Disputationes metaphysicae

1. There is a real distinction, and what it is.—In this title two things are supposed as certain and a third is inquired into. For, first, it is self-evident that there is in things a real distinction, which for greater explanation is wont to be called the distinction of thing from thing, which consists in this, that one thing is not another, nor conversely; but it is evident that there exist several things of which one is altogether not the other. It is only to be observed that sometimes things are not only so distinct, but also not united among themselves, as are two supposits, or accidents which are in distinct supposits, and others of this kind, in which there is no difficulty in knowing the aforesaid distinction, because there is in them no vestige of real identity. But sometimes it happens that things so distinct are united among themselves, as is evident in matter and form, quantity and substance; and in these it is often most difficult to discern the real distinction which is of thing from thing, if there can be in things another one less than it, which will be treated immediately; and then too it will be explained how one distinction is to be discerned from another.

2. One positive, another negative, and what each is.—It is also to be observed in this distinction that it is wont to be divided into positive and negative; which partition is given not so much on the side of the distinction itself as of its extremes; for the distinction itself formally always consists in a negation, as was said above; yet this negation sometimes intervenes between positive and real things of which one is not the other, and then it is called a positive distinction; and this is the proper real distinction of which we have spoken. But sometimes such a distinction is considered between being and non-being, or between non-beings altogether diverse, and then it is called a negative real distinction; because one of those extremes does not have the reality which the other has, if it is positive and real being; or, if each is privative being, as darkness and blindness, because they are so separated and distinguished among themselves that, if they were positive things, they would be really distinguished, or certainly because they have really distinct foundations in which in their own way they are thought to be. Whence this negative distinction is to be understood and declared through proportion or analogy to the positive; and accordingly, that being omitted, we must here treat only of the proper and positive real distinction.

3. Finally it is to be noticed that it matters nothing to the present disputation that a real relation or a relation of reason follows upon the real distinction; for we do not consider the distinction here as it can import a formal relation, but only by reason of the foundation upon which that relation can follow. Whence for the real distinction (formally speaking) a real relation is not necessary; for God is really distinguished from the angel, although he is not really referred to it. But if you say that the angel is referred to God, the answer is: whatever may be the case with this, nevertheless before that relation the angel is understood to be a thing distinct from God; for thence that relation results, if there is any. And in God the three persons are really distinguished, although between them the distinction is not a special real relation. This relation, therefore, is to be omitted as irrelevant to the present purpose.

4. Whether there is a distinction of reason, and what it is.—Secondly it is certain that besides the real distinction there is a distinction of reason. And it is that which formally and actually is not in the things which are so denominated distinct, as they exist in themselves, but only as they underlie our concepts and receive from them some denomination; in which way we distinguish in God one attribute from another, or the relation of identity from its term, when we say that Peter is the same as himself. This distinction, however, is wont to be divided into two: one, which has no foundation in the thing, and is called of reasoning reason, because it arises only from the negotiation and operation of the intellect; the other, which has a foundation in the thing, and is called by many of reasoned reason, although this expression, as it is very improper, so also can be equivocal. For a distinction of reasoned reason so called can be thought to be so because it pre-exists in the thing itself before reason reasons, so that it would be called as it were reasoned of itself, and reason would only be required to know it, not to make it; and it would only be called a distinction of reason and not real because it is not so great, nor of itself so patent as the real, and therefore requires an attentive operation of reason to distinguish it. But, the signification of this word being explained according to this etymology, such a distinction is not truly the distinction of reason of which we are now treating, but coincides with the distinction from the nature of the thing of which we shall speak immediately. In another sense, then, it can be called a distinction of reasoned reason: of reason indeed, because actually and formally it is not in things, but is made or thought out through reason; but reasoned, because it is not altogether from the mere work of reason, but from the occasion which the thing itself affords, about which the mind reasons. Whence the foundation which is said to be in the thing for this distinction is not a true and actual distinction between those things which are said to be so distinguished; otherwise not the foundation of the distinction but the distinction itself would precede; but it must be either the eminence of the thing itself which the mind so distinguishes, which is wont by many to be called virtual distinction, or certainly some relationship to other things truly and in the thing itself distinct, according to which such a distinction is thought out or conceived.

5. These two kinds of distinctions of reason, however, although they are explained otherwise by others, can nevertheless be fittingly declared in this way, namely, that the distinction of reasoning reason is in order to the same adequate or simple concept of the same thing, only through a certain repetition or comparison of it which is made in the mind. For in this way Peter is distinguished from himself, either in the notion of subject and predicate when he is enunciated of himself, or in the notion of term and subject of a relation when he is called the same as himself; for in these and similar distinctions of reason the concept of Peter is the same and integral, and there is only made a certain repetition and comparison of it. But the latter distinction of reason is made through inadequate concepts of the same thing; for, although through each the same thing is conceived, nevertheless through neither is the whole of what is in the thing exactly conceived, nor is its whole quiddity and objective notion exhausted; which is often done by conceiving that thing through a relationship to diverse things or to their mode; and therefore such a distinction always has a foundation in the thing, but formally it will be said to be made through inadequate concepts of the same thing. In this way we distinguish in God justice from mercy, because we do not conceive the most simple power of God as it is in itself and according to its whole force, but divide it by concepts in order to the diverse effects of which that eminent power is the principle, or through proportion to the diverse virtues which we find distinct in man and which are found united in a most eminent way in the most simple power of God.

6. From which it is understood, first, that the distinction of reason is not so called because it is concerned with beings of reason, in which many have been deceived, as we shall see afterwards; for it is evident from the said examples that the things which are said to be so distinguished are real beings, or rather real being conceived in diverse ways; and it is evident also by reason, because reason does not feign the beings which it so distinguishes, but only conceives after the manner of distinct things those which are not distinct; therefore not the things which are distinguished, but only the distinction itself, results through reason. Nor yet is the mind deceived in so distinguishing, because it does not affirm that the things which it so conceives are distinct in the thing, but simply and without composition, or affirmation or negation, it conceives them as distinct through prescissive abstraction, through which it as it were effects a distinction of this kind. But if afterwards it predicates either the reflection or that composition of the things so conceived, it does not affirm simply that they are distinct, but only in a certain respect, that is, according to reason. But although this distinction does not require extremes which are in themselves beings of reason, it nevertheless always supposes in them some denomination of reason, such as is the denomination of subject or predicate, or at least to be so concisely or inadequately conceived. From which it also comes about that, although this distinction does not require extremes which are absolutely beings of reason, it can nevertheless also be feigned and thought out between them; for a being of reason once conceived can be compared to itself, and so distinguished by reason. Indeed even the relation of species, for example, although in itself it is one being of reason in number adequately regarding all the individuals, can also be precisely conceived as it is terminated at one or another, and so be distinguished by reason. Although, therefore, the distinction of reason does not require beings of reason as extremes, nor is denominated thence, it can nevertheless be extended to them or be concerned with them.

7. One distinction of reason extrinsic, another intrinsic.—From which it is further understood that the distinction of reason can be said or denominated in two ways: first intrinsically, namely because in itself it is not a true distinction, but only conceived or feigned by reason; and this is the proper distinction of reason of which we are speaking; but in another way the distinction of reason can be called as it were extrinsically from the extremes in which it is understood to be concerned, so that that is called a distinction of reason which is altogether concerned with extremes or beings of reason; and this is not always a distinction of reason in the former way, but only then when it is concerned with the same being of reason, as has been explained. But sometimes two beings of reason can be distinguished which cannot properly be said to be really distinguished, because they are not real beings; yet neither can they be said properly and intrinsically to be distinguished by reason, because, in the way in which they are, they are truly distinguished not from the feigning of reason, but of themselves. For since distinction is a negation, it can be common even to feigned beings, and so that distinction is rather as it were real, as we were saying above of the distinction between darkness and blindness; for a similar one is understood between the relation of species to individuals which is conceived in human nature to its individuals, and in equine nature to its own; for those two relations are so compared among themselves that, if they were real, they would have to be really distinguished; for they have really distinct foundations and terms.

8. Whence any distinction of reason arises.—Finally, from what has been said it is understood that the proper and intrinsic distinction of reason of which we are speaking properly and per se is only by means of an intellect conceiving things imperfectly, abstractly, confusedly or inadequately. Because, since this distinction is not in the thing nor in the object known, it consists only in a certain denomination from the concepts of the mind, and therefore requires a distinction at least in the concepts themselves and in the denomination which is taken from them; but this distinction of concepts with respect to a thing which in itself is altogether one is never except on account of the imperfection of the concepts themselves. Wherefore the divine intellect per se does not properly make a distinction of reason, although it comprehends that which can be made by a finite intellect conceiving imperfectly.

The point of the question and various opinions

9. These things being posited, the chief difficulty remains whether besides these two kinds of distinctions another is to be admitted which is as it were intermediate between them. Many deny that any intermediate distinction can be thought out or understood. So thought Durandus, In I, dist. 2, q. 2; Ockham, q. 3; Hervaeus, Quodlibet III, q. 3; John of Jandun, Metaphysics VI, q. 10; Soncinas, Metaphysics VII, q. 36; and Cajetan thinks the same, I, q. 54, a. 2; and Soto, q. 3 on universals, and the chapter on Property, q. 2. But in these authors an equivocation is to be guarded against, by reason of which they can differ either only in names or also in the thing. For no distinction between positive and real extremes can be thought out which, if it is not feigned through reason, must not necessarily precede in the thing itself and be before every operation of the intellect; and because whatever is of this kind is real in so far as it exists in things, therefore in this sense every distinction which is not of reason can be called real; and so it seems manifest that there cannot be a medium between the real distinction and the distinction of reason. Yet, this being posited, the question still remains whether every distinction which precedes in things every operation of the intellect, not only fundamentally and virtually but also actually and formally, is as it were of the same notion as regards this, that it is between distinct things; or whether in things themselves there is a greater and a lesser distinction, and that which is greater, namely between thing and thing, obtains the name of real distinction, while the other is called an intermediate distinction, or by other names to be explained below. If, then, the said authors deny an intermediate distinction between the real and that of reason only in the former sense, they differ only in terms from those who admit it; yet they do not speak consistently who now deny it, now use it; which can most of all be seen in Soto in the places cited and in the chapter on Relation and others. But if they deny an intermediate distinction in the latter sense, then the dissension will be most of all about the thing.

10. In this sense, then, this opinion is persuaded, first: there are not more kinds of distinctions than of beings, because one and many follow being; but distinction is that through which multitude arises. But there are no other beings except real or of reason, as is gathered from Aristotle, Metaphysics V, text 14, and Metaphysics VI, text 6; for, since these two include an immediate contradiction, no medium can be thought out between them; therefore. Secondly, whatever things are in the thing before the intellect are either really the same or really diverse; otherwise there would be a medium between same and diverse, which is repugnant to Aristotle, Metaphysics IV, texts 4 and 5, where he says that same and diverse adequately divide being, as do one and many; and in Book X, text 11, he says that any being whatever compared to another is the same as or diverse from it. And the reason is that these too are opposed by immediate contradiction. Just as, therefore, same and diverse in general, so also such same and diverse, namely really, belong to any being whatever with respect to another. Therefore all things which are conceived by us as two beings are either really the same or really diverse; if really diverse, they are really distinguished; but if they are really the same, they cannot have a distinction in the thing before the intellect, because it is repugnant to be at the same time the same and diverse in reality.

11. But if perhaps it is said that it is not repugnant to be the same in the common notion of being, yet diverse in the notion of such or such being, for example of quality or relation, action or passion, etc., against this I argue, thirdly: when the inferior is multiplied, it is necessary that the superior predicate be multiplied in the same way; but any determinate notions of beings whatever are inferior to being; therefore some things cannot in reality be multiplied under determinate notions of beings, as, for example, in the notion of quality and relation, of whiteness or likeness, without being multiplied under the common notion of being. Therefore, if they are several under these determinate notions, they are also several beings; therefore they cannot be distinguished in reality in those notions without being really distinguished. The first proposition seems self-evident from what was said above of universals; for the same universal or common attribute existing in reality one and the same in number cannot be contracted or determined by opposite differences or modes; and on this account we said that unity in some common notion is not a true and real unity in reality, but only the likeness of the thing and a unity of reason; therefore, if some things are multiplied in the thing according to determinate notions of being, it is necessary that in them the notion of being itself also be multiplied in the thing. Because, since those two, in so far as they are distinguished in reality, include opposite or repugnant modes or differences by which they are distinguished among themselves, they cannot have in the thing true and real identity nor numerical unity in the notion of being, because the same being in number cannot at the same time be affected and determined by opposite differences. And it is confirmed, because otherwise there could also be one accident in number in the thing and yet two qualities, and quality and quantity at once; and by the same reason one substance could be two bodies, and one animal in number a horse and a lion at once, or something of this kind. But if in these an open repugnance is seen, the same will be in all things which are distinguished in the thing according to their proper notions with respect to any superior whatever, even being itself. Because being is no less essentially included in any inferior notions whatever than all the intermediate predicates. And because those opposite or dividing differences involve the same repugnance with respect to the same individual, under whatever superior or inferior notion it is considered.

12. Fourthly, the same is explained otherwise, for whatever is in reality has its real essence; therefore things which are distinct in reality have in reality distinct essences, either in number, if they themselves are distinct only in number, or in species or genus, if they are said to be essentially distinct; therefore they also have in reality distinct entities, which is to be really distinguished. This last consequence is evident, both because the entity of a thing is nothing other than the real essence placed outside its causes, as we shall show below; but if they are distinct essences, they are real and placed outside their causes; they will therefore be distinct entities. And also because, if there are there two real essences, each of them is the essence of some real being, because being and essence are compared adequately as abstract and concrete; but one and the same being can have only one essence; therefore, if there are two real essences, there are two real beings. The last minor proposition seems self-evident, because a thing has unity most of all from its essence, and because nothing must be more invariable and fixed and certain in a thing than its essence. And finally, if a thing is constituted by one essence, according to it it has its ultimate difference and species; therefore it is not further determinable; therefore that same thing cannot be actuated, determined or constituted by a difference of another species; therefore it cannot have another essence; if, therefore, there is another distinct essence, it constitutes another thing.

13. The sense of Scotus in positing the formal distinction.—The second opinion is that there is in things a certain actual distinction before the intellect, which accordingly is not of reason, but greater than it, nor yet is it as great a distinction as the real one between thing and thing. This opinion is commonly attributed to Scotus, In I, dist. 2, q. 7, last section, and dist. 5, q. 1, and dist. 8, q. 4; In II, dist. 3, q. 1, and in innumerable other places, in which he disputes either of the distinction of the attributes of God, or of the distinction of universals, or of similar things. Although in these places Scotus does not sufficiently explain whether this distinction which he calls formal is actual in the thing, or only fundamental or virtual; for sometimes he calls it virtual, and so among his followers there is a varied mode of opining. For some think that the formal distinction in Scotus is not other than the distinction of reasoned reason, in the sense and mode in which it has been declared by us, which they say is called formal because diverse definitions or formal notions are conceived there; they say also that it is called a distinction from the nature of the thing, because it has a foundation in things themselves and is virtually in them, although it does not actually precede; in which sense Scotus in no way favours the second opinion proposed; nor does it seem doubtful that in some places Scotus seems to think so, especially when he treats of the divine attributes. Nevertheless other disciples of Scotus understand him to have spoken of a true and actual distinction which is in the thing before the intellect, which they think is found not only in creatures but also in God, at least between the divine relations and the essence. Of which Durandus holds the same, In I, dist. 1, part II, dist. 5, q. 2, ad 4, and more fully dist. 33, q. 1; and many others, whom it would be long to recount here. There can also be referred for this opinion many who admit between various things a distinction from the nature of the thing and not real, as between existence and essence, nature and supposit, quantity and substance, foundation and relation, and similar things, which we shall see below in their places.

14. Whether the Scotist formal distinction is according to the mind of Aristotle.—This opinion is also wont to be attributed to Aristotle, either because in Physics III he asserts that the same motion is action and passion under diverse formal notions. And in Physics IV he distinguishes in the same way time from motion, which he nevertheless says is not a thing distinct from it. And because in De generatione I he seems to constitute a similar distinction between nutrition and augmentation, saying that they are the same in subject, that is, in entity, but are distinguished according to being, that is, according to formal being. And finally because in the Categories he places the same quality, for example heat, under diverse species, which cannot be understood except because two species can be the same according to the thing and be distinguished formally. But these testimonies do not compel much, because in the first two examples, and in the last too, a distinction of reason through inadequate concepts suffices, as we shall say more fully below in treating of accidents and the predicaments. But in the second example the exposition of those words of Aristotle is violent; for in him to be the same in subject is nothing other than (what the words themselves sound) to be conjoined in the same subject and supposit; but to be distinguished according to being is rather to be distinguished in its entity or form. In which way the same Aristotle says, Physics I, text 21, that white and musical are the same according to the thing, and distinguished by reason. Where he uses these words very equivocally; for he calls reason the essence or definition, but thing the subject or supposit in which these are. In this manner, then, it can, or even must, be expounded when he says that nutrition and augmentation are the same in subject but distinguished according to being; especially if nutrition signifies change as terminated at substance, but augmentation change as terminated at quantity; for, if each is taken as terminated at quantity, then they can be distinguished only by reason or relationship, in so far as the quantity acquired is greater than or equal to that lost; but of this elsewhere. From these and similar testimonies of Aristotle, then, no firm argument can be taken for this opinion. And I think the same of St. Thomas and the other ancient authors, who almost always use the words real distinction and distinction of reason in the former sense explained above, and do not distinctly treat the question with which we are now concerned.

15. By reason this opinion is wont chiefly to be persuaded thus: whatever is outside the essential definition of a thing is in some way distinct from it in the thing; but many things are outside the essence of a thing which are not things distinct from the thing itself; therefore there is a distinction in the thing less than the real distinction. Or otherwise: things which are distinguished by definition and objective concept are distinguished from the nature of the thing and before the intellect; but many things are distinguished in this way which are not distinguished as thing from thing; therefore. These and similar reasons the Scotists use, because in almost these ways Scotus seems to declare the formal distinction; yet, if anyone considers rightly, either the question is begged in them, or the formal distinction is taken for the distinction of reasoned reason through inadequate concepts, which can be said to be from the nature of the thing only virtually or fundamentally. What we say is proved or declared, because the essence of a thing is not always defined by us as it is in the thing, but as it is conceived by us; for in this way we define the essence of man as common, although in the thing it is only singular; and speaking of essence in this way, it is false that whatever is outside the essence is actually distinguished in reality from what is of the essence, as is evident from what was said above of individuation and the specific nature and of the other universals, namely genus and difference, of which the aforesaid authors seem chiefly to speak. Whence we too seem to speak so of essence in the first reason; for, if they speak of essence as it is in the thing, this is nothing other than the very entity of the thing, and therefore, when it is supposed that there is in the thing something distinct from the essence which is not a distinct thing, that is supposed which is to be proved. But the second reason is much weaker. For the major is not universally true; for many things are distinguished in objective concepts with respect to us which are distinguished only by reason through inadequate concepts, as is evident from what was said of the concept of being, and of the individual, the species and the other universals; and in the same way they can be distinguished by definition only according to reason, when the definition is not adequate to the thing as it is in itself, but as it is presented to such a concept of ours.

Resolution of the question

16. Nevertheless I think it simply true that there is in created things some actual distinction, and from the nature of the thing, before the operation of the intellect, which is not as great as that between two things or entities altogether distinct; which distinction, although by a general word it can be called real, because it is truly in reality and is not by extrinsic denomination from the intellect, nevertheless, in order to distinguish it from the other greater real distinction, we can call it either the distinction from the nature of the thing, applying to it as more imperfect the general name (which is customary), or more properly it can be called modal distinction; because, as I shall explain, it is always concerned with some thing and its mode. But the name of formal distinction does not please me so much, because it is very equivocal; for it often belongs to things really distinct, in so far as they are distinguished among themselves essentially, if they differ in species; for they have diverse formal unities, and so they also differ formally. Indeed even individuals of the same species, in so far as they have distinct individual formal unities, as we said above, can be said to be distinguished formally. Indeed even in the Trinity, paternity and filiation, which are distinguished really and not essentially, even according to number can be said to be distinguished formally in the objective notions of the relations, which mode of distinction will not be found outside that mystery. In this way, then, the formal distinction extends more widely and can be greater than the distinction from the nature of the thing of which we are now speaking. But on the other side it can also be less, and so it is more common, because it is frequently applied to formal notions as conceived and prescinded through our intellect, and then that distinction does not transcend the grade of the distinction of reason.

17. In order, however, that the assertion may be proved and explained, I suppose that in created things, besides their as it were substantial or radical entities (so to speak), there are found certain real modes, which both are something positive and affect the entities themselves by themselves, giving them something which is outside the whole essence, as individual and existing in the nature of things. This is evident by induction; for, for example, in the quantity which is in substance two things can be considered: one is the entity of the quantity itself; the other is the union or actual inherence of the same quantity with the substance. The first we call simply the thing of quantity, including whatever is of the essence of individual quantity placed in the nature of things, which remains and is preserved even if the quantity is separated from the subject; and it is impossible that that thing in number which is this quantity be preserved without including this essence of quantity with its intrinsic individuation and actual being, of which being we shall see afterwards; for the rest are evident from what has been said above. The second, that is, the inherence, we call a mode of the quantity, not indeed in that general signification by which every quality is wont to be called a mode of substance, as St. Thomas says, I-II, q. 49, a. 2. Nor in that general reason of speaking by which every contracting or determining thing is wont to be called a mode of the thing contracted; for in this way rational can be called a mode of animal, and specially this word is wont to be applied to those modes by which being or accident is determined to the most general genera. Nor is this word taken in that generality by which every determination or limitation prefixed to each finite thing according to its measure is wont to be called a mode, as St. Thomas noted in the same place, from Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram IV, c. 3, saying: Mode is that which the measure prefixes. In which way the same Augustine says, De natura boni, c. 3, that of the three things necessary for the goodness of each created thing, of which two are species and order, the third is mode, that is, the due commensuration to its principles, as St. Thomas explained, I, q. 5, and I-II, q. 85, a. 4, and often elsewhere. But departing from this general notion of mode and applying it to the present matter, the inherence of quantity is called its mode because it is something affecting it and as it were ultimately determining its state and notion of existing, yet it does not add to it a proper new entity, but only modifies the pre-existing one.

18. For that it does not bring a proper new entity can scarcely come into doubt, because, if it were an altogether new entity, it could not be the actual union between quantity and subject, but it would rather itself need something by which it would be united to the subject and to the quantity, as quantity itself needs inherence by which it is united to the subject. But if inherence does not need another union or inherence by which it is united or inheres, it is because it of itself does not bring a proper entity which would inhere and be united, but is only a certain mode which of itself is the reason of union and inherence. A sign of which too is that this inherence has such a mode of being that it can be by no power except actually conjoined to that form of which it is the inherence, and that this inherence in number cannot affect, or rather unite, except this form in number to which it is as it were affixed; which mode of affecting is never found in those forms or things which of themselves have proper entities. But what has been explained in the inherence of quantity proceeds in the same way in quality, and in the union of the substantial form to matter, and in subsistence or personality with respect to the nature, and in presence and local motion, and in any action or dependence with respect to its term, of all of which this is not the place to speak. They will occur, however, in the progress of this work. I shall only explain a little the last example, which seems easier; for light, for example, depends on the sun, which dependence is something besides the light and the sun; for it can be understood that the light and the sun remain and the light does not depend on the sun, as if God did not will to concur with the sun to produce or preserve the light, but preserved each by his power alone. But it cannot be conceived by the mind that this dependence of the light on the sun is an entity altogether distinct from the light itself, both because through that dependence the cause flows as it were through a way into the effect or term, whence it cannot be a thing altogether distinct from it; and also because otherwise that entity would at least by absolute power be separable from the other, which is plainly unintelligible; that dependence, therefore, is a certain mode of the light itself, which someone perhaps will call a relation; yet it is not a predicamental relation, but includes a transcendental relation or relationship, as will be said more fully below. There are, therefore, in created entities some modes affecting them, whose notion seems to consist in this, that they of themselves do not suffice to constitute a being or entity in the nature of things, but intrinsically postulate that they actually affect some entity, without which they can in no way be.

19. What the reason is for positing modes distinct from things only modally.—But the reason for positing these modes is taken a posteriori from the induction made; but a priori it seems to be that, since creatures are imperfect, and therefore either dependent, or composite, or limited, or mutable according to various states of presence, union or termination, they need these modes by which all these are completed in them. Because it is neither always necessary that this be done through altogether distinct entities, nor indeed can it be fittingly understood; nor can it be done through that which is altogether nothing; and therefore at least a real mode is required. Of which, how manifold it is and in what predicament it is placed per se or reductively, I shall speak below in the divisions of the predicaments. Finally Durandus seems to have recognized these modes, In I, dist. 30, q. 2, n. 15, where, speaking of being-in, or the inherence of accident, he says that it is a respect which is analogically called thing or being, because it is not a thing but a mode of being, nor is it an entity having a mode, but only a mode of an entity; and in n. 16 he says the same of dependence and of everything which is only a mode of being. And Astudillo speaks in the same way of inherence, De generatione I, q. 5, ad 1. And in particular, in treating of subsistence, many so explain it, as Giles, in the title De compositione angelorum, q. 5. And finally Fonseca, Metaphysics V, c. 6, q. 6, sect. 2, expressly posits these modes, although he distinguishes three kinds of modes: some which are entities of themselves distinct from others, as whiteness, sweetness; and in this order he places figure, but undeservedly, because it is constituted in the third, because with respect to quantity it affects it as a mode, not as a thing altogether distinct from it. Others which not only are not distinct entities, but are not in any way distinguished in the thing from the things of which they are said to be modes, but only by reason, as are those modes by which being is contracted to its inferiors. But these two kinds of modes have already been passed over by us, because these latter are not modes except according to reason, but the former are things, or forms having of themselves proper entities. In the third order, then, he places those modes which by a proper and special reason we call real modes, of which he thinks the same as we have explained, although he places some examples which are uncertain to us, as is that of the existence of created things, of the mode whence a thing is called necessary or contingent, or complete or incomplete being. For this last can be equivocal; because, if these are said of the whole and integral parts, then it is true that it is a certain mode pertaining to quantity; for the same portion of water, for example, if it is terminated per se and separated from others, is called a complete or total being; but if it is continuous with others, it is called a partial or incomplete being; which mode consists only in a diverse union or termination. But if those are said of being according to itself, they rather pertain to the intrinsic and essential modes of being, whether the being is called incomplete according to reason, as the difference, or physically and according to the thing, as the rational soul, which is called an incomplete being, not through something added to its essence, but through its very essence; whence that mode is distinguished from it only by reason. And I think the same of the other mode of necessary or contingent being, if these are considered in the absolute notion of being; for, if they are considered in the notion of effect, then they are extrinsic denominations, as we shall say below. But of existence the matter is more controverted, which we shall dispute below. But whatever may be the case with the examples, Fonseca says most truly that this mode is not properly a thing or entity, except by calling being broadly and most generally whatever is not nothing; yet, taking entity for that thing which of itself and in itself is so something that it does not postulate altogether intrinsically and essentially to be always affixed to another, but either is not unitable to another, or at least cannot be united except by means of some mode distinct from itself from the nature of the thing, a mode is not properly a thing or entity; and in this its imperfection is excellently declared, that it must always be affixed to another, to which per se it is immediately united without another intermediate mode, as sitting to the one sitting, union to the things united, and so of others, of which there will often be discussion in what follows.

20. From these things, then, the sense and proof of the conclusion posited is easily understood, for this mode, as it has been explained by us, is actually distinguished from the nature of the thing from the thing of which it is the mode, as all confess; indeed many call that distinction real, because it is found in the things themselves, which will be more evidently established from what is to be said in the following section; but this mode is not properly distinguished from that of which it is the mode as thing from thing; it is distinguished, therefore, by a lesser distinction, which is most properly called modal. The minor is proved, both because the mode, considered per se and precisely, is not properly a thing or entity, as has been sufficiently explained; therefore neither is it properly distinguished as thing from thing; and also because this mode so intimately includes conjunction with the thing of which it is the mode that by no power can it be without it; it is therefore a sign that that conjunction is a certain mode of identity; there is therefore a lesser distinction between this mode and the thing than between two things; all of which will be more confirmed in the following section, by declaring the signs of these distinctions and consequently the differences by which they are distinguished among themselves.

21. Besides the modal, the real and that of reason, no distinction.—Finally I add that besides the real, modal and that of reason no other distinction is found which is not either common to these or contained in them. I would say this on account of some who add a formal distinction, such as is between man and animal; which they divide into mutual, as between animal and rational, and non-mutual, such as is between animal and man; likewise an essential distinction, such as is between man and horse, and a potential distinction, such as is between the parts of the continuum; and similar things are wont to be multiplied, which do not seem necessary to me. The sufficiency, then, of the aforesaid partition is easily gathered from what has been said; for either the extremes of the distinction are not in any way actually distinct in reality, and then it is always a distinction of reason, even if it is called by other names, because it belongs only by extrinsic denomination, in so far as the same thing is presented or subordinated to diverse concepts. But in this distinction grades can be found, as I said, and when it has a foundation in the thing and is made through several inadequate concepts, it can be called a formal distinction, or sometimes also essential according to reason. And in this very thing there can be a manifold mode, in so far as the extremes can be compared in various respects, namely either only as determinate and indeterminate, as being and substance; or as whole and part, as difference and species; or as two co-parts, as animal and rational. And so this distinction can also be understood as between including and included, or as between things of which according to reason neither includes the other; in which sense, and in no other, this distinction can truly be called mutual or non-mutual, reciprocal or non-reciprocal; yet all these fall under the breadth of the distinction of reason. But if the extremes of the distinction are actually distinct in reality, either each is a true thing having a proper entity, simple or composite, or one is a thing and the other is its mode. In the former way the real distinction is constituted, in the latter the modal; but no other relationship between these extremes is intelligible; nor can another medium between them be thought out; for they include among themselves an immediate opposition as it were of contradiction; there is no other mode of distinction, therefore.

22. Various modes of the real distinction.—In the real distinction itself, however, or that of several things, various modes or various relationships can be considered. For first we can understand that things so distinct are not only distinct in reality but also dissimilar in their intrinsic and essential entity; and then they are said to be distinguished not only really but also essentially; and the greater or lesser that dissimilitude is, they are said to be distinguished either by lowest species, or by subaltern, or also by genus or predicament. Whence the essential distinction is either common to the real, the modal and that of reason; or, if it is taken most properly, it is included in the real, although it is not convertible with it; and it rather adds dissimilitude than distinction. All of which proceed using that word essential distinction rigorously; for if the discussion is of the distinction of essences, such as intervenes also between individuals, as we said above, this adds nothing properly, but indicates the things between which there is a distinction; as that is called a personal distinction which is between persons. Again, these things so distinct can sometimes be united among themselves, sometimes to one third thing: in the former way matter and form are united, and similarly continuous integral parts, to omit other more extrinsic and accidental unions. Wherefore, just as matter and form, although they are united, nevertheless retain a real distinction among themselves, so also continuous parts, although they are united, are really distinguished, not only as regards designation, as some speak, but also as regards the partial entity of each.

23. The potential distinction is truly real.—It is only to be noticed that matter and form are of themselves incomplete and partial beings, whether they are supposed to exist conjoined or separated; and therefore they are always thought to be distinguished in the same way. But integral parts do not have the notion of part nor of incomplete being except when they are conjoined; for as soon as they are separated, each begins to be an integral and total being, because per se it is not ordered to composing another; and therefore they are thought to be distinguished otherwise (more as regards denomination or mode than as regards the thing) when they are disjoined or united; for in the former state they are distinguished as total beings, in the latter as partial; and therefore parts of this kind, when united, are sometimes wont to be said to be actually distinguished as parts, but potentially as beings, that is, as certain wholes, because they are in potency to become such. All of which are seen most of all in homogeneous continuous parts; for in heterogeneous ones, although in the thing it is almost the same, there is nevertheless some diversity in the mode, because they have greater dissimilitude, and therefore they seem to have a certain greater distinction even while they are in the whole; and when they are separated, even if they do not change the substantial form but preserve the same which they had in the whole, as happens in plants and animals that can be cut, they are still thought to be incomplete and partial beings, because they are always as it were per se ordered to composing another. From these things, then, it is easily understood that that distinction which is called potential by some is a real distinction; but because distinction is a negation, two things can be denied by it: one, that this is that; and this is actually true of parts actually united, because one is not the other, and this negation is that which is per se primarily required and suffices for distinction. The other thing which can be denied is that this is conjoined to that, which is to say that this is not that as a whole and integral being distinct from it; and this does not belong to united parts in act but in potency, and under this notion that distinction can be called potential; yet as such it does not yet exist, and therefore it is not necessary to number it among the distinctions as distinct from the others. Finally, hence it is understood a fortiori that some without cause call this distinction between the parts of the continuum a distinction of reason having a foundation in the thing, because those parts are not distinguished in act, but in designation and potency. For this is not true, because there there is not only a foundation of distinction but a true distinction, using this word properly, not as it expresses separation or disjunction, but as it expresses diversity of total or partial entity. Otherwise matter and form, when they are united, would have to be called distinct not in act but only in potency, because there is no lesser union between matter and form than between the parts of the continuum. The separation, therefore, between those parts can be called of reason, because they can be considered only through reason as if they were disjoined and as it were certain wholes; but the distinction of the parts is actual and real. For these parts, even while they compose the whole, have some reality, because, as Aristotle said, Physics I, c. 2, substance is not composed except of substances, so an integral being is not composed except of beings at least partial; such beings, therefore, remain distinct, although united; indeed, unless they remained distinct, they could not make a composition, because composition is only of distinct things.

24. The distinction of the including from the included is real.—And hence further arises another mode of distinction which can be considered in any whole with respect to its individual parts; for they are not altogether the same, as is self-evident; nor are they distinguished as two parts among themselves, because these are so related that neither includes the other, but the whole contains in its entity each part, and therefore they are said to be distinguished as including and included. Yet this distinction too, as it intervenes here, is real, because the whole includes some thing which the part does not include. Whence this mode of distinction, of including and included, can in its own way be found in the real, modal and rational distinction; for in each order that which is related as a whole can be compared to another which is related as a part; yet in each it remains within the breadth of the real, modal or rational distinction, because that which one extreme includes beyond the other is distinguished really or modally or by reason from the other included one. From these things, then, it is sufficiently evident that there is no mode of distinction which is not contained in the three aforesaid.

25. It seems only able to be objected that, besides the distinction between thing and thing and between thing and mode, there can be found a distinction between mode and mode, as many think of subsistence and existence, and it is more certain of subsistence and local presence. For these modes cannot be distinguished by reason, because in reality they so exist that they have diverse principles and diverse affections, and finally that they can be separated, which are indications of an actual distinction existing in the thing, as we shall now say; nor are they distinguished really, because they are not distinguished as thing and thing, since they are not truly things; for by this argument we proved that the mode is not really distinguished from the thing itself which it affects. Nor finally can they be said to be distinguished only modally, both because one is not the mode of the other, and because they are often mutually separable from each other, which is a sign of a greater distinction than modal, as we shall immediately say.

26. How two modes are distinguished among themselves.—The answer is that, since these modes do not have being or entity except from the thing or in the thing to which they adhere, it must be weighed from it how they are distinguished from other modes; yet their distinction will always pertain to the real or the modal, supposing that they exist in the thing. Which I say for this reason, that modes too can be thought out distinct by reason alone; for, just as reason through inadequate concepts can distinguish one thing, so also one mode, as is very probable of action and passion, of motion and time, of existence and duration and others. But speaking of modes distinct in the thing itself, as are local presence, for example, and the subsistence of humanity, either these are compared only as they are in the same thing, and then they are distinguished only modally on account of the argument made, because, since of themselves they do not have a proper entity, of themselves too they do not have whence they would be distinguished more than modally; nor are they distinguished more from the thing which they affect, because we suppose it is the same; therefore they do not have a greater distinction than modal. And it is confirmed, because each of them has some identity with that thing which it affects; therefore in it and through it they have some identity among themselves; therefore they retain only a modal distinction. Whence it does not matter that they can be mutually separated, that is, that one can remain when the other does not exist, or conversely, because at least it is necessary that that thing always remain in which each exists with some identity. But if modes affecting diverse things are compared among themselves, whether those modes are of the same notion, as two subsistences of two men, or of diverse notions, as the sitting of one and the subsistence of another, then the distinction between these modes is real, not by reason of themselves, but by reason of the things in which they are; for each has some identity with the thing which it affects, and those things are really distinguished among themselves; therefore also the modes by reason of them. And that reason too confirms this well, because those modes are mutually separable both among themselves and each from that thing which the other affects; for this is a sufficient sign of real distinction. And in this manner every distinction, even between modes themselves, is reduced to the aforesaid three.

The arguments are solved

27. To the arguments of the former opinion, in so far as they can proceed against the modal distinction posited by us, the answer must be given. To the first the answer is that the argument from real being or being of reason, to conclude a real distinction or one of reason, can be taken in a twofold sense. First, as from the proper reason and cause, so that such a distinction is thought to be as the things in which it is concerned are. And this sense is false; for it has been shown that between real extremes there intervenes a distinction of reason, and conversely between extremes of reason there is at least a certain imitation of real distinction. Secondly, the argument can be proportional, or from parity of reason, that, because among beings there are only real ones or of reason, neither are there to be granted others among distinctions; and in this sense the proportion of the argument can be conceded, if it is made in due mode, and it will conclude nothing against our opinion. For, if real being is taken in its most ample conception for everything which is not altogether nothing and which can be in things without the feigning of the intellect, then it is true that there is no medium between real being and being of reason, and in the same sense I concede that there is no medium between the real distinction and that of reason; for every distinction from the nature of the thing can in this amplitude be called real; and so the ancient writers have almost spoken. In another way, however, real being can be taken for that which from its proper concept, or by virtue of its formal notion, can bring or constitute a proper entity; and in this sense it is false that there cannot be a medium between real being and being of reason; for there is a mode of being which neither is a mere being of reason, as is self-evident, nor is it real being taken in that rigour and propriety, as has been declared by us; and so also there is a modal distinction intermediate between the distinction of reason and the real one rigorously taken.

28. The second.—To the second the answer is that between same and diverse taken according to the same notion there is no medium, as the argument rightly proves; yet according to diverse notions it can happen that things which are the same in one way are diverse in another, as St. Thomas said, I, q. 11, a. 1, ad 2. In this way, then, a being and a mode can be said to be really the same and nevertheless have in the thing a modal distinction.

29. The third.—Nor does the third argument press anything against this, for we do not say that the thing and the mode are distinguished according to their proper notions and not according to the common one, which almost all the rejoinders made there suppose; for in the way in which the being and the mode are distinguished in reality, all the superior predicates, even transcendental ones, included in the mode are distinguished from those which are included in the thing of which it is the mode. And so it must be conceded that, in so far as the mode is being, so far it and the thing which it modifies are two beings and are distinguished in the thing itself, or really, speaking broadly. Nevertheless we add that the mode is not properly and rigorously being, and in this way we deny that there are two beings there; and we deny consequently that being taken properly in this way is a superior predicate to the thing and its mode. And therefore it is not necessary that on account of the distinction of the mode from the thing beings be multiplied in the said propriety and rigour. Whence to the confirmation of that third argument the same must be said of accident as was said of being; because accident sometimes signifies a form having of itself a proper entity, really distinguishable and separable from every other; sometimes it signifies only a mode of another, either accident or substance. And in the former way it is repugnant that several notions of accident be found in the same thing, as the argument convinces; yet it is not repugnant that one accidental entity have one or several modes distinct from it only modally. But substance simply so called does not signify a mode, but a proper thing perfect in its being; and the same holds of body and of any grade of substance placed under these; and therefore it cannot happen that these grades be multiplied in the thing itself without things and substances being multiplied. Yet even in the breadth of substance in common, or analogically taken, there can be some substantial modes, in which it can happen that in the same thing or substance properly and simply so called there are one or several substantial modes distinct among themselves and from it modally, such as are subsistence, union, etc.

30. The fourth.—And from these the solution to the fourth is easy; for what was said of being must be said of real essence. It can signify a proper nature of itself sufficient to constitute an entity in the nature of things, or more broadly any real notion constitutive of a being or of a real mode. In this latter sense we concede that in the thing and the mode there are distinct essences, and therefore that there is between them a distinction from the nature of the thing and in some way real. But in the former sense there is only one essence in any entity whatever; but the modes which are distinguished from it from the nature of the thing, or modally, cannot be of its essence, but are either accidents, or at most pertaining in some way to its integrity or causality, as we shall expound of each afterwards. From which it follows (which is very much to be noted) that in any entity properly so called there is a single essential notion, as at least all those arguments made at the beginning convince, which essential notion is as it were fundamental and invariable in such an entity, so that it is impossible that that entity be preserved in the nature of things without that essential notion, because through it it is first constituted; whence it can only be one specific notion, as the arguments made convince. But the modal notions, which can be as it were adhering or affixed to such an entity, can be multiplied and varied, because in the thing they are outside its essence, as will be more clearly evident in particular in the discourse of the whole Metaphysics.

1. In what the difficulty lies.—The whole difficulty consists in discerning the modal distinction from the others; for the real distinction and that of reason, since they are extremely opposed, are easily discerned; but the modal distinction, since it is intermediate, is sometimes thought to be real on account of the agreement which it has with that, but sometimes is thought to be nothing in the thing, but only according to reason, on account of a certain agreement with the other. In order, then, that some general signs may be had which can be applied to particular questions, some things must briefly be said, supposing that, in order that some things be distinguished by us more than by reasoning reason (of which distinction nothing need be added, because it is altogether feigned), at the least, or first of all, it is necessary that they have distinct objective concepts, and according to them formal notions in some way distinct; because, unless they are conceived at least in this way, neither will they be conceived as distinct, nor will there be any reason for inquiring how great or of what kind the distinction between them is; but several objective concepts being supposed, it is excellently and deservedly inquired how it will be known whether they have a distinction in the thing, and of what kind it is.

The sign of actual distinction in the thing

2. I say, first: whenever two objective concepts are so related that in reality and in the individual they can be separated, either so that one remains without the other in the nature of things, or so that they are really disjoined and lose the real union which they had, it is a sign that between them there is a greater distinction than that of reasoned reason, and so some actual distinction from the nature of the thing, or one which is in reality. This assertion is common among the Doctors, and it is taken from Aristotle, Topics VII, c. 1, fifteenth place, where he speaks thus: Further, if one can be without the other, it will not be the same; where Alexander of Aphrodisias notes it. It can also be taken from Augustine, De Trinitate VI, c. 6, where, having said: In each body magnitude is one thing, colour another, figure another, he subjoins such a proof: For both, the magnitude being diminished, the same colour and the same figure can remain; and, the colour being changed, the same magnitude and the same figure; and, the figure not remaining the same, it can be as great and coloured in the same way; and whatever other things are said of the body together can be changed both together and several without the others; and by this the nature of the body is proved to be manifold, but in no way simple. And below he proves thence that the human soul is not simple, because it has various acts and affections which he shows to be distinct, because some can be found without others, and some more, some less. The Scholastics too frequently use this rule, as is evident from the Master, In I, dist. 8; Durandus, dist. 30, q. 2; Soto, In II, dist. 1, q. 5, and In III, dist. 8, q. 1; Ockham, In I, dist. 1, q. 3; and Gabriel there, q. 3, a. 3, dub. 1; Hervaeus, Quodlibet III, q. 3; and among the metaphysicians John of Jandun uses this rule, Metaphysics VI, q. 10; Antonius Trombeta, Metaphysics V, q. 3, a. 1; Fonseca, Metaphysics V, c. 6, q. 6, sect. 1. Likewise Ferrariensis, Physics I, q. 10; and Paul of Venice, Physics III, text 19; Astudillo, cited in the preceding section. Many use the same to prove a distinction from the nature of the thing between subsistence and created nature, as is evident from Giles, cited in the preceding section; Medina, III, q. 4, a. 2. And below we shall report more in their place. And by the same argument it is wont to be proved that inherence is distinguished from the existence of the accident, and dependence or action from the term, all of which we shall see in what follows.

3. It is proved by reason, because, if things which are conceived by us as having two objective concepts are found conjoined in the thing and are afterwards separated, either each remains existing in reality after the separation from the other, or one ceases to be and the other remains; if it happens in the former way, it is necessary that those two be distinguished from the nature of the thing, indeed even really; first, because it is impossible that the same thing altogether be disjoined and separated from itself in reality; for an open contradiction is involved; for no greater union in the thing can be thought out than total identity in the thing; indeed that is not union but unity. Just as, therefore, it is impossible that what is indivisible be divided, so also that what is altogether the same be disjoined from itself. Next, because, if those two remain in reality and not united among themselves, one is not the mode of the other, nor conversely; because it is of the essential notion of a mode, as we saw, to be actually united or affixed to the thing of which it is the mode; therefore, whenever something can be separated from another and preserved separated, it is an evident sign that it is not its mode; it will therefore be either a thing of itself really distinct from the other, or a mode of another really distinct thing, by reason of which the mode itself too will be really distinguished from the other thing. But if two things are so separated in the thing that one remains existing and not the other, it is necessary that they be distinguished at least modally. First, because it is impossible that the same thing be and not be; therefore, if this does not exist which existed before, and something remains existing, they cannot be altogether the same in the thing; otherwise the same thing would at the same time exist and not exist. Secondly, when these two are so separated, there is something positive which in the thing is taken away from the other and ceases to be, taking something broadly as it is distinguished against nothing, for every real thing or mode; for we suppose that each of those things which are separable in the aforesaid way is such; that positive thing, therefore, after it is separated, is not; therefore, when it was, it was in some way distinct from that which remains existing. Finally, because it is no less impossible that the same thing altogether be separated from itself when one extreme is destroyed than when each is preserved; but it has been shown that the same thing cannot be separated from itself while each extreme remains; therefore neither will it be able when the other does not remain; therefore, as often as such a separation can come about, a distinction in the thing is supposed. And therefore those err greatly who think that a relation is something real and positive without which the foundation can remain in the thing itself, and yet that it is not actually and in reality distinguished from the foundation itself; for it is an open implication of contradiction. For if the relation in its essence is something real, and now is in the foundation and afterwards is not, the foundation itself remaining integral in its entity and essence, it is necessary that whatever it is which is the relation be in some way distinct in the thing itself from the foundation; otherwise the same thing altogether according to the thing would cease to be and would remain.

4. An objection is dissolved.—But you will object: for animal is in the thing conjoined to man and is separable from him in the horse or in the lion; and yet it is not distinguished in the thing from him, as was said above. The answer is that for this reason I said in the rule proposed: That which in the thing itself and in the individual is separable; for animal (and the same holds of all similar predicates) is only separable from man according to the common notion conceived, according to which it does not have in the thing unity in many, but by reason only; but in so far as animal is in the thing and in the individual conjoined to man, it is not separable from man; for this individual animal which in the thing is this man can never remain in the thing unless the man remains, nor conversely can this man last without this animal lasting.

5. A theological rejoinder is answered.—The divine relations are in no way distinguished in the thing from the essence.—You will press: for at least in God the divine essence is in the thing conjoined to paternity; and the same in number is separable from it in so far as it is conjoined to filiation; and yet they are not actually distinguished in the thing itself. Some theologians, on account of this difficulty, seem to admit an actual distinction, and in the thing itself at least a modal one, between the divine relation and the essence, which is wont to be attributed to Scotus, but Durandus thinks it more clearly; for Scotus speaks more obscurely and very much in common of his formal distinction. But that opinion in the aforesaid sense is very false and much repugnant to the divine simplicity and perfection. But this disputation we leave to the theologians, and answer briefly. First, by denying that the essence is separable from paternity; for it is one thing to be communicable to filiation or procession, another to be separable from paternity; rather, from its intrinsic notion it postulates so to be communicated to them as not to be separated from this; the rule posited about separation, therefore, has no place here. Secondly, the answer is that to be in that way communicable to many things really distinct among themselves without distinction from that which is common to them, except by reason alone or virtually, is proper to a thing simply infinite; and therefore, although, speaking broadly of separation for conjunction with another thing really distinct in creatures, it is an excellent argument that whatever is conjoined with another really distinct thing is itself also distinct in the thing from the other extreme, because one finite thing the same in number cannot by identity be conjoined with things really distinct, nevertheless in an infinite thing this is no argument, on account of its supreme simplicity and perfection; and this is the mystery of the Trinity, which we hold by faith alone and most certain.

The sign of a merely modal distinction

6. I say, secondly: the separation of one from another which is only non-mutual (as it is commonly called), that is, in which one extreme can remain without the other, yet not conversely, is a sufficient argument of modal distinction, yet not of a greater or real one properly taken. The former part has been sufficiently proved in the preceding assertion. The latter is proved, because from a non-mutual separation of this kind it is rightly proved that that thing which can remain when the other extreme is destroyed has of itself its reality, intrinsically and entitatively or essentially independent of that extreme which can be destroyed while it remains; but it cannot be concluded thence that the other extreme, which can be destroyed, has of itself a proper entity, because, as is supposed, that extreme is such that it cannot remain without the other; but for this it is enough that it be its mode; indeed this is intrinsic, as we have said, to modal entity, that it cannot remain by itself nor be actually separated from that of which it is the mode; therefore from the aforesaid separation no greater distinction than modal can be concluded. And it is confirmed; for so local motion is compared to the mobile, sitting to the one sitting, action to the term, between which no one who thinks rightly posits a greater distinction than modal.

7. A notable small question.—But someone will ask: granted that this as it were negative rule is true, that from this separation a greater distinction is not necessarily gathered, whether the positive rule too is true, namely that things which are separable only in this way are also distinguished only modally and not by a greater, real distinction. For such a rule seems uncertain and so fallacious; for, although that sign alone is not a sufficient argument of greater distinction, it does not seem a sufficient sign for denying a greater distinction. For it can happen that that inseparability which is on the side of the other extreme arises not from some identity or lesser distinction, but from some more intrinsic and separable mode of dependence. As, for example, subject and accident are so compared that the subject can remain without the accident, but the accident cannot naturally remain without the subject, even if it is a thing distinct from it. And some think that certain accidents, even if they are really distinct, cannot even supernaturally be preserved without a subject, as vital acts, and any others perhaps similar. That positive rule, therefore, is either false or uncertain. The answer is that it is one thing to speak of natural inseparability, another of inseparability in order to the absolute power of God. For from the former alone a sufficient argument of real indistinction most properly and rigorously taken cannot be taken, as the argument made and the example of subject and accident convince; and similarly of matter and individual material forms; for matter can be separated from any individual form whatever and preserved without it; but no such form can naturally be separated from matter so as to be preserved without it.

8. An objection is met.—But if the discussion is of inseparability in order to the absolute power of God, a very probable argument is taken that things which are compared in the aforesaid way and cannot be preserved mutually separated are distinguished only modally. The reason is that, if one extreme of those two is such that through the absolute power of God it cannot be preserved without the other, it is a great argument that it is essentially only a certain mode and not a true entity, because, if it were a true entity, it could not have so intrinsic a dependence on another entity that God could not supply it by his infinite power; therefore it can only come from this, that that extreme in its intrinsic essence is not an entity but only a mode. The antecedent is evident, because God can supply efficient causality as such, as is known to all. Likewise, by preserving an accident without a subject he supplies material causality not with respect to the composite but with respect to the other extreme, which alone of that genus can intervene in the present case. And by the same reason he could supply a similar formal causality, if it intervened, because of itself it is no less intrinsic than material. Nor can another genus of dependence between absolute things be feigned, to omit relation and term, of which immediately. You will say: many think that matter cannot be preserved by God without form, although form can be preserved without matter; and yet it does not follow that they are distinguished only modally. The answer is: those who so think will see on what probable foundation they assert it; for that opinion could never meet with my approval, as I shall say below in treating of causes. Next, it is not similar of matter; for, although we gratuitously grant that matter cannot be preserved without every form, nevertheless it is certain that it can naturally be preserved without this or that form and without any form determinately; and this is a sufficient argument that matter is not a mode of form, but a thing distinct as far as depends on itself; for that which is only a mode not only cannot be separated from every thing of which it is the mode, but also this mode in the individual cannot be separated from this individual thing, as this sitting from this one sitting; since, therefore, matter in the individual and this in number can be separated from this form and be under any other, it is rightly gathered that it is not a mode of form. But again from the fact that form is a separable thing able to remain without matter, at least by absolute power, it is also rightly concluded that it is not a mode of matter, but has in itself its entity, which is conjoined to matter by a distinct union; besides other arguments which can be taken from the perfection of form over matter and from its activity and other similar things. The rule posited, then, even declared in that positive way, is very probable as regards us. I say as regards us, because perhaps it can happen that things are distinct in themselves which with respect to our knowledge do not exhibit a sufficient sign of distinction. Yet, because we cannot pass judgement on things which are not seen in themselves except through effects or signs known to us, and because we have a general rule that distinctions are not to be multiplied without sufficient foundation, because distinction is not made by nature without sufficient cause or necessity, and finally because that inseparability seems also directly to show some identity, therefore we probably conjecture that where mutual separation is not possible, but only non-mutual, there is no distinction except modal.

Signs of real distinction

9. I say, thirdly: although several indications are wont to be assigned for knowing real distinction, nevertheless two which are taken from separation seem the chief. One is of separation only as regards real union, that is, if both can at the same time and actually be preserved in the nature of things without real union among themselves. The other is of mutual separation as regards existence, that is, that one can be preserved without the other and conversely, per se, immediately, and without order or necessary connection with some third thing. These two rules have almost been proved in explaining the two preceding conclusions. And the first is evident, because those two things which are so separated cannot be so related that one is the mode of the other, nor conversely, because it is of the essence of a mode that it cannot be except actually united to that of which it is the mode, because it is united by itself and not by another mode of union, as has been sufficiently declared; therefore those two will either be distinct things, which is what we intend, or modes of distinct things, or one will be a thing and the other the mode of another distinct thing; and in whichever of these ways they are related they will be really distinguished, either by themselves or by reason of the distinct things, according to what was said in the preceding section. The second is proved, because, when two things are so related that they can be mutually separated and one preserved without the other, neither can be the mode of the other, because it is of the intrinsic notion of a mode that it cannot remain without the thing of which it is the mode; therefore each of them will be a true thing bringing with it a true entity which can be preserved without the other. Therefore it is necessary that things of this kind be really distinguished, because they are distinguished in reality, since they can be separated, and they are not distinguished as a thing and the mode of a thing, but as thing and thing; therefore they are distinguished really. But I said per se and immediately, because it can happen that two modes of the same thing can mutually be one without the other and conversely; and then a real distinction between them is not rightly gathered, because, although not by reason of themselves, formally speaking, at least by reason of the thing which they modify, they have among themselves a certain real identity, and neither of them is separable so as to be preserved without the thing which it modifies.

10. And from these things it is evident that it matters nothing whether this separation can come about naturally or by absolute power, because it is so essential to that thing which we call only a mode to be actually affixed to and modifying the thing of which it is the mode that it is repugnant to it by absolute power to be preserved without that thing, or otherwise than by actually modifying it. By which reason neither can figure be understood by the mind separated from every quantity and thing of which it is the figure, nor relation without foundation, if it is its mode, nor motion without the mobile, and so of other similar things. And the reason has been touched upon above, because things of this kind do not have from their proper concept a sufficient entity in which they could be preserved, but only from a certain identity to those things in which they are; therefore whatever is separable in the aforesaid way, even by absolute power, is not a mode but a distinct thing. As regards inferring a distinction in the thing itself, then, it matters nothing whether the aforesaid separation comes about naturally or supernaturally; only as regards us the distinction can be better known when the separation comes about naturally; but sometimes it is made known to us through supernatural mysteries, whose knowledge helps much toward knowing natural things. In which way through the mystery of the Eucharist it has been established to us more certainly that quantity is a thing distinct from substance than could have been established through natural knowledge.

11. Worthy of attention.—Where it can also be observed in passing that, although sometimes a mutual separation and preservation of two things has not been made, but of one only from the other, nevertheless it suffices for us to infer a real distinction, as in the aforesaid example; hitherto indeed it has not been done by God that material substance be preserved without quantity, but only that quantity remain without material substance; and nevertheless this is a sufficient argument for us to gather that quantity and substance are distinguished not only modally but also really. Not indeed by reason of the form (so to speak), but by reason of the matter; for in humanity and subsistence too it has been done that humanity be preserved without created subsistence; but it has not been done, nor do we believe it can be done, that created subsistence be without its proper substantial nature, of which it is the term; whence in this example from the aforesaid separation we gather not a real distinction but only a modal one. In these, therefore, besides separation, it is necessary to consider the nature of that which is preserved without the other; for, if it is by its nature as it were adhering to another and more imperfect than it, and finally that which seems most of all able to have the notion of a mode, and nevertheless it is preserved without the other, it is a sign of real distinction; but it is otherwise when that which remains in the thing is more perfect and has the chief entity of the thing. As in the aforesaid examples, comparing substance and quantity according to themselves, it is clear that substance is more perfect, and that, if one had to be the mode of the other, not substance would have to be the mode of quantity, but quantity the mode of substance; therefore, since by the separation of quantity from substance it has been sufficiently declared that quantity is not a mode but a true thing, it has consequently been sufficiently declared that substance and quantity are distinguished not as thing and mode, but as two things. But in nature and subsistence it is rather evident that the substantial nature is the chief entity of the thing, and that, if one of them is the mode of the other, subsistence is the mode of the nature and not conversely; but by virtue of the separation made it has not been declared that subsistence is more than a mode, since it itself has not been preserved without the nature; and therefore from it it is not permitted to gather a real distinction, but only a modal one.

12. Whence distinction is to be conjectured in those things which have hitherto been separated by no power.—But a difficulty remains here when no separation, either natural or supernatural, has been made, how then a real distinction can be known; because then the aforesaid rules cannot serve, although it is not repugnant that many things be really distinguished which have hitherto not been separated in any of the aforesaid ways, as the matter and form of the heaven. But if you say that, granted that they have not been separated, they can be known as separable, this is the same as if it were said that they are known to be distinct, or at least it is of the same difficulty; for this is what we are inquiring, how we shall know that they are separable if they are neither naturally separated nor have hitherto been separated by God in any of the aforesaid ways. And the difficulty is increased because some things are inseparable even by absolute power which are nevertheless thought to be really distinct, as many think of the intellect and the will, both among themselves and with respect to the soul. On account of the former difficulty it can be said that the said sign taken from separation is neither adequate nor unique nor always first or necessary, and is only assigned as more certain and better known when it can be had; and therefore besides it some others are wont to be assigned, which are briefly to be touched upon.

Another sign of real distinction is rejected as useless

13. The first is the distinction of existences; for things which are really distinguished have distinct existences; but things which are modally distinguished have only one existence; for a mode is a mode because it does not have another existence besides the existence of the thing of which it is the mode.

14. But this sign is of no moment, because either it is more obscure than that with which we are dealing, or it begs the question, or it involves something false. For, first, if it is true that existence is the actual entity of the thing, it is the same to say that those things are really distinguished which have distinct existences as if it were said that those things are really distinguished which have distinct entities. But if existence is feigned to be a thing distinct from the actual essence, either it is supposed that those things which have distinct existences also have distinct essences; and this indeed is true, yet it is no less difficult to know distinct existences than distinct essences, unless perhaps through separation; or it is asserted that two essences can have one existence and then are distinguished only modally, but that real distinction is when with the distinction of essences the distinction of existences too is conjoined; and this I think is not only so hidden that naturally it can be known of no things, but also false, because there is no greater reason for distinguishing essences than existences in things which are modally distinguished; for the same mode of distinction which is between essences can be between existences. Wherefore, supposing, what we shall prove below, that existence is nothing other besides the very thing of the actual essence, just as in the thing and the mode distinct essences are understood, so also distinct existences are to be understood, because the mode, as co-distinct from the thing which it modifies, has its actuality; the reason, therefore, and the mode of distinction is the same between those two, whether they are considered in potency or in act, according to the being of essence or according to the being of existence. Add finally that, according to the opinion asserting that existence is a thing distinct from essence, things really distinct can exist by the same indivisible existence, as matter and form and all the parts of the same composite; therefore, even according to that opinion, the distinction of things is not sufficiently or truly manifested through the distinction of existences in those things which are so distinct that they are conjoined among themselves, in which the present difficulty is chiefly concerned, since distinct things can have the same existence. But if perhaps someone does not admit this, there is no reason why he can consistently admit that a thing and its mode have altogether the same existence, rather than one modally distinct, so that each has a being accommodated to itself; therefore the same question will be of the distinction of things or modes and of the distinction of existences.

Another sign of real distinction taken from Aristotle is expounded

15. The second sign can be taken from diverse production or corruption, so that those things are said to be really distinguished which are generated and corrupted by diverse generation and corruption. But conversely those things are really the same which are generated by the same generation; for Aristotle used this sign, Metaphysics IV, text 3, to prove that being and one are the same. Fonseca reports this opinion from Antonius Trombeta, treatise De formalitatibus, c. 2, and attacks it, because the properties of the soul are produced by the same action as the soul itself, and yet are distinct things; and conversely the relation is not really distinguished from the foundation nor the figure from the quantity, and yet they are produced by diverse action. But I do not think this sign is false if it is understood with due proportion; I think, however, that it is almost useless for knowing distinction, except in so far as it in some way includes the sign of separation. I explain each, and first I suppose that the discussion is of the natural action or production of things, not mixing in miracles. Likewise, that the discussion is of things which of themselves and by their nature require distinct actions by which they come about, even if they are produced together. But why I suppose these I shall explain below. Again, I notice that some things can be understood to be produced by distinct action in two ways. In one way, per se primarily and without any natural connection or consecution of such actions among themselves; in another way, with connection of the actions, so that one results from the other by natural necessity. Whence conversely some things can also be said to come about by the same action in two ways, namely either equally primarily and without any emanation of one from the other, or one primarily and the other secondarily, in so far as it necessarily results from the prior term.

16. Things, therefore, which in the former way come about per se primarily by actions distinct in the thing must necessarily be distinguished in the thing; and as regards this the rule posited above is most true. Because the whole notion and distinction of actions is taken from the terms; therefore, if the terms are such that they require distinct actions, they too will be distinct; yet a real distinction between the terms cannot absolutely be inferred hence, nor a greater one than is between the actions themselves; which sometimes can be distinguished really, as the production of wood and its heating; but sometimes only modally, as the production of wood and its local motion, which are distinguished only as two modes of the same wood; and in the same way the things produced through actions of this kind are distinguished, for through the former substance and heat are produced, which are really distinct; but through the latter substance and where, or local presence, which are distinguished only modally. The things produced, therefore, keep a distinction proportional to their productions. Which is true not only when actions of this kind come about separately and without natural conjunction, as happens in the production and heating of fire, but also when those actions are naturally conjoined and one results from the other, as happens, for example, in the production of some heavy thing in the region of the air and its motion downward, which naturally follows upon such generation; for there the distinction of the actions is evident and almost to sense, because one comes about intrinsically in one instant, the other is only extrinsically begun in the same instant. But the same distinction and consecution can be between instantaneous actions, as between the production of fire and the consequence of heat; and the same holds of the production of the soul and the emanation of its powers from it; for, if those powers are distinct things, that emanation too is a physically distinct action, although it results from the other and is therefore said not to come about per se primarily. And similar examples can be applied in actions distinct only modally, such as are the creation of an angel, for example, and the production of some where, or local presence, which naturally follows upon it; and the production of some quantity and its figuration, which comes about afterwards; and the same holds of the production of the foundation and the resultance of the relation, supposing that it is a distinct mode. And so it is evident that the instances or examples adduced against that opinion do not press; for in all of them, as there is a distinction between the actions, so also between the terms, and conversely.

17. It is evident next in what sense the principle posited by Aristotle in the said place is true: things which are generated by one production are the same. For this is true of things which come about per se and immediately by a single real action; but those which are only said to be produced, or rather co-produced, by one action, in so far as one results from the other, need not be really the same, but only in subject or by a certain binding together, because in truth they do not come about immediately and proximately by one real action, as has been declared in substance and really distinct attributes. Indeed it is necessary that that one action be taken indivisibly; for, if it is in some way composite, some distinction will be able to be found in its adequate term. As by a single action, for example heating, or the eduction of form from the potency of matter, heat or form comes about and is united to the subject or matter, where in the term two things come about distinct from the nature of the thing, or modally, namely the entity of the form or heat and its union; and yet the action is one, yet in some way composed of as it were partial modes which can be considered in it.

18. And hence further it is evident from what has been said why I said that this sign is almost useless for knowing the distinctions of things; for the same various modes of distinctions can be found between actions which are between terms, namely real, modal, and sometimes of reason, as is between the generation of man and of animal; but these modes of distinctions are not better known to us in actions than in terms. Rather, more frequently and more a priori we hunt out the distinction of actions from the terms; for for no other reason do we think that heating is an action really distinct from the wood, but its constitution in such a where distinct only modally, except because heat is a distinct thing, but local presence is only a distinct mode. I added moreover that these are to be understood of the distinction of actions which the terms per se by their nature require, because, if actions are distinguished only either from the succession of time or from the diverse mode in which they come about, it is not necessary that from the distinction of actions some distinction in the term be gathered. For, just as distinct modes can be in the same thing, especially successively, so distinct actions can be terminated at the same term if they are from distinct agents or at distinct times; in which way the same light is now produced by one action by one lamp, and can afterwards be preserved by another through a distinct action; and the same man is produced through generation and reproduced through resurrection. I said finally that miracles are not to be mixed in, because by divine power the same thing can be produced or preserved by several actions not only successively but also at the same time, as I treated more fully in tom. 3 of the Third Part. But conversely I do not think it can happen that altogether distinct things are produced by the same action. But the reason of the difference is not difficult from what has been said, because action is a certain mode of the thing which comes about; but one and the same indivisible mode cannot be in distinct things, as was proved above; but that several modes be in the same thing is not a repugnance when the modes themselves are not opposed among themselves; but it can seem superfluous when they are either of the same notion or tend to the same thing; yet with respect to the divine wisdom it can be not superfluous, and no conflict is shown on account of which it would not be possible.

Another sign of real distinction is weighed

19. A third sign is wont to be applied, namely, that when one is related as producing and the other as produced it is a sufficient sign of real distinction. So Fonseca, Metaphysics V, c. 6, q. 6, sect. 1, from St. Thomas, I, q. 41, a. 4. But this sign first of all is not universal, as is self-evident. Next, if it is only assigned to conclude a distinction from the nature of the thing, abstracting from modal or proper real, it is generally true; but if it is understood of the proper real distinction, in order that it hold true it must be restricted to production either substantial, proper, perfect and primary, or accidental which is terminated at something which is not united to the producer itself; for in these two cases a real distinction is always required; but in the others not always. The first is evident, because the same substantial supposit cannot produce itself properly and primarily, because, in order to produce, it is supposed to be; and therefore, if it produces a supposit, it produces another distinct from itself. Whence also the divine persons, although they have unity in essence, are really distinguished on account of the real production of one from another. But I said properly and primarily, because by miracle it can perhaps happen that some thing reproduces itself; yet then it is necessary that that thing be supposed first produced by another action, and therefore the second action is not a primary production nor a proper one, but only after the manner of conservation; of which matter more fully in the matter of the Eucharist. The second is declared thus, because whatever is produced by something must be actually distinguished from it in the thing itself, because the production itself must be in some way distinct from the producer, especially since it is posited as accidental; therefore its term too must be distinct in reality from the producer itself; therefore, if from elsewhere it is supposed that such a term is not produced with union and conjunction to the producer itself, it is necessary that it be not its mode, but a thing distinct from it or a mode of a thing distinct from it; it is necessary, therefore, that it be distinguished not only modally but in the thing, either per se immediately or by reason of that in which it is. But if the production is accidental and is terminated at something which is united and conjoined to the producer, it is not a sufficient sign of real distinction. For, although sometimes such a distinction can intervene, as in sight producing vision, and the intellect, the will and similar faculties, which produce qualities really distinct from themselves by which they are informed, nevertheless this is not simply necessary, as is evident whenever that which is produced is only a mode of the producer itself, whether it is produced per se and by a proper action, as in the local presence which one who moves himself effects in himself, or by an action only resulting, as in the emanation of subsistence from the nature, and similar cases. But if it is said that not any production whatever, but that which is a thing distinct from the producer, infers a real distinction of producer and produced, this will be an altogether useless circle; for that an action of this kind is a thing distinct from the producer cannot be gathered otherwise than from this, that through it there is not produced some mode of the producer, but a true quality or form affecting it, which was what was inquired.

20. And the same judgement holds of the other sign which the same author subjoins in the same place, about the relation of cause and effect; for this can have place most of all in the efficient cause, of which all that has been said proceeds; and they can be applied in their own way to the formal or material cause; for, although most properly they are not found except between act and potency really distinct, nevertheless by some reason they also intervene between a mode affecting and a thing affected; but in the final cause it has no place, since the end and the effect can coincide in the same thing; indeed also the end and the agent, or the end and the form.

21. A conclusion is drawn from what has been said.—Scarcely, then, can any certain indication of real distinction be given when things are such that naturally they are always and necessarily really united among themselves and have hitherto not been divinely separated; I do not deny, however, that several things of this kind can be found really distinct, as is evident from the examples brought forward above; but I only assert that a distinction of this kind cannot be discerned by any general sign, but that in each the proper essential notion and the grade of perfection and the function to which they are ordered must be considered, so that from all collected into one a judgement about the distinction can be made; as, for example, between the matter and the form of the heaven we easily believe there is a real distinction, because from the common essential notions of matter and form we understand that neither of them is a mode, but a true entity; and from elsewhere, from the various properties of the heaven, we understand that each is found in it according to their proper notions; and finally from their limited perfection we conclude that they are distinguished from the nature of the thing and consequently really. In a similar way between the substantial form and a power per se primarily ordered to effecting an accidental act a real distinction is believed to intervene, because the notion of an operative faculty is very perfect in its genus; whence it does not seem to be some accidental mode, which is wont to be very imperfect, but a true entity and form per se ordered to such an act; but from elsewhere, considering the limitation of finite substance, it does not seem in its essential notion, as it exists in the thing, to comprehend notions or relationships so diverse to acts so diverse as are the acts of being and of operating; whence we conclude that there is between those two a real distinction, since it is not between a thing and a mode, but between essences constituting proper entities. In this manner, then, one must philosophize in the others, considering first whether those notions between which the distinction is sought exceed the notion of mode, and each by itself suffices to constitute an entity; and then whether so great a diversity appears in them that in a finite thing they require some distinction from the nature of the thing, and actual in the thing itself; and so a probable conjecture can be made about the quality of the distinction.

A doubt occurring about the separability of distinct things

22. Things really distinct can be mutually separated, if they are preserved in being.—But a doubt remains which was touched upon in the other part of the proposed difficulty, namely whether all things which are really distinct in reality can be separated by the divine power. Which can be understood of the twofold separation touched upon above. First, of separation only as regards real union, each extreme being preserved in being. Secondly, of separation as regards being, that is, in which, one being destroyed, the other is preserved in being. I suppose, however, that the question is about things altogether co-distinct among themselves, so that they are not related as whole and part, or as including and included; for of these it is evident that what includes another cannot be preserved without it, because it intrinsically consists of it. But of things co-distinct in the former way various opinions could be reported, which I omit, because they pertain to particular matters. And to the former sense I answer that things of this kind can always be separated in that way by absolute power (for so we are speaking), nor does any exception occur which it is necessary to make in this. And the reason is that to these things mutual separation of one from the other cannot be repugnant from defect of sufficient entity (as happens in modes), because, as we suppose, each of them has a true entity distinct from the other; if, therefore, there is a repugnance, it can only be either from the dependence of one on the other, or from the natural connection or emanation of one from the other; for no other reason can be thought out. But, although natural inseparability can rightly be inferred here, it cannot be in order to the absolute power of God, because, as was touched upon above, God can supply all that dependence, because either it is dependence in the genus of efficient cause, or, if it is of formal or material cause, it is not as of something intrinsically composing, but as of something sustaining or actuating a thing distinct from itself, which is called a causality in a certain way extrinsic, all of which God can supply. But much more easily can he impede any natural emanation whatever, both because that cannot come about without the influx of God, which he can not give, and also because he can destroy any union whatever between those two things and by his own power alone effect or preserve each. And so in this I find neither a general repugnance nor a reasonable exception. For that which some make of attributes and essence either rests on no reason, or, if there is some apparent one, it rather proves that they are not distinct in the thing than that, the distinction being supposed, they cannot be separated.

23. An objection is met.—One could only press about the relations of union, for example of matter and form, which are really distinguished as matter and form themselves are, because they are in them adequately, and yet cannot be preserved disjoined, but only united. The answer is, first, that, if the discussion is of predicamental relations, perhaps they are not something real distinct in the thing from union of this kind, but only the mutual denomination of the things united among themselves; or, if we admit that those relations are positive real modes of the united parts, the answer is that they are not united among themselves, formally speaking, but are between the united parts; and therefore they cannot be preserved without their union, because they are founded in it, which is not against what has been said. But if the discussion is of the formal union itself, which is relative according to expression or transcendentally, it is not a thing distinct from the united parts, but their mode; and therefore it is not wonderful that such a mode cannot be preserved when the union itself is dissolved, since the mode and the union are the same.

24. Of distinct things one can be destroyed while the other remains in being.—But to the latter sense I answer that in that way too distinct things can be separated by the power of God, a threefold exception being applied, which can be comprehended under the one name of essential relationship or dependence. The reason of the general rule has almost already been touched upon, because, if things are really distinguished, they can also be really disjoined; but of things so disjoined it is not repugnant, nor does it involve a contradiction, that one be preserved by God without the other, because regularly there can only be between them effective dependence, not essential, and God can supply that.

25. The first exception, of God and creatures.—Whence the first exception is of creatures with respect to God; for they are things distinct from God, and God can be without them, but they cannot be without God; not only because God is per se necessary being, but on account of the essential dependence which they have on God; by reason of which, if per impossibile God were feigned not to be, creatures could not be without him. Which effective dependence so essential one creature does not have on another, especially if it has a true entity and reality, of which we are now speaking; for perhaps that which intrinsically is only a mode can essentially depend on that of which it is the mode; of which elsewhere, for it does not matter to the present point.

26. The second, of relation and term.—The second exception is of a relation and a really distinct term; for one cannot in the nature of things be mutually preserved without the other, although they do not have among themselves a proper real union, but a relationship. But the reason is that relation as such essentially and as it were formally depends on the term; and therefore it can neither arise nor be preserved without it; nor can this reason be proved further from elsewhere except that such is the essence of relation, as is now supposed from the common opinion; for we are speaking of real, purely predicamental relation.

27. The third, of the divine persons to one another.—The third example is of the divine persons, which, although they are really distinguished, cannot be separated among themselves in being, on account of the intrinsic and necessary connection which they have among themselves. Which can be reduced to the preceding head: for they are relative persons, and therefore one cannot be without the other. Likewise it arises from the union which they have in the essence through true and perfect identity with it, by reason of which it comes about first of all that any of those persons is simply necessary being, and so that it is absolutely and simply repugnant to it not to be; and consequently it comes about that none can be without the other; because, if none of those persons can not always be, neither will one be able to be when the other is not. Just as for this cause too, although creatures do not depend per se on the divine relations as such, they nevertheless cannot in the aforesaid way be separated in being from the same relations; because creatures cannot exist without those relations being supposed existing; for they are simply necessary being; and although on the side of the creature they are not per se necessary for its creation, nevertheless on the side of God they are necessary, because they are both per se in God and they themselves essentially are God. Finally, formally and sufficiently it comes from the union with the essence through identity; for, since any relation and the essence are among themselves altogether the same in the thing, neither can the essence be in reality without any relation, nor any relation without the essence. Whence it comes about that neither can one relation exist without the others. You will say that this argument is founded on that principle of Aristotle, Metaphysics IV, text 3: Things which are the same as one third thing are the same as each other, which has no place in the Trinity; otherwise it would be inferred not only that one relation cannot be without another, but also that it is the other. The answer is that it is not formally founded on that principle, but either on this, that things which are altogether the same in the thing cannot be so separated in the thing that one exists without the other; or certainly on this, that the essence and the divine relation are not the same in any way whatever, but so that the essence is of the essence of the relation and the relation is the intrinsic term of the essence; and therefore neither can the relation be without the essence essential to it, nor the essence without its intrinsic and simply necessary term. But of these enough for the occasion of this place.

Signs of the distinction of reason

28. Finally, from what has been said it can easily be understood how the distinction of reason can be recognized and discerned from the others. For first of all there is no difficulty about the distinction of reasoning reason, because, since this not only is not in the thing, but has no foundation in it either, it will be very easily known; especially since it does not even have a formal diversity in the objective concepts themselves, but only as it were a material one, through the repetition or comparison of the same concept, which, although it is one, we use as several, as Aristotle said, Metaphysics V, c. 9, text 16. But the distinction of reasoned reason requires first of all some formal diversity in the objective concepts, in which it differs from the other distinction of reasoning reason; but it agrees in this with the distinctions found in the thing. But in order that such a distinction be judged of reason and not of the thing, it is enough that, besides that distinction of concepts, no sign be found of all those posited for knowing modal or real distinction; for, since distinctions are not to be multiplied without cause, and the mere distinction of concepts does not suffice to infer a distinction of the thing, whenever with that distinction of concepts no other sign of greater distinction is adjoined, it is always to be judged a distinction of reason and not of the thing. From which I infer that, whenever it is certainly established that some two things which are united and conjoined in the thing are so distinct in objective concepts that in the thing and in the individual they are altogether inseparable, both mutually and non-mutually, both by absolute power and naturally, both as regards being and as regards real union among themselves, then there is a great and almost certain argument that they are not actually distinguished in the thing, but by reasoned reason. It is proved from what has been said, and first by induction; for Peter, man, animal and the other predicates, as they are in the thing in Peter, are not distinguished from the nature of the thing. Similarly in the intellect the superior and inferior reason, synderesis, memory and similar attributes of it do not signify things distinct in the thing, but only by reasoned reason; because that power is such that it comprehends all these in its adequate notion, nor are they in it in any way separable, even by the absolute power of God, as regards the faculty itself or first act, although as regards use they can be separated. Secondly, by the reason indicated, because things which are of this kind seem to be so inseparable for no other cause except because in the thing they have one and indivisible essence and entity; otherwise why could they not be separated at least by divine power, especially in creatures? Finally, because there there is no sufficient sign of greater distinction; therefore that distinction must be judged to be of reason, as long as a greater has not been established.

1. Aristotle treats of same and diverse, Metaphysics V, c. 9, and many place this among the distinct attributes of being, which we said above is comprehended under unity; and it is taken from Aristotle, Metaphysics X, text 9, cc. 5 and 6; and therefore at the end of these disputations on unity and multitude a few things are to be said of same and diverse, rather to explain the use of several words in this science than to add a new matter; for whatever pertains to the thing has been handed down in what we have said of unities and distinctions.

2. First, then, it is to be noticed that same can be said in two ways, namely relatively and negatively; or (as others speak) formally and fundamentally. For same formally taken seems to import a relation, in which it is most of all distinguished from unity; but negatively that is called the same which is not diverse or distinct from something; in which way it differs almost nothing from one, except that one expresses the negation of division in itself, but same expresses the negation of division from itself, or from that with which the being is said to be the same; on account of which Aristotle said, Metaphysics V, c. 9, text 16, that identity is a certain unity of being. And it is declared in that identity by which someone is said to be the same as himself; for, if this is taken relatively and formally, it expresses only a relation of reason, as is taken from Aristotle above, and it is the certain and common opinion, because there cannot be a real relation of the same thing to itself, because there must be a true opposition between relation and term, which cannot be of the same thing to itself; yet in this way, or formally, someone will not be said to be the same as himself, that is, to be referred to himself by such a relation, except when he is so conceived or compared through the intellect. But without any comparison or feigning of the intellect of this kind someone is said to be the same as himself fundamentally or negatively, because he is not diverse or divided from himself. And in this latter way identity can be numbered among the attributes of being, although that negation, as we were saying above, can be attributed not only to true being but also to feigned, and not only to being per se but also to any aggregate of beings or multitude and number; for any number whatever is the same as itself, as is one or unity. In another sense Scotus distinguished identity into absolute and relative, as Hervaeus reports, Quodlibet IV, q. 2; and Soncinas, Metaphysics X, q. 3; Javellus, q. 7; he calls absolute identity that by which one thing is said to be the same as itself, because there a respect to another thing is not implied; but he calls relative identity that by which one thing is said to be the same as another. And Scotus wishes, as the said authors report, that these two identities are distinct in reality, and in this they attack him. And indeed, if respective identity is taken between things distinct only by reasoned reason, as are man and Peter, that opinion is deservedly disproved, because the identity of Peter to himself, or to man or animal, do not differ in the thing, but as greater and lesser according to reason; otherwise the extremes themselves would have to be distinguished in the thing; but if respective identity is taken between things really distinct, and so the identity by which Peter is the same as himself is compared with that by which he is the same as Paul, then they can be called identities diverse in reality, since one is of the thing, the other of reason; but about names there is no need to care, since the thing is established.

3. Secondly it is to be observed from Aristotle above that identity is sometimes considered in some thing in itself, or with respect to itself; but sometimes in many compared among themselves, or in one thing compared with another. In the former way Peter is said to be the same in number with himself. But in the latter way he is the same in species with Paul, or the same in genus with the lion. And in this way Aristotle said, Metaphysics V, c. 9, that those things are the same which are one in something, either in genus, or in species, or in some analogous notion. The former identity, if it is considered as regards the negation or foundation, is identity simply, as also unity, because it is real identity; but in the respective notion it is only in a certain respect, because the relation of identity to itself is not real but of reason. But conversely the identity of several distinct things in a common notion (for we are speaking of creatures, to omit the identity of the three divine persons in one essence in number), as regards the foundation and as regards the negation of division, is only identity in a certain respect, or rather is a certain likeness, because it is only a unity of reason, as was shown above; but as regards the relation of identity this identity is thought to be simply so, because this relation, since it is between distinct things, is real according to the common conception of relations, of which we shall see below. And these indeed, as regards the thing, are general; but as regards the use of words, it is to be observed that this agreement of several things in a common notion has retained in substances the name of identity, simply speaking, from the accommodation of usage and as it were by antonomasia; but in qualities it is called likeness, in quantity equality, although this word signifies agreement not only in essential notion but also in magnitude; yet in all these, as there is the same mode of unity, so also the same formal notion of identity; and so all these are comprehended under same and diverse as they are taken transcendentally and attributed to being.

4. As many kinds of identity as of distinction.—Thirdly it is to be observed that, since same is said through the negation of division, either from itself, if one is said to be the same as himself, or between some two things, if they are said to be the same, as many modes of division or distinction as there are, so many modes of identity there can be, according to that saying: In as many ways as one of opposites is said, in so many can the other also be said. Whence it comes about that some things can be the same in thing, in mode and in reasoned reason; for by reasoning reason there is nothing which cannot be distinguished from itself, if it is in some way compared to itself; for if it is in no way conceived as several, it will now in no way be some things, but only something; whence Aristotle in the place cited says that identity is a certain unity either of several things, or when one uses one thing as several. But some things are the same in thing and in mode, yet not in reason; others can be the same according to the thing, yet not according to the mode; others finally are in no way the same according to the thing, but only according to reason. And hence it is understood, first, how same and diverse are opposed among themselves; for they are opposed first of all with respect to the same thing, not with respect to diverse ones, because they are opposed after the manner of relatives. Next they are opposed as compared to the same kind of distinction or division. Because a negation will not be opposed to an affirmation unless it is of the same according to the same; but these are opposed in so far as one includes the negation of the other; therefore to be the same in thing excludes to be really diverse, yet not to be diverse modally or by reason. And conversely, to be the same by reason does not exclude to be really distinct or diverse, because reason, as it distinguishes by concepts things which are the same in the thing, so conversely unites by a concept things which are diverse in the thing, as is evident from what was said above of universal unity.

5. But if you object that, although not every identity infers the negation of every diversity, nevertheless a greater identity seems to infer the negation of a greater diversity, as, if some things are modally the same, it is inferred not only that they are not modally diverse but also that they are not really diverse; but identity of reason seems to be the greatest; therefore modal and real identity is rightly inferred from it. The answer is that there is an equivocation in identity of reason; for it is not always the greatest; for there is a certain identity of reason which reason does not make but only conceives; and this is the greatest, because it supposes not only the actual negation of distinction in the thing but also the negation of a foundation or of virtual distinction; but there is another identity of reason which reason makes up, and this is not the greatest; indeed it is only in a certain respect, because it does not suppose in the thing identity simply, but only a foundation of likeness or agreement; and therefore this unity does not exclude diversity simply or according to the thing.

6. What to be distinguished, to differ and to be diverse are, and how they are compared among themselves.—But here it is necessary to beware of the equivocation of these terms, to be distinguished, to differ and to be diverse; for Aristotle says, Metaphysics V, c. 9, and Book X, c. 5, that to differ and to be diverse are not the same; for those things are said to differ which agree in something and are distinguished in something else; but those things too are said to be diverse which agree in nothing; whence to be diverse seems to be something superior to to differ, as the same Aristotle says, Book IV, c. 2. And in this breadth to be diverse is taken here; but to be distinct is also taken for the same as to be diverse; although in another acceptation, and one quite customary, to be distinct seems to express only the negation of real identity, but to be diverse seems also to add the negation of likeness and agreement, as one image is said to be distinct from another, however similar they are among themselves; whereas, when it is said to be diverse, not only this seems to be signified, but also that it is dissimilar or less perfect. But these, as I said, pertain only to the signification of words from the accommodation of usage, for of the thing it is sufficiently evident. In order, then, that same and diverse be opposed, they must be taken with proportion and with respect to the same thing, and in this way they include an immediate opposition, as one and many, as Aristotle said, Metaphysics IV, c. 2, because one includes the negation of the other.

7. And hence it is also evident how every being is the same or diverse, as Aristotle expressly says, Metaphysics X, c. 5, of which Soncinas says much there, qq. 5 and 6; Javellus, qq. 7 and 8; but it is an easy matter. For if these are taken relatively, it is not necessary that they belong to every being, because neither is a relation of reason necessary, as is self-evident, nor does one being always require another to which it is really referred by a real relation of identity or diversity, as is evident in God; for in the creature, because it depends essentially on God, there will always be a real relation of diversity or distinction, if such a relation is real. But if we speak (as it is necessary to speak truly) of fundamental or negative identity, or with respect to diverse things, every being is the same as itself and is diverse from every other, whether existing or possible, or even from feigned or imaginary being, because it can be denied of any of these; according to which sense many say that something is an attribute of being, because it signifies only division from every other. But with respect to the same thing, every being is the same as or diverse from it, if they are taken proportionately, for so they include a contradiction; but otherwise if the modes of identity and diversity are varied, as is sufficiently evident from what has been said. You will say: man and animal are neither the same nor diverse, because they are neither of the same genus or species, nor diverse, because they neither agree in the ultimate difference, and so cannot be of the same species, nor do they have opposite ultimate differences so as to be able to differ in species. The answer is that same and diverse with respect to the same thing are immediately opposed if they are taken as negatively or privatively opposed, but not as it were contrarily; as in the case proposed, if to be diverse in species is taken as it were only negatively, genus and species, or man and animal, can be said to be diverse in lowest species, because they are not constituted by the same ultimate difference. But if diverse in species is taken as it were positively and contrarily, then they are neither the same in species nor differ in species; and in similar proportion they are neither the same in genus nor diverse, but negatively they do not agree immediately in the same genus, and so can be said to be not of the same genus. When, therefore, these are said to be immediately opposed, the other extreme is to be taken negatively. Hence too to be opposed to another is thought to be an attribute of being, not indeed by relative opposition, which requires each extreme, but by fundamental opposition, in so far as every being has in itself some notion, difference or essence which excludes from it every other opposed or repugnant one. But this is to be understood either of opposition broadly taken, as it includes not only the four kinds posited by Aristotle in the Categories and in Books V and X of the Metaphysics, but also any repugnance whatever; or certainly it can be understood of the foundation of opposition, which at least suffices for contradiction with respect to any other whatever; and in this way nothing more is explained by the name of opposition than by the name of diversity. And so this property of being has been sufficiently declared.

8. Exposition of an Aristotelian pronouncement.—Finally it can be gathered from what has been said how that axiom which Aristotle posited, Metaphysics IV, is to be understood: Whatever things are the same as one third thing are the same as each other; for it is to be understood with proportion; for if they are the same in thing as one third thing, in a similar way they will be the same in thing as each other, but they will be able to be diverse in reason; but if they are the same in thing and reason as one third thing, they will in the same way be the same as each other. But this principle holds simply in creatures and in finite things; but in an infinite thing, such as is the divine essence, that maxim is not verified absolutely speaking, because on account of its infinity it can be the same as opposite relations which on account of their opposition cannot be the same among themselves except only in essence; of which elsewhere.