Disputationes metaphysicae

1. We have explained what universal unity is and how it belongs to things; it remains that we declare the various modes of this unity or universality, so that it may also be evident hence what difference there is in this between the metaphysician and the dialectician, and by what reason universals are to be distinguished or multiplied by each.

The first division

2. What the universal in causing is.—What in representing.—First, then, the universal is wont to be divided into the universal in causing, in representing, in being and in predicating. But this division does not matter to the present purpose as regards the first two members. For the cause which is called universal because it can produce various effects is a certain singular thing, as God, the heaven, etc.; whence it has no other unity except real, singular or numerical unity; but it is called as it were universal in object, because its power extends to several effects; just as the intellect and the will are wont to be called universal powers objectively, because they are concerned with all beings; and the common sense too, with respect to the external senses, can be called universal in the same way, although in itself it is one and singular. And the same must be said of the universal in signifying or representing, whether it is taken in names which are called by the dialecticians common terms, or in intelligible species, or in formal concepts, or finally in any image whatever, by whatever reason it is feigned to represent many uniformly; for whatever is a representing thing of this kind is in itself one singular individual, and is called universal only on the side of the object, because it signifies or represents many. But the third universal, which is called in being, either is none, or in the thing coincides with the fourth and differs only in name and in a relationship of reason. For if the universal in being is called that which in the thing itself is universal, such a universal is none, as we have declared; but if it is that which has some foundation in the thing, yet is conceived through the intellect as something one existing in many, and so is made a universal in being, this very thing is the universal in predicating; for it can therefore be predicated of many because it is in them through some identity, as we have declared. But by reason of the former relationship in order to being it is properly called universal; but by reason of the latter relationship in order to predication it is called predicable. Whence it is wont to be said by the dialecticians that to be predicable is as it were an attribute or property of the universal.

The second division

3. What the metaphysical universal is.—What the physical universal is.—Hence, secondly, the universal is wont to be divided into the metaphysical, physical and logical universal, which by other names can be called the universal before the thing, in the thing, and after the thing. The metaphysical universal would most properly be so called if there were some universal separated in reality from the individuals; for in reality it would most of all abstract from every change and contraction; but of things so abstracted the metaphysician chiefly considers. And therefore Aristotle in these books of the Metaphysics, especially VII, inquires accurately about this universal and shows that in truth there is none; but that this metaphysical universal is to be distinguished from them not in the thing but by reason only. Again, the physical universal can be called the universal nature itself as it exists in things; and in this way the universal is not taken formally as it is universal, but only materially for the nature, which can be abstracted and denominated universal. But this universal is called physical because, since it is contracted in the singular things themselves, it is subject to change and to sensible accidents, from which physical consideration begins. Although this universal is not outside metaphysical consideration, both because it can also be found in immaterial things and in those abstracting from matter according to being; and also because this universal requires some formal unity, the consideration of which pertains to the metaphysician. Indeed even the dialectician considers this universal in some way, not per se on account of the natures themselves so universal, but only in so far as it is the remote foundation and as it were the subject of the intention of universality.

4. What the logical universal is.—But the universal in act itself, which arises through the operation of the intellect, is called the logical universal; for, because it is the function of the dialectician to direct the operations of the intellect in order to making definitions, divisions and argumentations or demonstrations rightly and orderly, which are chiefly handed down of things universally conceived and compared and coordinated among themselves, it is therefore necessary that he consider the intentions of reason or the denominations arising thence; although this is not so proper to the dialectician that it cannot more properly and per se pertain to the metaphysician, and in some way also to the physicist. For the latter, disputing about the soul, consequently treats of the intellect and of its acts and object; whence it is necessary that he consider the universal in so far as it is universal, both because it is in some way the proper object of the intellect, and also because it arises through abstraction or comparison, which are proper operations of the intellect. But it pertains most of all to the metaphysician; for, as we saw above, it pertains to him to distinguish beings of reason from real ones, and to declare what essence or entity they have; which is very foreign and extrinsic to the dialectical purpose, but he only touches upon these in passing, so that he may be able to order the works of the intellect themselves and reduce them to a certain method and art. But if we wish to attribute to each what is proper to him, the metaphysician considers the proper notion of the universal, in so far as it is one in many, and whatever follows upon it by reason of which it imitates the nature of being and of essence and its properties. But the dialectician per se considers only the notion of the predicable, not indeed considering its quiddity or entity, but only what it is necessary to know for making definitions or predications. As regards the present point, then, and the fitting use of words, let us call every universal in act, under the notion of universal, metaphysical; but under the notion of predicable let it be called dialectical.

The third division into five universals

5. Thirdly, and what pertains most to the matter, the universal is wont to be divided into those five members which Porphyry distinguished in the predicables, namely genus, species, difference, property and accident. Of the quality and sufficiency of this division it is not now in my mind to dispute; for this cannot fittingly be done without an exact knowledge of the individual predicables; but to discourse of the individual predicables would be foreign to our purpose; we hope, however, God helping, to treat of each matter in its proper place. Only, then, is to be recalled that distinction given above of the universal conceived after the manner of something absolute, such as arises through the simple abstractive or prescissive conception of the intellect, and the universal related or compared to its inferiors. It can be asked, then, how this division is to be understood, or of what universal, or conceived under what notion, absolute, namely, or respective, metaphysical or logical. And there can be two modes of answering. The former is that the logical universal, as respective of reason, is divided there, and not the metaphysical universal, or as precisely abstracted. Because in it as such those five members do not seem always and universally to be able to be fittingly distinguished. For, although sometimes in diverse natures or concepts they are easily distinguished, as in man, animal, etc., nevertheless in others they cannot be distinguished, stopping at the absolute concept, until a relation or comparison is made to diverse things. So white, for example, abstractly conceived, is a certain universal; yet, stopping at that abstraction, it cannot be denominated a predicable accident rather than a species, because with respect to diverse things it is capable of each relationship; whence, until comparison is made to diverse things, that twofold notion cannot be distinguished in that universal. Something similar can be considered in property, which with respect to diverse things can have the notion of property and of species; indeed even a generic nature, even substantial, although with respect to species it is denominated genus, nevertheless with respect to its proper individuals (according to the probable opinion of many) has the notion of species. Indeed even of the difference itself it is probable that, although with respect to the species or its individuals it constitutes a proper universal, nevertheless with respect to inferior differences formally taken it constitutes another notion of predication or is reduced to the predicable of species; for rational is predicated of this rational, for example, formally taken, not in quale but in quid, which I do not care to discuss and examine further here. Only, then, the lowest species of a substantial or accidental nature taken in the abstract is altogether incapable of another universal relationship, and does not have other inferiors to which it could be compared besides the individuals, whose integral quiddity it contains. That division, therefore, does not seem to have place in the universal in so far as it arises precisely through abstraction.

6. But if you ask of what kind that universal is to be called, it can be answered that the notion of the universal under that consideration consists only in prescissive separation from singulars, from which arises a certain unity of reason with aptitude to many, which under this precise consideration is of the same notion in any universal whatever; and therefore the universal as such is not divided further, but retains only the notion of universal until it is compared with its inferiors and receives various denominations in order to diverse things. And so under this notion the universal is not compared to the aforesaid members as a genus to differences, but rather as a subject to accidents, or as a proximate foundation to the various relations by which it can be denominated. Whence, when it is wont to be said by the dialecticians that the universal or predicable is a genus to the five universals or predicables, it is to be taken formally and with due proportion, as relative conceived in common.

7. The sufficiency of the five predicables.—But considering the universal as it is compared to its inferiors, it is rightly divided by those five members, the reason of which division can be briefly assigned thus. For what is one in many, or predicable of many, can express something essential to them or something outside the essence; again, if it is essential, it either expresses the whole essence, and so is the specific universal, which can only be common to individuals differing in number, because only individuals of this kind can agree in the whole essence; or it expresses only part of the essence; and this can happen in two ways. First, that it be as it were something material and potential, and so the universal of genus is constituted, which, as such, necessarily regards diverse species, because that agreement in generic nature which is the foundation of this universality is neither in the whole essence of the thing nor in its ultimate formal constitutive and determinative, but in a certain potential grade determinable through several differences. Secondly, it can happen that the universal expresses part of the essence after the manner of a form constituting its formal unity, and so the universal of difference is constituted, and it is said to be predicated in quale quid, because it is related after the manner of a form constituting the quiddity. Which mode of universality and predication can sometimes be common to things differing in species, but sometimes to things differing only in number, as is evident in ultimate and subaltern differences. And the reason is that such a mode of constitution through essential difference neither per se excludes further differences also essentially constituting and distinguishing specific essences, nor per se requires them; whence, because this is accidental to such a universal, it also happens to it that the inferiors in which it is found differ in species or in number. But how these are to be accommodated to what Porphyry taught in the chapter on Difference, and what he himself thought about this, is to be remitted to dialectical commentaries. Finally, if the universal or predicable is outside the essence, it can either be per se connected with the essence and flowing from it, and this is called property; or, if it is in no way per se connected with the essence, but contingent and altogether accidentally belonging, it is called accident, the fifth predicable.

8. But although both property and accident are forms of those things of which they are predicated, they are nevertheless to be taken not in the abstract but in the concrete, in order that they may be able to assume the notion of such universals, because otherwise they are not apt to be said of their inferiors in such a way. Rather, if such forms are conceived in the abstract, they do not regard their subjects with that relationship with which the universal regards its inferiors, but in the way in which an act regards the potency which it can inform; in order, then, that these can be compared to such inferiors under such a notion and relationship of universals, they must be conceived in the concrete after the manner of a common whole which is in the inferiors subject to it and can truly be predicated of them in recto. Which can be observed in all universals too, for in all it is true that concretes can be predicated only of concretes, and consequently only with respect to them can have the notion of universals. For this cause it is wont to be said that the universal does not regard nor is predicated of its inferiors except after the manner of a whole; for, although we have said that genus and difference formally do not express the whole essence but a metaphysical part, nevertheless, in order that they may have the notion of universals, it is necessary that they be conceived after the manner of a whole, and therefore they must be taken in the concrete, so that they express the whole thing at least implicitly, and in so far as they at least in potency include several inferiors; in which way Porphyry said that the genus is a whole (namely potential) with respect to the species; and Aristotle, Physics I, c. 1, said that the universal is a certain whole. But how substantial abstracts participate the notion of universals, and how universal predication has place in them, we shall touch upon in sect. 10 of this disputation.

9. Some objections are met.—Various objections occurred in this place, which are wont to be made against the sufficiency of this division so expounded, which are proper to the dialecticians; and therefore I only notice that this division can be thought not aptly handed down on a twofold title. First, because in it not all the ultimate notions of universals are enumerated, for difference could be divided into several, and similarly property, etc. Or, if all these are said to be comprehended under the general notions of difference or property, from another side the division will seem inept or superfluous, because it could be reduced to fewer general members; for genus and species seem to agree among themselves no less than general and special difference.

10. Why difference is contained in one predicable.—But this difficulty is of no moment, because, whether those members are ultimate and specific or general, nevertheless the division will be sufficient at least on this head, because no other member is brought forward which is not contained under those enumerated. And although we grant that some members are general and some specific, the division will not on that account be inept; for it is not necessary that the members of a division be equal, or equally abstract and common; for it is enough that they be contained under the thing divided and be in some way opposed and exhaust it; but that some are enumerated under a more common and others under a less common notion is accidental, and for peculiar causes can sometimes be expedient, as perhaps was done in the present case, because the distinction of those five members was necessary and sufficed for coordinating the predicaments and making definitions and the other functions of the dialecticians for which that division was invented. It can finally be added that it is not necessary to admit that not all those members in the notion of universal and predicable are specific and ultimate. Because for the proper relation of the universal and its essential difference it matters nothing that the inferiors differ more or less among themselves, provided that the relationship of the superior to them is of the same mode and notion; but this so happens in ultimate or subaltern differences. And the reason is the same of property and accident, but not of genus and species compared among themselves, as can be sufficiently evident from the reason adduced to explain the sufficiency of the division; for to explain and discuss these more fully is not of our purpose.

11. On the second head the aforesaid division can seem insufficient, because there seem to be certain other universals which are in no way comprehended under these; but these are of a twofold kind: some are transcendentals, which are superior to species and genera, which, since they have one objective concept, as was said above, and can be in many and predicated of them, seem to lack nothing to be called universals. Whence Aristotle, Metaphysics IV, text 10, says that being and one are most universal.

12. Why transcendentals are not universals.—But it can be answered that transcendentals of this kind are not properly and simply universals, although sometimes they are so called broadly and in a certain respect, by the reason by which everything which is in some way one and common to many can be called universal. Nevertheless, because these are analogous, they either do not have unity simply, or do not regard many equally; and therefore on this side they are excluded from the proper notion and division of the universal, which is to be understood to be divided in that partition. Whence Aristotle, Ethics I, c. 6, expressly requires for the notion of universal that it be univocal; and in Metaphysics IV, c. 2, he in this way denies that being and one are universals. But if you press that it is not repugnant that there be some common objective concepts, essential to several predicaments, and univocal, and consequently universal, and not generic, because to many predicaments no genus is common, such as many think is the concept of accident, or the concept of successive being and the like, which they consequently say are not genera but after the manner of transcendentals, the answer is briefly that either there are no such univocal predicates (as many hold), or certainly, if there are any, they are reduced to genus, because in the notion of universal and in the mode of essential predication in quid incompletely, and not predicating the whole essence of the thing, they agree with it; yet they differ from proper genus, because they do not have proper differences by which they are contracted; and therefore they serve neither for definitions nor for coordinating the predicaments; of which matter a more fitting place for speaking will occur below, when we speak of the division of accident into nine predicaments.

13. Whether the vague individual is a universal.—But on the other side, from the other extreme, there seem to be certain common predicates as it were inferior to the lowest species and intermediate between it and the individual determinate singulars, such as Cajetan thought, in the chapter on Species, is the vague individual; and a more probable example can be adduced of the common notion of person or supposit, or of the very notion of individual. To which difficulty some deny that these predicates are univocal. But this is incredible, for in truth to be a person is said univocally of any man whatever, and to be first substance is said univocally of any first substance whatever; for what reason of analogy or equivocation can be thought out in these predicates? Others say that they are contained under the universal of species, for the notion of person is compared as specific to this and that person, and the notion of individual to this or that individual as such. But, although perhaps this can be defended formally, by comparing, for example, the notion of person to this person as such, it does not seem true if the comparison is made to this man as such, because as such it is not a quidditative predicate of him. Which can be taken from St. Thomas, I, q. 30, a. 4, ad 3. And this is enough to constitute a distinct universal according to relation, as it is now considered by us. Just as risible too is a species with respect to this and that risible thing as such, and nevertheless with respect to this or that man as such constitutes a new predicable, because under that notion it is not predicated essentially.

14. It seems it must be said, then, that individual as such, with respect to several individuals, does not constitute a new universal, because formally it expresses nothing other than the transcendental unity of each entity as it exists in the thing; and so it is excluded, as are the other transcendental predicates. Especially because, if it is taken according to the positive thing which it expresses, it adds nothing over being; but if it is taken according to what it formally adds, that is only a certain negation. Whence between individuals of the same species, for example two men, considering precisely their individual essences, besides the specific agreement there is no other in the notion of individual, except in so far as they agree in the notion of undivided being, which is only a transcendental agreement. But the notion of person or supposit I think can be reduced to the predicable of property, in so far as that mode by which it is constituted, namely personality or subsistence, is not essential, but per se accompanying the essence, as actually to inhere can be called a certain property of accident. Nor does it matter that that mode of personality or subsistence is not in its entity an accidental property but a substantial mode; because this does not vary the mode of universality or predication; just as to have a head, to be actually two-footed, is called an accident of the fifth predicable, although the thing from which it is taken is not an accident but substance, because the mode of predication is accidental and contingent; but of these let this be enough.

15. Finally we can add another mode of explaining that division of the absolute universal, or in so far as it arises through the abstractive consideration of the intellect, in which, although the aforesaid members cannot be altogether distinguished according to various relations to inferiors, as the discourse made above shows, they can nevertheless be distinguished in some way in order to metaphysical composition. So that genus is called that which after the manner of potency is apt to constitute the species; difference, that which after the manner of form or act contracts and divides the genus and constitutes the species; but species will be that which is composed of these; property, that which happens per se to the species; accident, that which is contingently in the individuals, or in the species by reason of the individuals. And in this way the universal is not so much divided according to diverse notions of universality as according to the diverse relationships of the universals themselves among themselves. Yet so that the universal of species is as it were chief, total and absolute; but the others express some as it were partial or formal relationship to the species itself, as has been declared. Whence it is also probable that the universal under this notion is not said equally primarily and univocally of these universals, but first of those which are essential, then of the others which are outside the essence, and that among the former the universal of species is chief; on account of which also Plato, as Aristotle sometimes indicates, posited ideas of species only. It is not, however, necessary to understand analogy among species, genus and difference in the notion of universal, because all express essential agreement and unity, and have the same mode of identity with respect to those from which they are abstracted, which happens otherwise in property and accident. And this consideration of universals according to their proper notions, and according as they are distinguished or compared among themselves, contributes most of all to knowing and defining the essences of things, and therefore is most necessary for the metaphysical purpose. But since property and accident are outside the essences of things, nothing occurs to be considered of them in so far as they are universals, besides the intentions and relations of reason which are declared by the dialecticians in order to predications; and what we shall say below in its place of the proper and real essence of accident and its distinction from substance, and of the various relationships which it has to substance, among which one can be intrinsic emanation, from which it has that it is named property; it remains, then, to speak of the other three universals, genus, species, difference, how they are distinguished in things and what principle and foundation they have in them.