Disputationes metaphysicae

1. That the intellect by composing and dividing is called true or false is certain from the common consent of all. Whence Augustine, De vera religione, c. 36: To whom it is manifest (he says) that falsity is that by which that is thought to be which is not, he understands that that is truth which shows that which is; but the intellect conceives or shows something to be or not to be when it composes and divides; it is certain, therefore, that truth is in the intellect by means of composition and division. But what that truth is, and how it is in the conception, is not easy to explain, and therefore the opinions are various.

The first opinion is treated

2. The first opinion is persuaded.—The first opinion is that that truth is not in the formal act or knowledge of the intellect, but in the thing known as presented to the intellect, in so far as it is conformed to itself as existing in reality; and in this way it expounds that truth is the conformity of the intellect to the thing, that is, the conformity of the objective concept of the enunciating intellect to the thing according to its real being. St. Thomas seemed to insinuate this opinion, Contra Gentiles I, c. 59; but we shall weigh that place better in the following section; Durandus taught it more clearly, In I, dist. 19, q. 5; and Hervaeus teaches almost the same, Quodlibet III, q. 1, aa. 2 and 3; and Soncinas defends it as probable, Metaphysics VI, q. 16; Flandria, q. 23; Javellus, q. 13. The foundation of Durandus is that this truth cannot be the conformity between the formal act by which the intellect judges something to be or not to be and the thing judged, according to the real being of such an act or according to the real agreement which it has with the object, because in this way they are very dissimilar, and the act of the intellect is spiritual, while the object can be something material; therefore it can only be conformity in representing; but conformity of this kind is attended to only according to that which is objectively in the intellect; therefore truth is only objectively in the intellect. And so it will be nothing other than the conformity of the thing in objective being to itself in real being. The minor is proved, because conformity in representing consists only in this, that the thing known is represented as it is in itself; but in this alone is declared the conformity of the thing in objective being to itself in real being; for when the thing is said to be represented so as it is in itself, by those two particles, so and as, the act of understanding is not compared to the thing; for so the comparison and the proposition would be false; but that which is presented to such an act according to known or apprehended being is compared to itself according to real being; therefore truth consists in the conformity between these. Secondly this can be confirmed, because the object of the intellect, or of its judgement, is the true as true; therefore truth is not the conformity of the judgement itself, but the conformity of the object itself. The consequence is evident, because the intellect, directly judging of truth, does not judge of the property or conformity of its act, but of the truth of the object itself; it is therefore a conformity in the object itself. Whence I argue, thirdly: for when the intellect reflects in order formally to know truth, it does not compare its act with the object, but compares the object in apprehended being to itself in real being; indeed, in order to know that its judgement was true, it begins from the thing judged itself, and, comparing it to itself as it is in itself, if it finds conformity in it, then it judges that it has judged truly; it is therefore a sign that truth consists in the conformity of the thing in objective being to itself in real being, and that the judgement is denominated true by it only by extrinsic denomination.

Resolution of the question

3. What complex truth is.—What truth in signifying is.—Nevertheless this opinion does not meet with my approval, and I think that the truth of complex knowledge, or of composition and division, or of the judgement by which we judge something to be this or that, or not to be (for we take all these for the same), is the conformity of the judgement to the thing known as it is in itself, from which conformity it comes about that the thing judged itself is said to be so in itself as it is judged. I think this is the opinion of St. Thomas, as can be taken from I, q. 16, aa. 1, 2 and 8; where Cajetan holds it, a. 2. The same St. Thomas, Contra Gentiles I, cc. 59 and 60; and Ferrariensis there; Soncinas, Metaphysics VI, q. 17; Giles, Quodlibet IV, q. 7, and others who follow St. Thomas. And it is proved, first, from Aristotle in the Categories, chapter on Substance, saying: From the fact that the thing is or is not, the proposition is true or false; where (as St. Thomas rightly weighed, in the said q. 16, a. 1, ad 3) he does not say from the fact that the thing is true, but from the fact that the thing is; therefore the knowledge is not denominated true from the conformity or truth of the object itself, but from the truth or conformity of the judgement itself to the object; therefore its truth consists in conformity of this kind. Secondly this can be declared from truth in signifying, which is in the vocal proposition; for it does not consist in the conformity of the thing as signified to itself as existing in itself, but consists in the immediate conformity of the signifying word to the thing signified. Indeed in any image whatever which is denominated true something similar is found; for the image of Peter, for example, is then called a true image when it represents him as he is in himself; whence its truth does not consist in the conformity between Peter in some represented being, which would be as it were objective with respect to the image, and himself existing in himself, but in the immediate conformity between the representation of the image and the represented thing itself.

4. Thirdly there is a general reason, because the thing as known or as represented, when it is truly known and represented, has no other objective being besides that which it has in itself; which is only said to be actually the object of such knowledge by extrinsic denomination from the knowledge which is terminated at it; just as the thing seen in objective being with respect to sight, if it is taken in aptitude or in first act, expresses nothing besides the being coloured or luminous which the thing has in itself. But if it is taken as actually seen, it adds nothing except an extrinsic denomination from the vision; therefore there is there no conformity of the object to the thing, but rather that is an altogether complete identity. But if the object is taken as denominated by the knowledge or by the form representing it, then formally it includes the form denominating it. Whence the object so taken as known or represented cannot by any other reason be said to be conformed to itself in real being, except because the very form by which it is known or represented has an immediate conformity with the thing known or represented according to itself; therefore the truth of knowledge consists first and per se in this.

5. Fourthly, finally, because often the thing has no being in itself which is the exercised being of existence, besides the being which it has as presented to the intellect; in which way God has true knowledge of those things which will never be, whether they are known only as possible or as those which would have been future if this or that happened; but in these objects the conformity of the thing as presented to the intellect to itself as in itself cannot easily be thought out, because it has no other being in itself besides that which is presented to the intellect. And the same holds of intuitive knowledge, which is terminated at the thing as it exists in itself, as is, for example, the beatific vision of God himself, which can be called true knowledge of God, since through it God is recognized as he is in himself; but it cannot be feigned how that truth is the conformity of God himself as seen to himself as he exists in reality, because he is seen immediately as he exists in himself, and to be seen adds only an extrinsic denomination. The truth of such a vision or knowledge, therefore, is the immediate conformity between it and the object; the same, therefore, holds in every knowledge or judgement by which something is judged to be or not to be.

Solution of the arguments

6. But to the argument of Durandus the answer is that this conformity of knowledge which we say is its truth does not consist in a likeness of entities, as is self-evident; nor in the likeness of a formal image or of such a representation as is in a formal image, because this is not without likeness in some entity or real form, which is not necessary for knowledge, as is to be said more fully elsewhere. It consists, therefore, in a certain intentional representation, by which, namely, it comes about that the intellect through the act or judgement so perceives the thing as it is in itself. And so this conformity is a certain due proportion and relationship between the perception of the intellect and the thing perceived. Which proportion is rightly explained by those words, that the thing known is so represented or judged as it is in itself; by which the thing known itself is not compared to itself in itself, as Durandus says, but the knowledge itself, or the judgement of the intellect, is compared to the thing known in the notion of representing and represented; and therefore there is no falsity in that comparison. Just as, when we say that this image is proper because it so represents as the thing is, we do not compare the represented thing itself to itself, but the image to the thing.

7. An objection is satisfied.—But if someone says that to compare the image as image to the thing is nothing other than to compare the thing in representative being to itself in its proper being, the answer is that, if by the name of the thing in representative being something other is understood than the image itself representing as such, the assumption is false; but if the very being of the image as representing is called the imperfect or diminished being of the thing represented, then the same is said by those words as we assert. But this in truth is not to compare the same thing to itself, but the image, from which the thing is extrinsically said to have representative being, to the thing according to its true being; and the same holds of knowledge in so far as it represents and is called the intentional image of its object.

8. To the second St. Thomas answers above, ad 3, and Soncinas, in the said q. 16, ad 1, that the true is not formally but fundamentally the object of the judgement or knowledge of the intellect, because, as Aristotle said, the being of the thing causes truth in the intellect, or is the object of the true judgement. Whence, when the intellect is said to assent only to the true, the sense is that it assents only to the object in so far as it is shown so to be; and in this way it judges of the truth of the object not formally (so to speak), but causally or fundamentally, that is, of the very being of the thing, so that from conformity to it truth results or exists in the knowledge.

9. To the third the assumption is denied; for in order formally to know truth we only compare our knowledge to the thing, or conversely the thing to the knowledge, according to that saying: From the fact that the thing is or is not, the proposition is true or false.