Disputationes metaphysicae

1. The reason for doubting can be taken from a certain common doctrine indicated by St. Thomas, I, q. 16, a. 1, and in other places, that truth expresses the conformity of knowledge to the thing known as of the measured to the measure, according to that saying of Aristotle: From the fact that the thing is or is not, the proposition is true or false. Hence, then, it seems to follow that only in speculative science is there properly truth, because only speculative science is measured by its object; for practical science is rather the measure of its object; for the thing made by art is therefore true because it is conformed to the art. But St. Thomas touched upon the reason in that place, because the thing understood can have a twofold order to the intellect, namely per se and per accidens; per se it has order to the intellect on which it depends, per accidens to the intellect on which it does not depend but by which it is only known. In the former way the effects of art depend on art and created things on God, and therefore things are not the measures of knowledge but rather conversely; therefore in such knowledge there is not truth, but rather in the things, in so far as they are commensurated to it. But in the latter way things are compared to speculative science, and therefore in this knowledge there will only be truth in so far as it is commensurated to the thing known. On the contrary, however, is the fact that also in practical knowledges and judgements there is truth or falsity; for who would deny that in the composition and division which comes about in practical things, not only moral and agible but also factible, there is most proper truth and falsity? Or how could the practical sciences be true sciences if there were not truth in them? They have, therefore, not only truth but also their self-evident principles and evidently true conclusions. Likewise, if we speak not of complex but of incomplex truth, the idea of the artificer too, if it is proper and adequate to the thing to be effected through art, is most true, and so much the more in that not only is it itself true but also it is the cause of the truth of the artefact. Finally in the science which God has of creatures there is most perfect truth, although it is also the measure of creatures.

2. It must be said, then, that truth is not only in the speculative intellect but also in the practical, in so far as there is in it the knowledge of things to be done or to be made, as the latter arguments prove and as Aristotle teaches, Ethics VI, c. 2, and it is a matter sufficiently self-evident. But to the reason to the contrary a twofold answer can be given: first, by denying that truth always and rigorously expresses a relation of measured to measure; otherwise God could not be called true, because he is not measured, even by his own science; any relation of conformity, therefore, seems to suffice, whether it be of measured to measure or conversely of measure to measured. But this answer does not seem conformed to the common mode of thinking and speaking of truth; for all think that the truth of knowledge is in the intellect in so far as it is conformed to the thing understood, and consequently that it is a relation of the measured or related after its manner.

3. The answer, then, secondly, is that practical knowledge can be compared to its object in two ways: in one way in the notion of knowledge, in another way in the notion of cause, either efficient or exemplar, as is the idea of the artificer. And in this latter way indeed practical knowledge, as it is a cause, so it is the measure of its object as it has the notion of its effect; and therefore as such it is not properly denominated true, but efficacious or sufficient for causing the effect in its genus; but in the former way practical knowledge is true; whence under that notion it is compared to its object as measured to measure, because under that precise consideration it is not its cause but mere knowledge, which as such is only the intentional representation of the object, and therefore has truth in so far as it is commensurated to it. Which can be declared also in this way: for science as science, even if it is practical, abstracts from the existence of the object and is true even if it effects or causes nothing; if, therefore, practical science is compared to the object according to itself and as it abstracts from existence, then it is not its measure, because as such it is not its cause; therefore such science is rather measured by the object considered according to its notion and essence, and through conformity to it has its truth. Which can easily be persuaded both in artificial and in moral things; for the science or art of building therefore dictates that the house is to be constructed in this proportion, figure, etc., because the perfection of the house according to itself and as it were by its nature postulates this, the end being considered to which it is ordered and the properties which it requires, as, for example, that it be useful, strong, beautiful. And dialectic, in so far as it imitates the practical sciences, therefore dictates that the syllogism is to be constructed in such mode and figure, because the nature of the syllogism postulates this. Therefore, according to itself and abstracting from existence, the thing made by art is not therefore to be constructed so because science or art dictates this, but rather science or art therefore dictates this and proposes such an idea of such an artefact because it of itself postulates such perfection in order to its end. The same may be seen in moral things, for the mean of temperance, for example, does not therefore consist in such a thing because moral philosophy or prudence dictates it, but rather conversely, moral science therefore dictates it because it is such in itself and requires such a proportion. And therefore I said in the I-II that practical moral truth is not taken from right appetite as from a measure, but rather conversely that it itself is the measure of right appetite. But the general reason is that practical science too, in so far as it is science, rests on first self-evident principles, which are chiefly taken from the definition of the object and its first property; but these, according to themselves and abstracting from existence, belong to the object from its intrinsic nature without the causality of such science. Therefore the truth of this science, as science is knowledge, is measured by the object considered according to the being of essence. But because that same object as regards existence is the effect of such science, according to that state it is measured by that science, and in this way we say that the house is rightly constructed because it is according to the rules or idea of the art.

4. An objection is satisfied.—You will say: as abstractive science is compared to the object abstracting from existence, so intuitive science is compared to the existing object; therefore, as the former is measured by the object according to itself, so the latter by the existing object; therefore under no notion is the object measured by the science. The answer is by conceding the antecedent with the first consequence and denying the second, because practical science is not the cause of its existing object as it is intuitive knowledge of it; for this neither is properly the science of which we are treating, but experience, nor is it properly and per se practical, but mere knowledge, because it is not active of the object but supposes it made. Therefore the same proper science which considers the object according to itself and as it abstracts from existence, applied by the will to the work, is its cause, and so is also the measure of the work made and existing.

5. But there still remains a difficulty about the science of God; for it follows that the science of God, as true, is measured by its object. The answer is that the science of God can be compared either to God himself or to creatures. With respect to himself it cannot according to the thing have a measure, because it is not distinguished from itself or from its object; it is therefore above every measure and true by itself, indeed truth itself; but according to reason it is so, for God has true and adequate science of himself because he is so in the thing as he knows himself. Nor is this against the perfection or immensity of God, because this is not to be properly or truly measurable, but rather to be such by himself and to be equal to himself; just as for God to be comprehensible by himself is not repugnant to his perfection, but pertains to greater perfection. But if that science is compared to created things in so far as it is practical science and the cause of them as they are existing, then it is evident that it is not measured by them, but is rather their measure, and does not have truth from them, but rather they are true in so far as they are conformed to the divine ideas, as we shall say immediately. But considering the divine science only as it is the simple intelligence of creatures according to the being of essence or possible being, or in so far as it is the intuitive vision of existence, then it seems that it can without inconvenience be conceded that the truth of that science too consists in conformity to those objects; for according to this precise consideration it is not the cause of such objects, but mere intuition and as it were speculation, and therefore according to the same consideration the thing is not of such an essence because it is known as such by God, but conversely, it is known as such because it is of such an essence, nor could it otherwise be truly known. And similarly holy and weighty theologians say that a thing is not future because God beholds it as future, but because it is future therefore God beholds it. Origen, On Romans, Book VII, about those words of c. 8: Whom he called, these he also justified; Jerome, Dialogue against the Pelagians III, and on Isaiah 16, Jeremiah 26, Ezekiel 2; Chrysostom, Homily LX on Matthew; Bede, book Variarum quaestionum, q. 13; Augustine indicates it, City of God V, c. 20; many Scholastics, In I, dist. 38.

6. In order, however, that we may speak properly and chastely, we must not say that the divine science under these considerations is measured by these objects, both because God so has the science of these objects that he does not receive it from them, but has it from himself, and from within and by virtue of his essential perfection has all its rectitude and infallibility; and also because that science so attains these secondary objects that it has no true relation or real relationship to them, but God attains all of them in a more eminent mode through this, that he comprehends himself. Because, then, in the notion of measure and measured contrary imperfections can be indicated, therefore the science of God cannot be said to be measured by these objects, even though it is not true without conformity with them.