Disputationes metaphysicae

1. That the intellect by composing and dividing is called true or false is certain from the common consent of all. Whence Augustine, De vera religione, c. 36: To whom it is manifest (he says) that falsity is that by which that is thought to be which is not, he understands that that is truth which shows that which is; but the intellect conceives or shows something to be or not to be when it composes and divides; it is certain, therefore, that truth is in the intellect by means of composition and division. But what that truth is, and how it is in the conception, is not easy to explain, and therefore the opinions are various.

The first opinion is treated

2. The first opinion is persuaded.—The first opinion is that that truth is not in the formal act or knowledge of the intellect, but in the thing known as presented to the intellect, in so far as it is conformed to itself as existing in reality; and in this way it expounds that truth is the conformity of the intellect to the thing, that is, the conformity of the objective concept of the enunciating intellect to the thing according to its real being. St. Thomas seemed to insinuate this opinion, Contra Gentiles I, c. 59; but we shall weigh that place better in the following section; Durandus taught it more clearly, In I, dist. 19, q. 5; and Hervaeus teaches almost the same, Quodlibet III, q. 1, aa. 2 and 3; and Soncinas defends it as probable, Metaphysics VI, q. 16; Flandria, q. 23; Javellus, q. 13. The foundation of Durandus is that this truth cannot be the conformity between the formal act by which the intellect judges something to be or not to be and the thing judged, according to the real being of such an act or according to the real agreement which it has with the object, because in this way they are very dissimilar, and the act of the intellect is spiritual, while the object can be something material; therefore it can only be conformity in representing; but conformity of this kind is attended to only according to that which is objectively in the intellect; therefore truth is only objectively in the intellect. And so it will be nothing other than the conformity of the thing in objective being to itself in real being. The minor is proved, because conformity in representing consists only in this, that the thing known is represented as it is in itself; but in this alone is declared the conformity of the thing in objective being to itself in real being; for when the thing is said to be represented so as it is in itself, by those two particles, so and as, the act of understanding is not compared to the thing; for so the comparison and the proposition would be false; but that which is presented to such an act according to known or apprehended being is compared to itself according to real being; therefore truth consists in the conformity between these. Secondly this can be confirmed, because the object of the intellect, or of its judgement, is the true as true; therefore truth is not the conformity of the judgement itself, but the conformity of the object itself. The consequence is evident, because the intellect, directly judging of truth, does not judge of the property or conformity of its act, but of the truth of the object itself; it is therefore a conformity in the object itself. Whence I argue, thirdly: for when the intellect reflects in order formally to know truth, it does not compare its act with the object, but compares the object in apprehended being to itself in real being; indeed, in order to know that its judgement was true, it begins from the thing judged itself, and, comparing it to itself as it is in itself, if it finds conformity in it, then it judges that it has judged truly; it is therefore a sign that truth consists in the conformity of the thing in objective being to itself in real being, and that the judgement is denominated true by it only by extrinsic denomination.

Resolution of the question

3. What complex truth is.—What truth in signifying is.—Nevertheless this opinion does not meet with my approval, and I think that the truth of complex knowledge, or of composition and division, or of the judgement by which we judge something to be this or that, or not to be (for we take all these for the same), is the conformity of the judgement to the thing known as it is in itself, from which conformity it comes about that the thing judged itself is said to be so in itself as it is judged. I think this is the opinion of St. Thomas, as can be taken from I, q. 16, aa. 1, 2 and 8; where Cajetan holds it, a. 2. The same St. Thomas, Contra Gentiles I, cc. 59 and 60; and Ferrariensis there; Soncinas, Metaphysics VI, q. 17; Giles, Quodlibet IV, q. 7, and others who follow St. Thomas. And it is proved, first, from Aristotle in the Categories, chapter on Substance, saying: From the fact that the thing is or is not, the proposition is true or false; where (as St. Thomas rightly weighed, in the said q. 16, a. 1, ad 3) he does not say from the fact that the thing is true, but from the fact that the thing is; therefore the knowledge is not denominated true from the conformity or truth of the object itself, but from the truth or conformity of the judgement itself to the object; therefore its truth consists in conformity of this kind. Secondly this can be declared from truth in signifying, which is in the vocal proposition; for it does not consist in the conformity of the thing as signified to itself as existing in itself, but consists in the immediate conformity of the signifying word to the thing signified. Indeed in any image whatever which is denominated true something similar is found; for the image of Peter, for example, is then called a true image when it represents him as he is in himself; whence its truth does not consist in the conformity between Peter in some represented being, which would be as it were objective with respect to the image, and himself existing in himself, but in the immediate conformity between the representation of the image and the represented thing itself.

4. Thirdly there is a general reason, because the thing as known or as represented, when it is truly known and represented, has no other objective being besides that which it has in itself; which is only said to be actually the object of such knowledge by extrinsic denomination from the knowledge which is terminated at it; just as the thing seen in objective being with respect to sight, if it is taken in aptitude or in first act, expresses nothing besides the being coloured or luminous which the thing has in itself. But if it is taken as actually seen, it adds nothing except an extrinsic denomination from the vision; therefore there is there no conformity of the object to the thing, but rather that is an altogether complete identity. But if the object is taken as denominated by the knowledge or by the form representing it, then formally it includes the form denominating it. Whence the object so taken as known or represented cannot by any other reason be said to be conformed to itself in real being, except because the very form by which it is known or represented has an immediate conformity with the thing known or represented according to itself; therefore the truth of knowledge consists first and per se in this.

5. Fourthly, finally, because often the thing has no being in itself which is the exercised being of existence, besides the being which it has as presented to the intellect; in which way God has true knowledge of those things which will never be, whether they are known only as possible or as those which would have been future if this or that happened; but in these objects the conformity of the thing as presented to the intellect to itself as in itself cannot easily be thought out, because it has no other being in itself besides that which is presented to the intellect. And the same holds of intuitive knowledge, which is terminated at the thing as it exists in itself, as is, for example, the beatific vision of God himself, which can be called true knowledge of God, since through it God is recognized as he is in himself; but it cannot be feigned how that truth is the conformity of God himself as seen to himself as he exists in reality, because he is seen immediately as he exists in himself, and to be seen adds only an extrinsic denomination. The truth of such a vision or knowledge, therefore, is the immediate conformity between it and the object; the same, therefore, holds in every knowledge or judgement by which something is judged to be or not to be.

Solution of the arguments

6. But to the argument of Durandus the answer is that this conformity of knowledge which we say is its truth does not consist in a likeness of entities, as is self-evident; nor in the likeness of a formal image or of such a representation as is in a formal image, because this is not without likeness in some entity or real form, which is not necessary for knowledge, as is to be said more fully elsewhere. It consists, therefore, in a certain intentional representation, by which, namely, it comes about that the intellect through the act or judgement so perceives the thing as it is in itself. And so this conformity is a certain due proportion and relationship between the perception of the intellect and the thing perceived. Which proportion is rightly explained by those words, that the thing known is so represented or judged as it is in itself; by which the thing known itself is not compared to itself in itself, as Durandus says, but the knowledge itself, or the judgement of the intellect, is compared to the thing known in the notion of representing and represented; and therefore there is no falsity in that comparison. Just as, when we say that this image is proper because it so represents as the thing is, we do not compare the represented thing itself to itself, but the image to the thing.

7. An objection is satisfied.—But if someone says that to compare the image as image to the thing is nothing other than to compare the thing in representative being to itself in its proper being, the answer is that, if by the name of the thing in representative being something other is understood than the image itself representing as such, the assumption is false; but if the very being of the image as representing is called the imperfect or diminished being of the thing represented, then the same is said by those words as we assert. But this in truth is not to compare the same thing to itself, but the image, from which the thing is extrinsically said to have representative being, to the thing according to its true being; and the same holds of knowledge in so far as it represents and is called the intentional image of its object.

8. To the second St. Thomas answers above, ad 3, and Soncinas, in the said q. 16, ad 1, that the true is not formally but fundamentally the object of the judgement or knowledge of the intellect, because, as Aristotle said, the being of the thing causes truth in the intellect, or is the object of the true judgement. Whence, when the intellect is said to assent only to the true, the sense is that it assents only to the object in so far as it is shown so to be; and in this way it judges of the truth of the object not formally (so to speak), but causally or fundamentally, that is, of the very being of the thing, so that from conformity to it truth results or exists in the knowledge.

9. To the third the assumption is denied; for in order formally to know truth we only compare our knowledge to the thing, or conversely the thing to the knowledge, according to that saying: From the fact that the thing is or is not, the proposition is true or false.

1. The first opinion is persuaded.—It remains to declare what this conformity is which we say is the truth of knowledge, namely, whether in the act itself it is something absolute or respective, real or of reason. For some think that truth is something real and absolute in the very act of knowing, or judgement of the intellect. Which opinion can be persuaded, for that this truth is something real in the act itself seems very probable. First, because the judgement in reality and without any feigning of the intellect is denominated true; therefore that denomination comes from some real form and not from an extrinsic form; because, as we have shown, truth is formally in the act itself and not extrinsically. Secondly, because truth is a perfection simply of the intellect; therefore it is something real in the intellect itself; and it is not in it except by means of the act; for we are treating of actual truth; therefore it is a real property of the act itself. Whence it is confirmed, thirdly, because in the habit of science it is a great perfection that it is true; therefore habitual truth (so to speak) is a real property of it; therefore similarly it will be in actual knowledge.

2. But that this property is absolute and not respective can be proved, first, from what has been said, because it is a perfection simply. Secondly, because, speaking per se, it does not depend of necessity on some real and existing term, except when such is judged to be; which is per accidens, for truth of the same notion must be in all; but in this judgement: A chimera is a feigned being, there is real truth without a real relation; therefore the same holds in all, whatever may be the case whether in some a real relation follows upon the truth; just as in science too the relationship to the knowable object is not formally speaking a real relation, although sometimes it can follow upon it. Thirdly, an argument can be taken from divine truth, for in God there is the truth of knowledge, which without doubt is a great perfection of his, and yet it cannot be a real relation, because, if it is compared to the very essence of God, it is not distinguished in the thing from it; but if to creatures, it cannot be really referred to them; it will therefore be an absolute property and perfection. Finally, because truth or falsity necessarily accompanies the judgement of the intellect, and yet no real relation necessarily accompanies it; therefore it is not something relative, but something absolute. And Soncinas seems to hold this opinion, Metaphysics VI, q. 17, where, although he says that truth expresses something absolute with a respect, nevertheless, explaining this respect, he says in sum that it is according to expression, not according to being; and he uses this example: just as intellective can be said to include a respect, because it cannot be conceived without a relationship to the intelligible; but it is evident that a respect of this kind of the intellective is only transcendental or according to expression; and Capreolus thinks the same, In I, dist. 19, q. 3, concl. 3.

3. The second opinion.—But to others it seems that truth of this kind consists only in a relation. Which Durandus holds, and Hervaeus, Javellus and Flandria, cited in the preceding section; Ammonius, Peri Hermeneias I, c. 1; and other expositors there. The foundation in common is that the being of truth depends altogether on the term, so that when it is changed truth is changed, and when it is posited truth is posited, no change being made on the side of the knower; for, on the testimony of Aristotle, the same proposition is changed from true to false and conversely when the object is changed; it is therefore a sign that truth consists only in a relation, for it is proper to a relation that, the foundation standing, it arises when the term is posited and is changed when it is changed. Whence it is confirmed, first, because truth is not of the essence of the act, since it is changed while the act remains; therefore it is an accident of it; and yet it is not an absolute accident; for it is not a quality, because the second and ultimate act is not the subject of another quality; nor is it in any other genus of absolute accident, as seems self-evident; therefore it will be a relation. It is confirmed, secondly, because truth is nothing other than a certain conformity; but conformity is nothing other than agreement or likeness or proportion; but all these indicate relation; as the conformity of the image to its exemplar is a relation, and so of others.

4. But whether this is a real relation or one of reason is controverted, even among the aforesaid authors; for the arguments by which the first opinion proved that truth is a real property seem consequently to prove that this relation must be real. But the arguments by which the same first opinion proved that truth is an absolute property seem to conclude that it is not a real relation but of reason. But each set of arguments compared among themselves seem to prove that this relation is sometimes real, sometimes of reason; for sometimes all the things which are necessary for a real relation seem to concur, but sometimes something can be lacking; therefore sometimes it will be a real relation, but sometimes not at all. The antecedent is declared, for for a real relation there is required first a real term and then a foundation not only real but also capable of relation, or ordainable to the term; but often these two concur in this relation of truth. For both it often regards a real and really existing term; and on the side of the judgement itself there is often a sufficient foundation, because both the judgement is something created, and on this side really referable to an extrinsic term, and moreover it is such that it is compared to its object as measured to measure, which relation is real on the side of the measured, by which reason the relation of science to the knowable is thought to be real; but this relation of truth is of this kind. But sometimes in this conformity a real term is lacking, as when the judgement is true of non-beings; but sometimes a foundation apt to found a real relation can be lacking, either because it is not ordainable to another extrinsic thing, as happens in the divine science with respect to existing creatures; or because it is not distinct from the term, as in the same science of God with respect to the same God; or because it is not compared as measured to measure, but rather as measure to measured, as the same science of God to all creatures; and the same is thought of human art with respect to the artefact; therefore in these cases this relation will be of reason and not real.

Resolution of the question

5. In order that we may explain this matter, it is to be noticed that it is one thing to inquire what truth adds over the act which is denominated true, another what the whole includes which is signified by the name of truth; in the way in which above we were saying of unity that it is one thing what it adds over being, another what is signified by the name of unity.

6. Truth adds nothing distinct in the thing to knowledge.—First, then, I think it certain that truth does not add to the true act some thing or absolute mode distinct from the nature of the thing from it, or from its essence and entity. In this all authors seem to agree; nor do I find anyone who expressly taught the opposite. And it is sufficiently proved by the arguments made in the second opinion. Likewise, because it can neither be understood nor explained what or of what kind this absolute is, nor for what it is posited. Which I declare thus, because either it is something separable from the true act, or it is altogether inseparable; if the second is said, it is posited without cause as distinct from the act from the nature of the thing; but if the first is said, it will not be absolute but respective, as the argument made proves; because it is separated through the mere change of the object without another absolute change on the side of the act; for the act of itself represents the same thing and in the same way, and only its truth is changed, because the thing is not related in the same way. You will say that truth adds something absolute inseparable from the act, yet distinct from it not in the thing but by reason. But on the contrary, because either this absolute completes the act as its ultimate specific or individual difference, or it does not complete it, but supposes it perfectly completed. If the first is said, then such an absolute is not added to the act constituted but constitutes it; therefore it is not rightly said that truth adds this absolute over the act; but the second cannot be said, because it is impossible to understand that to an act fully constituted something real and absolute, distinct by reason alone, is added. And next against this proceeds the argument about the change of the same act from true to false.

7. Truth does not add a predicamental relation.—Secondly it must be said that truth does not add over the act a proper and predicamental real relation of the act to the object. This too is sufficiently proved by the arguments made, for in many cases such a relation is impossible, and from them the argument is taken that such a relation is never necessary for the notion of truth as such. Both because the concept and mode of truth is of the same notion or proportion in all. And also because, although we gratuitously concede that sometimes all the things necessary concur in order that a real relation arise between act and object, nevertheless the act is understood to be true prior in nature to the real relation being understood to arise. For the latter is said to arise when foundation and term are posited; but the act is most formally true by the very fact that such a foundation and term are posited; so that, if per impossibile the resultance of the relation were impeded, the act would still be true by virtue of such an act and object posited in the nature of things; therefore relation does not enter the formal concept of truth, whatever may be the case whether it sometimes follows thence.

8. Nor a relation of reason strictly taken.—Thirdly it must be said that truth as such does not add to the true act an actual relation of reason properly and rigorously taken. This too that argument sufficiently persuades me, that the denomination of truth does not depend on a relation of this kind; for this, in the way in which it can be, is not actually except when the intellect is actually thinking or comparing one thing to another; but without comparison of this kind the act is simply true; therefore. Moreover, the argument made about real relation proves a fortiori of relation of reason; for, just as the former arises when foundation and term are posited, so the latter is feigned through the intellect, that being supposed which can intervene after the manner of foundation and term; but by virtue of that which is supposed for such a relation or feigning, the act is true; therefore such a relation does not formally enter the concept of truth; therefore neither does truth have such a relation over the act itself.

9. Truth adds to knowledge the connotation of the object as it is judged to be.—Fourthly it must be said that the truth of knowledge beyond the act itself adds nothing real and intrinsic to the act itself, but only connotes the object so related as it is represented through the act. This assertion follows from the preceding; for that the act is true expresses something more than that the act is; and it does not express something real, absolute or relative, beyond the act itself, nor does it express a proper and rigorous relation of reason; therefore it can add nothing else besides the said connotation or denomination arising from the connection or conjunction of such an act and object. Moreover, the argument by which the latter opinion proves that truth is not something altogether absolute confirms this, namely, because when the object is changed the truth of the knowledge is changed, and yet nothing intrinsic to the act is changed there, but the concomitance of the object is taken away; it is therefore a sign that truth includes, or at least connotes, the aforesaid concomitance of the object.

10. The same enunciation becomes true from false through extrinsic change.—Some answer by denying that the same mental proposition can be transferred from true to false without intrinsic change of it, speaking of the proper knowledge or judgement of the thing itself; because a proposition which for some time was true cannot be false for the same time, and in order that it become false it is necessary that the mind conjoin the extremes for another time, which it cannot do unless there is in it some change. But this is simply repugnant to Aristotle in the Categories, chapter on Substance, and to St. Thomas, I, q. 14, a. 15, ad 3. And, first, an argument can be taken from vocal propositions, or mental ones, which are said to be in the non-ultimate mind; for in them it cannot be doubted that it is altogether the same proposition which before was true and now is false through the change of the thing signified, without any change of the sign or of its signification; therefore that truth in signifying which belongs to these propositions, besides all that which holds on the side of the signifying proposition, connotes such a concomitance of the object. So, then, it can be understood in the truth of the judgement itself, or of the truth existing in the ultimate mind, at least imperfect and abstractive. Which I add for this reason, that in perfect intuitive knowledge, by which the thing is exactly seen in particular according to all the conditions of existence altogether determined, there cannot be a change of conformity between knowledge and object while the knowledge remains unchanged; for then the argument made proceeds rightly, that the act is always terminated at the thing as existing in such a time and moment; for which time and moment truth cannot be changed, although for other times it is changed. On account of which reason the divine science is always conformed to the objects known, however much these are changed for their diverse times. And the same is perhaps the case in angelic knowledge, when it is perfectly intuitive, although it differs from the divine in that the latter is simply immutable, but the former can be changed. Nevertheless in imperfect and abstractive knowledge, such as is our knowledge, it is not repugnant that the same judgement altogether be changed from true to false without intrinsic change, because that duration which we conceive and signify through the copula is not indivisible nor altogether determinate, but in some way indifferent and confused, and consequently having breadth, by reason of which in one part of that succession the object can be related in one way and in a diverse way in another. And for this reason it can happen that the same knowledge is changed from true to false through the change of the object, the knowledge itself remaining unchanged in itself; just as knowledge, or a proposition indefinite on the side of the object, remaining the same, can now be true by reason of one singular, afterwards by reason of another, although it itself is not changed in itself, because in that confused concept of a common and indefinitely conceived thing it includes in some way several singulars, each of which suffices for its truth; and therefore, although they are changed, truth can remain in the same confused concept; but if all the singulars were lacking, truth would altogether perish. The same, therefore, holds with respect to time or duration confusedly conceived; for with respect to that too the proposition or knowledge is as it were indefinite, and therefore, remaining the same, it can be compared to diverse instants or times, and be found in them now true, now false, without change of itself, through the mere change of the object. It is therefore a sign that this truth of knowledge at least connotes the concomitance of the object in such a state as is represented through the knowledge.

11. Finally it is confirmed from the similar case of goodness; for, as the true expresses conformity, so the good expresses fittingness; but the good as fitting adds only the denomination or concomitance of the other extreme having such a nature, or aptitude for such a perfection, as we shall show below; therefore one must philosophize of truth in the same way.

12. Truth requires the intentional representation of the object as it is.—Fifthly, from what has been said I conclude that the truth of knowledge includes such a representation of the knowledge as has conjoined with it the concomitance of the object so related as it is represented through the knowledge. It is proved from what has been said, because for truth neither does representation alone suffice, if the object is not so related as it is represented; nor can the concomitance of the object suffice for the denomination of truth unless the aforesaid representation is presupposed, or rather included; because truth is not that extrinsic denomination alone, but includes an intrinsic relationship of the act terminated at the object so related.

Censure of the first opinion and solutions of its arguments

13. And hence it is understood, first, what of truth the first opinion has, and what must be said to its reasons. For if by absolute it understands only the entity of the act with a real and transcendental relationship to the object, which it has altogether inseparably and immutably, then it is false that truth consists in this absolute alone, because otherwise it would be altogether immutable while the same act remains. But if it says that it consists in something absolute because it is not necessary that any intrinsic relation be added, but only the concomitance of the object, then we confess that truth is something absolute, or rather consists in something absolute with a respect according to expression; for that denomination taken from the concomitance of the object can not unfittingly be called a respect according to expression. Yet, because the reasons of that opinion seem to proceed in the former sense and can stand in the way of what we have said, satisfaction must be made to them.

14. What the formally true is, what the radically true.—To the former arguments, then, by which it is proved that the truth of knowledge is a real and intrinsic property of the act, the answer is by noticing that the denomination of true can be attributed to the act of knowledge in two ways: in one way formally, in another way radically; I call formal denomination of true that which I have hitherto explained, which consists in actual conformity to the object; but I call radical that perfection of the act from which it has conformity of this kind with the object, as is evidence in science, or certitude in faith, by reason of which it has that it is infallible, and consequently that it cannot exist without having conformity with its material object. This, then, being supposed, to the first I answer that the denomination of true taken radically from the intrinsic perfection of the act or habit is real and absolute; but we are not now speaking of that, because that is not so much the denomination of true as of certain or evident assent. Whence that perfection from which this denomination is taken is not something distinct from the nature of the thing from the judgement itself, but is the very specific difference which is taken from such a formal object or reason of assenting. But the formal and actual denomination of true is indeed in the thing itself without the feigning¹ of the intellect, as the argument rightly proves, yet it is not an altogether intrinsic denomination, but is partly from an intrinsic form, partly connotes the objective coexistence or concomitance of the object so related as it is judged through the knowledge. Whence what we have said, that truth of this kind of which we are treating belongs to the formal judgement or knowledge itself and not only to its object, is to be understood that by this conformity the judgement itself is first and per se denominated true, although the form by which it is denominated is not altogether intrinsic, but includes the concomitance of something extrinsic.

15. To the second satisfaction must be made by the same distinction; for radical truth, which is taken from the formal notion of such knowledge, is a perfection simply of the intellect, because it pertains to the notion of intellectual virtue simply; but actual truth, of which we are speaking, is not per se a perfection simply; indeed it does not even add perfection over the nature or species of the act of knowing itself. For this actual truth, on the side on which it connotes or includes the concomitance or fittingness of the extrinsic object, adds nothing real to the act, and consequently can bring it no perfection; but on the side on which it supposes or requires in the act itself a representation or real relationship to the object, it expresses some real perfection of it; but that perfection can sometimes be a perfection simply, but sometimes only in a certain respect. For sometimes this actual truth is infallibly and necessarily conjoined with the essential and real perfection of such an act and by virtue of it; and then the perfection which it supposes per se in the act is a perfection simply; for it pertains to the notion of intellectual virtue simply. But sometimes this actual truth is not necessarily conjoined with the act, or not by virtue of its formal and essential notion; and then the perfection which is supposed in the act is not simply so but in a certain respect, because it does not pertain to the notion of intellectual virtue simply, and always and intrinsically has admixed the imperfection of obscure or confused knowledge, as is in human faith and opinion, etc. To the third the answer is the same, for in the habit of science that it is radically true is its perfection, beyond which actual truth adds no perfection to it.

16. But the other arguments by which it is proved that truth is an altogether absolute property can indeed be admitted in so far as they prove that a real relation is not necessary for truth of this kind; but in so far as they could exclude every extrinsic connotation they do not rightly conclude; whence to the first it has already been declared when and how truth is a perfection simply, not indeed formally and in itself but in its root, when that is such that it necessarily has truth conjoined with it. To the second I concede that truth as such never formally consists in a real relation; I deny, however, that it follows thence that it does not include the concomitance of the object to which the knowledge is conformed. Nor does it matter that truth of knowledge of this kind does not always require an actually existing object, because we do not say that the real existence of the object is included in the concept of truth, but only that it be so related as it is represented or judged through the knowledge, or that it have such being as is known. Which being is not always the being of existence, but such as suffices for the truth of the enunciation, as Aristotle touched upon, Metaphysics V, c. 7, and Book VI, last chapter, and Book IX, last chapter.

17. In how many ways truth is in God, and whether it is a perfection simply.—To the third the same must be said of divine truth as has been said of the truth of science and of any intellectual virtue whatever, that in God it expresses perfection as regards radical truth; but as regards actual conformity with the object it adds no new perfection, nor even a real relation, as the argument rightly proves. In order that this may be better understood and every equivocation removed, it is to be noticed that the supreme perfection of truth is attributed to God in a threefold way, namely by reason of essence or being, by reason of intellect, and by reason of will; in which ways God is called the first truth in being, in understanding and in speaking. Of the first notion of truth in being we shall speak below, because that is nothing other than transcendental truth, which in God is in the supreme and first grade of perfection. The last notion of truth too matters nothing to the present point, because the name of truth under that signification is very equivocal and signifies a certain moral virtue existing in the will which inclines to always speaking and saying the true according to the mind; which virtue is in God in the most eminent grade, and is so natural to him that he can in no way speak other than the true; and in this way truth is a perfection simply, but moral. The second truth, then, namely the intellectual, can signify two things in God: first, a power of understanding so perfect that it never misses the mark nor can miss it; and this is a great perfection simply, which God has of himself in the most eminent grade; and by this reason he is called the first truth in knowing. Next it can express the actual conformity between the knowledge of God and the thing known; and this indeed supposes the aforesaid perfection, but does not add a new one, but only connotes that the object is so related in itself as it is known.

Answers to the arguments of the latter opinion

18. To the foundation of the contrary opinion the answer is that by that argument it is rightly proved that truth, besides the whole real and intrinsic perfection of knowledge, connotes and co-signifies the concomitance of the object, yet not a proper relation arising from the coexistence of knowledge and object, as has been sufficiently declared. You will say: if this argument is not efficacious in the present case for inferring a relation, none sufficient is left for proving real relations, especially those which are said to be founded in unity, as the relations of likeness, equality and the like; for, although, when the other extreme is changed, likeness is said to be changed, it can be said that no relation is varied thence, but only the denomination arising from the coexistence of each extreme. The answer is that this argument pertains to the predicament ad aliquid, of which we shall speak afterwards; now two things seem to be said: one is that such a mode of arguing is not sufficient to infer a real relation which would be a mode distinct from the nature of the thing from its foundation and term and as it were something intermediate between them, as the argument (in my opinion) convinces; whence, whatever may be the case with such relations, it cannot be denied that, prior in nature to their arising, foundation and term are understood existing together, in which there is fundamental unity or agreement. Whence, secondly, it is said: granted that we grant that some relation arises between knowledge and object, when in one there is a sufficient foundation and in the other a sufficient reason of terminating, nevertheless it is not formally necessary for the notion of truth, but that suffices which is understood to precede such a relation in each extreme; just as it also suffices whenever the extremes are such that they cannot found nor terminate a real relation; and indeed it is most probable that this relation is never real, as I shall now say.

19. Whence to the first confirmation I concede, speaking generally, that the truth of which we are treating, according to the whole of what it includes, is not of the essence of the act of knowledge; yet it does not therefore come about that it is some intrinsic accident inhering in the act itself, but only that, besides the entity and intrinsic perfection of the act, it connotes something else extrinsic without which the notion of truth does not subsist, by reason of which the truth of the act can sometimes be varied, although the act itself is not intrinsically changed in itself; and then truth is related after the manner of a separable accident, or of the fifth predicable, by reason of the variable extrinsic thing connoted. But in those acts which have inseparable and unfailing truth, that perfection whence arises such necessary conjunction with truth, which has been called by us radical truth, is in no way an accident but an essential property of such an act; but formal truth is related in these after the manner of an inseparable property.

20. To the second confirmation it has first already been answered that, although conformity can most formally be taken for relation, it can also be taken for the concomitance of those extremes between which that relation is feigned, as in the order of nature it precedes such a relation; and we have shown that conformity of this kind suffices for the notion of truth. Wherefore the controversy about that relation, whether it is always real or always of reason, or sometimes real, sometimes of reason, matters nothing to explaining the essence of truth; for, whatever may be the case with this, truth itself precedes such a relation. And without doubt it is true that such a relation is not always real, as the argument about the truth of the divine science and about the truth of knowledge concerning non-existing objects rightly proves; and this is enough that we understand that a proper relation is not necessary for the notion of truth; because neither is a real one necessary, as is evident from what has been said, nor one of reason, because this properly is not except while it is thought or feigned. But I further add that a real relation never follows in the act of knowledge precisely from that conformity which is necessary for truth; because that conformity does not consist in a true and proper formal likeness, but only in a certain proportion and intentional representation, by reason of which the thing is so perceived as it is, which will become more manifest from what follows.

1. The common opinion seems to be that the truth of knowledge, properly and rigorously speaking, is only in the composition and division of the intellect, and not in its simple acts. So thinks Cajetan, I, q. 16, a. 2, and some Thomists there; Hervaeus, Quodlibet III, q. 1, aa. 2 and 3; Durandus, In II, dist. 16, q. 5, n. 14; and it seems to be the opinion of St. Thomas there, for so he writes: Properly speaking, truth is in the intellect composing and dividing, but not in sense nor in the intellect knowing what a thing is. He has similar things in Contra Gentiles I, c. 59, and De veritate, q. 1, a. 3. And he seems to have taken this from Aristotle, De Interpretatione I, cc. 1 and 3, where he says that the true and the false consist in composition and division. He has similar things in De Anima III, c. 6, where he says that in the indivisible conception of the mind there is no falsity. But where falsity cannot be, neither can truth be; for opposites are apt by nature to be about the same thing. Whence Aristotle concludes: But in those things in which there is falsity and truth, in these there is already a certain composition of the concepts of the intellect; and in Metaphysics IX, last chapter, and Book VI, c. 2, he says that truth is only in the intellect, because only in it is there composition and division.

2. This opinion can be founded by reason, first, because in words there is not truth and falsity in signifying except in complex speech by which we signify this to be or not to be, but not in the utterance of incomplex words; therefore the same is to be judged of truth in knowing with respect to the concepts of the mind, namely, that it is not in incomplex and simple concepts, but only in those by which, composing, we know and judge this to be or not to be. The consequence is proved, because words are signs of concepts, and whatever of truth or falsity is in the concept can be in the word as in a sign. Which whole reason is taken from Aristotle, De Interpretatione I, c. 1.

3. Secondly, because, if there is truth in simple conception, either every simple concept is true and never false, or it is sometimes true, sometimes false, or it is always true and false with respect to diverse things; but none of these can be said probably; therefore neither can truth be attributed to simple conception. The minor is declared as regards each part. For, first, if there can be truth in a simple concept, no reason can be feigned why there cannot be falsity in the same; for, as I was saying, contraries are concerned with the same thing; therefore, although a simple concept can be true, not on that account will every such concept be true; rather, from the same principle it may be inferred that it can sometimes be false. And it is confirmed and declared by an example, for, if the simple and proper concept of true gold is true, then, if brass is simply conceived as true gold, that concept will be false. Next, if this is conceded, namely that some simple concept can be false with respect to something, I prove that it must necessarily be true with respect to another; because it is impossible that there be a concept of the intellect which does not have some proper object which it represents; therefore, if it is compared to that, it cannot not be a true concept of such an object, because it is necessary that it represent it naturally; but it cannot represent it naturally unless it is intentionally conformed to it; but if it is conformed, it is also true, because truth is nothing other than the conformity of the intellect to the thing. As in the example adduced, although the concept of brass with respect to gold is thought false, nevertheless with respect to brass it is a true concept of it. Indeed there can be no object so feigned and impossible that the concept of it as such is not true, as the concept of a chimera or of a hippocentaur, even if it can be called a false concept of a true or possible animal, is nevertheless with respect to the chimera or hippocentaur a true concept of it. Finally, if for this cause the same concept is said to be true and false with respect to diverse things, it follows that in all concepts there is some falsity, which is foreign to all truth; otherwise there would also be falsity in the divine concept. Likewise, who would say that an image of Christ the Lord, by the very fact that it is a true image of him, is a false image of Antichrist?

4. You will say: just as the same thing, by the very fact that it is similar to one, is dissimilar to another, so it is no inconvenience that the same concept is true and false with respect to diverse things. The answer is that by this argument it is rather declared that the truth or falsity of knowledge does not consist in simple likeness or dissimilitude, but in some other comparison or composition by which its proper concept, or a foreign one, is attributed to the thing; as in the example adduced, in conceiving brass there cannot be falsity, but in attributing to the thing so conceived the nature of true gold. And it is confirmed and declared because it is one thing not to know some thing, another to be deceived in the knowledge of it; but he who conceives by a simple and true concept one thing, although by virtue of it he does not conceive other dissimilar things, is nevertheless not deceived in the conception of them, because he neither conceives them nor attributes anything foreign to them; therefore the simple and proper concept of one thing cannot be called a false concept of other things because it does not represent them; and by the same reason it cannot be called true from the mere simple representation of its object. And it is confirmed finally, because otherwise there could be truth in the intelligible species alone; because it too simply represents, and in its representation a certain conformity to the thing represented can be understood; but the consequent is false, because in the intelligible species alone as such there is not knowledge; therefore neither can there be truth.

The second opinion

5. The opinion of others nevertheless is that the truth of knowledge is found not only in composition and division, but also in the simple concepts of the mind. Ferrariensis holds this opinion, Contra Gentiles I, cc. 59 and 60; and Capreolus thinks the same, In I, dist. 19, q. 3, a. 1, concl. 3; Soncinas, Metaphysics VI, c. 2, q. 17; Giles, Quodlibet IV, q. 7; Fonseca, Metaphysics IV, c. 2, q. 6, sect. 4. And it can be proved, first, from Aristotle, De Anima III, c. 6, at the end, where St. Thomas, lect. 11, says that although the incomplex intelligible is neither true nor false, the intellect nevertheless in understanding it is true in so far as it is adequated to the thing understood. And so he expounds Aristotle saying there that the intellect which is of what a thing is, from the what-it-was-to-be, is true, even if it does not (supply: enunciate or affirm) something of something. And it is confirmed by the example which Aristotle adduces in the same place, because he himself had said, De Anima II, c. 6, that sense in the knowledge of its proper sensible is true; but it is evident that in sense there is only a simple act or knowledge; therefore much more will there be truth in the simple knowledge of the intellect. Likewise, Metaphysics IX, c. 7, texts 21 and 22, where St. Thomas also notes this, lect. 11, saying that in simple things there is truth through this, that the thing is known according to its proper quiddity. This opinion is confirmed by reason, because, in order that the thing be conceived through a simple concept, it is necessary that there be some conformity of the concept to the thing in representing; on account of which Aristotle said, De Anima III, c. 8, that the soul in understanding becomes all things, because through representation it is conformed to all things; therefore that conformity is a certain truth, for the definition of truth belongs to it.

6. Secondly, in the divine and angelic intellect there is most perfect truth, and yet in them there is neither composition nor division; therefore in our intellect too knowing simply there can be truth. It will perhaps be said from St. Thomas, I, q. 16, a. 5, ad 1, and Contra Gentiles I, c. 59, that, although God knows simply, he nevertheless by that simple act judges that to be so or not to be which we judge complexly. But against this it is objected from the same St. Thomas in the same c. 59 of Contra Gentiles I, for we too through simple conception judge something of the thing, so that some simple concept virtually contains whatever is judged through the complex concept or through composition. As when I conceive man under the distinct concept of rational animal, and apprehend this as the quiddity of man, there I virtually judge that man is a rational animal, and that simple conception virtually contains all that is signified by this enunciation; therefore there will also be proper truth in that simple concept. Thirdly, every thing which is conformed and adequated to its measure and its principles has proper truth; but in a simple concept there is conformity to the object as to its measure and principle, to which it must be conformed; there is therefore truth in it, which is no other than the truth of knowledge, since that is the conformity of knowledge.

Two certain things are gathered from the said opinions

7. The foundations of these opinions seem to convince two things. One is that some truth is found in the simple conception of the mind, and not only of the mind but also of the senses. The other is that some truth is found by a proper and special reason in the composition of the intellect which is not found in the simple knowledge of the intellect. And the first indeed is evident, first, from the testimonies adduced from Aristotle and St. Thomas, and from the same St. Thomas, I, q. 16, a. 2 and following, and Contra Gentiles I, c. 59, and other places which Ferrariensis adduces there. Secondly, from the common mode of speaking; for we rightly say that he forms a true concept of man who apprehends him as a rational animal, and so of the concepts of other things. Thirdly, because these concepts of the mind are certain things or qualities; if, therefore, there is truth in other things, as we shall show below, it is necessary that there be truth also in these concepts; whence, just as that is called true gold which has the proper nature of gold, so that will be called a true concept of gold which has an entity commensurate with true gold in intentionally representing; and it is similar of the rest. And hence it is also evident what or of what kind this truth is which is found in the simple knowledge of the mind; for it is nothing other than transcendental truth itself accommodated to these beings. For if the truth which they call in being is an adequate attribute of being, as we shall say, it will be found in each being according to the mode of its nature; therefore also in those beings which are simple concepts of the mind. Whence, because the proper being of these concepts is the being of knowledge, and consequently formally to render knowing him in whom they are, therefore the truth of such a concept is also the truth of knowledge.

8. Truth in a special mode in composition and division.—The second, namely that truth and falsity are found in a special mode in composition and division, is proved. For not without cause did Aristotle in the places cited specially say that truth and falsity are found in the composition of the mind alone; for since this cannot be true of all truth and falsity, as is evident from the former point, it is necessary that truth be in composition of this kind in some proper and peculiar mode, in order that the doctrine of Aristotle may also be true. And so St. Thomas plainly thought in the same places cited, especially in the First Part. Secondly, this is evident from the common mode of thinking and speaking; because then someone is thought to have true knowledge of the thing when he knows and judges it to be so or not to be as it is or is not in the thing, which we men do not do except by composing or dividing. Whence, as in speaking truth or falsity is in a singular mode in propositions, because no one is thought to speak true or false until he enunciates a proposition, so also in the mind truth and falsity will be in a special mode in composition and division. Thirdly, the same can be declared from the contrary, because falsity is not properly found in the simple concept of the mind, but in composition or division, as I shall expound more fully in the following disputation; it is therefore a sign that truth too, to which falsity and deception are opposed, is found in a special mode in composite knowledge.

The point of the difficulty and various modes of dispatching it

9. But the difficulty is in explaining what this special mode is by which truth is said to be found in composition. For some are content to say that complex truth is found only in composition, but incomplex truth in simple knowledge. But this is to say nothing, nor does it explain the matter; for by the same reason it could be said that truth is found in a special mode in simple knowledge, because only incomplexly is it found in it. Likewise, because from this it is not had that truth is otherwise in composite knowledge, formally speaking, than in other things, but only as it were materially, that it is in it in a mode accommodated to it; but this is common to all other things; therefore on account of this cause alone there was no reason why the truth of knowledge should be attributed in a special mode to composition alone. The assumption is declared by examples, for truth too is otherwise in man, for example, than in the angel; for in man there is truth through composition (I speak of entitative truth), but in the angel simple truth; in man it is material, in the angel immaterial; and it is similar in the other beings; for each is true with a truth accommodated to itself, and yet it is not on that account said that truth is in a special mode in one more than in others; but absolutely it is said to be common to all by transcendental community; therefore, if in the composition of the mind nothing else singular is found except only this, that as the being of such knowledge is composite, so also its truth is complex, there is no reason why truth should be said to be found by a singular title in composition alone.

10. Others, then, answer that in simple knowledge truth is found, but not falsity, at least regularly and speaking per se; but in composition and division truth and falsity are found indifferently; and therefore Aristotle specially asserted that truth and falsity are found in composition and division alone. But this explains sufficiently neither the thing itself nor Aristotle’s expression. For, if truth is so found in the simple concept that falsity is not found in it, but in composition truth and falsity are found indifferently, it should rather have been said that truth is in a certain way proper to simple concepts, but falsity is found in composition alone, or at most it should have been said that composition is indifferent to truth and falsity, but not that it is as it were the proper recipient of each. And finally (as I was saying) this very thing, namely that in simple apprehension there is truth of such a notion that no falsity is opposed to it in such a subject, but in composition truth is found to which opposed falsity can be in, indicates that truth is in a special mode in composition; for the former is common to all truth in being, as I shall say below; but what this special mode of truth is is not declared through that indifference alone.

11. Otherwise it is wont to be said that truth or falsity is specially attributed to composition and division because according to it we are said to think truly or to be deceived, which we are not properly said to do by reason of simple concepts. But this indeed (as I also argued above) is an a posteriori indication that truth and falsity are in a singular mode in composition and division, yet it does not declare the matter a priori, namely in what this mode consists. For composition is not therefore true or false because according to it we think truly or falsely, but rather conversely, because it is true or false, therefore according to it we think truly or falsely; for the composition itself is a form which, as it communicates its being to us, so also its properties.

The doctrine of St. Thomas on this matter is weighed

12. St. Thomas, then, I, q. 16, a. 2, declaring this matter, says that truth is singularly attributed to composition and division because through this operation alone truth is in the intellect as in one knowing truth itself. And so he indicates that through simple knowledge truth is in the intellect only as in one knowing the thing apprehended by such knowledge, but not as in one knowing truth itself; but through composition truth is in the intellect not only as in one knowing the thing, but also as in one knowing truth itself. For truth consists in conformity. But while the intellect composes, it compares the thing as simply conceived in one way to the being of the thing itself, and knows the conformity which they have among themselves; and therefore it knows not only the thing but also the truth; and for that cause truth is said to be in a singular mode in composition and division. And this is the same as what others say, that truth is subjectively not only in composition but also in simple knowledge, but objectively only in composition and division.

13. But this answer has no small difficulty, because either the discussion is of direct knowledge or of reflex. If of direct, it is not true that in direct composition and division truth is objectively, and much less falsity. Nor is it true that the intellect in composing and dividing conceives not only the thing but also its truth. It is proved, because when the intellect composes that man is white and directly knows this, it does not compare its concept to some thing, nor the thing to the concept, in order to know truth, but only compares one thing to another, in order to know their conjunction among themselves, which is to compose; therefore. Whence that mode of arguing seems fallacious, that, because the intellect then compares one thing to another, it is therefore said to compare and know the conformity in which truth consists; because it does not compare the formal concept to the thing nor the thing to the concept, but compares the conceived thing to another or to itself. Whence it does not come about that through such composition it knows truth, but only that being of the thing which founds truth, according to that saying of Aristotle: From the fact that the thing is or is not, the opinion is true or false; which being formally is not truth, although it causes truth in the intellect, as the same St. Thomas said in the said q. 16, a. 1, ad 3. And it is confirmed, for it is one thing when the intellect composing says: Man is white, another when it says: That man is white is true; for this latter composition is reflex, and therefore in it truth is objectively, because it is formally known through it. But the former conception is only direct, and does not have the same object as the latter; therefore truth is not formally known through it, nor is it objectively in it.

14. But if it is said that the discussion is of reflex knowledge, it follows, first, that what Aristotle says, that truth and falsity are found in composition and division, is not universally true; but the consequent is false, because, as every vocal enunciation is true or false, so also every mental composition or division. Whence through all of it we think either truly or falsely. Secondly, it follows that there is no difference, because through simple reflex knowledge too truth can be formally and truly conceived; for, as we simply conceive what man is, so also we can simply conceive what truth is, and through a simple concept we can conceive the conformity between concept and thing after the manner of a certain relation; then, therefore, truth will also be objectively in simple knowledge; the aforesaid difference, therefore, is none.

15. It can be answered that the doctrine of St. Thomas is to be understood of the composition and division which comes about through direct knowledge, for it is certain that in every such composition proper truth or falsity is found. But to the objection made against this, if the opinion of Durandus were true, that truth is the conformity of the thing as it is in the objective being of the intellect to itself as it is in the thing, the answer would be easy, by saying that the intellect, when it composes, compares the objective concept of one thing to another, or to itself otherwise or earlier conceived; and so knows the conformity between them, and is therefore said to know truth. And in this way St. Thomas seems to have declared this matter, Contra Gentiles I, c. 59, in the first reason, saying: Since the truth of the intellect is the adequation of intellect and thing, according as the intellect says that to be which is or that not to be which is not, truth in the intellect pertains to that which the intellect says, not to the operation by which it says it; for for the truth of the intellect it is not required that the understanding itself be adequated to the thing, since the thing is sometimes material, but understanding immaterial; but that which the intellect in understanding says and knows must be equated to the thing, namely so that it be so in the thing as the intellect says. According to this interpretation, then, it is easily understood that through direct compositive knowledge the conformity in which truth consists is known.

16. But this answer, if nothing else is added, cannot satisfy us. First, because that opinion of Durandus has been rejected by us above, nor is it likely that St. Thomas intended that sense in the words cited, as is evident from the reason which he adduces, that it is not necessary that understanding be adequated to the thing, because sometimes the thing is material and understanding immaterial. Where it is evident that he openly speaks of understanding as regards the agreement which it has with the thing understood in the being of being and its conditions, and not of the agreement which it has in the notion of representing and represented. And so Ferrariensis there, distinguishing between understanding and the concept or word of the mind, and thinking that understanding is not representative of the thing, but that the concept or word represents it, expounds St. Thomas as speaking of the concept itself or word, and placing conformity or truth in it, not in understanding itself. But I think that, if we speak properly, understanding comes about formally through the word itself or concept as informing the intellect, and therefore that the word as word cannot be conformed in representing to the thing of which it is the word without the intellect too, in so far as it formally understands through the word, becoming conformed to the same thing. St. Thomas, therefore, could not exclude this conformity in the notion of representing, but only conformity in being. In the same sense, then, is to be understood what he says a little above: that truth pertains to that which the intellect says, not to the operation by which it says it. For the sense is that truth does not pertain to that operation as it were materially taken, as it is a certain spiritual quality, but formally, in so far as it refers to the intellect the thing which is said through it, or in so far as it contains in representative being the thing known.

17. Secondly, that opinion is not rightly applied to explaining the present difficulty, because when the intellect composes, it enunciates on the side of the predicate the thing either as it is in itself or as objectively conceived. If the first is said, then through that comparison it does not know the conformity of the thing as objectively conceived to itself as it is in itself, in which truth was said to consist, and so it will not know truth. But if the second is said, then also on the side of the subject the comparison is not made to the thing as it is in itself, but as objectively conceived, because there is no greater reason concerning the predicate than concerning the subject; for the intellect compares each as it has been conceived by it, so that the composition is as it were a certain collation of simple objective concepts and the knowledge of the conjunction which they have in themselves; therefore neither in this way is truth conceived as it is explained by Durandus, because the conformity of the thing in objective being to itself in the thing is not known, but the conformity, or identity, or union between one thing and another as each is in objective being. Thirdly, much less can that mode be applied to falsity; for when through composition one thing is falsely affirmed of another, the disconformity which is between them is not known, but rather a conformity which is not in the thing is known or conceived; therefore falsity is then not objectively in such knowledge or composition of the intellect.

The mind of St. Thomas, and the thing itself according to it, is explained

18. It must be said, then, that it is not the mind of St. Thomas that, when the intellect composes or divides, it knows formally and in signified act (as Cajetan well distinguished there) truth and the conformity in which truth formally consists; for the objection made convinces that this cannot be verified in this sense. St. Thomas understands, then, that when the intellect composes or divides, it knows in exercised act that in which truth consists, and consequently affirms or denies truth itself or falsity. And by this special reason truth is said to be properly in composition and division. But what it is to know or affirm truth in exercised act can be declared thus: for our intellect does not through one simple concept adequately conceive, nor distinctly and clearly exhaust, the thing conceived, as God or the angels do; and therefore, after it has in some way confusedly and inadequately conceived it, in order that it may know it distinctly and adequately it attributes to it several predicates distinct either in the thing or only by reason. But just as Aristotle said of words that, because we cannot bring things into the schools, we use terms for things, and therefore, when we affirm one thing of another, we do not do this outwardly except by means of a signifying word and in so far as it is signifying, so when in the mind we affirm one thing of another, although we chiefly intend to affirm thing of thing, we nevertheless do not do this except through concepts in so far as they naturally represent things to us. And hence it comes about that, while we compose one conceived thing with another, or with itself conceived in another way, by comparing the thing itself we at the same time in exercised act compare our concept as representing that thing. As, for example, when the intellect composing says that man is white, it formally and directly knows the identity or conjunction which white has with man; yet at the same time in the exercised act itself it knows that the concept of white in some way contains under itself man and represents him, and consequently is in some way conformed to him. And so, while the mind affirms that man is white, in exercised act it affirms truth, or that this is true, because while it affirms that white is in man it affirms that the concept of white has some true conformity with man. And in this sense St. Thomas said, in the said a. 2, that the intellect knows its conformity to the intelligible thing when it judges that the thing is so related as is the form which it apprehends of the thing, which it does by composing and dividing; not that, when the intellect composes, it judges the thing to be so related as is the form which is formally or inherently in the intellect, but that it judges it to be so related as is the form apprehended by the intellect, and consequently in exercised act judges the thing to be so related as is the form or concept formally representing in the intellect; because the formal concept, as representing, is thought to be as it were one thing with the thing represented, and because the intellect does not compare the represented thing except as conceived by itself. In this way, then, it is rightly understood why truth is said to be specially in our intellect knowing by means of composition and division; for through simple concepts the intellect in no way knows conformity, whence neither does it properly affirm or perceive truth, as it does when it composes simple concepts. Whence, although both composition and the simple apprehension of things are absolutely direct knowledge, nevertheless, if we compare composition to simple apprehension, it is in a certain way as it were reflexive upon it, as it were in the very exercise, because through composition there is made a collation between simple concepts, by reason of which truth is in it in the aforesaid special mode.

The opposing reasons are solved

19. And through these the answer to the foundations of the aforesaid opinions is evident, which we do not think contrary among themselves if they are rightly understood, as we have expounded, and as the authors themselves in truth expound, as is openly evident from St. Thomas and Cajetan above. But Ferrariensis, who is opposed to Cajetan, either did not wish to understand him and St. Thomas, or explains the same thing only in diverse words. The foundations of each opinion, then, in so far as they confirm them in the true sense, are to be admitted; but it remains to declare how in another sense they are not repugnant to them. To the testimonies of Aristotle adduced in the first place, then, the answer is that Aristotle is speaking there of truth existing in our intellect as knowing in some way truth itself. Whence to the first reason the answer is that one must speak of words in the same proportion as of concepts; for in the simple and incomplex word there is the truth of the sign as in that which has it after the manner of transcendental truth, or truth in being; for this word man both signifies true man and can be called a true sign of man; yet in the simple word there is not truth as in that which signifies truth, in the way in which it is in the composite enunciation, which, while it signifies this to be that, consequently and as it were in exercised act signifies conformity and truth, as has been explained of concepts. To the second, which touches the matter of falsity, it will be said more clearly in the following disputation. Now the answer is that of the three members enumerated there that one is to be chosen by which it is said that simple concepts are so true that they are not properly false, as the arguments made there sufficiently prove. Nor is it necessary that in every subject where one of opposites can be, the other can also be. Especially because, since truth is in simple apprehension in another way than in composition, for that reason it can happen that that truth is such as not to have an opposite falsity. But why this is so, and why rather the truth of composition can have a proper opposite falsity, will be evident from what is to be said. But what is touched upon in the last confirmation about the intelligible species will be declared immediately. To the foundations of the second opinion nothing need be added; for they only prove that in simple conception there is truth as in that which has it, not as in that which knows it. Only about the second it is necessary to note from what has been said that the reason is not the same of the simple knowledge of God or of the angels; for they by a simple concept perfectly judge of the thing and that it is so related as it is known, or that that is in it which is judged and known of it. Indeed that simple judgement is such (especially if the discussion is of the divine one) that through it every conformity which can be between it and the thing known is also most perfectly known; and therefore it is not similar of that simple knowledge.

1. Before judgement there can be understood in the intellect the power of understanding itself, the intelligible species, under which I comprehend the other habits, the very act of knowledge as it is in becoming, and the apprehension itself. It can be doubted, then, first, whether this truth can be said to be in the intelligible species, or in the act, or in the concept, or in the habit, or in the power of understanding itself. For St. Thomas, Contra Gentiles I, c. 59, first reason, in the words cited above, indicates that it is only in the concept or word of the mind, where Ferrariensis so understands him, and adds that it is not in the act of understanding, because it is not an image nor does it represent the object. Whence he infers that truth is in the intellect prior in the order of nature to the intellect knowing the thing represented through the concept, because the action of the intellect is terminated at the concept prior in the order of nature to its knowing the thing represented in it. In which sense St. Thomas seems to have said, De veritate, q. 1, a. 1, that knowledge is an effect of truth. But of the intelligible species he says that truth is in it in so far as it too represents the object and according to that representation has conformity with it, yet in an imperfect mode, in so far as the representation of the species is imperfect, and in so far as habit is compared to act as imperfect to perfect. But of the power of understanding itself and its judicative habit, and that which holds itself on the side of the power, he says nothing; yet consequently he would say that truth is not in them either, because they do not represent the object.

2. But we must suppose that the discussion here is only of the truth of knowledge. But we believe that knowledge comes about formally through the concept or word of the mind as informing the intellect itself; but that the concept or word of the mind is not distinguished in the thing itself from the act of understanding in so far as it is something made by the intellect, or a quality in its made state; but that intellection, in so far as it is an action in becoming, is distinguished modally from the word, as action or dependence is wont to be distinguished from the term. Since, therefore, knowledge simply signifies actual knowledge, the truth of knowledge absolutely and simply is in the concept or word, or the act of understanding in its made state, because all these are the same and signify the form by which the intellect becomes actually knowing, as if we said that the truth of the hot as such is in heat. But in the action of understanding as such there is not indeed the truth of knowledge, because that action is not knowledge simply, but the way to knowledge; yet, in the way in which it is, it has its truth, as heating, although it does not have the truth of heat, nevertheless has the truth of heating, because it is a true tending to heat; for so the action of understanding too is a true tending to the knowledge of the thing. And although it is said not to represent after the manner of a form, it nevertheless represents after the manner of a way, because it is a tending to true representation; the truth of knowledge, therefore, can be said to be in becoming in the act of understanding as it is an action. But in the intelligible species there is not the truth of knowledge except as in its principle and first act; yet there is in it proper entitative truth, by reason of which it is called the true intelligible species of such an object. To which it matters nothing whether the intelligible species represents formally as an image, or only effectively and virtually as a seed of the object, because by whatever reason it represents, according to it it can have its truth through due commensuration to such an object; just as the seed of man does not indeed have in itself the truth of human nature except virtually or instrumentally, yet has the truth of human seed according to the due proportion and relationship to such a nature or action. Whence it also comes about that the power of understanding, or the light of the intellect, or the habit perfecting it, do not formally and properly have per se the truth of knowledge of which we are treating, as is self-evident; yet they have their accommodated truth, which can radically be called the truth of knowledge, in so far as the intellectual light is true in so far as of itself it inclines to the true knowledge of the thing; and the same holds in its own way of the habit.

3. From which it is finally understood that what was said is false, that truth is in the concept of the mind, or in the intellect through the concept, prior in nature to the intellect actually understanding, because the concept of the mind, or word, is not prior in nature to its being in the intellect; for it does not come about except through eduction from its potency, and therefore it does not come about in any sign of nature in which it is not united to the intellect, so that the intellect can concur to its production after the manner of an active and receptive potency; therefore the word does not have truth prior in nature to its formally communicating it to the intellect; therefore neither is truth in it prior in nature to the intellect being actually knowing. The last consequence is evident, because the intellect is not constituted actually knowing otherwise than through the information of the word or concept. The truth of knowledge, therefore, is first and per se in the intellect actually knowing through the word, concept, or act in its made state, as through the form by which it actually knows. Whence what St. Thomas says in the said place, De veritate, q. 1, a. 1, that knowledge is a certain effect of truth, is to be understood either of fundamental truth, which is the very being of the thing, from which as from its object knowledge has it that it is true; or of the truth of conformity, which is through the intelligible species; or certainly of the formal effect which the true concept gives to the mind.

Of apprehensive knowledge

4. Secondly, it can be doubted whether the truth of knowledge is in apprehensive knowledge or only in judicative. And the reason for doubting can be that simple knowledge is only apprehensive, and yet we said that truth is in it. Likewise in the senses there is simple truth, as we said above from Aristotle, and yet in them there is only apprehensive knowledge. Finally, in apprehensive composition, even if the intellect cannot discern and judge whether there is truth or falsity in it, nevertheless one of these is truly in such an apprehension; for, if the vocal proposition is necessarily either true or false, much more the mental, even only apprehensive. On the contrary, however, is the fact that the intellect is not denominated true or false except when it judges. For although I apprehend this proposition, the stars are even in number, if I doubt and suspend judgement, I am neither false nor true; it is therefore a sign that in that apprehension there is neither truth nor falsity, otherwise it would denominate true or false. Whence, where Aristotle says, Metaphysics VI, c. 2, that truth is in the mind, in Greek the word is dianoia, which signifies judgement or understanding.

5. The answer is that the truth of knowledge is properly in judgement, and that any act of the intellect participates as much of this truth as it participates of judgement. For, if the matter is attentively regarded, the intellect knows nothing truly until it judges; therefore neither can it be true or false in knowing until it judges; therefore the truth of knowledge cannot be except in judgement. The antecedent is manifest in compositive knowledge; for when the intellect apprehends a composition and suspends assent, it is because it is ignorant whether in truth those extremes are so conjoined in the thing as they are apprehended through the composition. As in the said example of the apprehension of this composition, the stars are even in number, although the intellect knows in some way what the stars are and what an even number is, it is nevertheless altogether ignorant whether those two are conjoined in the thing, and therefore, although it apprehends the composition, it does not judge; but conversely it cannot happen that the intellect composes the predicate with the subject, actually knowing their conjunction which they have, or are thought to have, in the thing, without judging it to be so or not to be. Because, if it knows all this, there is nothing which judgement could add. The judgement of composition, therefore, consists in that knowledge by which the predicate is known to belong to the subject; by reason of which we said above with St. Thomas that truth is in the intellect composing as the known in the knower. In this way, then, the truth of composition is properly only in judicative knowledge.

6. But simple knowledge, which is wont to be called simple apprehension, is capable of some truth in so far as it is knowledge and participates some notion of judgement. For although the conception through simple acts is wont to be called simple apprehension in so far as the knowing power forms in itself a likeness of the thing and in a certain way draws it to itself, and in order that it may be distinguished from proper judgement, which is given by us when we compose one thing with another or divide them, nevertheless, in so far as that very apprehension is some knowledge of the thing, it is also some kind of judgement, by which it is implicitly judged that the thing is that which we know of it. And in this way in such apprehension or simple knowledge of the thing judgement is in some way included, because, since that apprehension is an act of a cognitive power, something must necessarily be known through it; but what is known is by that reason judged; for what cannot be judged is unknown.

7. Wherefore to the former reasons for doubting the answer is that in the simple apprehension of the intellect there is some kind of judgement, although imperfect, and according to it there is in that act the truth of knowledge. And the same must be said, proportion being kept, of the knowledge of sense; for when the sheep conceives the wolf and flees, although it has only a simple act, it nevertheless truly knows it as an enemy and so judges, although in an imperfect mode; and sight, while it knows this white thing, also in some way judges this to be white. But if sometimes the intellect or the imagination seems to apprehend something simply, judging nothing at all, as when a golden mountain or a chimera or something similar is feigned, then something is not apprehended as a true thing, but either as possible, at least as regards that figure under which it is apprehended, or as imaginable, or signifiable by a word; in which way some say that then the signification of the word is apprehended rather than some thing. Whence then only that is known which would arise if these or those parts were conjoined, and so this very thing is in some way judged, and in the same way there is some simple truth in an apprehension of this kind, because in truth that object is apprehended or known to be such as would arise if those parts were joined in the thing.

8. Whence to the other part, about apprehensive composition, the answer is, first of all, that mental compositions of this kind, which are without judgement, regularly come about through concepts of words rather than of things, because, since in the thing itself the conjunction of predicate with subject is not known, neither is it apprehended according to the thing, but according to the word or copula signifying such a union. But if this is so, then that apprehensive composition is in the mind, as they call it, not ultimate, and in it there is truth or falsity not as in knowledge, but only as in a conventional sign, as it is in a word or in writing. Next it is said that, if this non-judicative apprehension is said to be in some way in the compositive concept of the things themselves, either this is only in so far as through it something is conceived and something else is unknown, or it is only apprehended in order to the signification of the word. The former mode will be if I conceive the stars as even in number and know this to be possible and am ignorant whether it is so. And then, as regards that which is known, the knowledge is not only apprehensive but also judicative, and consequently either true or false; but as regards the other, as it is not judicative knowledge, so it is neither true nor false. Indeed neither is it apprehensive after the manner of the composition of the intellect affirming or denying, but after the manner of a certain simple apprehension of that possible enunciation, of which it is doubted whether it is so or not. For if this is not known through such a concept, namely that this is possible, I do not see what can be apprehended there through a true composition which would include the copula de inesse; therefore it can only be apprehended after the manner of a question whether this is so or is not, and then it is not necessary that there be there any truth or falsity. The latter mode will be if the extremes of that composition, or the composition itself, are apprehended only in so far as it is something signified by this word, for example the stars are even in number; and then too the intellect does not apprehend something by affirming or denying, but as it were by simply apprehending this as the significate of that word, whether it is so in the thing or not; and as regards that first some knowledge is involved there, and consequently something of simple truth. In this way, then, every truth of knowledge, in the way in which it is, exists in judgement.

1. The reason for doubting can be taken from a certain common doctrine indicated by St. Thomas, I, q. 16, a. 1, and in other places, that truth expresses the conformity of knowledge to the thing known as of the measured to the measure, according to that saying of Aristotle: From the fact that the thing is or is not, the proposition is true or false. Hence, then, it seems to follow that only in speculative science is there properly truth, because only speculative science is measured by its object; for practical science is rather the measure of its object; for the thing made by art is therefore true because it is conformed to the art. But St. Thomas touched upon the reason in that place, because the thing understood can have a twofold order to the intellect, namely per se and per accidens; per se it has order to the intellect on which it depends, per accidens to the intellect on which it does not depend but by which it is only known. In the former way the effects of art depend on art and created things on God, and therefore things are not the measures of knowledge but rather conversely; therefore in such knowledge there is not truth, but rather in the things, in so far as they are commensurated to it. But in the latter way things are compared to speculative science, and therefore in this knowledge there will only be truth in so far as it is commensurated to the thing known. On the contrary, however, is the fact that also in practical knowledges and judgements there is truth or falsity; for who would deny that in the composition and division which comes about in practical things, not only moral and agible but also factible, there is most proper truth and falsity? Or how could the practical sciences be true sciences if there were not truth in them? They have, therefore, not only truth but also their self-evident principles and evidently true conclusions. Likewise, if we speak not of complex but of incomplex truth, the idea of the artificer too, if it is proper and adequate to the thing to be effected through art, is most true, and so much the more in that not only is it itself true but also it is the cause of the truth of the artefact. Finally in the science which God has of creatures there is most perfect truth, although it is also the measure of creatures.

2. It must be said, then, that truth is not only in the speculative intellect but also in the practical, in so far as there is in it the knowledge of things to be done or to be made, as the latter arguments prove and as Aristotle teaches, Ethics VI, c. 2, and it is a matter sufficiently self-evident. But to the reason to the contrary a twofold answer can be given: first, by denying that truth always and rigorously expresses a relation of measured to measure; otherwise God could not be called true, because he is not measured, even by his own science; any relation of conformity, therefore, seems to suffice, whether it be of measured to measure or conversely of measure to measured. But this answer does not seem conformed to the common mode of thinking and speaking of truth; for all think that the truth of knowledge is in the intellect in so far as it is conformed to the thing understood, and consequently that it is a relation of the measured or related after its manner.

3. The answer, then, secondly, is that practical knowledge can be compared to its object in two ways: in one way in the notion of knowledge, in another way in the notion of cause, either efficient or exemplar, as is the idea of the artificer. And in this latter way indeed practical knowledge, as it is a cause, so it is the measure of its object as it has the notion of its effect; and therefore as such it is not properly denominated true, but efficacious or sufficient for causing the effect in its genus; but in the former way practical knowledge is true; whence under that notion it is compared to its object as measured to measure, because under that precise consideration it is not its cause but mere knowledge, which as such is only the intentional representation of the object, and therefore has truth in so far as it is commensurated to it. Which can be declared also in this way: for science as science, even if it is practical, abstracts from the existence of the object and is true even if it effects or causes nothing; if, therefore, practical science is compared to the object according to itself and as it abstracts from existence, then it is not its measure, because as such it is not its cause; therefore such science is rather measured by the object considered according to its notion and essence, and through conformity to it has its truth. Which can easily be persuaded both in artificial and in moral things; for the science or art of building therefore dictates that the house is to be constructed in this proportion, figure, etc., because the perfection of the house according to itself and as it were by its nature postulates this, the end being considered to which it is ordered and the properties which it requires, as, for example, that it be useful, strong, beautiful. And dialectic, in so far as it imitates the practical sciences, therefore dictates that the syllogism is to be constructed in such mode and figure, because the nature of the syllogism postulates this. Therefore, according to itself and abstracting from existence, the thing made by art is not therefore to be constructed so because science or art dictates this, but rather science or art therefore dictates this and proposes such an idea of such an artefact because it of itself postulates such perfection in order to its end. The same may be seen in moral things, for the mean of temperance, for example, does not therefore consist in such a thing because moral philosophy or prudence dictates it, but rather conversely, moral science therefore dictates it because it is such in itself and requires such a proportion. And therefore I said in the I-II that practical moral truth is not taken from right appetite as from a measure, but rather conversely that it itself is the measure of right appetite. But the general reason is that practical science too, in so far as it is science, rests on first self-evident principles, which are chiefly taken from the definition of the object and its first property; but these, according to themselves and abstracting from existence, belong to the object from its intrinsic nature without the causality of such science. Therefore the truth of this science, as science is knowledge, is measured by the object considered according to the being of essence. But because that same object as regards existence is the effect of such science, according to that state it is measured by that science, and in this way we say that the house is rightly constructed because it is according to the rules or idea of the art.

4. An objection is satisfied.—You will say: as abstractive science is compared to the object abstracting from existence, so intuitive science is compared to the existing object; therefore, as the former is measured by the object according to itself, so the latter by the existing object; therefore under no notion is the object measured by the science. The answer is by conceding the antecedent with the first consequence and denying the second, because practical science is not the cause of its existing object as it is intuitive knowledge of it; for this neither is properly the science of which we are treating, but experience, nor is it properly and per se practical, but mere knowledge, because it is not active of the object but supposes it made. Therefore the same proper science which considers the object according to itself and as it abstracts from existence, applied by the will to the work, is its cause, and so is also the measure of the work made and existing.

5. But there still remains a difficulty about the science of God; for it follows that the science of God, as true, is measured by its object. The answer is that the science of God can be compared either to God himself or to creatures. With respect to himself it cannot according to the thing have a measure, because it is not distinguished from itself or from its object; it is therefore above every measure and true by itself, indeed truth itself; but according to reason it is so, for God has true and adequate science of himself because he is so in the thing as he knows himself. Nor is this against the perfection or immensity of God, because this is not to be properly or truly measurable, but rather to be such by himself and to be equal to himself; just as for God to be comprehensible by himself is not repugnant to his perfection, but pertains to greater perfection. But if that science is compared to created things in so far as it is practical science and the cause of them as they are existing, then it is evident that it is not measured by them, but is rather their measure, and does not have truth from them, but rather they are true in so far as they are conformed to the divine ideas, as we shall say immediately. But considering the divine science only as it is the simple intelligence of creatures according to the being of essence or possible being, or in so far as it is the intuitive vision of existence, then it seems that it can without inconvenience be conceded that the truth of that science too consists in conformity to those objects; for according to this precise consideration it is not the cause of such objects, but mere intuition and as it were speculation, and therefore according to the same consideration the thing is not of such an essence because it is known as such by God, but conversely, it is known as such because it is of such an essence, nor could it otherwise be truly known. And similarly holy and weighty theologians say that a thing is not future because God beholds it as future, but because it is future therefore God beholds it. Origen, On Romans, Book VII, about those words of c. 8: Whom he called, these he also justified; Jerome, Dialogue against the Pelagians III, and on Isaiah 16, Jeremiah 26, Ezekiel 2; Chrysostom, Homily LX on Matthew; Bede, book Variarum quaestionum, q. 13; Augustine indicates it, City of God V, c. 20; many Scholastics, In I, dist. 38.

6. In order, however, that we may speak properly and chastely, we must not say that the divine science under these considerations is measured by these objects, both because God so has the science of these objects that he does not receive it from them, but has it from himself, and from within and by virtue of his essential perfection has all its rectitude and infallibility; and also because that science so attains these secondary objects that it has no true relation or real relationship to them, but God attains all of them in a more eminent mode through this, that he comprehends himself. Because, then, in the notion of measure and measured contrary imperfections can be indicated, therefore the science of God cannot be said to be measured by these objects, even though it is not true without conformity with them.

1. Since we have said that the truth of knowledge is in a special mode in composition and division, it will be worth while to expound whether it is equally in each, or more in composition than in division. For this last seems so, because in composition, when one thing is affirmed of another, the intellect knows the conformity of one with the other, and therefore in that knowledge truth is objectively in the mode expounded above; but in division the intellect rather knows that the concept which it denies of another thing does not have conjunction or conformity with it; therefore through that act it does not know truth but rather the negation of truth; therefore truth is not so objectively in division as it is in composition. On the contrary, however, is the fact that Aristotle and St. Thomas, and with them the other Doctors, attribute truth equally to division and to composition. Likewise, because it is as true that a thing is not which is not as that it is which is; therefore the intellect is as true in knowing or composing that negation as in composing this affirmation.

2. It must be said, then, that truth is found as truly and properly in division as in composition. For the negative vocal proposition is as simply and properly true as the affirmative; therefore the division which corresponds in the mind is as true as the composition. Whence (arguing theologically) it is as much of faith that God is not corporeal as that he is eternal; each judgement, therefore, is equally certain; therefore also equally true, although one is made by dividing, the other by composing.

3. But to the argument the answer is that truth (as I said above) is not so objectively in composition and division that it is formally and properly known through it, but only implicitly, because, while one objective concept is compared to another, in exercised act the conformity between the thing and the concept is in a certain way known. As, therefore, in composition this conformity is known, so in division the disconformity or disagreement of those objective concepts of which one is denied of the other is known, and consequently in exercised act the disconformity between the formal concepts of those objects is known, and virtually also the conformity which each of those concepts has with its object is known. For when the mind conceives that man is not a lion, it also implicitly knows that the concept which it has of man does not agree with the lion, but that to each its proper concept corresponds. And in this way in division too there is included the knowledge of truth or conformity, not indeed of those extremes among themselves of which one is denied of the other, but of each of them with its concept; for in this the truth of that negation is founded. Or secondly and more briefly it can be said: just as to know conformity, as it is, is true, so also to know disconformity, as it is, is true; and this very thing is signified through division and known in exercised act, and therefore truth is most properly in division as in composition.

1. This question is chiefly intended in this disputation, for we have set out the rest beforehand in order to explain the truth of being. It seems, then, that it cannot happen that some truth be an attribute of real being: first indeed from Aristotle, Metaphysics VII [recte VI], at the end, saying that the true and the false are not in things but in the mind, and placing in this the difference, that good and evil are in things, but not true and false, but only in the mind. Secondly, because the true adds over being either nothing, or only an extrinsic denomination; therefore it can in no way be a property of being. The consequence is proved, because if it adds nothing, it is nothing other than being itself, and consequently is no more its property than being itself is a property of itself. But if it adds only an extrinsic denomination, that cannot suffice for the notion of a property of being; both because otherwise infinite properties of this kind could be multiplied, because there can be infinite denominations of this kind; and also because this denomination is common to non-beings or beings of reason; for, just as gold is called true gold, so a relation of reason can be called a true being of reason, and (as we were just saying) a negation has truth just as an affirmation; truth, therefore, by reason of this denomination cannot be a property of the real being of which we are treating. And finally because otherwise falsity too could be called a property of real being; for, just as being can be truly known, so also falsely; therefore, as thence it is denominated true, hence it can be denominated false.

2. But the first antecedent of this reason is declared and proved; for when some being, for example gold, is called true gold, such a denomination can be or be understood in two ways. First, so that it is altogether absolute and intrinsic, and in this way it can add nothing to such a being, but only explain more its entity and reality; because in this way to be true gold is nothing other than not to be only apparent or feigned, but having the proper and real nature and essence of gold. But this is nothing other than to be gold; therefore to be true gold as regards this denomination adds nothing over being gold. And by the same reason, universally, to be true real being expresses no other concept than to be real being, that is, not feigned nor chimerical. By which reason we were saying above that thing adds nothing over real being, because it expresses nothing except to have a ratified essence, which is nothing other than to have a real essence, and it is the same to say a true essence. And taking the denomination of true in this sense Augustine seems to have said, Soliloquies II, c. 5, that the true is that which is, not that which seems, or which is such as it seems; because, even if the thing is not seen nor has conformity with any knowledge, it is nevertheless true; in which he indicates that truth is not an extrinsic denomination. And in the same sense fits the definition of Avicenna saying: The truth of each thing is the property of its being which is established for it. For when he says that it is a property, he does not take that word as it is wont to signify an attribute or some faculty, but signifies its own being, that is, not extraneous nor foreign, which adds nothing over being itself but can be explained after the manner of a relation of identity; for so it can be called a relation of property; for in this way each thing so has that being which is its own or which is established for it, and this very thing is to have the truth of such a being.

3. But in another way that denomination can be taken not as absolute and intrinsic, but as coming from elsewhere, and in this way it cannot be except an extrinsic denomination of the thing, namely that it is truly enunciated or is enunciable as such. Which St. Thomas seems to have thought, I, q. 16, a. 1, saying that the true names that to which the intellect tends, and is in the intellect according as it is conformed to the thing understood, and is derived from the intellect to the thing understood, which is called true according as it has some order to the intellect. But it is evident that from the conformity of the intellect to the thing only an extrinsic denomination results in the thing known. Whence in a. 6 St. Thomas expressly says that all created things are denominated true by one and the same truth, namely by the truth of the divine intellect, from which nevertheless they cannot be denominated except extrinsically. And in the solution ad 2 he confirms this from Anselm, De veritate, c. 11, saying, as time is related to temporal things, so truth to true things; which St. Thomas understands of one common time, from which it is evident that temporal things are only extrinsically denominated. Finally it is evident by reason, because either the thing is true because it is conformed to the intellect, or because the intellect is conformed to it. The first cannot be said, because rather from the fact that the thing is or is not, the intellect is true; otherwise we should fall into the error of the philosophers saying that nothing is true except what is understood. But if the second is said, it openly follows that it is only an extrinsic denomination, because that the intellect is conformed to the thing posits nothing in the thing except only that it is truly known. But besides those two nothing else can be thought out, because by the common consent of all every truth is taken from the conformity of intellect and thing. And it is confirmed, because falsity cannot be in things except as an extrinsic denomination; therefore neither truth; for the reason of opposites is the same or proportional. On the contrary, however, is the fact that, on the testimony of Aristotle, Metaphysics II, c. 1, as each thing is, so also it is true; by which words he signifies that truth so accompanies being that according to the grade and notion of entity there is in each the grade of truth; it is therefore a sign that truth accompanies being as its attribute.

Whether there is transcendental truth

4. In this matter it is evident that the denomination of true is wont to be attributed to things; for so we are wont to say that it is true gold, in order to distinguish it from apparent gold, and a true man, in order to distinguish him from a painted one, and the true God, in order to separate him from false ones; and in this way speak not only sacred and profane letters but also all men. Whence it plainly comes about that the same appellation of true can be attributed to any real being, either in order that it may be separated from feigned and imaginary being, or in order that in its species and notion it may be judged to have the proper essence of such a thing; for as regards these two the reason of this appellation is the same in all beings. And hence again it is also manifest that the true under some notion is an attribute of being and is convertible with it. But in order that it may be declared of what kind this denomination is, it is necessary before all things to expound what this truth is which is attributed to being, so that it may be evident thence how it can be its property and be convertible with it. Various modes, then, of explaining truth can be thought out.

The first opinion about what it is is disproved

5. The first is that transcendental truth signifies a certain real absolute property distinct from being by reasoned reason. So think certain modern Thomists, I, q. 16, and they think it is the opinion of St. Thomas, De veritate, q. 1, a. 8; of Capreolus, In I, dist. 19, q. 3, concl. 3; Soncinas, Metaphysics VI, q. 17; Javellus, treatise De transcendentibus, c. 5. It is proved, because truth is a real perfection; therefore it expresses a real notion, not relative; therefore absolute; and it is not a synonymous name signifying the same as entity; therefore it expresses a perfection at least distinct by reason from entity. The first antecedent is evident, both because that a thing is true is not something feigned, indeed this very thing seems to be excluded by the name of truth; and also because all things are of themselves true and not from the consideration of the intellect; and moreover because truth in God is a great perfection and is the measure of created truth; and finally because, since truth is a property of being, it cannot not be a real perfection. But that it is not relative will easily be proved below. Finally, that truth and entity are not the same as synonyms is evident from the common mode of conceiving of all and from the diverse definitions by which their objective concepts are explained by us; it is necessary, therefore, that they be distinguished at least by reasoned reason. Indeed, according to the opinion of Scotus treated above when we dealt with these attributes in common, it would have to be said that they are distinguished formally from the nature of the thing.

6. But in this opinion and in all the following it is to be observed that it is one thing to speak of the whole of what truth in being includes, another of that which truth adds over entity or (what is the same) true over being. In the former way we admit that the truth of real beings expresses a real perfection, as the arguments made prove, and others by which we showed above that unity does not express a mere negation, but entity under negation; for so now it must be asserted that truth does not express a mere extrinsic notion or one fabricated by the intellect, but is entity signified under some other notion, or by adding something, which we are now inquiring into. In this sense, then, the said opinion is true, and in truth St. Thomas, Capreolus and the older Thomists intend nothing else, but the moderns seem to signify more.

7. In another way, then, it can be understood that truth adds to being, over the notion of essence or entity, an absolute and real property. And in this sense I think the aforesaid opinion false. And first, if it is understood of a perfection distinct from the nature of the thing, it can sufficiently be proved, both by the arguments made above against Scotus about the attributes of being in general, and from what was said above of distinctions from the nature of the thing. For here a real distinction of thing from thing cannot intervene, as all confess, because there is no foundation for feigning such a distinction; nor can it be a modal distinction either, both because no indication of distinction between such a mode and being can be thought out; for they are altogether inseparable, so that they can scarcely be prescinded even by the intellect, as I shall immediately say; and also because no thing is understood to be true through a superadded mode, but through its entity, which, if it has it, even if you separate every other mode, you will understand that a true thing remains either in the notion of being or in the notion of such being as is apt to be constituted by such an entity. And this reason, applied with proportion, also proves that truth cannot add over entity some perfection co-distinct from entity by reasoned reason; for if they are so co-distinguished that neither extreme is included in the precise concept of the other (for so we are speaking), let truth be separated by reason from being, and I argue of each extreme. Being so prescinded is intelligible as far as depends on itself, both because it is conceived by the intellect by a direct and proper concept, and also because, as much as each thing has of being, so much it has of intelligibility, as St. Thomas said elsewhere, I, q. 16, a. 3; therefore being in that precise concept includes every real perfection which is required for the notion of true, because by the very fact that being is intelligible it is true; for in this sense the true is said to be the object of the intellect, and because between every intelligible being and the intellect there can be conformity. But from the other extreme too an argument is taken; for either truth so prescinded is understood to include real entity, and so it is not prescinded in the said way; or it does not include it, and so it will not express a real perfection. And St. Thomas signified all this, in the said I, q. 16, a. 3, ad 3, saying that although being can be apprehended without the notion of true being apprehended, that is, by including it expressly and formally, nevertheless conversely the true cannot be apprehended without the notion of being being apprehended, because being falls in the notion of the true; nor can being be apprehended without the notion of true following upon that apprehension, that is, without being itself, however precisely conceived, being true and able to be apprehended under the notion of true, even if no absolute perfection is added to it. And he adds an example, saying: And it is similar if we compare the intelligible to being; for being cannot be understood without being being intelligible, but nevertheless being can be understood in such a way that its intelligibility is not understood; and similarly being understood is true, yet in understanding being the true is not understood.

8. Moreover I argue, secondly, by inquiring what this absolute perfection is which the true adds over being; for it cannot be understood to be so absolute that it does not include a transcendental respect, or one according to expression (as they call it), as the aforesaid authors too confess from the common concept of all; for all conceive truth through conformity between thing and intellect, or in order to it; nor could such a real notion, altogether absolute and distinct from the notion of being, in which truth would consist, easily be feigned or explained. But if this is said to be an absolute notion with a transcendental respect, or explained after the manner of a respect, that cannot be except in order to some intellect; but truth as explained through such a respect cannot be anything other than entity itself with the same respect; nor can it add over it a real absolute notion even distinct by reason; therefore. The major is proved from the said definition of truth, which declares as it were its first conception. For truth signifies a certain adequation and conformity; but not every conformity has the notion of truth, for equality between two things, and likeness, is a certain conformity, and is not called truth; therefore truth expresses a special notion of conformity, which can be no other than that which is taken or explained in order to the intellect. Whence the minor is proved, because this conformity to the intellect can be understood to be twofold, namely actual and aptitudinal. Actual can consist only in this, that the thing is such as it is actually understood; but aptitudinal in this, that the thing is such that it can be understood by a true and proper concept of such a thing. But in neither of these ways is some real absolute perfection added over the entity of the thing, because to be actually understood adds nothing to the entity understood as such; therefore neither can the thing being such as it is understood add to it a real absolute notion. Again, by the very fact that being is being or such being, if there is in another a power to understand, it is apt to be adequated to a true concept; therefore it is not only superfluous but also impossible that this actual or aptitudinal conformity add to being some absolute perfection, even distinct by reason. Just as it is impossible that in whiteness to be apt to be assimilated to another should express an absolute perfection added to the notion of whiteness, and much more impossible that actual likeness should add an intrinsic absolute notion to whiteness itself.

The second opinion is examined with various interpretations

9. On account of these things, then, there can be a second opinion, saying that truth adds to being a relation of conformity to the intellect; for this seems to be concluded by the reason just made against the preceding opinion. But in explaining this opinion various modes can be thought out. One is that it be understood of the relation of actual conformity; for truth seems to signify actual conformity. Another is that it be understood of aptitudinal conformity, and in this way some say that transcendental truth is nothing other than the intelligibility of being, which intelligibility expresses not only an extrinsic denomination from the faculty which an intellective thing has of understanding every being, but on the side of the intelligible thing itself expresses a certain aptitude that it can be understood, which adds a relation to the intellect, to which, as far as depends on itself, it can be conformed. Again, some understand that this relation is to be taken only in order to the divine intellect, because all things depend per se on it, but not on others; indeed to them they are compared per accidens. Others think that it is to be taken in order to any intellect whatever, because the thing is of itself intelligible by anyone and so is of itself apt to be conformed to all, whence it can express the aforesaid relation to all, as colour, in so far as it is visible, expresses a relation to every sight, even if it does not depend on it. Finally some think that this relation is real, since truth is something real and exists in things. Others will have it to be a relation of reason, because it does not require existence nor distinction of the extremes, which Durandus, Capreolus and Cajetan think, in the places cited and to be cited; and St. Thomas favours it, In I, dist. 19, q. 5, a. 1. Others finally think that that relation is sometimes real, but often of reason, according to the capacity of the extremes, as Soncinas and Javellus above; Ferrariensis, Contra Gentiles I, c. 60; and St. Thomas favours it, De veritate, q. 1, a. 2, and In Peri Hermeneias I, lect. 5.

10. But in order that we may understand what of truth or falsity there can be in these modes of speaking, it is to be supposed that this opinion (in order that it be distinct from the others) is to be understood of a proper relation, which they call predicamental, if it is real, or one similar to it, if it is of reason. For if relation is taken broadly for every transcendental relationship, or for any denomination whatever which arises from the association of several things, then this opinion in one sense will coincide with the preceding, but in another with that which we shall treat afterwards.

11. For transcendental truth a strict relation of reason is not required.—First, then, I think that the denomination is not taken from some relation of reason taken in the said propriety, because truth neither expresses a relation of this kind nor entity under such a relation. It is proved by the reason often repeated, because an attribute of real being cannot consist in the aforesaid relation nor formally include it. Next, because such a relation is not except while it is considered or feigned; but the truth of things does not require feigning of this kind; rather, as I was saying above, it has a certain repugnance with the very name of truth. Likewise God from eternity is transcendentally true according to the complete and exact notion of truth, and yet he neither feigns relations of reason nor can require them in order that he be and be called the true God. Finally, this relation is not except through the reflection and comparison of the intellect, before which both this being is true gold, for example, and is known to be such.

12. A real relation is not necessary for transcendental truth.—This is proved in God.—Secondly it seems certain, speaking in common of the transcendental true as it abstracts from created and uncreated being, that it cannot consist in, or formally require, a real relation to another in order to which the denomination of true is taken. It is evident, because in God transcendental truth cannot include a relation of this kind, because either that truth is considered in God as he is God, in which way we say that the three persons are one true God; or it is considered in the individual persons according to their proper relations, to grant this to the theologians. In the former way God has no real relation, because neither to anything outside himself, as is evident, nor to anything within himself, because the true divinity has no distinction in the thing from all those things which are within God. Likewise, because that relation, if there is any, must be to the intellect; either, therefore, it is to the intellect as causing, and this has no place in the true divinity, which has no cause; or it is to the intellect as understanding, and this cannot be a real relation inwardly, since it is of the same thing to itself. In the latter way too there cannot be a real relation. First, because in God there are no other real relations besides the relations which accompany the origins, in which no others can be founded. Next, because in the Father, for example, that relation of truth cannot be to the intellect as producing, because the person of the Father is not produced; nor as understanding, because it is a relation of the same thing to itself. In the Son likewise, although he is a produced person, the truth of filiation cannot consist in a relation of conformity to the intellect as producing, or, what is the same, as having the idea or exemplar by which such a thing is produced, because the divine Word is not produced through an idea, but is itself the image or exemplar naturally produced by the Father. Nor can it express a real relation of conformity to the intellect as understanding, because so too in the Word such a relation is of the same thing to itself. For although the Word is also understood by the Father and itself also understands the Father, nevertheless, as they mutually understand each other, they are not distinguished from the intellect and from the act by which they understand themselves. And the same reason, applied with proportion, has place in the Holy Spirit. In God, therefore, there is no real relation of conformity in which truth could consist; and consequently neither can the truth of being, as it abstracts from created and uncreated, require this real relation.

13. Thirdly, even if we speak more contractedly of created being and its transcendental truth, as those seem to speak who say that the truth of this being consists in conformity to the divine intellect as it contains in itself the exemplars or ideas of created beings, although (I say) we speak of this being, I do not think that this truth consists in some real, proper and predicamental relation of such a being to the divine idea. Which some prove, because that relation of conformity which is required for truth is common in these beings whether they exist or do not exist; therefore it cannot be a real relation. But this reason is not of great moment. First indeed, because perhaps it assumes something false; for, as I was saying above, creatures considered only according to the being of essence do not have the truth of essence from conformity to the divine mind or idea; for man is not of such an essence because he is known as such by God, but rather is known to be of such an essence because he is such essentially. Next, that relation being posited, it will be said to be real when taken with proportion; for in created being existing only in potency truth too is only in potency; in the same way, therefore, there could be a real relation in potency; but in the same being actually existing, as there is real truth in act, so there could also be a real relation in act. Otherwise, then, it can be proved that that relation is not real, because otherwise there would be a process to infinity in such a relation, for that relation too would have an idea to which it would be conformed, and that through another relation, and so to infinity; but this reason is common to almost all relations, especially those which are founded in unity, such as likeness, equality and similar ones.

14. It is proved, then, otherwise, because either it is a relation of likeness or a relation of effect to cause, which by another name is wont to be called that of measured to measure. Not the first, because a relation of likeness properly is only that which is founded in unity or formal agreement; but between the creature and the idea which it has in God there is not such formal agreement, but only intentional or ideal, as between the intentional species and the visible object there is not a proper relation of likeness, although there is intentional representation. Nor can the second be said, because the idea or exemplar of the artificer has no other immediate influx into the effect besides that which the artificer has as he is a perfect efficient cause, nor through another action except that by which he is efficient, because the exemplar as such has no other causality than to direct the action of the agent; therefore in the effect no other relation results except that which follows by virtue of the action of the agent as agent; therefore it has no other real relation of conformity or dependence on the exemplar. But if you say that the effect depends on the exemplar as regards specification, but on the efficient as such as regards exercise, this very thing convinces that in the effect there does not result a special relation to the exemplar, but only that which is to the efficient cause, because the causality and action by which the thing comes about and comes about in such a species is single, and that distinction as regards exercise and specification is in the present case only according to reason and accommodation, not according to the thing. Indeed the exemplar is not compared to the efficient cause as a distinct cause, but as constituting it in its own way in first act for effecting; therefore neither in the effect does a manifold relation result, but only that which is of the effect to its efficient cause.

15. It will perhaps be said that the argument proves indeed that these relations are not distinct, but that it is nevertheless true that the relation of the creature includes in its essence that it is a relation of conformity to the idea of the creator, just as the action of the creator itself includes in its essence that it is from the idea. But whatever may be the case with such a real relation, and whether it is distinct or not, I prove further that the notion of the truth of created being cannot consist in it. First, by that general reason said above, that the attributes of being cannot add to being a real positive mode, neither absolute nor respective. Secondly, because it is one thing for a relation¹ to follow from another, another to constitute it formally; but that relation, if there is one, supposes the notion of truth in created being and follows upon it; therefore truth is not formally constituted by such a relation. The consequence is evident, because that which is formally constituted through some form cannot be supposed to that form itself. But the antecedent is evident, first, from the sensible example of artificial things; for a thing made according to the idea and rules of art is not therefore rightly made and conformed to the art because it has in itself some predicamental relation to the art, but precisely because it has such figure, proportion, etc., as the art postulates, and thence afterwards a relation follows, if it truly results. Whence, if we prescind such a relation in the mind, or if perhaps the opinion is true which denies relations of this kind resulting, the artificial thing will nevertheless be understood true in the genus of artefact; therefore the same holds in the creature with respect to the divine ideas; for it is compared to them as to an artificer. Next I explain in this way, because the creature is produced by God prior in nature to its being referred to him by the predicamental relation of the creature; therefore it is also a true creature, or true created being, prior in nature to its being referred by the aforesaid relation; and similarly it is a true man or a true lion prior in nature; that relation, therefore, is not included formally and intrinsically in the notion of truth. The antecedent is evident, because the foundation is prior in nature to the relation; but this relation is founded in the entity of the existing creature, and therefore supposes it created and flowing from God. But the first consequence is evident, because created being, by virtue of that entity which it has from God prior in nature to the predicamental relation resulting in it, is not only intelligible by a true concept of being but is also truly constituted in such or such a species of created being; therefore, such a relation being prescinded, it can be pre-understood to be true being and such being; the true, therefore, as true, does not add the aforesaid relation over being.

16. Which reason proceeds not only against those who say that this relation is real, but also against those who say that it is a relation of reason, if they speak of the formal and actual relation; otherwise if of the fundamental one, which is not so much a relation as the concomitance of several things or formal notions, or a denomination taken from such concomitance, as was declared above in the truth of knowledge. But the aforesaid reason proceeds chiefly of actual conformity to the divine idea; yet a fortiori it proves of similar actual conformity to any other knowledge whatever, because every other relation is posterior and more extrinsic. And it can also be applied to the aptitudinal relation by which a thing is said to be apt to be understood or to be conformed to an intellect having its proper or true concept; for this denomination in truth does not add a real relation in the thing which is called intelligible, because it is only an aptitude to a certain extrinsic denomination, to which the object is compared as the term or matter about which the knowledge is concerned. Likewise, because, as the arguments made prove, a thing is intelligible through itself and not through a superadded relation, as regards that which is required on its side; for on the side of the other a faculty for understanding is required. Likewise, because the knowable as such does not express a real relation to science, as all teach; and the same holds of the visible with respect to sight. Finally, even if you feign that no intellect actually exists, the thing will be intelligible of itself and true. In whatever way, then, truth is explained, whether through actual conformity or through aptitudinal, it cannot consist in a formal and proper relation.

The third opinion is disproved

17. A third opinion can be thought out, that transcendental truth adds over being only some negation. Which opinion indeed can seem singular, because all authors suppose that true expresses a positive denomination; yet, if the things said above are considered, it will seem plausible, because it has been shown that truth does not add over being a positive absolute notion, nor even a relative one of the thing or of reason; therefore nothing remains which it can add besides negation. It is confirmed from the common mode of declaring this truth; for, as Aureolus argues, in Capreolus, In I, dist. 13, q. 3, in order that we may conceive and explain the truth of some thing, for example that this is true gold, we do not have recourse to the divine exemplars, nor to any other intellect, as is evident from the very usage of conceiving and speaking, but we declare it through negation; for we say that that is true gold which is not feigned or only apparent, but which has the proper nature of gold, which we gather from its properties and effects. Whence this truth seems rather to be explained through the intrinsic principles of the thing, so that he is called a true man because he consists of the essential principles of man; but this adds nothing over the entity of the thing except the negation of feigning or appearance. Moreover it is declared by a similar case; for, just as to be the same (as we were saying above), although it is signified after the manner of something positive, nevertheless in the thing adds nothing over being except a negation, so it seems to happen in the true; for some thing is called true in such a notion of being because it has the true nature or the proper essential principles of that thing; but it is said to have a true nature because it does not have a feigned one, nor an extraneous and apparent one, but that which is proper to such a thing; and so he is called the true God in order that he may be distinguished from false ones, and true divinity in order to indicate that it is not feigned, but such of itself. Finally, in this manner the other transcendentals are explained by many; for thing, which signifies essence as real and ratified, is said to import the negation of imaginary or feigned essence, and something the negation of nothing or the negation of identity. What wonder, then, that the true too should be declared through negation, although it has the appearance of a positive property?

18. This mode of speaking, then, seems not altogether improbable; yet, because it appears new, it is not to be approved by us; for the notion and definition of truth, according to the common mode of conceiving of all who speak of truth, includes or connotes in some way a relationship to the intellect or to a knowing power; and not after the manner of a negation, as is self-evident; therefore after the manner of conformity, which is conceived as something positive. Next, because rather the falsity of a thing is placed in negation, as will be said below, because it expresses the lack of perfection due for the truth of the thing; therefore truth does not add formally the negation of that lack of due perfection, nor the negation of a feigned nature, but the proper and positive perfection of the thing. Finally, although these simple things are often explained by us through negation (which alone the conjectures adduced prove), nevertheless they do not therefore formally signify such a negation.

The fourth opinion

19. There is, then, a fourth opinion, that this truth is only an extrinsic denomination. So thinks Cajetan, I, q. 16, a. 6, at the end, where he deals only with created things, which he says are true by extrinsic denomination either from the divine truth, in so far as they are signs of it and imitate it, or from created truth speculatively understood, in so far as they are or can be its cause. His reason is that the true is so related to knowledge and to things as healthy to the animal having health and to medicine, etc.; for, just as, health being taken away, which is formally in the animal, the others would not be denominated healthy, so, the truth of knowledge being taken away, the others would not be denominated true; therefore, just as the animal is called healthy by intrinsic denomination, but the others only by extrinsic, so the intellect is that which is formally and intrinsically denominated true, but the others only by extrinsic denomination, in so far as they are signs or causes of the truth of the intellect. But Cajetan does not declare what is to be said of the truth by which God is called true; perhaps, however, he would say that in him too it signifies an extrinsic denomination, not of sign or cause, namely so that God is called true because he can cause true knowledge of himself, either properly in other intellects, or improperly and according to reason only with respect to his own intellect, in so far as he can after the manner of an object be to his intellect the reason of forming of himself a true concept of God.

20. But if you object that this very power of causing, or of being the sufficient objective reason of such knowledge, is intrinsic to being itself; likewise, that, since the knowledge of God is most intrinsic to him, an extrinsic denomination cannot be taken from it, it can be answered to the former part that that power or perfection is indeed intrinsic, but that it is denominated true or truth from without; just as in medicine too the power of causing health is intrinsic, yet the notion of health in it is extrinsic. To the other part it will be said that, although the knowledge by which God knows himself is most intrinsic to him and therefore intrinsically denominates him knowing, nevertheless the denomination of known as such is per se and formally extrinsic, and it happens to it that the form from which it is taken is within the thing which is denominated known.

21. What seems to stand in the way of the preceding opinion.—This opinion is clear as regards something, namely that the true adds over being only the concomitance of something extrinsic, as we shall show below; but in so far as it says that things are denominated true only by extrinsic denomination, this opinion seems difficult. First, because Aristotle, in the said place of Metaphysics II, text 4, thinks that some truth follows upon all beings, which St. Thomas also teaches, Contra Gentiles I, c. 60, last reason, distinguishing a twofold truth, namely of intellect and of thing, and of the latter expounding the definition of Avicenna, treatise I of his Metaphysics, c. 6, and treatise VIII, c. 6: The truth of the thing is the property of the being of each thing which is established for it. And I, q. 16, a. 1, he expounds of the same truth the definition of Augustine, De vera religione, c. 36, saying: Truth is the highest likeness of the principle, which is without any unlikeness; and the definition of Anselm, dialogue De veritate, c. 12: Truth is rectitude perceptible by the mind alone. In all of which it is signified that the truth of the thing is some intrinsic form and perfection of it. Whence Augustine above: True things (he says) are true in so far as they are; but they are in so far as they are similar to the principal One. Whence he adds that truth is the form of true things as likeness is the form of similar things. Moreover St. Thomas, De veritate, q. 1, a. 4, although he seems much to favour the opinion of Cajetan, nevertheless finally says: although the truth according to which all things are called true is less properly called truth, yet that the thing is denominated true from it as from an inhering form, and that it is nothing other than entity adequated to the intellect. And he thinks the same there, aa. 5 and 6. This truth, therefore, is something intrinsic to things and not only an extrinsic denomination. This can be confirmed by reason, first, because an extrinsic denomination alone cannot properly be numbered among the properties of a thing; but truth is called by all a property of being; therefore it is not only an external denomination. The major is evident, because a property must belong from within; but an extrinsic denomination belongs accidentally and from without. Which is most true of that denomination which is said to be taken only through analogy from proportion or relationship to another; for no one would say that health as such is a property of food or of urine, or risibility a property of a flowering meadow, because these predicates belong to those subjects only as it were metaphorically.

22. You will say: although these predicates, as regards the imposition of words, are metaphorical, nevertheless in truth they signify certain properties of those things to which they are attributed; and in this way health can be called a property of such food, not as regards formal health itself, but as regards that which is intended to be declared through such a denomination of healthy. But on the contrary, for hence at least we rightly gather that health is not a property of the food distinct from that which is declared through such a metaphor; but if that were not a property but the essence of the food itself, certainly healthy would not signify a property but the essence of the food. So, then, in the present case, if the true is said of things only through analogy and extrinsic denomination from the truth of the intellect, I ask what is indicated or signified in being itself through this metaphor or relationship. For either the entity of the thing alone is indicated, and so the true is not a property of being, but only differs from it in that the true metaphorically signifies that which being signifies with propriety; just as to laugh is not in the meadow a perfection other than that which is to be green or flowery, but is the same metaphorically signified. Or through that analogous appellation of true something diverse from entity is indicated in being; and of this we inquire what it is, and whether it is only an extrinsic denomination; for, if it is so, it will not be able to be a property of being; but if it is something beyond the extrinsic denomination, as regards that the notion of true will be intrinsic, whatever may be the case with the imposition of the word, whether it was taken from without.

23. And it is confirmed, because, if truth were only an extrinsic denomination, it could belong to beings of reason as well as to real ones, because denominations of this kind taken from knowledge can belong to beings of reason as well as to real ones, such as to be genera, species, to be truly known, signified, and the like. But if it is said that formally it is so, but that the foundations of these denominations belong otherwise to real beings, against this I always urge the reason made, because this foundation in this denomination of true is either something besides being or not; if it is something, I ask what it is, whether extrinsic or intrinsic, and the arguments made return; if it is not something, then the true as it is in things is not a property of being but being itself. A similar argument can be made, because it follows that that which is more perfectly being is not more perfectly true with the truth of the thing, which is openly against Aristotle and St. Thomas above, and against the common sense of all; for who would say that the angel is not more truly being in the notion of being than man, or also God than the angel? But the sequel is evident, because in that denomination which is taken from the truth of the intellect they cannot have inequality, because the idea which God has of man is as true as the idea which he has of the angel, and the conformity between those extremes is as great as between these; and the knowledge which God has of the angel is as true as that which he has of himself.

Resolution of the question

24. What transcendental truth intrinsically expresses.—In this variety of opinions it is difficult to pass a true judgement about truth; and perhaps the difficulty has arisen from this, that in the use of these words we do not sufficiently distinguish that from which their imposition was taken or transferred and that to signify which they are imposed; for it could have happened, and it is likely, that every appellation of true took its origin from the truth of knowledge, as I shall say more conveniently in the following section; but nevertheless by the name of true there is not signified in things only a denomination taken from the truth of knowledge, but something else to signify which that name was imposed. In order, then, that I may declare this, I say, first, that transcendental truth intrinsically expresses the real entity of the thing itself which is denominated true, and that besides it it adds nothing intrinsic to it, neither absolute nor relative, neither from the nature of the thing nor distinct by reason alone. This conclusion has been sufficiently proved from what was said in the first opinion, and it is clearly taken from St. Thomas in the places cited, and De veritate, q. 1, a. 1, ad 6, and a. 8; Capreolus, Cajetan, Ferrariensis and others cited above in the first opinion.

25. What transcendental truth connotes.—I say, secondly, that transcendental truth signifies the entity of the thing, connoting the knowledge or concept of the intellect to which such an entity is conformed, or in which such a thing is represented, or can be represented, as it is. This conclusion too is proved from what has been said, from a sufficient² enumeration of the parts. And I think that, although the authors speak in diverse ways, almost all wished to teach this same thing, and I explain it in this way. For I think that this concept of true being is virtually comparative of one thing or nature to the proper concept of that thing which is said to be true; as, for example, in professing the mystery of the Eucharist we are wont to say that the consecrated host is the true body of Christ the Lord, where by true body we signify nothing other than that same body which is represented through the proper and true concept of the body of Christ. And similarly, in confessing the mystery of the Incarnation, we say that God is true man, that is, that he has that nature which we truly conceive in the essential species of man. And hence Hervaeus said, Quodlibet III, q. 1, aa. 2 and 3, that this truth is the conformity of the thing as it is in itself to itself as objectively conceived; but Durandus, In I, dist. 19, q. 5, conversely said that this truth is the conformity of the thing according to objective being to itself according to real being; for each understood that this truth adds nothing to the thing besides the denomination arising from the conjunction and proportion or conformity between intellect and thing. But they declare through the objective concept what we declare through the formal; yet, because the objective concept adds nothing besides the thing except the denomination of the term of the formal concept, therefore the conformity between the thing and the objective concept is not rightly explained, but rather that between the thing and the formal concept or idea. And I think the same was thought by those who say that the true adds over being a relation of reason of the conformity of being to the intellect, as St. Thomas indicates, In I, dist. 19, q. 5, a. 1; for this, in order that it be true, is not to be understood of a proper and actual relation, but of that mutual connection of thing and concept and the connotation of one as corresponding to the other, which, because it is conceived by us after the manner of a relation, is wont to be called a relation of reason. Finally, in this sense that common definition of truth is easily applied to this truth, that it is the conformity between intellect and thing; for that conformity is not understood to be some relation, as was explained above in the truth of knowledge, but a denomination taken from the association of several things so related that one is such as it is represented by the other.

26. A saying of Augustine is explained.—I say, thirdly, that this transcendental truth can be explained both after the manner of aptitudinal and after the manner of actual conformity, both in order to the divine and to the created intellect, and in the notion of the known and the knower, if we speak universally of true being, or in the notion of the caused and the cause, or of the measured and the measure, if the discussion is of created or artificial being. I declare each, for first of all, that this truth can express actual conformity all confess, and it seems evident from the very name of truth and conformity; for it signifies act rather than aptitude. Likewise the truth of knowledge expresses actual conformity and commensuration; therefore the same holds proportionally of the truth of the thing. But if you object Augustine, Soliloquies II, c. 5, saying that the true is not rightly said to be that which is so related as it seems to the knower, because according to this nothing would be true if no one knew, we shall answer that according to this denomination that definition is not to be rejected absolutely and simply, if it is understood, as it must be understood, of a knower truly attaining the thing itself. Whence we also admit that conditional to be true; yet, as the antecedent is impossible, at least with respect to the divine intellect, so also the consequent. Whence St. Thomas, I, q. 16, a. 1, ad 1, treating this place of Augustine, says that it only excludes comparison to the created intellect.

27. Moreover, that this truth can also be declared through aptitudinal conformity is taken from that same place of Augustine, where after those words, The true is that which is so related as it seems to the knower, there is added: if he wishes and is able to know. Which words signify aptitude. More clearly Anselm, dialogue De veritate, c. 9, says that truth is rectitude perceptible by the mind alone. And St. Thomas, in the said q. 16, a. 5, says that truth is found in the thing according as it has being conformable to the intellect; and Contra Gentiles I, c. 60, declaring the definition of Avicenna, The truth of the thing is the property of the being of each thing which is established for it, adds: In so far as such a thing is apt by nature to make a true estimation of itself. And it is proved because every real being is apt by nature to make a true estimation of itself, in which way every being is called intelligible, whether it is the principle of knowledge or only the term; for this aptitude of itself abstracts from these modes; therefore nothing prevents this from being signified by the name of true or truth. And it is confirmed; for, although it is impossible that there be any being which is not actually truly conceived by some intellect, at least the divine, nevertheless, even if the intellect apprehends that impossible hypothesis posited in the thing, namely that every intellect, even the divine, ceased from the actual conception of things, there would still be truth in things; for both the composite of body and rational soul would be true man and gold would be true gold, etc., either according to the truth of essence, if we understand that existing things do not remain, or also according to existence, if we feign that, actual knowledge ceasing, things are still preserved existing by God operating through his executive power; therefore this truth can be sufficiently understood through that aptitudinal conformity, even if the actual is not. You will say that by a similar argument it can be proved that aptitudinal conformity is not necessary, for, even if another impossible hypothesis is feigned, namely that the thing is neither understood nor can be understood by anyone, and that it remains in its essence or existence, each thing would nevertheless be true in its essence; and yet then it would not be understood as apt to make a true estimation of itself, because there would be none with whom it could make it; therefore that aptitude too is not of the notion of truth. The answer is, first, that that latter hypothesis involves a more direct and formal repugnance with the proper notion of real entity, at least according to essence; for it is of its notion that it be possible, and consequently and much more that it be intelligible. Next, that hypothesis being made, the thing could be called true fundamentally or non-repugnantly, yet not positively and formally; because then the truth of knowledge would not be possible, and consequently every denomination of true would cease.

28. The truth of the thing is to be regarded most of all in order to the divine intellect.—Moreover from these things it is easily evident that this appellation or conformity is chiefly and per se to be taken in order to the divine intellect, as St. Thomas teaches, in the said q. 16, a. 1, and in other places. First, because conformity to this intellect is most of all per se in all things: in created things on account of the dependence which they have on it; but in uncreated being itself on account of the intrinsic and essential identity with its intellect and actual intellection. Next, because in the divine intellect there is supreme and infallible truth and the most perfect reason or representation of all things; therefore a thing is then most of all called true when it can be conformed to the concept which God has of such a thing.

29. Secondarily in order to the created.—But that it can also be taken in order to the created intellect, although secondarily, St. Thomas expressly teaches, De veritate, q. 1, in the place cited. And it can easily be declared from what has been said; because this conformity which truth expresses can be understood not only of actual but also of aptitudinal; but according to aptitude every being is apt by nature to have a true estimation of itself in every intellect, not only divine but also created. Whence, if we wish to conceive this denomination after the manner of a relation, we shall understand that any being whatever has this relation of intelligibility not only to the divine intellect but also to any created one. Likewise, because the created intellect is a certain participation of the divine intellect, to which it is apt by nature to be conformed in understanding, if it understands truly; therefore, by the very fact that being is called true because it is conformable to the divine intellect, it will also be able to be called true because it is conformable to a created intellect truly understanding. Finally that argument proves this, that we do not always know the truth of things through conformity to the divine idea, but through the conception which we have of such a thing. And in this way we are wont to use the definition of such a thing or nature to prove that something is truly such; for the definition is nothing other than the explanation of such a nature as it is conceived by us; this truth, therefore, can be taken not only from conformity to the divine intellect but also to the created.

30. The conformity of truth in common is the conformity of knower and known.—But this holds most of all if this conformity is taken only in the notion of knower and known, in which way it must necessarily be taken if the discussion is of transcendental truth in its whole breadth. Because in God no other genus of conformity can be understood, since he is not a dependent or caused being, as is self-evident; nor can he properly be said to be measured in the notion of true through some science, not only because on account of supreme identity there cannot be the notion of measure there, but also because, in the way in which they can be distinguished and commensurated by reason, rather the essence of God is the true measure of his science than conversely; for God is not therefore the true God because he knows himself to be such, but rather, because he is the true God, therefore he truly knows himself to be such. Therefore the transcendental true taken in its whole breadth cannot express conformity to the intellect as to a cause or to a measure, but only as to that which represents or knows, either in act or in aptitude. In this way, then, such conformity, especially aptitudinal, can be taken in order to any intellect whatever, so that God is called true because in any intellect whatever he can generate a true concept of God, or because in reality he has in himself that nature which any intellect truly conceiving God conceives in God. And the same holds by the same reason of created beings; for the same concept of truth can be applied proportionally to all; and what in God suffices for truth, if it can be found in others by participation, as in truth it can, will also suffice for their truth by participation.

31. Created beings are conformed to the divine intellect as to their maker.—But it is added in the last part of the conclusion that in created beings there is found conformity to the divine intellect as to a cause and exemplar, by reason of which such beings can be denominated true, because that too is a true conformity to an intellect practically knowing and in its own way operating. And by the same reason artificial beings which proceed from the human intellect have with respect to it the same conformity as to their exemplar or idea, and according to it can also be called true. Indeed St. Thomas thinks that created beings are chiefly denominated true from this conformity, because it belongs to them per se; but conformity to other intellects speculatively knowing is more extrinsic and per accidens. Which has place most of all in existing and actually created things; for things according to the being of essence do not actually have an exemplar cause, just as neither an efficient one; yet they have them in potency, and therefore, if they are considered as they are possible, they per se require exemplars and ideas in the first artificer which represent each such as it can be or as its nature postulates to come about. And in this way all created things, even according to the being of essence, per se primarily postulate to be in the divine intellect and to have conformity with it as with the first artificer by whom alone they can be brought to being. But God, since he is uncreated being, can have this relationship to no intellect; yet by another reason he can be said per se to have conformity with respect to his own intellect rather than to others; because per se and essentially he postulates that he actually understand himself and be not only intelligible but also actually understood by himself and his own intellection. And so the conclusion has been proved as regards all its parts.

32. But you will object: therefore the notion of transcendental truth is not one but manifold, because aptitudinal or actual conformity, and speculative or practical, are very diverse. Secondly it can specially be objected that truth expresses a relation of measured to measure, at least fundamentally; therefore the truth of things cannot be taken in order to the created intellect, whose knowledge is not the measure of the truth of things, but is rather measured by them. Whence I argue, thirdly, for knowledge is true because it is conformed to the things known; therefore conversely things cannot be called true through conformity to such knowledge; because between these there is not a relation of mutual or similar comparison, such as is between two similar things, but of dissimilar or non-mutual comparison, such as is between measure and measured.

33. To the first some do not think it inconvenient to concede all that is inferred in the argument; because, since these are only certain denominations which are taken or explained after the manner of relations, it is not inconvenient that they be multiplied from various heads and diverse considerations. Indeed some also add that under one notion they are real respects, but under another of reason. Which is at least concomitantly probable, although it is not formally true. It will perhaps be better said, however, that all those respects are contained under one adequate one, or are reduced to one, namely to that aptitude by which each thing is apt by nature to confer a true estimation of itself; for it has this with respect to any intellect or knowledge whatever, and over it actual conformity adds nothing besides the denomination or coexistence of the knowledge. But if thence a relation results when that knowledge is practical and the cause of things, that rather supposes truth than constitutes it, as was shown concerning the second opinion. To the second the answer is that rigorously it is not necessary that being be called true in the notion of measured by the knowledge to which it is conformed; otherwise God could not be called true being, as I argued above, because in the notion of being he has no measure, neither according to the thing nor according to reason; and therefore, as was said more fully in I, q. 14, the divine science is not compared to its essence and its being as practical, but only as speculative. Only in the truth of speculative knowledge, then, is it true that the notion of true is taken in the notion of the measured; for the divine practical science too, as practical, is true, although as such it does not have the notion of measured, but rather of measure. Whence to the third the answer is by denying the consequence; because the very notion of truth is not said in the same way of knowledge and of things; and therefore it is not inconvenient that according to diverse relationships it belong to knowledge through conformity to things in so far as it represents them as they are, and to things in order to knowledge in so far as they are apt in the notion of object to induce a true estimation of themselves.

34. Transcendental truth is not a mere extrinsic denomination.—I say, finally, that this transcendental truth is not a mere extrinsic denomination, although it includes in some way or connotes the conjunction of another thing from which it results. In this conclusion I differ from the opinion of Cajetan, although perhaps it is not so much a difference as an explanation of his opinion. It is proved, then, from what has been said, because the truth of the thing intrinsically includes its entity; therefore it is not a mere extrinsic denomination. The antecedent is evident from the definitions of truth which Augustine, Anselm and Avicenna hand down, and from the others adduced above. Likewise, because for this cause fictitious beings are not true beings and are intelligible far otherwise than true beings; for these are of themselves apt by nature to be apprehended and known as they are; but those not at all, but it is necessary that by the artifice and power of the intellect they be clothed with some appearance or shadow of reality. Likewise, by this reason, the more a thing has of entity, the more it also has of this truth; and that which is more perfect being is called of itself more intelligible. Whence we can further argue: because to be intelligible is not a mere extrinsic denomination; therefore neither is to be true objectively or really. The antecedent is evident both from what has been said, that intelligibility follows the entity of the thing; and also because the object is prior in nature to the power, and its reason; therefore there is supposed in the object some aptitude by reason of which it is apt to terminate the act of the power, as, for example, in colour and sound with respect to sight and hearing; therefore similarly in being, in so far as it is intelligible, there is understood not only the extrinsic faculty which has the power of understanding, although this is necessary, but also on the side of being itself an intrinsic aptitude is supposed, by reason of which it can terminate an act of this kind. Moreover the things which were adduced in favour of the first opinion confirm this, and we shall add others in the following section.

Corollaries from the above resolution

35. How uncreated and created beings are true.—And from these things it is understood, first, how to be true belongs to every real being, whether created or uncreated; because every being is of itself apt to be conformed to the intellect; indeed there is no being which is not actually conformed to some intellect, at least the divine. Whence it comes about that this notion of true belongs primarily to the first being, which is God; because per se and essentially he includes knowledge and has with it supreme and necessary conformity; and because he is per se (so to speak) the reason of his own truth and is the origin and measure of all truth which is found in creatures.

36. How the true is an attribute of being.—Secondly it is understood from what has been said how the true is an attribute of being. For it is called an attribute not as if it were a real property distinct from the nature of the thing from being, but in a broader way, only because it is a certain attribute which is reciprocated with being and is in some way distinguished from it, at least according to reason or connotation. The first is evident, because it has been shown that every being is true. It is likewise evident from what has been said that every true thing, in the way explained by us, is real being; because, although beings of reason, in the way in which they are known, can be said to have conformity with the intellect, nevertheless, because of themselves they have neither intelligibility nor entity in which that conformity would be founded, therefore neither do they have the truth which is an attribute of being. Especially since it has been shown that this truth expresses entity itself as conformed. But the other part, about the distinction, has also been sufficiently explained from what has been said. Nor do the things proceed against it which we objected concerning the opinion of Cajetan, because we do not assert that the denomination alone is the property, but entity itself conceived under such a notion. Whence it comes about that through this attribute of the true no new perfection or real notion is explained in being itself, but only the very notion of being is declared more fully through the relationship to knowledge, in the way explained by us. And because this relationship in a certain way happens to being as such, and is in some way, at least according to reason, posterior to it (although it is always conjoined with it), therefore the true, which through this relationship declares the nature of being, is called its attribute or property.

37. A saying of Aristotle is explained.—Thirdly it is understood from what has been said in what sense it was said by Aristotle, at the end of Metaphysics VI, that the true is not in things but in the mind; for he is speaking of complex truth, which is in the composition of the mind, and of the other being or not-being which is signified through such a complexion and is required for its truth. For because truth is in a special mode in the composition and division of the intellect, as I said above, therefore truth, as it were by antonomasia or analogy, is wont to be specially said of that truth which is in composition and division, which is found equally in negations and affirmations and per se does not require real being, but such as is signified through the complexion.

1. Reasons for doubting.—We have said that truth is found in things and in knowledge; it is necessary, then, to explain in what order and mode it belongs to each, which will also help that the notion of transcendental truth may remain more fully explained. It seems, then, that truth belongs to things prior to knowledge. First indeed, because the true is the object of the intellect; therefore before every act of the intellect truth is supposed; therefore truth is in things prior to knowledge. Secondly, because the truth of things is more universal, since it is transcendent; therefore it is prior, because more universal things are prior by their nature. Indeed, since it has been said that the true is convertible with real being, and the concepts of the mind themselves are real beings, they seem to be true by no other reason than in so far as they are beings; therefore the truth of things is of itself more common and prior to the truth of knowledge. On the contrary, however, is the fact that all authors think that the true is something analogous, whose principal analogate is the truth of knowledge, from Aristotle, Metaphysics VI, at the end, saying that truth is only in the intellect formally and properly, but in things as in a cause, as he also says in Metaphysics IX, c. 12. But in words it is said to be as in a sign, in so far as they signify the true or the false, as is said in Peri Hermeneias I, c. 4.

Various opinions

2. It is, then, the opinion of many that truth is first and chiefly found in knowledge, but secondarily in things; indeed that it is intrinsically and formally in knowledge alone, but in things causally or objectively. So that, just as healthy is analogous by attribution, which is said of one analogate only intrinsically and formally, but of the others by mere denomination from it, so true is analogous by attribution of altogether the same notion, which will be said of knowledge formally, because it is true, but of things only by a denomination taken from the truth of knowledge, in so far as they are its cause. As it is also said of the truth of speech only in so far as it is its sign. So thinks Cajetan, cited in the preceding section. And it seems to be taken from St. Thomas, the said I, q. 16, aa. 1, 3 and 6, and De veritate, q. 1, a. 3, and on the places of Aristotle cited above. And it can be further declared from the very definition of the true as it is applied to all these. For knowledge is called true in so far as it is conformed to the thing which it represents, not as the thing itself is true, but as it is such as it is conceived in the mind and affirmed or denied, as St. Thomas noted, in the said q. 16, a. 1, ad 3. But the thing is called true in so far as it is conformed or conformable to the true concept which some intellect has or can have of such a thing. It is therefore a sign that the notion of truth is found per se in knowledge, but in things only by denomination from it, and that there is no notion of true common to both. For by a similar reason we conclude that truth is found in words only analogically as in a sign, because they are not true except in so far as they signify true knowledge. Finally, from the very mode of speaking and conceiving¹ of all this seems able to be sufficiently confirmed; for all, simply speaking, attribute truth to the judgement of the intellect, but to things only in a certain respect; and therefore we simply say that the intellect is true; but we do not say that other things are simply true, but with an addition: true gold, or something similar.

3. But others use a distinction. For things can be denominated true in two ways: in one way as the measure of knowledge; in another way as measured by knowledge. In the former way things are called true as the objects of speculative knowledge, in so far as they are either conformed or apt to be conformed to its truth; because the object is the measure of such knowledge, especially if it is its primary object. Which I say on account of the knowledge which God has of the essences of creatures, by which he is not measured, as I said above, because it does not regard them as its primary object, but as a secondary one eminently contained in the primary, by which that knowledge is proximately as it were measured. Indeed Giles adds, Quodlibet IV, q. 7, that neither is the knowledge which the angel has of the sun, for example, and of other things of which it has infused species, properly measured by their objects, but by the divine ideas from which those species flowed, of which elsewhere; for now it is enough that things of this kind are called true in so far as they can be adequated to the human intellect as its measure. But in the latter way all things are called true which flow from an intellectual exemplar or idea and are conformed to it as to their measure. They say, then, that truth is said equally primarily of every adequation of the measured to the measure which is found between thing and intellect or knowledge, whether it be of knowledge or of the thing; but of the adequation of the measure to the measured, whether it be of knowledge or of the thing, it is not truly and properly said that it is truth, but at most it can be said through the aforesaid analogy of attribution. The foundation of this opinion is only that truth, as the very name shows, expresses a relation of the measured; for it expresses the conformity of the intellect to the thing; for what must be conformed to another in order to be true regards it as a measure.

4. According to which opinion it follows, first, that God in the notion of being is not true, but only in the notion of science or of one knowing speculatively; because in so far as he is being he has no measure of his truth and of his being, nor is he conformed to any intellect, even his own, as measured by it, as was said above. Unless someone wishes to explain negatively that God is true because he is not unconformed to any measure or idea, as St. Thomas explained in a similar case, in the said q. 16, a. 5, ad 2. It follows, secondly, that the divine science as practical is not true simply speaking, because as such it is not measured but the measure of things. It follows, thirdly, that the essences of creatures considered according to the being of essence cannot be called true simply, but only through the aforesaid analogy, because they do not have a measure in the notion of essence. It follows, fourthly, that, absolutely speaking, there is not an order of prior and posterior between the truth of things and of knowledge, but between the truth of the measure and of the measured; because the latter, whether it exists in things or in knowledge, is said to be proper and formal truth; but the former, both in things and in knowledge, is said not to be truth, but only the relation of the measure, which through analogy is sometimes called truth. And many of the modern writers seem to follow this opinion.

5. A third opinion can be that it is one thing to speak of the first origin or imposition of this word true or truth, another of the proper significate which it now in fact has. For in the former way it is indeed true that through that word the truth of knowledge, or of composition and division, was first signified, because that is better known to us; nevertheless that word has now been extended, not through metaphorical transference but through propriety, to signify the truth of things, which in the notion of truth too can be more perfect than the truth of knowledge. As the theologians are wont to say that the names of paternity or mercy or similar ones were first imposed to signify these properties in creatures, but afterwards were extended to signify similar properties of God, not through metaphor but through supreme propriety and analogy, in which the first and chief analogate is God as having properties of this kind. The foundation of this opinion is that the adequation of the thing to the intellect is as perfect and proper as is the adequation of the intellect to the thing; therefore on this side nothing stands in the way that the notion of truth belong equally to each. Again, that this adequation is after the manner of measure or of measured seems to matter nothing to its being able in either way to obtain both the name and the notion of truth; both because it is proved by no sufficient reason that the notion of the true intrinsically expresses and postulates the notion of the measured, nor is it gathered from the common definition of truth, but rather the contrary; for it is called the conformity between thing and intellect, where nothing is said of conformity after the manner of measure or of measured. Indeed, as St. Thomas noted in the places cited above, by virtue of that definition truth is no more said to be the conformity of the intellect to the thing than the conformity of the thing to the intellect. And also because that notion of measure and measured adds nothing in one extreme rather than in the other except either a denomination taken from some causality of that thing which is called the measure toward the thing which is called measured, or some transcendental order according to which one thing is ordered to another rather than conversely, as science to the knowable rather than the knowable to science. But these respects do not change the truth or propriety of the adequation or conformity, which alone is per se required for the notion of truth. As, for example, if a thing made by art is compared to the intellect of the artificer from which it proceeded, and to the intellect of another who perfectly conceives the notion and idea of such an artefact, influencing and causing nothing in it, certainly the artefact in the thing is equally conformed to one and to the other intellect; therefore it is equally true with respect to each, even if to one it has the relation of effect and not to the other.

6. And to this are added the things which we inferred to follow from the second opinion; which, because they seem of themselves inconvenient, persuade that this difference does not pertain formally and per se to the notion of truth. But this difference being set aside, there is no reason why the notion of truth could not belong to every adequation between thing and intellect, whether it be between intellect and thing or between thing and intellect, and whether it be between measure and measured or between measured and measure, or between those things which have neither notion among themselves, as we were saying of the essences of creatures as such and of the speculative science of creatures in God. Indeed neither does a sufficient reason of analogy seem able to be assigned between the truth of the thing and of knowledge; both because, although the name of truth was first invented by us on account of knowledge, it does not therefore come about that it is said analogically of the truth of things, as has been explained; and also on account of the things which were proposed in the preceding section concerning the opinion of Cajetan, by which it seems to be shown that the truth of things cannot consist in a mere extrinsic and metaphorical denomination.

Resolution of the question

7. The truth of composition and division is not transcendental.—From these opinions we can take something which may help to explain this question. In order, however, that the resolution which seems truer to us may be understood, it is to be noticed, what we said above, that truth is found in a more special mode in composition and division than in simple things, either concepts or things. But that special truth which is in the composition and division of the intellect is in truth not the transcendental truth of that act or judgement which in composition and division is denominated true. Which is evident thus, for transcendental truth, since it is in its own way a proper attribute of being, is immutable and inseparable from being; but that truth which is in composition is separable from it as far as depends on its notion, because sometimes it is separated when, the same judgement remaining, the thing judged is changed and begins to be otherwise than it is judged, although before it had conformity with the judgement. But if sometimes this truth is immutable, that comes from this, that the thing about which the judgement is concerned is immutable either simply or as it falls under the judgement.

8. In composition, with its truth or falsity, transcendental truth always stands.—And hence it may be understood that in this very judgement or act of composition and division a twofold truth is found, one transcendental, the other special, which we can call the truth of knowledge or accidental, while others call it formal. Which is declared and proved thus, for when the judgement is changed from true to false, it loses some truth and does not lose all, but necessarily retains some; therefore it had a twofold truth. The major is self-evident, for falsity, since it is contrary to truth, excludes some truth from the act when it is changed from true to false. But the minor is evident, because the true is convertible with being, as we have said; but that judgement which is changed from true to false nevertheless remains a real judgement and a real being; therefore it is necessary that it remain true also with transcendental truth. Which consists in this, that in the notion of a judgement of the intellect that act has the true essence and species of judgement and conformity with the proper concept or idea of an intellectual judgement. Which can conveniently be explained in a vocal proposition; for this enunciation, every man is white, or another similar one, if you consider in it the conformity to the thing which it signifies, does not have truth but falsity, and in this sense is called not true but simply false; but if you consider in it the definition or essence of a proposition and the conformity which it has with the rules of the dialectical art or with the idea of a proposition, it is understood to have its truth as it were transcendental, according to which it can be called a true proposition, in the way in which gold is called true gold, and in the way in which a syllogism will be called a true syllogism if the inference is good, even if it concludes something false.

9. The primary signification of the word truth.—This distinction, then, being established, I think, first of all, that truth in its primary signification was said of the truth of knowledge which is specially found in composition and division. All the things adduced above prove this; for by this reason Aristotle often said that truth is in the intellect or in composition and division. Likewise for this cause a judgement having this truth is called simply true. But if it lacks it, it is called simply false, even if it has transcendental truth in the mode declared by us. Finally the reason seems to be that truth of this kind is better known to us and is more formally in our knowledge, as was explained above.

10. In its primary signification truth can extrinsically denominate real beings and beings of reason.—Secondly I think that things known can by extrinsic analogy and denomination from this truth of knowledge be called true, yet that the true is not taken according to this notion or denomination when it is said to be an attribute of being. The former part is proved from the things adduced in reporting the first opinion and the opinion of Cajetan treated in the second section. It is also declared by that example of the healthy; for, just as that is called healthy both which has health and which causes and signifies it, so in the present case both the judgement having this truth, and the vocal proposition signifying it, and the thing itself in so far as it causes or founds it, can be called true. Whence usage also confirms this; for we say not only that the judgement by which we believe that God is three and one is true, and similarly that the proposition by which we affirm this is true, but also that this very thing, that God is three and one, is true; which truth that thing has only as it is objectively in the intellect, that is, in so far as it is complexly known and judged truly and as it is; and of the true or the denomination of true of this kind Aristotle also said that it is not in the thing but in the intellect. Whence this denomination of true belongs also to non-beings; for so we say it is true both that a chimera is a feigned being and that man is not a horse. And hence the latter part is evident, that this denomination is not the truth which is an attribute of being. And that reason also confirms this, that the true is the object of the intellect; for, although some say that truth is only a condition of the object of the intellect, not antecedent but rather consequent upon the act of the intellect, as may be seen in Toletus, De Anima III, q. 20, nevertheless in this way the true would be called very improperly the object of the intellect; because the object of a passive power as such is supposed to the act, and therefore those conditions which are proper to the object must be supposed, not follow; therefore the true, as it is said to be the object of the intellect, is not in so far as it is denominated by the act itself, but according to some other notion according to which it can precede the act. Finally the things by which it was proved above that transcendental truth does not consist in this mere extrinsic denomination confirm this.

11. The transference of the word truth.—Thirdly, therefore, I think that from this truth of knowledge this name of true has been transferred to signify this property of any real being whatever, which is conformity with the intellect conceiving, in act or in potency, the thing under such a notion of real being. This is evident from what has been said and from a sufficient enumeration. You will say that this denomination in no way differs from that extrinsic denomination by which a thing is called true because it can found or cause the truth of the intellect. The answer is by denying the consequence, because that denomination is taken precisely from extrinsic truth as denominating the object or its cause; but this truth of things is not taken from that denomination, but from the very entity of the thing as having conformity to another. And so, just as knowledge or judgement is called true because it is conformed to the very being or not-being of the thing, yet is not denominated true from the truth of the thing itself but from its own being, connoting at the same time the being of the object itself such as is represented through the judgement, so in the present case the thing is called true because it has being conformed or conformable to such a concept, which denomination is not taken extrinsically from the truth of the concept, but from the intrinsic entity, as it is under a relationship or quasi-relationship to another. It is confirmed and declared, first; for, just as in relatives this white thing, for example, is called similar to another, not by extrinsic denomination from the likeness which is in the other, but because it has in itself a relation by which it tends to the other, or because it has in itself such a quality as is in the other, so in the present case it can easily be understood that the thing is called true on account of conformity with the intellect, although it is not denominated extrinsically from the truth of the intellect alone. Finally, if we prescind in the mind the truth of knowledge from the representation of the idea or concept, the thing would still be denominated true through conformity to the idea so representing; therefore this denomination is not formally taken from the truth of the intellect itself.

12. By what analogy truth is said of the truth of knowledge and of the thing.—Whence I further gather that the true, as it is said of the truth of composition or division and of the truth of things, or transcendental truth, is not properly said according to some analogy of attribution taken from some form which belongs intrinsically to one of the analogates, but extrinsically to the others, because, as has been shown, a denomination of this kind does not intervene in the present case. This word, then, seems to be said equivocally under these two notions, or at most according to an analogy of proportionality. Because here too there does not seem to intervene one objective concept according to some one common notion; for, as we have explained, the notion of truth in composition and division is far other than it is in other things. There can remain, then, only a certain proportional analogy, which consists in this, that, just as the truth of composition requires that conformity between the being of the thing and the judgement, so transcendental truth requires such an entity of the thing as can be adequated to the proper concept or idea, or to the intellectual representation of such a thing. But an analogy of this kind in no way stands in the way of the transcendent true being able to be a property of being, because, although the transference of the name was taken from that proportionality, it nevertheless does not formally signify it, but the property in which it can be considered. Just as in the healthy, besides the analogy of attribution declared above, another of proportionality can be understood, according to which an apple in which nothing is corrupt is called healthy, because, just as the health of the animal consists in the due proportion and disposition of the humours, so the apple is called healthy because it has the due disposition of all its parts; and yet healthy under this signification signifies some property or intrinsic perfection of the apple, namely its integrity or incorruption. So, then, the true, although it has been transferred through some analogy of proportionality to signify the truth of things, can nevertheless signify a property of being itself.

13. But what we say of the truth of things is to be understood also of the truth which is attributed to the senses or to the simple concepts of the mind; indeed also of the truth of composition itself, in so far as some notion of being is considered in it; for in all these the truth is of the same mode or notion as transcendental truth, and properly consists in the adequation of such a thing to the idea or relation which can be formed of it, although in sense or in the intellect it is sometimes explained through order to the objects, because the object is as it were the form of the act or concept, which takes its species from it. And often this transcendental truth is wont to be explained through the intrinsic principles, and especially through the form, as that is called true paternity which is terminated at a true son begotten by it, although the formal notion of truth, even in paternity itself, consists in adequation to the intellect.

The reasons for doubting posited at the beginning are solved

14. Finally from these things satisfaction has been made to the reasons for doubting posited at the beginning; for the former prove that transcendental truth according to itself is prior, yet not that this word was first imposed to signify it. And the reasons made in the second place about the truth of knowledge prove this likewise. But the question which is touched upon there about the true, how it is the object of the intellect, is not proper to this place, but is to be explained in the matter on the soul, although in the thing the exposition is easier from what has been said. For if the discussion is absolutely of the intellect, the true is not otherwise said to be its object than being, for by the name of true there is signified only that aptitude or proportion which is in being, that it can be understood; for in so far as it is such that it can have adequation with some concept, so far it can terminate the act of the intellect and be its object. Whence conversely the intellect then understands the thing when it forms that concept to which that thing can be adequated, and therefore it is said to understand it as true. And in this way truth is said to be a necessary condition in the object of the intellect, on which matter Cajetan can be read, I, q. 16, a. 3, ad 3, and II-II, q. 1, a. 1; and Capreolus, In I, dist. 2, a. 1; Giles, Quodlibet IV, q. 20. But if the discussion is of the intellect as properly judging, or as composing and dividing, then the true is called the object of the intellect because, in the way in which truth is said to be in composition, the intellect never gives its assent except by knowing the truth or conformity of one thing, or of its concept, to another in exercised act; by knowing, I say, or at least thinking that it knows; and in this way the intellect is said always to assent under the notion of true, and the true is said to be the proper object of the judgement or assent of the intellect.