truth would consist, easily be feigned or explained. But if this is said to be an absolute notion with a transcendental respect, or explained after the manner of a respect, that cannot be except in order to some intellect; but truth as explained through such a respect cannot be anything other than entity itself with the same respect; nor can it add over it a real absolute notion even distinct by reason; therefore. The major is proved from the said definition of truth, which declares as it were its first conception. For truth signifies a certain adequation and conformity; but not every conformity has the notion of truth, for equality between two things, and likeness, is a certain conformity, and is not called truth; therefore truth expresses a special notion of conformity, which can be no other than that which is taken or explained in order to the intellect. Whence the minor is proved, because this conformity to the intellect can be understood to be twofold, namely actual and aptitudinal. Actual can consist only in this, that the thing is such as it is actually understood; but aptitudinal in this, that the thing is such that it can be understood by a true and proper concept of such a thing. But in neither of these ways is some real absolute perfection added over the entity of the thing, because to be actually understood adds nothing to the entity understood as such; therefore neither can the thing being such as it is understood add to it a real absolute notion. Again, by the very fact that being is being or such being, if there is in another a power to understand, it is apt to be adequated to a true concept; therefore it is not only superfluous but also impossible that this actual or aptitudinal conformity add to being some absolute perfection, even distinct by reason. Just as it is impossible that in whiteness to be apt to be assimilated to another should express an absolute perfection added to the notion of whiteness, and much more impossible that actual likeness should add an intrinsic absolute notion to whiteness itself.

The second opinion is examined with various interpretations

9. On account of these things, then, there can be a second opinion, saying that truth adds to being a relation of conformity to the intellect; for this seems to be concluded by the reason just made against the preceding opinion. But in explaining this opinion various modes can be thought out. One is that it be understood of the relation of actual conformity; for truth seems to signify actual conformity. Another is that it be understood of aptitudinal conformity, and in this way some say that transcendental truth is nothing other than the intelligibility of being, which intelligibility expresses not only an extrinsic denomination from the faculty which an intellective thing has of understanding every being, but on the side of the intelligible thing itself expresses a certain aptitude that it can be understood, which adds a relation to the intellect, to which, as far as depends on itself, it can be conformed. Again, some understand that this relation is to be taken only in order to the divine intellect, because all things depend per se on it, but not on others; indeed to them they are compared per accidens. Others think that it is to be taken in order to any intellect whatever, because the thing is of itself intelligible by anyone and so is of itself apt to be conformed to all, whence it can express the aforesaid relation to all, as colour, in so far as it is visible, expresses a relation to every sight, even if it does not depend on it. Finally some think that this relation is real, since truth is something real and exists in things. Others will have it to be a relation of reason, because it does not require existence nor distinction of the extremes, which Durandus, Capreolus and Cajetan think, in the places cited and to be cited; and St. Thomas favours it, In I, dist. 19, q. 5, a. 1. Others finally think that that relation is sometimes real, but often of reason, according to the capacity of the extremes, as Soncinas and Javellus above; Ferrariensis, Contra Gentiles I, c. 60; and St. Thomas favours it, De veritate, q. 1, a. 2, and In Peri Hermeneias I, lect. 5.

10. But in order that we may understand what of truth or falsity there can be in these modes of speaking, it is to be supposed that this opinion (in order that it be distinct from the others) is to be understood of a proper relation, which they call predicamental, if it is real, or one similar to it, if it is of reason. For if relation is taken broadly for every transcendental relationship, or for any denomination whatever which arises from the association of several things, then this opinion in one sense will coincide with the preceding, but in another with that which we shall treat afterwards.

11. For transcendental truth a strict relation of reason is not required.—First, then, I think that the denomination is not taken from some relation of reason taken in the said propriety, because truth neither expresses a relation of this kind nor entity under such a relation. It is proved by the reason often repeated, because an attribute of real being cannot consist in the aforesaid relation nor formally include it. Next, because such a relation is not except while it is considered or feigned; but the truth of things does not require feigning of this kind; rather, as I was saying above, it has a certain repugnance with the very name of truth. Likewise God from eternity is transcendentally true according to the complete and exact notion of truth, and yet he neither feigns relations of reason nor can require them in order that he be and be called the true God. Finally, this relation is not except through the reflection and comparison of the intellect, before which both this being is true gold, for example, and is known to be such.

12. A real relation is not necessary for transcendental truth.—This is proved in God.—Secondly it seems certain, speaking in common of the transcendental true as it abstracts from created and uncreated being, that it cannot consist in, or formally require, a real relation to another in order to which the denomination of true is taken. It is evident, because in God transcendental truth cannot include a relation of this kind, because either that truth is considered in God as he is God, in which way we say that the three persons are one true God; or it is considered in the individual persons according to their proper relations, to grant this to the theologians. In the former way God has no real relation, because neither to anything outside himself, as is evident, nor to anything within himself, because the true divinity has no distinction in the thing from all those things which are within God. Likewise, because that relation, if there is any, must be to the intellect; either, therefore, it is to the intellect as causing, and this has no place in the true divinity, which has no cause; or it is to the intellect as understanding, and this cannot be a real relation inwardly, since it is of the same thing to itself. In the latter way too there cannot be a real relation. First, because in God there are no other real relations besides the relations which accompany the origins, in which no others can be founded. Next, because in the Father, for example, that relation of truth cannot be to the intellect as producing, because the person of the Father is not produced; nor as understanding, because it is a relation of the same thing to itself. In the Son likewise, although he is a produced person, the truth of filiation cannot consist in a relation of conformity to the intellect as producing, or, what is the same, as having the idea or exemplar by which such a thing is produced, because the divine Word is not produced through an idea, but is itself the image or exemplar naturally produced by the Father. Nor can it express a real relation of conformity to the intellect as understanding, because so too in the Word such a relation is of the same thing to itself. For although the Word is also understood by the Father and itself also understands the Father, nevertheless, as they mutually understand each other, they are not distinguished from the intellect and from the act by which they understand themselves. And the same reason, applied with proportion, has place in the Holy Spirit. In God, therefore, there is no real relation of conformity in which truth could consist; and consequently neither can the truth of being, as it abstracts from created and uncreated, require this real relation.

13. Thirdly, even if we speak more contractedly of created being and its transcendental truth, as those seem to speak who say that the truth of this being consists in conformity to the divine intellect as it contains in itself the exemplars or ideas of created beings, although (I say) we speak of this being, I do not think that this truth consists in some real, proper and predicamental relation of such a being to the divine idea. Which some prove, because that relation of conformity which is required for truth is common in these beings whether they exist or do not exist; therefore it cannot be a real relation. But this reason is not of great moment. First indeed, because perhaps it assumes something false; for, as I was saying above, creatures considered only according to the being of essence do not have the truth of essence from conformity to the divine mind or idea; for man is not of such an essence because he is known as such by God, but rather is known to be of such an essence because he is such essentially. Next, that relation being posited, it will be said to be real when taken with proportion; for in created being existing only in potency truth too is only in potency; in the same way, therefore, there could be a real relation in potency; but in the same being actually existing, as there is real truth in act, so there could also be a real relation in act. Otherwise, then, it can be proved that that relation is not real, because otherwise there would be a process to infinity in such a relation, for that relation too would have an idea to which it would be conformed, and that through another relation, and so to infinity; but this reason is common to almost all relations, especially those which are founded in unity, such as likeness, equality and similar ones.

14. It is proved, then, otherwise, because either it is a relation of likeness or a relation of effect to cause, which by another name is wont to be called that of measured to measure. Not the first, because a relation of likeness properly is only that which is founded in unity or formal agreement; but between the creature and the idea which it has in God there is not such formal agreement, but only intentional or ideal, as between the intentional species and the visible object there is not a proper relation of likeness, although there is intentional representation. Nor can the second be said, because the idea or exemplar of the artificer has no other immediate influx into the effect besides that which the artificer has as he is a perfect efficient cause, nor through another action except that by which he is efficient, because the exemplar as such has no other causality than to direct the action of the agent; therefore in the effect no other relation results except that which follows by virtue of the action of the agent as agent; therefore it has no other real relation of conformity or dependence on the exemplar. But if you say that the effect depends on the exemplar as regards specification, but on the efficient as such as regards exercise, this very thing convinces that in the effect there does not result a special relation to the exemplar, but only that which is to the efficient cause, because the causality and action by which the thing comes about and comes about in such a species is single, and that distinction as regards exercise and specification is in the present case only according to reason and accommodation, not according to the thing. Indeed the exemplar is not compared to the efficient cause as a distinct cause, but as constituting it in its own way in first act for effecting; therefore neither in the effect does a manifold relation result, but only that which is of the effect to its efficient cause.

15. It will perhaps be said that the argument proves indeed that these relations are not distinct, but that it is nevertheless true that the relation of the creature includes in its essence that it is a relation of conformity to the idea of the creator, just as the action of the creator itself includes in its essence that it is from the idea. But whatever may be the case with such a real relation, and whether it is distinct or not, I prove further that the notion of the truth of created being cannot consist in it. First, by that general reason said above, that the attributes of being cannot add to being a real positive mode, neither absolute nor respective. Secondly, because it is one thing for a relation¹ to follow from another, another to constitute it formally; but that relation, if there is one, supposes the notion of truth in created being and follows upon it; therefore truth is not formally constituted by such a relation. The consequence is evident, because that which is formally constituted through some form cannot be supposed to that form itself. But the antecedent is evident, first, from the sensible example of artificial things; for a thing made according to the idea and rules of art is not therefore rightly made and conformed to the art because it has in itself some predicamental relation to the art, but precisely because it has such figure, proportion, etc., as the art postulates, and thence afterwards a relation follows, if it truly results. Whence, if we prescind such a relation in the mind, or if perhaps the opinion is true which denies relations of this kind resulting, the artificial thing will nevertheless be understood true in the genus of artefact; therefore the same holds in the creature with respect to the divine ideas; for it is compared to them as to an artificer. Next I explain in this way, because the creature is produced by God prior in nature to its being referred to him by the predicamental relation of the creature; therefore it is also a true creature, or true created being, prior in nature to its being referred by the aforesaid relation; and similarly it is a true man or a true lion prior in nature; that relation, therefore, is not included formally and intrinsically in the notion of truth. The antecedent is evident, because the foundation is prior in nature to the relation; but this relation is founded in the entity of the existing creature, and therefore supposes it created and flowing from God. But the first consequence is evident, because created being, by virtue of that entity which it has from God prior in nature to the predicamental relation resulting in it, is not only intelligible by a true concept of being but is also truly constituted in such or such a species of created being; therefore, such a relation being prescinded, it can be pre-understood to be true being and such being; the true, therefore, as true, does not add the aforesaid relation over being.

16. Which reason proceeds not only against those who say that this relation is real, but also against those who say that it is a relation of reason, if they speak of the formal and actual relation; otherwise if of the fundamental one, which is not so much a relation as the concomitance of several things or formal notions, or a denomination taken from such concomitance, as was declared above in the truth of knowledge. But the aforesaid reason proceeds chiefly of actual conformity to the divine idea; yet a fortiori it proves of similar actual conformity to any other knowledge whatever, because every other relation is posterior and more extrinsic. And it can also be applied to the aptitudinal relation by which a thing is said to be apt to be understood or to be conformed to an intellect having its proper or true concept; for this denomination in truth does not add a real relation in the thing which is called intelligible, because it is only an aptitude to a certain extrinsic denomination, to which the object is compared as the term or matter about which the knowledge is concerned. Likewise, because, as the arguments made prove, a thing is intelligible through itself and not through a superadded relation, as regards that which is required on its side; for on the side of the other a faculty for understanding is required. Likewise, because the knowable as such does not express a real relation to science, as all teach; and the same holds of the visible with respect to sight. Finally, even if you feign that no intellect actually exists, the thing will be intelligible of itself and true. In whatever way, then, truth is explained, whether through actual conformity or through aptitudinal, it cannot consist in a formal and proper relation.

The third opinion is disproved

17. A third opinion can be thought out, that transcendental truth adds over being only some negation. Which opinion indeed can seem singular, because all authors suppose that true expresses a positive denomination; yet, if the things said above are considered, it will seem plausible, because it has been shown that truth does not add over being a positive absolute notion, nor even a relative one of the thing or of reason; therefore nothing remains which it can add besides negation. It is confirmed from the common mode of declaring this truth; for, as Aureolus argues, in Capreolus, In I, dist. 13, q. 3, in order that we may conceive and explain the truth of some thing, for example that this is true gold, we do not have recourse to the divine exemplars, nor to any other intellect, as is evident from the very usage of conceiving and speaking, but we declare it through negation; for we say that that is true gold which is not feigned or only apparent, but which has the proper nature of gold, which we gather from its properties and effects. Whence this truth seems rather to be explained through the intrinsic principles of the thing, so that he is called a true man because he consists of the essential principles of man; but this adds nothing over the entity of the thing except the negation of feigning or appearance. Moreover it is declared by a similar case; for, just as to be the same (as we were saying above), although it is signified after the manner of something positive, nevertheless in the thing adds nothing over being except a negation, so it seems to happen in the true; for some thing is called true in such a notion of being because it has the true nature or the proper essential principles of that thing; but it is said to have a true nature because it does not have a feigned one, nor an extraneous and apparent one, but that which is proper to such a thing; and so he is called the true God in order that he may be distinguished from false ones, and true divinity in order to indicate that it is not feigned, but such of itself. Finally, in this manner the other transcendentals are explained by many; for thing, which signifies essence as real and ratified, is said to import the negation of imaginary or feigned essence, and something the negation of nothing or the negation of identity. What wonder, then, that the true too should be declared through negation, although it has the appearance of a positive property?

18. This mode of speaking, then, seems not altogether improbable; yet, because it appears new, it is not to be approved by us; for the notion and definition of truth, according to the common mode of conceiving of all who speak of truth, includes or connotes in some way a relationship to the intellect or to a knowing power; and not after the manner of a negation, as is self-evident; therefore after the manner of conformity, which is conceived as something positive. Next, because rather the falsity of a thing is placed in negation, as will be said below, because it expresses the lack of perfection due for the truth of the thing; therefore truth does not add formally the negation of that lack of due perfection, nor the negation of a feigned nature, but the proper and positive perfection of the thing. Finally, although these simple things are often explained by us through negation (which alone the conjectures adduced prove), nevertheless they do not therefore formally signify such a negation.

The fourth opinion

19. There is, then, a fourth opinion, that this truth is only an extrinsic denomination. So thinks Cajetan, I, q. 16, a. 6, at the end, where he deals only with created things, which he says are true by extrinsic denomination either from the divine truth, in so far as they are signs of it and imitate it, or from created truth speculatively understood, in so far as they are or can be its cause. His reason is that the true is so related to knowledge and to things as healthy to the animal having health and to medicine, etc.; for, just as, health being taken away, which is formally in the animal, the others would not be denominated healthy, so, the truth of knowledge being taken away, the others would not be denominated true; therefore, just as the animal is called healthy by intrinsic denomination, but the others only by extrinsic, so the intellect is that which is formally and intrinsically denominated true, but the others only by extrinsic denomination, in so far as they are signs or causes of the truth of the intellect. But Cajetan does not declare what is to be said of the truth by which God is called true; perhaps, however, he would say that in him too it signifies an extrinsic denomination, not of sign or cause, namely so that God is called true because he can cause true knowledge of himself, either properly in other intellects, or improperly and according to reason only with respect to his own intellect, in so far as he can after the manner of an object be to his intellect the reason of forming of himself a true concept of God.

20. But if you object that this very power of causing, or of being the sufficient objective reason of such knowledge, is intrinsic to being itself; likewise, that, since the knowledge of God is most intrinsic to him, an extrinsic denomination cannot be taken from it, it can be answered to the former part that that power or perfection is indeed intrinsic, but that it is denominated true or truth from without; just as in medicine too the power of causing health is intrinsic, yet the notion of health in it is extrinsic. To the other part it will be said that, although the knowledge by which God knows himself is most intrinsic to him and therefore intrinsically denominates him knowing, nevertheless the denomination of known as such is per se and formally extrinsic, and it happens to it that the form from which it is taken is within the thing which is denominated known.

21. What seems to stand in the way of the preceding opinion.—This opinion is clear as regards something, namely that the true adds over being only the concomitance of something extrinsic, as we shall show below; but in so far as it says that things are denominated true only by extrinsic denomination, this opinion seems difficult. First, because Aristotle, in the said place of Metaphysics II, text 4, thinks that some truth follows upon all beings, which St. Thomas also teaches, Contra Gentiles I, c. 60, last reason, distinguishing a twofold truth, namely of intellect and of thing, and of the latter expounding the definition of Avicenna, treatise I of his Metaphysics, c. 6, and treatise VIII, c. 6: The truth of the thing is the property of the being of each thing which is established for it. And I, q. 16, a. 1, he expounds of the same truth the definition of Augustine, De vera religione, c. 36, saying: Truth is the highest likeness of the principle, which is without any unlikeness; and the definition of Anselm, dialogue De veritate, c. 12: Truth is rectitude perceptible by the mind alone. In all of which it is signified that the truth of the thing is some intrinsic form and perfection of it. Whence Augustine above: True things (he says) are true in so far as they are; but they are in so far as they are similar to the principal One. Whence he adds that truth is the form of true things as likeness is the form of similar things. Moreover St. Thomas, De veritate, q. 1, a. 4, although he seems much to favour the opinion of Cajetan, nevertheless finally says: although the truth according to which all things are called true is less properly called truth, yet that the thing is denominated true from it as from an inhering form, and that it is nothing other than entity adequated to the intellect. And he thinks the same there, aa. 5 and 6. This truth, therefore, is something intrinsic to things and not only an extrinsic denomination. This can be confirmed by reason, first, because an extrinsic denomination alone cannot properly be numbered among the properties of a thing; but truth is called by all a property of being; therefore it is not only an external denomination. The major is evident, because a property must belong from within; but an extrinsic denomination belongs accidentally and from without. Which is most true of that denomination which is said to be taken only through analogy from proportion or relationship to another; for no one would say that health as such is a property of food or of urine, or risibility a property of a flowering meadow, because these predicates belong to those subjects only as it were metaphorically.

22. You will say: although these predicates, as regards the imposition of words, are metaphorical, nevertheless in truth they signify certain properties of those things to which they are attributed; and in this way health can be called a property of such food, not as regards formal health itself, but as regards that which is intended to be declared through such a denomination of healthy. But on the contrary, for hence at least we rightly gather that health is not a property of the food distinct from that which is declared through such a metaphor; but if that were not a property but the essence of the food itself, certainly healthy would not signify a property but the essence of the food. So, then, in the present case, if the true is said of things only through analogy and extrinsic denomination from the truth of the intellect, I ask what is indicated or signified in being itself through this metaphor or relationship. For either the entity of the thing alone is indicated, and so the true is not a property of being, but only differs from it in that the true metaphorically signifies that which being signifies with propriety; just as to laugh is not in the meadow a perfection other than that which is to be green or flowery, but is the same metaphorically signified. Or through that analogous appellation of true something diverse from entity is indicated in being; and of this we inquire what it is, and whether it is only an extrinsic denomination; for, if it is so, it will not be able to be a property of being; but if it is something beyond the extrinsic denomination, as regards that the notion of true will be intrinsic, whatever may be the case with the imposition of the word, whether it was taken from without.

23. And it is confirmed, because, if truth were only an extrinsic denomination, it could belong to beings of reason as well as to real ones, because denominations of this kind taken from knowledge can belong to beings of reason as well as to real ones, such as to be genera, species, to be truly known, signified, and the like. But if it is said that formally it is so, but that the foundations of these denominations belong otherwise to real beings, against this I always urge the reason made, because this foundation in this denomination of true is either something besides being or not; if it is something, I ask what it is, whether extrinsic or intrinsic, and the arguments made return; if it is not something, then the true as it is in things is not a property of being but being itself. A similar argument can be made, because it follows that that which is more perfectly being is not more perfectly true with the truth of the thing, which is openly against Aristotle and St. Thomas above, and against the common sense of all; for who would say that the angel is not more truly being in the notion of being than man, or also God than the angel? But the sequel is evident, because in that denomination which is taken from the truth of the intellect they cannot have inequality, because the idea which God has of man is as true as the idea which he has of the angel, and the conformity between those extremes is as great as between these; and the knowledge which God has of the angel is as true as that which he has of himself.

Resolution of the question

24. What transcendental truth intrinsically expresses.—In this variety of opinions it is difficult to pass a true judgement about truth; and perhaps the difficulty has arisen from this, that in the use of these words we do not sufficiently distinguish that from which their imposition was taken or transferred and that to signify which they are imposed; for it could have happened, and it is likely, that every appellation of true took its origin from the truth of knowledge, as I shall say more conveniently in the following section; but nevertheless by the name of true there is not signified in things only a denomination taken from the truth of knowledge, but something else to signify which that name was imposed. In order, then, that I may declare this, I say, first, that transcendental truth intrinsically expresses the real entity of the thing itself which is denominated true, and that besides it it adds nothing intrinsic to it, neither absolute nor relative, neither from the nature of the thing nor distinct by reason alone. This conclusion has been sufficiently proved from what was said in the first opinion, and it is clearly taken from St. Thomas in the places cited, and De veritate, q. 1, a. 1, ad 6, and a. 8; Capreolus, Cajetan, Ferrariensis and others cited above in the first opinion.

25. What transcendental truth connotes.—I say, secondly, that transcendental truth signifies the entity of the thing, connoting the knowledge or concept of the intellect to which such an entity is conformed, or in which such a thing is represented, or can be represented, as it is. This conclusion too is proved from what has been said, from a sufficient² enumeration of the parts. And I think that, although the authors speak in diverse ways, almost all wished to teach this same thing, and I explain it in this way. For I think that this concept of true being is virtually comparative of one thing or nature to the proper concept of that thing which is said to be true; as, for example, in professing the mystery of the Eucharist we are wont to say that the consecrated host is the true body of Christ the Lord, where by true body we signify nothing other than that same body which is represented through the proper and true concept of the body of Christ. And similarly, in confessing the mystery of the Incarnation, we say that God is true man, that is, that he has that nature which we truly conceive in the essential species of man. And hence Hervaeus said, Quodlibet III, q. 1, aa. 2 and 3, that this truth is the conformity of the thing as it is in itself to itself as objectively conceived; but Durandus, In I, dist. 19, q. 5, conversely said that this truth is the conformity of the thing according to objective being to itself according to real being; for each understood that this truth adds nothing to the thing besides the denomination arising from the conjunction and proportion or conformity between intellect and thing. But they declare through the objective concept what we declare through the formal; yet, because the objective concept adds nothing besides the thing except the denomination of the term of the formal concept, therefore the conformity between the thing and the objective concept is not rightly explained, but rather that between the thing and the formal concept or idea. And I think the same was thought by those who say that the true adds over being a relation of reason of the conformity of being to the intellect, as St. Thomas indicates, In I, dist. 19, q. 5, a. 1; for this, in order that it be true, is not to be understood of a proper and actual relation, but of that mutual connection of thing and concept and the connotation of one as corresponding to the other, which, because it is conceived by us after the manner of a relation, is wont to be called a relation of reason. Finally, in this sense that common definition of truth is easily applied to this truth, that it is the conformity between intellect and thing; for that conformity is not understood to be some relation, as was explained above in the truth of knowledge, but a denomination taken from the association of several things so related that one is such as it is represented by the other.

26. A saying of Augustine is explained.—I say, thirdly, that this transcendental truth can be explained both after the manner of aptitudinal and after the manner of actual conformity, both in order to the divine and to the created intellect, and in the notion of the known and the knower, if we speak universally of true being, or in the notion of the caused and the cause, or of the measured and the measure, if the discussion is of created or artificial being. I declare each, for first of all, that this truth can express actual conformity all confess, and it seems evident from the very name of truth and conformity; for it signifies act rather than aptitude. Likewise the truth of knowledge expresses actual conformity and commensuration; therefore the same holds proportionally of the truth of the thing. But if you object Augustine, Soliloquies II, c. 5, saying that the true is not rightly said to be that which is so related as it seems to the knower, because according to this nothing would be true if no one knew, we shall answer that according to this denomination that definition is not to be rejected absolutely and simply, if it is understood, as it must be understood, of a knower truly attaining the thing itself. Whence we also admit that conditional to be true; yet, as the antecedent is impossible, at least with respect to the divine intellect, so also the consequent. Whence St. Thomas, I, q. 16, a. 1, ad 1, treating this place of Augustine, says that it only excludes comparison to the created intellect.

27. Moreover, that this truth can also be declared through aptitudinal conformity is taken from that same place of Augustine, where after those words, The true is that which is so related as it seems to the knower, there is added: if he wishes and is able to know. Which words signify aptitude. More clearly Anselm, dialogue De veritate, c. 9, says that truth is rectitude perceptible by the mind alone. And St. Thomas, in the said q. 16, a. 5, says that truth is found in the thing according as it has being conformable to the intellect; and Contra Gentiles I, c. 60, declaring the definition of Avicenna, The truth of the thing is the property of the being of each thing which is established for it, adds: In so far as such a thing is apt by nature to make a true estimation of itself. And it is proved because every real being is apt by nature to make a true estimation of itself, in which way every being is called intelligible, whether it is the principle of knowledge or only the term; for this aptitude of itself abstracts from these modes; therefore nothing prevents this from being signified by the name of true or truth. And it is confirmed; for, although it is impossible that there be any being which is not actually truly conceived by some intellect, at least the divine, nevertheless, even if the intellect apprehends that impossible hypothesis posited in the thing, namely that every intellect, even the divine, ceased from the actual conception of things, there would still be truth in things; for both the composite of body and rational soul would be true man and gold would be true gold, etc., either according to the truth of essence, if we understand that existing things do not remain, or also according to existence, if we feign that, actual knowledge ceasing, things are still preserved existing by God operating through his executive power; therefore this truth can be sufficiently understood through that aptitudinal conformity, even if the actual is not. You will say that by a similar argument it can be proved that aptitudinal conformity is not necessary, for, even if another impossible hypothesis is feigned, namely that the thing is neither understood nor can be understood by anyone, and that it remains in its essence or existence, each thing would nevertheless be true in its essence; and yet then it would not be understood as apt to make a true estimation of itself, because there would be none with whom it could make it; therefore that aptitude too is not of the notion of truth. The answer is, first, that that latter hypothesis involves a more direct and formal repugnance with the proper notion of real entity, at least according to essence; for it is of its notion that it be possible, and consequently and much more that it be intelligible. Next, that hypothesis being made, the thing could be called true fundamentally or non-repugnantly, yet not positively and formally; because then the truth of knowledge would not be possible, and consequently every denomination of true would cease.

28. The truth of the thing is to be regarded most of all in order to the divine intellect.—Moreover from these things it is easily evident that this appellation or conformity is chiefly and per se to be taken in order to the divine intellect, as St. Thomas teaches, in the said q. 16, a. 1, and in other places. First, because conformity to this intellect is most of all per se in all things: in created things on account of the dependence which they have on it; but in uncreated being itself on account of the intrinsic and essential identity with its intellect and actual intellection. Next, because in the divine intellect there is supreme and infallible truth and the most perfect reason or representation of all things; therefore a thing is then most of all called true when it can be conformed to the concept which God has of such a thing.

29. Secondarily in order to the created.—But that it can also be taken in order to the created intellect, although secondarily, St. Thomas expressly teaches, De veritate, q. 1, in the place cited. And it can easily be declared from what has been said; because this conformity which truth expresses can be understood not only of actual but also of aptitudinal; but according to aptitude every being is apt by nature to have a true estimation of itself in every intellect, not only divine but also created. Whence, if we wish to conceive this denomination after the manner of a relation, we shall understand that any being whatever has this relation of intelligibility not only to the divine intellect but also to any created one. Likewise, because the created intellect is a certain participation of the divine intellect, to which it is apt by nature to be conformed in understanding, if it understands truly; therefore, by the very fact that being is called true because it is conformable to the divine intellect, it will also be able to be called true because it is conformable to a created intellect truly understanding. Finally that argument proves this, that we do not always know the truth of things through conformity to the divine idea, but through the conception which we have of such a thing. And in this way we are wont to use the definition of such a thing or nature to prove that something is truly such; for the definition is nothing other than the explanation of such a nature as it is conceived by us; this truth, therefore, can be taken not only from conformity to the divine intellect but also to the created.

30. The conformity of truth in common is the conformity of knower and known.—But this holds most of all if this conformity is taken only in the notion of knower and known, in which way it must necessarily be taken if the discussion is of transcendental truth in its whole breadth. Because in God no other genus of conformity can be understood, since he is not a dependent or caused being, as is self-evident; nor can he properly be said to be measured in the notion of true through some science, not only because on account of supreme identity there cannot be the notion of measure there, but also because, in the way in which they can be distinguished and commensurated by reason, rather the essence of God is the true measure of his science than conversely; for God is not therefore the true God because he knows himself to be such, but rather, because he is the true God, therefore he truly knows himself to be such. Therefore the transcendental true taken in its whole breadth cannot express conformity to the intellect as to a cause or to a measure, but only as to that which represents or knows, either in act or in aptitude. In this way, then, such conformity, especially aptitudinal, can be taken in order to any intellect whatever, so that God is called true because in any intellect whatever he can generate a true concept of God, or because in reality he has in himself that nature which any intellect truly conceiving God conceives in God. And the same holds by the same reason of created beings; for the same concept of truth can be applied proportionally to all; and what in God suffices for truth, if it can be found in others by participation, as in truth it can, will also suffice for their truth by participation.

31. Created beings are conformed to the divine intellect as to their maker.—But it is added in the last part of the conclusion that in created beings there is found conformity to the divine intellect as to a cause and exemplar, by reason of which such beings can be denominated true, because that too is a true conformity to an intellect practically knowing and in its own way operating. And by the same reason artificial beings which proceed from the human intellect have with respect to it the same conformity as to their exemplar or idea, and according to it can also be called true. Indeed St. Thomas thinks that created beings are chiefly denominated true from this conformity, because it belongs to them per se; but conformity to other intellects speculatively knowing is more extrinsic and per accidens. Which has place most of all in existing and actually created things; for things according to the being of essence do not actually have an exemplar cause, just as neither an efficient one; yet they have them in potency, and therefore, if they are considered as they are possible, they per se require exemplars and ideas in the first artificer which represent each such as it can be or as its nature postulates to come about. And in this way all created things, even according to the being of essence, per se primarily postulate to be in the divine intellect and to have conformity with it as with the first artificer by whom alone they can be brought to being. But God, since he is uncreated being, can have this relationship to no intellect; yet by another reason he can be said per se to have conformity with respect to his own intellect rather than to others; because per se and essentially he postulates that he actually understand himself and be not only intelligible but also actually understood by himself and his own intellection. And so the conclusion has been proved as regards all its parts.

32. But you will object: therefore the notion of transcendental truth is not one but manifold, because aptitudinal or actual conformity, and speculative or practical, are very diverse. Secondly it can specially be objected that truth expresses a relation of measured to measure, at least fundamentally; therefore the truth of things cannot be taken in order to the created intellect, whose knowledge is not the measure of the truth of things, but is rather measured by them. Whence I argue, thirdly, for knowledge is true because it is conformed to the things known; therefore conversely things cannot be called true through conformity to such knowledge; because between these there is not a relation of mutual or similar comparison, such as is between two similar things, but of dissimilar or non-mutual comparison, such as is between measure and measured.

33. To the first some do not think it inconvenient to concede all that is inferred in the argument; because, since these are only certain denominations which are taken or explained after the manner of relations, it is not inconvenient that they be multiplied from various heads and diverse considerations. Indeed some also add that under one notion they are real respects, but under another of reason. Which is at least concomitantly probable, although it is not formally true. It will perhaps be better said, however, that all those respects are contained under one adequate one, or are reduced to one, namely to that aptitude by which each thing is apt by nature to confer a true estimation of itself; for it has this with respect to any intellect or knowledge whatever, and over it actual conformity adds nothing besides the denomination or coexistence of the knowledge. But if thence a relation results when that knowledge is practical and the cause of things, that rather supposes truth than constitutes it, as was shown concerning the second opinion. To the second the answer is that rigorously it is not necessary that being be called true in the notion of measured by the knowledge to which it is conformed; otherwise God could not be called true being, as I argued above, because in the notion of being he has no measure, neither according to the thing nor according to reason; and therefore, as was said more fully in I, q. 14, the divine science is not compared to its essence and its being as practical, but only as speculative. Only in the truth of speculative knowledge, then, is it true that the notion of true is taken in the notion of the measured; for the divine practical science too, as practical, is true, although as such it does not have the notion of measured, but rather of measure. Whence to the third the answer is by denying the consequence; because the very notion of truth is not said in the same way of knowledge and of things; and therefore it is not inconvenient that according to diverse relationships it belong to knowledge through conformity to things in so far as it represents them as they are, and to things in order to knowledge in so far as they are apt in the notion of object to induce a true estimation of themselves.

34. Transcendental truth is not a mere extrinsic denomination.—I say, finally, that this transcendental truth is not a mere extrinsic denomination, although it includes in some way or connotes the conjunction of another thing from which it results. In this conclusion I differ from the opinion of Cajetan, although perhaps it is not so much a difference as an explanation of his opinion. It is proved, then, from what has been said, because the truth of the thing intrinsically includes its entity; therefore it is not a mere extrinsic denomination. The antecedent is evident from the definitions of truth which Augustine, Anselm and Avicenna hand down, and from the others adduced above. Likewise, because for this cause fictitious beings are not true beings and are intelligible far otherwise than true beings; for these are of themselves apt by nature to be apprehended and known as they are; but those not at all, but it is necessary that by the artifice and power of the intellect they be clothed with some appearance or shadow of reality. Likewise, by this reason, the more a thing has of entity, the more it also has of this truth; and that which is more perfect being is called of itself more intelligible. Whence we can further argue: because to be intelligible is not a mere extrinsic denomination; therefore neither is to be true objectively or really. The antecedent is evident both from what has been said, that intelligibility follows the entity of the thing; and also because the object is prior in nature to the power, and its reason; therefore there is supposed in the object some aptitude by reason of which it is apt to terminate the act of the power, as, for example, in colour and sound with respect to sight and hearing; therefore similarly in being, in so far as it is intelligible, there is understood not only the extrinsic faculty which has the power of understanding, although this is necessary, but also on the side of being itself an intrinsic aptitude is supposed, by reason of which it can terminate an act of this kind. Moreover the things which were adduced in favour of the first opinion confirm this, and we shall add others in the following section.

Corollaries from the above resolution

35. How uncreated and created beings are true.—And from these things it is understood, first, how to be true belongs to every real being, whether created or uncreated; because every being is of itself apt to be conformed to the intellect; indeed there is no being which is not actually conformed to some intellect, at least the divine. Whence it comes about that this notion of true belongs primarily to the first being, which is God; because per se and essentially he includes knowledge and has with it supreme and necessary conformity; and because he is per se (so to speak) the reason of his own truth and is the origin and measure of all truth which is found in creatures.

36. How the true is an attribute of being.—Secondly it is understood from what has been said how the true is an attribute of being. For it is called an attribute not as if it were a real property distinct from the nature of the thing from being, but in a broader way, only because it is a certain attribute which is reciprocated with being and is in some way distinguished from it, at least according to reason or connotation. The first is evident, because it has been shown that every being is true. It is likewise evident from what has been said that every true thing, in the way explained by us, is real being; because, although beings of reason, in the way in which they are known, can be said to have conformity with the intellect, nevertheless, because of themselves they have neither intelligibility nor entity in which that conformity would be founded, therefore neither do they have the truth which is an attribute of being. Especially since it has been shown that this truth expresses entity itself as conformed. But the other part, about the distinction, has also been sufficiently explained from what has been said. Nor do the things proceed against it which we objected concerning the opinion of Cajetan, because we do not assert that the denomination alone is the property, but entity itself conceived under such a notion. Whence it comes about that through this attribute of the true no new perfection or real notion is explained in being itself, but only the very notion of being is declared more fully through the relationship to knowledge, in the way explained by us. And because this relationship in a certain way happens to being as such, and is in some way, at least according to reason, posterior to it (although it is always conjoined with it), therefore the true, which through this relationship declares the nature of being, is called its attribute or property.

37. A saying of Aristotle is explained.—Thirdly it is understood from what has been said in what sense it was said by Aristotle, at the end of Metaphysics VI, that the true is not in things but in the mind; for he is speaking of complex truth, which is in the composition of the mind, and of the other being or not-being which is signified through such a complexion and is required for its truth. For because truth is in a special mode in the composition and division of the intellect, as I said above, therefore truth, as it were by antonomasia or analogy, is wont to be specially said of that truth which is in composition and division, which is found equally in negations and affirmations and per se does not require real being, but such as is signified through the complexion.