Disputationes metaphysicae

1. There is a real distinction, and what it is.—In this title two things are supposed as certain and a third is inquired into. For, first, it is self-evident that there is in things a real distinction, which for greater explanation is wont to be called the distinction of thing from thing, which consists in this, that one thing is not another, nor conversely; but it is evident that there exist several things of which one is altogether not the other. It is only to be observed that sometimes things are not only so distinct, but also not united among themselves, as are two supposits, or accidents which are in distinct supposits, and others of this kind, in which there is no difficulty in knowing the aforesaid distinction, because there is in them no vestige of real identity. But sometimes it happens that things so distinct are united among themselves, as is evident in matter and form, quantity and substance; and in these it is often most difficult to discern the real distinction which is of thing from thing, if there can be in things another one less than it, which will be treated immediately; and then too it will be explained how one distinction is to be discerned from another.

2. One positive, another negative, and what each is.—It is also to be observed in this distinction that it is wont to be divided into positive and negative; which partition is given not so much on the side of the distinction itself as of its extremes; for the distinction itself formally always consists in a negation, as was said above; yet this negation sometimes intervenes between positive and real things of which one is not the other, and then it is called a positive distinction; and this is the proper real distinction of which we have spoken. But sometimes such a distinction is considered between being and non-being, or between non-beings altogether diverse, and then it is called a negative real distinction; because one of those extremes does not have the reality which the other has, if it is positive and real being; or, if each is privative being, as darkness and blindness, because they are so separated and distinguished among themselves that, if they were positive things, they would be really distinguished, or certainly because they have really distinct foundations in which in their own way they are thought to be. Whence this negative distinction is to be understood and declared through proportion or analogy to the positive; and accordingly, that being omitted, we must here treat only of the proper and positive real distinction.

3. Finally it is to be noticed that it matters nothing to the present disputation that a real relation or a relation of reason follows upon the real distinction; for we do not consider the distinction here as it can import a formal relation, but only by reason of the foundation upon which that relation can follow. Whence for the real distinction (formally speaking) a real relation is not necessary; for God is really distinguished from the angel, although he is not really referred to it. But if you say that the angel is referred to God, the answer is: whatever may be the case with this, nevertheless before that relation the angel is understood to be a thing distinct from God; for thence that relation results, if there is any. And in God the three persons are really distinguished, although between them the distinction is not a special real relation. This relation, therefore, is to be omitted as irrelevant to the present purpose.

4. Whether there is a distinction of reason, and what it is.—Secondly it is certain that besides the real distinction there is a distinction of reason. And it is that which formally and actually is not in the things which are so denominated distinct, as they exist in themselves, but only as they underlie our concepts and receive from them some denomination; in which way we distinguish in God one attribute from another, or the relation of identity from its term, when we say that Peter is the same as himself. This distinction, however, is wont to be divided into two: one, which has no foundation in the thing, and is called of reasoning reason, because it arises only from the negotiation and operation of the intellect; the other, which has a foundation in the thing, and is called by many of reasoned reason, although this expression, as it is very improper, so also can be equivocal. For a distinction of reasoned reason so called can be thought to be so because it pre-exists in the thing itself before reason reasons, so that it would be called as it were reasoned of itself, and reason would only be required to know it, not to make it; and it would only be called a distinction of reason and not real because it is not so great, nor of itself so patent as the real, and therefore requires an attentive operation of reason to distinguish it. But, the signification of this word being explained according to this etymology, such a distinction is not truly the distinction of reason of which we are now treating, but coincides with the distinction from the nature of the thing of which we shall speak immediately. In another sense, then, it can be called a distinction of reasoned reason: of reason indeed, because actually and formally it is not in things, but is made or thought out through reason; but reasoned, because it is not altogether from the mere work of reason, but from the occasion which the thing itself affords, about which the mind reasons. Whence the foundation which is said to be in the thing for this distinction is not a true and actual distinction between those things which are said to be so distinguished; otherwise not the foundation of the distinction but the distinction itself would precede; but it must be either the eminence of the thing itself which the mind so distinguishes, which is wont by many to be called virtual distinction, or certainly some relationship to other things truly and in the thing itself distinct, according to which such a distinction is thought out or conceived.

5. These two kinds of distinctions of reason, however, although they are explained otherwise by others, can nevertheless be fittingly declared in this way, namely, that the distinction of reasoning reason is in order to the same adequate or simple concept of the same thing, only through a certain repetition or comparison of it which is made in the mind. For in this way Peter is distinguished from himself, either in the notion of subject and predicate when he is enunciated of himself, or in the notion of term and subject of a relation when he is called the same as himself; for in these and similar distinctions of reason the concept of Peter is the same and integral, and there is only made a certain repetition and comparison of it. But the latter distinction of reason is made through inadequate concepts of the same thing; for, although through each the same thing is conceived, nevertheless through neither is the whole of what is in the thing exactly conceived, nor is its whole quiddity and objective notion exhausted; which is often done by conceiving that thing through a relationship to diverse things or to their mode; and therefore such a distinction always has a foundation in the thing, but formally it will be said to be made through inadequate concepts of the same thing. In this way we distinguish in God justice from mercy, because we do not conceive the most simple power of God as it is in itself and according to its whole force, but divide it by concepts in order to the diverse effects of which that eminent power is the principle, or through proportion to the diverse virtues which we find distinct in man and which are found united in a most eminent way in the most simple power of God.

6. From which it is understood, first, that the distinction of reason is not so called because it is concerned with beings of reason, in which many have been deceived, as we shall see afterwards; for it is evident from the said examples that the things which are said to be so distinguished are real beings, or rather real being conceived in diverse ways; and it is evident also by reason, because reason does not feign the beings which it so distinguishes, but only conceives after the manner of distinct things those which are not distinct; therefore not the things which are distinguished, but only the distinction itself, results through reason. Nor yet is the mind deceived in so distinguishing, because it does not affirm that the things which it so conceives are distinct in the thing, but simply and without composition, or affirmation or negation, it conceives them as distinct through prescissive abstraction, through which it as it were effects a distinction of this kind. But if afterwards it predicates either the reflection or that composition of the things so conceived, it does not affirm simply that they are distinct, but only in a certain respect, that is, according to reason. But although this distinction does not require extremes which are in themselves beings of reason, it nevertheless always supposes in them some denomination of reason, such as is the denomination of subject or predicate, or at least to be so concisely or inadequately conceived. From which it also comes about that, although this distinction does not require extremes which are absolutely beings of reason, it can nevertheless also be feigned and thought out between them; for a being of reason once conceived can be compared to itself, and so distinguished by reason. Indeed even the relation of species, for example, although in itself it is one being of reason in number adequately regarding all the individuals, can also be precisely conceived as it is terminated at one or another, and so be distinguished by reason. Although, therefore, the distinction of reason does not require beings of reason as extremes, nor is denominated thence, it can nevertheless be extended to them or be concerned with them.

7. One distinction of reason extrinsic, another intrinsic.—From which it is further understood that the distinction of reason can be said or denominated in two ways: first intrinsically, namely because in itself it is not a true distinction, but only conceived or feigned by reason; and this is the proper distinction of reason of which we are speaking; but in another way the distinction of reason can be called as it were extrinsically from the extremes in which it is understood to be concerned, so that that is called a distinction of reason which is altogether concerned with extremes or beings of reason; and this is not always a distinction of reason in the former way, but only then when it is concerned with the same being of reason, as has been explained. But sometimes two beings of reason can be distinguished which cannot properly be said to be really distinguished, because they are not real beings; yet neither can they be said properly and intrinsically to be distinguished by reason, because, in the way in which they are, they are truly distinguished not from the feigning of reason, but of themselves. For since distinction is a negation, it can be common even to feigned beings, and so that distinction is rather as it were real, as we were saying above of the distinction between darkness and blindness; for a similar one is understood between the relation of species to individuals which is conceived in human nature to its individuals, and in equine nature to its own; for those two relations are so compared among themselves that, if they were real, they would have to be really distinguished; for they have really distinct foundations and terms.

8. Whence any distinction of reason arises.—Finally, from what has been said it is understood that the proper and intrinsic distinction of reason of which we are speaking properly and per se is only by means of an intellect conceiving things imperfectly, abstractly, confusedly or inadequately. Because, since this distinction is not in the thing nor in the object known, it consists only in a certain denomination from the concepts of the mind, and therefore requires a distinction at least in the concepts themselves and in the denomination which is taken from them; but this distinction of concepts with respect to a thing which in itself is altogether one is never except on account of the imperfection of the concepts themselves. Wherefore the divine intellect per se does not properly make a distinction of reason, although it comprehends that which can be made by a finite intellect conceiving imperfectly.

The point of the question and various opinions

9. These things being posited, the chief difficulty remains whether besides these two kinds of distinctions another is to be admitted which is as it were intermediate between them. Many deny that any intermediate distinction can be thought out or understood. So thought Durandus, In I, dist. 2, q. 2; Ockham, q. 3; Hervaeus, Quodlibet III, q. 3; John of Jandun, Metaphysics VI, q. 10; Soncinas, Metaphysics VII, q. 36; and Cajetan thinks the same, I, q. 54, a. 2; and Soto, q. 3 on universals, and the chapter on Property, q. 2. But in these authors an equivocation is to be guarded against, by reason of which they can differ either only in names or also in the thing. For no distinction between positive and real extremes can be thought out which, if it is not feigned through reason, must not necessarily precede in the thing itself and be before every operation of the intellect; and because whatever is of this kind is real in so far as it exists in things, therefore in this sense every distinction which is not of reason can be called real; and so it seems manifest that there cannot be a medium between the real distinction and the distinction of reason. Yet, this being posited, the question still remains whether every distinction which precedes in things every operation of the intellect, not only fundamentally and virtually but also actually and formally, is as it were of the same notion as regards this, that it is between distinct things; or whether in things themselves there is a greater and a lesser distinction, and that which is greater, namely between thing and thing, obtains the name of real distinction, while the other is called an intermediate distinction, or by other names to be explained below. If, then, the said authors deny an intermediate distinction between the real and that of reason only in the former sense, they differ only in terms from those who admit it; yet they do not speak consistently who now deny it, now use it; which can most of all be seen in Soto in the places cited and in the chapter on Relation and others. But if they deny an intermediate distinction in the latter sense, then the dissension will be most of all about the thing.

10. In this sense, then, this opinion is persuaded, first: there are not more kinds of distinctions than of beings, because one and many follow being; but distinction is that through which multitude arises. But there are no other beings except real or of reason, as is gathered from Aristotle, Metaphysics V, text 14, and Metaphysics VI, text 6; for, since these two include an immediate contradiction, no medium can be thought out between them; therefore. Secondly, whatever things are in the thing before the intellect are either really the same or really diverse; otherwise there would be a medium between same and diverse, which is repugnant to Aristotle, Metaphysics IV, texts 4 and 5, where he says that same and diverse adequately divide being, as do one and many; and in Book X, text 11, he says that any being whatever compared to another is the same as or diverse from it. And the reason is that these too are opposed by immediate contradiction. Just as, therefore, same and diverse in general, so also such same and diverse, namely really, belong to any being whatever with respect to another. Therefore all things which are conceived by us as two beings are either really the same or really diverse; if really diverse, they are really distinguished; but if they are really the same, they cannot have a distinction in the thing before the intellect, because it is repugnant to be at the same time the same and diverse in reality.

11. But if perhaps it is said that it is not repugnant to be the same in the common notion of being, yet diverse in the notion of such or such being, for example of quality or relation, action or passion, etc., against this I argue, thirdly: when the inferior is multiplied, it is necessary that the superior predicate be multiplied in the same way; but any determinate notions of beings whatever are inferior to being; therefore some things cannot in reality be multiplied under determinate notions of beings, as, for example, in the notion of quality and relation, of whiteness or likeness, without being multiplied under the common notion of being. Therefore, if they are several under these determinate notions, they are also several beings; therefore they cannot be distinguished in reality in those notions without being really distinguished. The first proposition seems self-evident from what was said above of universals; for the same universal or common attribute existing in reality one and the same in number cannot be contracted or determined by opposite differences or modes; and on this account we said that unity in some common notion is not a true and real unity in reality, but only the likeness of the thing and a unity of reason; therefore, if some things are multiplied in the thing according to determinate notions of being, it is necessary that in them the notion of being itself also be multiplied in the thing. Because, since those two, in so far as they are distinguished in reality, include opposite or repugnant modes or differences by which they are distinguished among themselves, they cannot have in the thing true and real identity nor numerical unity in the notion of being, because the same being in number cannot at the same time be affected and determined by opposite differences. And it is confirmed, because otherwise there could also be one accident in number in the thing and yet two qualities, and quality and quantity at once; and by the same reason one substance could be two bodies, and one animal in number a horse and a lion at once, or something of this kind. But if in these an open repugnance is seen, the same will be in all things which are distinguished in the thing according to their proper notions with respect to any superior whatever, even being itself. Because being is no less essentially included in any inferior notions whatever than all the intermediate predicates. And because those opposite or dividing differences involve the same repugnance with respect to the same individual, under whatever superior or inferior notion it is considered.

12. Fourthly, the same is explained otherwise, for whatever is in reality has its real essence; therefore things which are distinct in reality have in reality distinct essences, either in number, if they themselves are distinct only in number, or in species or genus, if they are said to be essentially distinct; therefore they also have in reality distinct entities, which is to be really distinguished. This last consequence is evident, both because the entity of a thing is nothing other than the real essence placed outside its causes, as we shall show below; but if they are distinct essences, they are real and placed outside their causes; they will therefore be distinct entities. And also because, if there are there two real essences, each of them is the essence of some real being, because being and essence are compared adequately as abstract and concrete; but one and the same being can have only one essence; therefore, if there are two real essences, there are two real beings. The last minor proposition seems self-evident, because a thing has unity most of all from its essence, and because nothing must be more invariable and fixed and certain in a thing than its essence. And finally, if a thing is constituted by one essence, according to it it has its ultimate difference and species; therefore it is not further determinable; therefore that same thing cannot be actuated, determined or constituted by a difference of another species; therefore it cannot have another essence; if, therefore, there is another distinct essence, it constitutes another thing.

13. The sense of Scotus in positing the formal distinction.—The second opinion is that there is in things a certain actual distinction before the intellect, which accordingly is not of reason, but greater than it, nor yet is it as great a distinction as the real one between thing and thing. This opinion is commonly attributed to Scotus, In I, dist. 2, q. 7, last section, and dist. 5, q. 1, and dist. 8, q. 4; In II, dist. 3, q. 1, and in innumerable other places, in which he disputes either of the distinction of the attributes of God, or of the distinction of universals, or of similar things. Although in these places Scotus does not sufficiently explain whether this distinction which he calls formal is actual in the thing, or only fundamental or virtual; for sometimes he calls it virtual, and so among his followers there is a varied mode of opining. For some think that the formal distinction in Scotus is not other than the distinction of reasoned reason, in the sense and mode in which it has been declared by us, which they say is called formal because diverse definitions or formal notions are conceived there; they say also that it is called a distinction from the nature of the thing, because it has a foundation in things themselves and is virtually in them, although it does not actually precede; in which sense Scotus in no way favours the second opinion proposed; nor does it seem doubtful that in some places Scotus seems to think so, especially when he treats of the divine attributes. Nevertheless other disciples of Scotus understand him to have spoken of a true and actual distinction which is in the thing before the intellect, which they think is found not only in creatures but also in God, at least between the divine relations and the essence. Of which Durandus holds the same, In I, dist. 1, part II, dist. 5, q. 2, ad 4, and more fully dist. 33, q. 1; and many others, whom it would be long to recount here. There can also be referred for this opinion many who admit between various things a distinction from the nature of the thing and not real, as between existence and essence, nature and supposit, quantity and substance, foundation and relation, and similar things, which we shall see below in their places.

14. Whether the Scotist formal distinction is according to the mind of Aristotle.—This opinion is also wont to be attributed to Aristotle, either because in Physics III he asserts that the same motion is action and passion under diverse formal notions. And in Physics IV he distinguishes in the same way time from motion, which he nevertheless says is not a thing distinct from it. And because in De generatione I he seems to constitute a similar distinction between nutrition and augmentation, saying that they are the same in subject, that is, in entity, but are distinguished according to being, that is, according to formal being. And finally because in the Categories he places the same quality, for example heat, under diverse species, which cannot be understood except because two species can be the same according to the thing and be distinguished formally. But these testimonies do not compel much, because in the first two examples, and in the last too, a distinction of reason through inadequate concepts suffices, as we shall say more fully below in treating of accidents and the predicaments. But in the second example the exposition of those words of Aristotle is violent; for in him to be the same in subject is nothing other than (what the words themselves sound) to be conjoined in the same subject and supposit; but to be distinguished according to being is rather to be distinguished in its entity or form. In which way the same Aristotle says, Physics I, text 21, that white and musical are the same according to the thing, and distinguished by reason. Where he uses these words very equivocally; for he calls reason the essence or definition, but thing the subject or supposit in which these are. In this manner, then, it can, or even must, be expounded when he says that nutrition and augmentation are the same in subject but distinguished according to being; especially if nutrition signifies change as terminated at substance, but augmentation change as terminated at quantity; for, if each is taken as terminated at quantity, then they can be distinguished only by reason or relationship, in so far as the quantity acquired is greater than or equal to that lost; but of this elsewhere. From these and similar testimonies of Aristotle, then, no firm argument can be taken for this opinion. And I think the same of St. Thomas and the other ancient authors, who almost always use the words real distinction and distinction of reason in the former sense explained above, and do not distinctly treat the question with which we are now concerned.

15. By reason this opinion is wont chiefly to be persuaded thus: whatever is outside the essential definition of a thing is in some way distinct from it in the thing; but many things are outside the essence of a thing which are not things distinct from the thing itself; therefore there is a distinction in the thing less than the real distinction. Or otherwise: things which are distinguished by definition and objective concept are distinguished from the nature of the thing and before the intellect; but many things are distinguished in this way which are not distinguished as thing from thing; therefore. These and similar reasons the Scotists use, because in almost these ways Scotus seems to declare the formal distinction; yet, if anyone considers rightly, either the question is begged in them, or the formal distinction is taken for the distinction of reasoned reason through inadequate concepts, which can be said to be from the nature of the thing only virtually or fundamentally. What we say is proved or declared, because the essence of a thing is not always defined by us as it is in the thing, but as it is conceived by us; for in this way we define the essence of man as common, although in the thing it is only singular; and speaking of essence in this way, it is false that whatever is outside the essence is actually distinguished in reality from what is of the essence, as is evident from what was said above of individuation and the specific nature and of the other universals, namely genus and difference, of which the aforesaid authors seem chiefly to speak. Whence we too seem to speak so of essence in the first reason; for, if they speak of essence as it is in the thing, this is nothing other than the very entity of the thing, and therefore, when it is supposed that there is in the thing something distinct from the essence which is not a distinct thing, that is supposed which is to be proved. But the second reason is much weaker. For the major is not universally true; for many things are distinguished in objective concepts with respect to us which are distinguished only by reason through inadequate concepts, as is evident from what was said of the concept of being, and of the individual, the species and the other universals; and in the same way they can be distinguished by definition only according to reason, when the definition is not adequate to the thing as it is in itself, but as it is presented to such a concept of ours.

Resolution of the question

16. Nevertheless I think it simply true that there is in created things some actual distinction, and from the nature of the thing, before the operation of the intellect, which is not as great as that between two things or entities altogether distinct; which distinction, although by a general word it can be called real, because it is truly in reality and is not by extrinsic denomination from the intellect, nevertheless, in order to distinguish it from the other greater real distinction, we can call it either the distinction from the nature of the thing, applying to it as more imperfect the general name (which is customary), or more properly it can be called modal distinction; because, as I shall explain, it is always concerned with some thing and its mode. But the name of formal distinction does not please me so much, because it is very equivocal; for it often belongs to things really distinct, in so far as they are distinguished among themselves essentially, if they differ in species; for they have diverse formal unities, and so they also differ formally. Indeed even individuals of the same species, in so far as they have distinct individual formal unities, as we said above, can be said to be distinguished formally. Indeed even in the Trinity, paternity and filiation, which are distinguished really and not essentially, even according to number can be said to be distinguished formally in the objective notions of the relations, which mode of distinction will not be found outside that mystery. In this way, then, the formal distinction extends more widely and can be greater than the distinction from the nature of the thing of which we are now speaking. But on the other side it can also be less, and so it is more common, because it is frequently applied to formal notions as conceived and prescinded through our intellect, and then that distinction does not transcend the grade of the distinction of reason.

17. In order, however, that the assertion may be proved and explained, I suppose that in created things, besides their as it were substantial or radical entities (so to speak), there are found certain real modes, which both are something positive and affect the entities themselves by themselves, giving them something which is outside the whole essence, as individual and existing in the nature of things. This is evident by induction; for, for example, in the quantity which is in substance two things can be considered: one is the entity of the quantity itself; the other is the union or actual inherence of the same quantity with the substance. The first we call simply the thing of quantity, including whatever is of the essence of individual quantity placed in the nature of things, which remains and is preserved even if the quantity is separated from the subject; and it is impossible that that thing in number which is this quantity be preserved without including this essence of quantity with its intrinsic individuation and actual being, of which being we shall see afterwards; for the rest are evident from what has been said above. The second, that is, the inherence, we call a mode of the quantity, not indeed in that general signification by which every quality is wont to be called a mode of substance, as St. Thomas says, I-II, q. 49, a. 2. Nor in that general reason of speaking by which every contracting or determining thing is wont to be called a mode of the thing contracted; for in this way rational can be called a mode of animal, and specially this word is wont to be applied to those modes by which being or accident is determined to the most general genera. Nor is this word taken in that generality by which every determination or limitation prefixed to each finite thing according to its measure is wont to be called a mode, as St. Thomas noted in the same place, from Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram IV, c. 3, saying: Mode is that which the measure prefixes. In which way the same Augustine says, De natura boni, c. 3, that of the three things necessary for the goodness of each created thing, of which two are species and order, the third is mode, that is, the due commensuration to its principles, as St. Thomas explained, I, q. 5, and I-II, q. 85, a. 4, and often elsewhere. But departing from this general notion of mode and applying it to the present matter, the inherence of quantity is called its mode because it is something affecting it and as it were ultimately determining its state and notion of existing, yet it does not add to it a proper new entity, but only modifies the pre-existing one.

18. For that it does not bring a proper new entity can scarcely come into doubt, because, if it were an altogether new entity, it could not be the actual union between quantity and subject, but it would rather itself need something by which it would be united to the subject and to the quantity, as quantity itself needs inherence by which it is united to the subject. But if inherence does not need another union or inherence by which it is united or inheres, it is because it of itself does not bring a proper entity which would inhere and be united, but is only a certain mode which of itself is the reason of union and inherence. A sign of which too is that this inherence has such a mode of being that it can be by no power except actually conjoined to that form of which it is the inherence, and that this inherence in number cannot affect, or rather unite, except this form in number to which it is as it were affixed; which mode of affecting is never found in those forms or things which of themselves have proper entities. But what has been explained in the inherence of quantity proceeds in the same way in quality, and in the union of the substantial form to matter, and in subsistence or personality with respect to the nature, and in presence and local motion, and in any action or dependence with respect to its term, of all of which this is not the place to speak. They will occur, however, in the progress of this work. I shall only explain a little the last example, which seems easier; for light, for example, depends on the sun, which dependence is something besides the light and the sun; for it can be understood that the light and the sun remain and the light does not depend on the sun, as if God did not will to concur with the sun to produce or preserve the light, but preserved each by his power alone. But it cannot be conceived by the mind that this dependence of the light on the sun is an entity altogether distinct from the light itself, both because through that dependence the cause flows as it were through a way into the effect or term, whence it cannot be a thing altogether distinct from it; and also because otherwise that entity would at least by absolute power be separable from the other, which is plainly unintelligible; that dependence, therefore, is a certain mode of the light itself, which someone perhaps will call a relation; yet it is not a predicamental relation, but includes a transcendental relation or relationship, as will be said more fully below. There are, therefore, in created entities some modes affecting them, whose notion seems to consist in this, that they of themselves do not suffice to constitute a being or entity in the nature of things, but intrinsically postulate that they actually affect some entity, without which they can in no way be.

19. What the reason is for positing modes distinct from things only modally.—But the reason for positing these modes is taken a posteriori from the induction made; but a priori it seems to be that, since creatures are imperfect, and therefore either dependent, or composite, or limited, or mutable according to various states of presence, union or termination, they need these modes by which all these are completed in them. Because it is neither always necessary that this be done through altogether distinct entities, nor indeed can it be fittingly understood; nor can it be done through that which is altogether nothing; and therefore at least a real mode is required. Of which, how manifold it is and in what predicament it is placed per se or reductively, I shall speak below in the divisions of the predicaments. Finally Durandus seems to have recognized these modes, In I, dist. 30, q. 2, n. 15, where, speaking of being-in, or the inherence of accident, he says that it is a respect which is analogically called thing or being, because it is not a thing but a mode of being, nor is it an entity having a mode, but only a mode of an entity; and in n. 16 he says the same of dependence and of everything which is only a mode of being. And Astudillo speaks in the same way of inherence, De generatione I, q. 5, ad 1. And in particular, in treating of subsistence, many so explain it, as Giles, in the title De compositione angelorum, q. 5. And finally Fonseca, Metaphysics V, c. 6, q. 6, sect. 2, expressly posits these modes, although he distinguishes three kinds of modes: some which are entities of themselves distinct from others, as whiteness, sweetness; and in this order he places figure, but undeservedly, because it is constituted in the third, because with respect to quantity it affects it as a mode, not as a thing altogether distinct from it. Others which not only are not distinct entities, but are not in any way distinguished in the thing from the things of which they are said to be modes, but only by reason, as are those modes by which being is contracted to its inferiors. But these two kinds of modes have already been passed over by us, because these latter are not modes except according to reason, but the former are things, or forms having of themselves proper entities. In the third order, then, he places those modes which by a proper and special reason we call real modes, of which he thinks the same as we have explained, although he places some examples which are uncertain to us, as is that of the existence of created things, of the mode whence a thing is called necessary or contingent, or complete or incomplete being. For this last can be equivocal; because, if these are said of the whole and integral parts, then it is true that it is a certain mode pertaining to quantity; for the same portion of water, for example, if it is terminated per se and separated from others, is called a complete or total being; but if it is continuous with others, it is called a partial or incomplete being; which mode consists only in a diverse union or termination. But if those are said of being according to itself, they rather pertain to the intrinsic and essential modes of being, whether the being is called incomplete according to reason, as the difference, or physically and according to the thing, as the rational soul, which is called an incomplete being, not through something added to its essence, but through its very essence; whence that mode is distinguished from it only by reason. And I think the same of the other mode of necessary or contingent being, if these are considered in the absolute notion of being; for, if they are considered in the notion of effect, then they are extrinsic denominations, as we shall say below. But of existence the matter is more controverted, which we shall dispute below. But whatever may be the case with the examples, Fonseca says most truly that this mode is not properly a thing or entity, except by calling being broadly and most generally whatever is not nothing; yet, taking entity for that thing which of itself and in itself is so something that it does not postulate altogether intrinsically and essentially to be always affixed to another, but either is not unitable to another, or at least cannot be united except by means of some mode distinct from itself from the nature of the thing, a mode is not properly a thing or entity; and in this its imperfection is excellently declared, that it must always be affixed to another, to which per se it is immediately united without another intermediate mode, as sitting to the one sitting, union to the things united, and so of others, of which there will often be discussion in what follows.

20. From these things, then, the sense and proof of the conclusion posited is easily understood, for this mode, as it has been explained by us, is actually distinguished from the nature of the thing from the thing of which it is the mode, as all confess; indeed many call that distinction real, because it is found in the things themselves, which will be more evidently established from what is to be said in the following section; but this mode is not properly distinguished from that of which it is the mode as thing from thing; it is distinguished, therefore, by a lesser distinction, which is most properly called modal. The minor is proved, both because the mode, considered per se and precisely, is not properly a thing or entity, as has been sufficiently explained; therefore neither is it properly distinguished as thing from thing; and also because this mode so intimately includes conjunction with the thing of which it is the mode that by no power can it be without it; it is therefore a sign that that conjunction is a certain mode of identity; there is therefore a lesser distinction between this mode and the thing than between two things; all of which will be more confirmed in the following section, by declaring the signs of these distinctions and consequently the differences by which they are distinguished among themselves.

21. Besides the modal, the real and that of reason, no distinction.—Finally I add that besides the real, modal and that of reason no other distinction is found which is not either common to these or contained in them. I would say this on account of some who add a formal distinction, such as is between man and animal; which they divide into mutual, as between animal and rational, and non-mutual, such as is between animal and man; likewise an essential distinction, such as is between man and horse, and a potential distinction, such as is between the parts of the continuum; and similar things are wont to be multiplied, which do not seem necessary to me. The sufficiency, then, of the aforesaid partition is easily gathered from what has been said; for either the extremes of the distinction are not in any way actually distinct in reality, and then it is always a distinction of reason, even if it is called by other names, because it belongs only by extrinsic denomination, in so far as the same thing is presented or subordinated to diverse concepts. But in this distinction grades can be found, as I said, and when it has a foundation in the thing and is made through several inadequate concepts, it can be called a formal distinction, or sometimes also essential according to reason. And in this very thing there can be a manifold mode, in so far as the extremes can be compared in various respects, namely either only as determinate and indeterminate, as being and substance; or as whole and part, as difference and species; or as two co-parts, as animal and rational. And so this distinction can also be understood as between including and included, or as between things of which according to reason neither includes the other; in which sense, and in no other, this distinction can truly be called mutual or non-mutual, reciprocal or non-reciprocal; yet all these fall under the breadth of the distinction of reason. But if the extremes of the distinction are actually distinct in reality, either each is a true thing having a proper entity, simple or composite, or one is a thing and the other is its mode. In the former way the real distinction is constituted, in the latter the modal; but no other relationship between these extremes is intelligible; nor can another medium between them be thought out; for they include among themselves an immediate opposition as it were of contradiction; there is no other mode of distinction, therefore.

22. Various modes of the real distinction.—In the real distinction itself, however, or that of several things, various modes or various relationships can be considered. For first we can understand that things so distinct are not only distinct in reality but also dissimilar in their intrinsic and essential entity; and then they are said to be distinguished not only really but also essentially; and the greater or lesser that dissimilitude is, they are said to be distinguished either by lowest species, or by subaltern, or also by genus or predicament. Whence the essential distinction is either common to the real, the modal and that of reason; or, if it is taken most properly, it is included in the real, although it is not convertible with it; and it rather adds dissimilitude than distinction. All of which proceed using that word essential distinction rigorously; for if the discussion is of the distinction of essences, such as intervenes also between individuals, as we said above, this adds nothing properly, but indicates the things between which there is a distinction; as that is called a personal distinction which is between persons. Again, these things so distinct can sometimes be united among themselves, sometimes to one third thing: in the former way matter and form are united, and similarly continuous integral parts, to omit other more extrinsic and accidental unions. Wherefore, just as matter and form, although they are united, nevertheless retain a real distinction among themselves, so also continuous parts, although they are united, are really distinguished, not only as regards designation, as some speak, but also as regards the partial entity of each.

23. The potential distinction is truly real.—It is only to be noticed that matter and form are of themselves incomplete and partial beings, whether they are supposed to exist conjoined or separated; and therefore they are always thought to be distinguished in the same way. But integral parts do not have the notion of part nor of incomplete being except when they are conjoined; for as soon as they are separated, each begins to be an integral and total being, because per se it is not ordered to composing another; and therefore they are thought to be distinguished otherwise (more as regards denomination or mode than as regards the thing) when they are disjoined or united; for in the former state they are distinguished as total beings, in the latter as partial; and therefore parts of this kind, when united, are sometimes wont to be said to be actually distinguished as parts, but potentially as beings, that is, as certain wholes, because they are in potency to become such. All of which are seen most of all in homogeneous continuous parts; for in heterogeneous ones, although in the thing it is almost the same, there is nevertheless some diversity in the mode, because they have greater dissimilitude, and therefore they seem to have a certain greater distinction even while they are in the whole; and when they are separated, even if they do not change the substantial form but preserve the same which they had in the whole, as happens in plants and animals that can be cut, they are still thought to be incomplete and partial beings, because they are always as it were per se ordered to composing another. From these things, then, it is easily understood that that distinction which is called potential by some is a real distinction; but because distinction is a negation, two things can be denied by it: one, that this is that; and this is actually true of parts actually united, because one is not the other, and this negation is that which is per se primarily required and suffices for distinction. The other thing which can be denied is that this is conjoined to that, which is to say that this is not that as a whole and integral being distinct from it; and this does not belong to united parts in act but in potency, and under this notion that distinction can be called potential; yet as such it does not yet exist, and therefore it is not necessary to number it among the distinctions as distinct from the others. Finally, hence it is understood a fortiori that some without cause call this distinction between the parts of the continuum a distinction of reason having a foundation in the thing, because those parts are not distinguished in act, but in designation and potency. For this is not true, because there there is not only a foundation of distinction but a true distinction, using this word properly, not as it expresses separation or disjunction, but as it expresses diversity of total or partial entity. Otherwise matter and form, when they are united, would have to be called distinct not in act but only in potency, because there is no lesser union between matter and form than between the parts of the continuum. The separation, therefore, between those parts can be called of reason, because they can be considered only through reason as if they were disjoined and as it were certain wholes; but the distinction of the parts is actual and real. For these parts, even while they compose the whole, have some reality, because, as Aristotle said, Physics I, c. 2, substance is not composed except of substances, so an integral being is not composed except of beings at least partial; such beings, therefore, remain distinct, although united; indeed, unless they remained distinct, they could not make a composition, because composition is only of distinct things.

24. The distinction of the including from the included is real.—And hence further arises another mode of distinction which can be considered in any whole with respect to its individual parts; for they are not altogether the same, as is self-evident; nor are they distinguished as two parts among themselves, because these are so related that neither includes the other, but the whole contains in its entity each part, and therefore they are said to be distinguished as including and included. Yet this distinction too, as it intervenes here, is real, because the whole includes some thing which the part does not include. Whence this mode of distinction, of including and included, can in its own way be found in the real, modal and rational distinction; for in each order that which is related as a whole can be compared to another which is related as a part; yet in each it remains within the breadth of the real, modal or rational distinction, because that which one extreme includes beyond the other is distinguished really or modally or by reason from the other included one. From these things, then, it is sufficiently evident that there is no mode of distinction which is not contained in the three aforesaid.

25. It seems only able to be objected that, besides the distinction between thing and thing and between thing and mode, there can be found a distinction between mode and mode, as many think of subsistence and existence, and it is more certain of subsistence and local presence. For these modes cannot be distinguished by reason, because in reality they so exist that they have diverse principles and diverse affections, and finally that they can be separated, which are indications of an actual distinction existing in the thing, as we shall now say; nor are they distinguished really, because they are not distinguished as thing and thing, since they are not truly things; for by this argument we proved that the mode is not really distinguished from the thing itself which it affects. Nor finally can they be said to be distinguished only modally, both because one is not the mode of the other, and because they are often mutually separable from each other, which is a sign of a greater distinction than modal, as we shall immediately say.

26. How two modes are distinguished among themselves.—The answer is that, since these modes do not have being or entity except from the thing or in the thing to which they adhere, it must be weighed from it how they are distinguished from other modes; yet their distinction will always pertain to the real or the modal, supposing that they exist in the thing. Which I say for this reason, that modes too can be thought out distinct by reason alone; for, just as reason through inadequate concepts can distinguish one thing, so also one mode, as is very probable of action and passion, of motion and time, of existence and duration and others. But speaking of modes distinct in the thing itself, as are local presence, for example, and the subsistence of humanity, either these are compared only as they are in the same thing, and then they are distinguished only modally on account of the argument made, because, since of themselves they do not have a proper entity, of themselves too they do not have whence they would be distinguished more than modally; nor are they distinguished more from the thing which they affect, because we suppose it is the same; therefore they do not have a greater distinction than modal. And it is confirmed, because each of them has some identity with that thing which it affects; therefore in it and through it they have some identity among themselves; therefore they retain only a modal distinction. Whence it does not matter that they can be mutually separated, that is, that one can remain when the other does not exist, or conversely, because at least it is necessary that that thing always remain in which each exists with some identity. But if modes affecting diverse things are compared among themselves, whether those modes are of the same notion, as two subsistences of two men, or of diverse notions, as the sitting of one and the subsistence of another, then the distinction between these modes is real, not by reason of themselves, but by reason of the things in which they are; for each has some identity with the thing which it affects, and those things are really distinguished among themselves; therefore also the modes by reason of them. And that reason too confirms this well, because those modes are mutually separable both among themselves and each from that thing which the other affects; for this is a sufficient sign of real distinction. And in this manner every distinction, even between modes themselves, is reduced to the aforesaid three.

The arguments are solved

27. To the arguments of the former opinion, in so far as they can proceed against the modal distinction posited by us, the answer must be given. To the first the answer is that the argument from real being or being of reason, to conclude a real distinction or one of reason, can be taken in a twofold sense. First, as from the proper reason and cause, so that such a distinction is thought to be as the things in which it is concerned are. And this sense is false; for it has been shown that between real extremes there intervenes a distinction of reason, and conversely between extremes of reason there is at least a certain imitation of real distinction. Secondly, the argument can be proportional, or from parity of reason, that, because among beings there are only real ones or of reason, neither are there to be granted others among distinctions; and in this sense the proportion of the argument can be conceded, if it is made in due mode, and it will conclude nothing against our opinion. For, if real being is taken in its most ample conception for everything which is not altogether nothing and which can be in things without the feigning of the intellect, then it is true that there is no medium between real being and being of reason, and in the same sense I concede that there is no medium between the real distinction and that of reason; for every distinction from the nature of the thing can in this amplitude be called real; and so the ancient writers have almost spoken. In another way, however, real being can be taken for that which from its proper concept, or by virtue of its formal notion, can bring or constitute a proper entity; and in this sense it is false that there cannot be a medium between real being and being of reason; for there is a mode of being which neither is a mere being of reason, as is self-evident, nor is it real being taken in that rigour and propriety, as has been declared by us; and so also there is a modal distinction intermediate between the distinction of reason and the real one rigorously taken.

28. The second.—To the second the answer is that between same and diverse taken according to the same notion there is no medium, as the argument rightly proves; yet according to diverse notions it can happen that things which are the same in one way are diverse in another, as St. Thomas said, I, q. 11, a. 1, ad 2. In this way, then, a being and a mode can be said to be really the same and nevertheless have in the thing a modal distinction.

29. The third.—Nor does the third argument press anything against this, for we do not say that the thing and the mode are distinguished according to their proper notions and not according to the common one, which almost all the rejoinders made there suppose; for in the way in which the being and the mode are distinguished in reality, all the superior predicates, even transcendental ones, included in the mode are distinguished from those which are included in the thing of which it is the mode. And so it must be conceded that, in so far as the mode is being, so far it and the thing which it modifies are two beings and are distinguished in the thing itself, or really, speaking broadly. Nevertheless we add that the mode is not properly and rigorously being, and in this way we deny that there are two beings there; and we deny consequently that being taken properly in this way is a superior predicate to the thing and its mode. And therefore it is not necessary that on account of the distinction of the mode from the thing beings be multiplied in the said propriety and rigour. Whence to the confirmation of that third argument the same must be said of accident as was said of being; because accident sometimes signifies a form having of itself a proper entity, really distinguishable and separable from every other; sometimes it signifies only a mode of another, either accident or substance. And in the former way it is repugnant that several notions of accident be found in the same thing, as the argument convinces; yet it is not repugnant that one accidental entity have one or several modes distinct from it only modally. But substance simply so called does not signify a mode, but a proper thing perfect in its being; and the same holds of body and of any grade of substance placed under these; and therefore it cannot happen that these grades be multiplied in the thing itself without things and substances being multiplied. Yet even in the breadth of substance in common, or analogically taken, there can be some substantial modes, in which it can happen that in the same thing or substance properly and simply so called there are one or several substantial modes distinct among themselves and from it modally, such as are subsistence, union, etc.

30. The fourth.—And from these the solution to the fourth is easy; for what was said of being must be said of real essence. It can signify a proper nature of itself sufficient to constitute an entity in the nature of things, or more broadly any real notion constitutive of a being or of a real mode. In this latter sense we concede that in the thing and the mode there are distinct essences, and therefore that there is between them a distinction from the nature of the thing and in some way real. But in the former sense there is only one essence in any entity whatever; but the modes which are distinguished from it from the nature of the thing, or modally, cannot be of its essence, but are either accidents, or at most pertaining in some way to its integrity or causality, as we shall expound of each afterwards. From which it follows (which is very much to be noted) that in any entity properly so called there is a single essential notion, as at least all those arguments made at the beginning convince, which essential notion is as it were fundamental and invariable in such an entity, so that it is impossible that that entity be preserved in the nature of things without that essential notion, because through it it is first constituted; whence it can only be one specific notion, as the arguments made convince. But the modal notions, which can be as it were adhering or affixed to such an entity, can be multiplied and varied, because in the thing they are outside its essence, as will be more clearly evident in particular in the discourse of the whole Metaphysics.