Disputationes metaphysicae

1. In what the difficulty lies.—The whole difficulty consists in discerning the modal distinction from the others; for the real distinction and that of reason, since they are extremely opposed, are easily discerned; but the modal distinction, since it is intermediate, is sometimes thought to be real on account of the agreement which it has with that, but sometimes is thought to be nothing in the thing, but only according to reason, on account of a certain agreement with the other. In order, then, that some general signs may be had which can be applied to particular questions, some things must briefly be said, supposing that, in order that some things be distinguished by us more than by reasoning reason (of which distinction nothing need be added, because it is altogether feigned), at the least, or first of all, it is necessary that they have distinct objective concepts, and according to them formal notions in some way distinct; because, unless they are conceived at least in this way, neither will they be conceived as distinct, nor will there be any reason for inquiring how great or of what kind the distinction between them is; but several objective concepts being supposed, it is excellently and deservedly inquired how it will be known whether they have a distinction in the thing, and of what kind it is.

The sign of actual distinction in the thing

2. I say, first: whenever two objective concepts are so related that in reality and in the individual they can be separated, either so that one remains without the other in the nature of things, or so that they are really disjoined and lose the real union which they had, it is a sign that between them there is a greater distinction than that of reasoned reason, and so some actual distinction from the nature of the thing, or one which is in reality. This assertion is common among the Doctors, and it is taken from Aristotle, Topics VII, c. 1, fifteenth place, where he speaks thus: Further, if one can be without the other, it will not be the same; where Alexander of Aphrodisias notes it. It can also be taken from Augustine, De Trinitate VI, c. 6, where, having said: In each body magnitude is one thing, colour another, figure another, he subjoins such a proof: For both, the magnitude being diminished, the same colour and the same figure can remain; and, the colour being changed, the same magnitude and the same figure; and, the figure not remaining the same, it can be as great and coloured in the same way; and whatever other things are said of the body together can be changed both together and several without the others; and by this the nature of the body is proved to be manifold, but in no way simple. And below he proves thence that the human soul is not simple, because it has various acts and affections which he shows to be distinct, because some can be found without others, and some more, some less. The Scholastics too frequently use this rule, as is evident from the Master, In I, dist. 8; Durandus, dist. 30, q. 2; Soto, In II, dist. 1, q. 5, and In III, dist. 8, q. 1; Ockham, In I, dist. 1, q. 3; and Gabriel there, q. 3, a. 3, dub. 1; Hervaeus, Quodlibet III, q. 3; and among the metaphysicians John of Jandun uses this rule, Metaphysics VI, q. 10; Antonius Trombeta, Metaphysics V, q. 3, a. 1; Fonseca, Metaphysics V, c. 6, q. 6, sect. 1. Likewise Ferrariensis, Physics I, q. 10; and Paul of Venice, Physics III, text 19; Astudillo, cited in the preceding section. Many use the same to prove a distinction from the nature of the thing between subsistence and created nature, as is evident from Giles, cited in the preceding section; Medina, III, q. 4, a. 2. And below we shall report more in their place. And by the same argument it is wont to be proved that inherence is distinguished from the existence of the accident, and dependence or action from the term, all of which we shall see in what follows.

3. It is proved by reason, because, if things which are conceived by us as having two objective concepts are found conjoined in the thing and are afterwards separated, either each remains existing in reality after the separation from the other, or one ceases to be and the other remains; if it happens in the former way, it is necessary that those two be distinguished from the nature of the thing, indeed even really; first, because it is impossible that the same thing altogether be disjoined and separated from itself in reality; for an open contradiction is involved; for no greater union in the thing can be thought out than total identity in the thing; indeed that is not union but unity. Just as, therefore, it is impossible that what is indivisible be divided, so also that what is altogether the same be disjoined from itself. Next, because, if those two remain in reality and not united among themselves, one is not the mode of the other, nor conversely; because it is of the essential notion of a mode, as we saw, to be actually united or affixed to the thing of which it is the mode; therefore, whenever something can be separated from another and preserved separated, it is an evident sign that it is not its mode; it will therefore be either a thing of itself really distinct from the other, or a mode of another really distinct thing, by reason of which the mode itself too will be really distinguished from the other thing. But if two things are so separated in the thing that one remains existing and not the other, it is necessary that they be distinguished at least modally. First, because it is impossible that the same thing be and not be; therefore, if this does not exist which existed before, and something remains existing, they cannot be altogether the same in the thing; otherwise the same thing would at the same time exist and not exist. Secondly, when these two are so separated, there is something positive which in the thing is taken away from the other and ceases to be, taking something broadly as it is distinguished against nothing, for every real thing or mode; for we suppose that each of those things which are separable in the aforesaid way is such; that positive thing, therefore, after it is separated, is not; therefore, when it was, it was in some way distinct from that which remains existing. Finally, because it is no less impossible that the same thing altogether be separated from itself when one extreme is destroyed than when each is preserved; but it has been shown that the same thing cannot be separated from itself while each extreme remains; therefore neither will it be able when the other does not remain; therefore, as often as such a separation can come about, a distinction in the thing is supposed. And therefore those err greatly who think that a relation is something real and positive without which the foundation can remain in the thing itself, and yet that it is not actually and in reality distinguished from the foundation itself; for it is an open implication of contradiction. For if the relation in its essence is something real, and now is in the foundation and afterwards is not, the foundation itself remaining integral in its entity and essence, it is necessary that whatever it is which is the relation be in some way distinct in the thing itself from the foundation; otherwise the same thing altogether according to the thing would cease to be and would remain.

4. An objection is dissolved.—But you will object: for animal is in the thing conjoined to man and is separable from him in the horse or in the lion; and yet it is not distinguished in the thing from him, as was said above. The answer is that for this reason I said in the rule proposed: That which in the thing itself and in the individual is separable; for animal (and the same holds of all similar predicates) is only separable from man according to the common notion conceived, according to which it does not have in the thing unity in many, but by reason only; but in so far as animal is in the thing and in the individual conjoined to man, it is not separable from man; for this individual animal which in the thing is this man can never remain in the thing unless the man remains, nor conversely can this man last without this animal lasting.

5. A theological rejoinder is answered.—The divine relations are in no way distinguished in the thing from the essence.—You will press: for at least in God the divine essence is in the thing conjoined to paternity; and the same in number is separable from it in so far as it is conjoined to filiation; and yet they are not actually distinguished in the thing itself. Some theologians, on account of this difficulty, seem to admit an actual distinction, and in the thing itself at least a modal one, between the divine relation and the essence, which is wont to be attributed to Scotus, but Durandus thinks it more clearly; for Scotus speaks more obscurely and very much in common of his formal distinction. But that opinion in the aforesaid sense is very false and much repugnant to the divine simplicity and perfection. But this disputation we leave to the theologians, and answer briefly. First, by denying that the essence is separable from paternity; for it is one thing to be communicable to filiation or procession, another to be separable from paternity; rather, from its intrinsic notion it postulates so to be communicated to them as not to be separated from this; the rule posited about separation, therefore, has no place here. Secondly, the answer is that to be in that way communicable to many things really distinct among themselves without distinction from that which is common to them, except by reason alone or virtually, is proper to a thing simply infinite; and therefore, although, speaking broadly of separation for conjunction with another thing really distinct in creatures, it is an excellent argument that whatever is conjoined with another really distinct thing is itself also distinct in the thing from the other extreme, because one finite thing the same in number cannot by identity be conjoined with things really distinct, nevertheless in an infinite thing this is no argument, on account of its supreme simplicity and perfection; and this is the mystery of the Trinity, which we hold by faith alone and most certain.

The sign of a merely modal distinction

6. I say, secondly: the separation of one from another which is only non-mutual (as it is commonly called), that is, in which one extreme can remain without the other, yet not conversely, is a sufficient argument of modal distinction, yet not of a greater or real one properly taken. The former part has been sufficiently proved in the preceding assertion. The latter is proved, because from a non-mutual separation of this kind it is rightly proved that that thing which can remain when the other extreme is destroyed has of itself its reality, intrinsically and entitatively or essentially independent of that extreme which can be destroyed while it remains; but it cannot be concluded thence that the other extreme, which can be destroyed, has of itself a proper entity, because, as is supposed, that extreme is such that it cannot remain without the other; but for this it is enough that it be its mode; indeed this is intrinsic, as we have said, to modal entity, that it cannot remain by itself nor be actually separated from that of which it is the mode; therefore from the aforesaid separation no greater distinction than modal can be concluded. And it is confirmed; for so local motion is compared to the mobile, sitting to the one sitting, action to the term, between which no one who thinks rightly posits a greater distinction than modal.

7. A notable small question.—But someone will ask: granted that this as it were negative rule is true, that from this separation a greater distinction is not necessarily gathered, whether the positive rule too is true, namely that things which are separable only in this way are also distinguished only modally and not by a greater, real distinction. For such a rule seems uncertain and so fallacious; for, although that sign alone is not a sufficient argument of greater distinction, it does not seem a sufficient sign for denying a greater distinction. For it can happen that that inseparability which is on the side of the other extreme arises not from some identity or lesser distinction, but from some more intrinsic and separable mode of dependence. As, for example, subject and accident are so compared that the subject can remain without the accident, but the accident cannot naturally remain without the subject, even if it is a thing distinct from it. And some think that certain accidents, even if they are really distinct, cannot even supernaturally be preserved without a subject, as vital acts, and any others perhaps similar. That positive rule, therefore, is either false or uncertain. The answer is that it is one thing to speak of natural inseparability, another of inseparability in order to the absolute power of God. For from the former alone a sufficient argument of real indistinction most properly and rigorously taken cannot be taken, as the argument made and the example of subject and accident convince; and similarly of matter and individual material forms; for matter can be separated from any individual form whatever and preserved without it; but no such form can naturally be separated from matter so as to be preserved without it.

8. An objection is met.—But if the discussion is of inseparability in order to the absolute power of God, a very probable argument is taken that things which are compared in the aforesaid way and cannot be preserved mutually separated are distinguished only modally. The reason is that, if one extreme of those two is such that through the absolute power of God it cannot be preserved without the other, it is a great argument that it is essentially only a certain mode and not a true entity, because, if it were a true entity, it could not have so intrinsic a dependence on another entity that God could not supply it by his infinite power; therefore it can only come from this, that that extreme in its intrinsic essence is not an entity but only a mode. The antecedent is evident, because God can supply efficient causality as such, as is known to all. Likewise, by preserving an accident without a subject he supplies material causality not with respect to the composite but with respect to the other extreme, which alone of that genus can intervene in the present case. And by the same reason he could supply a similar formal causality, if it intervened, because of itself it is no less intrinsic than material. Nor can another genus of dependence between absolute things be feigned, to omit relation and term, of which immediately. You will say: many think that matter cannot be preserved by God without form, although form can be preserved without matter; and yet it does not follow that they are distinguished only modally. The answer is: those who so think will see on what probable foundation they assert it; for that opinion could never meet with my approval, as I shall say below in treating of causes. Next, it is not similar of matter; for, although we gratuitously grant that matter cannot be preserved without every form, nevertheless it is certain that it can naturally be preserved without this or that form and without any form determinately; and this is a sufficient argument that matter is not a mode of form, but a thing distinct as far as depends on itself; for that which is only a mode not only cannot be separated from every thing of which it is the mode, but also this mode in the individual cannot be separated from this individual thing, as this sitting from this one sitting; since, therefore, matter in the individual and this in number can be separated from this form and be under any other, it is rightly gathered that it is not a mode of form. But again from the fact that form is a separable thing able to remain without matter, at least by absolute power, it is also rightly concluded that it is not a mode of matter, but has in itself its entity, which is conjoined to matter by a distinct union; besides other arguments which can be taken from the perfection of form over matter and from its activity and other similar things. The rule posited, then, even declared in that positive way, is very probable as regards us. I say as regards us, because perhaps it can happen that things are distinct in themselves which with respect to our knowledge do not exhibit a sufficient sign of distinction. Yet, because we cannot pass judgement on things which are not seen in themselves except through effects or signs known to us, and because we have a general rule that distinctions are not to be multiplied without sufficient foundation, because distinction is not made by nature without sufficient cause or necessity, and finally because that inseparability seems also directly to show some identity, therefore we probably conjecture that where mutual separation is not possible, but only non-mutual, there is no distinction except modal.

Signs of real distinction

9. I say, thirdly: although several indications are wont to be assigned for knowing real distinction, nevertheless two which are taken from separation seem the chief. One is of separation only as regards real union, that is, if both can at the same time and actually be preserved in the nature of things without real union among themselves. The other is of mutual separation as regards existence, that is, that one can be preserved without the other and conversely, per se, immediately, and without order or necessary connection with some third thing. These two rules have almost been proved in explaining the two preceding conclusions. And the first is evident, because those two things which are so separated cannot be so related that one is the mode of the other, nor conversely, because it is of the essence of a mode that it cannot be except actually united to that of which it is the mode, because it is united by itself and not by another mode of union, as has been sufficiently declared; therefore those two will either be distinct things, which is what we intend, or modes of distinct things, or one will be a thing and the other the mode of another distinct thing; and in whichever of these ways they are related they will be really distinguished, either by themselves or by reason of the distinct things, according to what was said in the preceding section. The second is proved, because, when two things are so related that they can be mutually separated and one preserved without the other, neither can be the mode of the other, because it is of the intrinsic notion of a mode that it cannot remain without the thing of which it is the mode; therefore each of them will be a true thing bringing with it a true entity which can be preserved without the other. Therefore it is necessary that things of this kind be really distinguished, because they are distinguished in reality, since they can be separated, and they are not distinguished as a thing and the mode of a thing, but as thing and thing; therefore they are distinguished really. But I said per se and immediately, because it can happen that two modes of the same thing can mutually be one without the other and conversely; and then a real distinction between them is not rightly gathered, because, although not by reason of themselves, formally speaking, at least by reason of the thing which they modify, they have among themselves a certain real identity, and neither of them is separable so as to be preserved without the thing which it modifies.

10. And from these things it is evident that it matters nothing whether this separation can come about naturally or by absolute power, because it is so essential to that thing which we call only a mode to be actually affixed to and modifying the thing of which it is the mode that it is repugnant to it by absolute power to be preserved without that thing, or otherwise than by actually modifying it. By which reason neither can figure be understood by the mind separated from every quantity and thing of which it is the figure, nor relation without foundation, if it is its mode, nor motion without the mobile, and so of other similar things. And the reason has been touched upon above, because things of this kind do not have from their proper concept a sufficient entity in which they could be preserved, but only from a certain identity to those things in which they are; therefore whatever is separable in the aforesaid way, even by absolute power, is not a mode but a distinct thing. As regards inferring a distinction in the thing itself, then, it matters nothing whether the aforesaid separation comes about naturally or supernaturally; only as regards us the distinction can be better known when the separation comes about naturally; but sometimes it is made known to us through supernatural mysteries, whose knowledge helps much toward knowing natural things. In which way through the mystery of the Eucharist it has been established to us more certainly that quantity is a thing distinct from substance than could have been established through natural knowledge.

11. Worthy of attention.—Where it can also be observed in passing that, although sometimes a mutual separation and preservation of two things has not been made, but of one only from the other, nevertheless it suffices for us to infer a real distinction, as in the aforesaid example; hitherto indeed it has not been done by God that material substance be preserved without quantity, but only that quantity remain without material substance; and nevertheless this is a sufficient argument for us to gather that quantity and substance are distinguished not only modally but also really. Not indeed by reason of the form (so to speak), but by reason of the matter; for in humanity and subsistence too it has been done that humanity be preserved without created subsistence; but it has not been done, nor do we believe it can be done, that created subsistence be without its proper substantial nature, of which it is the term; whence in this example from the aforesaid separation we gather not a real distinction but only a modal one. In these, therefore, besides separation, it is necessary to consider the nature of that which is preserved without the other; for, if it is by its nature as it were adhering to another and more imperfect than it, and finally that which seems most of all able to have the notion of a mode, and nevertheless it is preserved without the other, it is a sign of real distinction; but it is otherwise when that which remains in the thing is more perfect and has the chief entity of the thing. As in the aforesaid examples, comparing substance and quantity according to themselves, it is clear that substance is more perfect, and that, if one had to be the mode of the other, not substance would have to be the mode of quantity, but quantity the mode of substance; therefore, since by the separation of quantity from substance it has been sufficiently declared that quantity is not a mode but a true thing, it has consequently been sufficiently declared that substance and quantity are distinguished not as thing and mode, but as two things. But in nature and subsistence it is rather evident that the substantial nature is the chief entity of the thing, and that, if one of them is the mode of the other, subsistence is the mode of the nature and not conversely; but by virtue of the separation made it has not been declared that subsistence is more than a mode, since it itself has not been preserved without the nature; and therefore from it it is not permitted to gather a real distinction, but only a modal one.

12. Whence distinction is to be conjectured in those things which have hitherto been separated by no power.—But a difficulty remains here when no separation, either natural or supernatural, has been made, how then a real distinction can be known; because then the aforesaid rules cannot serve, although it is not repugnant that many things be really distinguished which have hitherto not been separated in any of the aforesaid ways, as the matter and form of the heaven. But if you say that, granted that they have not been separated, they can be known as separable, this is the same as if it were said that they are known to be distinct, or at least it is of the same difficulty; for this is what we are inquiring, how we shall know that they are separable if they are neither naturally separated nor have hitherto been separated by God in any of the aforesaid ways. And the difficulty is increased because some things are inseparable even by absolute power which are nevertheless thought to be really distinct, as many think of the intellect and the will, both among themselves and with respect to the soul. On account of the former difficulty it can be said that the said sign taken from separation is neither adequate nor unique nor always first or necessary, and is only assigned as more certain and better known when it can be had; and therefore besides it some others are wont to be assigned, which are briefly to be touched upon.

Another sign of real distinction is rejected as useless

13. The first is the distinction of existences; for things which are really distinguished have distinct existences; but things which are modally distinguished have only one existence; for a mode is a mode because it does not have another existence besides the existence of the thing of which it is the mode.

14. But this sign is of no moment, because either it is more obscure than that with which we are dealing, or it begs the question, or it involves something false. For, first, if it is true that existence is the actual entity of the thing, it is the same to say that those things are really distinguished which have distinct existences as if it were said that those things are really distinguished which have distinct entities. But if existence is feigned to be a thing distinct from the actual essence, either it is supposed that those things which have distinct existences also have distinct essences; and this indeed is true, yet it is no less difficult to know distinct existences than distinct essences, unless perhaps through separation; or it is asserted that two essences can have one existence and then are distinguished only modally, but that real distinction is when with the distinction of essences the distinction of existences too is conjoined; and this I think is not only so hidden that naturally it can be known of no things, but also false, because there is no greater reason for distinguishing essences than existences in things which are modally distinguished; for the same mode of distinction which is between essences can be between existences. Wherefore, supposing, what we shall prove below, that existence is nothing other besides the very thing of the actual essence, just as in the thing and the mode distinct essences are understood, so also distinct existences are to be understood, because the mode, as co-distinct from the thing which it modifies, has its actuality; the reason, therefore, and the mode of distinction is the same between those two, whether they are considered in potency or in act, according to the being of essence or according to the being of existence. Add finally that, according to the opinion asserting that existence is a thing distinct from essence, things really distinct can exist by the same indivisible existence, as matter and form and all the parts of the same composite; therefore, even according to that opinion, the distinction of things is not sufficiently or truly manifested through the distinction of existences in those things which are so distinct that they are conjoined among themselves, in which the present difficulty is chiefly concerned, since distinct things can have the same existence. But if perhaps someone does not admit this, there is no reason why he can consistently admit that a thing and its mode have altogether the same existence, rather than one modally distinct, so that each has a being accommodated to itself; therefore the same question will be of the distinction of things or modes and of the distinction of existences.

Another sign of real distinction taken from Aristotle is expounded

15. The second sign can be taken from diverse production or corruption, so that those things are said to be really distinguished which are generated and corrupted by diverse generation and corruption. But conversely those things are really the same which are generated by the same generation; for Aristotle used this sign, Metaphysics IV, text 3, to prove that being and one are the same. Fonseca reports this opinion from Antonius Trombeta, treatise De formalitatibus, c. 2, and attacks it, because the properties of the soul are produced by the same action as the soul itself, and yet are distinct things; and conversely the relation is not really distinguished from the foundation nor the figure from the quantity, and yet they are produced by diverse action. But I do not think this sign is false if it is understood with due proportion; I think, however, that it is almost useless for knowing distinction, except in so far as it in some way includes the sign of separation. I explain each, and first I suppose that the discussion is of the natural action or production of things, not mixing in miracles. Likewise, that the discussion is of things which of themselves and by their nature require distinct actions by which they come about, even if they are produced together. But why I suppose these I shall explain below. Again, I notice that some things can be understood to be produced by distinct action in two ways. In one way, per se primarily and without any natural connection or consecution of such actions among themselves; in another way, with connection of the actions, so that one results from the other by natural necessity. Whence conversely some things can also be said to come about by the same action in two ways, namely either equally primarily and without any emanation of one from the other, or one primarily and the other secondarily, in so far as it necessarily results from the prior term.

16. Things, therefore, which in the former way come about per se primarily by actions distinct in the thing must necessarily be distinguished in the thing; and as regards this the rule posited above is most true. Because the whole notion and distinction of actions is taken from the terms; therefore, if the terms are such that they require distinct actions, they too will be distinct; yet a real distinction between the terms cannot absolutely be inferred hence, nor a greater one than is between the actions themselves; which sometimes can be distinguished really, as the production of wood and its heating; but sometimes only modally, as the production of wood and its local motion, which are distinguished only as two modes of the same wood; and in the same way the things produced through actions of this kind are distinguished, for through the former substance and heat are produced, which are really distinct; but through the latter substance and where, or local presence, which are distinguished only modally. The things produced, therefore, keep a distinction proportional to their productions. Which is true not only when actions of this kind come about separately and without natural conjunction, as happens in the production and heating of fire, but also when those actions are naturally conjoined and one results from the other, as happens, for example, in the production of some heavy thing in the region of the air and its motion downward, which naturally follows upon such generation; for there the distinction of the actions is evident and almost to sense, because one comes about intrinsically in one instant, the other is only extrinsically begun in the same instant. But the same distinction and consecution can be between instantaneous actions, as between the production of fire and the consequence of heat; and the same holds of the production of the soul and the emanation of its powers from it; for, if those powers are distinct things, that emanation too is a physically distinct action, although it results from the other and is therefore said not to come about per se primarily. And similar examples can be applied in actions distinct only modally, such as are the creation of an angel, for example, and the production of some where, or local presence, which naturally follows upon it; and the production of some quantity and its figuration, which comes about afterwards; and the same holds of the production of the foundation and the resultance of the relation, supposing that it is a distinct mode. And so it is evident that the instances or examples adduced against that opinion do not press; for in all of them, as there is a distinction between the actions, so also between the terms, and conversely.

17. It is evident next in what sense the principle posited by Aristotle in the said place is true: things which are generated by one production are the same. For this is true of things which come about per se and immediately by a single real action; but those which are only said to be produced, or rather co-produced, by one action, in so far as one results from the other, need not be really the same, but only in subject or by a certain binding together, because in truth they do not come about immediately and proximately by one real action, as has been declared in substance and really distinct attributes. Indeed it is necessary that that one action be taken indivisibly; for, if it is in some way composite, some distinction will be able to be found in its adequate term. As by a single action, for example heating, or the eduction of form from the potency of matter, heat or form comes about and is united to the subject or matter, where in the term two things come about distinct from the nature of the thing, or modally, namely the entity of the form or heat and its union; and yet the action is one, yet in some way composed of as it were partial modes which can be considered in it.

18. And hence further it is evident from what has been said why I said that this sign is almost useless for knowing the distinctions of things; for the same various modes of distinctions can be found between actions which are between terms, namely real, modal, and sometimes of reason, as is between the generation of man and of animal; but these modes of distinctions are not better known to us in actions than in terms. Rather, more frequently and more a priori we hunt out the distinction of actions from the terms; for for no other reason do we think that heating is an action really distinct from the wood, but its constitution in such a where distinct only modally, except because heat is a distinct thing, but local presence is only a distinct mode. I added moreover that these are to be understood of the distinction of actions which the terms per se by their nature require, because, if actions are distinguished only either from the succession of time or from the diverse mode in which they come about, it is not necessary that from the distinction of actions some distinction in the term be gathered. For, just as distinct modes can be in the same thing, especially successively, so distinct actions can be terminated at the same term if they are from distinct agents or at distinct times; in which way the same light is now produced by one action by one lamp, and can afterwards be preserved by another through a distinct action; and the same man is produced through generation and reproduced through resurrection. I said finally that miracles are not to be mixed in, because by divine power the same thing can be produced or preserved by several actions not only successively but also at the same time, as I treated more fully in tom. 3 of the Third Part. But conversely I do not think it can happen that altogether distinct things are produced by the same action. But the reason of the difference is not difficult from what has been said, because action is a certain mode of the thing which comes about; but one and the same indivisible mode cannot be in distinct things, as was proved above; but that several modes be in the same thing is not a repugnance when the modes themselves are not opposed among themselves; but it can seem superfluous when they are either of the same notion or tend to the same thing; yet with respect to the divine wisdom it can be not superfluous, and no conflict is shown on account of which it would not be possible.

Another sign of real distinction is weighed

19. A third sign is wont to be applied, namely, that when one is related as producing and the other as produced it is a sufficient sign of real distinction. So Fonseca, Metaphysics V, c. 6, q. 6, sect. 1, from St. Thomas, I, q. 41, a. 4. But this sign first of all is not universal, as is self-evident. Next, if it is only assigned to conclude a distinction from the nature of the thing, abstracting from modal or proper real, it is generally true; but if it is understood of the proper real distinction, in order that it hold true it must be restricted to production either substantial, proper, perfect and primary, or accidental which is terminated at something which is not united to the producer itself; for in these two cases a real distinction is always required; but in the others not always. The first is evident, because the same substantial supposit cannot produce itself properly and primarily, because, in order to produce, it is supposed to be; and therefore, if it produces a supposit, it produces another distinct from itself. Whence also the divine persons, although they have unity in essence, are really distinguished on account of the real production of one from another. But I said properly and primarily, because by miracle it can perhaps happen that some thing reproduces itself; yet then it is necessary that that thing be supposed first produced by another action, and therefore the second action is not a primary production nor a proper one, but only after the manner of conservation; of which matter more fully in the matter of the Eucharist. The second is declared thus, because whatever is produced by something must be actually distinguished from it in the thing itself, because the production itself must be in some way distinct from the producer, especially since it is posited as accidental; therefore its term too must be distinct in reality from the producer itself; therefore, if from elsewhere it is supposed that such a term is not produced with union and conjunction to the producer itself, it is necessary that it be not its mode, but a thing distinct from it or a mode of a thing distinct from it; it is necessary, therefore, that it be distinguished not only modally but in the thing, either per se immediately or by reason of that in which it is. But if the production is accidental and is terminated at something which is united and conjoined to the producer, it is not a sufficient sign of real distinction. For, although sometimes such a distinction can intervene, as in sight producing vision, and the intellect, the will and similar faculties, which produce qualities really distinct from themselves by which they are informed, nevertheless this is not simply necessary, as is evident whenever that which is produced is only a mode of the producer itself, whether it is produced per se and by a proper action, as in the local presence which one who moves himself effects in himself, or by an action only resulting, as in the emanation of subsistence from the nature, and similar cases. But if it is said that not any production whatever, but that which is a thing distinct from the producer, infers a real distinction of producer and produced, this will be an altogether useless circle; for that an action of this kind is a thing distinct from the producer cannot be gathered otherwise than from this, that through it there is not produced some mode of the producer, but a true quality or form affecting it, which was what was inquired.

20. And the same judgement holds of the other sign which the same author subjoins in the same place, about the relation of cause and effect; for this can have place most of all in the efficient cause, of which all that has been said proceeds; and they can be applied in their own way to the formal or material cause; for, although most properly they are not found except between act and potency really distinct, nevertheless by some reason they also intervene between a mode affecting and a thing affected; but in the final cause it has no place, since the end and the effect can coincide in the same thing; indeed also the end and the agent, or the end and the form.

21. A conclusion is drawn from what has been said.—Scarcely, then, can any certain indication of real distinction be given when things are such that naturally they are always and necessarily really united among themselves and have hitherto not been divinely separated; I do not deny, however, that several things of this kind can be found really distinct, as is evident from the examples brought forward above; but I only assert that a distinction of this kind cannot be discerned by any general sign, but that in each the proper essential notion and the grade of perfection and the function to which they are ordered must be considered, so that from all collected into one a judgement about the distinction can be made; as, for example, between the matter and the form of the heaven we easily believe there is a real distinction, because from the common essential notions of matter and form we understand that neither of them is a mode, but a true entity; and from elsewhere, from the various properties of the heaven, we understand that each is found in it according to their proper notions; and finally from their limited perfection we conclude that they are distinguished from the nature of the thing and consequently really. In a similar way between the substantial form and a power per se primarily ordered to effecting an accidental act a real distinction is believed to intervene, because the notion of an operative faculty is very perfect in its genus; whence it does not seem to be some accidental mode, which is wont to be very imperfect, but a true entity and form per se ordered to such an act; but from elsewhere, considering the limitation of finite substance, it does not seem in its essential notion, as it exists in the thing, to comprehend notions or relationships so diverse to acts so diverse as are the acts of being and of operating; whence we conclude that there is between those two a real distinction, since it is not between a thing and a mode, but between essences constituting proper entities. In this manner, then, one must philosophize in the others, considering first whether those notions between which the distinction is sought exceed the notion of mode, and each by itself suffices to constitute an entity; and then whether so great a diversity appears in them that in a finite thing they require some distinction from the nature of the thing, and actual in the thing itself; and so a probable conjecture can be made about the quality of the distinction.

A doubt occurring about the separability of distinct things

22. Things really distinct can be mutually separated, if they are preserved in being.—But a doubt remains which was touched upon in the other part of the proposed difficulty, namely whether all things which are really distinct in reality can be separated by the divine power. Which can be understood of the twofold separation touched upon above. First, of separation only as regards real union, each extreme being preserved in being. Secondly, of separation as regards being, that is, in which, one being destroyed, the other is preserved in being. I suppose, however, that the question is about things altogether co-distinct among themselves, so that they are not related as whole and part, or as including and included; for of these it is evident that what includes another cannot be preserved without it, because it intrinsically consists of it. But of things co-distinct in the former way various opinions could be reported, which I omit, because they pertain to particular matters. And to the former sense I answer that things of this kind can always be separated in that way by absolute power (for so we are speaking), nor does any exception occur which it is necessary to make in this. And the reason is that to these things mutual separation of one from the other cannot be repugnant from defect of sufficient entity (as happens in modes), because, as we suppose, each of them has a true entity distinct from the other; if, therefore, there is a repugnance, it can only be either from the dependence of one on the other, or from the natural connection or emanation of one from the other; for no other reason can be thought out. But, although natural inseparability can rightly be inferred here, it cannot be in order to the absolute power of God, because, as was touched upon above, God can supply all that dependence, because either it is dependence in the genus of efficient cause, or, if it is of formal or material cause, it is not as of something intrinsically composing, but as of something sustaining or actuating a thing distinct from itself, which is called a causality in a certain way extrinsic, all of which God can supply. But much more easily can he impede any natural emanation whatever, both because that cannot come about without the influx of God, which he can not give, and also because he can destroy any union whatever between those two things and by his own power alone effect or preserve each. And so in this I find neither a general repugnance nor a reasonable exception. For that which some make of attributes and essence either rests on no reason, or, if there is some apparent one, it rather proves that they are not distinct in the thing than that, the distinction being supposed, they cannot be separated.

23. An objection is met.—One could only press about the relations of union, for example of matter and form, which are really distinguished as matter and form themselves are, because they are in them adequately, and yet cannot be preserved disjoined, but only united. The answer is, first, that, if the discussion is of predicamental relations, perhaps they are not something real distinct in the thing from union of this kind, but only the mutual denomination of the things united among themselves; or, if we admit that those relations are positive real modes of the united parts, the answer is that they are not united among themselves, formally speaking, but are between the united parts; and therefore they cannot be preserved without their union, because they are founded in it, which is not against what has been said. But if the discussion is of the formal union itself, which is relative according to expression or transcendentally, it is not a thing distinct from the united parts, but their mode; and therefore it is not wonderful that such a mode cannot be preserved when the union itself is dissolved, since the mode and the union are the same.

24. Of distinct things one can be destroyed while the other remains in being.—But to the latter sense I answer that in that way too distinct things can be separated by the power of God, a threefold exception being applied, which can be comprehended under the one name of essential relationship or dependence. The reason of the general rule has almost already been touched upon, because, if things are really distinguished, they can also be really disjoined; but of things so disjoined it is not repugnant, nor does it involve a contradiction, that one be preserved by God without the other, because regularly there can only be between them effective dependence, not essential, and God can supply that.

25. The first exception, of God and creatures.—Whence the first exception is of creatures with respect to God; for they are things distinct from God, and God can be without them, but they cannot be without God; not only because God is per se necessary being, but on account of the essential dependence which they have on God; by reason of which, if per impossibile God were feigned not to be, creatures could not be without him. Which effective dependence so essential one creature does not have on another, especially if it has a true entity and reality, of which we are now speaking; for perhaps that which intrinsically is only a mode can essentially depend on that of which it is the mode; of which elsewhere, for it does not matter to the present point.

26. The second, of relation and term.—The second exception is of a relation and a really distinct term; for one cannot in the nature of things be mutually preserved without the other, although they do not have among themselves a proper real union, but a relationship. But the reason is that relation as such essentially and as it were formally depends on the term; and therefore it can neither arise nor be preserved without it; nor can this reason be proved further from elsewhere except that such is the essence of relation, as is now supposed from the common opinion; for we are speaking of real, purely predicamental relation.

27. The third, of the divine persons to one another.—The third example is of the divine persons, which, although they are really distinguished, cannot be separated among themselves in being, on account of the intrinsic and necessary connection which they have among themselves. Which can be reduced to the preceding head: for they are relative persons, and therefore one cannot be without the other. Likewise it arises from the union which they have in the essence through true and perfect identity with it, by reason of which it comes about first of all that any of those persons is simply necessary being, and so that it is absolutely and simply repugnant to it not to be; and consequently it comes about that none can be without the other; because, if none of those persons can not always be, neither will one be able to be when the other is not. Just as for this cause too, although creatures do not depend per se on the divine relations as such, they nevertheless cannot in the aforesaid way be separated in being from the same relations; because creatures cannot exist without those relations being supposed existing; for they are simply necessary being; and although on the side of the creature they are not per se necessary for its creation, nevertheless on the side of God they are necessary, because they are both per se in God and they themselves essentially are God. Finally, formally and sufficiently it comes from the union with the essence through identity; for, since any relation and the essence are among themselves altogether the same in the thing, neither can the essence be in reality without any relation, nor any relation without the essence. Whence it comes about that neither can one relation exist without the others. You will say that this argument is founded on that principle of Aristotle, Metaphysics IV, text 3: Things which are the same as one third thing are the same as each other, which has no place in the Trinity; otherwise it would be inferred not only that one relation cannot be without another, but also that it is the other. The answer is that it is not formally founded on that principle, but either on this, that things which are altogether the same in the thing cannot be so separated in the thing that one exists without the other; or certainly on this, that the essence and the divine relation are not the same in any way whatever, but so that the essence is of the essence of the relation and the relation is the intrinsic term of the essence; and therefore neither can the relation be without the essence essential to it, nor the essence without its intrinsic and simply necessary term. But of these enough for the occasion of this place.

Signs of the distinction of reason

28. Finally, from what has been said it can easily be understood how the distinction of reason can be recognized and discerned from the others. For first of all there is no difficulty about the distinction of reasoning reason, because, since this not only is not in the thing, but has no foundation in it either, it will be very easily known; especially since it does not even have a formal diversity in the objective concepts themselves, but only as it were a material one, through the repetition or comparison of the same concept, which, although it is one, we use as several, as Aristotle said, Metaphysics V, c. 9, text 16. But the distinction of reasoned reason requires first of all some formal diversity in the objective concepts, in which it differs from the other distinction of reasoning reason; but it agrees in this with the distinctions found in the thing. But in order that such a distinction be judged of reason and not of the thing, it is enough that, besides that distinction of concepts, no sign be found of all those posited for knowing modal or real distinction; for, since distinctions are not to be multiplied without cause, and the mere distinction of concepts does not suffice to infer a distinction of the thing, whenever with that distinction of concepts no other sign of greater distinction is adjoined, it is always to be judged a distinction of reason and not of the thing. From which I infer that, whenever it is certainly established that some two things which are united and conjoined in the thing are so distinct in objective concepts that in the thing and in the individual they are altogether inseparable, both mutually and non-mutually, both by absolute power and naturally, both as regards being and as regards real union among themselves, then there is a great and almost certain argument that they are not actually distinguished in the thing, but by reasoned reason. It is proved from what has been said, and first by induction; for Peter, man, animal and the other predicates, as they are in the thing in Peter, are not distinguished from the nature of the thing. Similarly in the intellect the superior and inferior reason, synderesis, memory and similar attributes of it do not signify things distinct in the thing, but only by reasoned reason; because that power is such that it comprehends all these in its adequate notion, nor are they in it in any way separable, even by the absolute power of God, as regards the faculty itself or first act, although as regards use they can be separated. Secondly, by the reason indicated, because things which are of this kind seem to be so inseparable for no other cause except because in the thing they have one and indivisible essence and entity; otherwise why could they not be separated at least by divine power, especially in creatures? Finally, because there there is no sufficient sign of greater distinction; therefore that distinction must be judged to be of reason, as long as a greater has not been established.