Disputationes metaphysicae

1. The first opinion is persuaded.—It remains to declare what this conformity is which we say is the truth of knowledge, namely, whether in the act itself it is something absolute or respective, real or of reason. For some think that truth is something real and absolute in the very act of knowing, or judgement of the intellect. Which opinion can be persuaded, for that this truth is something real in the act itself seems very probable. First, because the judgement in reality and without any feigning of the intellect is denominated true; therefore that denomination comes from some real form and not from an extrinsic form; because, as we have shown, truth is formally in the act itself and not extrinsically. Secondly, because truth is a perfection simply of the intellect; therefore it is something real in the intellect itself; and it is not in it except by means of the act; for we are treating of actual truth; therefore it is a real property of the act itself. Whence it is confirmed, thirdly, because in the habit of science it is a great perfection that it is true; therefore habitual truth (so to speak) is a real property of it; therefore similarly it will be in actual knowledge.

2. But that this property is absolute and not respective can be proved, first, from what has been said, because it is a perfection simply. Secondly, because, speaking per se, it does not depend of necessity on some real and existing term, except when such is judged to be; which is per accidens, for truth of the same notion must be in all; but in this judgement: A chimera is a feigned being, there is real truth without a real relation; therefore the same holds in all, whatever may be the case whether in some a real relation follows upon the truth; just as in science too the relationship to the knowable object is not formally speaking a real relation, although sometimes it can follow upon it. Thirdly, an argument can be taken from divine truth, for in God there is the truth of knowledge, which without doubt is a great perfection of his, and yet it cannot be a real relation, because, if it is compared to the very essence of God, it is not distinguished in the thing from it; but if to creatures, it cannot be really referred to them; it will therefore be an absolute property and perfection. Finally, because truth or falsity necessarily accompanies the judgement of the intellect, and yet no real relation necessarily accompanies it; therefore it is not something relative, but something absolute. And Soncinas seems to hold this opinion, Metaphysics VI, q. 17, where, although he says that truth expresses something absolute with a respect, nevertheless, explaining this respect, he says in sum that it is according to expression, not according to being; and he uses this example: just as intellective can be said to include a respect, because it cannot be conceived without a relationship to the intelligible; but it is evident that a respect of this kind of the intellective is only transcendental or according to expression; and Capreolus thinks the same, In I, dist. 19, q. 3, concl. 3.

3. The second opinion.—But to others it seems that truth of this kind consists only in a relation. Which Durandus holds, and Hervaeus, Javellus and Flandria, cited in the preceding section; Ammonius, Peri Hermeneias I, c. 1; and other expositors there. The foundation in common is that the being of truth depends altogether on the term, so that when it is changed truth is changed, and when it is posited truth is posited, no change being made on the side of the knower; for, on the testimony of Aristotle, the same proposition is changed from true to false and conversely when the object is changed; it is therefore a sign that truth consists only in a relation, for it is proper to a relation that, the foundation standing, it arises when the term is posited and is changed when it is changed. Whence it is confirmed, first, because truth is not of the essence of the act, since it is changed while the act remains; therefore it is an accident of it; and yet it is not an absolute accident; for it is not a quality, because the second and ultimate act is not the subject of another quality; nor is it in any other genus of absolute accident, as seems self-evident; therefore it will be a relation. It is confirmed, secondly, because truth is nothing other than a certain conformity; but conformity is nothing other than agreement or likeness or proportion; but all these indicate relation; as the conformity of the image to its exemplar is a relation, and so of others.

4. But whether this is a real relation or one of reason is controverted, even among the aforesaid authors; for the arguments by which the first opinion proved that truth is a real property seem consequently to prove that this relation must be real. But the arguments by which the same first opinion proved that truth is an absolute property seem to conclude that it is not a real relation but of reason. But each set of arguments compared among themselves seem to prove that this relation is sometimes real, sometimes of reason; for sometimes all the things which are necessary for a real relation seem to concur, but sometimes something can be lacking; therefore sometimes it will be a real relation, but sometimes not at all. The antecedent is declared, for for a real relation there is required first a real term and then a foundation not only real but also capable of relation, or ordainable to the term; but often these two concur in this relation of truth. For both it often regards a real and really existing term; and on the side of the judgement itself there is often a sufficient foundation, because both the judgement is something created, and on this side really referable to an extrinsic term, and moreover it is such that it is compared to its object as measured to measure, which relation is real on the side of the measured, by which reason the relation of science to the knowable is thought to be real; but this relation of truth is of this kind. But sometimes in this conformity a real term is lacking, as when the judgement is true of non-beings; but sometimes a foundation apt to found a real relation can be lacking, either because it is not ordainable to another extrinsic thing, as happens in the divine science with respect to existing creatures; or because it is not distinct from the term, as in the same science of God with respect to the same God; or because it is not compared as measured to measure, but rather as measure to measured, as the same science of God to all creatures; and the same is thought of human art with respect to the artefact; therefore in these cases this relation will be of reason and not real.

Resolution of the question

5. In order that we may explain this matter, it is to be noticed that it is one thing to inquire what truth adds over the act which is denominated true, another what the whole includes which is signified by the name of truth; in the way in which above we were saying of unity that it is one thing what it adds over being, another what is signified by the name of unity.

6. Truth adds nothing distinct in the thing to knowledge.—First, then, I think it certain that truth does not add to the true act some thing or absolute mode distinct from the nature of the thing from it, or from its essence and entity. In this all authors seem to agree; nor do I find anyone who expressly taught the opposite. And it is sufficiently proved by the arguments made in the second opinion. Likewise, because it can neither be understood nor explained what or of what kind this absolute is, nor for what it is posited. Which I declare thus, because either it is something separable from the true act, or it is altogether inseparable; if the second is said, it is posited without cause as distinct from the act from the nature of the thing; but if the first is said, it will not be absolute but respective, as the argument made proves; because it is separated through the mere change of the object without another absolute change on the side of the act; for the act of itself represents the same thing and in the same way, and only its truth is changed, because the thing is not related in the same way. You will say that truth adds something absolute inseparable from the act, yet distinct from it not in the thing but by reason. But on the contrary, because either this absolute completes the act as its ultimate specific or individual difference, or it does not complete it, but supposes it perfectly completed. If the first is said, then such an absolute is not added to the act constituted but constitutes it; therefore it is not rightly said that truth adds this absolute over the act; but the second cannot be said, because it is impossible to understand that to an act fully constituted something real and absolute, distinct by reason alone, is added. And next against this proceeds the argument about the change of the same act from true to false.

7. Truth does not add a predicamental relation.—Secondly it must be said that truth does not add over the act a proper and predicamental real relation of the act to the object. This too is sufficiently proved by the arguments made, for in many cases such a relation is impossible, and from them the argument is taken that such a relation is never necessary for the notion of truth as such. Both because the concept and mode of truth is of the same notion or proportion in all. And also because, although we gratuitously concede that sometimes all the things necessary concur in order that a real relation arise between act and object, nevertheless the act is understood to be true prior in nature to the real relation being understood to arise. For the latter is said to arise when foundation and term are posited; but the act is most formally true by the very fact that such a foundation and term are posited; so that, if per impossibile the resultance of the relation were impeded, the act would still be true by virtue of such an act and object posited in the nature of things; therefore relation does not enter the formal concept of truth, whatever may be the case whether it sometimes follows thence.

8. Nor a relation of reason strictly taken.—Thirdly it must be said that truth as such does not add to the true act an actual relation of reason properly and rigorously taken. This too that argument sufficiently persuades me, that the denomination of truth does not depend on a relation of this kind; for this, in the way in which it can be, is not actually except when the intellect is actually thinking or comparing one thing to another; but without comparison of this kind the act is simply true; therefore. Moreover, the argument made about real relation proves a fortiori of relation of reason; for, just as the former arises when foundation and term are posited, so the latter is feigned through the intellect, that being supposed which can intervene after the manner of foundation and term; but by virtue of that which is supposed for such a relation or feigning, the act is true; therefore such a relation does not formally enter the concept of truth; therefore neither does truth have such a relation over the act itself.

9. Truth adds to knowledge the connotation of the object as it is judged to be.—Fourthly it must be said that the truth of knowledge beyond the act itself adds nothing real and intrinsic to the act itself, but only connotes the object so related as it is represented through the act. This assertion follows from the preceding; for that the act is true expresses something more than that the act is; and it does not express something real, absolute or relative, beyond the act itself, nor does it express a proper and rigorous relation of reason; therefore it can add nothing else besides the said connotation or denomination arising from the connection or conjunction of such an act and object. Moreover, the argument by which the latter opinion proves that truth is not something altogether absolute confirms this, namely, because when the object is changed the truth of the knowledge is changed, and yet nothing intrinsic to the act is changed there, but the concomitance of the object is taken away; it is therefore a sign that truth includes, or at least connotes, the aforesaid concomitance of the object.

10. The same enunciation becomes true from false through extrinsic change.—Some answer by denying that the same mental proposition can be transferred from true to false without intrinsic change of it, speaking of the proper knowledge or judgement of the thing itself; because a proposition which for some time was true cannot be false for the same time, and in order that it become false it is necessary that the mind conjoin the extremes for another time, which it cannot do unless there is in it some change. But this is simply repugnant to Aristotle in the Categories, chapter on Substance, and to St. Thomas, I, q. 14, a. 15, ad 3. And, first, an argument can be taken from vocal propositions, or mental ones, which are said to be in the non-ultimate mind; for in them it cannot be doubted that it is altogether the same proposition which before was true and now is false through the change of the thing signified, without any change of the sign or of its signification; therefore that truth in signifying which belongs to these propositions, besides all that which holds on the side of the signifying proposition, connotes such a concomitance of the object. So, then, it can be understood in the truth of the judgement itself, or of the truth existing in the ultimate mind, at least imperfect and abstractive. Which I add for this reason, that in perfect intuitive knowledge, by which the thing is exactly seen in particular according to all the conditions of existence altogether determined, there cannot be a change of conformity between knowledge and object while the knowledge remains unchanged; for then the argument made proceeds rightly, that the act is always terminated at the thing as existing in such a time and moment; for which time and moment truth cannot be changed, although for other times it is changed. On account of which reason the divine science is always conformed to the objects known, however much these are changed for their diverse times. And the same is perhaps the case in angelic knowledge, when it is perfectly intuitive, although it differs from the divine in that the latter is simply immutable, but the former can be changed. Nevertheless in imperfect and abstractive knowledge, such as is our knowledge, it is not repugnant that the same judgement altogether be changed from true to false without intrinsic change, because that duration which we conceive and signify through the copula is not indivisible nor altogether determinate, but in some way indifferent and confused, and consequently having breadth, by reason of which in one part of that succession the object can be related in one way and in a diverse way in another. And for this reason it can happen that the same knowledge is changed from true to false through the change of the object, the knowledge itself remaining unchanged in itself; just as knowledge, or a proposition indefinite on the side of the object, remaining the same, can now be true by reason of one singular, afterwards by reason of another, although it itself is not changed in itself, because in that confused concept of a common and indefinitely conceived thing it includes in some way several singulars, each of which suffices for its truth; and therefore, although they are changed, truth can remain in the same confused concept; but if all the singulars were lacking, truth would altogether perish. The same, therefore, holds with respect to time or duration confusedly conceived; for with respect to that too the proposition or knowledge is as it were indefinite, and therefore, remaining the same, it can be compared to diverse instants or times, and be found in them now true, now false, without change of itself, through the mere change of the object. It is therefore a sign that this truth of knowledge at least connotes the concomitance of the object in such a state as is represented through the knowledge.

11. Finally it is confirmed from the similar case of goodness; for, as the true expresses conformity, so the good expresses fittingness; but the good as fitting adds only the denomination or concomitance of the other extreme having such a nature, or aptitude for such a perfection, as we shall show below; therefore one must philosophize of truth in the same way.

12. Truth requires the intentional representation of the object as it is.—Fifthly, from what has been said I conclude that the truth of knowledge includes such a representation of the knowledge as has conjoined with it the concomitance of the object so related as it is represented through the knowledge. It is proved from what has been said, because for truth neither does representation alone suffice, if the object is not so related as it is represented; nor can the concomitance of the object suffice for the denomination of truth unless the aforesaid representation is presupposed, or rather included; because truth is not that extrinsic denomination alone, but includes an intrinsic relationship of the act terminated at the object so related.

Censure of the first opinion and solutions of its arguments

13. And hence it is understood, first, what of truth the first opinion has, and what must be said to its reasons. For if by absolute it understands only the entity of the act with a real and transcendental relationship to the object, which it has altogether inseparably and immutably, then it is false that truth consists in this absolute alone, because otherwise it would be altogether immutable while the same act remains. But if it says that it consists in something absolute because it is not necessary that any intrinsic relation be added, but only the concomitance of the object, then we confess that truth is something absolute, or rather consists in something absolute with a respect according to expression; for that denomination taken from the concomitance of the object can not unfittingly be called a respect according to expression. Yet, because the reasons of that opinion seem to proceed in the former sense and can stand in the way of what we have said, satisfaction must be made to them.

14. What the formally true is, what the radically true.—To the former arguments, then, by which it is proved that the truth of knowledge is a real and intrinsic property of the act, the answer is by noticing that the denomination of true can be attributed to the act of knowledge in two ways: in one way formally, in another way radically; I call formal denomination of true that which I have hitherto explained, which consists in actual conformity to the object; but I call radical that perfection of the act from which it has conformity of this kind with the object, as is evidence in science, or certitude in faith, by reason of which it has that it is infallible, and consequently that it cannot exist without having conformity with its material object. This, then, being supposed, to the first I answer that the denomination of true taken radically from the intrinsic perfection of the act or habit is real and absolute; but we are not now speaking of that, because that is not so much the denomination of true as of certain or evident assent. Whence that perfection from which this denomination is taken is not something distinct from the nature of the thing from the judgement itself, but is the very specific difference which is taken from such a formal object or reason of assenting. But the formal and actual denomination of true is indeed in the thing itself without the feigning¹ of the intellect, as the argument rightly proves, yet it is not an altogether intrinsic denomination, but is partly from an intrinsic form, partly connotes the objective coexistence or concomitance of the object so related as it is judged through the knowledge. Whence what we have said, that truth of this kind of which we are treating belongs to the formal judgement or knowledge itself and not only to its object, is to be understood that by this conformity the judgement itself is first and per se denominated true, although the form by which it is denominated is not altogether intrinsic, but includes the concomitance of something extrinsic.

15. To the second satisfaction must be made by the same distinction; for radical truth, which is taken from the formal notion of such knowledge, is a perfection simply of the intellect, because it pertains to the notion of intellectual virtue simply; but actual truth, of which we are speaking, is not per se a perfection simply; indeed it does not even add perfection over the nature or species of the act of knowing itself. For this actual truth, on the side on which it connotes or includes the concomitance or fittingness of the extrinsic object, adds nothing real to the act, and consequently can bring it no perfection; but on the side on which it supposes or requires in the act itself a representation or real relationship to the object, it expresses some real perfection of it; but that perfection can sometimes be a perfection simply, but sometimes only in a certain respect. For sometimes this actual truth is infallibly and necessarily conjoined with the essential and real perfection of such an act and by virtue of it; and then the perfection which it supposes per se in the act is a perfection simply; for it pertains to the notion of intellectual virtue simply. But sometimes this actual truth is not necessarily conjoined with the act, or not by virtue of its formal and essential notion; and then the perfection which is supposed in the act is not simply so but in a certain respect, because it does not pertain to the notion of intellectual virtue simply, and always and intrinsically has admixed the imperfection of obscure or confused knowledge, as is in human faith and opinion, etc. To the third the answer is the same, for in the habit of science that it is radically true is its perfection, beyond which actual truth adds no perfection to it.

16. But the other arguments by which it is proved that truth is an altogether absolute property can indeed be admitted in so far as they prove that a real relation is not necessary for truth of this kind; but in so far as they could exclude every extrinsic connotation they do not rightly conclude; whence to the first it has already been declared when and how truth is a perfection simply, not indeed formally and in itself but in its root, when that is such that it necessarily has truth conjoined with it. To the second I concede that truth as such never formally consists in a real relation; I deny, however, that it follows thence that it does not include the concomitance of the object to which the knowledge is conformed. Nor does it matter that truth of knowledge of this kind does not always require an actually existing object, because we do not say that the real existence of the object is included in the concept of truth, but only that it be so related as it is represented or judged through the knowledge, or that it have such being as is known. Which being is not always the being of existence, but such as suffices for the truth of the enunciation, as Aristotle touched upon, Metaphysics V, c. 7, and Book VI, last chapter, and Book IX, last chapter.

17. In how many ways truth is in God, and whether it is a perfection simply.—To the third the same must be said of divine truth as has been said of the truth of science and of any intellectual virtue whatever, that in God it expresses perfection as regards radical truth; but as regards actual conformity with the object it adds no new perfection, nor even a real relation, as the argument rightly proves. In order that this may be better understood and every equivocation removed, it is to be noticed that the supreme perfection of truth is attributed to God in a threefold way, namely by reason of essence or being, by reason of intellect, and by reason of will; in which ways God is called the first truth in being, in understanding and in speaking. Of the first notion of truth in being we shall speak below, because that is nothing other than transcendental truth, which in God is in the supreme and first grade of perfection. The last notion of truth too matters nothing to the present point, because the name of truth under that signification is very equivocal and signifies a certain moral virtue existing in the will which inclines to always speaking and saying the true according to the mind; which virtue is in God in the most eminent grade, and is so natural to him that he can in no way speak other than the true; and in this way truth is a perfection simply, but moral. The second truth, then, namely the intellectual, can signify two things in God: first, a power of understanding so perfect that it never misses the mark nor can miss it; and this is a great perfection simply, which God has of himself in the most eminent grade; and by this reason he is called the first truth in knowing. Next it can express the actual conformity between the knowledge of God and the thing known; and this indeed supposes the aforesaid perfection, but does not add a new one, but only connotes that the object is so related in itself as it is known.

Answers to the arguments of the latter opinion

18. To the foundation of the contrary opinion the answer is that by that argument it is rightly proved that truth, besides the whole real and intrinsic perfection of knowledge, connotes and co-signifies the concomitance of the object, yet not a proper relation arising from the coexistence of knowledge and object, as has been sufficiently declared. You will say: if this argument is not efficacious in the present case for inferring a relation, none sufficient is left for proving real relations, especially those which are said to be founded in unity, as the relations of likeness, equality and the like; for, although, when the other extreme is changed, likeness is said to be changed, it can be said that no relation is varied thence, but only the denomination arising from the coexistence of each extreme. The answer is that this argument pertains to the predicament ad aliquid, of which we shall speak afterwards; now two things seem to be said: one is that such a mode of arguing is not sufficient to infer a real relation which would be a mode distinct from the nature of the thing from its foundation and term and as it were something intermediate between them, as the argument (in my opinion) convinces; whence, whatever may be the case with such relations, it cannot be denied that, prior in nature to their arising, foundation and term are understood existing together, in which there is fundamental unity or agreement. Whence, secondly, it is said: granted that we grant that some relation arises between knowledge and object, when in one there is a sufficient foundation and in the other a sufficient reason of terminating, nevertheless it is not formally necessary for the notion of truth, but that suffices which is understood to precede such a relation in each extreme; just as it also suffices whenever the extremes are such that they cannot found nor terminate a real relation; and indeed it is most probable that this relation is never real, as I shall now say.

19. Whence to the first confirmation I concede, speaking generally, that the truth of which we are treating, according to the whole of what it includes, is not of the essence of the act of knowledge; yet it does not therefore come about that it is some intrinsic accident inhering in the act itself, but only that, besides the entity and intrinsic perfection of the act, it connotes something else extrinsic without which the notion of truth does not subsist, by reason of which the truth of the act can sometimes be varied, although the act itself is not intrinsically changed in itself; and then truth is related after the manner of a separable accident, or of the fifth predicable, by reason of the variable extrinsic thing connoted. But in those acts which have inseparable and unfailing truth, that perfection whence arises such necessary conjunction with truth, which has been called by us radical truth, is in no way an accident but an essential property of such an act; but formal truth is related in these after the manner of an inseparable property.

20. To the second confirmation it has first already been answered that, although conformity can most formally be taken for relation, it can also be taken for the concomitance of those extremes between which that relation is feigned, as in the order of nature it precedes such a relation; and we have shown that conformity of this kind suffices for the notion of truth. Wherefore the controversy about that relation, whether it is always real or always of reason, or sometimes real, sometimes of reason, matters nothing to explaining the essence of truth; for, whatever may be the case with this, truth itself precedes such a relation. And without doubt it is true that such a relation is not always real, as the argument about the truth of the divine science and about the truth of knowledge concerning non-existing objects rightly proves; and this is enough that we understand that a proper relation is not necessary for the notion of truth; because neither is a real one necessary, as is evident from what has been said, nor one of reason, because this properly is not except while it is thought or feigned. But I further add that a real relation never follows in the act of knowledge precisely from that conformity which is necessary for truth; because that conformity does not consist in a true and proper formal likeness, but only in a certain proportion and intentional representation, by reason of which the thing is so perceived as it is, which will become more manifest from what follows.