Disputationes metaphysicae
Francisco Suárez (1548–1617)
Disputationes metaphysicae, in quibus universa naturalis theologia ordinate traditur, et quaestiones omnes ad duodecim Aristotelis libros pertinentes accurate disputantur
First published 1597
Francisco Suárez's fifty-four metaphysical disputations, the systematic metaphysics of the late scholastic tradition, first published at Salamanca in 1597. This edition gives the Latin of the prooemium and all fifty-four disputations — the first part on being and its passions (I–XI), the second on its causes (XII–XXVII), and the third on the division of being into infinite and finite, substance and the nine kinds of accident, and beings of reason (XXVIII–LIV) — with the transcription's apparatus of variant readings from the 1597, 1600, 1605, 1614, 1751 and 1861 editions, and the facsimile of the 1597 print.
Prooemium
Disputatio I: ON THE NATURE OF FIRST PHILOSOPHY OR METAPHYSICS
Sectio I: WHAT THE OBJECT OF METAPHYSICS IS
Sectio II: WHETHER METAPHYSICS IS CONCERNED WITH ALL THINGS ACCORDING TO THEIR PROPER NOTIONS
Sectio III: WHETHER METAPHYSICS IS ONLY ONE SCIENCE
Sectio IV: HOW MANY ARE THE FUNCTIONS OF THIS SCIENCE, WHAT ITS END, AND WHAT ITS USEFULNESS
Sectio V: WHETHER METAPHYSICS IS THE MOST PERFECT SPECULATIVE SCIENCE, AND TRUE WISDOM
Sectio VI: WHETHER AMONG ALL THE SCIENCES METAPHYSICS IS MOST OF ALL DESIRED BY MAN WITH NATURAL APPETITE
Disputatio II: ON THE ESSENTIAL NOTION OR CONCEPT OF BEING
Sectio I: WHETHER BEING IN SO FAR AS IT IS BEING HAS IN OUR MIND ONE FORMAL CONCEPT COMMON TO ALL BEINGS
Sectio II: WHETHER BEING HAS ONE CONCEPT OR OBJECTIVE FORMAL NOTION
Sectio III: WHETHER THE NOTION OR CONCEPT OF BEING IS IN REALITY AND BEFORE THE INTELLECT IN SOME WAY PRESCINDED FROM ITS INFERIORS
Sectio IV: IN WHAT THE NOTION OF BEING IN SO FAR AS IT IS BEING CONSISTS, AND HOW IT BELONGS TO THE INFERIOR BEINGS
Sectio V: WHETHER THE NOTION OF BEING TRANSCENDS ALL THE NOTIONS AND DIFFERENCES OF THE INFERIOR BEINGS, SO THAT IT IS INTIMATELY AND ESSENTIALLY INCLUDED IN THEM
Sectio VI: HOW BEING IN SO FAR AS IT IS BEING IS CONTRACTED OR DETERMINED TO ITS INFERIORS
Disputatio III: ON THE ATTRIBUTES OF BEING IN COMMON AND ITS PRINCIPLES
Sectio I: WHETHER BEING IN SO FAR AS IT IS BEING HAS SOME ATTRIBUTES, AND OF WHAT KIND THEY ARE
Sectio II: HOW MANY ARE THE ATTRIBUTES OF BEING, AND WHAT ORDER THEY KEEP AMONG THEMSELVES
Sectio III: BY WHAT PRINCIPLES THE ATTRIBUTES CAN BE DEMONSTRATED OF BEING, AND WHETHER AMONG THEM THIS IS THE FIRST: IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE SAME THING AT THE SAME TIME TO BE AND NOT TO BE
Disputatio IV: ON TRANSCENDENTAL UNITY IN COMMON
Sectio I: WHETHER TRANSCENDENTAL UNITY ADDS TO BEING SOME POSITIVE NOTION, OR ONLY A PRIVATIVE ONE
Sectio II: WHETHER ONE FORMALLY EXPRESSES ONLY THE NEGATION WHICH IT ADDS OVER BEING, OR SOMETHING ELSE
Sectio III: HOW MANIFOLD UNITY IS IN THINGS
Sectio IV: WHETHER UNITY IS AN ADEQUATE ATTRIBUTE OF BEING, AND ON THE DIVISION OF BEING INTO ONE AND MANY
Sectio V: WHETHER THE DIVISION OF BEING INTO ONE AND MANY IS ANALOGOUS
Sectio VI: HOW ONE AND MANY ARE OPPOSED
Sectio VII: WHETHER ONE IS PRIOR TO MANY, AND INDIVISION TO DIVISION
Sectio VIII: WHETHER THE DIVISION OF BEING INTO ONE AND MANY IS THE FIRST OF ALL
Sectio IX: WHETHER TRANSCENDENTAL UNITY IS NUMERICAL UNITY, OR WHAT IT IS
Disputatio V: ON INDIVIDUAL UNITY AND ITS PRINCIPLE
Sectio I: WHETHER ALL THINGS WHICH EXIST OR CAN EXIST ARE SINGULAR AND INDIVIDUAL
Sectio II: WHETHER IN ALL NATURES THE INDIVIDUAL AND SINGULAR THING, AS SUCH, ADDS SOMETHING OVER THE COMMON OR SPECIFIC NATURE
Sectio III: WHETHER SIGNATE MATTER IS THE PRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUATION IN MATERIAL SUBSTANCES
Sectio IV: WHETHER THE SUBSTANTIAL FORM IS THE PRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUATION OF MATERIAL SUBSTANCES
Sectio V: WHETHER THE PRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUATION IS THE EXISTENCE OF THE SINGULAR THING
Sectio VI: WHAT, FINALLY, THE PRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUATION IS IN ALL CREATED SUBSTANCES
Sectio VII: WHETHER THE PRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUATION OF ACCIDENTS IS TO BE TAKEN FROM THE SUBJECT
Sectio VIII: WHETHER IT IS REPUGNANT THAT TWO ACCIDENTS DIVERSE ONLY IN NUMBER BE AT THE SAME TIME IN THE SAME SUBJECT ON ACCOUNT OF THEIR INDIVIDUATION
Sectio IX: WHETHER IT IS REPUGNANT TO THE INDIVIDUATION OF ACCIDENTS THAT SEVERAL DIFFERING ONLY IN NUMBER BE SUCCESSIVELY IN THE SAME SUBJECT
Disputatio VI: ON FORMAL AND UNIVERSAL UNITY
Sectio I: WHETHER THERE IS IN THINGS SOME FORMAL UNITY DISTINCT FROM NUMERICAL UNITY AND LESS THAN IT
Sectio II: WHETHER THE UNIVERSAL UNITY OF THE NATURE, DISTINCT FROM FORMAL UNITY, IS IN THINGS BEFORE THE OPERATION OF THE MIND
Sectio III: WHETHER THE COMMON NATURE OF ITSELF HAS SOME UNITY OF PRESCISSION OUTSIDE THE INDIVIDUALS, AND BEFORE THE OPERATION OF THE MIND
Sectio IV: WHAT THE APTITUDE TO BE IN MANY IS IN THE UNIVERSAL NATURE
Sectio V: WHETHER UNIVERSAL UNITY ARISES FROM THE OPERATION OF THE INTELLECT, AND HOW THE DIFFICULTIES POSITED TO THE CONTRARY ARE TO BE SATISFIED
Sectio VI: BY WHAT OPERATION OF THE INTELLECT THINGS BECOME UNIVERSAL
Sectio VII: WHETHER UNIVERSALS ARE REAL BEINGS, CORPOREAL, SUBSTANTIAL OR ACCIDENTAL, AND WHAT CAUSES THEY HAVE
Sectio VIII: HOW MANIFOLD THE UNIVERSAL, OR ITS UNITY, IS
Sectio IX: HOW THE UNITY OF GENUS AND DIFFERENCE ARE DISTINGUISHED IN THE THING, BOTH AMONG THEMSELVES AND FROM SPECIFIC UNITY
Sectio X: WHETHER THE METAPHYSICAL ABSTRACTS OF GENERA, SPECIES AND DIFFERENCES CAN TRULY BE PREDICATED OF ONE ANOTHER
Sectio XI: WHAT THE PRINCIPLE OF FORMAL AND UNIVERSAL UNITY IS IN THINGS
Disputatio VII: ON THE VARIOUS KINDS OF DISTINCTIONS
Sectio I: WHETHER BESIDES THE REAL DISTINCTION AND THE DISTINCTION OF REASON THERE IS SOME OTHER DISTINCTION IN THINGS
Sectio II: BY WHAT SIGNS OR MODES THE VARIOUS GRADES OF THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS CAN BE DISCERNED
Sectio III: HOW SAME AND DIVERSE ARE COMPARED BOTH AMONG THEMSELVES AND TO BEING
Disputatio VIII: ON TRUTH, OR THE TRUE, WHICH IS AN ATTRIBUTE OF BEING
Sectio I: WHETHER FORMAL TRUTH IS IN THE COMPOSITION AND DIVISION OF THE INTELLECT
Sectio II: WHAT THE TRUTH OF KNOWLEDGE IS
Sectio III: WHETHER THE TRUTH OF KNOWLEDGE IS ONLY IN COMPOSITION AND DIVISION, OR ALSO IN SIMPLE CONCEPTS
Sectio IV: WHETHER THE TRUTH OF KNOWLEDGE OR OF THE INTELLECT IS NOT IN IT UNTIL IT JUDGES
Sectio V: WHETHER THE TRUTH OF KNOWLEDGE IS ONLY IN THE SPECULATIVE INTELLECT OR ALSO IN THE PRACTICAL
Sectio VI: WHETHER TRUTH IS IN DIVISION EQUALLY AS IN COMPOSITION
1. Since we have said that the truth of knowledge is in a special mode in composition and division, it will be worth while to expound whether it is equally in each, or more in composition than in division. For this last seems so, because in composition, when one thing is affirmed of another, the intellect knows the conformity of one with the other, and therefore in that knowledge truth is objectively in the mode expounded above; but in division the intellect rather knows that the concept which it denies of another thing does not have conjunction or conformity with it; therefore through that act it does not know truth but rather the negation of truth; therefore truth is not so objectively in division as it is in composition. On the contrary, however, is the fact that Aristotle and St. Thomas, and with them the other Doctors, attribute truth equally to division and to composition. Likewise, because it is as true that a thing is not which is not as that it is which is; therefore the intellect is as true in knowing or composing that negation as in composing this affirmation.
2. It must be said, then, that truth is found as truly and properly in division as in composition. For the negative vocal proposition is as simply and properly true as the affirmative; therefore the division which corresponds in the mind is as true as the composition. Whence (arguing theologically) it is as much of faith that God is not corporeal as that he is eternal; each judgement, therefore, is equally certain; therefore also equally true, although one is made by dividing, the other by composing.
3. But to the argument the answer is that truth (as I said above) is not so objectively in composition and division that it is formally and properly known through it, but only implicitly, because, while one objective concept is compared to another, in exercised act the conformity between the thing and the concept is in a certain way known. As, therefore, in composition this conformity is known, so in division the disconformity or disagreement of those objective concepts of which one is denied of the other is known, and consequently in exercised act the disconformity between the formal concepts of those objects is known, and virtually also the conformity which each of those concepts has with its object is known. For when the mind conceives that man is not a lion, it also implicitly knows that the concept which it has of man does not agree with the lion, but that to each its proper concept corresponds. And in this way in division too there is included the knowledge of truth or conformity, not indeed of those extremes among themselves of which one is denied of the other, but of each of them with its concept; for in this the truth of that negation is founded. Or secondly and more briefly it can be said: just as to know conformity, as it is, is true, so also to know disconformity, as it is, is true; and this very thing is signified through division and known in exercised act, and therefore truth is most properly in division as in composition.