Disputationes metaphysicae

1. The common opinion seems to be that the truth of knowledge, properly and rigorously speaking, is only in the composition and division of the intellect, and not in its simple acts. So thinks Cajetan, I, q. 16, a. 2, and some Thomists there; Hervaeus, Quodlibet III, q. 1, aa. 2 and 3; Durandus, In II, dist. 16, q. 5, n. 14; and it seems to be the opinion of St. Thomas there, for so he writes: Properly speaking, truth is in the intellect composing and dividing, but not in sense nor in the intellect knowing what a thing is. He has similar things in Contra Gentiles I, c. 59, and De veritate, q. 1, a. 3. And he seems to have taken this from Aristotle, De Interpretatione I, cc. 1 and 3, where he says that the true and the false consist in composition and division. He has similar things in De Anima III, c. 6, where he says that in the indivisible conception of the mind there is no falsity. But where falsity cannot be, neither can truth be; for opposites are apt by nature to be about the same thing. Whence Aristotle concludes: But in those things in which there is falsity and truth, in these there is already a certain composition of the concepts of the intellect; and in Metaphysics IX, last chapter, and Book VI, c. 2, he says that truth is only in the intellect, because only in it is there composition and division.

2. This opinion can be founded by reason, first, because in words there is not truth and falsity in signifying except in complex speech by which we signify this to be or not to be, but not in the utterance of incomplex words; therefore the same is to be judged of truth in knowing with respect to the concepts of the mind, namely, that it is not in incomplex and simple concepts, but only in those by which, composing, we know and judge this to be or not to be. The consequence is proved, because words are signs of concepts, and whatever of truth or falsity is in the concept can be in the word as in a sign. Which whole reason is taken from Aristotle, De Interpretatione I, c. 1.

3. Secondly, because, if there is truth in simple conception, either every simple concept is true and never false, or it is sometimes true, sometimes false, or it is always true and false with respect to diverse things; but none of these can be said probably; therefore neither can truth be attributed to simple conception. The minor is declared as regards each part. For, first, if there can be truth in a simple concept, no reason can be feigned why there cannot be falsity in the same; for, as I was saying, contraries are concerned with the same thing; therefore, although a simple concept can be true, not on that account will every such concept be true; rather, from the same principle it may be inferred that it can sometimes be false. And it is confirmed and declared by an example, for, if the simple and proper concept of true gold is true, then, if brass is simply conceived as true gold, that concept will be false. Next, if this is conceded, namely that some simple concept can be false with respect to something, I prove that it must necessarily be true with respect to another; because it is impossible that there be a concept of the intellect which does not have some proper object which it represents; therefore, if it is compared to that, it cannot not be a true concept of such an object, because it is necessary that it represent it naturally; but it cannot represent it naturally unless it is intentionally conformed to it; but if it is conformed, it is also true, because truth is nothing other than the conformity of the intellect to the thing. As in the example adduced, although the concept of brass with respect to gold is thought false, nevertheless with respect to brass it is a true concept of it. Indeed there can be no object so feigned and impossible that the concept of it as such is not true, as the concept of a chimera or of a hippocentaur, even if it can be called a false concept of a true or possible animal, is nevertheless with respect to the chimera or hippocentaur a true concept of it. Finally, if for this cause the same concept is said to be true and false with respect to diverse things, it follows that in all concepts there is some falsity, which is foreign to all truth; otherwise there would also be falsity in the divine concept. Likewise, who would say that an image of Christ the Lord, by the very fact that it is a true image of him, is a false image of Antichrist?

4. You will say: just as the same thing, by the very fact that it is similar to one, is dissimilar to another, so it is no inconvenience that the same concept is true and false with respect to diverse things. The answer is that by this argument it is rather declared that the truth or falsity of knowledge does not consist in simple likeness or dissimilitude, but in some other comparison or composition by which its proper concept, or a foreign one, is attributed to the thing; as in the example adduced, in conceiving brass there cannot be falsity, but in attributing to the thing so conceived the nature of true gold. And it is confirmed and declared because it is one thing not to know some thing, another to be deceived in the knowledge of it; but he who conceives by a simple and true concept one thing, although by virtue of it he does not conceive other dissimilar things, is nevertheless not deceived in the conception of them, because he neither conceives them nor attributes anything foreign to them; therefore the simple and proper concept of one thing cannot be called a false concept of other things because it does not represent them; and by the same reason it cannot be called true from the mere simple representation of its object. And it is confirmed finally, because otherwise there could be truth in the intelligible species alone; because it too simply represents, and in its representation a certain conformity to the thing represented can be understood; but the consequent is false, because in the intelligible species alone as such there is not knowledge; therefore neither can there be truth.

The second opinion

5. The opinion of others nevertheless is that the truth of knowledge is found not only in composition and division, but also in the simple concepts of the mind. Ferrariensis holds this opinion, Contra Gentiles I, cc. 59 and 60; and Capreolus thinks the same, In I, dist. 19, q. 3, a. 1, concl. 3; Soncinas, Metaphysics VI, c. 2, q. 17; Giles, Quodlibet IV, q. 7; Fonseca, Metaphysics IV, c. 2, q. 6, sect. 4. And it can be proved, first, from Aristotle, De Anima III, c. 6, at the end, where St. Thomas, lect. 11, says that although the incomplex intelligible is neither true nor false, the intellect nevertheless in understanding it is true in so far as it is adequated to the thing understood. And so he expounds Aristotle saying there that the intellect which is of what a thing is, from the what-it-was-to-be, is true, even if it does not (supply: enunciate or affirm) something of something. And it is confirmed by the example which Aristotle adduces in the same place, because he himself had said, De Anima II, c. 6, that sense in the knowledge of its proper sensible is true; but it is evident that in sense there is only a simple act or knowledge; therefore much more will there be truth in the simple knowledge of the intellect. Likewise, Metaphysics IX, c. 7, texts 21 and 22, where St. Thomas also notes this, lect. 11, saying that in simple things there is truth through this, that the thing is known according to its proper quiddity. This opinion is confirmed by reason, because, in order that the thing be conceived through a simple concept, it is necessary that there be some conformity of the concept to the thing in representing; on account of which Aristotle said, De Anima III, c. 8, that the soul in understanding becomes all things, because through representation it is conformed to all things; therefore that conformity is a certain truth, for the definition of truth belongs to it.

6. Secondly, in the divine and angelic intellect there is most perfect truth, and yet in them there is neither composition nor division; therefore in our intellect too knowing simply there can be truth. It will perhaps be said from St. Thomas, I, q. 16, a. 5, ad 1, and Contra Gentiles I, c. 59, that, although God knows simply, he nevertheless by that simple act judges that to be so or not to be which we judge complexly. But against this it is objected from the same St. Thomas in the same c. 59 of Contra Gentiles I, for we too through simple conception judge something of the thing, so that some simple concept virtually contains whatever is judged through the complex concept or through composition. As when I conceive man under the distinct concept of rational animal, and apprehend this as the quiddity of man, there I virtually judge that man is a rational animal, and that simple conception virtually contains all that is signified by this enunciation; therefore there will also be proper truth in that simple concept. Thirdly, every thing which is conformed and adequated to its measure and its principles has proper truth; but in a simple concept there is conformity to the object as to its measure and principle, to which it must be conformed; there is therefore truth in it, which is no other than the truth of knowledge, since that is the conformity of knowledge.

Two certain things are gathered from the said opinions

7. The foundations of these opinions seem to convince two things. One is that some truth is found in the simple conception of the mind, and not only of the mind but also of the senses. The other is that some truth is found by a proper and special reason in the composition of the intellect which is not found in the simple knowledge of the intellect. And the first indeed is evident, first, from the testimonies adduced from Aristotle and St. Thomas, and from the same St. Thomas, I, q. 16, a. 2 and following, and Contra Gentiles I, c. 59, and other places which Ferrariensis adduces there. Secondly, from the common mode of speaking; for we rightly say that he forms a true concept of man who apprehends him as a rational animal, and so of the concepts of other things. Thirdly, because these concepts of the mind are certain things or qualities; if, therefore, there is truth in other things, as we shall show below, it is necessary that there be truth also in these concepts; whence, just as that is called true gold which has the proper nature of gold, so that will be called a true concept of gold which has an entity commensurate with true gold in intentionally representing; and it is similar of the rest. And hence it is also evident what or of what kind this truth is which is found in the simple knowledge of the mind; for it is nothing other than transcendental truth itself accommodated to these beings. For if the truth which they call in being is an adequate attribute of being, as we shall say, it will be found in each being according to the mode of its nature; therefore also in those beings which are simple concepts of the mind. Whence, because the proper being of these concepts is the being of knowledge, and consequently formally to render knowing him in whom they are, therefore the truth of such a concept is also the truth of knowledge.

8. Truth in a special mode in composition and division.—The second, namely that truth and falsity are found in a special mode in composition and division, is proved. For not without cause did Aristotle in the places cited specially say that truth and falsity are found in the composition of the mind alone; for since this cannot be true of all truth and falsity, as is evident from the former point, it is necessary that truth be in composition of this kind in some proper and peculiar mode, in order that the doctrine of Aristotle may also be true. And so St. Thomas plainly thought in the same places cited, especially in the First Part. Secondly, this is evident from the common mode of thinking and speaking; because then someone is thought to have true knowledge of the thing when he knows and judges it to be so or not to be as it is or is not in the thing, which we men do not do except by composing or dividing. Whence, as in speaking truth or falsity is in a singular mode in propositions, because no one is thought to speak true or false until he enunciates a proposition, so also in the mind truth and falsity will be in a special mode in composition and division. Thirdly, the same can be declared from the contrary, because falsity is not properly found in the simple concept of the mind, but in composition or division, as I shall expound more fully in the following disputation; it is therefore a sign that truth too, to which falsity and deception are opposed, is found in a special mode in composite knowledge.

The point of the difficulty and various modes of dispatching it

9. But the difficulty is in explaining what this special mode is by which truth is said to be found in composition. For some are content to say that complex truth is found only in composition, but incomplex truth in simple knowledge. But this is to say nothing, nor does it explain the matter; for by the same reason it could be said that truth is found in a special mode in simple knowledge, because only incomplexly is it found in it. Likewise, because from this it is not had that truth is otherwise in composite knowledge, formally speaking, than in other things, but only as it were materially, that it is in it in a mode accommodated to it; but this is common to all other things; therefore on account of this cause alone there was no reason why the truth of knowledge should be attributed in a special mode to composition alone. The assumption is declared by examples, for truth too is otherwise in man, for example, than in the angel; for in man there is truth through composition (I speak of entitative truth), but in the angel simple truth; in man it is material, in the angel immaterial; and it is similar in the other beings; for each is true with a truth accommodated to itself, and yet it is not on that account said that truth is in a special mode in one more than in others; but absolutely it is said to be common to all by transcendental community; therefore, if in the composition of the mind nothing else singular is found except only this, that as the being of such knowledge is composite, so also its truth is complex, there is no reason why truth should be said to be found by a singular title in composition alone.

10. Others, then, answer that in simple knowledge truth is found, but not falsity, at least regularly and speaking per se; but in composition and division truth and falsity are found indifferently; and therefore Aristotle specially asserted that truth and falsity are found in composition and division alone. But this explains sufficiently neither the thing itself nor Aristotle’s expression. For, if truth is so found in the simple concept that falsity is not found in it, but in composition truth and falsity are found indifferently, it should rather have been said that truth is in a certain way proper to simple concepts, but falsity is found in composition alone, or at most it should have been said that composition is indifferent to truth and falsity, but not that it is as it were the proper recipient of each. And finally (as I was saying) this very thing, namely that in simple apprehension there is truth of such a notion that no falsity is opposed to it in such a subject, but in composition truth is found to which opposed falsity can be in, indicates that truth is in a special mode in composition; for the former is common to all truth in being, as I shall say below; but what this special mode of truth is is not declared through that indifference alone.

11. Otherwise it is wont to be said that truth or falsity is specially attributed to composition and division because according to it we are said to think truly or to be deceived, which we are not properly said to do by reason of simple concepts. But this indeed (as I also argued above) is an a posteriori indication that truth and falsity are in a singular mode in composition and division, yet it does not declare the matter a priori, namely in what this mode consists. For composition is not therefore true or false because according to it we think truly or falsely, but rather conversely, because it is true or false, therefore according to it we think truly or falsely; for the composition itself is a form which, as it communicates its being to us, so also its properties.

The doctrine of St. Thomas on this matter is weighed

12. St. Thomas, then, I, q. 16, a. 2, declaring this matter, says that truth is singularly attributed to composition and division because through this operation alone truth is in the intellect as in one knowing truth itself. And so he indicates that through simple knowledge truth is in the intellect only as in one knowing the thing apprehended by such knowledge, but not as in one knowing truth itself; but through composition truth is in the intellect not only as in one knowing the thing, but also as in one knowing truth itself. For truth consists in conformity. But while the intellect composes, it compares the thing as simply conceived in one way to the being of the thing itself, and knows the conformity which they have among themselves; and therefore it knows not only the thing but also the truth; and for that cause truth is said to be in a singular mode in composition and division. And this is the same as what others say, that truth is subjectively not only in composition but also in simple knowledge, but objectively only in composition and division.

13. But this answer has no small difficulty, because either the discussion is of direct knowledge or of reflex. If of direct, it is not true that in direct composition and division truth is objectively, and much less falsity. Nor is it true that the intellect in composing and dividing conceives not only the thing but also its truth. It is proved, because when the intellect composes that man is white and directly knows this, it does not compare its concept to some thing, nor the thing to the concept, in order to know truth, but only compares one thing to another, in order to know their conjunction among themselves, which is to compose; therefore. Whence that mode of arguing seems fallacious, that, because the intellect then compares one thing to another, it is therefore said to compare and know the conformity in which truth consists; because it does not compare the formal concept to the thing nor the thing to the concept, but compares the conceived thing to another or to itself. Whence it does not come about that through such composition it knows truth, but only that being of the thing which founds truth, according to that saying of Aristotle: From the fact that the thing is or is not, the opinion is true or false; which being formally is not truth, although it causes truth in the intellect, as the same St. Thomas said in the said q. 16, a. 1, ad 3. And it is confirmed, for it is one thing when the intellect composing says: Man is white, another when it says: That man is white is true; for this latter composition is reflex, and therefore in it truth is objectively, because it is formally known through it. But the former conception is only direct, and does not have the same object as the latter; therefore truth is not formally known through it, nor is it objectively in it.

14. But if it is said that the discussion is of reflex knowledge, it follows, first, that what Aristotle says, that truth and falsity are found in composition and division, is not universally true; but the consequent is false, because, as every vocal enunciation is true or false, so also every mental composition or division. Whence through all of it we think either truly or falsely. Secondly, it follows that there is no difference, because through simple reflex knowledge too truth can be formally and truly conceived; for, as we simply conceive what man is, so also we can simply conceive what truth is, and through a simple concept we can conceive the conformity between concept and thing after the manner of a certain relation; then, therefore, truth will also be objectively in simple knowledge; the aforesaid difference, therefore, is none.

15. It can be answered that the doctrine of St. Thomas is to be understood of the composition and division which comes about through direct knowledge, for it is certain that in every such composition proper truth or falsity is found. But to the objection made against this, if the opinion of Durandus were true, that truth is the conformity of the thing as it is in the objective being of the intellect to itself as it is in the thing, the answer would be easy, by saying that the intellect, when it composes, compares the objective concept of one thing to another, or to itself otherwise or earlier conceived; and so knows the conformity between them, and is therefore said to know truth. And in this way St. Thomas seems to have declared this matter, Contra Gentiles I, c. 59, in the first reason, saying: Since the truth of the intellect is the adequation of intellect and thing, according as the intellect says that to be which is or that not to be which is not, truth in the intellect pertains to that which the intellect says, not to the operation by which it says it; for for the truth of the intellect it is not required that the understanding itself be adequated to the thing, since the thing is sometimes material, but understanding immaterial; but that which the intellect in understanding says and knows must be equated to the thing, namely so that it be so in the thing as the intellect says. According to this interpretation, then, it is easily understood that through direct compositive knowledge the conformity in which truth consists is known.

16. But this answer, if nothing else is added, cannot satisfy us. First, because that opinion of Durandus has been rejected by us above, nor is it likely that St. Thomas intended that sense in the words cited, as is evident from the reason which he adduces, that it is not necessary that understanding be adequated to the thing, because sometimes the thing is material and understanding immaterial. Where it is evident that he openly speaks of understanding as regards the agreement which it has with the thing understood in the being of being and its conditions, and not of the agreement which it has in the notion of representing and represented. And so Ferrariensis there, distinguishing between understanding and the concept or word of the mind, and thinking that understanding is not representative of the thing, but that the concept or word represents it, expounds St. Thomas as speaking of the concept itself or word, and placing conformity or truth in it, not in understanding itself. But I think that, if we speak properly, understanding comes about formally through the word itself or concept as informing the intellect, and therefore that the word as word cannot be conformed in representing to the thing of which it is the word without the intellect too, in so far as it formally understands through the word, becoming conformed to the same thing. St. Thomas, therefore, could not exclude this conformity in the notion of representing, but only conformity in being. In the same sense, then, is to be understood what he says a little above: that truth pertains to that which the intellect says, not to the operation by which it says it. For the sense is that truth does not pertain to that operation as it were materially taken, as it is a certain spiritual quality, but formally, in so far as it refers to the intellect the thing which is said through it, or in so far as it contains in representative being the thing known.

17. Secondly, that opinion is not rightly applied to explaining the present difficulty, because when the intellect composes, it enunciates on the side of the predicate the thing either as it is in itself or as objectively conceived. If the first is said, then through that comparison it does not know the conformity of the thing as objectively conceived to itself as it is in itself, in which truth was said to consist, and so it will not know truth. But if the second is said, then also on the side of the subject the comparison is not made to the thing as it is in itself, but as objectively conceived, because there is no greater reason concerning the predicate than concerning the subject; for the intellect compares each as it has been conceived by it, so that the composition is as it were a certain collation of simple objective concepts and the knowledge of the conjunction which they have in themselves; therefore neither in this way is truth conceived as it is explained by Durandus, because the conformity of the thing in objective being to itself in the thing is not known, but the conformity, or identity, or union between one thing and another as each is in objective being. Thirdly, much less can that mode be applied to falsity; for when through composition one thing is falsely affirmed of another, the disconformity which is between them is not known, but rather a conformity which is not in the thing is known or conceived; therefore falsity is then not objectively in such knowledge or composition of the intellect.

The mind of St. Thomas, and the thing itself according to it, is explained

18. It must be said, then, that it is not the mind of St. Thomas that, when the intellect composes or divides, it knows formally and in signified act (as Cajetan well distinguished there) truth and the conformity in which truth formally consists; for the objection made convinces that this cannot be verified in this sense. St. Thomas understands, then, that when the intellect composes or divides, it knows in exercised act that in which truth consists, and consequently affirms or denies truth itself or falsity. And by this special reason truth is said to be properly in composition and division. But what it is to know or affirm truth in exercised act can be declared thus: for our intellect does not through one simple concept adequately conceive, nor distinctly and clearly exhaust, the thing conceived, as God or the angels do; and therefore, after it has in some way confusedly and inadequately conceived it, in order that it may know it distinctly and adequately it attributes to it several predicates distinct either in the thing or only by reason. But just as Aristotle said of words that, because we cannot bring things into the schools, we use terms for things, and therefore, when we affirm one thing of another, we do not do this outwardly except by means of a signifying word and in so far as it is signifying, so when in the mind we affirm one thing of another, although we chiefly intend to affirm thing of thing, we nevertheless do not do this except through concepts in so far as they naturally represent things to us. And hence it comes about that, while we compose one conceived thing with another, or with itself conceived in another way, by comparing the thing itself we at the same time in exercised act compare our concept as representing that thing. As, for example, when the intellect composing says that man is white, it formally and directly knows the identity or conjunction which white has with man; yet at the same time in the exercised act itself it knows that the concept of white in some way contains under itself man and represents him, and consequently is in some way conformed to him. And so, while the mind affirms that man is white, in exercised act it affirms truth, or that this is true, because while it affirms that white is in man it affirms that the concept of white has some true conformity with man. And in this sense St. Thomas said, in the said a. 2, that the intellect knows its conformity to the intelligible thing when it judges that the thing is so related as is the form which it apprehends of the thing, which it does by composing and dividing; not that, when the intellect composes, it judges the thing to be so related as is the form which is formally or inherently in the intellect, but that it judges it to be so related as is the form apprehended by the intellect, and consequently in exercised act judges the thing to be so related as is the form or concept formally representing in the intellect; because the formal concept, as representing, is thought to be as it were one thing with the thing represented, and because the intellect does not compare the represented thing except as conceived by itself. In this way, then, it is rightly understood why truth is said to be specially in our intellect knowing by means of composition and division; for through simple concepts the intellect in no way knows conformity, whence neither does it properly affirm or perceive truth, as it does when it composes simple concepts. Whence, although both composition and the simple apprehension of things are absolutely direct knowledge, nevertheless, if we compare composition to simple apprehension, it is in a certain way as it were reflexive upon it, as it were in the very exercise, because through composition there is made a collation between simple concepts, by reason of which truth is in it in the aforesaid special mode.

The opposing reasons are solved

19. And through these the answer to the foundations of the aforesaid opinions is evident, which we do not think contrary among themselves if they are rightly understood, as we have expounded, and as the authors themselves in truth expound, as is openly evident from St. Thomas and Cajetan above. But Ferrariensis, who is opposed to Cajetan, either did not wish to understand him and St. Thomas, or explains the same thing only in diverse words. The foundations of each opinion, then, in so far as they confirm them in the true sense, are to be admitted; but it remains to declare how in another sense they are not repugnant to them. To the testimonies of Aristotle adduced in the first place, then, the answer is that Aristotle is speaking there of truth existing in our intellect as knowing in some way truth itself. Whence to the first reason the answer is that one must speak of words in the same proportion as of concepts; for in the simple and incomplex word there is the truth of the sign as in that which has it after the manner of transcendental truth, or truth in being; for this word man both signifies true man and can be called a true sign of man; yet in the simple word there is not truth as in that which signifies truth, in the way in which it is in the composite enunciation, which, while it signifies this to be that, consequently and as it were in exercised act signifies conformity and truth, as has been explained of concepts. To the second, which touches the matter of falsity, it will be said more clearly in the following disputation. Now the answer is that of the three members enumerated there that one is to be chosen by which it is said that simple concepts are so true that they are not properly false, as the arguments made there sufficiently prove. Nor is it necessary that in every subject where one of opposites can be, the other can also be. Especially because, since truth is in simple apprehension in another way than in composition, for that reason it can happen that that truth is such as not to have an opposite falsity. But why this is so, and why rather the truth of composition can have a proper opposite falsity, will be evident from what is to be said. But what is touched upon in the last confirmation about the intelligible species will be declared immediately. To the foundations of the second opinion nothing need be added; for they only prove that in simple conception there is truth as in that which has it, not as in that which knows it. Only about the second it is necessary to note from what has been said that the reason is not the same of the simple knowledge of God or of the angels; for they by a simple concept perfectly judge of the thing and that it is so related as it is known, or that that is in it which is judged and known of it. Indeed that simple judgement is such (especially if the discussion is of the divine one) that through it every conformity which can be between it and the thing known is also most perfectly known; and therefore it is not similar of that simple knowledge.